Why
Does the Space Shuttle Have Wings?
A Look at the Social Construction of Technology in Air and Space
by
Stephen J. Garber
I.
Introduction
From
1969 to early 1972, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) considered a variety of designs for a vehicle that could
carry people and cargo into space repeatedly. The numerous designs
involved three basic kinds of orbiter vehicles: a winged vehicle,
like an airplane; a wingless lifting body; and a ballistic
capsule such as the Apollo, Gemini, and Mercury programs used. Airplanes
usually made powered horizontal landings; lifting bodies generally
glided to horizontal landings; and ballistic capsules either splashed
down in the ocean or used parachutes to land on terra firma. After
many heated political and technical debates, the design that emerged
had triangular (delta) wings at the rear of the Space Shuttle.
Why
did NASA choose a winged configuration? Were its motivations technological
or political? Such a false dichotomy neglects the critical point
that the Shuttle, like all technological tools, is designed by humans
to meet specific goals. Thus the social-political goals that NASA
dictated and accepted for the Shuttle determined its technological
design. Specifically, the Shuttle was designed to carry a reasonably
large payload, to have significant cross range capability, to be
a reusable system that would lower the cost of access to space,
and to be safe enough for human crews. These four social-political
criteria severely constrained the myriad proposed technical configurations
for the Shuttle.
Yet
is it possible that there were other social reasons governing the
design of the Shuttle? One argument is that the people who were
designing spacecraft and launch systems in the 1960s and 1970s were
largely trained as aeronautical engineers and thus were conditioned
to think about airplanes flying. To such a mindset, spaceflight
was simply an extension of flight in the atmosphere, despite all
the major differences. Indeed, winged spaceflight has a long theoretical
tradition that dates back well before Sputnik, the worlds
first artificial satellite, was ever launched in 1957. While it
may be tempting to think that the Shuttle has wings because of this
aeronautical engineering mindset, it is difficult to gather sufficient
historical evidence to warrant this assertion.
Although
the technological goals of the Shuttle limited the number of possible
configurations, it is still worth considering other cultural factors.
As compared with the Soviet Union/Russia, for example, the United
States has a tradition of technological innovation and "invention,"
while the Soviets/Russians tend toward continual modification and
improvement. Such an analysis may help explain why NASA essentially
discarded proven technologies that it had used in the 1960s, such
as the Saturn launch vehicle family and the ballistic reentry capsules
used in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs, in favor of a
totally new space transportation system.
This
paper will briefly cover the specific historical circumstances of
the Shuttle design decision and examine the trade-offs of the possible
wing configurations with respect to the four design goals. As theoretical
background, this paper then will briefly review some of the relevant
social construction of technology (SCOT) literature by scholars
such as Wiebe Bijker and Thomas Hughes. In addition, this paper
will examine articles by Walter Vincenti and Eric Schatzberg that
address similar issues of technological definitions and solutions
in the aeronautics field. Then this paper will combine SCOT theory
with the specific circumstances of this Shuttle case study to identify
and analyze possible social constructs of technology in the Shuttle
case. Finally, this paper will attempt to draw some conclusions
about which social factors were most important in giving the Shuttle
its delta wings and to draw out some implications for SCOT.
II.
Historical BackgroundWhat Were the Shuttles Goals and
Possible Configurations?
III.
Theoretical Models
IV.
SCOT and the Shuttles Wings
V.
Conclusions
References
1If
the Shuttle were launched south into a polar orbit of the Earth,
by the time the Shuttle made one complete orbit, the Earth would
have spun on its axis over 1,000 miles east. If the Shuttle were
then to land at its original launch site, it would need to be able
to maneuver over 1,000 miles laterally to meet up with
its launch site on the ground.


Updated
April 5, 2001
Steven J. Dick, NASA Chief Historian
Steve Garber, NASA History Web Curator
For further information, e-mail histinfo@hq.nasa.gov
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