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Public Lessons Learned Entry: 1108

Lesson Info:

  • Lesson Number: 1108
  • Lesson Date: 1999-02-01
  • Submitting Organization: HQ
  • Submitted by: David M. Lengyel

Subject:

International Space Station Program/Crew Return Vehicle (CRV)/X-38 Risk Assessment and Testing

Description of Driving Event:

Thorough Risk Assessment and Testing Program for the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV)

Lesson(s) Learned:

Plans calling for availability on orbit in early 2003 of a U.S. CRV based on the X-38 technology demonstrator are highly ambitious. Although much of the X-38 technology is off the shelf, there are numerous features that rely on yet unproven approaches.

Recommendation(s):

NASA must not allow the limited CRV development time to comprise the conduct of a thorough risk assessment and testing program.

Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness:

Concur. The new CRV acquisition strategy requires the developing contractor to take responsibility/accountability for the CRV's flight readiness. The CRV RFP Synopsis asked candidate contractors about CRV risks. None identified 2003 launch readiness as a significant risk. For government developed technologies (i.e. parafoil and OML aero) the test programs are ongoing and will be demonstrated with flight tests. Although much of the X-38 design is based upon off-the-shelf technology, it is recognized that features such as the parafoil landing system are unproven. Where this is the case, extra testing is being performed to certify and human rate these systems. The extensive parafoil test program at the Yuma Proving Ground is an example of the rigorous testing of an unproven design. The last several successful parachute tests are beginning to show the fruits of this approach. Once parafoil testing has reached a point, which has a proven safety and maturity of its design, the parafoil design will not be allowed to be changed by the contractor in their CRV design. Safety and Mission Assurance play an important role in the X-38 Phase 1 activity. Each contractor will be required to develop at least an S&MA Plan, Risk Management Plan, Vehicle Certification Plan, Vehicle fault tolerance studies & recommendations, Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis, and Human Rating Assessment for their CRV design. Quality of these S&MA tasks will play a major role in the selection by NASA personnel of one contractor to perform the Phase 2 task of building the CRV.

Documents Related to Lesson:

N/A

Mission Directorate(s):

  • Space Operations
  • Exploration Systems

Additional Key Phrase(s):

  • Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
  • Policy & Planning
  • Research & Development
  • Risk Management/Assessment
  • Test & Verification

Additional Info:

    Approval Info:

    • Approval Date: 2002-02-12
    • Approval Name: Bill Loewy
    • Approval Organization: HQ
    • Approval Phone Number: 202-358-0528


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