

## Challenges of Risk Management for Rapid Acquisition

As viewed from a rapid USSF system acquisition program

- Rapid acquisition programs are characterized by
  - Shorter acquisition schedules
  - Smaller program management office teams
  - Higher risk tolerance
- Implementing traditional Risk Management poses challenges
  - Limited staff and schedule to execute the rigorous RM process
  - Unclear how to translate "risk tolerance" into the 5x5 risk matrix
  - Tempo of risk handling must outpace the traditional RMB cycle
- The de facto risk management process addresses the big rocks as they emerge
  - Risks posing potential for a major setbacks get mitigated
  - Urgency tends to establish priority
  - PM makes the decisions no RMB formality

Need: fast, efficient method to prioritize risks to support PM decision

# Adopt a Different Perspective



RISK MANAGEMENT	ATTRIBUTE	RISK CONTROL
Risks to program success (P, C, S)	Focus	Threats to the mission success (D5)
Identify, analyze, treat & monitor the risks continually – INCOSE-TP-2003-002-04	Purpose	Inform the decision to allocate resources to counter threats
Completeness, Rigor	Goals	Necessity, Speed
Identify, Analyze, Handle, Monitor	<b>Process</b>	Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA Loop)
Risk matrix Risk burn-down plans	Products	Threat priority list Threat countermeasures


Prerequisite to Risk Control approach is a concise set of Mission – not Program – Objectives that define success

## Risk Control OODA Loop



**OBSERVE** emergent threats; generate a threat statement of the form:

- "Given <evidence> then <mission effect hypothesis>"
- Evidence is the set of facts observed
- Mission Effect is a hypothesis of possible impact to mission success



The OODA Loop repeats as new evidence is created or observed

# Threat Priority Matrix and Countermeasure Guidance

# **Threat Priority Matrix**

Confidence	Definition (modeled on CIA criteria)	
High	All evidence is consistent in support of the hypothesis	
Moderate	The preponderance of evidence supports the hypothesis	
Low	The evidence is inconsistent in support of the hypothesis	
None	The preponderance of evidence supports the antithesis	

Timout Thomas Indian				
High	10	7	4	1
<b>Confidence</b> Low Moderate	10	8	5	2
	10	9	6	3
None		10	10	10

None Disrupt Degrade Destroy

Mission Effect

#### **Countermeasures Guidance**


Must Have		
More is Better		
Nice to Have		
Accept		

Effects	Definition (analog to operational effect)	
Destroy	Fail to deliver the capability	
Degrade	Deliver less capability than planned (in quality or quantity)	
Disrupt	Deliver conditional capability or deliver late	
None	Programmatic impact only with no mission effect	

Threat priorities constitute actionable information for decisions

# Assessment of Actual Program Risks

Risk	Program Concern	Mission Concern
R-09	Miss an important component delivery deadline	Capability delayed until component delivered
R-21	Delay start of developmental test	No mission impact
R-24	Interoperability challenges due to architectural complexity	Capability delayed for post-launch SW updates
D 20	Inability of Customer to ingest and process data	Inability of Customer to indeed and process data



Mission-focused threat assessment improves resolution of priorities

# Next Steps

- Demonstrate Observe and Orient steps
  - Recast existing risks in accordance with Risk Control scheme
  - Compare Risk Matrix and Threat Priority List
  - Assess impact of priority changes
- Survey PMs regarding Decision step
  - Collect perceived relative utility of the Risk Matrix and Threat Priority List
  - Obtain recommended departures from Countermeasure Guidance
- Evaluate Act step
  - Assess effectiveness of current risk handling plans as Countermeasures



# Questions?

