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21st Century Space Travel

Season 1Episode 112Oct 4, 2019

A discussion of historical space policy with Stephen Garber and Glen Asner, co-authors of "Origins of 21st Century Space Travel," which examines the formation of NASA's Decadal Planning Team, the tragic Columbia accident, and the direction of NASA after the accident, which they argue shapes how the agency is laid out today. HWHAP Episode 112.

21st Century Space Travel

21st Century Space Travel

If you’re fascinated by the idea of humans traveling through space and curious about how that all works, you’ve come to the right place.

“Houston We Have a Podcast” is the official podcast of the NASA Johnson Space Center from Houston, Texas, home for NASA’s astronauts and Mission Control Center. Listen to the brightest minds of America’s space agency – astronauts, engineers, scientists and program leaders – discuss exciting topics in engineering, science and technology, sharing their personal stories and expertise on every aspect of human spaceflight. Learn more about how the work being done will help send humans forward to the Moon and on to Mars in the Artemis program.

Episode 112 features a discussion of historical space policy with Stephen Garber and Glen Asner, co-authors of “Origins of 21st Century Space Travel,” which examines the formation of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team, the tragic Columbia accident, and the direction of NASA after the accident, which they argue shapes how the agency is laid out today. This episode was recorded on August 16th, 2019.

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Transcript

Gary Jordan (Host): Houston, we have a podcast. Welcome to the official podcast of the NASA Johnson Space Center, Episode 112, “21st Century Space Travel”. I’m Gary Jordan, and I’ll be your host today. If you’re new to the show, we bring in the experts to talk about all different parts of our space agency and human spaceflight. Planning spaceflight missions can be tough. You hear us today discussing the art of this program, which sends human to the surface of the moon in a few short years. These types of plans, even years down the road, are ambitious and aggressive when talking about human spaceflight. And a major part of being successful is overcoming budgetary, technological, and policy constraints way in advance. You’re probably familiar with President Kennedy’s declaration to Congress in May of 1961, which was reiterated at Rice University in Texas, in September of ’62. He declared that we would put a man on the moon and return him safely to Earth by the end of the decade. NASA met this challenge with the right support and funding to match the goal, but later years prove that this would not always be the case. Decades passed, many presidents went by, and NASA’s exploration goals seemed ever so on the horizon. What NASA needed was a way to focus its efforts and think strategically. The best way to do that, long-term planning. It was 1999 when NASA put together the Decadal Planning Team under administrator Dan Goldin, which would dedicate time to laying out exactly how NASA could achieve its goals over a long period of time and fight for a budget that would support these efforts. The Decadal Planning Team would see changes in its name and direction in following years, but its roots would remain the same, to focus on where we’re going and exactly how we’re going to get there. Today, we’re sitting down with Stephen Garber and Glen Asner, co-authors of the book titled “Origins of 21st Century Space Travel: A History of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team and the Vision for Space Exploration, 1999 to 2004”. This book examines NASA in those years, which saw the formation of this planning team, the tragic Columbia accident, and the forward direction of NASA after the accident, which would shape how the agency is laid out today. So, let’s take a deep dive into historical space policy with Steve Garber and Glen Asner. Enjoy.

[ Music ]

Host:All right, so let’s get into the book. First, it’s called Origins of 21st Century Space Travel: A History of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team and the Vision for Space Exploration, 1999 to 2004. We’re going to take a snapshot of those years in NASA’s history. Can you tell me why you decided to focus on these years? What was it that draw your attention to those specific time?

Glen Asner: Well, we were actually asked to write this book. You know, it was kind of an odd circumstance. Well, we were asked to write a study, not this book, per se. But the day before I started working in the NASA History Headquarters Program, I was asked by the chief historian if I wanted a co-author study with Steve on the Decadal Planning Team. And we were told that at the start, so we both agreed, and we were told at the start that the Decadal Planning Team had led to the Vision for Space Exploration. We were a little bit skeptical, and so we did a much broader study, and we did a lot more research, and indeed, we came up with the — we confirmed that the visions for space exploration and the Decadal Planning Team had very strong linkages and decided to make it a full buck.

Host: And then in terms of what these things are, Decadal Planning Team and Vision for Space Exploration, really, it’s a group of people sitting down and thinking about where do we want to be in terms of human spaceflight in x number of years and how are we going to get there.

Steve Garber: Right, we can talk a little bit about the two pieces. I like to think of this as two bookends to our story. The Cato planning team started in 1999. And then the end of our story is really in 2004, with the unveiling of the Vision for Space Exploration by President George W. Bush. So, we can talk a little bit about the two bookends, if you will, and how those came about. That’s really our story.

Host: Perfect, and actually, that’s what I was hoping to do. I was hoping to really dive deep into this moment in time. And I actually had the pleasure of reading the book to prepare for this interview. I know it starts off with sort of setting the context pre 1999, in fact, even going back to the early parts of human spaceflight at NASA, It even starts with von Braun and the context of formation with NASA, going through the Apollo program. I think the reason that you wanted to start with that was there were elements of planning that sort of eventually, I guess, led to what was to be later, in 1999, the Decadal Planning Team. So, how does that start? How does the book start with actually setting the context of NASA and the policy thus far that got us to the point where we needed a Decadal Planning Team?

Steve Garber: Sure. Well, the way I like to think about it is that chapter two is the prehistory in air quotes, if you will, of our story, so before 1999. And one thing I’ve learned in working in history over the years is that it seems like there’s a prehistory to practically every topic you think about, as somebody’s always thought about some aspect of it before you did, right? So, the way — and to put it in a little more context, I can give you two examples of other monographs that have been written that are relevant. One is a bibliography that a colleague at JSC did, Johnson Space Center did. That’s a — it’s a bibliography of works about spaceflight before the space age began with the launch of Sputnik, so pre 1957. So, this includes lots of literature from Cykowski and other people who were thinking about how space could be accessed. So, there’s a whole bibliography on that, and then there’s another bibliography that our office published about 20 years ago or so that covers literally hundreds of planning studies for sending humans to Mars. So, in between this, there’s all these other blue ribbon task forces. There are many — there are the roles of advocacy organizations. There’s what’s called the Von Braun Paradigm of exploration. That was named after Wernher von Brown, of course. All these different ideas that had been sort of circulating, distilling, marinating, what have you over time, so that these ideas of sending humans beyond low Earth orbit and doing accompanying and integrating robotic spaceflight, people had fought about these things for many years before. So, it’s not like the story — the story begins in earnest in 1999, but there was a whole prehistory to it.

Host: Right, yeah, and a lot of it has to do not only with that, but with the politics that were surrounding this. I know, especially during the Apollo program, you know, you had funding that matched the ambitious goal of getting humans to the surface of the moon by the end of the decade. And, you know, I think a lot of NASA and others really believe that this trend would continue. And I think there was just these waves of inconsistency throughout the years that eventually led, and one of those elements that you’re talking about with what set up the Decadal Planning Team was the, it was called the SEI, I believe it’s Space Exploration Initiative under H.W. Bush to sort of get — take that Von Braun Paradigm of, you know, what are the steps we need to take to get there, and it was this idea, one of the ideas, of focusing the — NASA’s efforts, right?

Steve Garber: Right, right. So, in 1989, on the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 mission, President George H.W. Bush stood on the steps of the National Air and Space Museum and announced what became known as the Space Exploration Initiative or SEI. And the idea behind it was to send humans, astronauts, back to the moon and then on to Mars. So, this was the first, if you will, formal I’m sort of waving my hand to indicate quasi formal program to do that, to go on send humans beyond low Earth orbit.

Host: Now, there was changes of, you know, sending humans beyond low Earth orbit, but really thinking about how that was going to happen, you know, where would you fit in low Earth orbit? Where would you fit in the moon? I know there was — we were going back and forth. There was this thing called the Mars Reference Mission of, I think, it was something where if we were to just go, you know, focus all of our efforts on going to Mars and sending a single mission of astronauts to Mars, skipping all the other steps, what would that take, right? So, they were thinking of all — not only just like where can we go, but what are the processes, steps, years of funding requirements that would be needed for x, y, and z.

Steve Garber: Right. Well, the way I think of the Mars Reference Mission is it’s sort of like a template for how we would send humans to Mars and addresses some of the different technical subsystems, if you will, that we’d need to think about, so, for example, propulsion or building a spacecraft that could accommodate a small crew for the six month journey to the red planet, that kind of thing. Think about all of the human factors, all these different things and sort of weighs out what do we need to know? What do we need to do to get there? But — so that’s sort of a plan that was on the shelf, if you will, but it was just a template plan. In the meantime, there were lots of people leading lots of people and lots of circumstances leading up to 1999, where people were thinking well, is that really what we want to do, is send humans directly to Mars or on to the moon and then to Mars. So, for example, the Space Task Group in 1969, shortly before the Apollo 11 landing, they were already looking at the next big thing for NASA in terms of human spaceflight. And there were a couple of options. One was Earth orbiting space station, one was basically the space shuttle, and one was sending humans beyond low Earth orbit that way. So, it ended up that the space Task Group recommended building a shuttle, in part, because that was the least expensive option, and that’s what President Nixon adopted. But people were thinking about — that’s just one example of how people were thinking about all these different options.

Host: Now, if we kind of fast forward just right before the Decadal Planning Team, I think one — a key person in this story of this snapshot of 1999 to 2004 and what happened, a key person in that story is Dan Goldin, who was the administrator. I think he’s the longest serving administrator of NASA, if I’m not mistaken.

Steve Garber: Yes.

Host: But he sort of laid the foundation pre-Decadal Planning Team. I know one of the slogans was “faster, better, cheaper”, you know, he had a lot of focus on Mars. And there were a lot of good things that were happening pre 1999. You had this discovery of a meteorite that could, you know, it brought up more questions of is there really life on Mars. There were like maybe little hints in there. You had great things like Pathfinder. You had the Hubble Servicing Mission. Things were going well, right, in the late 90s?

Glen Asner: Well, yes, for the most part they were. The faster, better, cheaper initiative was really considered a great success, and, like you said, Pathfinder and Sojourner rovers were really very, very highly acclaimed. The — there were a couple of notable failures. You had the 1999 Mars Polar Lander and then the Mars Climate Orbiter, which impacted Dan Goldin’s thinking at that time, and also the space station and the shuttle were starting to encounter some cost overruns. So, he was really starting to think, at that point in time, that we needed to start planning for the post shuttle and post station period.

Host: Right, yeah, and that’s kind of where this all kicks off, right? So, 1999, the formation of the Decadal Planning Team, let’s get right into it. What were some of the first steps to get to what would be the DPT?

Steve Garber: Well, if I may, I just wanted to mention a couple of the reasons that Dan Goldin wanted to establish a Decadal Planning Team. When we interviewed him for this book, he just sort of ticked them off in quick fashion, but the more we thought about them, the more significant they seem. So, in no particular order, he mentioned four different factors. One was — this, again, this is 1999, so the next year would be a new presidential election and a new administration, because President Clinton had already served two terms. So, he wanted to prepare a slate, a game plan for the next president, whoever that would be. So, that’s one item. Another thing was he wanted to prepare for such a time where there would be a, like a bull market, if you will. There would be money available in the economy to do big things in space, right? And then a third thing was he wanted to integrate robotic spaceflight and human spaceflight. Previously, he felt that culturally, NASA had suffered from operating under these distinct silos, if you will, where the people who did robotic space science didn’t really cooperate much with the people who did human spaceflight. And then last, and perhaps least, I don’t know, he sort of decried what was the slogan that was commonly heard at the time of Mars or bust, and by that, what he meant was he wanted a truly compelling rationale to send humans to Mars, if there was one. And he wanted more — even more than that, he wanted a truly compelling rationale to do whatever the game plan would be, not just talk about things that sounded cool, but why are we doing them fundamentally.

Host: And I know one of the, I guess, main items to make this successful was to have the right people. I know there are some key players in this whole story, and I’m — I might butcher their names, so just correct me if I do. Steve Isakowitz.

Steve Garber: Yeah.

Host: Okay, Isakowitz, okay. I know he’s a very key player in this. I believe, at the time, in 1999, he was with OMB the Office of Management and Budget Chief of Science and Space programs, but there’s also Jim Garvin, Lisa Guerra, some other folks that he recruited to really focus on these initiatives.

Glen Asner: Well, so Steve Isakowitz over at OMB, he came up with the idea he and his team to give NASA five million dollars per year over the next few years to initiate these studies, which became the Decadal Planning Team. The people at NASA, like Lisa Guerra and Garvin and Harley Thronson, were chosen by the heads of the Office of Spaceflight and Science. Joe Rothenberg was in charge of Spaceflight and Ed Weiler was in charge of Science at that time.

Host: I see. So, it was taking — it was assigning these folks to different areas and having them focus their efforts on unifying into a common goal.

Glen Asner: That’s correct, and it was top down. It was control of this, and the inspiration, of course, came from Dan Goldin and Steve Isakowitz, but it was really being managed at NASA headquarters. And they — by the heads of Spaceflight and Science, and they were pulling from the NASA centers, but the idea was that whatever policy would be developed would be implemented by headquarters. And the priorities would be set by headquarters.

Steve Garber: Right. Weiler and Rothenberg were dubbed the stakeholders, and so they got to choose who would be on this team.

Host: Okay, they were some of the leadership of this the Decadal Planning Team, and you were mentioning a top down sort of strategy. And I believe that was, you know, the Decadal Planning Team was, I guess, organized or maybe executed in phases. And that was part of phase one, which was the charter, was this top down strategy, and I believe part of that was a forward-looking strategy, not to look at past concepts as much. And I know one of the big key drivers here was to be science-driven and technology-enabled. Is that right?

Glen Asner: That’s correct.

Host: Yeah.

Glen Asner: Yeah.

Host: And what was the, I guess, reasoning behind that? Why be science-driven?

Glen Asner: Well, they’ve — part of it was Dan Goldin was looking for a new rationale for Spaceflight, and a lot of people at NASA at that time also thought that the scientific goals, as they were being articulated by the science community, the National Academy of Sciences, were really solid ones that deserved consideration and could really help set the pace for future spaceflight and determine where we should go, for how long we should go. So, Dan Goldin, I think, grabbed on to that, and some of the personnel on the team reflected that desire to have science — the scientific goals determining the pace and the destinations. And the other half of that was technology-enabled, and the idea there would really be that technology or the state of technology would influence the pace of the exploration program as well in where we could go.

Host: Yeah, I know that, in terms of being science-driven, I can say confidently now, you know, working very closely with the International Space Station Program, that’s definitely one of the main drivers of communication and efforts, even on the Space Station now. So, that’s definitely still true today, you know, when we’re talking about laying the foundation for what is 21st century space travel, I believe that’s still true today. I know, especially in these early phases, I believe one of the ideas was to be quote, destination independent, you know, like designing the technologies and being technology-abled and understanding and driving toward that science, but being, you know, having no place to go initially, I believe, had its own hazards.

Glen Asner: Yeah, that’s correct. I mean, that was a big discussion from the very beginning, from the very first meeting was not being tied to any specific destination, although they were later kind of layout clear destinations to go. The real concept here is to develop the capabilities to go wherever you want, wherever later on the science determined or whatever other factor determined would be the best place to go.

Host: And I know one of the funding strategies was this other quote, ‘buying by the yard’. What did that — what does that mean?

Glen Asner: Well, I mean, it’s certainly the concept though. It’s related to the other science-driven technology-enabled in the sense that you have to devise the program to sustain the political winds and the budgetary ups and downs. And so we’re — and this is what distinguishes the DPT. This is one of the things that distinguishes DPT from what eventually was the Vision for Space Exploration. The concept at the very beginning was that, under Dan Goldin, was that this was not — a big announcement was not likely, a big announcement of sending humans beyond low Earth orbit. So, the idea was really to slowly, gradually develop these capabilities, so when the time came, if there was a shift in public opinion or a shift in NASA’s budgetary fortunes, then we would have the technologies in place to do it. But we couldn’t do that with one, like, with a big Apollo announcement. They were really thinking this was going to be gradual, and so we had to slowly develop those capabilities and technologies.

Steve Garber: Right, and sort of the idea that we knew basically what kinds of technologies we needed. So, we might as well get started on those. So, whether it’s in space propulsion or crew and crews — crew and the life sciences safety issues to maintain the health of the crew on the mission, long duration mission, those kinds of things. We knew what we needed to develop. So, we might as well just get started, as much as we could, sort of building generic technologies that then could be tailored toward the particular mission.

Host: Right, and then that eventually led to, I guess, in 2000, phase two of this whole Decadal Planning Team was actually thinking of specific architectures. And I know one of the key points here in this story was the Y River retreat. What happened there?

Steve Garber: Well, {Laughter} some people who participated in the Decadal Planning Team felt that it was certainly a watershed moment, but not in a good way and for a variety of reasons. There were some Goldin sort of — the DPT participants at the time sort of felt that Goldin lost interest in what they were doing when before he was very interested in what they were doing and joked about being part of the team himself and this kind of thing. And it turned out that there were some other things that were weighing on the administrator’s mind at the time, such as ISS cost overruns that not everybody knew about within NASA at the time and other things. So, it sort of shifted a little bit but — and things moved on from there a little bit, but at the same time, they were still sort of thinking about some of their earlier goals. And this phrase of sneaking up on Mars came about a little bit earlier before then. And it’s worth just mentioning that the idea was sort of, as Glen was saying before, that we would have sort of a plan on the shelf for when circumstances dictated it, because the idea was that a lot of people in the space community wanted to send humans to Mars. But we, again, needed to find a compelling rationale and the right timeframe — the right time period to initiate such a big program. So, until then, we, the Decadal Planning Team, sort of worked not in secret, but they were — their work was what was called embargoed, meaning it wasn’t widely discussed with other NASA people and certainly not outside, because the idea was that they would be given some figurative space to work out these different ideas for how to build these technologies they would that we, NASA, would need to have these science-driven missions.

Host: Right, yeah. It was kind of enabling the capability, so when that time did come, they were already ahead of the game in terms of technology and capability.

Steve Garber: Right, right.

Host: Okay. Now, after that, I believe, this is when George W. Bush comes in, and now we’re starting to get away from the Decadal Planning Team. I know there’s some changes in administration, and then even the name of Decadal Planning Team. So, what’s happening there?

Glen Asner: So, at that point, the Decadal Planning Team becomes the next exploration team or wait–

Glen Asner: NASA exploration team next.

Host: Next, right.

Glen Asner: Yeah, yeah, yeah, all these names get a little hard to keep in mind, and actually, soon thereafter we also have a change in leadership over at NASA. Sean O’Keefe succeeded Dan Goldin as the NASA administrator, and at the level of the planning team, Jim Garvin, who was the leader of it was replaced by Gary Martin, who was then also named the space architect.

Steve Garber: Yeah.

Glen Asner: Yeah.

Steve Garber: NASA space architect.

Host: Space architect, okay. So, then what–

Steve Garber: It’s a good title, right?

Host: That is pretty awesome, right? So, Sean O’Keefe and Gary Martin I believe these leadership changes kind of are one of the key drivers in, I guess, the — how the difference between the Decadal Planning Team and NEXT what — what’s — how is O’Keefe a little bit different from Goldin in terms of the way he’s thinking?

Glen Asner: Well, O’Keefe walked in and he — the first presentation to him from the team — he was really kind of shocked by it, shocked because he thought that’s what NASA did. He didn’t think this was new. He thought NASA was supposed to be doing this kind of long-term planning all along. And so he was just kind of surprised that they were keeping it secret, and he was surprised that it was such a big deal. He — and he gave them full room to go ahead and do more studies, dig deeper into the issues that they had been thinking about.

Host: Now, there are some other key drivers here that eventually kind of changed the way that NEXT is, I think, perceived in a lot of them is just things going on around the world. We’re getting — we’re now sneaking up on, you know, September 11th, 2001. We got some serious — some national security elements, and I believe the director of Space Policy of National Security, I think, Joe Klinger starts getting involved. So, there are some external elements outside of NASA that start, I guess, and correct me if I’m wrong, influencing the direction there.

Glen Asner: Well, that name is Gil Klinger just to correct the record. Yeah, I mean, I absolutely, you know, 9/11 is a huge deal. That comes and totally changes everything for the United States. A key thing that occurred at that time too was that Steve Isakowitz moved over. I think that might have been slightly later, but Steve Isakowitz, the man who had given the money to start DPT actually came over as the NASA comptroller.

Host: That’s right.

Glen Asner: And so that was another just kind of boost to this whole initiative.

Host: Yeah, and he’s a big part of the story.

Steve Garber: Right. He had worked with O’Keefe at the Office of Management and Budget, because O’Keefe had previously been the deputy head of the OMB, so they knew each other that way. And then O’Keefe brought him over as the comptroller. The other thing that you alluded to a minute ago, Gary, was this idea of sort of the interagency process getting geared up. And people such as Gil Klinger at the National Security Council and Brett Alexander at the Offices of Science and Technology Policy at the White House got involved. And then other people from other agencies got involved–

Glen Asner: That really starts after Columbia, in earnest.

Steve Garber: Right, right, right.

Host: Which is a big part of this story. I know you guys actually dedicated a whole chapter to Columbia. Now, let’s kind of recap Columbia, what happened there and the significant shift in — at NASA that occurred post Columbia.

Steve Garber: Sure. Well, the story that I tell about that is when we interviewed Sean O’Keefe about this, Glen and I started talking to him about Columbia. And I viewed it as sort of a little bit of a diversion in the conversation, and so I said something to that effect. And he said, “No, no, Columbia is key to the story of how the Vision for Space Exploration came about. So, let’s talk about that.” So, that’s what Sean O’Keefe said. So, the Columbia accident on February 1st, 2003, was, in fact, a huge turning point for NASA in many, many ways, and not the least of which it enabled what became the Vision for Space Exploration. So, we can certainly talk about some of those different aspects.

Host: Now, another, you know, I alluded to this a little bit earlier as well, but there was a lot going on in the world. You know, even just at NASA Columbia was so significant, but even something go around now, you know, we’re post 9/11. You have an anxiety of Americans, terrorism war going on, that the White House is divided in what NASA is going to do next during this very confusing time that we’re in. And now, I believe, this is where the conversation of, you know, we were talking a little bit about kind of flying under the radar and not really choosing where we’re going to go, that this is where the conversation of we need a compelling vision, we need, you know, we need somewhere to go, we need some destination at NASA. And that’s where this sort of picks up is post Columbia.

Steve Garber: Right. Well, two points to mention here. One is about the process, and I’ll just tell another story about Gil Klinger. He says that what happened when he got involved was his boss of the time asked him to be sort of a point person to shepherd this through the National Security Council’s policymaking process, that an established process for National Security. And Klinger responded something to the effect of, “Well, this isn’t really national security, its civilian space, and I don’t know much about it, and I don’t really want to do this.” And his boss — he said it, not that, you know, I’m not going to do it or, you know, he wasn’t grinding his feet in the floor or anything. But he said — he — the way he put it to us was something like, “I pushed this away at every opportunity I got.” But then finally, his boss said to him, “Well, what’s the right thing to do for the president?” And then he back out okay, I better do this, right? So, that — and that’s important, because you might, again, ask, “Well, why was this policy process enacted?” Or and why was it utilized, especially post Columbia, and it’s because there was a specific process available for policymakers on the national security side when there wasn’t really on the civilian side. There was a Domestic Policy Council, and they got involved, but they didn’t have the same kind of established policy process — policymaking process. So, that’s one thing. The other thing about the Columbia accident, of course, it was a huge wake up call for not only everybody at NASA, but everybody in the space community. And people were really wondering what sort of wither NASA, if you will or what’s going to happen next, what’s the raison d’etre going to be for NASA, if we can’t fly humans? And one other twist to that story is that shortly after the accident, President George W. Bush said something to the effect of, “We need to, you know, grieve for the astronauts whose lives were lost in this terrible accident. And one of the ways we need to honor their memory is by going back into space with astronauts.” Right, and so this guy Brett Alexander from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, he picked up on that, and he used that little remark by the president to remind other people that he was working with, who doubted the wisdom, if you will, of going forward with such a big vision with a small V. He reminded them, and he said, “Hey, the president has already said we’re going to get back to flying humans in spaceflight. So, anybody who doubts the continued existence of NASA, forget about it. We are going to do this.” Because people were seriously doubting whether NASA could exist and if it existed, but what would it do if not human spaceflight, all this kind of discussion. So, that’s why it was such a big turning point.

Host: Yeah, definitely, and I know that was reflected even the — in the investigation board of the Columbia accident investigation board. When they actually made the report to go to root cause I know when it comes to the actual report, one of the — a portion of that report actually departed from the norm and started talking about these points that you’re saying, you know, we need to explore and sorts of that as part of the findings of this official report. So, it was definitely ingrained in that culture to continue to explore. I know another part, you know, and you alluded to this a little bit was the way that the politics and the way the decision-making process works. This is where thing, you know, I guess we’re starting to depart from the norm. I know that the White House rump group was a part of that to sort of shift the way that actual decisions were made, whether, you know, the involvement of the National Security Council versus being in civilian space and how that all works. So, where was — how did that shift happen from 2003, moving forward?

Glen Asner: Well, so, I mean, at simultaneously at NASA and at the White House right after the Columbia accident, there were groups thinking about what to do next. And as Steve had said, we were in danger of losing the shuttle program, the whole spaceflight program. There was some question raised at the very beginning whether or not we should even go ahead with a new shuttle or maybe we need to develop a new vehicle or maybe NASA should be broken up. There were a lot of different ideas being floated around, and as Steve said, when the President indicated he was strongly behind bringing the space agency back and flying the shuttle again to this station, that shifted everything. And the separate groups that were thinking about it at NASA and the White House came together, under the Gil Klinger, at the National Security Council. That’s when the policy process started in earnest, and that’s when they started to really go back and forth between NASA, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, even though the Council of Economic advisors was — were on it. So, they started to form a working group after that with representatives of different agencies, including the State Department and Department of Defense.

Steve Garber: I just wanted to add one other thing. If you sort of can mentally put yourself in the time period that we’re talking about, it can lend some context of what’s going on. So, again, the Columbia accident happened on February 1st, 2003, and when the real sausage making of policy happens is later that year, immediately after the Columbia action and throughout the rest of 2003. And then the Vision is announced in January of 2004, and so going back to the first part of our story, the Decadal Planning Team, and it morphed into NEXT and things like that. So — but the Decadal Planning Team, again, they had done this work that, in some ways, really was what Goldin had hoped for in that it created a roadmap to use a jargon term. It created a roadmap or game plan for what NASA could do when the time was right. So, people like Gil Klinger and Brett Alexander and other people at NASA could pull those plans and ideas off the shelf right after the Columbia accident, when all this big discussion is going on and sort of big thoughts are being considered about what was going to happen with NASA after the Columbia accident.

Glen Asner: Well, of course, it was both the plans that were there that were in place that were still in motion and the people that had been doing that work.

Steve Garber: Right.

Glen Asner: So, Steve Isakowitz, Gary Martin, all those people were available to then support NASA’s positions in negotiations with the White House over what the new Vision for Space Exploration would look like.

Host: Yeah, and that was a dynamic time when — if you read through the book, I mean, you’re looking at — they were considering, like, everything. I was reading more about there was an orbital space plane. They were talking about what happens to the International Space Station, what happens to the shuttle, where do you go. You know, there was talk about half in low Earth and half beyond low Earth orbit and what, you know, every mix in between, calling Mars, Mars or calling Mars the red planet. What are you going to do, yeah, for the next generation, yeah, right? There was — I mean, this was a very dynamic time.

Glen Asner: And there were an unusual number of what are called deputy’s meetings at the National Security Council. No one could give us an exact figure, but it was somewhere between five and 10, where they were fleshing out the — they were running the competing proposals and fleshing out the ideas. But they — I think, fairly quickly, I mean, actually, before they even started this, everyone knew they were going to return to flight. They were going to retire the shuttle in 2010, and they were going to focus on finishing the ISS. I mean, there was some agreement among all of the people involved in the process that they were — that they would do these things and that they would develop a plan that took humans beyond low Earth orbit. There was a little dissent there, but for the most part, 90% of the people who were involved in this process, all agreed on these elements of it.

Steve Garber: Right, although it did take a little while to get to that consensus, because that time period right after — immediately after the Columbia accident, it was, as you said, a dynamic time where lots of ideas were being thrown around. And that’s why it was especially useful to have the background work that the Decadal Planning Team and NEXT had done already.

Host: That’s right, and I think one of the things toward the end of this dynamic time where they were actually focusing in on a vision, one of the selling points to the Bush administration was that the — this vision itself having a vision and a destination was, you know, one of the reasons why we headed towards this Vision for Space Exploration, this central team, I believe. And that’s where there was an actual security directive. I believe it was called National Security Presidential Directive 31. So, I guess — how does that work really, when it comes to the direction of where NASA would go and signing this NSPD 31? What was the history there?

Glen Asner: Well, that was the — so with the National Security Council policymaking process you had deputies, committees, and then that would lead to a kind of final decision by the president in a — with all of the principles from all of the major stakeholders in the government, so that included Marburger, who was the president’s science advisor and then–

Steve Garber: People like the secretary of defense, secretary of state, that kind of thing.

Glen Asner: A lot of, well, Sean O’Keefe was there. So, the final decisions were made at this meeting with the president who — one of the big — his big imprint on it was to say yes, we’re going to do the stepping stones approach with moon as a key initial destination, but then we are definitely going on to Mars, at least as he determined it at that point. He was set on going to Mars. He was concerned about the rollout of it publicly and how we were going to relate to international partners.

Steve Garber: Right. And the presidential directive was just sort of if you I use the word just all loosely here, but just sort of the formal incarnation of the Vision for Space Exploration policy, but it’s basically what all these interagency folks agreed upon that became the Vision for Space Exploration.

Host: I see.

Steve Garber: Or more formal version.

Host: Now, this is a, you know, this was part of that, like you said, the Vision for Space Exploration, and this was, as you mentioned, the right stakeholders when it comes to who was involved in making this presidential directive. Now, do you know how it’s different from what we have now, where the — where we are now is space policy directive one? Do you know how that’s changed?

Steve Garber: Well, we could talk a little bit about directives that way, but if we focus on — it might be easier to just sort of focus on the Vision for Space Exploration and how that came about. That might be a little simpler, and then people can understand by putting it — by comparison — by, excuse me, by comparing to what’s going on now.

Host: Okay. So, then what is The Vision for Space Exploration, because that’s, as I believe, the next step where, I believe, Bush made a speech in January of 2004?

Glen Asner: Well, I just wanted to mention, in the National Security process itself or in that final meeting with President Bush, there was a decision made there that was critical to the whole operations of NASA for the next 20 years. And that decision was to allow a large gap in time between the retirement of the shuttle and the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle, which was the replacement vehicle or the first flight of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. So, we had determined, at that point, one of the key decisions was that we would depend on the Russians to fly our astronauts to the station, and at that point in time with the Vision development process we also determined that it would be — the budget would be one billion dollars over five years and 11 billion dollars reprogrammed from this Space Station shuttle and other NASA programs.

Steve Garber: Right. We should also probably mention the elements of the Vision for Space Exploration itself.

Host: Sure.

Steve Garber: So, in January of 2004, when President Bush came to NASA headquarters to announce this policy, it included several components. The first was to return the shuttle safely to flying again, something that we should not take for granted and then to retire the shuttle safely by 2010, to complete the ISS by 2010, and to develop a new human rated spacecraft, which became known as the Crew Exploration Vehicle and then more broadly to go send humans back to the Moon, to Mars and then beyond, in general.

Host: Okay, so that was the vision, I believe, you know, and that’s kind of, I believe, what was the main focus of this book was 1999 to 2004, post that speech though, you know, I think you go a little bit into what kind of — how that impacted NASA in the future years. You know, there was economic opportunity for a few companies to engage with this vision of exploration. But there was different international reactions, and how that plan for how funding would happen and support the vision over the next few years on how that was actually implemented.

Steve Garber: Right. Well, one thing there — you mentioned a few different pieces there, so–

Host: Okay.

Steve Garber: Let me just pull out one piece at to discuss first one, that’s the national and international aspect. So, this was developed as a national policy, right? So, we talked a lot about how the national policy was developed with these interagency meetings of different elements of the executive branch of the government, right? But it wasn’t designed as an international program per se. So, it’s perhaps not surprising that there was some international criticism afterwards that some international partners of NASA felt like they weren’t included as much as they would have liked to have been. But sort of the retort to that might be well, again, this was developed as a national policy, and if we tried to develop a policy like this with international partners, before it was unveiled, that would be just totally unworkable in terms of too many people in the room, so to speak.

Host: Okay. So, then, I guess, yeah. So, there were mixed reactions. Now, how about the actual implementation of the vision throughout those next couple years, including a leadership change from Sean O’Keefe to Michael Griffin?

Glen Asner: So, I’ll just say that I believe that the key decision here was to set deadlines to retire the shuttle and complete the Space Station. So, in terms of what comes after it, and there are a lot of twists and turns over the next several years, but the overarching framework or the key decision here was to set a date to retire the shuttle and set a date to complete the Space Station. So, then, in terms of implementation, we had Michael Griffin replace Sean O’Keefe and, you know, this is also another key thing to mention in this period is the return to flight.

Host: Yes.

Glen Asner: So, at that period of time under Griffin, we returned to flight safely. We have Bill Gerstenmaier in charge of Spaceflight, and they changed the process for certifying space shuttle flights, and that was critical as well. So, it puts the — putting the agency on a solid path and returning to flight without any accidents afterwards does a lot to make sure that we continue to move, that the agency NASA continues to move forward with these plans, and they do through the end of the administration.

Host: And to reiterate your point, the focus was to retire the shuttle and complete the Space Station, which we can say, you know, we’ve done. And now, the Space Station has been in orbit for almost actually 20 years at this point.

Glen Asner: Yeah, that’s right.

Host: So, recapping, you know, we talked in depth about this period of time and even laying the foundation for how this planning team morphed into what was the Vision for Space Exploration. You know, like, what was that, you know, if we were to condense that into just a few, I guess, short sentences? What was that change that really led from the Decadal Planning Team to the NEXT to the Vision for Space Exploration in just a few short years?

Steve Garber: Well, I would just say, DPT, the Decadal Planning Team morphed into NEXT and had some other changes on the way. But again, the key marker in the sand, the key event that happened was the Columbia accident, and then policymaking shifted after that.

Glen Asner: Well, I’d add that the people there — there’s a continuity here in people. There’s — there are changes, but there’s a lot of continuity here and people were who were holding the torch for human spaceflight for the future of NASA.

Host: Yeah, and that’s even true today. It sort of laid the foundation for what we see as, you know, NASA even now in 2019. You know, we’re looking at the International Space Station, the space shuttle has been retired. We are still relying on the Russian vehicles, but that’s plan, I mean, I think has remained sort of consistent, but at the same time, we’ve shifted focus, I guess, from that Crew Exploration Vehicle that NASA focused to a more commercial focus, but it did sort of, you know, looking at just that time period, lay the foundation for how for how we see NASA today.

Glen Asner: Yeah, at the time of the vision development, I’ll just add, there were — there was some discussion about bringing in more private sector partners into it, but that’s been a continuity, use of contractors in industry since the beginning of NASA. It’s more pronounced now, but it doesn’t change the basic fact that NASA’s providing the infrastructure and providing the guidance here on, especially for long-term space travel.

Host: Yeah. I think I was especially excited to talk about this time period today, because I think it’s important to kind of go back into history and understand these policy changes. And I think it’s important to know to set real realistic expectations for how we should conduct business in the future, because, like, you know, we did mention this was a very dynamic time, and there was a lot of iterations of how you conduct space policy or both back to H. W. Bush with the Space Exploration Initiative and then changing from the Decadal Planning Team. There was a lot of changes in focus, but I believe understanding that kind of is a good way to predict the future on how we should go about thinking about space policy and long-term planning.

Steve Garber: Right. I agree wholeheartedly and thank you for your supportive history in that way,

Host: Yeah.

Steve Garber: Yeah, you know, one interesting piece about this is that some of the people who were involved in both the DPT and the Vision for Space Exploration policymaking were aware of the previous history. And some of them, for example, didn’t want to make the perceived mistakes of the Space Exploration Initiative or — and they knew that many teams that tackled similar issues before. So, they wanted to be able to do something different, to contribute in a different way.

Host: But the, I think, the ultimate idea, and maybe you have a different interpretation of this, but I think the ultimate idea is you want NASA to achieve the goals, right? You want — the idea of long-term planning is you set this vision, because you want to achieve a goal. And I think the — these slight changes over the years of how we organize NASA to meet that goal, I think that’s important to understand, so that we actually get to a point where, you know, we set a goal and we’re going for it. And I believe we’re in that time now. We’re setting goals, and we’re working hard to make them a reality.

Steve Garber: Sure, sure, and, you know, it’s goes back to the old aphorism about, you know, if you don’t know history, you’re doomed to repeat it. So, it’s worth thinking about history in what another colleague likes to call an applied history way. So, it’s not just ivory tower, academics ruminating about things that happened many years ago that have no relevance to today. It’s talking about things that are pretty directly relevant.

Host: That’s right. Did you enjoy working on the book, researching all the elements and doing — conducting all the interviews?

Glen Asner: I know I did. It was a lot of fun to do the oral history interviews and to work with Steve.

Steve Garber: Yeah, it was a great team effort, Glen and I working together. Many, many other people helped us in many ways, and one of the real rewards of this was that during recent history, you have access to all these people who are involved in this. And they were very gracious with their time. They agreed to oral histories. They turned over notes and emails to us. So, it was — it made it much, much easier in that way.

Host: Yeah. Well, gentlemen, I really appreciate your time today to take us through the — this period of time and go into detail. I know I really enjoyed reading this book, and it definitely set more context for me. You know, I haven’t been working here at NASA too long, so actually taking time to see what happened at NASA before I got here is actually — it’s fascinating, and I really appreciate you saying — sitting down and taking the time to talk with me about the book, but again, also to write the book. I really appreciate the work that went into this.

Glen Asner: Well, thank you, Gary. It’s been a pleasure.

Steve Garber: Thank you for your support and interest.

Host: Alright.

[ Music ]

Host: Hey, thanks for sticking around. I really hope you enjoyed this deep dive into historical space policy with Steve Garber and Glen Asner, and it was a very — it was a pleasure talking to them. And it was a pleasure reading the book, and you can do it right now at nasa.gov/ebooks. Again, the title of the book is, and it’s a long one, Origins of 21st Century Space Travel: A History of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team and the Vision for Space Exploration, 1999 to 2004. If you like podcasts, we dive into history a lot on this one. You can check out some of the others on nasa.gov/podcasts, and we usually send out this podcast on some of the NASA Johnson Space Center pages of Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. If you have a question for us, use the hashtag NASA, #AskNASA on your favorite platform, submit an idea for the show, make sure to mention it for Houston we have a podcast. This episode was recorded on August 16th, 2019. Thanks to Alex Perryman, Norah Moran, Pat Ryan, Cliff Feldman and the headquarters’ TV team. Thanks to you Steve Garber and Glen Asner for taking the time out of their day to speak with us from NASA headquarters in Washington DC. We’ll be back next week.