

## **ASTERIA**



### Lessons Learned: Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI) Technical Interchange Meeting-4 (TIM-4)

Amanda Donner and Matthew W. Smith

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, California, United States

# ASTERIA

Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research In Astrophysics

#### Overview

- 6U CubeSat (approx. 10.2 kg, 11 x 24 x 37 cm<sup>3</sup>)
- JPL and MIT collaboration
  - Sara Seager, PI
  - Built, tested, operated at JPL
- Funded through JPL's Phaeton Program for early career training plus MIT contributions to ops
- Launched to ISS in August 2017 on SpaceX CRS-12, deployed into orbit 3 months later by NanoRacks
- 300+ days of operation in space

### **Prime Mission Achievements**

- Demonstrated pointing stability of <0.5 arcseconds RMS over 20 minutes</li>
- Demonstrated **pointing repeatability of 1 milliarcsecond RMS** from orbit to orbit
- Demonstrated **focal plane thermal stability of ±0.01 K** over 20 minutes



# ASTERIA

Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research In Astrophysics Extended Missions Status

- First CubeSat to detect an exoplanet: known super-Earth 55 Cancri e
- Continued observations of primary target star system, HD219134
- Continuing observations of secondary target star system, Alpha Centauri
- Demonstrating LEO orbit determination without GPS by imaging satellites in the geostationary belt
- Further characterizing reaction wheel jitter and its contribution to imaging performance
- Developing task networks to increase spacecraft autonomy and reduce ground-in-the-loop operations










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
## **ASTERIA Spacecraft Overview**



# **ASTERIA: Lessons Learned**

## **General Categories**

- Vendor interactions: contracts vs. results
- Design decisions: cost vs. risk
- Mission assurance: independence vs. insight
- Integration and test: schedule vs. completeness
- Operations: rigor vs. efficiency



## **Vendor Interactions**

- Background: ASTERIA supplier overview
  - Most suppliers (especially of COTS components) were specific to the CubeSat industry, and had not been previously used by JPL
  - Many CubeSat suppliers are small start-ups and do not have a certified Quality Management System (QMS)
  - A majority of suppliers used to fabricate JPL designs (e.g., PWB fabrication) did have a QMS and history with JPL
- Detail requirements and expectations in procurement documents (PO, statement of work), even for "COTS" hardware
  - Example: flight computer vendor data sheet described features that were not implemented in the product (e.g. SPI interface).
- Verify system behaviors of delivered products via testing
  - Example: Radio "auto mode" (speak only when spoken to) was not documented, which prohibited a beacon mode.
  - Example: Behavior of EPS timers governing power sequencing was nuanced, and finally fully characterized in system testing.

# **Hardware Design Decisions**

- Thermal model accuracy was critical
  - Example: EPS board-level thermal analysis revealed high junction temperatures, and a custom mount was designed to move heat away from the EPS
- Staking and conformal coating
  - All electronic boards included staking of large components
  - Access to conformal coating facilities and technicians was a challenge at JPL (oriented toward large, Class B missions)
    - Availability of a "cheap" and "fast" conformal coating capability would have removed schedule bottlenecks
    - Primary drivers for conformal coating were general protection against FOD, etc. and potential mitigation against tin whiskers (some pure tin parts used, but leaded solder used throughout)
- Latchup prevention
  - Known sensitive parts were avoided as much as possible, and/or protected with overcurrent protection circuitry

# **System Design Decisions**

- Value in designing flexibility and extensibility into the system with an eye toward operations.
  - Example: Fault protection updates via parameter table updates have allowed response to idiosyncracies not identified during limited system testing time.
  - Example: Flight software update capability has allowed team to address corner cases or space environment-related
  - Testing the flexibility features (e.g. FSW update) is essential
- To achieve positive power margin in worst case scenarios, a radio duty cycle was required
- FSW is a significant driver of system cost and complexity
  - F-prime FSW architecture developed on ASTERIA helped manage complexity but caused additional development work (ASTERIA was one of the first adopters of F-prime)
  - System engineering involvement in FSW design early is critical: decisions such as hard-coded parameters and different forms of parameters in each component were challenging
  - Clearly defined change control process for FSW (e.g., in JIRA) extremely useful

# **Mission Assurance**

## Lessons Learned

• Limited funding on CubeSat mission requires:

A: Insight > Independence One full-time individual acting as MAM also fills multiple other roles, ideally all related to risk mitigation. or B: Independence > Insight One individual fills MAM role and maintains independence, but is not funded beyond a low-level of support.

- Solution A worked well on ASTERIA (with MAM also specifically filling the role of fault protection engineer, and ultimately MOAM in operations)
  - Incorporation of independent reviews of mission assurance and fault protection approaches were key to mitigating a potential conflict of interest

### **CubeSat Fault Protection:**

- Identify simple "catch-all" fault monitors and test them thoroughly
- Do not hesitate to implement a *"hard-hammer" power-cycling response*
- Allow for *in-flight fault protection updates* without a FSW update

## **Mission Assurance**

### Tailored approach on ASTERIA

#### Hardware Quality Assurance (HQA):

- Inspections start at board assembly level (not part level)
- Flow quality assurance requirements to vendors (e.g., require tin-lead, not pure tin, solder)
- Conduct reviews for subsystems prior to system integration
- Oversight during assembly and testing of flight system

#### Environments Assurance:

- Vibration test (per NanoRacks requirements) of flight system
- Thermal vacuum test of flight system (with qual batteries)
- Minimize effects due to electromagnetic interference and electrostatic discharge
- **Reliability Assurance:** focus on derating of electronic parts for JPL-designed boards
- Electronic Parts Assurance: minimize radiation-induced single event effects
- System Safety:
  - NanoRacks safety requirements compliance evaluation
  - Conduct safety surveys of lab areas


#### • Software Quality Assurance (SQA):

- Review initial flight software development plan
- Support reviews of launch delivery software and in-flight software updates
- Assisted with software static analysis shortly before delivery (earlier may have been helpful)

## Integration and Test

- Mission Scenario Tests (MSTs) are critical to understanding system behavior and identifying idiosyncracies:
  - MSTs run included: nominal deploy/detumble, off-nominal deploy/detumble, nominal day-in-the-life, off-nominal day-in-the-life (interjection of multiple faults), observation sequence
- Long duration system testing was also critical
  - On ASTERIA, ran tests in parallel on flight system and on testbed to "shake out" long-term issues in FSW, for example, before fully verifying on flight system
- Overlap Cog-E and technician roles
  - Train Cog-E's in crimping, conformal coating, etc., to minimize wait time for technicians
- Make multiple testbeds available to FSW team
  - The ideal, not always realized, is to have a testbed for the exclusive use of the FSW team that includes the flight-equivalent CDH hardware

## **ASTERIA Operations Overview**




## **Operations**

- Operational Readiness Tests (ORTs) were helpful
  - Exercised and refined operations processes in the flight venue using the testbed as a proxy for the spacecraft
  - Especially valuable for this team, which for the most part was new to operations
  - Occurred after delivery but before deployment
  - Real operations exposed issues that were not identified in the ORTs (low data rates, spacecraft rotation, fault recovery)
- End-to-end information system (EEIS) testing was essential
  - Performed several EEIS "thread tests" to validate the end-to-end data flow from RF at the station to the GDS server
  - No single thread test covered the entire chain; needed to combine multiple tests to achieve full coverage due to equipment constraints (e.g. ground station modem was at JPL for the first ORT but shipped to Morehead in the weeks prior to deployment)

## **Operations**

- Value of full system testbed (combines flight spare and EM hardware, and ground system hardware for "front door" testing)
  - "Front door" testing (through the flight GDS interface) allows endto-end testing of new commands, which was especially valuable in validating a new FSW update process using a FSW patch
  - "Back door" testing used primarily for testing new sequences and testing new FSW versions
- Single ground station
  - Pros: responsive and flexible
  - Cons: no backup in the event of a failure, weather, etc.
- Access to shell commanding on the spacecraft CDH through Linux OS has been beneficial (allows access to low-level payload commands and access to system logs)
- GitHub-based uplink approval process works well








# **Questions?**




# Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Approach

ASTERIA: Combined Roles to Scale for Small Team



# **Combined Roles on ASTERIA**

### **Risk Management Example**



## **Fault Protection Design**

Monitors catch system-wide safety issues

Examples: Low battery voltage\* ACS off-sun Command loss Sequence failure

#### **Responses assert safe state**

"Soft hammer" safe mode response powers off payload and commands ACS to point at sun

"Hard hammer" reset response power cycles all subsystems except EPS


#### **EPS** watchdog

If FSW does not respond to health pings, EPS power cycles flight computer, which boots into Safe Mode


\*At launch the response to this fault was the safe mode response, as testing and analysis had not identified a credible scenario where power cycling the ACS unit would provide greater benefit than risk...

# **Tumbling Anomaly and Commanded Reset**


### **Motivation for Fault Protection Updates**



## **Fault Protection In-Flight Changes**




#### Later changes via FSW update



All changes were tested on the testbed per ASTERIA operations procedures

## **55 Cancri e Detection**



- 410 ppm transit observed at SNR=3
- 2R<sub>E</sub> exoplanet around a V=5.95 Sun-like star
- The above plots contain 526 minutes of cumulative observation time, phase folded
- Photometric precision is 730 to 1140 ppm/min at V=5.95