Mattingly: IÂ’m looking through to see if there are any notes. Most of the things that we did on Trans-Earth coast we did under direct ground control. We went about our business with stowage, EVA preps, entry preps, and all that kind of stuff. But we let the ground run the SIM bay real-time calls, and I felt that that was probably the best way to do it, rather than have us all sit there and. watch the clock.
PTC on the way home turned out to be no more difficult than PTC on the way out. With a light vehicle, PTC was another thing that surprised me. We were able to set up PTCs that would end up with the nose describing a 10-degree cone.
System Operation. I donÂ’t know of any anomalies we had in systems. You got any on your list, John?
Young: Yes, several, as a matter of fact. The cabin fan stopped.
Mattingly: The cabin fan. And that went out on the day after TEI. In fact, I guess it was the morning of EVA prep?
Young: Right.
Mattingly: All of a sudden, the fan let out a big moan. It sounded like it .dropped several steps in frequency and made a big moaning sound. We never turned it on again. We taped up the cabin fan inlet screen which had an awful lot of junk and trash that was being sucked up against it. I cleaned it off once that I remember. Just an awful lot of stuff got up there. We finally ended up cutting out a piece of the map and taping it over the screen to keep stuff from backing out away from the filter. What else do you have on the systems?
Young: I redid this list last night. Stop the tape and let me get organized. What was the first one of those that you read?
Mattingly: We talked about the cabin fan filter. One of the things I see on this list is that the gamma ray boom finally stopped just before entry. We tried retracting it and it didnÂ’t come in. They said it was sufficiently retracted so that we could jettison the service module without jettisoning the boom first.
Young: The digital event timer.
Mattingly: Yes, the digital event timer started to act up during rendezvous. I noticed it at TEI that it lost track of the ignition time. Prior to TEI, it was running intermittently, but coincidentally, it happened to run nicely at TEI. After that, it seemed like it was more often not running than it was running. Each time it would step, it would count. It sounded like it was making a count every second, but it would lose track somewhere in the tens and units digits. It would just come up with the wrong time.
Young: ItÂ’s clear to me that people who arenÂ’t concerned with space flight donÂ’t realize how much the crew depends on the digital event timer. We used it for things like timing the 10 minutes the MEED was supposed to be out, which didnÂ’t work; timing her down to the reentry reference time, which it didnÂ’t work for; and timing up to every burn, which it didnÂ’t work for.
Mattingly: The clock weÂ’re talking about is the one on MPC Panel 2. As far as I know, the one down in the LEB continued to work.
Duke: It worked for the Skylab. When I used it down there for the Skylab contamination, it worked.
Mattingly: At the end of the mission, I noticed when you would go to reset on the main panel DET, that youÂ’d hit reset and it would just sit there and continue to cycle. YouÂ’d have to hit stop to get it to stop spinning. But it did that only during the latter stages of Trans-Earth coast. It didnÂ’t do that when it first started acting up. There was no powder or anything like that visible in the window such as was reported by Apollo 15. You mentioned another problem there, John.
Young: Battery compartment.
Mattingly: Battery compartment. Yes. We had just put battery B on charge the morning of the EVA.
Duke: Bat B had just started charging when we got a slight odor like it was burning insulation. I took the battery of f charge and looked at the bat compartment and it was up over about 3. So from then on, we started a series of vents. Up until EVA, we initiated a series of little vents to get that pressure back down. WeÂ’d vent one and then close the vent, and it would immediately start climbing back up rapidly to about 1.5 and then maybe 0.1 of an hour from there to about 2.7 or 2.8. I personally didnÂ’t want to charge any more batteries and fortunately we didnÂ’t have to, because the batteries all had good charges on them. So we just left them like that for the reentry and we didnÂ’t charge any more. And the explanation we got from MCC was that it was the battery compartment, the type of compartment. Due to the long discharges on LOI and D0I and then subsequent long recharges, the batteries were venting more than normal. The compartment was tight and thatÂ’s why the pressure was building up. That sounded pretty plausible to us. The only question I guess we still had was why was the thing still venting so long after those charges.
Mattingly: The thing I think was significant was that we had a definite odor, an acrid smell that could be attributed to insulation cooking. It smelled to me like things that you smell around batteries. That was down in the LEB. IÂ’d been on the couch and we shifted seats for some reason, and I crawled down and John crawled back on the couch out of the LEB. When I moved down there, I noticed it immediately. But itÂ’s the kind of odor that when youÂ’re around it for a while, you quickly wipe it out. I think if it built up any slower, you wouldnÂ’t even notice it. I think it was distinctly different than the other cockpit odors that we have.
Young: I didnÂ’t smell it because as usual my nose was all plugged up and so was my head. I just didnÂ’t smell it.
Duke: But they were convinced that we had good batteries and sure enough, we did. At entry when we brought them on, they took up the load. Boy, they were just great and worked like champs.
Young: Okay. The IMU CDU glitch.
Mattingly: Okay, IMU. I guess we got our glitches on that starting the day before entry. That would have been EVA day.
Young: It was EVA day.
Mattingly: But it was late in the day. And we had an ISS light and a PGNCS light came on. The first time it came on, I didnÂ’t notice the ISS light as it vent out. And I think both you and John saw it. All we had was the 3777 alarm remaining on the DSKY. We compared the FDAI with the NOUN 20s, and they seemed to be in agreement. We tried Verb 10 and that didn't make any difference. I think we then had another master alarm with the same sequence of events, where the ISS light came on for just a flicker and then it went out and left us with a PGNCS alarm. We did all kinds of things. The ground gave us some angles to fly through, to try to excite the CDUs. We went through all that and never did come up with anything that could cause the alarm again. I donÂ’t think we had another alarm on it until entry morning.
Young: ThatÂ’s right..
Mattingly: We must have had a half dozen on entry morning. On one occasion, the ISS light came on and remained on, although everything else continued to operate normally. Then finally, it seemed like one of them went out and John heard a click or clang of some sort in the LEB. We looked around and it looked like the Tool E, which had been strapped to one of the handholds on the nay station, might have banged the panel.
Young: It banged the panel just above where - implausible as it seems - it was hanging on the right optics handrail. It banged the panel just above where I think the PSA module is for the computer. At the same time when the ISS light went out, it was underneath it.
Mattingly: I didnÂ’t see the Tool E hit the panel. But when you kicked it later, we did see where that was. That was underneath the verb-noun list.
Young: Yes.
Mattingly: But it was right next to that rails of the structure that goes between the verb-noun list and the star codes.
Young: Yes.
Mattingly: ThatÂ’s where youÂ’d have to put the light out. At least when you tapped it, the light went out.
Young: Yes.
Mattingly: That was the last ISS light we had. Our feeling on that is the fact that practically every problem we had with manned. space flight has been due to some kind of contamination floating around in zero gravity. ThatÂ’s probably what it is. Since they are getting it back, they ought to be able to find it.
Duke: One time the light was on steady though, Ken. I took the Tool E and tapped all over the panel, which had no effect on it.
Young: The trouble is, that isnÂ’t where any of the gear is located.
Duke: I know.
Young: ItÂ’s located in that box behind the closeout bend.
Mattingly: In general, we had several bags that didnÂ’t spill when you put them on the food port. I donÂ’t know whether it was coincidental or what, but it seemed like there were more of these bags that had been thermally sealed right across the entrance valve, more in the cocoa packages than in all the others.
Young: ThatÂ’s right, all put together.
Mattingly: Whether that was really the way it was statistically or just...
Young: At least four of them.
Mattingly: It sure catches your attention when you put that hot water all over yourself.
Young: Not only were the bags sealed across the entry port, but for almost every cocoa bag that we opened, part of the bag itself was sealed so that you couldnÂ’t get any water in it. Remember where the bag was just flattened together and welded together? All it meant was that you get more cocoa per ounce of water.
Mattingly: I think one of the things that the people that build these bags need to recognize is that you canÂ’t make a visual inspection of the bag before you fill it to determine these things.
Mattingly: Because a good bag looks exactly the same way under the vacuum package. They all look like theyÂ’re sealed together. ItÂ’s only when you put pressure on it, you find that it wonÂ’t inflate. Then you know that you have a bag thatÂ’s sealed over.
Duke: One of them that failed did fail right up there near the filler neck where it looked like it was vacuum sealed. when I put the water in there, the water just squirted out to the side.
Speaker: One of the holes?
Duke: Another one failed around the seam. It was where the seam was crinkled. I put a couple of ounces in it and was starting to mix it up, when I squeezed it and it broke through. We also had a failure of a juice bag on the lunar surface. That was a grapefruit one, I think. Besides one we couldnÂ’t fill at all, we had three that once we got water in them, they broke.
Speaker: Any other systems?
Mattingly: I guess one of the things we need to talk about is the chlorine injector. Sometime during the EVA, perhaps it was post-EVA, we lost it. It may still be in the cockpit. I had taken the chlorine injector in the little bag that it comes in and snapped it up on the compartment right over it. I kept it there for quick use. Apparently I knocked it off sometime around the EVA. We never did find it again. So we did not chlorinate the water the last two evenings.
Duke: And it was delicious.
Young: ThatÂ’s right.
Mattingly: It was really good. We ought to confess to that anyhow.
Young: Yes, I want to discuss this other thing that we had. We had an O2 flow high light, right after we finished dumping the water out of the cabin. The ground kept asking us if we had sealed the side hatch. ThereÂ’s just no way you cannot seal the side hatch. ThereÂ’s just no way. Because the little plug goes in there and thatÂ’s the end of it. The problem was that the inflow valve was all covered with dust, and of r course that makes the flow go up. But that should have been the first thing that occurred to them. But they asked us at least twice and maybe three times if we had sealed that hole up. I was nervous as a cat about opening it up in the first place. I thought that was unnecessary harassment. (Laughter)
Young: The plug is right there, Deke. And itÂ’s as big as the end of my finger. You canÂ’t miss it.
Mattingly: Okay. I think thatÂ’s all the systems things.
Young: Yes. The DET, the O2 flow. What about the umbilical cord?
Mattingly: Okay. ItÂ’s really not systems. ItÂ’s a problem which is not new, but somebody sure needs to remember in space flight that you just shouldnÂ’t ask a man to operate in zero-g with a half-inch-diameter umbilical strapped on. One of the beautiful advantages of zero-g is that you can move around, you can hold a position, and you can do things. The amount of effort it takes to resist that torque, which comes in the form of both rotation and translation forces, is a continual nuisance and makes it difficult when you want to get up next to a window and look out of it. You canÂ’t just go lay next to the window. You have to get into the position, and then you have to anchor yourself with your feet to your hands. Your hands are the things that you are trying to use. Those are the tools that make your being there worthwhile. ItÂ’s just a continual nuisance, something that I realize Apollo is going to live with. But itÂ’s something that just never ought to be included in the spacecraft design. Communications shouldnÂ’t have to go through an umbilical that size. We practice and train every day with a communications umbilical that has a tiny little wire that goes up to your head. You climb in a real space-craft and you put on something that looks like it could carry half of the United States telephone communications. ItÂ’s just one of those things that for long-duration flight, I think itÂ’s going to become an extremely distracting influence. ItÂ’s the one that goes to the suit. The one that goes between the crewmen and the bulkhead, and the one that goes between the suit adapter and the comm carrier. I think weÂ’ve overlooked that comm failure a little bit. Charlie had an intermittent transmitter in his right mike.
Duke: It was intermittent where it connected to the CWG adapter.
Speaker: But within the mike circuit?
Duke: It was in the mike circuit, yes. Because by jiggling it, you could make it work. I got that out and then the right mike was loose. You could take the head of the boom mike and pull it out and expose the wires in there.
Young: When Charlie buttoned up for the first EVA, we started to go through the comm checks, and he wasnÂ’t transmitting. I mean he wasnÂ’t getting out on either mike. I figured it was all over right there.
Speaker: ThatÂ’s really a mess.
Mattingly: One of the things that we did when we went to the comm carrier originally was to put those zippers in there, so you can have spare electronics and spare heads with the cap itself. They are interchangeable. It seems to me that it would be prudent where so much depends on communications in this business to carry a spare set of electronics. I donÂ’t think that would be a particularly big package. WeÂ’ve tried the lightweight headset, which is a terrible misnomer. I think Charlie was the only one who ever made it work anywhere near satisfactorily. The big disadvantage to the lightweight headset is that you have to hold the microphone in front of your mouth. The range of it is not as great as what you get on the comm carrier. The comm carrier conveniently keeps the mike position stable. If you want to use your hands to do something and then talk at the same time, youÂ’re forced to wear the comm carrier. This just makes for another nuisance operation. I think that I never did use the lightweight headset except just once, to try it and see how it worked. I think the idea of having everything depend on the comm carrier makes that a justifiable item to throw in a spare for, even though we have two independent electronic sets on both sides. CharlieÂ’s failure was in the cable.
Duke: It was in the cable.
Mattingly: That may have some common points in it. We do carry a spare CCU cable and we carry a spare suit harness. It seems reasonable to carry the redundancy one step further.
Young: YouÂ’d sure be out of luck if the comm carrier crumps out on you. YouÂ’re not going to do your mission right.
Mattingly: Navigation. We didnÂ’t have anything on navigation. We didnÂ’t do any P23s on the way home. We talked about FTC just being nominal.
The Gamma Ray Boom didnÂ’t retract any from the last try. The systems people know about what extension I had. We had no indication.
The Mass Spec we had jettisoned in lunar orbit.
The Mapping CameraÂ’s Retraction and Extension times toward the end of the mission were becoming more and more nominal. I think that puzzled everyone. Perhaps the stellar lens shield damage might explain that. We finally bent it to a place where it didnÂ’t get in the way. On consumables, it looked like everything worked nominally, and as a matter of fact, towards the end of the mission, we went to half-degree dead band or half-degree-per-second maneuver rates because we had so much propellant.
Duke: It appeared that EECOM was suspecting some stratification in the H2 tanks and occasionally had us bring the fans on during the last 2 days. But we hadnÂ’t noticed any trouble in the pressure. I donÂ’t know how they figured that out. But from the onboard side, the pressures looked good and everything went well throughout the whole flight. The cryo system, the fuel cells, and the DPS were just superb all the way.
Mattingly: LetÂ’s say something about the fuel cells. We noticed that in contrast to the simulator where the fuel cell flows would rise steadily, the fuel cell flows from the real spacecraft continually pulsed in both hydrogen and oxygen. All three fuel cells did it. They never steadied out to any nominal value but were continually pulsed. Fuel Cell 3 had a hydrogen-oxygen flow unbalance throughout the entire mission. It started out reading about an eighth of an inch. The two scales are different normally; the needles for hydrogen and oxygen are opposite each other. Fuel Cell 3 throughout the mission was not that way. It seemed to me that toward the end of the mission, the difference became greater. We checked all the pressures and they were nominal.
Duke: EECOM was satisfied with it so we didnÂ’t worry about it. I didnÂ’t even notice it until we were into the mission a few days. Then it caught our attention. One thing, Ken, that we ought to mention, although we were told about it pre-flight, is the H2 Tank 1 that had a glitchy transducer on the pressure. It would sit there in the green and all of a sudden jump almost off-scale high. It would ride for a little while and jump back down again. It was intermittent, sometimes lasting for a couple of minutes, sometimes lasting just for a few seconds, and sometimes longer than that. No rhyme or reason to it.
Mattingly: IÂ’d like to put in another pitch for future spacecraft. One of the things that always gets you in trouble is timing water dumps when youÂ’re supposed to dump waste water down to 10 percent or when youÂ’re supposed to purge the fuel cells for two minutes or when youÂ’re supposed to stir the cryo fans for a minute. These kinds of tasks are forever the sort of things that last just long enough that you get bored watching them. You go off to do something else, and the first thing you know, you come back and you find that youÂ’ve never done it by a significant amount. It seems to me that any operation like that should have some built-in system in the spacecraft to give you a call. We used a kitchen timer. I think whenever we used it, we always made the operation come out properly. There ought to be some way to build in to the spacecraft a call system that would alert you. You could set a scale that would tell you that youÂ’re down to 15 percent on the waste water, for instance, and by just ringing a bell when you got there, you wouldnÂ’t have to monitor it continuously.
Young: I think the kitchen timer is really a good idea, at least operationally from our standpoint. You always get interrupted in whatever youÂ’re doing during one of these 2-minute tasks. Right in the middle of it, somebody wants you to do something else. ItÂ’s inevitable, you forget it.
Mattingly: But that should be something thatÂ’s built in to the spacecraft, not something that youÂ’ve got to carry in your PPK.
Young: Some timer like that sure would be a handy thing to have for those tasks because there is going to be a bunch of them.
Mattingly: Okay. Star/Earth horizons. We didnÂ’t ever look at those except for a gee whiz.
DAP Loads. There is nothing to say about them.
IMU alignments. Again, we cancelled some of the P52s because the platform was running so smoothly.
Young: The only thing I donÂ’t understand about the IMU realignment was the last one we did, just prior to entry with a full five alarm. I was looking out the telescope and I didnÂ’t see any stars. And there were sure plenty to pick from. I mean I didnÂ’t see any Earth, I didnÂ’t see any Moon, or any Sun. I didnÂ’t understand that for a while. I donÂ’t understand why it flunked the star pick a pair test. The sky was full of stars. Maybe somebody can explain that to us. That was a super plat.
Mattingly: The UV Photography. We did it nominally, with the one exception being the last UV photography we did, which comes up about 2½ hours before entry. It required one CEX frame, and we had stowed all the CEX magazines by mistake. So we have the UV photography at the last frame and that was all we put with it.
The Skylab Contamination Photography. We did one sequence which they called Sequence B which complements the lunar orbit stuff. However, we didnÂ’t do the lunar orbit stuff. The Skylab Sequence B we did accomplish on the way home. This sequence and the dump photography had the Moon in the field of view of the camera which concerned us at the time. ItÂ’s very difficult to understand how weÂ’re going to get meaningful data out of long exposures when you have a bright object like the Moon sitting right in the field of view. I guess all IÂ’m going to do is comment that the Moon was in the field of view for those photographs. The dump photography procedures worked out pretty well once we got started. We had a lot of trouble with condensation in the cockpit. We noticed condensation under the PGA bag after LOI. We noticed it again after TEI and then all the way home. It seemed like the condensation in the cockpit was building continuously.
Young: Yes, it really covered the top hatch and the side hatch.
Mattingly: The side hatch was really dripping by the time we got around to doing the dump photography. All the windows were clouding up during the dump photography. I think we all had to use tissues to wipe the window off between frames. There just wasnÂ’t any way to keep from fogging the window. Whether the fogging shows up on the photography or not, I donÂ’t have any idea. The procedure for dumping out the hatch, once we finally got it all worked out, seemed to go okay. The first time I put the water to the side nozzle, I turned the heater on some 10 minutes prior to dumping. The first thing it did was spurt for about a second and then freeze.
Young: Yes, I guess that condensation is inevitable because the temperature on the hatch is below the dewpoint. So any water in the air thatÂ’s in the vicinity of that hatch is going to act like a water separator and just condense it right down the frame. ThereÂ’s no way out of it. The top hatch, the side hatch, and the windows are better water separators than anything weÂ’ve got.
Speaker: But it didnÂ’t do this on the way out?
Young: No, it didnÂ’t do it on the way out. But we didnÂ’t have these kinds of temperatures on the side hatch. When youÂ’d grab a hold of the side hatch, that son-of-a-gun would be cold. When youÂ’d grab a hold of the top hatch, that rascal would be cold. We didnÂ’t have the LM on the way out, and I donÂ’t know why it got so cold on the way back on the side hatch. But it sure did.
Mattingly: It may have been the attitude we were going to.
Duke: We were in some strange attitudes, John.
Young: But itÂ’s inevitable with the attitude profile that we had.
Mattingly: But it also did not clear up when we went in the PTC, which should have stabilized the temperature again. IÂ’ll admit that the hatch was cool, but it was not what IÂ’d call cold.
Young: ItÂ’s cold enough to get the water out.
Mattingly: Obviously, it was, unless it condensed there maybe.
Young: We had water on the glycol lines. There is always water on them. ItÂ’s a fact of nature. ThereÂ’s no way out of that.
Mattingly: I think the point thatÂ’s significant is that apparently our water separation capability is marginal to the extent that once you get an excess of moisture in the cockpit, even going back to PTC is not going to clear it up. Whether thatÂ’s due to lack of circulation or what, it just isnÂ’t going to clear out once you got it in there.
Young: If youÂ’re going to pass saturated air next to something thatÂ’s colder than what it is, itÂ’s got to go out on it. It doesnÂ’t ever get to the water separator.
Mattingly: It was during the dump photography that John noticed the scheme on the dump photography was that you dumped one water bag, one of the contingency water bags full of water, out the side hatch. We would photograph the nozzle and the dump, and then we would run a stereo set of pictures looking down-Sun in the direction of the dump itself to watch the rate of dissipation. When we turned and looked down-Sun, down along the dump track, we saw the increased luminescence looking against the dark sky. It looked like it was in the area that we dumped the water. We might say a few words about the characteristics of the water coming out of the nozzle. From what we could see coming out of the cockpit looking out of the center hatch window, it appeared that the water coming out and hitting the sunlight looked like you were firing a sparkler out a very narrow cone, much narrower than I anticipated. Charlie, how did that compare with what was coming out the regular dump nozzle?
Duke: In the waste water dump, this thing would come out to look like a cone about like that and about 10 feet out from the spacecraft, it would start diverging. It was almost like a jet at first, slowly diverging.
Mattingly: Charlie is describing what he saw from the LM looking at the waste water dump that we made in lunar orbit.
Young: What kind of pictures did you take of that, Charlie? Was it a 70 or a 16?
Duke: I donÂ’t remember. I think it must be 70, because I looked at all of the 16 last night from the LM and we didnÂ’t have it.
Mattingly: So did I, and I didnÂ’t see it on the 70 so far either.
Young: Okay, EVA.
Mattingly: EVA Prep. The whole scene was set by having to go in just prior to launch and put in an extra hour to allow for suit donning on EVA day. Then we started EVA day off by getting up an hour late. Sort of negated all the effort we put into it. But we did make up 45 minutes of that hour.
Young: The reason we were up an hour later is that we did part of the EVA prep the night before.
Mattingly: Yes, we tried to do some of the EVA stuff the night before the EVA day. I would conclude that we really didnÂ’t get that much done that night.
Young: I think you need a couple of uninterrupted hours the night before. DonÂ’t you think so?
Mattingly: Yes. We didnÂ’t spend a couple of hours on it. We spent about an hour on it. IÂ’m not sure it was that productive, because the problem is that you go to start out on EVA prep and you quickly find yourself putting yourself in a configuration that you donÂ’t want, in order to eat dinner that night or eat breakfast the next morning or when you have a midcourse coming up. So you end up sort of wasting the time. We did the EVA prep the first day down to Page 3-2, unstowing from A-2. ThatÂ’s one page of the EVA prep. There were several items that we ended up doing the next day. We had to make marks not to forget to come back. So my conclusion was that we could have put 30 minutes more on the second day and then 30 minutes saved on the total time. ThatÂ’s correct. We spent an hour the night before, and it took us an hour instead of 30 minutes to do it because we had to stop and say, can we really afford to do this tonight? A lot of the things, we had to go back and do over. I feel like we really didnÂ’t make as much money as IÂ’d hoped we could. The only reason for doing it was we were afraid we were pushing the time for the next morning.
Young: But you figure it was a full hour that we cranked in there, that you had enough time on the day you did it. If you had used that hour, which you didnÂ’t obviously.
Mattingly: Yes. I think we could have done it all in the same day. I think Jim Ellis did an excellent job of putting it together. Everything worked out fine; when we got to the other end, I had no concern that weÂ’d overlooked anything at all. I felt completely comfortable.
Duke: I was going to say the same thing. I was just sitting there watching you two guys go at it. It was just real "atta boy" where Ken had it all laid out, and everything seemed to be there and available.
Young: This is something we donÂ’t really get to practice, like everybody else. Maybe you do it two or three times during a training cycle. Ken does it a lot for the stowage temp[?], but Charlie and I donÂ’t get in there. We only did it twice on the training cycle. I thought that was really good, considering.
Duke: IÂ’d like to make a recommendation that even though the Flight Plan says 200 and whatever hours and whatever minutes for the EVA, that you check this thing logically like we did. Slowly go through it, and if it comes out an hour later than that time, then itÂ’s going to be an hour later than that time. Because John and I didnÂ’t ever get in there to do those kinds of things. I did not feel too comfortable with a hurry-up type procedure. It didnÂ’t work that way, but I felt one time that I almost got a panicky feeling that man, we were really going to make this time, but it never did turn out that way and everything got ready. I thought it was great. But due to the fact that we didnÂ’t get in there and train except for a couple of times with you, Ken, we really never did the stowage part in the airplane. You donÂ’t have a chance in the airplane.
Mattingly: ThereÂ’s only one reason for opening the hatch on the time in the Flight Plan, and thatÂ’s if you made a commitment to a network TV, and you ought to start it early enough so that you can meet the comfortably.
Young: ThatÂ’s not quite true, anymore than it is any other time.
Mattingly: We didnÂ’t because we didnÂ’t have a choice. But I think if you say youÂ’re going to do at 220 hours and 10 minutes (and NASA has a real bad attitude about not meeting those kinds of schedules), the onus is on the flight crew to meet it.
Speaker: ThatÂ’s not the case, never has been.
Mattingly: Okay. On EVA Cabin Depress. ThereÂ’s one thing that we all saw at about the same time. when you open that side hatch, no matter how well you think you got the cockpit cleaned up, thereÂ’s always a lot of trash in there and itÂ’s going to head for that exit. I saw a little screw come by and I tried to catch it, and I batted it out of the way. I thought it was gone. A little later, John says, donÂ’t let that screw in there. I made a dive for it as it went through the valve. That worried me for the next hour and a half because I didnÂ’t know whether it came out the other side, and I really think there ought to be some kind of a debris screen that you put over that equalization valve on the side of the hatch.
Young: Yes, because we had a lot of pebbles and rocks that were on the suit that we didnÂ’t get cleaned off and on the LEVAs and on everything else that we brought back. We were sitting there and there were at least four or five pebbles and rocks that came floating by. That stuff can go through your dump valve and it gets lodged in there so you couldnÂ’t close it. That would be a bad thing. I know thatÂ’s a big valve and a big hole, but I assume that thereÂ’s something that size that could get through there. Sure would be good to have a screen over it, I think.
Mattingly: Seems like you ought to have a screen, or you ought to have a thorough understanding that the inlet is the minimum cross section. Anything that gets started in there is going to keep going. Even then I think a screen is the proper answer, because thereÂ’s just no way you could get in there and operate on that thing and clean it out. The only thing I could think of to do was if it didnÂ’t seal, I figured a rock would crush in the thing, a lot of mechanical advantage. But for something like those little screws that we saw go by, I never would have gotten those things crushed. The only thing I could think of was to open it up, and go ahead and waste some oxygen, and try to build a flow through it. But that was one that I just had not considered at all pre-flight.
The Hatch Opening. Let me go back and catch one thing on that hatch opening. In order to cover all bets, we did our own thing with the nitrogen, instead of venting the nitrogen bottle after lift-off. I hung onto it until after rendezvous and we got rid of the LM. I then vented the hatch nitrogen bottle into the cockpit. So we had it available then. Just about the hatch opening time for EVA, I vented it again and there had been no subsequent build-up.
Young: IÂ’m really interested to see how the red blood cell mass comes out. I donÂ’t know whether it was a factor or not. I donÂ’t think the potassium has anything to do with the blood cell mass, but maybe the nitrogen does.
Mattingly: When we opened the hatch, we had taken the counterbalance off with the hex nut instead of disconnecting the pip pin we did on 15. We did this so weÂ’d have the hatch open lock available to stabilize the hatch for the MEED experiment. And it all went just super fine; it was real easy. One of the things that I was a little bit surprised at was when we opened the hatch, we got a little impatient and still had a little more pressure in the cabin than I expected and it opened rather rapidly. I had my hand on it so it didnÂ’t go far. There was still a little more residual cabin pressure. When the gage gets down under a half a psi, the cabin pressure gage is difficult to read and with parallax, it probably isnÂ’t very accurate down there anyhow. The hatch opened with no friction and the same thing was true when it came time to close the hatch. No friction evident at all. It really worked nicely. And movement in the cockpit was no problem. I thought the checkout procedures, again, were just perfectly adequate and gave me a lot of confidence that we had done all the right things in the suit preparation. On the suit integrity checks prior to cabin depress, it took a long time again for the oxygen flow to come down in the suit loop. I finally got it to come down by opening the equalization valve a little bit and dropping the cabin pressure to build up the suit Delta-P. We had spent what seemed to me like two minutes with the 02 flow going during the suit loop integrity check that you people did. You just have to bump it some way to get it up there. It takes a suit integrity check of about 4.5. ThatÂ’s pretty high pressure, and thereÂ’s a lot of volume in those suits for that little bleed valve to make up. Moving in and out of the hatch and operation around the spacecraft with the OPS on and all, your helmet and visor are really not much of a problem at all at zero-g. ItÂ’s so much easier than all the things you do in training, and itÂ’s very comforting. Charlie, you want to comment on your maneuvers?
Duke: In the zero-g airplane and in the simulator, when I got pressurized down, I felt like I was trapped behind the X-struts at the foot of the couch. But in flight, I could just zip right through those and I could bend the suit. It was very good mobility, from my viewpoint. I never felt like I was tangled up in KenÂ’s umbilicals. I never even felt the tether tugging on me and I went out as far as I could. I wasnÂ’t about to let go but I still had my feet inside. One thing I wanted to mention, Ken, is the hatch opening. WeÂ’d always had this trouble with the temp in valve and the glycol loop. We got it tweaked up before we started depress, and during depress, sure enough, it must have been that water freezing on the glycol lines or something because EECOM started going crazy with these glycol loop temps; we thought sure we were going to have to do some adjustment or something but it stabilized. That would have really been a bear if we had to get down there and fiddle with this 382 panel then. WeÂ’d just have had to go with what we had, because it would have been impossible to get down there. That sort of gave us a moment of panic when that thing started acting up. I think it was probably water freezing on the glycol lines. I looked in it and there was a lot of water. All during the EVA, we kept getting ice crystals as big as a penny floating by me.
Young: Right after we opened the hatch, there was a great rush of ice from that region down there. It passed right across me and went ,right out the hatch. I figured it was coming off the floor but it seemed to be generally coming from that region over there. IÂ’m sure it came from around the glycol lines and around that region where the control panel is.
Mattingly: Okay. TV and DAC Installation. That was as simple as you would have expected it to be. We spent very little time adjusting the TVs. John took one look at the monitor and said it was okay the way it was, and we left it alone.
Young: Yes, the ground wanted to change it but they changed their mind on that.
Mattingly: I guess this is a good a time as any to talk about the only two EMU comments I have. We had two things before I went out. I found out it was very difficult to move my left wrist. My first thought was that maybe all this stuff about how you lose your strength when you lay around like a marshmallow for 10 days was really true and that I had just gotten super weak. And so I wasnÂ’t about to complain about it. Now, I look back on it d IÂ’d like to have someone look at that glove because I think thereÂ’s something wrong with it. At no time was I able to comfortably move it. Occasionally I could move it with my wrist, but generally, in order to make my left wrist move very much, I had to use my right hand to push the glove over to where I wanted it. And then I could keep it there.
Duke: It sounds like an Ed Mitchell problem to me, like he had on Apollo 14.
Mattingly: Yes. It was a nuisance sort of thing.
Young: And you really had a hard time getting the mapping camera cassette because of it?
Mattingly: Yes. The problem is that the glove has two stable points normally, and itÂ’s only friction that holds it in the intermediate position. They will stay flopped over towards you or flopped away from you. Every time I tried to put the little wrist tether hook on the mapping cassette, IÂ’d hit that rail around the side of the door, push the glove over to the other side, and I had to keep pulling it out and resetting it.
Duke: Yes. When you said you were having trouble getting the mapping camera cassette, I couldnÂ’t figure what it was because you normally were down there and slapped it on there in the water tank. MA19INGLY The other EMU problem had to do with the visors. I went out and the Sun was just bright as all get out. So the first thing I did was to pull down the inner and the gold visors and that was pretty good until I got in the Sun. Then I still wanted to get that bright Sun out of my eyes, so I pulled down the hard covers on the outside, and John had forgotten to tell me that they didnÂ’t go back up.
Young: During our last EVA when I got back in, I couldn't get the visor up. I couldnÂ’t see what I was doing. I was going in here and there with my eyes closed.
Mattingly: Fortunately, they got that little trapdoor in the front of the visor and I could handle that, but I never got the side blind down and I never got the thing pushed back up.
Young: When you are in the Lunar Module, you butt your head up against this thing, you pull the trapdoor open, then you put your head back down, and the trapdoor comes back down again.
Mattingly: And that really worked pretty well. It only got in the way when I wanted to try to close the hatch. And on ingress, every time I tried to close the hatch, I knocked that little visor back down in my face. We went around and around with that one. I guess itÂ’s worth checking that the visor goes in both directions before you open the hatch. It seems like a natural failure mode with all the dust and dirt and stuff in there.
Young: Yes. That is what it was, I am sure.
Mattingly: And itÂ’s just one of those things you ought to be aware of. The Pan Cassette and all that stuff came out super neat. The Mapping Cassette did the same thing. Because of the trouble I was having with my left wrist, I didnÂ’t carry it in the mode that I normally would have. I was not going to let go of the cassette. I was just going to slip along the rail with it, holding it in my hand, but it was all I could do to hold on with my left hand. As Charlie says, that sure is black. I probably left fingerprints all over those rails.
Young: When you passed that last cassette in to me, the first thing I did was reach over there and hook that hook onto your tether instead of the cassette.
Mattingly: Yes, I was watching that and I had visions of our two tethers hooked together and the cassette floating free.
Young: Yes. I think the message there is just take it slow and easy.
Duke: I might add here that we had developed a technique, Ken and I, in the airplane where I did not ingress the Command Module during the film transfers. What I would do was move up on top of the hatch and sit up on the upper part of the hatch with my feet just barely in the hatch, and Ken would come in next to the hatch and he would have plenty of opening even for the large cassette. Between arms, legs, hands, and hooks, there was no way for that thing to float out of there once we got it inside. Something that Apollo 17 ought to look at in their training is to have the LMP sit up on the top of the hatch there around the upper hatch seal. They can hold on to that. YouÂ’ve got plenty of handholds up there, and it worked great.
Mattingly: Yes, I thought the transfer was very simple and right. I can say one thing about the visibility when youÂ’re out there. You really run into this stark, bright contrast between bright areas where thereÂ’s direct Sun and complete shadow. When you look around the side of the spacecraft across the shadow line, it just gets flat black. The only light that youÂ’re going to get down there is either what's coming from the Moon which is probably very small, or what bounces off of your suit as a reflection. And you can see bubbles all along the thermal coating. There was an awful lot of bubbling around the service module coatings. The radiators that we looked at all looked nice and clean. I didnÂ’t see any surface contaminants on the radiator panels that I saw. Around the RCS was a lot of surface bubbling, particularly on Quad B. It was my impression, however, that there was no higher concentration of bubbles at the nozzle exit or in the immediate vicinity of the jet plume than there was scattered around the rest of the thermal panel there. The housing on the side of the quad, the little box that builds up around the nozzles had bubbles on it, just like the skin underneath; so maybe if there is a heating problem, maybe the heating that started the bubbling is either solar heating or itÂ’s a heat soak type of thing rather than jet plumes. I looked at the mapping camera first on the way back. The stellar lens shield had apparently been out and had stayed out from the first extension, and it was partially retracted so that the folding lip of the stellar shield was up against the handrail and had been mashed down against it, sort of folded the whole stellar shield as the mapping camera retracted. I had been asked to look at the mapping camera and look at the mechanism for retraction and extension and other features, the cables that went to it. ItÂ’s very difficult to see, because itÂ’s down in a shadowed area. I suppose if I had taken the time to position my body differently, I might have gotten more reflected sunlight down in there, but thatÂ’s a pretty hard shadow and I just didnÂ’t take the time to try to set myself off, although I think if you want to look down in the SIM bay, if youÂ’ll point your head so itÂ’s toward the Sun, I think that gold visor combined with the white suit make a wonderful reflector. I think you can probably see down inside some of those deep shadows pretty well if you just turn around and face the Sun. I just didnÂ’t take the time to do it. In retrospect, now I kind of wish maybe I had. I thought that we had seen what was wrong with the mapping camera when I found that stellar shield smashed against the rail.
I went back and looked at the aft end of the SIM bay. The mass spectrometer was gone, of course, and the shield that goes over the top of it was sticking straight up. I suppose thatÂ’s the nominal position. for post boom jettison.
Gamma Ray. I guess at this time we probably had noticed that it wasnÂ’t doing all of the right things because the cover was slightly ajar. It was sticking up at about a 15- to 20-degree angle and it was loose. I could wiggle the outer end of it like plus or minus 0.5 inch. It did not appear that the instrument itself was touching the hatch or the cover door. So somewhere the mechanism was holding it open. The instrument appeared to be down inside and it was on the rails. You could see the tapered end of the rails sticking through the instrument. It appeared to me that it was fully retracted, from what I had seen of the instrument pre-flight. So it was only the door that hadnÂ’t closed.
The Alpha/X-Ray Door was closed and it all looked completely normal. I looked at the aft end of the spacecraft, back around where the service module separates from the SLA and that was not as clean a cut as the SIM bay. The SIM bay, where the door came off, was a really clean cut. I looked at all of the surfaces, and I couldnÂ’t see one jagged edge sticking out anywhere or any loose metal. Looking back at the SLA/Service Module interface cut, there was quite a bit of material to the plus-Y side of what I could see. It has some sharp edges and pieces of metal that were bent out and still hanging on intact. And IÂ’d say they extended out maybe 0.5 inch. Looked like a good area to stay away from. Getting back in, we took the TV pole down. That was no problem. I passed it inside, removed the TV and the DAC, and put the MEED on it.
MEED Installation was no problem. When we got the MEED in place in the hatch, we ran into our first difficulty with the MEED. The MEED has a little Velcro strap which has been used to hold the lock in a locked position, just to keep you from knocking it. When you release it on the ground in one-g, this Velcro strap, which is about 6 inches long, will hang down. When you get in zero-g, this Velcro strap has an internal memory, and it goes right up over the Sun site. I was going to cut it off. I got talked out of wasting time on that and found a place where I could look around it and see the Sun site. The Sun site worked beautifully. You could really see the target. You could see where you were on it, what you needed to do to fix it. This MEED position was very difficult to get out to. I had to get completely out of the hatch in order to see it. And that was partly caused by the fact that with the visor down, I couldnÂ’t get head high enough to look up at it.
Young: Did holding your feet help you any?
Mattingly: The reason I wanted you to hold my feet as that the only other way I had to get out there was to climb up the pole. In training, what I had done was to plant my feet, one on the hatch and one on the couch strut inside, lean back, and look up at it. But I couldnÂ’t look up because the visor was down. The only way I could see the Sun site was to get up so that I could look down at it. And the only way to do that was to walk my way up the pole, and I was afraid that hanging onto the pole was going to cause the hatch to move back and forth and change the pointing angle. And I donÂ’t know how much in angular measure that thing was going to move, so I had Charlie hold my feet down and that let me let go of the pole for a minute. And it turned out that when I let go of the pole, it didnÂ’t move any from when I was hanging on to it, so after that, I just went ahead and held onto the pole. And initially, the target showed that we were outside in pitch and we maneuvered in minimum impulse to put it in and got it. We had an error of about 2 degrees in pitch and about 3 degrees in yaw. And we didnÂ’t take any more time to dress it up after we did that. Opening the MEED was no problem. I pulled the little ring out and twisted it. Charlie backed up the timing with his wristwatch, and Hank backed it up on the ground. So we had two clocks going on the MEED timing. When it came time to close it, I had been a little concerned about having to climb up the pole in order to close it again, but that turned out to be a pretty simple thing. I closed the experiment and then I went to lock it, and there apparently was just enough extra inflation with the seal, that I couldnÂ’t get the lock to lock and once again the problem I was running into was that I was trying to use my right arm to kind of put a half nelson on the box and hold myself to the pole and squeeze the box closed, while I tried to use my left hand to lock the lock and started running into problems with the glove again. So IÂ’m really not sure, everything working the way I had expected, of how many problems weÂ’d have run into. The end result was that I pulled the MEED down without its being locked and passed it inside where John and Charlie locked it with apparently no trouble at all.
Duke: I thought it was a lot of trouble.
Young: It took four hands.
Duke: And I had to push it against the couch strut.
Young: If itÂ’s a two-hand operation and it takes essentially five arms to do it, thatÂ’s troublesome.
Mattingly: I would guess that we gave it an extra UV exposure of 5 to 10 seconds at the most.
Duke: Yes, and that wasnÂ’t direct.
Young: Indirect. I think that was on the order of 3 seconds.
Mattingly: I donÂ’t think we disturbed the data at all.
Young: It may have done something to the data, but I donÂ’t know how youÂ’d evaluate it.
Mattingly: Okay. Comm during EVA. I thought it was super. I could hear you guys and I just didnÂ’t have any problems at all with the comm.
Young: In any case, the comm during the EVA was a lot better than it was in the altitude chamber, I thought. MA!PTINGLY Yes, there was a lot less noise.
Young: A lot less noise. M&TTINGLY Ingress was simple again. Every time I raised the folding visor, I closed the hatch on it and knocked it back down. I was having a hard time looking at the seals. Finally, John and Charlie checked all of the seals to make sure they were clear, then we pressurized it. Once again, I want to mention how nervous you feel about closing the hatch without some visible indicator that you have really gone over center on those locks. One of the technicians showed me how you could check the clearance and at the very- last stroke of travel, you could see a place where the dogs come across. But you sit there and youÂ’re counting on that thing holding pressure on you, and the only indication you have that itÂ’s latched is the fact that it quit stroking and the little bar falls down, but you donÂ’t really see all of the dogs go over center.
Young: With the visor down, neither Ken nor Charlie nor I could check that the seal was in fact clear, so itÂ’s the kind of thing where you could have the hatch closed and it would be dogged as much as it could, but something might be in the seal and you couldnÂ’t check it. This indication that Ken had with the last stroke of travel that shows the dogs over center that the technician showed him is a good way to do it. The only problem was, with the visor down again, he could not make that check and thatÂ’s a valid check. I think in future spacecraft design, there ought to be positive indication to the crew that the dogs are in fact over center. I guess thatÂ’s a standard gripe with me and the hatch, and has been ever since I participated in the design of it. I think in future spacecraft design, somebody ought to worry about it.
Mattingly: Once we got the cabin pressurized, we didn’t have any problem on that. It takes awhile. You just have to be patient while you build up the cabin with the purge flow. It takes about ten minutes to build it up to where the repressed package bring it to where you have 3£frac12; psi that they’d like to have before you open up the purge valve.
Duke: IÂ’d like to say one thing. During EVA, I was always very comfortable. In the suit on the surge tank, the activities that I did never felt like I was overheated and we hardly used any oxygen out of the surge tank, the entire hour.
Young: It was still up around 850 or so, I guess. We flew the spacecraft a little in pulse to get the MEED lined up, and I didnÂ’t think that was any problem, although you canÂ’t handle the hand controller like you normally do because youÂ’ve got it over in the left hand and it's all in a catawampus angle to your wrist, but itÂ’s still no problem. I donÂ’t think flying a spacecraft in that manner for that kind of thing is hard.
Mattingly: On the subject of the OPS, another thought passing on that is that we give, going outside, an OPS and a purged umbilical. And we give the people inside two relatively low-pressure oxygen bottles to live on. And the crewman outside has a lot more protection with that OPS than the crewman in the suit loop. Because not only does he have more makeup capability with the purge umbilical just to start with, but heÂ’s got a backup system with almost unlimited makeup capability. If thereÂ’s anybody that has a minimum of backup protection, itÂ’s the two crewmen on a suit loop in the spacecraft, where they have nothing but a surge tank and a repress package to work from. Neither of those have a particularly high flow capability. And as long as the umbilical is flown, youÂ’ll never get those things pumped back up. It seems to me itÂ’s a bit inconsistent in our approach to backup systems.
Young: Yes, but I think everybodyÂ’s realized that all along, Ken. No question about it. The crewman on the outside is a lot better off than those on the inside, and it makes everybody feel warm.
Mattingly: We write rules that say, if you donÂ’t have an OPS, you shouldnÂ’t go EVA. YouÂ’ve got more to start with than the crewmen in the cabin.
Young: I agree. I think if worse came to worst, and you wanted to get the pan camera and film but for some reason, you lost OPS, I donÂ’t see anything more risky about going without OPS, I really donÂ’t. MPLTTINGLY Okay. We used the OPS to pump the cabin up. And we used the OPS two more times as a way of bleeding the OPS down. We had something like 1600 psi in the OPS after we finished pumping the cabin up the first time. I think it was 1300 when we finished. That evening when we pumped the cabin up, it had built up again to 1500 to 1600. One of the things that we had overlooked on our post-EVA stowage was that I turned right around and stowed the OPS, only to have to go and unstow it for the pre-sleep checklist to get the cabin pumped up again. That was an unnecessary amount of shuffling of materials around. On the post-EVA, we tried to get started toward an entry stowage, and the technique that we used was that I went ahead and got unsuited, and John and Charlie stayed with their suits on and just laid on the couch. I could move around and we decided not to let everybody unsuit, because that was having six people in there plus all the junk, and the only way you can get in out of these boxes is to have one of the crewmen thatÂ’s fairly mobile and the other two people passing stuff. I guess we spent about 2½ hours on that. At times there, you couldnÂ’t see anything except bags and boxes and junk floating around. I looked up from the LEB once and there was just nothing in sight.
Duke: I couldnÂ’t see you either.
Young: Yes, that was very interesting. We were getting this thing where itÂ’s almost like Gemini as far as the stowage is concerned. You canÂ’t take one box out without taking the whole mess of other boxes out. It gets pretty tight.
Mattingly: If you would take it methodically, itÂ’s only a nuisance. It did bother me when I looked around and saw how much stuff we had floating free that if you ever had any reason to have to do something in a hurry, if you had some hardware problem, you were really going to be thrashing trying to get to some of the corners of the spacecraft because there is just stuff everywhere.
Young: IÂ’d like to say that I thought Ken really had the stowage laid out well. ItÂ’s just by the numbers, and thatÂ’s really the only way to do it. In the order that you have to do it to stow it, thatÂ’s the way he had it laid out. Really, the only thing that we did that was probably inconsistent was that we were working the entry stowage list after we finished the EVA, and we were taking it very methodically box by box until we got down to the PGA stowage, at which time we assumed that all three of the suits belonged in the stowage bag. We pushed them in there, only to find out that they didnÂ’t want all three suits in the stowage bag. We wanted one under the right-hand couch. I assumed we could have probably left it that way since we got them all in there, except that we didnÂ’t have any place to stow the LEVs. Charlie was sleeping under the right couch, so we ended up taking one suit out and just sort of letting it float down in the LEB, which was in the way of everything. But I guess the thing to do is to remind the crew to sort of have a delta entry stowage after you finish the EVA.
Mattingly: We got ahead of ourselves in a couple of cases, such as putting the OPS and burying it underneath a lot of stuff, only to have to pull it out to pressurize the cabin that night and the following night. And we left the TV stowed which we needed the following day.
Young: I guess the way to handle that might be to put asterisks on the entry stowage list so that it sort of indicates that thereÂ’s a delta stowage youÂ’re going to have to do after you finish the EVA or something that youÂ’re going to have to restow those items for, reentry maybe. Something like that.
Mattingly: I'm not sure that there is a much cleaner way than the way we did it.
Duke: I thought it was great.
Young: I thought it was great, only it was inconvenient to restow that stuff, thatÂ’s all.
Mattingly: One of the things you have to keep in mind is that three crewmen in three couches donÂ’t sleep very successfully. I think that you really need to lose that. Because when you sleep, you kind of sprawl out a little, and I think if you tried to put. the third person sleeping in the center couch, that he probably wouldnÂ’t sleep very well. That means you have to put one person under the couch, and with all of the rock bags stowed under there and all the other things (and by this time, youÂ’ve filled up another jettison bag full of trash and you got just enough stuff so that that extra suit has to go to somewhere) so you can leave the poor fellow a place to go to sleep.
Young: We had three items that were our delta stowage after we woke up the last day. The pressure suit we had to restow, the jettison bag which by this time was enormous, and that black fecal bag which we had to move every time we did anything. What was the last one
Duke: The goodie bag.
Young: The goodie bag, and it was a lot bigger than weÂ’d anticipated too. DUI It had the Flight Plan in it.
Young: And it had the LM Flight Data File. IÂ’m sure we didnÂ’t have a CG exactly. DU It was all in the LEB, and I tied it all down.
Mattingly: Mass Spec. There was nothing to say except we jettisoned it. We did another Light Flash thing and. once again Charlie sandbagged it.
Young: Yes, Charlie had me 3 to 1 on the light flashes. I really donÂ’t think it was fair.
Mattingly: Flight Plan Updates. They settled down a little bit by this time. I donÂ’t think we had any particular problems with it, since the ground was running most of the calls in real time. That seemed to work pretty well.
Duke: It was great, especially during that suit doff on the EVA post.
Mattingly: I think you really ought to take advantage of the people on the ground. TheyÂ’ve got the time and theyÂ’ve got the manpower to watch clocks and remind you of things and let you go about your business and not be a slave to the clock. I think that frees you to do a lot of things that youÂ’d otherwise have to let go.
Young: Especially since our clock wasnÂ’t working.
Mattingly: Okay. This takes us right on up to entry. Maneuvering to the Entry Attitude and all those things. We got up on entry morning, and I felt we had a very leisurely, very comfortable time, even with our ISS lights thrown in. And I thought that was the kind of day ft ought to be, nothing extra thrown in there. I think that whole day ought to be preserved, just in its present form.
Duke: John and Ken were in the cockpit making sure we were up to speed on the entry checklist. I was going about the final stowage things, getting the suit tied up under and the sleep restraints and things like that, and I thought that was a good way to do it. Another comment on the EVA. We mentioned our failures, except one I failed to mention was that my watch blew a crystal on EVA-3 and it stopped running at that point. So the flight watch went belly up and I got it brought it back to let them examine it. But the crystal either blew out or broke, and I donÂ’t ever remember hitting it. The face of the watch doesnÂ’t look like itÂ’s scratched. So I think what happened is the crystal just blew out and we got dust in it, and the thing was just not running and that happened on EVA-3. ThatÂ’s it.