Apollo Lunar Surface Journal


Return to the LM and Closeout Day 6: From the Snowman to Docking (AFJ)


Return to Orbit

Corrected Transcript and Commentary Copyright © 1995-2015 by Eric M. Jones.
All rights reserved.
MP3 audio clips by Ken Glover.
Last revised 20 March 2015.


MP3 Audio Clip ( 31 min 02 sec )

135:26:37 Conrad: Now, we don't have anything left but a little rendezvous. (Sounding like someone about to enter a haunted house) Ha, ha, ha, ha.

135:26:41 Bean: Ascent and rendezvous, babes. (Pete chuckles; Pause)

135:26:54 Conrad: Give me your purge valve thing, I'll put it in the TSB (Temporary Storage Bag).

[The TSB is more usually known as the purse and hangs under Panel 5 in front of Pete. Al calls it the "purse" at 115:16:22.]
135:26:57 Bean: Wait a minute; let me give you my purge valve.

135:26:58 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

135:27:08 Bean: You got it. (Pause)

135:27:16 Conrad: (Laughing) This suit stuff has...

135:27:19 Bean: (Finishing the thought)...got all that dirt on it. I think it...Is this mine? (Pause)

135:27:24 Bean: There you go, Pete.

135:27:26 Conrad: I can't turn it. Can you get it open?

135:27:27 Bean: Sure, sure. (Garbled) purge valve because it has to rotate with the other...Got your...

135:27:32 Conrad: Yeah. If I can find it. (Long Pause) (Garbled)

135:27:55 Bean: I know.

135:27:58 Conrad: It's here somewhere.

135:27:59 Bean: "Descent H2O valve open."

135:28:00 Conrad: I'll turn it open. (Pause)

135:28:09 Bean: "Purge valve and OPS O2 hose; stow purge valves in TSB (Temporary Stowage Bag."

135:28:15 Conrad: All right, just threw it in there, I'll find the ball.

[The purge valves are activated by, first, grabbing a red ball at the end of a short cord and pulling to remove a locking pin. The red ball is sometimes referred to as the Red Apple and can be seen just below Buzz Aldrin's left hand in 40-5903.]
135:28:18 Bean: Oh, may have thrown it over. (Chuckles) May be behind you. (Pause)
[Al may have tried to toss his purge valve's 'red-apple' into the TSB ( better known as the 'purse' and missed.]
135:28:24 Conrad: These things (the OPS oxygen hose or his gloves) won't come undone!

135:28:26 Bean: Bet they've got a lot of that dust on them.

135:28:28 Conrad: Here. Would you turn this, please?

135:28:29 Bean: Yes, I sure will. (Pause) There you go.

135:28:36 Conrad: I don't understand why (garbled). Here.

135:28:39 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

135:28:43 Conrad: They're sticking.

135:28:44 Bean: Okay. "Connect the LM (O2) hoses. Red to red; blue to blue. Suit Isolation (Valve), both suits." So I'll hand you your hoses, Pete.

135:28:57 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

135:29:02 Bean: So far, we haven't touched one of those circuit breakers as far as I can tell. (Garbled) around in here. (Pause)

[Although there isn't much room in the cabin and they have been constantly turning to reach circuit breakers, valves, and switches, they haven't bumped anything hard enough with a PLSS to change a setting or break anything off. Other crews weren't so lucky, but there was never any unrecoverable situation. The frequent checks of circuit breaker and switch settings prevented any such change from going long without notice.]
135:29:10 Bean: There's your (LM) hoses, Pete. Got them?

135:29:13 Conrad: Yeah.

135:29:14 Bean: Here's mine. (Long Pause) Okey-dokey. (Long Pause) "Red to red; blue to blue; (suit) isolation (valves) both to Suit Flow."

135:29:57 Conrad: Okay, would you turn mine on? Thank you.

135:30:02 Bean: You've got it.

135:30:04 Conrad: Does that (flow of LM oxygen) feel good!

135:30:06 Bean: Okay. Let's take the "PLSS (LCG water) pump, Off; and (PLSS) fan Off"; it (the LM O2)'s backpressuring in your fan. (Pause) Okay, that's good. "Disconnect PLSS H2O from PGA. Connect LM H2O." I'll get yours and you get mine. (Pause) Lift up your RCU a little bit, Pete (so that he can see the connectors better). RCU. There you go. (Pause) That did it. (Pause)

135:30:50 Conrad: Okay?

135:30:51 Bean: Okay.

135:30:52 Conrad: "(LM) LCG Pump (circuit breaker), In (that is, Closed)."

135:30:54 Bean: Okay. We're going to get cooler, probably. (Pause) It's in. "PLSS mode, both of them O, (that is) Off."

[They have turned off their RCUs and won't be able to talk to Houston until they connect to the LM comm system. When they come back up on comm, they will be on Sur-93.]
135:31:01 Conrad (on-board): Okay. Hello there. (Long Pause)

135:32:09 Bean (on-board): Okay, turn your VHF A, Off, and B, Off.

135:32:12 Conrad (on-board): A, Off, and B is Off.

135:32:13 Bean (on-board): Mode, ICS/Push-to-Talk.

135:32:15 Conrad (on-board): ICS/Push-to-Talk.

135:32:19 Bean (on-board): Okay. Relay, Off.

135:32:20 Conrad (on-board): My Relay is Off.

135:32:21 Bean (on-board): You're out of VOX, right?

135:32:22 Conrad (on-board): Yes, sir.

135:32:23 Bean (on-board): Okay.

135:32:24 Conrad (on-board): Hello, Houston. How do you read?

135:32:28 Bean (on-board): Comm, okay? VHF, Off, Off.

135:32:35 Gibson: Intrepid, Houston.

135:32:36 Conrad: Houston, Intrepid hooked up on the Intrepid system. How do you read?

135:32:41 Bean (on-board): They never told us to turn our tape recorder on.

135:32:42 Gibson: We read you loud and clear, Pete, and we're standing by to give you any help on the stowage you may need. And, when you get down to it, we also have some good words for you on how to stow the (LM) TV camera.

135:32:58 Conrad: Okay, we'll wait for a while. Let us get through our checklist, please.

135:33:02 Gibson: Roger.

[Very Long Comm Break. They are at the top left-hand column of Surface 93. Their next transmission will concern steps in the middle of the right-hand column. During this break, they are doffing their RCUs, PLSSs and OPSs. At the top of the right-hand column, they will perform an OPS check, making sure that both are working before jettisoning the PLSSs. They will keep the OPSs so that, in the unlikely case that they are unable to dock with Yankee Clipper, they can make an emergency spacewalk between the two spacecraft. Had either of the OPSs failed the check, they would have kept a PLSS in its place.]
135:43:47 Conrad: Hello, Houston; Intrepid.

135:43:51 Gibson: Intrepid; Houston. Go ahead.

135:43:54 Conrad: Roger. Are we a little bit early, or do you want me to go ahead with the checklist and put on my rendezvous radar operate heater circuit breaker (in order to warm up the electronics)?

135:44:03 Gibson: Stand by, Pete. (Long Pause) Pete, we show that you are ahead. You can go ahead and complete that step, and we'll be back with you on any items which we would like you to hold on (that is, delay execution).

135:45:38 Conrad: Okay. Very good. I'll go ahead and put that in, and we're going to go ahead with our jettison here shortly.

135:45:48 Gibson: Roger.

[Very Long Comm Break.]

MP3 Audio Clip ( 26 min 41 sec )

[An extended conversation between Gibson and Gordon is omitted from the transcript but can be found on the MP3 audio clip linked immediately above. It concerns engineering matters and observations Gordon is to make of a reported transient brightening - between the central peak and the west wall - in the Crater Alphonsus seen from Earth. When Gordon does take a look at Alphonsus, he sees nothing out of the ordinary. "I didn't see anything out there. There's a dark area in between the central peak and the west wall but I can't tell what it is. It's a little bit darker than the rest of the surrounding area. It's quite aways away (110 kilometers south of him) and I really can't see much down there."]

[After closing the circuit breaker, Pete and Al will doff their boots and, then are supposed to stow them in a jettison bag. During preparation of the ALSJ, I was under the impression that the boots had been brought back to Earth and that Al used his to texture his painting in later years. In a 1999 fax to Ulrich Lotzmann, Alan assures us both pairs of lunar boots are "still on the Moon". He uses duplicates to texture his paintings.]

[After removing their boots, Pete and Al will unload the ETB - note that "CSC" in the checklist is "Close-up Stereo Camera" - and stow the empty ETB in one of the jett bags. Then, they will unlock the hatch and, as per Sur-94, use up the remaining film on magazine AS12-48 by taking pictures out the window. These are AS12-48- 7153 to 7171. Dave Byrne has assembled a window pan.]

[Note that Pete and Al finished magazine 49 before going down into Surveyor Crater.]

[After finishing with the photos, they stow the magazines for return to Earth and then put the cameras and other unneeded gear in the disposable Left-hand Side Stowage Compartment (LHSSC) for jettison. Finally, they collect the remaining feedwater from the PLSSs and weigh it. At the top of Sur-95, they report the weights to Houston.]

MP3 Audio Clip ( 22 min 58 sec )

136:13:19 Conrad: Hello, Houston; Intrepid.

136:13:22 Gibson: Intrepid, Houston. Go ahead.

136:13:26 Conrad: Roger. Commander's feedwater remaining 0.32 kg.

136:13:36 Gibson: 0.32 kilograms.

136:13:41 Conrad: That's right, and we'll have the LMP's for you in just a minute.

136:13:46 Gibson: Roger.

[Long Comm Break]
136:17:14 Conrad: Houston, the LMP's water is 0.26.

136:17:19 Gibson: 0.26. (Long Pause)

136:17:34 Conrad: That's affirmative.

[Long Comm Break.]

[Now, they will put the water bags and the scale in the jettison bag, remove Pete's remaining forearm rest and put it in the jettison bag, and get the PLSSs in position. Then they will don their gloves and perform a pressure integrity check of the suits.]

136:27:25 Conrad: Houston, as soon as we get through our suit integrity check, we will be depressing the cabin for the jettison.

136:27:32 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid.

[Very Long Comm Break. During this comm break, they open the hatch, perform the jettison, close the hatch, and repressurize the cabin. Those procedures are on Sur-96. Houston can, of course, monitor their progress via telemetry from the spacecraft and the seismometer.]

[Bean, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "I think that one of the best decisions that we made was not taking the suits off at night. This allowed us to control our temperatures pretty well. We were always able either to turn on the LCG pump and get cool that way, or to turn on the vent flow. If we had had the suits opened up, I'm afraid that we would have had a lot more trouble with dust in the zippers, inside the suit, and inside the helmets. It was tough enough on just (keeping) the wrist rings and neck rings (clean). We tried to wipe them off before we put our equipment back on the next morning, but we did notice it was harder to put on. I didn't have any leak rate for all the pressure checks prior to launch (from Earth) and at other times, but during the last pressure check that we pulled (at jettison), I had a leak rate of something like two-tenths (psi pressure decrease) over the minute. So, the thing was leaking somewhere and it must have been around the neck and wrist rings, because those were the only openings that changed."]

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "My suit was the same way. I had about 0.15 over a minute, although I had very little on our first check prior to getting out (at the start of EVA-1)."]

[The J-mission crews reported the results of their pressure checks to Houston and the pressure decreases were typically 0.2 psi. On Apollo 14, Ed Mitchell inexplicably had a pressure decrease of 0.25 psi prior to their first EVA. Any decrease of less than 0.3 psi was deemed acceptable.]

MP3 Audio Clip ( 35 min 07 sec )

136:45:11 Gibson: Intrepid, Houston. Comm check.

136:45:18 Conrad: Loud and clear. The equipment's jettisoned. We are just cleaning up the cockpit. Sorry (for not reporting in).

[They are now on Sur-97.]
136:45:23 Gibson: Roger, Pete. We copy two impacts on the PSE during jettison.
[That is, the Passive Seismic Experiment recorded the impacts of both PLSSs.]
136:45:31 Conrad: That's PLSS 1 and PLSS 2.

136:45:36 Gibson: Roger.

136:45:38 Conrad: As a matter of fact, that may help you calibrate that thing, because I got a clean kick on both of them. In other words, when they left the hatch, they departed the hatch and free-fell all the way to the ground without touching the ladder or anything on the way.

136:46:01 Gibson: Okay. They pretty much went straight out...

136:46:02 Conrad: (Garbled) roughly did the same thing...

136:46:04 Gibson: ...on a ballistic right on down and hit the ground. Didn't arc up at all?

136:46:09 Conrad: That's right.

136:46:13 Gibson: Okay. Thank you.

[Comm Break. One can estimate the horizontal velocity Pete had to impart to get the PLSSs to clear the porch and that, plus the easily-calculated vertical velocity at impact, lets the experimenter estimate the force of the impacts. The Public Affairs commentator reports that Pete and Al's peak heart rates during the second EVA were between 165 and 170 beats per minute.]
136:48:28 Gibson: Intrepid; Houston. We're changing over sites in about 10 seconds (means minutes). We may be losing comm for a minute or two.

136:48:39 Conrad: Thank you.

[Long Comm Break]
136:52:22 Gibson: Intrepid; Houston. We have some words for you on the stowage of the TV and also the equipment which is put on the floor by the (plus) Z-27.
[The plus Z-27 bulkhead separates the front of the cabin from the back, just in front of the acent engine cover. The plus Z-27 bulkhead is also the front face of what is called the Midstep. Here, Ed is talking about putting gear at the back of the floor where the astronauts stand, in front of the base of the plus Z-27 bulkhead.]

[[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "The only discussions that I had heard were that we couldn't stack (rocks) on top of the OPSs because the OPS leg holders were designed only for the OPSs and that part of the structure wouldn't hold. But anything that we could stash on the floor behind them was okay as long as we kept it off (means 'not touching') the Z27 bulkhead&quot:]

136:52:34 Bean: (Simultaneous with Pete) Go ahead, Houston.

136:52:34 Conrad: Okay. We're right at that point (at the bottom of the left-hand column of Sur-97); we're just ready for you.

136:52:39 Gibson: Okay, Pete. And, first, you could fold the TV handle and stow it (the TV) in the LiOH canister bracket on the (back of the) engine cover, lens up. Secure the TV cable end to the camera, pad the camera with utility towels (which are stowed) in the upper boot bay. Replace the knurled knob hold-down, secure the camera with the utility straps. Wrap the straps around the lens and the knurled knobs.

136:53:13 Bean: Understand. (Pause)

136:53:24 Gibson: Intrepid, give me a call when you are ready for some information on the equipment to go by Z-27.

136:53:33 Bean: Okay. That'll be 10 (to) 15 minutes.

[Bean - "Z-27 is the forward bulkhead."]

[Conrad - "Yeah, that's were it went, right in front of the hatch. We weren't ever going to use the (forward) hatch again. Hopefully."]

[The plus Z-27 bulkhead separates the front the cabin from the back, just in front of the acent engine cover. The plus Z-27 bulkhead is also the front face of what is called the Midstep. Pete and Al have mis-remembered which bulkhead was the Z-27 - not surprising 22 years after the last time they were in a LM. It is possible that they did stow the equipment against the hatch but, since part of the reason for stowing gear in particular locations was to ensure that the LM center-of-mass was as close as possible to the thrust axis, this seems unlikely. I suspect that they did stow the gear at the base of the midstep.]

[Long Comm Break]

136:59:45 Gibson: Intrepid, Houston. You can expect lost Comm here for about 1 to 2 minutes. We have a handover.

136:59:54 Bean: Okay. 136:59:55 Conrad: Okay.

[Very Long Comm Break. This handover is from the Goldstone Station in California to the Honeysuckle Station in Australia.]
137:18:05 Conrad: Okay, Houston. Start talking to us about the gear you want us to tie down back of the OPSs.
[As can be inferred from this discussion with Ed Gibson and from the LM Lunar Launch Stowage list, the OPSs were secured to the floor just aft of the hatch, in the location occupied by the LMP PLSS during the landing and that additional gear and samples were stowed in a jettison bag which, in turn, was secured aft of the OPSs.]
137:18:16 Gibson: Roger, Pete. (Pause) Okay, first point there is to ensure that the (plus) Z-27 bulkhead is protected (from the gear in the jettison bag). You can use data books and towels for that purpose. We suggest, also, in tying down the equipment and rocks which you have in the bags there that goes on the floor next to the Z-27 by the OPS, that you use two additional strands of the utility straps. They will go from the top of the jettison bag to the ISA (Interim Stowage Assembly) attach fitting; that's the D ring on the midsection step. This will give you four strands total.

137:19:06 Bean: Say the last part again, Ed.

MP3 Audio Clip ( 46 min 18 sec ),
starting about one third of the way into Ed's next transmission.

137:19:09 Gibson: Okay. We suggest that you use two additional strands of the utility straps. Now, this would go from the top of the jettison bag to the ISA fitting; that's the D ring on the midsection step. This will give you a total of four strands. (Pause) Essentially what we're looking for here, Al, is to tie this thing down with as many strands as you can - at least four - so that in the docking we don't get this thing coming off the floor and busting the straps.

137:19:53 Bean: Understand.

[Comm Break]

[Conrad - "They were worried about keeping the c.g. (center of gravity) in a very narrow envelope for lift-off."]

[Jones - "So they cared about where things were stowed."]

[Bean - "Very much more so than, let's say, for landing. They cared then, but not as much. You could trim it out (that is, correct for a slight misalignment of the thrust vector and the center of gravity) with the descent stage engine but you couldn't with this one."]

137:21:16 Gibson: Yankee Clipper, Houston.

137:21:22 Gordon: Hello, Houston; Clipper here.

137:21:25 Gibson: Hello, Dick. Pete and Al are just finishing up the post-EVA, and it looks as though they're pretty far ahead. They have a little bit of time to sit back and relax. We have a map update for Rev 29 when you're ready to copy.

137:21:49 Gordon: (Faint) Okay, I'm ready to copy. Tell those guys to sit back and relax. Did a great job.

137:21:59 Gibson: Dick, say again. You're broken up.

137:22:04 Gordon: Roger. I'm ready to copy. Tell those guys they deserve a rest. They can sit back and relax. It's a pretty job.

137:22:11 Gibson: Roger. Will do. LOS, 138:32:34, 138:57:42, 139:18:49.

137:22:33 Gordon: Clipper copies.

137:22:35 Gibson: Roger, Dick. (Long Pause)

[The first of these numbers is Loss of Signal as Gordon disappears behind the Moon, and the third time is his re-appearance. The middle time may mark the completion of the orbit he's on, with the start of orbits marked at the point at which Apollo 12 first entered lunar orbit with its burn over the Farside.]
137:22:49 Gordon: Ed, it sounds like they didn't have any problems down there at all.

137:22:59 Gibson: Dick, that's affirmative. They ran into a few things; but, as they did yesterday, they overcame them. No problems. (Pause)

137:23:16 Gordon: I expect most of the problems are human. (Pause)

137:23:26 Gibson: Maybe so, Dick, but not many of them theirs. Dick, would you go back in your flight plan to 131:30? And we missed a crew status report at that point. (Long Pause)

137:23:55 Gordon: Okay. Says here I had 7 hours sleep, PRD (garbled) (Long Pause)

137:24:51 Gibson: Yankee Clipper; Houston. How do you read?

137:24:56 Gordon: Loud and clear. How me?

137:25:02 Gibson: Stand by, Dick. We still have a lot of garbling, and broken up.

[Very Long Comm Break]
137:38:34 Conrad: Houston, Intrepid. We have everything stowed, secured properly, and we're ready to start the launch countdown at the proper time. And, if you'll give us about 15 or 20 minutes to chow down here, we'll come back with you and have a little chitty chat about the EVA.
[Conrad - (Laughing) "Never give them a chance to tell you what to do!"]
137:38:58 Gibson: Roger, Pete. Sounds like a good plan. (Pause) And, Pete, you're still quite a bit ahead.
[Lift-off will come at 142:03, about 4 1/2 hours from now. They are scheduled to start a 45-minute lunch break at 138:25 and to begin Launch Preps at 139:10.]
137:39:10 Gibson: It looks as though the furthest you could go up to in the checklist is on Surface 101: lift-off minus 2:40. You'll have to hold at that point until we get you the right CSM state vector.

137:39:26 Conrad: Okay. No problem. I'm not hustling on that. We're just sitting here now; we've got the spacecraft all squared away. I'll say everything's tied down, but man, oh man, is it filthy in here; we must have 20 pounds of dust, dirt, and all kinds of junk.

137:39:46 Gibson: Roger, Pete. That'll be an interesting (return to) zero g.

137:39:48 Conrad: Right. Al and I look just like a couple of bituminous coal miners right at the moment. (Long Pause)

137:40:08 Conrad: But we're happy.

137:40:12 Gibson: So are a lot of people down here. (Long Pause)

[Journal Contributor Ulrich Lotzmann has created a sketch that captures the spirit of Apollo 12.]

[Jones - "Do you remember there being a film of dust on the DSKY or things like that? Or did it all wind up on the floor?"]

[Conrad - "I don't remember any up there, particularly. I'm sure we had some. I really don't remember it so much until we launched. And then it was 'tsooo' (gesturing to indicate 'everywhere'). Because I think we launched with our helmets off, didn't we?"]

[Bean - "No."]

[Conrad - "I guess we launched with our helmets on; and then we went and tried to take 'em off after insertion - when we're getting ready for the rendezvous - I think we got about as far as opening the necks and deciding that was a real bad idea."]

[Bean - "So we put them back on. That's what happened. Things were just floating all around. You could look around and see 'em. Once you got to zero-g. As long as the engine was burning, it was down there on the floor; You didn't even know it (was there). But when the engines stop, this cloud comes up."]

137:40:50 Conrad: Say, let me get a time hack with you on my mission timer. I'm reading 137:40:53, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 137:41; is that about right?

137:41:11 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid. You're a couple of seconds off; we can give you a more accurate time hack if you like.

137:41:19 Conrad: No, that's all right. I'll bring the computer out of Standby and get the time okay.

137:41:24 Gibson: Roger.

137:41:27 Conrad: I just happened to think about it; I haven't messed with the mission timer since we landed.

[Comm Break]
137:44:39 Conrad: Say, Houston, how's the SIDE doing? Did that cold gas jobber-do get running or not?

137:44:48 Gibson: Stand by on that, Pete; we'll get the latest word on it.

137:44:56 Conrad: Also, how are the package temperatures doing? Are they running like they expected? (Pause)

137:45:06 Gibson: Pete, looks good on both counts. The CCIG came up and is looking nominal, and the temperatures are looking nominal.

137:45:17 Conrad: Very good. All equipment's running, huh?

137:45:20 Gibson: That's affirm. And I'll tell you, from watching those plots from down here, that PSE is sure doing the job.

137:45:29 Conrad: Great.

[Long Comm Break. The seismometer can sense Pete and Al moving around in the spacecraft.]
137:50:44 Conrad: Houston, Intrepid.

137:50:47 Gibson: Intrepid, Houston. Go ahead.

137:50:52 Conrad: Roger. If you'll look at our schedule there, we've been running our tape recorder according to the schedule; and, because the EVAs ran longer, do we have anything left on that for ascent and rendezvous? Can you check that out for us?

137:51:10 Gibson: Roger. Will do, Pete. Stand by.

[Very Long Comm Break, which includes an extended engineering conversation between Gibson and Dick Gordon which is omitted here. Note that, at the next transmission, Pete and Al are still 45 minutes away from the scheduled start of Launch Preps at 139:10.]
MP3 Audio Clip ( 22 min 29 sec )

138:24:36 Gibson: Yankee Clipper and Intrepid. We'd like to give you the T17 and T18 lift-off Pads before CSM LOS, coming up in about 8 minutes.

138:24:49 Conrad: Okay. (Long Pause while they get the data book out) This is Intrepid ready to copy.

138:25:09 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid. Yankee Clipper, are you ready to copy?

138:25:16 Gordon: Yankee Clipper's ready.

138:25:19 Gibson: Roger. T17, 140:05:15; T18, 142:03:40. (Pause)

[T18 is the scheduled lift-off.]
138:25:44 Conrad: Okay. Intrepid copies 140:05:15, 142:03:40.

138:25:51 Gibson: Readback's correct, Intrepid. (Pause)

138:26:09 Conrad: And, Houston, Intrepid standing by to copy the P22 (radar tracking of the Command Module) Acq(uisition) time and the new octal numbers and we're also ready to debrief with you. Standing by for your questions.

[These items are in the right-hand column on Sur-97.]
138:26:27 Gibson: Okay, Intrepid. We're not planning to do that P22. The job's been done already, so we can forget the P22 coming up at 140 plus 00.

138:26:45 Conrad: Okay. (Long Pause)

138:27:02 Gibson: And, Intrepid, we have your consumables Pad when you're ready to copy.

138:27:11 Conrad: We're ready to copy.

138:27:13 Gibson: Consumables at GET (Ground Elapsed Time) of 137:00: RCS A, 80 percent; B, 76; O2, and we'll give you first the descent and the ascent. 47, 96; H2O, 39.5, 99.2; amp-hours, 729.7, 572.3.

138:27:54 Conrad: Roger. Copied all that.

[Jones - "Don't you have on-board readouts of these quantities?"]

[Bean - "You want to know what you've got on board and you want to see if the gauges look about the same as what they're getting from telemetry. If they do, you don't worry about it. You just kind of get a feel for what you've got available to get yourself up to rendezvous with the Command Module."]

[Conrad - "There was a (computer memory) dump back a little while back and their readings are from separate instrumentation. They make a calculation to make sure everybody knows what everybody's got."]

138:27:57 Gibson: Okay, Intrepid. And on your question on the (Data Storage Electronics Assembly, DSEA) tape recorder. We show that, under the way that we'd normally figure it, that by extending those two EVAs, we come up with 10-1/2 hours, whereas the tape recorder normally goes 10. However, those assumptions are: first, 100-percent activity (that is, the recorder is on all the time) in the descent, ascent, and the rendezvous and 30-percent activity (that is, the recorder is on 30 percent of the time) on the EVA. The 100-percent figure is most likely high and the 30-percent figure is most likely low; so it's pretty difficult for us to come up and tell you exactly when you're going to be cutting off in the ascent or if you will at all.

138:28:48 Conrad: Okay. We'll just go ahead and run it per the schedule.

138:28:51 Gibson: Roger. (Pause)

[On page I-5 in the Apollo LM News Reference, we have: "The data storage electronics assembly is a tape recorder that records voice and time-correlation data (mission elapsed time). The voice and data inputs are multiplexed and recorded. The recorder can be operated manually or semiautomatically. In the manual mode, an astronaut closes a push-to-talk switch on his attitude controller assembly or electrical umbilical and speaks into his microphone. In the semiautomatic mode (also known as voice-activated or VOX), CS equipment senses voice inputs from within the cabin or from the communications receivers and activates the recorder. Voice signals from the CS intercom bus are also recorded, together with mission elapsed time.]
138:29:03 Gibson: Okay, Intrepid. And our first comment on the EVA. The Gold Flight Team members back here would like to give you their congratulations for a job well done.

138:29:20 Conrad: Thank you. (Pause)

138:29:28 Gibson: And, Intrepid, we have a few questions. First one of which is on the weigh bags and their cracking. Can you briefly describe the problem that you encountered in cracking and what the reason may be for it?

[Pete mentioned the cracking to Houston at 131:46:00. See, also, the discussion at 118:38:43.]
138:29:49 Conrad: Well, they seem to...When I folded the first big one...Let me think a minute. Oh, I know. The contingency sample one (that is, the contingency sample bag), I believe, has some holes in it, doesn't it, Al? (Pause) I can't remember on that but, anyhow, the first big one (weigh bag) wound up (with) just about an inch-and-a-half-long crack (that) appeared in it when I was folding it. Just like a fatigue failure; and that appears to be pretty much what happened. I noticed a couple of the saddlebags were the same way after we got done rattling around with them. They had some 1- or 2-inch-long cracks which made holes in them.

138:30:40 Gibson: Roger. We copy that. Can you relate it to a given thermal situation? In other words, were they all cold at the time or really couldn't you say that?

138:30:52 Conrad: Well, I really couldn't say. I think you all realize - from the angle that we're at (that is, the LM orientation on the surface)- that the MESA was in the Sun. Did you all know that?

138:31:09 Gibson: Okay. No, we didn't know that. At least, I wasn't aware of that one.

138:31:18 Conrad: Okay. It's not completely in the Sun, but it's almost in the Sun. When I say "almost", you know there's some gear struts throwing some shadows and everything, but that area was in sunlight.

138:31:35 Gibson: Roger, Pete. Yankee Clipper, 1 minute to LOS. See you on the other side.

138:31:44 Gordon: Roger.

138:31:48 Gibson: Question two, Intrepid. Could you discuss the failure of the camel hander (sic)...(correcting himself) the camera handle?

138:32:01 Conrad: Yes, sir. The knurled knob came off the shaft that it was mounted to, therefore allowing all the pieces to fall apart.

138:32:14 Gibson: Roger. And how did the hammer fail? Did it fail in some way other than just the chips of the coating coming off?

138:32:30 Conrad: No, no; that's all. Just the coating was coming off.

[Al brought the hammer back to Earth and now uses it in texturing his paintings. Photo by Ulli Lotzmann.]
138:32:34 Gibson: Roger. (Pause) Okay. What problems did you have with the S-band in terms of (tripping on) the cable; and, also, exactly where did you put it?

138:32:57 Conrad: Well, just the fact that I wasn't looking where I was going. I'd get tangled up in the S-band antenna wire every once in a while. That one's not as bad as the TV (cable), though, because the TV one doesn't lay flat; the S-band one lays flat. We put the S-band out just like we agreed to do it - to minimized running over the wire - which was out the plus-Y direction pretty much.

138:33:29 Gibson: Roger. And, Pete, when you went back to check the CCIG, could you tell us how close you got to it?

138:33:43 Conrad: I walked up to within about 5 feet of it.

138:33:55 Gibson: Okay. Thank you. (Pause) Okay, and a question on the third film pack which we used. How much of that was used on the inside, and where in the traverse did you pick it up and change it to one of the existing cameras?

[Bean - "This was a trick question. They suspected we'd left it outside."]

[I have been unable to find any mention of the extra magazine anywhere in the transcript prior to the middle of EVA-2 when, at 133:36:15, they made a casual reference to it at the time they were starting to have trouble with the cameras prior to going into Surveyor crater. At 134:02:24 we learned that the extra magazine was in Al's saddlebag; and it is possible that it was put aside at about 134:50:16 when they were having so much trouble with the TV cable. Unfortunately, neither Pete nor Al unambiguously mentioned the extra magazine when they were putting Al's saddlebag on at about 131:57:05.]

[Conrad - "We talked about another magazine over by the Surveyor. We talk about a third magazine."]

[Bean - "We did. Well, how did we know we picked the two black & whites to take in?"]

[Jones - "Because you loaded those on the cameras in the spacecraft..."]

[Conrad - "We swapped 'em between cameras, then we took the magazine off of the broken camera..."]

[Bean - "Oh, you think we didn't just take one of the magazines off and throw it in the bag; we put it on the broken camera. Well, the camera wasn't broken..."]

[Conrad - "We made several comments. The first one was, we talked about a third magazine when we were out there near the Surveyor, in the middle of the discussion about camera brackets and everything. We came across a magazine (in Al's saddlebag). Then, we wound up swapping the two black & white magazines between our cameras."]

[Bean - "So we never threw a..."]

[Conrad - "Then, at some point in time, we decided that one of the cameras was no good anymore, but it was about the time the film was used up."]

[Bean - "Yes."]

[Conrad - "And, so, I either discarded that camera...Which I think we did, somewhere out there. We threw it away. Then we put the black and white in the rock bag..."]

[Bean - "Yeah, loose."]

[Conrad - "I remembered this (prior to starting the 1991 mission review). I knew we knew that we left the color magazine out there."]

[Bean - "Yeah, but I'm saying we couldn't have known that if they were both in the same bag."]

[Conrad - "Well, there's some discussion at the bottom of the ladder about film magazines. And there's some discussion about one of them being in a saddlebag. And then, we set that down on the footpad. And we must have set it down on the footpad in the saddlebag. And we must have left it there."]

[Bean - "You know what we might have done? We might have had that spare film in the saddlebag all along."]

[Conrad - "That's right."]

[Bean - "Because we probably didn't want to get it dirty with all those rocks in the other thing."]

[Jones - "It probably came out in the ETB at the start of the second EVA."]

[On Al's first EVA-2 cuff checklist page, he was supposed to stow both cameras and a color magazine in the ETB for transfer via the LEC down to Pete on the surface. He undoubtedly did that and, as discussed after 131:46:00, either Pete put the magazine in Al's saddlebag when he was unloading the ETB or Al did just before they started the traverse. Although page 61 in the Lunar Surface Operations Plan indicates that he was supposed to mount the color mag on his camera before they went into Surveyor Crater, there is no other mention of the color mag in the cuff checklist than on the first page of Al's. That fact, coupled with the camera difficulties they had before going into the crater, makes it understandable that they forgot to load the color magazine on Al's camera.]

[Bean - "We put it in one of our saddlebags. And that's where it ended up. 'Cause, otherwise, we never would have known if we'd picked the right one."]

[Conrad - (Laughing) "The one thing I've always remembered is that we left a color mag on the Moon."]

[Bean - "And I'm trying to figure out how you could possibly know it. But, maybe by then we were inside and had looked at them. You can tell what magazines they are."]

138:34:19 Conrad: Well, I've got some bad news for you and some good news. In the first place, the third magazine was a color magazine, and all it had on it were some shots that were taken of Earthrise and a few things like that coming around on descent. And, unfortunately, Al and I got our signals crossed, and it's outside on the lunar surface right now. Now, what we did was take the black-and-white magazine off of Al's camera when it failed and put it on my camera and used it up so that we have two complete black and whites of the second EVA and two complete colors of the first EVA, and the only thing that's missing is the color magazine that had undocking and a couple other mundane things like that on it at the beginning of the LM operation. And, unfortunately, that's out there in that saddle bag. We didn't catch that one.

138:35:18 Gibson: Okay. You did get the Surveyor, though?

138:35:26 Conrad: Oh, yeah. We have all the Surveyor pictures and everything, but they're all black and white.

138:35:32 Gibson: Real good. And lastly, we've been looking at your power consumption profile and notice that you're not using as much as they initially anticipated. They attribute that to the lack of use of the floodlights. Would you confirm that you've not had the floodlights on since the beginning of the first EVA?

[See the further discussion at 138:50:11. I asked if the floodlights were the same as the "utility lights" of later missions. The latter were portable lamps that could be moved around the cabin and be clamped in place as needed. Usually the utility lamps were clamped to the guard on the Alignment Optical Telescope (AOT) which was the star sighting instrument mounted over the hatch on the instrument panel. After some discussion, we decided that the floodlights were not the utility lights. Thomas Schwagmeier has provide a labelled version of an Apollo 15 LM close-out photo showing both types of lights.]

[Jones - "Do you remember what kind of cabling there was on the utility lights? Was there a long enough cable that you could move them around the spacecraft?"]

[Conrad - "I know it very well, because it's sitting in my closet with nice gold, spring-loaded, spiral cable."]

138:35:58 Conrad: That's right. We haven't had the floodlights on. And, also, we've used LCG pump very, very little. Every once in a while we give ourselves a squirt. The spacecraft, in contrast to Neil's...We've been very warm. And we've been comfortably warm with just the air in our suits, and I'd say the temperature inside here right now is running in the low 70s somewhere. And it's been that way ever since we got here.
[The Apollo 11 cabin was very cold during the lunar stay and Armstrong and Aldrin reported that, during their rest period, it was too cold to sleep. For Apollo 12, procedures were changed to make sure that the ECS air heater was on enough of the time to maintain the cabin temperature at a comfortable level.]
138:36:32 Gibson: Roger, Pete. Okay. That's the last of our questions. We could finish this up if you give us two PRD readings.

138:36:43 Conrad: Okay. Wait one. (Long Pause) Al is 04022, and I'm still 11020. It'd kind of give you the idea mine may have quit running.

[Shortly after landing at 113:08, they reported PRD readings of 04019 and 11018. During EVA-2 preps at 129:02, their readings were 04021 and 11020. A change of one in the last digit represents an exposure of 10 millirad. During these twenty five hours on the Moon, they have had an exposure of between 20 and 30 millirad. This should be compared with their total, ten-day mission exposures of about 650 millirad, most of it experienced during passage through the Van Allen belts on the outbound and inbound portions of the voyage, and with the 100 millirad dose one receives from a chest x-ray.]
138:37:19 Gibson: Okay, Pete. We copy a 04022, and say the second (again).

138:37:28 Conrad: 11020, and I think that's what it was the last time I gave it to you.

138:37:34 Gibson: That's correct, Pete. A question on the...

138:37:40 Conrad: Maybe it quit running.

138:37:44 Gibson: Could be. A question on the equipment jettison. Was there anything other than what's already called out for that was jettisoned or not jettisoned?

138:38:01 Conrad: Well, we jettisoned everything according to the checklist.

138:38:06 Gibson: Roger. Say, Pete, how does the inside of the cabin look about now?

138:38:10 Conrad: Except for...(Stops to listen to Gibson) It's very neat and orderly except for the fact that it's very dirty.

138:38:20 Gibson: Kind of a neat, orderly coal mine.

138:38:25 Conrad: That's about the size of it. The only thing that we do have (that was not jettisoned as per the checklist), of course, is the LiOH canister container which now has the TV camera in it.

138:38:38 Gibson: Roger. (Pause)

138:38:45 Conrad: EVA antenna is down and stowed.

138:38:52 Gibson: Roger. And we also understood from Al out there on the surface that only partially deployed; only got up around 60 degrees.

138:39:01 Conrad: Okay. I was the one that put it up; and, when I put it back down, I discovered that I hadn't turned it the last, about, 20 percent. And, so, it went all the way up, and then I stowed it. So it functioned correctly. It was me. I didn't put it all the way up.

138:39:25 Gibson: Roger, Pete. The comm was beautiful, though. We had probably the best of any Sim we've had.

138:39:35 Conrad: Yeah, I concur; the comm really has been super. (Pause) These PLSSs and suits performed magnificently. These suits are a shambles (that is, dirty) though. (Long Pause)

[Bean, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "When we got back to the LM, we tried to dust each other off. Usually, it was just Pete trying to dust me off. I would get up on the ladder and he would try to dust me off with his hands, but we didn't have a lot of luck. We should have some sort of whisk broom on the MESA. Before we get back in (on subsequent missions), we'll dust each other up high (that is, dust off the upper parts of the suits); (and) then the LMP will get on the ladder, and the CDR will give him a dust and then will get in. We are bringing too much dust into the LM. Another possibility is that, just as soon as you get in (the cabin), you slip on some sort of second coveralls that fit over the feet up to the waist, because that's the dirty area. Then you keep that on all the time you're in the LM and take it off just before you get out. The other alternative to this is that you put on a similar something (that is, a removable leg covering) when you're getting out on the lunar surface. The reason I suggest the former was that I think you want to be as free as you can possibly be when on the lunar surface. Adding another garment over the top of the already existing equipment is going to be restrictive and might give you a few more problems."]

[The large dustbrush that Al suggested for suit cleaning was first flown on Apollo 13 an, when it was first used on Apollo 14, was a big help in reducing the amount of dust that Shepard and Mitchell brought into the cabin. Al's suggestion of leg coverings wasn't utilized until Apollo 15, the first mission on which the crew took off their suits for the rest period. After doffing their suits, Scott, Irwin, and the subsequent crews put the legs into jettison bags before stowing them on the engine cover for the night.]

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "I got quite concerned with not only the wear and tear on the suits, but (also) the effect of the dust on the suits. On our final hookup back on the LM ECS System for ascent, it was all we could do to get our wrist locks and suit-hose locks to work. They obviously were beginning to bog down with dust in them. When you go over these suits later, you'll be able to analyze this. I have no idea what the effects were on the O-rings. Suit integrities did stay good, but there's no doubt in my mind that with a couple of more EVAs, something would have ground to a halt. In the area where the lunar boots fitted on the suits, we wore through the outer garment and were beginning to wear through the Mylar. I'm sure that with all the wear on the outside surfaces, there's bound to have been rubbing of the bladder. I'm sure they (the suits) will be very carefully inspected to see what these effects were. Al and I had extreme confidence in the suits; therefore, we didn't give a second thought to working our heads off in the suits and banging them around - not in an unsafe manner, but to do the job in the way we had practiced it on Earth. These suits were more worn than our training suits. We must have had more than a hundred hours (of) suited work with the same equipment, and the wear was not as bad on the training suits as it is on these flight suits in just the 8 hours that we were out. I think it has to be the abrasiveness of the dust."]

138:40:11 Gibson: Say, Pete and Al, when you climbed back in, you terminated at 3 plus 55. And, (for) both of you, your reserve was determined by oxygen. In PLSS 1 (Pete's) the reserve was 2 plus 05, which would have given you a 6-hour PLSS; and the PLSS 2 was 1 plus 50, which is pretty close to 6 hours also.
[The Apollo 14 crew was able to take advantage of these ample margins and did EVAs of 4.75 and 4.5 hours. Oxygen capacity for the J missions was increased fifty percent to a 9-hour maximum and several EVAs of over 7 hours were done on those missions. The longest was the 7 hour 37 minute second EVA of Apollo 17. Details of usage for each of the Apollo 12 EVAs are shown on page 8-20 (0.1 Mb) in the Apollo 12 Mission Report.]
138:40:44 Conrad: That's very good to know, and there's no reason why you can't stay out there and work that long. You don't get tired.

138:40:53 Gibson: Get a little thirsty, though, I bet.

138:40:59 Conrad: We were. We were really thirsty after the second EVA because...I don't know, did you add up how far we went? I think we made a pretty good trip out there.

138:41:15 Gibson: Roger, Pete. We're estimating something over a mile for the full circuit. But that's not counting some of the side jaunts you made.

138:41:23 Conrad: Yeah. We've been trying to follow our tracks (of footprints) out here with the monocular.

[Bean - "I remember you doing that - looking out there and see if you could see the footprints. Seeing where we'd really gone."]

[Journal Contributor Ulli Lotzmann notes that the 10x40 monocular was manufactured by Leitz, Germany, and modified by NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Houston. It was based on the commercial binocular version.]

[Jones - "Al, before I got the tape recorder on, you said that it wasn't the traveling that was the hard part."]

[Bean - "The hard part was when you got somewhere..."]

[Conrad - "And you had to work."]

[Bean - "Traveling's okay. Unless you're going uphill. If you're just running flat, you're okay."]

[Conrad - "You could run all day but when you stop and you're doing all this work..."]

[Bean - "Trying to adjust some piece of equipment, digging a trench. That's when moving the suit around's the hard part. Leaning over..."]

[Jones - "Flexing the suit."]

[Bean - "That's hard."]

138:41:29 Conrad: The other thing that I...Have you got your map book there? Let me talk to you about this big blocky-rimmed crater that's out here.

138:41:43 Gibson: Yeah. Stand by on that. (Pause) Okay. We got the map.

138:42:02 Conrad: Okay. On the great big map, it's the crater that has got the really big blocks on it, that's just outside the ellipse on map A.

138:42:14 Gibson: Okay, Pete. Which is the great big map?

[Ed's confusion is understandable. I believe the "great big map" is LAM 7 which, with a scale of 1:100,000, shows the largest area of any of the LM surface maps. Each of the small squares is one kilometer on a side. LAM 7 shows the landing ellipse and, as indicated in a detail, the crater is just outside the ellipse west and slightly south of the landing site.]

[" Map A" is undoubtedly LSM 7-A ( 2.2 Mb or 0.6 Mb ), which has a scale of 1:25,000. The crater coincides with the white number '39'. LMS 7-A shows that the crater is covered by 1:5,000 maps LSE 7-30, 7-31 , 7-38, and 7-39. LSE 7-30 shows the eastern rim of the crater and the blocks that Pete is about to describe. Note that each of the small squares on the 1:5,000 maps is 50 meters on a side and that the north-south dimension of the very large block at L4/11.0 on LSE 7-30 is roughly 20 meters. For comparison, the LM Descent stage is only 4 meters across.]

138:42:16 Conrad: The smaller one (that is, the 1:5,000 map) is...(Answering Gibson) Okay, the one that shows the landing ellipse. It's number 39. Wait a minute. Let me look just a second. (Pause) It's number (LSE 7-) 30 chart. (Long Pause) That crater is on our horizon and we can see it from here. And I can sit here with the map and pick out the really great big boulders and everything. One of the problems up here is there's nothing to break up...or, there's nothing between you and any object that you happen to pick up (visually) out there - like a rock - to judge distance by. And, when we first landed, I really thought that crater was like a thousand feet away, but it's obviously a whale of a lot further than that away. But it looks like it's right next to us, and we can use the monocular and scan those gigantic boulders that are there. That's the only one that's visible to us on the horizon. But I wanted to point out...You can get an idea of the fact - that really looks like it's about a thousand feet away, (and) you know how far it really is (4.5 kilometers or 15 thousand feet) - how difficult it is to judge distance.

138:44:02 Gibson: Roger, Pete. Maybe the use of that LM shadow then was pretty useful. I know in the beginning (at 112:07:13), you doubted that the shadow was really that long, and apparently it was telling you the truth.

138:44:19 Conrad: Yeah. I think you're probably right. The other thing is (that), from the spacecraft here looking at the ALSEP, it looks like it's right under the window. And Al and I's best guess is that it's at least 450 feet away now.

[The actual distance to the ALSEP is about 126 meters or 413 feet, about 8% less than their estimate.]
138:44:38 Gibson: Roger.
[Comm Break]

[Bean - (Laughing) "Yeah, I remember that. It really is 400 feet out; but I remember, that night, looking and saying 'My god, we didn't take it far enough away (to avoid contamination from the launch)'"]

138:46:05 Conrad: Say, I got a question for you, Houston. What do the experts think about doing an alignment (of the inertial platform) in orbit now, versus what we got here on the lunar surface yesterday?

138:46:22 Gibson: Copy your question, Pete. Stand by. Also, that crater which you were talking about is, we estimate, 4-1/2 kilometers from your present position.

MP3 Audio Clip ( 44 min 26 sec )

138:46:37 Conrad: Looks like it's just a hop, skip, and a jump.

[Comm Break]
138:48:32 Gibson: (Responding to Pete's question about doing an alignment of the inertial platform) Pete, we'd like to go ahead and stick with the procedures we have right now. We can give you an update on it after the two P57's after at insertion. There's a chance that we may not need it.

138:48:47 Conrad: Okay. Well, I wasn't proposing that we didn't do it; we're going to go ahead and do it. I was just curious, after we got a good RLS - which we've never gotten before - out of the P57 yesterday, what everybody thought about that.

[Bean - "The RLS is a Reference Landing Site. The reason we didn't call it the landing site is because the math it solved assumed it was setting on a perfectly spherical Moon; and, so, we really weren't there, but we were close enough to there...and the math and the computer could solve that problem. It didn't even really know where we were going to land exactly, so it had to have that reference. And we could always take it out when we got into orbit. It was plenty good enough to get you into orbit, no matter where you were setting, in the lowest valley or the highest place."]

[Comm Break]

138:50:11 Conrad: Say, Houston, one thing that occurred to me...The reason we're not using the floodlights is because that overhead hatch is not rigged right and that microswitch is open all the time - I should say the microswitch isn't rigged right; the hatch is okay. And those floodlights were on all the time, so when we were getting ready to come down over the night side, we had the floods on, just the two lower ones were still always on. So, we pulled that breaker, and we've left it out all the rest of the time. That's the reason.

138:50:46 Gibson: Roger. We copy that. (Long Pause)

[Bean - "Floodlights, I guess, are built in; but I don't know why it's got anything to do with the hatch."]

[Conrad - "It does, because - remember - the window shades are up (that is, closed because they pull up from the bottom to cover the window) and the whole thing's buttoned up when you first go in (that is, when they first entered the LM on the way out from Earth, at about 63 hours and again prior to the descent). So when you opened the hatch, the lights come on. You turned on the floods so you didn't have to go into a dark LM."]

[Bean - "So, when we closed the hatch, they still stayed on."]

[Conrad - "Yeah, apparently."]

[Bean - "So we pulled the circuit breaker."]

138:51:05 Gibson: Say, Pete and Al, do you think that if you were out there for say 4-1/2, maybe even 5 hours, you'd get hungry as well as thirsty on an extended traverse?

138:51:23 Conrad: I don't think so, if you chowed down good just before you left.

138:51:27 Bean: I agree with that. You really get thirsty, though. Maybe they can come up with something that you can put on the inside of your helmet, something like - not exactly like - the little valsalva device. Just something where you could maybe reach over and take even a swallow of water. You're only thirsty because your throat is dry, and if you just had something - one swallow - I think that'd fix you up right there.

[Bean - "The valsalva device was a little rubber thing on the inside of your helmet ring. And that allowed you, when you were being pressurized and your ears didn't clear, you could put your nose down on it (to close the nostril) and you could blow to unblock your ears. It was a little blue rubber thing. I can remember using 'em in tests when my head was stuffy."]

[Jones - "That reminds me of another question. Some of the later crews had a little patch of Velcro in there somewhere where they could scratch their nose."]

[Bean - "Oh, they did? We didn't have that. That's a good idea."]

[Nose-scratching pads were added around the rim of the feed port inside the bubble helmets for Apollo 16 and 17. See photos from suit-up for the Apollo 17 Countdown Demonstration Test (CDDT). [The later crews had drink bags that hung down inside the suits from the neck ring. The bags were equipped with a short straw so that the astronauts could reach over and get a drink.]

[The drink bags flown on Apollo 13 are described on pages 92> and 94> in the Apollo 13 Press Kit ( 6Mb PDF ). On page 92, the water bags are called 'Gunga Dins', a clear reference to the heroic water carrier in the Rudyard Kipling poem.]

138:51:56 Gibson: Roger, Al. Say, did either one of you kneel down in order to get anything off the surface, or did you use the newly-developed Bean technique of holding on to the Surveyor parts bag and lowering the Commander to the surface?

138:52:15 Conrad: Yeah. Well, we used all kinds of things like that. You could take the shovel and stick it in the ground and just do a one-arm pushup and lean down and pick up a rock off the ground with the other hand. It's really a ridiculous way to do it. If you had a suit that would bend, why, you'd have the whole program wired. But, you could do that. It's okay. I fell over once out there, and Al picked me back up again. It's no big deal.

[On several occasions during Apollo 17, Gene Cernan and Jack Schmitt used their tools - and rocks - in just the fashion that Pete is suggesting here. One-armed pushups proved to be quite easy.]
138:52:45 Bean: But, in the same sense, you're always fussing around trying to get down there to get these rocks, and we did kneel down a couple of times. I knelt down and picked some stuff up. And it's particularly easy if you got that Hand Tool Carrier with you. But we really do need to come up with some sort of strap or something that would allow you to lean over and grab a rock that won't fit in those tongs.

138:53:10 Gibson: Roger.

[Long Comm Break]
139:03:02 Conrad: Houston, Intrepid. (We're) picking up the Launch Prep Verb 98 at LO (Lift-Off) minus 02:50.

139:03:11 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid.

[Long Comm Break. Pete probably meant "Verb 96". They are on Sur-98, powering up the inertial platform. On Sur-99 and Sur-100, they will change the circuit breaker configuration for power-up]
139:12:05 Conrad: Okay, Houston. You see that 212? That's the same thing we had before, also.

139:12:12 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid. We copy, and we concur. We expect it.

[Comm Break]

[Journal Contributor Frank O'Brien provides the following explanation of the 212 alarm.]

[O'Brien - "Pete and Al are beginning to power up the LM systems for ascent, which includes, of course, the guidance system. They are in the process of aligning the inertial platform, and the 212 refers to a computer alarm that states there is a 'failure in the platforms' accelerometer, but the accelerometers are not being used. Apparently, either the computer (most likely) or the IMU is incorrectly detecting a problem. This doesn't appear to be a serious problem, since Houston nor the crew seems particularly concerned about it."]

139:13:59 Gibson: Intrepid, Houston.

139:14:05 Conrad: Go.

139:14:07 Gibson: We have a update on the star Arcturus on page 102 of the surface checklist. We'd like you to use Procyon, (Star) 16, or Sirius, 15, and that's detent 1. (Pause)

139:14:34 Conrad: Roger. (Pause) Okay. And we passed self-test all right.

139:14:48 Gibson: Roger.

139:14:54 Conrad: Are you ready for E-MOD dump?

139:14:58 Gibson: That's affirmative. We're ready for the E-MOD.

[Comm Break]
139:16:31 Gibson: Intrepid, Houston.

139:16:35 Conrad: Go.

139:16:37 Gibson: If you will give us P00 and Accept, we'll give you a CSM state vector and RLS update.

139:16:45 Conrad: You have P00 and Accept.

[Comm Break; Houston is transmitting data which updates the Reference Landing Site and Command Module orbital parameters stored in the LM computer. Astronaut Gerry Carr takes over as CapCom.]
139:20:05 Gordon: Hello, Houston; Yankee Clipper.

139:20:09 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. Loud and clear.

139:20:14 Gordon: Well, hello there, stranger. How are you?

139:20:22 Carr: Morning, Dick. We are fine. How are you?

139:20:27 Gordon: Well, pretty good. I hope you would like to have some company for a change.

139:20:31 Carr: Roger. Got the house clean?

139:20:36 Gordon: As a matter of fact, I just finished that. I sure do; got everything in order; ready to go towards the LM and bring back (garbled). That's quite a chore; keeping this thing clean.

139:20:53 Carr: Roger. You got a couple of coal miners coming up to see you.

139:20:59 Gordon: That's okay. I'll be glad to see them.

139:21:10 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. The computer is yours. Break. Yankee Clipper, if you will go P00 and ACCEPT, we have an uplink.

139:21:20 Gordon: All yours.

139:23:14 Conrad: Houston, (have) you got the lift-off time for me?

139:23:20 Carr: Stand by. (Pause) Intrepid, Houston. Your lift-off time is 142:03:47.

139:23:52 Conrad: I copy 142:03:47.00.

139:23:57 Carr: Affirmative. (Pause) Clipper, Houston. Computer's yours.

139:24:11 Gordon: Okay. And Gerry, will you find out what they want to do about this battery charge, because I'm using the bus ties during the rendezvous?

139:24:23 Carr: Roger. (Long Pause) Yankee Clipper, Houston. Why don't you figure on terminating the battery charge at LOS?

139:24:52 Gordon: All right; I could let it go until I (garbled) just before lift-off. That way it might take it all the way up.

139:25:33 Carr: Clipper, Houston. We prefer that you terminate at LOS on this pass.

139:25:40 Gordon: Roger.

139:25:41 Carr: Roger. That would be one less thing for us to keep track of prior to lift-off.

139:25:48 Gordon: Okay.

[Comm Break]
139:27:17 Bean: Say, Houston; Intrepid.

139:27:20 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Go.

139:27:25 Bean: Roger. When you look out the AOT in the dark quadrant? You can see these lights - particles of light, flashes of light just seem to come from - in this case, I'm looking in quadrant 1 which is the left one. It's coming from behind me, the left, and they're just sailing off in space. I was thinking they're dropping from my water boiler, but it looks like some of those things are escaping the Moon. They really haul out of here and just press off at the stars.

139:27:56 Carr: Roger. (Long Pause) Yankee Clipper, Houston with a P22 tracking Pad.

139:28:42 Gordon: Go ahead.

139:28:44 Carr: Roger. Your target is LM. T1 is 139:57:39; T2 is 140:02:38; south 05; latitude is minus 3...

139:29:10 Gordon: Roger. T 112 -

139:29:13 Carr: Latitude, minus 3.036; longitude over 2 is minus 11.709; altitude minus 1.13. If you want to take photos, your DAC settings are 1/60th, 1 over 60, one SP ... (correcting himself) 1 FPS, and C-EX film. You should be at zero local horizontal rather than 22 degrees pitchdown. Over.

139:30:04 Gordon: Roger. Understand. T1, 139:57:39, T2, 140:02:38, 5 miles south, latitude is minus 3.036, longitude over 2 is minus 11.709; altitude minus 1.13 and (garbled) information. I will not use it.

139:30:34 Carr: Roger, Dick. And I've got a REV 30 map update when you're ready.

139:30:51 Gordon: Go ahead.

139:30:54 Carr: Roger. REV 30, LOS 140:31:05; 140:56:06, 141:17:20.

139:31:20 Gordon: Roger. Yankee Clipper, we copied.

139:31:22 Carr: Okay. And, Dick, I've got your consumables update when you are ready.

139:31:30 Gordon: Go ahead.

139:31:32 Carr: Roger. At a GET of 139 plus 20, RCS total was 56 percent; Alpha is 58; Bravo, 56; Charlie, 56; Delta, 55; hydrogen tank 1 is 49.9; tank 2 is 49.8; oxygen, 52.7 and 54.4. Over.

139:32:14 Gordon: Roger. I copy that. And my rendezvous radar transponder self-check is okay.

139:32:25 Carr: Roger.

139:32:57 Gordon: Hey, Gerry, I would like to have a DAP update also, please.

139:33:06 Carr: Roger, Dick. Stand by. We'll get it for you.

139:34:06 Conrad: Okay, Houston. Looking at the DSKY torquing angles?

139:34:13 Carr: Roger. We see them, Pete.

[Comm Break]
139:35:19 Carr: Intrepid, Houston.

139:35:24 Conrad: Go.

139:35:26 Carr: Roger, Pete. How's your drinking water intake been since you got back in? You been replacing quite a bit of it?

139:35:35 Conrad: Yes, sir.

[Long Comm Break]
139:39:19 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. If you'll give us P00 and ACCEPT, we have another LM state vector for you.

139:39:29 Gordon: Okay, Houston. I'm going to stop my roll (garbled) here. Okay. Go ahead.

139:39:34 Carr: Roger. (Long Pause)

139:40:20 Conrad: All right, Houston. Is there any objection if we track him when he goes by this time? And do you have the OSCIL, or don't you want us to do it?

139:40:36 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. We hadn't really planned on doing a P22 on this pass.

139:40:45 Conrad: Okay. We'll forget it.

139:40:50 Carr: Okay. Break. Yankee Clipper, Houston. I've got your DAP update.

139:41:00 Gordon: Sock it to me.

[A popular TV comedy program of the time was Rowan and Martin's Laugh-in. "Sock it to me" was one of the running gag lines, used at various times by all of the continuing characters and many of the guests, including sitting President Nixon. In a typical case, comedienne Judy Carne walked onto a bare stage in a bikini, complaining about the indignity of having to do the sketch and trying to explain that she was a serious actress. An offstage voice would tell her to get on with it, she would say "sock it to me" with great reluctance, and a torrent of water would fall from above and soak her. In another, comedian Arte Johnson's World War II German soldier would say the phrase and someone wearing a boxing glove would reach on camera and punch him. The gag got funnier with repetition and the phrase came to mean "go ahead and do it, because I know you're going to do it anyway".]
139:41:02 Carr: Okay. About the only change you need is you need to go to 0.5-degree deadband, so R1 should read 11101.

139:41:27 Gordon: Okay. Are the weights and trim verified yet?

139:41:35 Carr: Roger, Dick. Your weights and your trims are good.

139:41:41 Gordon: Okay. That's what I was worried about. Thank you. I'll probably go to a half a degree a second during the rendezvous because those maneuvers are pretty long.

139:41:49 Carr: Roger.

[Comm Break]
139:42:58 Gordon: Houston, Clipper. Never mind. Forget it.
[Comm Break]
139:44:21 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. We're through with your computer.

139:44:28 Gordon: Roger. Thank you.

139:44:59 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. On your maneuver, go S-band OMNI Charlie. Over.

[Long Comm Break]
139:49:20 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. Go OMNI Delta.

139:49:29 Conrad: Houston, Intrepid.

139:49:32 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Go.

139:49:37 Conrad: Has Yankee gone overhead yet? (Pause)

139:49:43 Carr: Not yet, Pete.

139:49:48 Conrad: Give me an overhead time, so I can watch him go by. (Long Pause)

139:50:08 Gordon: Take T2 and add 96 (minutes), Gerry. (Long Pause)

139:51:01 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Clipper should be overhead at 140:04:10.

139:51:17 Conrad: Okay. Thank you. (Pause) I'm going to check the plane change and see how good you are. (Long Pause)

139:52:08 Gordon: Houston, Yankee Clipper. Is Intrepid up VHF?

139:52:15 Carr: Stand by, Clipper. Break. Intrepid, this is Houston. Clipper wants to know if you're up VHF.

139:52:24 Conrad: No, but we will come up VHF.

139:52:28 Carr: Roger. Break. Clipper, Houston. Intrepid says he'll be up.

139:52:35 Conrad: Okay. Ask him whether he wants us up VHF A or B SIMPLEX.

139:52:40 Carr: Clipper, Houston. What would you like, VHF A or B SIMPLEX?

139:52:46 Gordon: (Garbled) go on normal VHF ranging.

139:52:51 Carr: Say again, Clipper.

139:52:57 Gordon: How about the normal VHF ranging (garbled)?

139:53:06 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Come up on VHF ranging configuration. Over.

139:53:15 Conrad: Will do.

[Long Comm Break]
MP3 Audio Clip ( 40 min 08 sec )

139:58:19 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston.

139:58:24 Gordon: Go ahead.

139:58:26 Carr: Roger, Dick. Are you going to use the zero-degree pitch or 22-degree pitch down for this pass?

139:58:33 Gordon: Twenty-two degrees.

[Long Comm Break]
140:04:53 Conrad: Hello, Yankee Clipper; Intrepid on VHF. How do you read?

140:04:59 Gordon: Loud and clear, Pete. (Long Pause) Hello, Houston; Clipper.

140:05:45 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. Go.

140:05:50 Gordon: Roger. Houston, I don't like those marks at all, that Sun angle was pretty high. That whole area is washed out; and the best that I could tell you (is that) I think I was on the Surveyor Crater but I can't be sure of that.

140:06:08 Carr: Roger, Dick.

140:06:13 Gordon: That Sun's a little too high to define that right now.

[The shadows have largely disappeared from the craters at the landing site and, therefore, Gordon couldn't be certain that he was tracking the right crater in the CSM sextant.]
140:06:16 Conrad: Houston, Intrepid. We had a visual on him although I couldn't talk to him on VHF.

140:06:25 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Roger. Clipper, this is Houston. Did you read Intrepid on VHF?

140:06:36 Gordon: That's affirmative.

140:06:39 Carr: Roger. You sure it wasn't S-band because, you know, we're in a relay mode.

140:06:49 Gordon: Intrepid, Clipper. (Pause) I think I read VHF, Gerry.

140:06:57 Carr: Okay. (Long Pause)

140:07:56 Gordon: Hey, Gerry, I sure wouldn't do anything with that P22 data because I'm just not that sure of it.

140:08:04 Carr: Roger, Dick. We've copied your data. (Long Pause) Clipper, Houston. We'll give that data a good evaluation before we do anything with it.

[Comm Break. P22 is the program that Dick Gordon used to get data on his orbit relative to the landing site and, because he couldn't be sure that he was tracking the right crater, the data gathered by his computer is suspect.]
140:09:25 Bean: Houston; Intrepid.

140:09:30 Carr: Intrepid; Houston. Go.

140:09:34 Bean: Got sort of an interesting thing going on the AGS right now. I didn't notice earlier, but it may just be because the lights are brighter now. I'm getting an all-8s flash on both the address and the information registers at about one-fifth the brilliance of the normal numbers. And it's pulsing every second.

140:10:00 Carr: Roger, Al.

140:10:06 Bean: If I turn down the illumination level just a little bit, it's not noticeable. (Long Pause)

140:10:52 Conrad: Hello, Houston; Intrepid. You ready for my RCS hot fire?

140:10:59 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Roger. Fire away.

140:11:03 Conrad: Okay. (Long Pause)

[Pete will briefly fire the Reaction Control System engines. He is at the bottom of Sur-105]
140:11:32 Carr: Intrepid, Houston.

140:11:37 Bean: Go.

140:11:39 Carr: Roger, Al. Fredo (Haise) is here. He and I have both seen that phenomena on your DEDA during testing of most all the spacecrafts (sic) up at (the Grumman plant at) Bethpage, (New York), and it's probably an EMI.

[EMI is electromagnetic interference.]
140:11:56 Bean: That's what we've been talking about, but we thought we'd just touch in on it.
[Al seems to be saying that he and Pete have been talking offline in the cabin about the 'all-8s' and that they decided to mention the 'all-8s' briefly to Houston.]
140:11:59 Conrad: (Garbled) roll left, pitch up...

140:12:01 Carr: Roger. I think TRW's got a workup on this problem.

140:12:08 Bean: Okay.

[TRW is Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge, the company that built the unit. Pete is now at the top of Sur-106.]
140:12:11 Conrad: Here you go, Houston, with roll, pitch, and yaw (tests of the RCS).

140:12:14 Carr: Roger, Pete. (Static; Long Pause) Intrepid, Houston.

140:12:53 Conrad: (To Houston) Don't panic! We just blew over our S-band erectable (with the exhaust from the RCS), and we're up on our steerable.

140:13:02 Carr: Roger. I was just going to tell you, Pete, we lost some of the data on that fire check.

140:13:11 Conrad: Okay. You want me to give it to you again?

140:13:13 Carr: Stand by. I'll tell you what we need.

140:13:15 Conrad: I never gave you yaw anyhow.

140:13:19 Carr: Pete, can you just start over from the beginning?

140:13:25 Conrad: (Chuckles) Okay. (Long Pause)

140:13:45 Conrad: Pitch up is the only one that didn't sound right.

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "I'm going to have Mission Control look over their data, but that RCS firing on the ground appeared to me to be excellent (that is, a good idea) in that I noticed very ragged thruster firing on the first pass through all the thrusters. I don't know why that was. The system should have been pressurized and we should have had solid fuel (with no helium or other vapor phases) all the way out to the thrusters; but, they were very ragged. The first trip around roll, pitch, and yaw, they steadied out to be very solid firing. I'm sure that, if they were ragged, this shows on the data on the ground (that is, in the telemetry), but I want to make sure somebody checks that. I'd hate to have that first portion of the lift-off and not have good thrusters during the very critical time of getting that baby off the descent stage."]

[Although there is no discussion of this issue in the Apollo 12 Mission Report, the later crews all performed hot fire checks.]

140:13:51 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. I've got a K-factor update for you when you're ready.

140:13:58 Conrad: Okay.

140:14:01 Carr: Roger. R1 is 00140; R2 is all zips (that is, all zeroes); R3 is 00033.

140:14:16 Conrad: Okay. 000...(correcting himself) 00140; all zips; three zips 33.

140:14:23 Carr: Roger.

140:14:30 Conrad: Okay. How'd the hot fire look? (Pause)

140:14:39 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. That went kind of fast. Give us a chance to take a look at our tapes.

140:14:47 Conrad: Okay.

[Comm Break]
140:15:50 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. The passive seismometer just verified that you did do your hot fire.

140:16:01 Conrad: Very good! (Long Pause) (Amused) Does the passive seismometer say my hot fire's Go (that is, that it was satisfactory)? (Long Pause)

140:16:50 Gordon: Houston, Clipper.

140:16:54 Carr: Clipper, Houston. Go.

140:16:59 Gordon: You have the DSKY.

140:17:01 Conrad: I understand I was GO. (No answer) (Pause)

140:17:13 Gordon: Houston, are you ready for our gyro torquing angles (via downlink from the CSM computer)?

140:17:19 Carr: Clipper, Houston. Roger. Go ahead. (Long Pause)

140:17:45 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. I have a LM ascent Pad and a CSI PAD (as per the top of the right-hand column of Sur-106).

140:17:54 Conrad: Okay. Just a second. Are you ready for the rest of my hot fire?

140:17:58 Carr: Roger. We're ready. Go ahead. Break. Clipper, you can go ahead and torque.

140:18:05 Gordon: Okay; I did. Thank you.

[Comm Break]
140:19:08 Conrad: Okay. I gave you an extra pitchup fire because we were photographing the effects on the ground. It's quite spectacular.

140:19:16 Carr: Roger, Pete.

[These are the control jets mounted on the front of the LM which fire down toward the ground. They used the 16 mm camera to record the dust kicked up by the firing.]
140:19:20 Bean: And we're ready to copy the Launch Pad.

140:19:25 Carr: Roger. LM ascent Pad follows: Tig 142:03:47.00; Noun 76, 5535.0 (this will be their horizontal velocity at engine shutdown), 0037.0, plus 000.2; DEDA 47 is plus 37364, plus 05607, plus 58642, plus 56955; DEDA 465 is plus 00370; DEDA 546 is NA (not applicable); ignition one Rev late is 144:02:09; LM weight, 10789; CSM weight, 35390. Over.

140:21:02 Bean: Roger. Copied 142:03:47.00, 5535.0, 0037.0, plus 000.2, plus 37364, plus 05607, plus 58642, plus 56955, plus 00370, NA, 144:02:09.00, 10789, 35390.

140:21:36 Carr: That's affirmative, Al. P32 CSI Pad follows. Noun 11, 143:01:50.60; Noun 37, 144:38, all zips; Noun 81, 0492, all zips; DEDA 373 is 01818; 275 is 02780; AGS Delta-V's, plus 0492, all zips, plus 0010. Over.

140:22:43 Bean: Roger. 143:01:50.60; 144:38, all zeros, 0492, all zeros, 01818, 02780, plus 0492, all zeros, plus 0010.

140:23:05 Carr: Affirmative, Al.

140:23:14 Conrad: Okay, Houston. I'm standing by for your up-data link of the LGC (LM Guidance Computer) gyro compensation.

140:23:23 Carr: Roger, Pete. (Pause)

[The gyro compensation uplink step is on Sur-105 in the lower right corner and hasn't yet been done. At 140:27:36, Houston will tell Pete that they want to wait until after the last of the star sightings to send the uplink, saying also that the uplink is "poorly placed in the checklist".]
140:23:31 Gordon: Houston, this is Clipper. I copied those Pads.

140:23:35 Carr: Roger, Clipper. (Long Pause) Yankee Clipper, Houston. Over.

140:23:57 Gordon: Go ahead.

140:23:59 Carr: Roger, Dick. You can terminate your battery Bravo charge now. And we'd like to have you put your O2 tank 1 heaters and your hydrogen tank 2 heaters back to Auto. And dump your waste water to between...

140:24:15 Gordon: Roger; Roger. (Long Pause)

140:24:48 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston.

140:24:54 Gordon: Go ahead. I have got the H2 and O2 heaters, and dump the water to 52 percent.

140:25:01 Carr: Okay. That's it, Dick. Thank you.

140:25:03 Gordon: And I'll do a purge next.

140:25:05 Carr: Roger.

140:25:06 Gordon: I'll do a purge on the oxygen and hydrogen fuel cell.

[Comm Break]
140:27:17 Carr: Intrepid, Houston.

140:27:22 Conrad: Go ahead.

140:27:24 Carr: Pete, we'll be sending your gyro compensation uplink to you after you've done your second P57 (which starts at the bottom of Sur-106).

140:27:34 Conrad: Okay, must be a mistake in the checklist.

140:27:36 Carr: Yeah, that's right. It's poorly placed in the checklist.

140:27:42 Conrad: Okay. How'd the hot fire look all the way around? Everything okay? (Long Pause) Got another question for you, too, Houston. What did Yankee Clipper's orbit finally decay down to? How well did you hit 60 (nautical miles)?

[Irregularities in the density distribution in the lunar crust have been perturbing the Command Module Orbit. Although NASA had models of the density distribution and made predictions of the changes in the CSM orbit, the available data on the density distribution was far from complete - especially for the Farside - so it was an open question as to just what orbit the CSM would be in at launch time.]
140:28:25 Carr: Roger, Pete. It's 61.9 by 58.4 at CDH (Constant Delta Height).

140:29:33 Conrad: Yeah, that's pretty good, and we're targeted for zero CDH here on this thing, right?

140:29:42 Carr: That's affirmative.

140:29:47 Conrad: Okay. (Long Pause)

140:30:30 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. We're about 35 seconds from LOS. You're looking good, and we're looking for an AOS at 141:17.

140:30:42 Gordon: Okay, Gerry. Thank you.

[Long Comm Break]
140:38:11 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. How do you read?

140:38:16 Conrad: Loud and clear.

140:38:18 Carr: Roger. Read you the same.

[Very Long Comm Break. NASA Public Affairs mentions that launch will occur when Yankee Clipper is about 80 nautical miles beyond the landing site. Intrepid will go into an initial orbit with a perilune of 60,000 feet and, being in a lower orbit, will slowly catch up with the Command Module.]
MP3 Audio Clip ( 8 min 58 sec )

141:00:06 Conrad: Houston, Intrepid.

141:00:09 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Go.

141:00:14 Conrad: Any objections to us starting P57 now? (Long Pause)

141:00:31 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. We prefer that you wait until (launch minus) four-five (minutes, as per Sur-106) in order to maximize the Delta-T there (that is, the time since the first P57).

141:00:39 Conrad: You mean (Ground Elapsed Time 141:)15, I hope. (Pause)

141:00:46 Carr: Yeah. That's right; 15. (Pause) We were thinking in terms of lift-off minus 45 (minutes).

141:00:58 Conrad: I'm with you.

[Comm Break]
141:02:22 Carr: Intrepid, Houston.

141:02:29 Bean: Go ahead.

141:02:31 Carr: Roger, Al. Would you put battery 5 on the line now? Before, it wasn't really carrying its load as well as it should have, and we'd kind of like to pre-precondition that one, get it a little warmer and get it started early.

141:02:47 Bean: Okay. I noticed that. We'll do it.

141:02:49 Carr: Okay. (Long Pause)

141:03:02 Bean: That's exactly what it did prior to descent: not much.

[Very Long Comm Break. At the end of this period, Yankee Clipper reappears from behind the Moon for the last time prior to LM ascent.]
MP3 Audio Clip ( 5 min 32 sec )

141:17:48 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston. How do you read?

141:17:53 Conrad: Loud and clear. We're standing by (garbled under Gordon).

141:17:55 Gordon: Clipper, I read you loud and clear. (Pause) Houston, Yankee Clipper. Read you loud and clear.

141:18:11 Carr: Roger, Clipper. Reading you the same.

141:18:16 Gordon: Okay. Looks Go here, Jer.

141:18:22 Carr: Roger, Dick. (Long Pause) Clipper, Houston. Your state vectors are all good, so there'll be no uplink to you this time. Your map update Pad is scratched, and I've got a landmark tracking Pad if you're ready to copy.

141:19:01 Gordon: Roger. Do you want us to do this one, or can we skip it?

141:19:09 Carr: Stand by. (Pause)

141:19:22 Gordon: The reason I say that, Gerry; since I can't see them at these high Sun angles, it's pretty academic to do this one. (Pause) I'd just as soon save the gas (it would take to position the spacecraft) and skip it.

141:19:35 Carr: Roger, Dick. We're talking about it. (Long Pause) Clipper, Houston. The data is only in the event you want to try to watch lift-off.

141:20:10 Gordon: Yeah. I know that. I don't think I can see them, Gerry, so let's skip it. The sun angle's too high.

141:20:15 Carr: Okay, Dick.

[Comm Break. On the surface, Pete and Al have begun their final P57, starting with a determination of the local gravity vector, as per Sur-107.]
141:21:30 Carr: Intrepid. Houston. Your gravity angle difference looks good and, there'll be no uplinks to you this time.

141:21:39 Conrad: Very good. Very good.

141:21:43 Carr: Yankee Clipper, Houston.

141:21:48 Gordon: Go ahead.

141:21:49 Carr: Roger, Dick. Here's the Comm plan. About the time when you get VHF communications established with Intrepid, we're going to dump the MSFN relay. If for some reason you lose it and you want to hear the Intrepid lift-off, let us know, and we can reconfigure in about 20 seconds; but we would prefer to leave the relay out as long as you've got VHF.

141:22:16 Gordon: Roger. I think that'll be fine. Thank you. (Long Pause) Boy, this place is fascinating! Absolutely fascinating!

141:22:16 Carr: Roger.

[Long Comm Break. On the surface, Pete and Al are doing the final set of star sightings for platform alignment.]
141:29:35 Carr: Pretty nice looking torquing angles, Intrepid.

141:29:40 Bean: Yes, sir. I like them.

141:29:42 Carr: Roger.

[Comm Break. Apparently, the new measurements agree nicely with the previous ones and indicate little or no platform drift.]
MP3 Audio Clip ( 1 min 53 sec )

141:31:08 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. You're go to cast off on this Rev.

141:31:14 Conrad: Roger; Roger.

[Comm Break. Astronaut Gerry Carr is a Marine Corps pilot and is mixing a naval term - "cast off" - with an astronautical one - "Rev" or Command Module revolution. Pete and Al are both Naval aviators.]

[Journal Contributor Jack Kozak, a Navy veteran who served aboard submarines, offers the following correction to my inadvertent reference to Pete and Al as 'Navy pilots'. "The proper term is Naval Aviator. Why? Because in the days before the Wright brothers, a navy 'pilot' was someone who guided ships into harbor - a 'Harbor Pilot' - a term still used today. In the Gilbert & Sullivan operetta, 'The Pirates of Penzance', a young man was supposed to be apprenticed to a 'pilot', but was apprenticed to a 'pirate' by accident. That 19th century reference to a pilot will give some context as to why those who fly aircraft in the Navy came to be called aviators rather than pilots. I know this is a picky point, but more Naval Aviators (7 including Navy-trained Neil Armstrong) walked on the moon than Air Force Pilots (4) and the distinction is generally important to them."]

MP3 Audio Clip ( 9 min 04 sec )

141:32:53 Bean: Houston, did you copy the values of 047 and 053?

141:32:58 Carr: That's affirmative, Al, and they're Go.

[Long Comm Break. The "values" referred to here have to do with the alignment they have done of the AGS (Abort Guidance System) from the PGNS (Primary Guidance and Navigation System) at the upper right on Sur-108. During this Comm Break, they may be donning their bubble helmets and gloves, if they haven't done so already.]
141:42:48 Conrad: Houston, we're firing ascent 1.

141:42:52 Carr: Roger, Intrepid. (Long Pause)

[They are opening the ascent stage helium tanks to pressurize the propellant tanks as per the steps near the middle of Sur-112. For the last several minutes, they have been reconfiguring and verifying switch, circuit breaker, and valve settings.]

[Conrad - "The helium tanks are sealed off and the valves are pyrotechnically opened. One shot (that is, it has to work). But it's the most reliable (method)."]

[Jones - "And, once it's open, it's open."]

[Conrad - "That's it. But we waited until a very specific time prior to launch so that, in the event of a leak, it could take a certain amount of leak. So there were a whole bunch of these things. We had a lot of dead time in here because we started early. But these were time-dependent on lift-off, for just that reason. So we are now in the final count. And if I read this right, we're about 20 minutes from lift-off and that was exactly when we were supposed to open them."]

141:43:08 Carr: (Houston having looked over the tank pressure telemetry) Intrepid, Houston. Looks good. (Long Pause) Tank 2 looks good.
[Long Comm Break]
141:48:03 Conrad: (As per Sur-113) Batts 2 and 4 coming off, Houston.

141:48:07 Carr: Roger, Intrepid. (Long Pause)

MP3 Audio Clip ( 1 min 29 sec )

141:49:09 Bean: Houston, Intrepid. Are you recommending VHF A Receiver On or Off for launch? Over.

141:49:19 Carr: Stand by, Intrepid. (Long Pause) Intrepid, Houston. Need to have your VHF A Transmitter to Voice Range; and Receiver, Off.

141:50:03 Bean: That's where she sits. Thanks.

[Bean - "We're going voice range (a Doppler ranging system) so Dick can pick us up. Probably get us going over, isn't he?"]

[Conrad - "Yeah. He's overhead when we go up."]

[Very Long Comm Break. During this Comm Break, Pete and Al make a final check of the circuit breaker configuration as per Sur-114 and 115.]

MP3 Audio Clip ( 6 min 27 sec )

142:00:52 Conrad: Hello, Houston; Intrepid is on VOX. How do you read?

[VOX is the voice-activated comm system, as opposed to push-to-talk.]
142:00:57 Carr: Loud and clear, Pete.

142:01:02 Conrad: Roger. Checklist is complete; standing by for Tig minus 2.

142:01:06 Carr: Roger. (Long Pause)

[Bean - "We checked all those switches ten times."]
142:01:49 Conrad: Tig minus 2. 400 plus 10. Set your watch.

142:01:56 Bean: I set that at 1 minute.

142:01:59 Gordon: Houston; Clipper. I have the LM (visually).

142:02:00 Conrad: And...

142:02:01 LM Crew: Start (garbled under Gordon)

142:02:02 Carr: Roger, Clipper. Intrepid, Clipper's watching you.

142:02:07 Conrad: Howdy, Yankee Clipper. Okay. Very good. (Long Pause)

142:02:43 Conrad: On my time, Yankee Clipper, it will be 1 minute.

142:02:49 Conrad: Mark. One minute. Master Arm is On...

142:02:53 Bean: Okay.

142:02:54 Conrad: 367, Read.

[Pete is asking Al to bring up AGS address 367 on the DEDA on Al’s side of the cabin. That will show the altitude rate (ft/sec). See, for example, Table 6.3 in the AGS Operating Manual - FP6 (38 Mb).]
142:02:57 Bean: I've got it. First stage (means 'abort stage') push at 30 seconds, Pete.

142:03:05 Conrad: Roger. (Pause) Watch the ALSEP, and I'll fly the bird.

[Al will watch their position relative to the ALSEP, a crude check on the performance of the LM guidance.]
142:03:08 Bean: Sounds good to me. (Pause) (Garbled)

142:03:16 Conrad: DSKY's blank. (Pause) Average g...

142:03:23 LM Crew: Abort stage, push. Engine arm, ascent.

142:03:26 Bean: All we lack is Pro(ceed) and then, after, we get Engine Start.

142:03:28 Conrad: Okay. Twenty seconds.

142:03:32 Carr: Looking good, Pete.

142:03:36 Conrad: (Responding to Carr) Okay. 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5...

142:03:45 Conrad: ARM.

[They are arming the explosive devices which will separate the LM stages.]
142:03:46 Bean: Pro.

142:03:47 Conrad: 3, 2, 1...

142:03:49 Conrad: Lift-off. And away we go.

142:03:52 Bean: Boy, did it fire.

142:03:55 Conrad: Yawing? Looks pretty good.

142:03:56 Bean: (Garbled) our descent stage - holding on.

142:03:58 Conrad: Looks good. ALSEP looks good.

142:04:01 Bean: (Garbled). It didn't get the ALSEP.

142:04:03 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Copy ignition; guidance looks good.

142:04:06 Conrad: Pitchover's looking good. Okay. Boy, you sure do (garbled)

142:04:15 Bean: Nice and quiet, isn't it?

142:04:16 Conrad: Firing like I don't know what.

[Jones - "You guys sound like you might have done this before."]

[Bean - (Laughing) "I'm not saying much. Notice, I'm not giving myself away!"]

[Reading this in 2015, a quarter century after the review sessions with Pete and Al, I can't be certain for the reason for Al's laughter. What occurs to me is that he is commenting that he didn't have much to say during the ascent, working to keep a lid on his excitement about what they were doing while they got the job done. Thanks to Thomas Schwagmeier for the question.]

142:04:18 Conrad: Mark. Thirty seconds. Thirty seconds; 177 (feet per second horizontal velocity), 984.6 (feet per second vertical velocity), and out at 1900 feet (altitude).

142:04:28 Bean: That's pretty good.

142:04:29 Conrad: We're on our way.

142:04:30 Bean: And at 1 minute, yaw right 20, Pete.

142:04:32 Conrad: Okay.

[They are rotating the spacecraft 20 degrees around the thrust axis to give themselves better comm during the ascent.]
142:04:38 Bean: Boy, there's that.

142:04:43 Conrad: Say again? Pitch program looks good.

142:04:50 Bean: Kind of wobbles around up here.

142:04:51 Conrad: (Garbled).

142:04:52 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Looking good at 1 minute.

142:04:57 Conrad: Okay. We've yawed right 20. Keeping right down the pike.

142:05:02 Bean: Okay.

142:05:04 Conrad: What a nice...

142:05:05 Bean: Both tank pressures look good, Pete.

142:05:06 Conrad: What a nice ride!

142:05:07 Bean: RCS, right in there.

142:05:10 Conrad: Yeah.

142:05:11 Bean: Sure jumps every time those thrusters fire.

142:05:13 Conrad: Yeah. Flies smooth.

142:05:14 Bean: (Garbled) part of it.

142:05:20 Conrad: Mark, 1 plus 30, 745 (horizontal velocity), 156. We're out at 9000 feet.

142:05:32 Bean: (Garbled) jumpy.

142:05:36 Conrad: Okay. It's just changing CG (Center of Gravity).

142:05:38 Bean: I know it. It's still smooth.

[Bean - "Why would 'changing CG' make sense?"]

[Conrad - "Well, it's burning out fuel."]

[Bean - "Yeah. And it sounded to me like something happened here that we knew about."]

[Conrad - "Yeah, but I don't remember (what it was)."]

142:05:41 Conrad: What a neat-o ride.

142:05:44 Bean: It's real...

142:05:45 Conrad: This thing is pitching over. It's right on the pitch profile.

142:05:49 Conrad: Mark.

142:05:50 LM Crew: Two minutes.

142:05:52 Conrad: 1061, 175...

142:05:55 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. Go at 2.

142:05:56 Conrad: ...6. Just a little bit higher. Roger.

142:06:03 Bean: Everything looks good, Pete. Pressures look good.

142:06:04 Conrad: Sure does. (Pause) Looks like some of the same territory we've passed over before, doesn't it? (Pete chuckles)

142:06:14 Bean: PGNS and AGS agree. Perfectly.

142:06:16 Conrad: Roger. Okay.

142:06:19 Conrad: Mark. Two minutes and 30 seconds, looking at 1373 (horizontal velocity), 187 (vertical velocity), climbing out at 19,700 (feet). Houston, you better clear me out of flight level 240 for flight level 600.

142:06:37 Carr: Roger. Squawk 21.

[Conrad - "It's airplane terminology. It's like 'hook down', and 'fox corpen'."]
142:06:38 Bean: (Garbled) right.

142:06:41 Conrad: (Laughing) Okay. Squawking 21. How does your high gain look, Al?

142:06:48 Bean: High gain looks real good, Pete. Hanging in there.

142:06:49 Conrad: MARK. Three minutes, 1752, 194, climbing out at 25,000 (feet).

142:07:00 Gordon: Houston, Clipper. If you can, have him transmit VHF also.

142:07:06 Conrad: Say again, Dick.

142:07:07 Carr: Dick would like you to transmit on VHF.

MP3 Audio Clip ( 2 min 56 sec )

142:07:13 Conrad: Roger. I am transmitting on VHF. (Pause) Three minutes and 30 seconds, Al. 2130 feet per second, climbing 193, and we're out at 31,600.

142:07:31 Bean: Okay. (Sequence) camera went off sometime after lift-off. I hope it got the ALSEP (as they flew over).

142:07:41 Conrad: It's still running.

142:07:42 Bean: I turned it back on.

142:07:43 Conrad: Oh, I see. Wonder why we got the Master Alarm? Never did see anything.

142:07:47 Bean: No, I didn't either. Everything looks good.

142:07:50 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. You're looking good at 4.

142:07:51 Conrad: Four minutes, 2513,...

142:07:56 Bean: Pressures look good.

142:07:57 Conrad: ...37, climbing out at 37,000 (feet altitude).

142:07:59 Bean: Okay.

142:08:01 Conrad: Oh, look at that rille down there. Wow! (I) think that was part of Lansberg, I think, down there on the left. (Pause) Okay...

142:08:15 Bean: The camera stopped again, Pete.

142:08:17 Conrad: Forget it.

142:08:19 Conrad: Mark. 4:30. 2954 feet (per second horizontal velocity). This is a hot machine. 173, climbing out of 42,800. Glad you're happy. Okay. (Pause) Helium pressures look good.

142:08:38 Bean: (The LM is) starting move around a little bit more now as we lighten up.

142:08:41 Conrad: Okay. You've got a big job now. Don't forget the ascent feed (garbled)...(Laughs).

142:08:45 Bean: I've been thinking about them since we lifted off.

142:08:48 Conrad: Okay. Five minutes.

142:08:50 Conrad: MARK. Five minutes, 3403, 156 feet, and out at 47,000.

142:08:57 Carr: Intrepid, Houston. You're looking good at 5. The harbor master has cleared you into the main channel.

142:09:04 Conrad: Roger.

142:09:08 Bean: Really getting down there. (Pause) Look at that lunar surface, would you.

142:09:16 Conrad: Okay. Five plus 30.

142:09:19 Bean: Okay.

142:09:20 Conrad: Mark. Man, look at that crater we're flying over.

142:09:22 Bean: Okay. I'm going to call it 500.

142:09:24 Conrad: And - What are you doing?

142:09:26 Bean: Okay; 70, 100.

142:09:28 Conrad: Okay. (Garbled) 4000. I think we got it.

142:09:33 Bean: 1400 feet per second to go (in horizontal velocity). Okay. (Pause) 142:09:39 Conrad:Get a mark at 6 minutes.

142:09:49 Conrad: Six minutes, 6 minutes, 4382. Okay, I'm going to get over on Verb 16, Noun 85 right now. This thing's running a little bit hot.

142:10:02 Bean: Okay. 900 feet according to the AGS.

142:10:05 Conrad: Okay.


This concludes the Apollo 12 Lunar Surface Journal.


Return to the LM and Closeout Apollo 12 Journal Day 6: From the Snowman to Docking (AFJ)