1. Relevant Organization Charts of NASA and Morton Thiokol.

NASA

• NASA Headquarters (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).
• Office of Space Flight (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).
• Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).
• John F. Kennedy Space Center (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).

  George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Organization Charts:

• Center Organization (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).
• Science and Engineering Directorate (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).
• Shuttle Projects Office (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).
• Key Marshall Personnel Related to the Solid Rocket Booster.

Morton Thiokol

• Morton Thiokol, Inc. (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).
• Morton Thiokol 27 Jan 1986 Meeting Participants.

2. Temperature Definitions (as applicable to this report)

References:

1. Report, "Accident Analysis Team Report, Solid Rocket Motor Working Group, NASA, April 1986", pages B-105 through B-114.

2. Commission Panel Work Session (Solid Rocket Booster matters) Design and Production Panel; Brigham City, Utah, March 18, 1986, pages 392 through 403.

3. Report, "Accident Analysis Team Report, Space Shuttle Systems Working Group. NASA, April 1986", pages 18 through 23, Tables B.1 and B.2.

Note: A comparison of atmospheric environmental data (wind, temperature, precipitation) for Flights STS-1 through STS-61C in included in Tables B.5 and B.6 of reference 3.

3. Early Marshall documents and memoranda raising design objections.

• This briefing chart is the earliest known indication that the joint design was unacceptable. Leon Ray, in a 1977 briefing on a planned Structural Test Article test indicates that no changing the design is unacceptable since the tang can move outboard and cause excessive joint clearance resulting in seal leakage.
• This memorandum, written by Leon Ray and signed by John Q. Miller, strongly urged that the clevis joint be redesigned.
• This memorandum, also written by Leon Ray and signed by John Q. Miller, strongly questions the clevis joint design. It is the earliest known official document which questions the redundancy of the seal.
• This Leon Ray memorandum documents his visits to two O-ring manufacturers, both of whom expressed concern relative to the O-ring performing properly in the joint design.

4. Documents relating to the change from Criticality 1R to 1, and the waiver of the redundancy requirements for the Solid Rocket Motor seal.

• This original Critical Items List entry for the Solid Rocket Motor case joint seals establishes them as Critically 1R (redundant).
• In late 1982, Marshall Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance engineers reviewed test and analysis results and determined that the case joints should be reclassified as Critically 1 (not redundant). This form was signed by Maurice (Bud) Parker, a local Thiokol Reliability engineer, beginning the process of management approval of the Criticality change.
• On January 21, 1983, the Marshall Configuration Control Board, chaired by Lawrence Mulloy, approved the change from Criticality 1R to Criticality 1 and approved it for forwarding to Level II.
• After receiving written concurrence from certain Johnson organizations, Glynn Lunney, the Shuttle Program Manager, approved the Criticality change, based on a telephone conversation with Lawrence Mulloy, the Solid Rocket Booster Project Manager. The action was taken without convening a meeting of the Program Requirements Control Board. This action authorized submittal of a waiver of the "fail-safe" design requirement to Level I.

  Glynn Lunney signed this request for Level I to approve for the field joint a waiver of the "fail-safe requirement" for Shuttle component, in that the joint had been reclassified as Criticality 1 (no redundancy). The waiver was approved for Level I by L. Michael Weeks on March 28, 1983.

5. Memoranda written following the field joint O-ring erosion on STS 41-B (flight 10).

• This internal Marshall note was written by John W. Miller after the O-ring erosion experience on STS 41-B (flight 10), indicating concern that the leak check procedures may displace putty ("blow-holes") leading to O-ring burning ("erosion"). STS 41-B was the first flight for which a 200 psi leak check stabilization pressure was used.
• In this memorandum to Lawrence Mulloy, George Morefield compares the Titan joint with the Shuttle joint and assesses a higher failure probability for the shuttle joint, indicating concern that putty may cause "single point pressurization" of the primary O-ring.

6. Marshall urgent request for briefing after the STS 51-C mission (flight 15).

• Following the discovery of the STS 51-C (flight 15) O-ring erosion and blow-by, Lawrence Mulloy sent this "Certified Urgent" message to the Solid Rocket Motor manager, Larry Wear. This message was passed on to Thiokol as direction to prepare a detailed briefing on O-ring problems for the next Flight Readiness Review.

7. Internal NASA Headquarters memorandum after visit to Marshall.

• This memorandum to Level I describes a visit to Marshall by Irving Davids of NASA Headquarters. Davids' visit was prompted by the nozzle O-ring problems suffered on STS 51-B (flight 17).

8. Thiokol letters and memoranda written after O-ring concern escalates.

• Roger Boisjoily's first attempt after STS 51-B (flight 17) to convince his management of the seriousness of the O-ring erosion problem.
• In this memorandum to S.R. Stein, A.R. Thompson indicates the O-ring seal problem is acute and short-term measures should be taken to reduce flight risk.
• In this weekly activity report, Robert Ebeling attempts ("Help!") to draw management attention to the difficulties experienced by the seal task force in getting adequate support, indicating "This is a red flag."
• S.R. Stein echoes the concerns about the seal task force not getting full support.
• In this activity report, Roger Boisjoly expresses his frustration with the slow progress of and lack of management attention to the seal task force.

9. Marshall internal memorandum in the fall of 1985.

• In this memorandum, J. E. Kingsbury informs Lawrence Mulloy that he places high priority on the O-ring seal problem and desires additional information on plans for improving the situation.