[19] Flight of the Space Shuttle Challenger on Mission 51-L began at 11:38 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on January 28, 1986. It ended 73 seconds later in an explosive burn of hydrogen and oxygen propellants that destroyed the External Tank and exposed the Orbiter to severe aerodynamic loads that caused complete structural breakup. All seven crew members perished. The two Solid Rocket Boosters flew out of the fireball and were destroyed by the Air Force range safety officer 110 seconds after launch.
The ambient air temperature at launch was 36 degrees Fahrenheit measured at ground level approximately 1,000 feet from the 51-L mission launch pad 39B. This temperature was 15 degrees colder than that of any previous launch.
The following description of the flight events is based on visual examination and image enhancement of film from NASA operated cameras and telemetry data transmitted from the Space Shuttle to ground stations. The last telemetry data from the Challenger was received 73.618 seconds after launch.
At 6.6 seconds before launch, the Challenger's liquid fueled main engines were ignited in sequence and run up to full thrust while the entire Shuttle structure was bolted to the launch pad. Thrust of the main engines bends the Shuttle assembly forward from the bolts anchoring it to the pad. When the Shuttle assembly springs back to the vertical, the Solid Rocket Boosters' restraining bolts are explosively released. During this prerelease "twang" motion, structural loads are stored in the assembled structure. These loads are released during the first few seconds of flight in a structural vibration mode at a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The maximum structural loads on the aft field joints of the Solid Rocket Boosters occur during the "twang," exceeding even those of the maximum dynamic pressure period experienced later in flight.
Just after liftoff at .678 seconds into the flight, photographic data show a strong puff of gray smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster. The two pad 39B cameras that would have recorded the precise location of the puff were inoperative. Computer graphic analysis of film from other cameras indicated the initial smoke came from the 270 to 310-degree sector of the circumference of the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Booster. This area of the solid booster faces the External Tank. The vaporized material streaming from the joint indicated there was not complete sealing action within the joint.
Eight more distinctive puffs of increasingly blacker smoke were recorded between .836 and 2.500 seconds. The smoke appeared to puff upwards from the joint. While each smoke puff was being left behind by the upward flight of the Shuttle, the next fresh puff could be seen near the level of the joint. The multiple smoke puffs in this sequence occurred at about four times per second, approximating the frequency of the structural load dynamics and resultant joint flexing. Computer graphics applied to NASA photos from a variety of cameras in this sequence again placed the smoke puffs' origin in the 270-to 310-degree sector of the original smoke spurt.
As the Shuttle increased its upward velocity, it flew past the emerging and expanding smoke puffs. The last smoke was seen above the field joint at 2.733 seconds. At 3.375 seconds the last [20] smoke was visible below the Solid Rocket Boosters and became indiscernible as it mixed with rocket plumes and surrounding atmosphere.
The black color and dense composition of the smoke puffs suggest that the grease, joint insulation and rubber O-rings in the joint seal were being burned and eroded by the hot propellant gases.
Launch sequence films from previous missions were examined in detail to determine if there were any prior indications of smoke of the color and composition that appeared during the first few seconds of the 51-L mission. None were found. Other vapors in this area were determined to be melting frost from the bottom of the External Tank or steam from the rocket exhaust in the pad's sound suppression water trays.
Shuttle main engines were throttled up to 104 percent of their rated thrust level, the Challenger executed a programmed roll maneuver and the engines were throttled back to 94 percent.
At approximately 37 seconds, Challenger encountered the first of several high-altitude wind shear conditions, which lasted until about 64 seconds. The wind shear created forces on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These were immediately sensed and countered by the guidance, navigation and control system. Although flight 51-L loads exceeded prior experience in both yaw and pitch planes at certain instants, the maxima had been encountered on previous flights and were within design limits.
The steering system (thrust vector control) of the Solid Rocket Booster responded to all commands and wind shear effects. The wind shear caused the steering system to be more active than on any previous flight.
At 45 seconds into the flight, three bright flashes appeared downstream of the Challenger's right wing. Each flash lasted less than one-thirtieth of' a second. Similar flashes have been seen on other flights. Another appearance of a separate bright spot was diagnosed by film analysis to be a reflection of main engine exhaust on the Orbital Maneuvering System pods located at the upper rear section of the Orbiter. The flashes were unrelated to the later appearance of the flame plume from the right Solid Rocket Booster.
Both the Shuttle main engines and the solid rockets operated at reduced thrust approaching and passing through the area of maximum dynamic pressure of 720 pounds per square foot. Main engines had been throttled up to 104 percent thrust and the Solid Rocket Boosters were increasing their thrust when the first flickering flame appeared on the right Solid Rocket Booster in the area of the aft field joint. This first very small flame was detected on image enhanced film at 58.788 seconds into the flight. It appeared to originate at about 305 degrees around the booster circumference at or near the aft field joint.
One film frame later from the same camera, the flame was visible without image enhancement. It grew into a continuous, well-defined plume at 59.262 seconds. At about the same time (60 seconds), telemetry showed a pressure differential between the chamber pressures in the right and left boosters. The right booster chamber pressure was lower, confirming the growing leak in the area of the field joint.
As the flame plume increased in size, it was deflected rearward by the aerodynamic slipstream and circumferentially by the protruding structure of the upper ring attaching the booster to the External Tank. These deflections directed the flame plume onto the surface of the External Tank. This sequence of flame spreading is confirmed by analysis of the recovered wreckage. The growing flame also impinged on the strut attaching the Solid Rocket Booster to the External Tank.
At about 62 seconds into the flight, the control system began to react to counter the forces caused by the plume and its effects. The left Solid Rocket Booster thrust vector control moved to counter the yaw caused by reduced thrust from the leaking right Solid Rocket Booster. During the next nine seconds, Space Shuttle control systems worked to correct anomalies in pitch and yaw rates.
The first visual indication that swirling flame from the right Solid Rocket Booster breached the External Tank was at 64.660 seconds when there was an abrupt change in the shape and color of the plume. This indicated that it was mixing with leaking hydrogen from the External Tank. Telemetered changes in the hydrogen tank pressurization confirmed the leak. Within 45 milliseconds of the breach of the External Tank, a bright sustained glow developed on the black-tiled underside of the Challenger between it and the External Tank.
Beginning at about 72 seconds, a series of events occurred extremely rapidly that terminated [21] the flight. Telemetered data indicate a wide variety of flight system actions that support the visual evidence of the photos as the Shuttle struggled futilely against the forces that were destroying it.
At about 72.20 seconds the lower strut linking the Solid Rocket Booster and the External Tank was severed or pulled away from the weakened hydrogen tank permitting the right Solid Rocket Booster to rotate around the upper attachment strut. This rotation is indicated by divergent yaw and pitch rates between the left and right Solid Rocket Boosters.
At 73.124 seconds, a circumferential white vapor pattern was observed blooming from the side of the External Tank bottom dome. This was the beginning of the structural failure of the hydrogen tank that culminated in the entire aft dome dropping away. This released massive amounts of liquid hydrogen from the tank and created a sudden forward thrust of about 2.~3 million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank upward into the intertank structure. At about the same time, the rotating right Solid Rocket Booster impacted the intertank structure and the lower part of the liquid oxygen tank. These structures failed at 73.137 seconds as evidenced by the white vapors appearing in the intertank region.
Within milliseconds there was massive, almost explosive, burning of the hydrogen streaming from the failed tank bottom and the liquid oxygen breach in the area of the intertank.
At this point in its trajectory, while traveling at a Mach number of 1.92 at an altitude of 46,O00 feet, the Challenger was totally enveloped in the explosive burn. The Challenger's reaction control system ruptured and a hypergolic burn of its propellants occurred as it exited the oxygen-hydrogen flames. The reddish brown colors of the hypergolic fuel burn are visible on the edge of the main fireball. The Orbiter, under severe aerodynamic loads, broke into several large sections which emerged from the fireball. Separate sections that can be identified on film include the main engine/tail section with the engines still burning, one wing of the Orbiter, and the forward fuselage trailing a mass of umbilical lines pulled loose from the payload bay.
Evidence in the recovered wreckage from the 51-L mission hardware supports this final sequence of events.
[37-39] STS 51-L Sequence of Major Events
.
16:37:53.444
ME - 3 Ignition
Command
- 6.566
GPC
37:53.564
ME - 2 Ignition
Command
- 6.446
GPC
37:53.684
ME - 1 Ignition
Command
- 6.326
GPC
38:00.010
SRM Ignition Command
(T=O)
0.000
GPC
38:00.018
Holddown Post 2 PIC
firing
0.008
E8 Camera
38:00.260
First Continuous Vertical
Motion
0.250
E9 Camera
38:00.688
Confirmed smoke above field
joint on RH SRM
0.678
E60 Camera
38:00.846
Eight puffs of smoke (from
0.836 thru 2.500 sec MET)
0.836
E63 Camera
38:02.743
Last positive evidence of
smoke above right aft SRB/ET attach ring
2.733
CZR-1 Camera
38:03.385
Last positive visual
indication of smoke
3.375
E60 Camera
38:04.349
SSME 104% Command
4.339
E41M2076D
38:05.684
RH SRM pressure 11.8 psi
above nominal
5.674
B47P2302C
38:07.734
Roll maneuver
initiated
7.724
V9OR5301C
38:19.869
SSME 94% Command
19.859
E41M2076D
38:21.134
Roll maneuver
completed
21.124
V9OR5301C
38:35.389
SSME 65% Command
35.379
E41M2076D
38:37.000
Roll and Yaw Attitude
Response to Wind (36.990 to 62.990 sec)
36.990
V95H352nC
38:51.870
SSME 104% Command
51.860
E41M2076D
38:58.798
First evidence of flame on
RH SRM
58.788
E207 Camera
38:59.010
Reconstructed Max Q (720
psf)
59.000
BET
38:59.272
Continuous well defined
plume on RH SRM
59.262
E207 Camera
38: 59.763
Flame from RH SRM in + Z
direction (seen from south side of vehicle)
59.753
E204 Camera
39:00.014
SRM pressure divergence (RH
vs. LH)
60.004
B47P2302
39:00.248
First evidence of plume
deflection, intermittent
60.238
E207 Camera
39:00.258
First evidence of SRB plume
attaching to ET ring frame
60.248
E203 Camera
39:00.998
First evidence of plume
deflection, continuous
60.988
E207 Camera
39:01.734
Peak roll rate response to
wind
61.724
V9OR5301C
39:02.094
Peak TVC response to
wind
62.084
B58H1150C
39:02.414
Peak yaw rate response to
wind
62.404
V9OR5341C
39:02.494
RH outboard elevon actuator
hinge moment spike
62.484
V58P0966C
39:03.934
RH outboard elevon actuator
delta pressure change
63.924
V58P0966C
39:03.974
Start of planned pitch rate
maneuver
63.964
V9OR5321C
39:04.670
Change in anomalous plume
shape (LH2 tank leak near 2058 ring frame)
64.660
E204 Camera
39:04.715
Bright sustained glow on
sides of ET
64.705
E204 Camera
39:04.947
Start SSME gimbal angle
large pitch variations
64.937
V58HllOOA
39:05.174
Beginning of transient
motion due to changes in aero forces due to plume
65.164
V9OR5321C
39:05.534
LH outboard elevon actuator
delta pressure change
65.524
V58P0866C
39:06.774
Start ET
LH2
ullage pressure deviations
66.764
T41P1700C
39:12.214
Start divergent yaw rates
(RH vs. LH SRB)
72.204
V9OR2528C
39:12.294
Start divergent pitch rates
(RH vs. LH SRB)
72.284
V9OR2525C
39:12.488
SRB major high-rate
actuator command
72.478
V79H2111A
39:12.507
SSME roll gimbal rates 5
deg/sec
72.497
V58HllOOA
39:12.535
Vehicle max + Y lateral
acceleration ( + .227 g)
72.525
V98A1581C
39:12.574
SRB major high-rate
actuator motion
72.564
B58H1151C
39:12.574
Start of H2 tank pressure
decrease with 2 flow control valves open
72.564
T41P1700C
39:12.634
Last state vector
downlinked
72.624
Data reduction
39:12.974
Start of sharp MPS LOX
inlet pressure drop
72.964
V41P1330C
39:13.020
Last full computer frame of
TDRS data
73.010
Data reduction
39:13.054
Start of sharp MPS
LH2
inlet pressure drop
73.044
V41Pl lOOC
39:13.055
Vehicle max -Y lateral
acceleration (-.254 g)
73.045
V98A1581C
39:13.134
Circumferential white
pattern on ET aft dome (LH2 tank failure)
73.124
E204 Camera
39:13.134
RH SRM pressure 19 psi
lower than LH SRM
73.124
B47P2302C
39:13.147
First hint of vapor at
intertank
73.137
E207 Camera
39:13.153
All engine systems start
responding to loss of fuel and LOX inlet pressure
73.143
SSME team
39:13.172
Sudden cloud along ET
between intertank and aft dome
73.162
E207 Camera
39:13.201
Flash between Orbiter and
LH2
tank
73.191
E204 Camera
39:13.221
SSME telemetry data
interference from 73.211 to 73.303
73.211
.
39:13.223
Flash near SRB fwd attach
and brightening of flash between Orbiter and ET
73.213
E204 Camera
39:13.292
First indication intense
white flash at SRB fwd attach point
73.282
E204 Camera
39:13.337
Greatly increased intensity
of white flash
73.327
E204 Camera
39:13.387
Start RCS jet chamber
pressure fluctuations
73.377
V42P1552A
39:13.393
All engines approaching
HPFT discharge temp redline limits
73.383
E41TnO1OD
39:13.492
ME-2 HPFT disch. temp Chan.
A vote for shutdown; 2 strikes on Chan. B
73.482
MEC data
39:13.492
ME-2 controller last time
word update
73.482
MEC data
39: 13.513
ME-3 in shutdown due to
HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance
73.503
MEC data
39:13.513
ME-3 controller last time
word update
73.503
MEC data
39:13.533
ME-1 in shutdown due to
HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance
73.523
Calculation
39:13.553
ME-1 last telemetered data
point
73.543
Calculation
39:13.628
Last validated Orbiter
telemetry measurement
73.618
V46P0120A
39:13.641
End of last reconstructed
data frame with valid synchronization and frame count
73.631
Data reduction
39:14.140
Last radio frequency signal
from Orbiter
74.130
Data reduction
39:14.597
Bright flash in vicinity of
Orbiter nose
74.587
E204 Camera
39:16.447
RH SRB nose cap sep/chute
deployment
76.437
E207 Camera
39:50.260
RH SRB RSS destruct
110.250
E202 Camera
39:50.262
LH SRB RSS destruct
110.252
E230 Camera
ACT POS
- Actuator Position
MEC
- Main Engine
Controller
APU
- Auxiliary Power
Unit
MET
- Mission Elapsed
Time
BET
- Best Estimated
Trajectory
MPS
- Main Propulsion
System
CH
- Channel
PC
- Chamber Pressure
DISC
- Discharge
PIC
- Pyrotechnics Initiator
Controller
ET
- External Tank
psf
- Pounds per square
foot
GG
- Gas Generator
RCS
- Reaction Control
System
GPC
- General Purpose
Computer
RGA
- Rate Gyro Assembly
GMT
- Greenwich Mean
Time
RH
- Righthand
HPFT
- High Pressure Fuel
Turbopump
RSS
- Range Safety
System
LH
- Lefthand
SRB
- Solid Rocket
Booster
LH2
- Liquid Hydrogen
SRM
- Solid Rocket Motor
LO2
- Liquid Oxygen
SSME
- Space Shuttle Main
Engine
MAX Q
- Maximum Dynamic
Pressure
TEMP
- Temperature
ME
- Main Engine (same as
SSME)
TVC
- Thrust Vector
Control
Note: The shuttle coordinate system used in Chapter 2 is, relative to the Orbiter, as follows:
Shuttle to Ground Telemetry Channels
.
B47P1302C
LH SRM CHAMBER
PRESSURE
B47P2302C
RH SRM CHAMBER
PRESSURE
B58H1150C
LH SRB TVC TILT ACT
POS
B58H1151C
LH SRB TVC ROCK ACT
POS
E41M2076D
ME-3 VEHICLE COMMAND
E41T1O1OD
ME-1 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH
A
E41T2010D
ME-2 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH
A
E41T3010D
ME-3 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH
A
T41P1700C
ET LH2 ULLAGE
PRESSURE
V41P11OOC
MPS LH2 INLET PRESS
(ME-1)
V41P1330C
MPS LO2 INLET PRESS
(ME-3)
V42P1552A
RCS THRUSTER PC
V46P0120A
APU-1 GG CHAMBER
PRESS
V58H11OOA
ME-PITCH ACTUATOR
POS
V58P0866C
LH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA
P
V58P0966C
RH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA
P
V79H2111A
LH SRB TILT ACT
DRIVER
V90R2525C
SEL LH SRB PITCH
RATE
V90R2528C
SEL RH SRB YAW RATE
V90R5301C
SELECTED RGA ROLL
RATE
V90R5321C
SELECTED RGA PITCH
RATE
V90R5341C
SELECTED RGA YAW
RATE
V95H3522C
BODY YAW ATTITUDE
ERROR
V95H3523C
BODY ROLL ATTITUDE
ERROR
V98A1581C
LATERAL ACCELERATION