[19] Flight of the Space Shuttle Challenger on Mission 51-L began at 11:38 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on January 28, 1986. It ended 73 seconds later in an explosive burn of hydrogen and oxygen propellants that destroyed the External Tank and exposed the Orbiter to severe aerodynamic loads that caused complete structural breakup. All seven crew members perished. The two Solid Rocket Boosters flew out of the fireball and were destroyed by the Air Force range safety officer 110 seconds after launch.
The ambient air temperature at launch was 36 degrees Fahrenheit measured at ground level approximately 1,000 feet from the 51-L mission launch pad 39B. This temperature was 15 degrees colder than that of any previous launch.
The following description of the flight events is based on visual examination and image enhancement of film from NASA operated cameras and telemetry data transmitted from the Space Shuttle to ground stations. The last telemetry data from the Challenger was received 73.618 seconds after launch.
At 6.6 seconds before launch, the Challenger's liquid fueled main engines were ignited in sequence and run up to full thrust while the entire Shuttle structure was bolted to the launch pad. Thrust of the main engines bends the Shuttle assembly forward from the bolts anchoring it to the pad. When the Shuttle assembly springs back to the vertical, the Solid Rocket Boosters' restraining bolts are explosively released. During this prerelease "twang" motion, structural loads are stored in the assembled structure. These loads are released during the first few seconds of flight in a structural vibration mode at a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The maximum structural loads on the aft field joints of the Solid Rocket Boosters occur during the "twang," exceeding even those of the maximum dynamic pressure period experienced later in flight.
Just after liftoff at .678 seconds into the flight, photographic data show a strong puff of gray smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster. The two pad 39B cameras that would have recorded the precise location of the puff were inoperative. Computer graphic analysis of film from other cameras indicated the initial smoke came from the 270 to 310-degree sector of the circumference of the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Booster. This area of the solid booster faces the External Tank. The vaporized material streaming from the joint indicated there was not complete sealing action within the joint.
Eight more distinctive puffs of increasingly blacker smoke were recorded between .836 and 2.500 seconds. The smoke appeared to puff upwards from the joint. While each smoke puff was being left behind by the upward flight of the Shuttle, the next fresh puff could be seen near the level of the joint. The multiple smoke puffs in this sequence occurred at about four times per second, approximating the frequency of the structural load dynamics and resultant joint flexing. Computer graphics applied to NASA photos from a variety of cameras in this sequence again placed the smoke puffs' origin in the 270-to 310-degree sector of the original smoke spurt.
As the Shuttle increased its upward velocity, it flew past the emerging and expanding smoke puffs. The last smoke was seen above the field joint at 2.733 seconds. At 3.375 seconds the last [20] smoke was visible below the Solid Rocket Boosters and became indiscernible as it mixed with rocket plumes and surrounding atmosphere.
The black color and dense composition of the smoke puffs suggest that the grease, joint insulation and rubber O-rings in the joint seal were being burned and eroded by the hot propellant gases.
Launch sequence films from previous missions were examined in detail to determine if there were any prior indications of smoke of the color and composition that appeared during the first few seconds of the 51-L mission. None were found. Other vapors in this area were determined to be melting frost from the bottom of the External Tank or steam from the rocket exhaust in the pad's sound suppression water trays.
Shuttle main engines were throttled up to 104 percent of their rated thrust level, the Challenger executed a programmed roll maneuver and the engines were throttled back to 94 percent.
At approximately 37 seconds, Challenger encountered the first of several high-altitude wind shear conditions, which lasted until about 64 seconds. The wind shear created forces on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These were immediately sensed and countered by the guidance, navigation and control system. Although flight 51-L loads exceeded prior experience in both yaw and pitch planes at certain instants, the maxima had been encountered on previous flights and were within design limits.
The steering system (thrust vector control) of the Solid Rocket Booster responded to all commands and wind shear effects. The wind shear caused the steering system to be more active than on any previous flight.
At 45 seconds into the flight, three bright flashes appeared downstream of the Challenger's right wing. Each flash lasted less than one-thirtieth of' a second. Similar flashes have been seen on other flights. Another appearance of a separate bright spot was diagnosed by film analysis to be a reflection of main engine exhaust on the Orbital Maneuvering System pods located at the upper rear section of the Orbiter. The flashes were unrelated to the later appearance of the flame plume from the right Solid Rocket Booster.
Both the Shuttle main engines and the solid rockets operated at reduced thrust approaching and passing through the area of maximum dynamic pressure of 720 pounds per square foot. Main engines had been throttled up to 104 percent thrust and the Solid Rocket Boosters were increasing their thrust when the first flickering flame appeared on the right Solid Rocket Booster in the area of the aft field joint. This first very small flame was detected on image enhanced film at 58.788 seconds into the flight. It appeared to originate at about 305 degrees around the booster circumference at or near the aft field joint.
One film frame later from the same camera, the flame was visible without image enhancement. It grew into a continuous, well-defined plume at 59.262 seconds. At about the same time (60 seconds), telemetry showed a pressure differential between the chamber pressures in the right and left boosters. The right booster chamber pressure was lower, confirming the growing leak in the area of the field joint.
As the flame plume increased in size, it was deflected rearward by the aerodynamic slipstream and circumferentially by the protruding structure of the upper ring attaching the booster to the External Tank. These deflections directed the flame plume onto the surface of the External Tank. This sequence of flame spreading is confirmed by analysis of the recovered wreckage. The growing flame also impinged on the strut attaching the Solid Rocket Booster to the External Tank.
At about 62 seconds into the flight, the control system began to react to counter the forces caused by the plume and its effects. The left Solid Rocket Booster thrust vector control moved to counter the yaw caused by reduced thrust from the leaking right Solid Rocket Booster. During the next nine seconds, Space Shuttle control systems worked to correct anomalies in pitch and yaw rates.
The first visual indication that swirling flame from the right Solid Rocket Booster breached the External Tank was at 64.660 seconds when there was an abrupt change in the shape and color of the plume. This indicated that it was mixing with leaking hydrogen from the External Tank. Telemetered changes in the hydrogen tank pressurization confirmed the leak. Within 45 milliseconds of the breach of the External Tank, a bright sustained glow developed on the black-tiled underside of the Challenger between it and the External Tank.
Beginning at about 72 seconds, a series of events occurred extremely rapidly that terminated [21] the flight. Telemetered data indicate a wide variety of flight system actions that support the visual evidence of the photos as the Shuttle struggled futilely against the forces that were destroying it.
At about 72.20 seconds the lower strut linking the Solid Rocket Booster and the External Tank was severed or pulled away from the weakened hydrogen tank permitting the right Solid Rocket Booster to rotate around the upper attachment strut. This rotation is indicated by divergent yaw and pitch rates between the left and right Solid Rocket Boosters.
At 73.124 seconds, a circumferential white vapor pattern was observed blooming from the side of the External Tank bottom dome. This was the beginning of the structural failure of the hydrogen tank that culminated in the entire aft dome dropping away. This released massive amounts of liquid hydrogen from the tank and created a sudden forward thrust of about 2.~3 million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank upward into the intertank structure. At about the same time, the rotating right Solid Rocket Booster impacted the intertank structure and the lower part of the liquid oxygen tank. These structures failed at 73.137 seconds as evidenced by the white vapors appearing in the intertank region.
Within milliseconds there was massive, almost explosive, burning of the hydrogen streaming from the failed tank bottom and the liquid oxygen breach in the area of the intertank.
At this point in its trajectory, while traveling at a Mach number of 1.92 at an altitude of 46,O00 feet, the Challenger was totally enveloped in the explosive burn. The Challenger's reaction control system ruptured and a hypergolic burn of its propellants occurred as it exited the oxygen-hydrogen flames. The reddish brown colors of the hypergolic fuel burn are visible on the edge of the main fireball. The Orbiter, under severe aerodynamic loads, broke into several large sections which emerged from the fireball. Separate sections that can be identified on film include the main engine/tail section with the engines still burning, one wing of the Orbiter, and the forward fuselage trailing a mass of umbilical lines pulled loose from the payload bay.
Evidence in the recovered wreckage from the 51-L mission hardware supports this final sequence of events.
[37-39] STS 51-L Sequence of Major Events
.
       16:37:53.444
       ME - 3 Ignition
         Command
       - 6.566
       GPC
       37:53.564
       ME - 2 Ignition
         Command
       - 6.446
       GPC
       37:53.684
       ME - 1 Ignition
         Command
       - 6.326
       GPC
       38:00.010
       SRM Ignition Command
         (T=O)
       0.000
       GPC
       38:00.018
       Holddown Post 2 PIC
         firing
       0.008
       E8 Camera
       38:00.260
       First Continuous Vertical
         Motion
       0.250
       E9 Camera
       38:00.688
       Confirmed smoke above field
         joint on RH SRM
       0.678
       E60 Camera
       38:00.846
       Eight puffs of smoke (from
         0.836 thru 2.500 sec MET)
       0.836
       E63 Camera
       38:02.743
       Last positive evidence of
         smoke above right aft SRB/ET attach ring
       2.733
       CZR-1 Camera
       38:03.385
       Last positive visual
         indication of smoke
       3.375
       E60 Camera
       38:04.349
       SSME 104% Command
       4.339
       E41M2076D
       38:05.684
       RH SRM pressure 11.8 psi
         above nominal
       5.674
       B47P2302C
       38:07.734
       Roll maneuver
         initiated
       7.724
       V9OR5301C
       38:19.869
       SSME 94% Command
       19.859
       E41M2076D
       38:21.134
       Roll maneuver
         completed
       21.124
       V9OR5301C
       38:35.389
       SSME 65% Command
       35.379
       E41M2076D
       38:37.000
       Roll and Yaw Attitude
         Response to Wind (36.990 to 62.990 sec)
       36.990
       V95H352nC
       38:51.870
       SSME 104% Command
       51.860
       E41M2076D
       38:58.798
       First evidence of flame on
         RH SRM
       58.788
       E207 Camera
       38:59.010
       Reconstructed Max Q (720
         psf)
       59.000
       BET
       38:59.272
       Continuous well defined
         plume on RH SRM
       59.262
       E207 Camera
       38: 59.763
       Flame from RH SRM in + Z
         direction (seen from south side of vehicle)
       59.753
       E204 Camera
       39:00.014
       SRM pressure divergence (RH
         vs. LH)
       60.004
       B47P2302
       39:00.248
       First evidence of plume
         deflection, intermittent
       60.238
       E207 Camera
       39:00.258
       First evidence of SRB plume
         attaching to ET ring frame
       60.248
       E203 Camera
       39:00.998
       First evidence of plume
         deflection, continuous
       60.988
       E207 Camera
       39:01.734
       Peak roll rate response to
         wind
       61.724
       V9OR5301C
       39:02.094
       Peak TVC response to
         wind
       62.084
       B58H1150C
       39:02.414
       Peak yaw rate response to
         wind
       62.404
       V9OR5341C
       39:02.494
       RH outboard elevon actuator
         hinge moment spike
       62.484
       V58P0966C
       39:03.934
       RH outboard elevon actuator
         delta pressure change
       63.924
       V58P0966C
       39:03.974
       Start of planned pitch rate
         maneuver
       63.964
       V9OR5321C
       39:04.670
       Change in anomalous plume
         shape (LH2 tank leak near 2058 ring frame)
       64.660
       E204 Camera
       39:04.715
       Bright sustained glow on
         sides of ET
       64.705
       E204 Camera
       39:04.947
       Start SSME gimbal angle
         large pitch variations
       64.937
       V58HllOOA
       39:05.174
       Beginning of transient
         motion due to changes in aero forces due to plume
       65.164
       V9OR5321C
       39:05.534
       LH outboard elevon actuator
         delta pressure change
       65.524
       V58P0866C
       39:06.774
       Start ET
         LH2
         ullage pressure deviations
       66.764
       T41P1700C
       39:12.214
       Start divergent yaw rates
         (RH vs. LH SRB)
       72.204
       V9OR2528C
       39:12.294
       Start divergent pitch rates
         (RH vs. LH SRB)
       72.284
       V9OR2525C
       39:12.488
       SRB major high-rate
         actuator command
       72.478
       V79H2111A
       39:12.507
       SSME roll gimbal rates 5
         deg/sec
       72.497
       V58HllOOA
       39:12.535
       Vehicle max + Y lateral
         acceleration ( + .227 g)
       72.525
       V98A1581C
       39:12.574
       SRB major high-rate
         actuator motion
       72.564
       B58H1151C
       39:12.574
       Start of H2 tank pressure
         decrease with 2 flow control valves open
       72.564
       T41P1700C
       39:12.634
       Last state vector
         downlinked
       72.624
       Data reduction
       39:12.974
       Start of sharp MPS LOX
         inlet pressure drop
       72.964
       V41P1330C
       39:13.020
       Last full computer frame of
         TDRS data
       73.010
       Data reduction
       39:13.054
       Start of sharp MPS
         LH2
         inlet pressure drop
       73.044
       V41Pl lOOC
       39:13.055
       Vehicle max -Y lateral
         acceleration (-.254 g)
       73.045
       V98A1581C
       39:13.134
       Circumferential white
         pattern on ET aft dome (LH2 tank failure)
       73.124
       E204 Camera
       39:13.134
       RH SRM pressure 19 psi
         lower than LH SRM
       73.124
       B47P2302C
       39:13.147
       First hint of vapor at
         intertank
       73.137
       E207 Camera
       39:13.153
       All engine systems start
         responding to loss of fuel and LOX inlet pressure
       73.143
       SSME team
       39:13.172
       Sudden cloud along ET
         between intertank and aft dome
       73.162
       E207 Camera
       39:13.201
       Flash between Orbiter and
         LH2
         tank
       73.191
       E204 Camera
       39:13.221
       SSME telemetry data
         interference from 73.211 to 73.303
       73.211
       .
       39:13.223
       Flash near SRB fwd attach
         and brightening of flash between Orbiter and ET
       73.213
       E204 Camera
       39:13.292
       First indication intense
         white flash at SRB fwd attach point
       73.282
       E204 Camera
       39:13.337
       Greatly increased intensity
         of white flash
       73.327
       E204 Camera
       39:13.387
       Start RCS jet chamber
         pressure fluctuations
       73.377
       V42P1552A
       39:13.393
       All engines approaching
         HPFT discharge temp redline limits
       73.383
       E41TnO1OD
       39:13.492
       ME-2 HPFT disch. temp Chan.
         A vote for shutdown; 2 strikes on Chan. B
       73.482
       MEC data
       39:13.492
       ME-2 controller last time
         word update
       73.482
       MEC data
       39: 13.513
       ME-3 in shutdown due to
         HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance
       73.503
       MEC data
       39:13.513
       ME-3 controller last time
         word update
       73.503
       MEC data
       39:13.533
       ME-1 in shutdown due to
         HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance
       73.523
       Calculation
       39:13.553
       ME-1 last telemetered data
         point
       73.543
       Calculation
       39:13.628
       Last validated Orbiter
         telemetry measurement
       73.618
       V46P0120A
       39:13.641
       End of last reconstructed
         data frame with valid synchronization and frame count
      
       73.631
       Data reduction
       39:14.140
       Last radio frequency signal
         from Orbiter
       74.130
       Data reduction
       39:14.597
       Bright flash in vicinity of
         Orbiter nose
       74.587
       E204 Camera
       39:16.447
       RH SRB nose cap sep/chute
         deployment
       76.437
       E207 Camera
       39:50.260
       RH SRB RSS destruct
       110.250
       E202 Camera
       39:50.262
       LH SRB RSS destruct
       110.252
       E230 Camera
      
   
       
   
          
            
      
          
            
      
          
            
      
          
            
      
       
   
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
          
          
          
          
   
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
          
          
          
          
ACT POS
       - Actuator Position
       
       MEC
       - Main Engine
         Controller
       APU
       - Auxiliary Power
         Unit
       MET
       - Mission Elapsed
         Time
       BET
       - Best Estimated
         Trajectory
       MPS
       - Main Propulsion
         System
       CH
       - Channel
       PC
       - Chamber Pressure
       DISC
       - Discharge
       PIC
       - Pyrotechnics Initiator
         Controller
       ET
       - External Tank
       psf
       - Pounds per square
         foot
       GG
       - Gas Generator
       RCS
       - Reaction Control
         System
       GPC
       - General Purpose
         Computer
       RGA
       - Rate Gyro Assembly
      
       GMT
       - Greenwich Mean
         Time
       RH
       - Righthand
       HPFT
       - High Pressure Fuel
         Turbopump
       RSS
       - Range Safety
         System
       LH
       - Lefthand
       SRB
       - Solid Rocket
         Booster
       LH2
       - Liquid Hydrogen
       SRM
       - Solid Rocket Motor
      
       LO2
       - Liquid Oxygen
       SSME
       - Space Shuttle Main
         Engine
       MAX Q
       - Maximum Dynamic
         Pressure
       TEMP
       - Temperature
       ME
       - Main Engine (same as
         SSME)
       TVC
       - Thrust Vector
         Control
      
   
       
   
          
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
   
          
          
          
          
       
          
          
          
          
Note: The shuttle coordinate system used in Chapter 2 is, relative to the Orbiter, as follows:
Shuttle to Ground Telemetry Channels
.
       B47P1302C
       LH SRM CHAMBER
         PRESSURE
       B47P2302C
       RH SRM CHAMBER
         PRESSURE
       B58H1150C
       LH SRB TVC TILT ACT
         POS
       B58H1151C
       LH SRB TVC ROCK ACT
         POS
       E41M2076D
       ME-3 VEHICLE COMMAND
      
       E41T1O1OD
       ME-1 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH
         A
       E41T2010D
       ME-2 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH
         A
       E41T3010D
       ME-3 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH
         A
       T41P1700C
       ET LH2 ULLAGE
         PRESSURE
       V41P11OOC
       MPS LH2 INLET PRESS
         (ME-1)
       V41P1330C
       MPS LO2 INLET PRESS
         (ME-3)
       V42P1552A
       RCS THRUSTER PC
       V46P0120A
       APU-1 GG CHAMBER
         PRESS
       V58H11OOA
       ME-PITCH ACTUATOR
         POS
       V58P0866C
       LH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA
         P
       V58P0966C
       RH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA
         P
       V79H2111A
       LH SRB TILT ACT
         DRIVER
       V90R2525C
       SEL LH SRB PITCH
         RATE
       V90R2528C
       SEL RH SRB YAW RATE
       V90R5301C
       SELECTED RGA ROLL
         RATE
       V90R5321C
       SELECTED RGA PITCH
         RATE
       V90R5341C
       SELECTED RGA YAW
         RATE
       V95H3522C
       BODY YAW ATTITUDE
         ERROR
       V95H3523C
       BODY ROLL ATTITUDE
         ERROR
       V98A1581C
       LATERAL ACCELERATION