1 1 2 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 3 4 5 REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT 6 PLANS COMMITTEE 7 8 9 Public Meeting 10 Ronald Reagan Building 11 and International Trade Center 12 Amphitheater 13 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 14 Washington, D.C. 15 August 12, 2009 16 1:00 p.m. 17 18 19 20 21 REPORTED BY JANA MULHOLLAN 22 Registered Professional Reporter 23 24 VALADOR, INC. 25 2 1 MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 2 (Appearances) 3 4 5 Chairman 6 NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE 7 8 Executive Director 9 Designated Federal Official (DFO) 10 PHIL MCALISTER 11 12 13 Members Listed Alphabetically 14 15 WANDA M. AUSTIN, PH.D. 16 BOHDAN BEJMUK 17 LEROY CHIAO, PH.D. 18 CHRISTOPHER CHYBA, PH.D. 19 EDWARD F. CRAWLEY, PH.D. 20 JEFF GREASON 21 SALLY RIDE, PH.D. 22 23 24 25 3 1 I N D E X 2 3 Introduction and Opening Remarks 4 Phil McAlister/Norman Augustine..... 4 5 Integrated Options 6 Ed Crawley.......................... 8 7 Affordability Analysis 8 Sally Ride.......................... 65 9 Evaluation Measures and Criteria 10 Wanda Austin........................ 156 11 Preliminary Options Scoring 12 Ed Crawley.......................... 188 13 Meeting adjourned....................... 350 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 4 1 MR. McALISTER: Good afternoon and 13:07:54 2 welcome to Review of U.S. Human Space Flight 13:07:56 3 Plans Committee meeting. I'm Phil McAlister. 13:08:00 4 I'm the executive director of the committee. 13:08:04 5 And it's good to see members of the public 13:08:04 6 present today. So welcome to you and all of 13:08:06 7 the members watching -- all of the members of 13:08:08 8 the public watching on NASA TV and also on 13:08:09 9 the Internet. 13:08:14 10 Speaking of the website, the 13:08:14 11 committee is aware that there will likely be 13:08:14 12 lots of interest in the presentations today. 13:08:17 13 The plan is to get them on our website by the 13:08:19 14 end of the day. So hopefully we'll have that 13:08:23 15 up very, very soon, and the website address, 13:08:27 16 again, is http://hsf.nasa.gov. 13:08:29 17 We will also have a press event at 13:08:29 18 the end the day with Norm Augustine. 13:08:34 19 The focus of today's meeting will be 13:08:37 20 on deliberations. So we are not going to 13:08:40 21 have a public comment period distinct from 13:08:44 22 the other public meetings. But you can still 13:08:46 23 make a comment to the committee. Our website 13:08:47 24 is still active. We're still receiving 13:08:48 25 comments. So we'd like to reserve today for 13:08:51 5 1 the committee's deliberations since we're 13:08:54 2 getting close to end. But if you do have a 13:08:57 3 comment, the committee is still receiving 13:08:57 4 those via the website. 13:09:00 5 This meeting is governed by the 13:09:05 6 Federal Advisory Committee Act. So all of 13:09:05 7 the presentations today and comments are on 13:09:05 8 the record. Please mute your cell phones, 13:09:05 9 and please do not interrupt the committee's 13:09:10 10 discussions and deliberations. 13:09:15 11 With that, the committee chair, Norm 13:09:15 12 Augustine. 13:09:15 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thanks, Phil. 13:09:21 14 Good afternoon. Let me welcome 13:09:21 15 everyone here in the room and also those who 13:09:21 16 are watching on television or on the Web. 13:09:27 17 Our committee has 19 days to go before we are 13:09:27 18 to have completed our task. We believe we're 13:09:35 19 on schedule. 13:09:35 20 Today our principal purpose is going 13:09:35 21 to be to finalize the options that we 13:09:41 22 presented when we last met a week ago and 13:09:41 23 also to do an evaluation of them, and I'll 13:09:47 24 say a little bit more in a moment. 13:09:47 25 Before I go any further, I want to 13:09:51 6 1 publicly thank the people at NASA and the 13:09:57 2 people at the Aerospace Corporation who have 13:09:57 3 been helping us. No task has been too 13:10:02 4 difficult nor too unreasonable even at 3:00 13:10:02 5 in the morning, and we're greatly indebted to 13:10:07 6 both the NASA folks and the Aerospace folks. 13:10:11 7 Their professionalism, their detachment in 13:10:15 8 terms of being objective, we could not 13:10:19 9 possibly have asked for greater support. 13:10:22 10 Today the speakers, as you heard, 13:10:22 11 will be members of the committee. We had 13:10:26 12 divided up into subcommittees and then into 13:10:28 13 little task groups. And today we'll be 13:10:33 14 talking about, first, the options that we 13:10:33 15 will be the providing to the White House and 13:10:38 16 to NASA. We will be describing the cost 13:10:38 17 analysis that's been going on, and we will be 13:10:45 18 describing the evaluation criteria that we 13:10:48 19 are going to propose be used to select 13:10:52 20 options. 13:10:56 21 We ourselves have been asked to 13:10:56 22 provide options and not recommendations, and 13:11:00 23 so we'll apply no weightings or no total 13:11:04 24 tabulations of the weightings, rather, just 13:11:08 25 try to provide guidelines to the policymakers 13:11:11 7 1 since those are the people who have to apply 13:11:15 2 weightings really given their greater 13:11:17 3 perspective than any of us on the committee 13:11:19 4 are able to have. 13:11:22 5 And, finally, we will go through the 13:11:25 6 evaluations themselves. 13:11:30 7 It's our plan that this be our last 13:11:30 8 public meeting. We had -- we have, though, 13:11:33 9 tentatively scheduled, as you may know, 13:11:38 10 another meeting on the 24th in case that 13:11:38 11 there are things that need last-minute 13:11:41 12 cleanup. I'm a believer, as I've said on 13:11:47 13 other occasions, the secret to good program 13:11:47 14 management is to have reserves, and that's 13:11:54 15 our reserve. 13:11:57 16 At the end of today it's our hope 13:11:58 17 that we'll have a general -- a good agreement 13:12:00 18 on the options that we would lay before the 13:12:05 19 decision makers and an assessment of those 13:12:06 20 options, but we still have 20 percent of our 13:12:09 21 90 days remaining before us. And so we still 13:12:12 22 have work to day, and the computers are 13:12:17 23 cranking as we sit here. 13:12:17 24 And so there will undoubtedly be 13:12:22 25 technical changes to the options that will be 13:12:22 8 1 incorporated in our final report that we 13:12:29 2 don't yet have today, but the options 13:12:29 3 themselves will be representative of what we 13:12:34 4 intend to produce. But I do caution that if 13:12:34 5 there are errors or updated technical 13:12:38 6 information or something we, of course, would 13:12:42 7 incorporate that in our report. 13:12:48 8 Having said that, the first order of 13:12:48 9 business today is to review, once again, the 13:12:48 10 options that we have been looking at. Our 13:12:56 11 colleague Ed Crawley calculated that there 13:12:59 12 were over 3,000 combinations when we began. 13:13:03 13 We narrowed that down to 800. We hope to get 13:13:06 14 a little below that. 13:13:11 15 And so today, Ed, that's your task. 13:13:12 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Thank you, Norm. 13:13:15 17 Well, as Norm has outlined, we're 13:13:18 18 working, I would say, from above through the 13:13:23 19 space of possibilities to define the 13:13:25 20 questions and options that are remaining 13:13:32 21 before us. So I'm actually a little bit at a 13:13:34 22 disadvantage here because I can't read that 13:13:44 23 monitor and I don't have a paper copy. So... 13:13:47 24 (Discussion off the record.) 13:14:15 25 DR. CRAWLEY: So the topics of this 13:14:15 9 1 first discussion, which I'll lead us through, 13:14:21 2 which is largely review to set the stage for 13:14:24 3 the next three discussions we'll have, I 13:14:27 4 guess, to summarize the potential decisions 13:14:30 5 and options on human exploration, and this 13:14:33 6 will lay the groundwork for the discussion 13:14:36 7 that will immediately follow me from Sally 13:14:43 8 Ride on the costing and scheduling work that 13:14:43 9 has been done to date on these by the 13:14:47 10 combination of the Aerospace and NASA team. 13:14:47 11 And then my colleague Wanda Austin will 13:14:52 12 present the framework in which we're going to 13:14:56 13 evaluate these. And then there will be a 13:14:56 14 committee discussion of the actual evaluation 13:14:59 15 process that will follow that. 13:15:01 16 So just to quickly summarize, we've 13:15:02 17 reduced the number of questions that a 13:15:06 18 policymaker would face in resolving this 13:15:09 19 issue of the future of human space flight now 13:15:15 20 down to five by reflecting on the 13:15:15 21 deliberations that occurred at the last 13:15:17 22 public meeting and simplifying and combining 13:15:21 23 some things. 13:15:25 24 So essentially the questions are: 13:15:27 25 What's the phaseout plan of the shuttle? 13:15:27 10 1 Should it fly out the remainder of the 13:15:32 2 flights safely -- that would be the minimum 13:15:32 3 that we would recommend -- or that we should 13:15:32 4 extend it one or two shuttle flights per year 13:15:32 5 through about '15, which would likely only be 13:15:40 6 a desirable idea if it was done in 13:15:40 7 conjunction with a tightly shuttle-derived 13:15:48 8 vehicle used for heavy lift? 13:15:48 9 Then second: What's the future of 13:15:54 10 the ISS? Should we retire it as planned -- 13:15:54 11 from the U.S. human space flight planned in 13:15:54 12 '15 or extend it to '20? So -- oh, I'm 13:15:54 13 sorry. That was the chart I just covered. 13:16:05 14 So we'll synchronize here in a moment. 13:16:05 15 So I'm just going to have a quick 13:16:14 16 chart or so on the possible variance of these 13:16:14 17 decisions that we're still considering. 13:16:14 18 There is, as it is shown by NASA, 13:16:23 19 little margin left in the shuttle schedule, 13:16:23 20 and there's broad agreement that the 13:16:23 21 important thing to do is to fly the remaining 13:16:32 22 flights safely on a schedule that will unfold 13:16:32 23 from flight to flight and that we estimate 13:16:32 24 that this will go sometime at least into 13:16:44 25 fiscal year '11, if not into calendar year 13:16:44 11 1 '11. It's the safe and appropriate thing to 13:16:44 2 do, and we recommend nothing other than doing 13:16:53 3 this at a minimum. 13:16:53 4 The only problem with this is, of 13:16:53 5 course, that the additional funding in FY '11 13:16:53 6 to extend the lifetime of the shuttle 13:16:53 7 transportation -- the space transportation 13:16:53 8 system is not currently in the budget. So at 13:17:08 9 an absolute minimum, we will recommend that 13:17:08 10 that be included. 13:17:08 11 Then the question arises: Should we 13:17:08 12 so-called "close the gap" from below and 13:17:08 13 extend the shuttle to about 2015 or sometime 13:17:30 14 in the mid decade, by which time some other 13:17:30 15 U.S. based capability would be available to 13:17:30 16 fly to the ISS? We think that this can be 13:17:30 17 done safely at a flight of one to two flights 13:17:30 18 a year, that this would make sense 13:17:30 19 economically if tightly coupled with a 13:17:30 20 heavy-lift option that most directly built on 13:17:52 21 the shuttle heritage. 13:17:52 22 It would reduce the gap. It would 13:17:52 23 support the continuing utilization of the 13:17:52 24 International Space Station, which was, in 13:17:52 25 fact, designed assuming that the shuttle was 13:17:52 12 1 available for a logistics carrier. It would 13:17:52 2 smooth some workforce transitions, and it 13:17:52 3 would take maximum advantage of existing 13:18:10 4 infrastructure. 13:18:10 5 However, it is not in the budget as 13:18:10 6 defined by the President or by NASA going 13:18:10 7 into this point, and it would require the 13:18:10 8 extension of the shuttle systems throughout 13:18:10 9 this approximately five-year period, which 13:18:10 10 would, of course, impact all of the other 13:18:10 11 plans that are also in the budget. 13:18:31 12 In addition, there's a technical 13:18:31 13 issue, which is that, although the shuttle 13:18:31 14 has been -- gone through phased reviews of 13:18:31 15 its continuing airworthiness or flight 13:18:31 16 worthiness, there would be -- we would 13:18:31 17 recommend some additional NASA and 13:18:31 18 independent risk assessment associated with 13:18:31 19 the technical issues, aside from the 13:18:31 20 budgetary and programmatic issues, of 13:18:56 21 extending the shuttle lifetime. 13:18:56 22 Did I say that about right? 13:18:56 23 DR. RIDE: Yes, sir. 13:18:56 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 13:18:56 25 (Discussion off the record.) 13:18:56 13 1 DR. CRAWLEY: So I'm now on ISS to 13:18:56 2 2015, which is one more. There we go. 13:19:21 3 So that's really the two options that 13:19:21 4 we're considering in the shuttle, retire it 13:19:21 5 in a workmanlike manner when the existing 13:19:21 6 flights are flown out in probably '11 or 13:19:21 7 extend it to about '15. 13:19:21 8 Now, we come to the next decision, 13:19:21 9 which is: What's the plan for the ISS? And 13:19:21 10 here the, if you will, reference decision is 13:19:48 11 to continue with the historical plan -- that 13:19:48 12 is to say, the plan which is in the current 13:19:48 13 budget -- of ending primary U.S. support for 13:19:48 14 the ISS in 2015 and that we would focus, to 13:19:48 15 the greatest extent possible, the work there 13:19:48 16 on both the continuing science and the 13:19:48 17 preparation for exploration, that the 13:19:48 18 resupply and logistics between now and then 13:19:48 19 would likely be through the international 13:20:25 20 partners and through the commercial 13:20:25 21 transportation services contract; that is to 13:20:25 22 say, that its our view that it is unlikely 13:20:25 23 that any other U.S. based capability, either 13:20:25 24 government or commercially provided, would 13:20:25 25 so-called "close the gap" from above, that is 13:20:25 14 1 to say, would be available substantially 13:20:25 2 before 2015. 13:20:25 3 If we proceed with this, it would 13:20:25 4 require -- since the International Space 13:20:25 5 Station is truly an international endeavor, 13:20:51 6 it would require an agreement among the 13:20:51 7 partners for the either extension or 13:20:51 8 decommissioning and the retirement of the 13:20:51 9 station. And what this essentially -- this 13:20:51 10 option would essentially probably lead to is 13:20:51 11 the retirement and de-orbit of the ISS in 13:20:51 12 2016, our view being that it is unlikely that 13:20:51 13 there is a managerial solution or a non-U.S. 13:21:16 14 lead user solution that would allow the 13:21:16 15 station to function in a robust way without 13:21:16 16 the involvement of the United States 13:21:16 17 government. 13:21:16 18 So essentially we have not found a 13:21:16 19 desirable solution which is -- allows the 13:21:16 20 space station to continue past '15 but 13:21:38 21 without the United States being the lead user 13:21:38 22 and carrying that line within the budget, 13:21:38 23 although we looked hard. 13:21:38 24 The alternative is to extend the ISS 13:21:38 25 until about 2020 or at least until 2020, 13:21:53 15 1 which would allow what we are calling 13:21:53 2 enhanced U.S. participation. In the 13:21:53 3 budgeting for this, we've actually put in a 13:21:53 4 more robust budget line for utilization of 13:22:08 5 the space station, and this would show to our 13:22:08 6 partners a full commitment to utilize the 13:22:08 7 space station at least through the first 13:22:08 8 decade of their presence, many of whom only 13:22:08 9 placed their laboratory modules on orbit in 13:22:17 10 the last year or so, that this would provide 13:22:17 11 additional opportunities for international 13:22:22 12 partnership, one can imagine, including new 13:22:22 13 partners and using the ISS partnership as an 13:22:25 14 evolving mechanism by which a more standing 13:22:29 15 partnership -- a more established partnership 13:22:33 16 would then be transitioned from the use of 13:22:36 17 the ISS to a partnership for exploration. 13:22:42 18 This is something that the international 13:22:45 19 partners have said to us they think would be 13:22:47 20 a desirable path. 13:22:51 21 In this case, there would be an 13:22:51 22 extensive utilization of the ISS, both from a 13:22:54 23 human physiology perspective and from an 13:22:54 24 engineering development perspective, to lay 13:23:02 25 the groundwork for exploration. Things like 13:23:02 16 1 the development of cryogenic fuel handling 13:23:04 2 and transfer in zero gravity would be -- 13:23:11 3 would likely to be developed and tested on 13:23:14 4 the station through this enhanced utilization 13:23:16 5 program. 13:23:20 6 And this option is actually more 13:23:20 7 consistent with the existing national policy 13:23:24 8 of viewing the ISS as a national laboratory. 13:23:27 9 However, it is not consistent with the 13:23:31 10 existing budget which does not contain 13:23:34 11 funding for the space station past 2015 and, 13:23:36 12 in fact, probably also does not contain 13:23:41 13 enough money to retire this -- to retire -- 13:23:41 14 that is to say, de-orbit the space station in 13:23:44 15 2015 or '16 if that were the choice. 13:23:47 16 So in our -- as Sally will discuss, 13:23:53 17 we've appropriately put in reserves into all 13:23:53 18 of our budgeting exercises for either the 13:23:58 19 extension or the orderly de-orbit of the 13:24:02 20 space station. 13:24:05 21 So that covers the decisions -- the 13:24:07 22 first two decisions, what to do with the 13:24:10 23 shuttle and what to do with the ISS. 13:24:14 24 Now, these two are somewhat closely 13:24:14 25 coupled because they basically have to do 13:24:16 17 1 with launch into low Earth orbit and the 13:24:19 2 servicing of crew in low Earth orbit. 13:24:23 3 The first one is should the 13:24:26 4 government develop launch -- should the 13:24:28 5 government-developed launch system be based 13:24:31 6 on NASA, slash, shuttle heritage or an 13:24:32 7 EELV-based system. So we essentially are now 13:24:36 8 carrying four choices for that decision. 13:24:41 9 The program of record, the Ares I 13:24:43 10 plus Ares V without any explicit considering 13:24:47 11 of on-orbit refueling, a proposal that 13:24:50 12 actually came from the program that we 13:24:53 13 slightly scaled back the capabilities of the 13:24:58 14 Ares V to what we call the Ares V Lite, to 13:25:01 15 keep it simple. There is an official program 13:25:06 16 designation for this. 13:25:06 17 And you would use this, for example, 13:25:10 18 on lunar missions in a dual launch scenario 13:25:10 19 where two launches of the heavy-launch 13:25:15 20 vehicle rather than a launch of the Ares I 13:25:15 21 and the Ares V would be used to support lunar 13:25:18 22 missions. And in this one, importantly the 13:25:23 23 Ares V would become human rated or at least 13:25:23 24 human ratable. And this option would be 13:25:27 25 enhanced with potentially commercially 13:25:29 18 1 supplied refueling in low Earth orbit -- at 13:25:31 2 least initially in low Earth orbit. 13:25:33 3 The third principal option here is 13:25:35 4 the directly shuttle-derived vehicle, one 13:25:38 5 that would be either side mount or inline but 13:25:42 6 would trace more directly to the NASA 13:25:45 7 heritage of engines, SRBs, external tank and 13:25:48 8 so forth which also could be potentially 13:25:53 9 enhanced with on-orbit refueling. 13:25:56 10 And the last option we are carrying 13:25:59 11 is an EELV heavy -- an EELV super heavy -- 13:26:03 12 I'm sorry -- something in the 75-metric-ton 13:26:06 13 category, which is really a placeholder for a 13:26:11 14 more generic hydrocarbon-based rocket which 13:26:17 15 would have a LOX/kerosene first stage and 13:26:17 16 high energy LOX/hydrogen upper stages, 13:26:20 17 something along the layout of -- not 13:26:23 18 necessarily the physical layout but the fuel 13:26:24 19 choices that were used in the Saturn V. And 13:26:28 20 it, too, could be potentially enhanced by 13:26:32 21 commercial refueling. 13:26:35 22 So you'll see that in actually all of 13:26:37 23 the cases but the baseline, the first one, we 13:26:39 24 are considering recommending that the 13:26:41 25 technology for on-orbit fuel transfer of the 13:26:45 19 1 appropriate fuels, in all cases LOX/hydrogen, 13:26:48 2 be developed as a technology item so that it 13:26:49 3 would eventually be available to either 13:26:54 4 increase the throw mass from low Earth orbit 13:26:56 5 of the smaller stages or enhance the throw 13:26:59 6 mass from low Earth orbit of the larger 13:27:01 7 stages. 13:27:02 8 MR. GREASON: I think there's a 13:27:08 9 business model choice that's embedded in that 13:27:10 10 too, not just the technology item. 13:27:14 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. And I'll get to 13:27:14 12 that in another chart. Thank you, Jeff. 13:27:15 13 And then the other question is: How 13:27:17 14 should the crew be carried, on U.S. 13:27:17 15 government-provided systems or by commercial 13:27:20 16 and internationals? 13:27:22 17 And in this latter case, it implies 13:27:24 18 that we think that the U.S. government should 13:27:29 19 maintain an option for the future of being 13:27:29 20 able to fly crew to low Earth orbit in the 13:27:32 21 case that either, for one reason or another, 13:27:38 22 the internationals or the commercials do not 13:27:42 23 materialize or are no longer interested or 13:27:48 24 able to carry them but that what we've 13:27:48 25 decided to recommend is that this an 13:27:48 20 1 operational backup, that is to say, that 13:27:57 2 whatever the vehicle that is chosen in answer 13:27:57 3 to Question 3 should maintain the capability 13:27:57 4 of at least being human ratable without a 13:28:07 5 great deal of additional investment. So 13:28:07 6 there would be some cost in both performance 13:28:07 7 and money to doing that, but it would retain 13:28:20 8 for the United States the option of having 13:28:20 9 our government provide access to low Earth 13:28:20 10 orbit. 13:28:20 11 So in a little more detail here are 13:28:20 12 the options. This is the Ares I plus Ares V. 13:28:20 13 This is essentially the program of record, 13:28:32 14 about a 26-ton vehicle and about a 160-ton 13:28:32 15 vehicle using NASA heritage components. 13:28:32 16 Oh, I'm sorry. Thank you. Just bug 13:28:32 17 me, Leroy, when I forget that. 13:28:44 18 That the Ares I would be the crew 13:28:44 19 transportation to ISS and Earth orbit, that 13:28:44 20 in the lunar and other out of LEO missions it 13:28:44 21 would rendezvous with the Ares V crewed 13:28:44 22 flights, and the Ares V by itself would be 13:28:57 23 used in cargo flights. 13:28:57 24 A slight variant of that, as I 13:28:57 25 mentioned, is the one proposed by the program 13:28:57 21 1 to simplify or scale back the design of the 13:28:57 2 Ares V a little bit, going from five and a 13:29:12 3 half to five segments, from RS-68B's to 13:29:12 4 RS-68A engines. This reduces the performance 13:29:12 5 a little bit but still keeps it in this sort 13:29:12 6 of super, super heavy class. 13:29:31 7 But along with this, you would 13:29:31 8 redesign the mode for lunar exploration to be 13:29:31 9 the so-called dual launch where -- well, 13:29:31 10 there are various manifesting options. I 13:29:31 11 won't go into that detail. 13:29:31 12 But as a crew -- as a cargo vehicle, 13:29:31 13 now, you would launch one Ares V, and in 13:29:31 14 crewed missions you would launch two in a 13:29:56 15 dual mode. And there are options here for 13:29:56 16 the rendezvous occurring either in Earth 13:29:56 17 orbit or in lunar orbit, which is a matter of 13:29:56 18 some details of the balancing of the payload 13:29:56 19 on the two launch vehicles. 13:29:56 20 We have costed and are still 13:29:56 21 considering a directly shuttle-derived 13:29:56 22 vehicle as an option, and we have not made -- 13:29:56 23 MR. BEJMUK: Ed, would you call -- 13:30:38 24 excuse me, Ed. Would you call by numbers so 13:30:38 25 these folks can, you know, cycle the charts. 13:30:38 22 1 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm sorry. 13:30:38 2 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 13:30:38 3 DR. CRAWLEY: So that was Chart 10 13:30:38 4 that I was just referring to. Now we're 13:30:38 5 going to 11, Shuttle Derived Vehicle. 13:30:38 6 In this case we have examined 13:30:38 7 conceptually and still keep in the trade 13:30:38 8 space both the sidemount and inline 13:30:38 9 shuttle-derived vehicles because we do not 13:30:38 10 feel that within the scope of this study we 13:30:38 11 are likely to directly recommend that one or 13:30:38 12 the other is the likely desirable vehicle if 13:31:12 13 this class of launch vehicles remains in our 13:31:12 14 recommendation. That's simply too detailed 13:31:12 15 an engineering study that a panel of this 13:31:12 16 size, even with the support of NASA and 13:31:12 17 outside contractors, would be able to do 13:31:12 18 during this time frame. 13:31:12 19 However, we have kept it in the trade 13:31:12 20 space as a generic option of a vehicle which 13:31:12 21 is directly shuttle derived and has 13:31:12 22 performance in the range of 100 metric tons 13:31:12 23 to LEO and that neither of these would 13:31:50 24 necessarily be human rated and that, in fact, 13:31:50 25 we would use a commercial crew transport to 13:31:50 23 1 bring the crew to low Earth orbit and 13:31:50 2 transfer into the heavy-lift vehicles and 13:31:50 3 their payloads and inject out of low Earth 13:31:50 4 orbit. 13:31:50 5 So I guess this is an appropriate 13:31:50 6 point to observe that there is a strong 13:31:50 7 consensus that the government -- the 13:31:50 8 United States should support a vigorous 13:31:50 9 program of developing a commercial crew 13:32:20 10 transportation launch vehicle and capsule 13:32:20 11 that would be used, for example, in this 13:32:20 12 scenario, and it would be the likely crew 13:32:20 13 transportation system from the United States 13:32:20 14 in the event that we extend the space station 13:32:20 15 beyond 2015, so, thereby, creating, in 13:32:20 16 addition to the COTS cargo capacity which is 13:32:20 17 currently under development, an additional 13:32:20 18 broadly based commercial opportunity to 13:32:43 19 supply launch vehicles and capsules for crew 13:32:43 20 and that this would be an open competition 13:32:43 21 with good specifications written by the 13:32:43 22 government and a largely commercially 13:32:43 23 provided service. 13:32:43 24 This is consistent with the 13:32:43 25 discussion that the panel has had at several 13:32:43 24 1 of its previous meetings that the appropriate 13:33:00 2 task for NASA is to do the hard things, to 13:33:00 3 develop the new technologies. And, in fact, 13:33:00 4 going back to a model which is in the 13:33:00 5 predecessor of NASA, the NACA, one of the 13:33:00 6 primary roles of the NACA was to develop 13:33:00 7 technology which was then transferred to 13:33:22 8 commercial industry and that appeared in both 13:33:22 9 military and civil aircraft. And we think 13:33:22 10 that a reinvigoration of this -- the hard 13:33:22 11 job, the development of the big new vehicles 13:33:22 12 and the technology to support the commercial 13:33:22 13 exploitation of space is an appropriate task 13:33:22 14 for NASA in the years ahead. 13:33:22 15 This crew transportation vehicle 13:33:39 16 would also be used alongside a 13:33:39 17 LOX/kerosene-based EELV super-heavy vehicle 13:33:39 18 in the 75-ton range, and, again, the 13:33:39 19 commercial vehicle would transport the crew 13:33:39 20 to the ISS and do Earth rendezvous. There 13:33:39 21 are several options for the super heavy with 13:33:59 22 the LOX/RP-1 based first stage, and we do not 13:33:59 23 intend to necessarily advocate any one of 13:33:59 24 those potential routes for acquisition -- or 13:33:59 25 any one of the routes to a particular 13:34:16 25 1 vehicle, that this is a generic class that 13:34:16 2 we're considering. 13:34:16 3 For the Moon, the crew missions for a 13:34:16 4 vehicle of this class are likely to consist 13:34:16 5 of the crew taxi and two or three launches, 13:34:16 6 depending on the exact design of the lunar 13:34:32 7 system that follows, and the cargo is one or 13:34:32 8 maybe as many as two launches to provide the 13:34:32 9 logistics train to the lunar surface and to 13:34:32 10 other destinations beyond low Earth orbit. 13:34:32 11 MR. BEJMUK: Ed, may I make a 13:34:54 12 comment. I think it's absolutely essential 13:34:54 13 that if NASA undertakes this competition for 13:34:54 14 crew access to LEO that there is -- that 13:34:54 15 competition is structured in such a way that 13:34:54 16 not only the newcomers into this business can 13:34:54 17 compete but also our best and most 13:35:15 18 experienced companies can likewise 13:35:15 19 participate. 13:35:15 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 13:35:15 21 MR. BEJMUK: Because they'll give us 13:35:15 22 assurance that we will have reliable access 13:35:15 23 to space by our crews, so -- and it's going 13:35:15 24 to be -- it's going to require a very wise, 13:35:15 25 very smart structuring of this competition. 13:35:15 26 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Absolutely. 13:35:32 2 That's a broad consensus of the committee, I 13:35:32 3 would say. 13:35:32 4 Okay. The last point on 13:35:32 5 transportation is that we have spent a fair 13:35:32 6 amount of time thinking about the 13:35:32 7 opportunities that are created by either 13:35:32 8 refueling with a single tanker the upper 13:35:32 9 stages on orbit or refueling from a depot of 13:35:47 10 Earth departure stages in orbit. This is not 13:35:47 11 new idea, as Jeff showed at our meeting last 13:35:47 12 week -- wherever it was -- was it here -- oh, 13:35:47 13 it was in Cocoa Beach, I think -- a famous 13:36:00 14 quote from von Braun, who, in fact, had 13:36:00 15 imagined this operational concept, as he did 13:36:00 16 many, and advocated it -- that in the tanker 13:36:00 17 mode, which is slightly simpler, a single 13:36:10 18 tanker is launched to orbit. 13:36:10 19 In the depot mode, a more 13:36:15 20 semipermanent or permanent depot exists and, 13:36:15 21 in that case, becomes the fuel tank in space. 13:36:15 22 It becomes the repository for smaller or 13:36:22 23 medium size vehicles, which could also be 13:36:22 24 commercially supplied or commercially 13:36:30 25 delivered fuel to orbit, to come up, meet 13:36:30 27 1 with the depot transfer fuel. And then 13:36:30 2 there's an autonomous rendezvous -- which 13:36:42 3 would be an autonomous rendezvous to fuel 13:36:42 4 transfer, and then the eventual cargo stage 13:36:42 5 that is tanked would come up and rendezvous 13:36:51 6 with the depot. 13:36:51 7 This is the KC-135/KC-10 in the sky. 13:36:51 8 It's exactly the same concept. You enhance 13:37:04 9 the capability of the vehicles by 13:37:04 10 independently having fuel arrive there and 13:37:04 11 transferred to them. 13:37:04 12 The advantages of this are that for a 13:37:04 13 given upper stage or departure stage you can 13:37:04 14 significantly, probably by at least a factor 13:37:21 15 of two, increase the throw capability away 13:37:21 16 from the Earth -- important if we plan to 13:37:21 17 explore -- or you can take it out in design 13:37:21 18 and build a smaller Earth departure stage and 13:37:21 19 resulting booster and be able to inject an 13:37:33 20 equal amount of mass out of low Earth orbit. 13:37:33 21 The disadvantages are that the 13:37:33 22 operations become more complex. There are 13:37:33 23 more launches for a single event. There are 13:37:33 24 some isolation of that problem by putting in 13:37:33 25 a depot so that the flights to the depot 13:37:45 28 1 become decoupled from the flights out of low 13:37:45 2 Earth orbit. There are technologies which 13:37:45 3 have to be developed. 13:38:00 4 And this is a good point to mention 13:38:00 5 also that it's a strong feeling of the 13:38:00 6 committee that in any budget that we go 13:38:00 7 forward with that a significant investment in 13:38:00 8 new technology for space should included. 13:38:00 9 So this creates -- this is the answer 13:38:15 10 to your comment, Jeff. 13:38:15 11 This creates a basically third 13:38:15 12 potential market for commercial development 13:38:15 13 of space, the first being the existing cargo 13:38:15 14 supply to the space station, the second being 13:38:25 15 the potential of commercial crew to low Earth 13:38:25 16 orbit and the third being the delivery of 13:38:25 17 fuel to a tanker or depot. So this creates 13:38:35 18 the possibility of a business model, as Jeff 13:38:35 19 mentioned, which creates a fairly robust and 13:38:45 20 dynamic demand for domestic commercial 13:38:45 21 providers of launch services to space. 13:38:45 22 MR. GREASON: While I completely 13:38:54 23 agree with all of that, the point I was 13:38:54 24 trying to mention earlier is, I think, in our 13:38:54 25 internal deliberations that when we've 13:38:54 29 1 discussed the various 75-ton class 13:39:03 2 alternatives it's not just a technology 13:39:03 3 choice about which fuel you put in the first 13:39:03 4 stage, we're also looking at sort of a "make" 13:39:09 5 versus "buy" model. 13:39:09 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. Right. And 13:39:09 7 you're absolutely right. I was going to let 13:39:14 8 Sally explain that. 13:39:18 9 Got that, Sally? 13:39:18 10 DR. RIDE: Yeah. Thank you. 13:39:22 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, let me expand on 13:39:25 12 what Jeff has said -- is that within the 13:39:27 13 class of vehicles which does not rely 13:39:28 14 directly on shuttle and NASA heritage, which 13:39:32 15 would be -- if you go to Chart 10 -- would be 13:39:36 16 either the Ares family or on Chart 11 the 13:39:42 17 shuttle-derived family. 13:39:48 18 Essentially if those are the launch 13:39:49 19 vehicles of choice, the business model is -- 13:39:51 20 the current business model, which is that 13:39:54 21 these are NASA-derived vehicles built, at 13:39:57 22 least in part, in NASA-maintained and 13:40:00 23 operated facilities, the choice of the 13:40:03 24 heavy -- the heavy hydrocarbon, which is more 13:40:06 25 aligned with the existing EELV and commercial 13:40:10 30 1 launch infrastructure, creates the 13:40:16 2 opportunity for the alternative business 13:40:19 3 model that the launch services are largely 13:40:21 4 acquired in a more commercial mode by NASA 13:40:24 5 even for the heavy-lift vehicles and... 13:40:25 6 Is that the point? 13:40:32 7 MR. GREASON: Yes. 13:40:36 8 DR. CRAWLEY: And Dr. Ride will 13:40:36 9 comment on the economic and other 13:40:39 10 considerations of that in her comments. 13:40:40 11 MR. BEJMUK: Ed, just, you know, yes, 13:40:46 12 you stated it as an opportunity. But there 13:40:48 13 is also a flip side to it. We, in America, 13:40:53 14 have gone hydrogen-oxygen for a long time. 13:41:05 15 We have gotten good at it. We have gone 13:41:05 16 solid booster for the first stage where 13:41:05 17 thrust is very important, less so than ISP, 13:41:18 18 and we have gotten good at that. 13:41:18 19 And today to recommend that we are 13:41:18 20 transitioning from this well-honed, 13:41:18 21 well-developed know-how and thinking this is 13:41:18 22 going to be a picnic, undertaking what the 13:41:29 23 Russians have actually been very good at, we 13:41:29 24 are not stating all of the pitfalls, and we 13:41:29 25 need to be clear that this requires 13:41:41 31 1 abandoning what we have become good at and 13:41:41 2 undertaking development of new things. 13:41:41 3 In fact, you know, a number of years 13:41:41 4 ago when the question came of getting a 13:41:53 5 hydrocarbon engine for Atlas, we had to go to 13:41:53 6 Russia to buy one because we did not have 13:41:53 7 sufficient efficient technology to do it 13:41:53 8 ourselves. So we have to be -- we have to 13:42:03 9 walk into this new opportunity with open 13:42:03 10 eyes. 13:42:03 11 DR. CRAWLEY: That's absolutely 13:42:03 12 correct. And as all of us know, the likely 13:42:03 13 first stage engine for this, in the absence 13:42:11 14 of a large new American LOX/kerosene engine 13:42:11 15 development, would be the RD-180 engine, a 13:42:20 16 Russian-supplied engine. 13:42:27 17 So that in our consideration of this, 13:42:27 18 we're also factoring in, as you know, the 13:42:27 19 cost and schedule risk of developing a 13:42:27 20 domestic, large LOX/kerosene engine of a 13:42:36 21 comparable class, let's say. And we 13:42:36 22 definitely understand -- your point is well 13:42:42 23 taken, that for the last several decades the 13:42:46 24 United States has used as the high thrust -- 13:42:46 25 not necessarily the highest ISP option for 13:42:51 32 1 launch from the ground -- it certainly is in 13:42:55 2 the civil program -- a combination of 13:42:59 3 LOX/hydrogen and solids, and this would be a 13:42:59 4 different route. 13:43:04 5 The last of the decisions which is: 13:43:05 6 What is the first destination for exploration 13:43:09 7 beyond LEO? We've tried to boil down into 13:43:11 8 these four, the Moon with surface 13:43:15 9 exploration -- 14. I'm sorry. Right. 14. 13:43:17 10 Back one. 13:43:20 11 What's the first destination for 13:43:20 12 exploration beyond LEO? The Moon with 13:43:30 13 surface exploration focused on a base or on 13:43:33 14 sorties which then move towards the 13:43:42 15 development of a base; Moon with surface 13:43:42 16 exploration focused on slightly more on the 13:43:44 17 global exploration, more of a scouting and 13:43:44 18 reconnaissance and establishment of shorter 13:43:49 19 term bases; deep space, that is to say, 13:43:52 20 visiting the nearby planetary bodies up to 13:43:57 21 and including flybys of Mars without any 13:43:58 22 immediate exploration of the planetary 13:44:02 23 surface but with the use of robotics in 13:44:04 24 coordination; and then an option which goes 13:44:08 25 first to Mars. 13:44:11 33 1 So, Norm, today we're down to 128, if 13:44:11 2 you counted that up. 13:44:15 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Keep going. 13:44:18 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. By the end of 13:44:21 5 the day. 13:44:21 6 So I'll just give us a few words 13:44:21 7 about each one of these. These are not 13:44:27 8 significantly changed from the presentation 13:44:27 9 that we made at Cocoa Beach several weeks 13:44:31 10 ago. Chart 15. 13:44:35 11 So the one which we loosely call 13:44:35 12 Lunar Base, which, in fact, is sorties which 13:44:43 13 likely leads to Lunar Base, which is 13:44:43 14 approximately the approach of the program of 13:44:47 15 record, the Constellation program, is that 13:44:47 16 there would be first sorties to the lunar 13:44:50 17 surface and then extended stays, building up 13:44:54 18 the capability of a permanent human presence 13:44:56 19 of crew on the lunar surface at a base-like 13:44:59 20 facility in rotations of about 190 days, much 13:45:05 21 like the crew rotation is today on the ISS; 13:45:10 22 that there would be mobility from this site 13:45:14 23 which should be likely in the range of a 13:45:14 24 hundred or hundreds of kilometers, which 13:45:19 25 sounds like a long way to drive on the lunar 13:45:25 34 1 surface but, in fact, does not allow you to 13:45:25 2 cover a very large fraction of the lunar 13:45:29 3 surface as exploration, one of the deficits 13:45:29 4 of this strategy; that since you're at a 13:45:34 5 pole, you're able to get insulation from the 13:45:36 6 Sun to generate solar power through the lunar 13:45:39 7 night -- it's a little like being at the 13:45:43 8 South Pole on the Equinox, the Sun is more or 13:45:47 9 less always on the horizon, so that you can 13:45:51 10 find locations that will allow you to 13:45:51 11 generate electrical power most of the time; 13:45:53 12 that habitation would be provided by a 13:45:56 13 concept not unlike the ISS with modules that 13:45:59 14 are offloaded from landers and linked 13:46:03 15 together; and that the emphasis in this would 13:46:06 16 be understanding the lunar environment and 13:46:09 17 its applicability to future human exploration 13:46:13 18 to develop the long-stay human physiology 13:46:18 19 information, to learn how to scout and to 13:46:18 20 move mobily on a planetary surface other than 13:46:25 21 ours. 13:46:25 22 There is interesting planetary 13:46:25 23 geology to do on the Moon that would be a 13:46:31 24 prime objective of the science campaign, 13:46:31 25 reliability in the systems, the suits, the 13:46:37 35 1 rovers, the airlocks and a systematic testing 13:46:37 2 approach of our capability to live on a 13:46:44 3 distant planetary surface but one that is not 13:46:50 4 so distant that within a few days you 13:46:50 5 couldn't get back to the home planet. 13:46:54 6 The architecture that goes with this 13:46:54 7 is fairly well understood. Next chart, 16. 13:46:59 8 It's basically the program of 13:47:02 9 reference architecture, that there would be a 13:47:07 10 launch and a half -- that is to say, an 13:47:07 11 Ares I and an Ares V -- that rendezvous in 13:47:07 12 low Earth orbit. The Orion moves over and 13:47:12 13 joins the stack. It's injected to lunar 13:47:20 14 orbit. The lander goes down to the lunar 13:47:20 15 surface after some amount of time. The 13:47:28 16 ascent module, if it's a crewed flight, comes 13:47:28 17 back up to low lunar orbit, and the Orion 13:47:28 18 capsule returns to a water -- a nominal water 13:47:35 19 landing. In the cargo mode you just take off 13:47:35 20 the Orion and the ascent module. 13:47:42 21 So this is a view of how -- in 13:47:42 22 reference years, just starting from one so 13:47:48 23 that we're allowed to slide it back and forth 13:47:48 24 on the schedule, how this would evolve; that 13:47:55 25 in the first year you'd have human lunar 13:47:55 36 1 return, a single flight, for about seven days 13:48:01 2 on the lunar surface for up to four crew; by 13:48:01 3 the second year you'd have flights of up to 13:48:14 4 14 days with some initial power and 13:48:14 5 habitation and mobility; by about the third 13:48:14 6 year longer distance pressurized rovers would 13:48:14 7 be on the lunar surface providing 13:48:24 8 14-or-so-day traverses on the lunar surface; 13:48:24 9 and eventually, by about year six or so, 13:48:24 10 you've established the capability of nearly 13:48:34 11 continuous or continuous human presence and 13:48:34 12 then you continue to build up capabilities 13:48:34 13 from that. 13:48:43 14 There are mixed in here the option of 13:48:43 15 making short duration, order of seven-day 13:48:43 16 sorties to other sites on the Moon of 13:48:43 17 interest. 13:48:48 18 So another strategy for exploring the 13:48:48 19 Moon we call Lunar Global, and this allows 13:48:55 20 the evolution of the lunar surface 13:49:01 21 exploration to proceed more in a long sortie 13:49:01 22 or brief habitation mode; that we start out 13:49:06 23 by some number of sorties of up to 7 to 13:49:10 24 14 days to various sites on the Moon which 13:49:13 25 are of important scientific interest and then 13:49:17 37 1 we, in subsequent sorties, build up more and 13:49:23 2 more capability that's deployed to the Moon 13:49:30 3 of habitats and rovers. This has the 13:49:33 4 advantage that you then have this several 13:49:35 5 hundred kilometer survey distance from a 13:49:38 6 number of sites on the Moon so that you don't 13:49:44 7 just go once to the pole and then are able to 13:49:48 8 explore on the surface from there, and it has 13:49:51 9 the disadvantage of not as effectively 13:49:53 10 utilizing the assets that you've brought to 13:49:56 11 the surface of the Moon on return visits. 13:49:59 12 And there are some hybrids that go 13:50:01 13 between the lunar global scenario and the 13:50:05 14 base scenario, but these sort of represent 13:50:09 15 the bookends in the system. So in the 13:50:09 16 sorties phase, there might be three or four 13:50:12 17 sorties to a like number of locations about 13:50:17 18 seven days. In the extended duration, you 13:50:17 19 went to a first site, you might stay 50, 13:50:20 20 60 days -- I'm sorry -- I'm on Chart 19 -- 13:50:20 21 thank you -- that you would have -- come 13:50:29 22 along with the cargo in some number of crewed 13:50:31 23 flights, probably about five. Then at the 13:50:36 24 next site, you'd push it up to maybe as much 13:50:36 25 as 90 days with several -- a couple of cargo 13:50:38 38 1 flights and maybe as many as six crew flights 13:50:41 2 and pressurized mobility and so on; that you 13:50:45 3 would, as you went to the next site, deploy 13:50:48 4 increasingly more capability. And at some 13:50:50 5 point this strategy for exploring the lunar 13:50:53 6 surface might just go back to the first one. 13:50:55 7 At some point you've found a place which is 13:51:01 8 so interesting that you decide to build an 13:51:02 9 almost permanent crewed base at that site. 13:51:06 10 So these are not completely different 13:51:10 11 strategies. They're slightly different 13:51:13 12 strategies. 13:51:15 13 So this would be what the timeline 13:51:17 14 would look like for this Lunar Global; that 13:51:21 15 there would be test flights and some sortie 13:51:23 16 flights, maybe as many as five; then you'd 13:51:28 17 go to the first extended duration location in 13:51:35 18 Years 4 and 5 with some habitation; you'd go 13:51:35 19 to the second -- and unpressurized rovers 13:51:35 20 much like we used on Apollo -- the latter 13:51:40 21 Apollo flights; you'd go to the second 13:51:46 22 location with some more habitation and 13:51:46 23 pressurized rovers for traverses and so on, 13:51:46 24 building up capabilities. 13:51:52 25 We're also still carrying the option 13:51:52 39 1 of going first to the Moon -- I'm sorry -- 13:51:58 2 first to Mars. We have stated, for the 13:51:58 3 record, that we feel that the ultimate goal 13:52:06 4 of human exploration is to become a 13:52:06 5 space-faring civilization, that the likely 13:52:11 6 intermediate destination of that is on Mars 13:52:17 7 and that, therefore, we're carrying an option 13:52:17 8 of going essentially directly to Mars or Mars 13:52:22 9 First with the possibility that along the way 13:52:28 10 there would be a test flight to the Moon of 13:52:28 11 the Martian system or perhaps a visit to the 13:52:35 12 NEOs of the Martian system. 13:52:35 13 Mars -- this is the next chart, 22. 13:52:40 14 This doesn't have a number. Right. 13:52:44 15 The architecture to launch a piloted 13:52:44 16 mission to Mars is substantially more 13:52:50 17 challenging. It involves as many as six 13:52:53 18 Ares V flights to launch the cargo -- the two 13:52:56 19 cargo flights, one of which brings an ascent 13:52:59 20 vehicle from the Mars surface and one of 13:53:09 21 which brings a Mars surface hab. Then when 13:53:09 22 that's all in place, as many as about three 13:53:13 23 Ares V flights and one Ares I crew launch 13:53:13 24 bring the piloted vehicle which goes to Mars, 13:53:18 25 loiters in orbit while the crew goes down to 13:53:23 40 1 the surface for over 500 days and then 13:53:27 2 returns. 13:53:31 3 We've created a variant of this on 13:53:31 4 the next chart, which is what a dress 13:53:31 5 rehearsal for this would look like on the 13:53:37 6 lunar surface, and convinced ourselves that 13:53:42 7 if you were, in fact, to go directly to Mars 13:53:42 8 or Mars First that such a flight would be a 13:53:47 9 reasonable idea, but it would be a test 13:53:47 10 flight. It wouldn't have as its objectives 13:53:52 11 explicitly to put humans on the Moon or to 13:53:56 12 explore the Moon. Its objectives would be to 13:53:56 13 validate in an off-Earth environment the 13:54:00 14 systems that would be used to go to Mars. 13:54:05 15 And the timeline of this is 13:54:05 16 significantly more extended. Because of the 13:54:13 17 timing of answering both technical questions, 13:54:13 18 such as what is the right aerodynamic shape 13:54:19 19 to use in a Mars entry, descent and landing 13:54:24 20 system or a Mars aerobraking system -- you 13:54:30 21 see that in there in the middle below the 13:54:34 22 line around Year 7 and 8. There would be 13:54:34 23 more robotic landings, including likely a 13:54:37 24 robotic sample return mission to assure 13:54:42 25 forward -- to deal with issues with forward 13:54:46 41 1 and reverse contamination from the Martian 13:54:46 2 surface, and it would lead to the first 13:54:51 3 humans on Mars well into the second decade of 13:54:54 4 such a program. 13:54:58 5 The last of the destination 13:55:00 6 options -- Chart 25 -- is the one we call 13:55:02 7 Flexible Path. Here essentially the strategy 13:55:06 8 is to extend human presence beyond LEO by 13:55:10 9 visiting locations within the near Earth 13:55:15 10 space up to and including flybys and orbits 13:55:17 11 of Mars but not immediately go to the 13:55:23 12 planetary surface. Now, it turns out that 13:55:27 13 there are both programmatic and technical 13:55:31 14 reasons to do this. 13:55:35 15 The programmatic reason is that the 13:55:35 16 steps necessary to get to the planetary 13:55:43 17 surface, to build the modern-day LM, to 13:55:43 18 build the modern-day rover, to build the 13:55:43 19 habitation and power systems, in fact, 13:55:49 20 produce significant budgetary wedges in the 13:55:49 21 program. 13:55:49 22 So, in essence, what this plan is -- 13:55:53 23 is one where we develop experience operating 13:55:53 24 beyond LEO by visiting some interesting 13:56:01 25 places and some near Earth objects and doing 13:56:01 42 1 flybys up to and including flybys of Mars 13:56:01 2 while we are at the same time developing the 13:56:10 3 capability, within reasonable expectation of 13:56:10 4 budget, to explore planetary surfaces and 13:56:18 5 then go back and go and explore the lunar 13:56:18 6 surface. 13:56:24 7 So the in-space part of it would look 13:56:24 8 something like this, that there's first a 13:56:24 9 lunar flyby-like mission; there would be then 13:56:29 10 missions of up to the twenties of days to the 13:56:29 11 near Earth vicinity, the Lagrange points 13:56:33 12 where the gravitational influence of Earth 13:56:37 13 and Mars are balanced, which are potential 13:56:39 14 sites for future exploration systems such as 13:56:43 15 fuel depots and are potential sites for 13:56:43 16 future servicing missions of scientific 13:56:47 17 spacecraft that might be brought to those 13:56:52 18 points for servicing. 13:56:54 19 Then there would be to go to the 13:56:56 20 Earth-Sun tipping points, the libration 13:56:58 21 points, for example, the L2 point in the 13:57:00 22 shadow of the Earth from the Sun, which is a 13:57:02 23 likely location for many future astronomical 13:57:05 24 observatories, or the L1 point between the 13:57:09 25 Earth and the Sun, which would be the first 13:57:11 43 1 time that humans would travel not only 13:57:13 2 outside of the magnetosphere of the Earth but 13:57:15 3 outside of the bow shock wave of the Earth 13:57:18 4 and solar wind and, therefore, better 13:57:21 5 characterize and understand the physiological 13:57:24 6 effects on humans of a true deep space 13:57:27 7 environment that would be necessary for 13:57:32 8 transit to Mars. 13:57:32 9 By that time you would build the 13:57:32 10 capability to do a Mars flyby and potentially 13:57:37 11 an inner solar system orbital flight like a 13:57:37 12 rendezvous with Mars' Phobos and -- Mars' 13:57:37 13 moons Phobos and Deimos. 13:57:41 14 MR. McALISTER: Ed, just a 13:57:47 15 clarification, don't we subsequently call 13:57:47 16 this Deep Space? 13:57:48 17 DR. CRAWLEY: We do. 13:57:49 18 MR. McALISTER: Okay. 13:57:49 19 DR. CRAWLEY: We have unfortunately 13:57:49 20 used both Deep Space and Flexible Path to 13:57:50 21 characterize the name of this. Good point. 13:57:54 22 Chart 27 this is the equivalent flow 13:57:58 23 diagram of this mission. Mission option, 13:58:03 24 that there would be unpiloted lunar flights 13:58:04 25 and piloted lunar flights and then some 13:58:08 44 1 flights of increasing days up to 90 days. 13:58:09 2 90 days is approximately ten times longer 13:58:15 3 than any humans have ever been outside of the 13:58:17 4 low Earth orbit. So this is not an 13:58:19 5 insignificant accomplishment. 13:58:21 6 Then a flight of maybe 180 days to 13:58:24 7 one or several near Earth objects. These are 13:58:29 8 the objects which are on crossing paths with 13:58:32 9 Earth that have both scientific and planetary 13:58:37 10 protection implications, that understanding 13:58:41 11 their trajectories and their composition 13:58:41 12 could be important for several reasons. 13:58:44 13 And then we've basically shown on 13:58:44 14 this diagram a branch off onto human lunar 13:58:46 15 return by about Year 7 or 8 into the 13:58:51 16 program -- 7 or 8 from the beginning of the 13:58:54 17 piloted test flights. 13:58:54 18 So what I just took you through 13:58:58 19 was -- now on Chart 28. What I just took you 13:58:59 20 through were five key decisions -- what we do 13:59:04 21 with the shuttle, what we do with the 13:59:06 22 station, what the U.S. heavy-launch 13:59:09 23 capability should be, what the U.S. strategy 13:59:12 24 for getting to low Earth orbit with crew 13:59:19 25 should be and where we should go beyond low 13:59:19 45 1 Earth orbit. And for each of those five 13:59:26 2 decisions, I described several choices that a 13:59:26 3 policymaker would have, some of them as few 13:59:31 4 as two choices and some of them as many as 13:59:31 5 four. 13:59:38 6 What we did, both leading up to the 13:59:38 7 last public meeting and subsequently, was we 13:59:38 8 tried to create what we call integrated 13:59:38 9 options. These are ways to string together 13:59:45 10 these choices of each of the individual 13:59:45 11 choices -- the decisions about each of the 13:59:45 12 individual choices in such a way that it 13:59:52 13 produces a package that makes good sense and 13:59:52 14 then to examine these integrated packages -- 14:00:00 15 these integrated options both from the 14:00:00 16 technical perspective, which I will not say 14:00:00 17 any more about, and from a cost and schedule 14:00:06 18 perspective, as Dr. Ride will speak about 14:00:12 19 next. 14:00:12 20 So I'll just take you very quickly 14:00:12 21 through the integrated options, and this the 14:00:17 22 is the handoff to the budget and schedule 14:00:17 23 discussion. 14:00:26 24 The first one is -- and the 14:00:26 25 highlighting in color on this chart is 14:00:26 46 1 intended to just sort of flag up what it is 14:00:26 2 that changes -- the principal change from one 14:00:34 3 row to the next. 14:00:34 4 So the first row is the program of 14:00:34 5 record, as I described it, not constrained to 14:00:34 6 the fiscal year '10 budget, shuttle retiring 14:00:34 7 in '11, station retiring in '15, launching 14:00:44 8 with the Ares I and Ares, crew on Ares I and 14:00:44 9 Orion, going to the Moon in a sortie and 14:00:57 10 outpost. 14:00:57 11 We then constrained that in an 14:00:57 12 attempt to get a program that would fit 14:00:57 13 within the President's budget -- to be 14:00:57 14 constrained to the FY '10 budget. That's the 14:00:57 15 second integrated option. 14:01:12 16 The third integrated option is one 14:01:12 17 which otherwise leaves the program of record 14:01:12 18 largely unchanged and only extends the space 14:01:12 19 station date to 2020. We examined that with 14:01:12 20 Ares as the commercial -- as the launch -- 14:01:26 21 Ares I as the launch mechanism to low Earth 14:01:26 22 orbit and with the commercial launch to low 14:01:26 23 Earth orbit. 14:01:26 24 And then we had one other variant 14:01:26 25 which goes to the Moon but is -- and extends 14:01:41 47 1 the shuttle life and bases government launch 14:01:41 2 services on the shuttle-derived vehicle. 14:01:41 3 So these are, you can see, different 14:01:41 4 combinations of ways in which you would 14:02:00 5 eventually get to something like a lunar 14:02:00 6 outpost but by considering different 14:02:00 7 combinations of shuttle extension, station 14:02:00 8 extension and some modest changes in the 14:02:00 9 launch vehicle. 14:02:00 10 The second set are the ones that 14:02:11 11 basically go into the Flexible Path or 14:02:11 12 Deep Space option, so that the common thing 14:02:11 13 here on the right-hand side is the 14:02:11 14 destinations and the strategy for 14:02:11 15 exploration -- going to lunar orbit, the 14:02:25 16 Lagrange points, the NEOs, a Mars flyby and 14:02:25 17 then to the Moon. 14:02:25 18 So the first one is what we call Dash 14:02:25 19 Out of LEO, it's constrained to the budget, 14:02:25 20 if shuttle retires in '11, the station in 14:02:37 21 '15, we go directly to the Ares Lite, 14:02:37 22 bypassing the Ares I, and use commercial crew 14:02:37 23 capability -- commercial delivery of crew to 14:02:54 24 LEO. 14:02:54 25 The one we call Deep Space option is 14:02:54 48 1 not constrained, extends the ISS and uses the 14:02:54 2 Ares V Lite. 14:02:54 3 The one that we call Deep Space EELV 14:02:54 4 relies on building a commercial hydrocarbon 14:03:15 5 75-ish-ton LEO class vehicle. 14:03:15 6 And the last one does much the same 14:03:15 7 thing except swapping out the shuttle-derived 14:03:15 8 vehicle. 14:03:15 9 So as you can see here, these are 14:03:15 10 principally changing in and out the launch -- 14:03:15 11 the heavy-launch vehicle is the thing that's 14:03:36 12 principally changing here. 14:03:36 13 And the last three are arguably the 14:03:36 14 ones that are either slightly or completely 14:03:36 15 focused on Mars, that is to say, that there's 14:03:36 16 lunar sorties and extended stays which are 14:03:36 17 intended to be in a more Mars-like 14:03:57 18 exploration preparation strategy. And, here 14:03:57 19 again, the principal change is the swap-out 14:03:57 20 of the commercial hydrocarbon vehicle with 14:03:57 21 the Ares V Lite. 14:03:57 22 And the last one is the Mars First 14:03:57 23 strategy of not going to the Moon but 14:03:57 24 planning on focusing and building systems to 14:03:57 25 go exclusively to Mars but reserving the 14:04:15 49 1 possibility that we do a test flight on the 14:04:15 2 Moon. 14:04:15 3 So that summarizes the technical 14:04:15 4 considerations that have been underway and 14:04:15 5 the refinements that have been made. 14:04:15 6 And now I'll hand it off -- or, Norm, 14:04:15 7 do you want to have a discussion or -- 14:04:15 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think what we will 14:04:34 9 do is ask you questions we have. And with 14:04:34 10 regard to the possibility of adding options 14:04:34 11 or deleting options, which is something I 14:04:34 12 hope we can consider seriously here, we'll do 14:04:34 13 that after we've heard the cost part 14:04:34 14 probably. Before you leave, I've got some 14:04:57 15 questions. 14:04:57 16 Does anybody else have questions they 14:04:57 17 want to raise? 14:04:57 18 Okay. Fine. I saw you first, Jeff, 14:04:57 19 and then Chris. 14:04:57 20 MR. GREASON: This is as much a 14:04:57 21 comment as a question. I am particular -- 14:04:57 22 because of the ties I have in the commercial 14:04:57 23 world, I've been getting an awful lot of 14:04:57 24 questions of people going why aren't we all 14:04:57 25 excited about a lunar base because we want to 14:04:57 50 1 do in situ propellant production -- a 14:05:14 2 sentiment with which I'm in total agreement. 14:05:14 3 And you have to really dive down into the 14:05:14 4 details of what was envisioned for the lunar 14:05:14 5 base scenario to realize that, while we might 14:05:14 6 want a lunar base to do in situ propellant 14:05:30 7 production, it wasn't this lunar base. 14:05:30 8 This lunar base was proceeding in a 14:05:30 9 rapid fashion and very reminiscent of ISS to 14:05:30 10 get the capability up there, maybe we'll do 14:05:30 11 some science with it but we'll fundamentally 14:05:44 12 think about what we're going to do with it 14:05:44 13 and why it's there later. And that's the 14:05:44 14 reason why -- it's, in fact, my advocacy of 14:05:44 15 wanting to do industrial development on the 14:05:44 16 Moon that has pushed me very strongly in the 14:05:44 17 direction of the Lunar Global scenario, 14:05:44 18 because that way we do exploration and we 14:06:01 19 build up a transportation infrastructure that 14:06:01 20 we can do lots of things with while we find 14:06:01 21 out what's up there and figure out what the 14:06:01 22 things are that we want to do. 14:06:01 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Good comment. 14:06:01 24 Chris... 14:06:01 25 DR. CHYBA: Ed, I just wanted to note 14:06:01 51 1 that some of your Flexible Path slides 14:06:01 2 show -- as was the case the last time we saw 14:06:21 3 these in, I think, Cocoa Beach -- show Venus 14:06:21 4 as a possible destination along the Flexible 14:06:21 5 Path, and I wanted to note that, from my 14:06:21 6 point of view, I think that Venus makes very 14:06:21 7 little sense as a destination for human 14:06:21 8 missions and would be a terrible distraction 14:06:21 9 from those destinations that do make sense, 14:06:21 10 mainly Mars and with -- and Moon. So I would 14:06:38 11 recommend that Venus simply be dropped from 14:06:38 12 all of the Deep Space and Flexible Path 14:06:38 13 scenarios. 14:06:38 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Does anybody have a 14:06:38 15 problem with that? 14:06:54 16 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I agree with that. 14:06:54 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think it's probably 14:06:54 18 a good idea too. 14:06:54 19 DR. AUSTIN: Norm, I had a question. 14:06:54 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Please, 14:06:54 21 Wanda... 14:06:54 22 DR. AUSTIN: Ed, in your Chinese menu 14:06:54 23 of, you know, a little shuttle, a little 14:06:54 24 station, a little exploration, you didn't 14:06:54 25 explicitly talk about technology except for 14:06:54 52 1 the propellant options. I think that one of 14:07:02 2 the things that, you know, I'm concerned 14:07:02 3 about is in order to do some of these hard 14:07:02 4 things does require an investment in tech 14:07:11 5 development and maturation with an eye toward 14:07:11 6 the actual application. 14:07:16 7 So I guess my question to you for 14:07:16 8 clarification is: What are your assumptions 14:07:22 9 about a tech investment that's associated 14:07:22 10 with each of these options? 14:07:22 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Thank you for 14:07:29 12 flagging that up. 14:07:29 13 At Cocoa Beach, I think it was, Jeff 14:07:29 14 made a presentation as part of our working 14:07:29 15 group on the high priority items which are -- 14:07:37 16 many of which are, in fact, enabling of some 14:07:37 17 of these routes -- the large high thrust 14:07:42 18 LOX/kerosene engine, the fuel transfer, some 14:07:48 19 of the technology of planetary encounter -- 14:07:48 20 I'm trying to think what else were the main 14:07:52 21 items on the list -- 14:07:52 22 MR. GREASON: Advanced space 14:07:55 23 propulsion of one kind or another. 14:07:55 24 DR. CRAWLEY: -- advanced in-space 14:07:55 25 propulsion, restartable long cold soak, 14:07:58 53 1 restartable engines, which are not of 14:07:59 2 interest to really anybody but NASA -- that 14:08:02 3 is to say, it's not a pertinent problem on 14:08:05 4 launch off of the Earth -- and a similar list 14:08:08 5 of things that was in our Cocoa Beach 14:08:13 6 presentation. 14:08:16 7 And you're absolutely right. There 14:08:16 8 have to be three things that are consistent 14:08:19 9 here. One is the dedication of NASA and the 14:08:21 10 highly trained and expert workforce of NASA 14:08:25 11 to work on these problems, the second is 14:08:28 12 their linkage to the future plans for 14:08:30 13 exploration and the third is their linkage to 14:08:33 14 the budget. 14:08:37 15 And we have recommended, as you'll 14:08:37 16 see in Sally's presentation, which has been 14:08:40 17 adopted in, I think, all but the program of 14:08:45 18 record reference case, what we would consider 14:08:45 19 a fairly robust technology investment program 14:08:50 20 that would not only directly serve the needs 14:08:53 21 of Constellation but the longer term needs 14:08:55 22 of -- not only the near-term needs of 14:08:58 23 Constellation but the longer term needs of 14:09:02 24 exploration and also the needs of a 14:09:05 25 burgeoning commercial space community, 14:09:10 54 1 needless to say, in addition, from a 14:09:10 2 perspective that you would say consistent 14:09:13 3 with the Space Act of 1958, the development 14:09:15 4 of technologies which are also of interest to 14:09:18 5 the security interests of the nation. 14:09:20 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Other questions? 14:09:23 7 MR. BEJMUK: I have one more 14:09:25 8 question. 14:09:27 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sure, Bo. 14:09:27 10 MR. BEJMUK: You know, when I look at 14:09:31 11 these options, Ed, we have these options of a 14:09:31 12 different selection of the launch system that 14:09:36 13 will support these integrated options, and 14:09:39 14 when I, for example, look at Ares V Lite 14:09:41 15 versus, for example, shuttle derived or the 14:09:45 16 hydrocarbon rocket, what this doesn't really 14:09:50 17 reflect is the additional mission complexity 14:09:53 18 that you have to face when you use more than 14:09:56 19 one or more than two rockets. 14:09:59 20 And, you know, if we just observe 14:10:03 21 how -- what it takes to launch shuttle or any 14:10:05 22 of the other launch vehicles, you get 14:10:09 23 affected by winds on the ground, winds aloft, 14:10:12 24 lightning, load glitches in a ECO sensor and 14:10:16 25 God knows what else. So the more rockets you 14:10:19 55 1 have to launch, the more difficult it is to 14:10:21 2 execute a mission. 14:10:24 3 And I'd like to hear your opinion 14:10:24 4 of -- what do you think; what is an element 14:10:28 5 of increasing of mission complexity when it 14:10:28 6 goes to more smaller rockets, and would you 14:10:35 7 agree with me that for a big trip you need to 14:10:35 8 have fewer big rockets? 14:10:40 9 You know, when I saw your picture 14:10:40 10 going to Mars and I saw half a dozen of 14:10:45 11 Ares V, you probably couldn't put -- 14:10:45 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Probably closer to a 14:10:45 13 dozen of Ares V actually. 14:10:45 14 MR. BEJMUK: -- you probably couldn't 14:10:47 15 put enough smaller rockets on this page and 14:10:47 16 not to mention how you would manage this 14:10:51 17 scenario, you know, when you have to watch 14:10:55 18 weather, watch all of the other restrictions, 14:10:57 19 watch hardware integrity to be able to 14:11:03 20 execute these very many multiple missions. 14:11:06 21 So could you address that mission 14:11:09 22 complexity resulting from a large number of 14:11:11 23 smaller launch vehicles? 14:11:15 24 DR. CRAWLEY: I'll be happy to, and 14:11:15 25 then I'll invite comment from anyone else on 14:11:16 56 1 the panel. 14:11:18 2 But you are right. If one moves to a 14:11:21 3 smaller launch vehicle, one has to 14:11:24 4 consistently make one or two -- one of two -- 14:11:24 5 go down one of two routes. You either have 14:11:28 6 to downsize the size of the in-space systems 14:11:36 7 that you're going to use or keep the same 14:11:36 8 size in-space systems and develop a very 14:11:43 9 capable in-space refueling, which introduces 14:11:54 10 a certain type of in-space complexity not 14:11:54 11 in -- we do not think impossible but not 14:11:54 12 likely to be easy, or you have to go down the 14:11:54 13 route of having more launches from the Earth 14:12:09 14 of the -- call them slightly smaller 14:12:09 15 heavy-lift launch vehicles, which causes the 14:12:09 16 complications of additional pad availability, 14:12:09 17 range availability, weather issues and so 14:12:22 18 forth. 14:12:22 19 And we actually had, in the course of 14:12:22 20 the last couple weeks, NASA do an analysis 14:12:22 21 for us of basically launch availability when 14:12:22 22 some number of critical payloads -- some 14:12:36 23 number of critical launches and some number 14:12:36 24 of less critical launches had to be flown 14:12:36 25 within a certain window of time. 14:12:36 57 1 And as exactly you expect, as anyone 14:12:36 2 who's ever watched the shuttle try and fly, 14:12:46 3 the more launches of vehicles that you need 14:12:46 4 to get within a window, the more that impacts 14:12:46 5 the total mission availability, without going 14:12:52 6 into the details of what the trades are. 14:12:52 7 But one of the things that we did 14:13:01 8 notice in this is that we will rediscover 14:13:01 9 soon something that spacefarers knew in the 14:13:01 10 '60s -- is that if you abort in the ocean, 14:13:09 11 there's an additional factor of sea state 14:13:13 12 that comes into play as well, which -- and 14:13:17 13 it's been a long time since we've thought 14:13:21 14 about sea state on a -- that is to say, how 14:13:24 15 stormy it is in the ocean. It's been a long 14:13:26 16 time since we've thought about that, but it 14:13:26 17 won't be long before we start thinking about 14:13:28 18 it again. And that, too, plays into the 14:13:30 19 consideration of the human element of the 14:13:33 20 launch, regardless of how the launch goes. 14:13:35 21 So you're right. You either have to 14:13:39 22 sort of downsize the upper -- the things that 14:13:39 23 you throw away from the Earth or you have to 14:13:45 24 invest in the refueling technology or you get 14:13:45 25 more launches or some combination of those 14:13:52 58 1 things. 14:13:52 2 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 14:13:52 3 MR. GREASON: Yes. I'd to take your 14:13:52 4 invitation to comment further. 14:13:58 5 Ultimately we want to be able to do 14:13:58 6 bigger and better things in space. And I 14:14:01 7 don't think anybody thinks that we're going 14:14:08 8 to go to Mars some day with one really big 14:14:09 9 rocket. So you ultimately -- it's not a 14:14:13 10 question of what you need to learn to do. 14:14:17 11 It's ultimately a question of what order you 14:14:21 12 need to learn to do it in. Either we learn 14:14:27 13 how to put more things together, which lends 14:14:33 14 itself to less large -- I won't call them 14:14:33 15 small -- rockets, and that involves both an 14:14:37 16 investment in technology and that involves an 14:14:42 17 investment in learning the things you need to 14:14:42 18 learn to support a higher flight rate. And 14:14:47 19 there's many of them. 14:14:47 20 And, again, as you say, when you look 14:14:53 21 at the Mars infrastructure, it's not as 14:14:53 22 though we're not going to launch six or seven 14:15:00 23 or eight launches per mission on the current 14:15:00 24 plans. The difference is cost is an 14:15:00 25 independent variable. And, you know, it is 14:15:11 59 1 not obvious that all of the ways of doing 14:15:11 2 this also cost the same. It's also not 14:15:11 3 obvious that we're ever going to go to 14:15:20 4 Mars -- actually it is obvious to me that 14:15:20 5 we're not going to go to Mars with the 14:15:28 6 current technology suite. So we don't know 14:15:28 7 how many pieces of what size we're going to 14:15:28 8 need to go to Mars. 14:15:37 9 So it's just -- I just don't think 14:15:37 10 it's true to say that we know, as you 14:15:37 11 stipulated, that you have to have a really 14:15:37 12 big rocket to go places. I think that's one 14:15:37 13 of the options. But it is not obvious that 14:15:49 14 it's the best option, and it's certainly not 14:15:49 15 true that it's the only option. 14:15:49 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally... 14:15:49 17 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I wanted to just 14:16:06 18 pick up on something that Ed mentioned. You 14:16:06 19 know, Ed brought up that we'll be landing in 14:16:06 20 the water again with the present plan for 14:16:06 21 Orion, and that opens up to me the whole 14:16:06 22 issue of operations costs. 14:16:06 23 We haven't really had a robust 14:16:23 24 discussion about the size of Orion. It's the 14:16:23 25 size of Orion with the five-meter capsule 14:16:23 60 1 that actually drives you to the need for a 14:16:23 2 water landing. Were the capsule a smaller 14:16:38 3 capsule, you'd at least have the opportunity 14:16:38 4 of considering a land landing. I know both 14:16:38 5 Leroy and I would prefer to land on land if 14:16:38 6 we got to choose. 14:16:53 7 But I think that maybe more to the 14:16:53 8 point is that a water landing probably 14:16:53 9 significantly increases the operations costs 14:16:53 10 that you'll be facing with the vehicle for 14:16:53 11 years and years and years and years into the 14:16:53 12 future, and that's just one small example of 14:16:53 13 our collective tendency to optimize programs 14:17:11 14 for the DDT&E cost, the DDT&E phase, but 14:17:11 15 neglect or push off until the future 14:17:11 16 discussion of the operations costs and trying 14:17:11 17 to optimize for the ops phase that's gotten 14:17:11 18 us into trouble before on the shuttle 14:17:24 19 program, on the station program, where the 14:17:24 20 ops costs just became what they became once 14:17:24 21 we were able to launch the shuttle and once 14:17:36 22 we were able to begin operating the station. 14:17:36 23 And it would appear that we're in 14:17:36 24 danger of heading down the same path with the 14:17:36 25 current program or any program that we might 14:17:47 61 1 elect to evolve into, and I think that I 14:17:47 2 would argue that we should put a lot more 14:17:47 3 thought -- NASA going forward -- put a lot 14:17:53 4 more thought into the operational costs of 14:17:57 5 whatever suite of vehicles and elements we go 14:18:02 6 forward with, because it's those operations 14:18:02 7 costs that, once you're finished with the 14:18:05 8 development, you're stuck with for 10 years, 14:18:08 9 20 years, 30 years, 40 years and, especially 14:18:10 10 an exploration program, you're going to be 14:18:17 11 facing those costs for a very long time in 14:18:17 12 the future. So it really pays to consider 14:18:24 13 them in the development phase of the program. 14:18:24 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you, Sally. 14:18:29 15 Ed, I've got three items I'd like to 14:18:29 16 raise, and then we'll, I think, move ahead 14:18:36 17 into costing. 14:18:36 18 The first is a nit, and that is, the 14:18:40 19 program of record, we need to fix the chart 14:18:40 20 to show it's 2010 on the shuttle here. 14:18:48 21 The second is that the integrated 14:18:48 22 options, the first two of them, really 14:18:55 23 ultimately enable a trip to Mars, I think, 14:18:55 24 and the document here makes it sound like 14:19:05 25 they're sort of dead-ended after the flybys 14:19:05 62 1 and so on. If I'm right, we ought to do 14:19:09 2 something to make clear that there's another 14:19:14 3 phase beyond this. It's just beyond our 14:19:21 4 costing and lifetimes, I'm afraid. 14:19:21 5 The third one is kind of a Catch 22 14:19:21 6 where, as you were describing the first block 14:19:32 7 of options, you had mentioned that if you had 14:19:32 8 a shuttle-derived vehicle it would make sense 14:19:32 9 to keep the shuttle operating, which makes 14:19:32 10 some sense to me. On the other hand, if you 14:19:44 11 keep the shuttle operating, you won't have 14:19:44 12 any money to build the shuttle-derived 14:19:44 13 vehicle. And would you care to comment. 14:19:44 14 DR. CRAWLEY: I think that's an 14:19:57 15 excellent introduction to Dr. Ride. 14:19:57 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. 14:19:57 17 DR. CRAWLEY: And I was just going to 14:19:57 18 ask, Sally, you know, it doesn't make a 14:19:57 19 difference to you that it's off San Diego? 14:19:57 20 DR. RIDE: Well, actually as a matter 14:19:57 21 of fact, it does make a difference to me that 14:20:08 22 it's just off San Diego. So I'm hoping for 14:20:08 23 precision in the landings. 14:20:08 24 Norm, let me just, before I get up, 14:20:08 25 briefly address that question because we're 14:20:20 63 1 about to get buried in numbers, and I think 14:20:20 2 that that's a good question to discuss. 14:20:20 3 As you'll see in -- as part of 14:20:33 4 this -- or as, I'm sure, will come out in the 14:20:33 5 discussion, the cost of NASA's existing 14:20:33 6 infrastructure, facilities, workforce, 14:20:33 7 capabilities are a real important 14:20:33 8 consideration actually in all of these 14:20:47 9 scenarios. Because in some cases, you're 14:20:47 10 able to keep them. In some cases, you keep 14:20:47 11 them to a significant extent, but you have to 14:20:47 12 reconstitute the workforce. 14:21:00 13 When shuttle retires, there will be a 14:21:00 14 significant disruption to the workforce. 14:21:00 15 Other of our options require less of the NASA 14:21:00 16 infrastructure. And there's one, in 14:21:11 17 particular, that actually envisions a 14:21:11 18 completely different model that would bring 14:21:11 19 with it significant disruptions to the 14:21:11 20 NASA -- the existing infrastructure. So 14:21:23 21 we're going to see that play out. 14:21:23 22 The combination of the shuttle and a 14:21:23 23 shuttle-derived vehicle takes maximum 14:21:23 24 advantage of the existing facilities, the 14:21:36 25 existing infrastructure, the existing 14:21:36 64 1 workforce, the existing elements. So in some 14:21:36 2 sense, those costs are shared by the shuttle 14:21:36 3 and the shuttle-derived vehicle. So there is 14:21:47 4 some savings. That's not to say that it's 14:21:47 5 necessarily the most cost-effective program, 14:21:47 6 but there are savings that way. And, in 14:22:00 7 fact, there are actually some savings just 14:22:00 8 going directly to a shuttle-derived vehicle, 14:22:00 9 again, because it's got the most commonality 14:22:00 10 with the existing infrastructure and 14:22:00 11 facilities. But we're going to see this play 14:22:13 12 out in the costing. 14:22:13 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 14:22:13 14 MR. GREASON: While Sally gets up, 14:22:28 15 one more on this point. I don't believe we 14:22:28 16 said that if you're going to do the 14:22:28 17 shuttle-derived vehicle you might as well 14:22:28 18 extend the shuttle. 14:22:28 19 DR. RIDE: That's exactly right. 14:22:28 20 MR. GREASON: It's the other way 14:22:28 21 around. If you were going to extend the 14:22:28 22 shuttle, then the only heavy lift option that 14:22:28 23 makes sense is the shuttle-derived vehicle. 14:22:28 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, it seems to me 14:22:43 25 there's a case for the other as well in the 14:22:43 65 1 sense that for continuity of workforce and 14:22:43 2 facilities -- it's a stronger case than the 14:22:43 3 rest of you made it, but it seems to me 14:22:43 4 there's a case. 14:22:56 5 DR. CHYBA: It might also make sense 14:22:56 6 to have a shuttle-derived vehicle and not 14:22:56 7 extend shuttle. I mean, I think all of those 14:22:56 8 are in the space right now. 14:22:56 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 14:22:56 10 DR. RIDE: Yeah. Exactly. 14:22:56 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Sally... 14:22:56 12 DR. RIDE: Okay. Could I have the 14:22:56 13 first slide. 14:22:56 14 I think it's fair to say that our 14:23:11 15 review group drew the short straw and I drew 14:23:11 16 the shortest by having to actually give this 14:23:11 17 presentation. But the first thing that I 14:23:11 18 want to do is implicate my coconspirators 14:23:11 19 here. So the team that has actually spent an 14:23:11 20 enormous amount of time over the last five or 14:23:25 21 six days is myself, Professor Crawley, Jeff 14:23:25 22 Greason and Bo. 14:23:25 23 We've been working very, very closely 14:23:33 24 with the team from Aerospace Corporation, 14:23:33 25 which was leading the costing exercise. 14:23:33 66 1 They're our an independent -- independent 14:23:42 2 assessment arm, and they're here just to make 14:23:42 3 sure that we've got a nice arm's length from 14:23:49 4 NASA. 14:23:49 5 Having said that, I think we all 14:23:49 6 recognized -- Aerospace certainly recognized 14:23:56 7 and we recognized that without close 14:23:56 8 collaboration with NASA the data that they 14:23:56 9 were putting into the costing models would 14:24:02 10 immediately be suspect. So we formed a not 14:24:02 11 small team -- a large team from Aerospace and 14:24:07 12 an even larger and geographically widely 14:24:15 13 dispersed group from NASA that have spent a 14:24:15 14 lot of good quality time getting to know each 14:24:19 15 other over the last few days. 14:24:26 16 And what I'm going to explain is a 14:24:26 17 little bit of a work in process, as you'll 14:24:31 18 see, but the first thing that I need to do is 14:24:31 19 thank everybody, particularly the people from 14:24:38 20 Aerospace and the people from NASA, who have 14:24:38 21 been putting in the extraordinarily long 14:24:38 22 hours over the last five days. And it's 14:24:48 23 literally been -- I mean, literally 24/7 14:24:48 24 since last Wednesday late afternoon. Next 14:24:48 25 slide. 14:24:55 67 1 So let me go through our timeline and 14:24:55 2 process just to give you a sense of what 14:24:59 3 we've been going through here. Ed briefed 14:24:59 4 the seven scenarios -- which we've expanded 14:25:07 5 somewhat, but he re-briefed again just now -- 14:25:10 6 on last Wednesday, about 160 hours ago. So 14:25:12 7 this is not -- has not got a long shelf life 14:25:15 8 here. 14:25:20 9 The committee members finalized most 14:25:20 10 of the ground rules and the assumptions that 14:25:23 11 would go into this costing exercise through a 14:25:25 12 series of long discussions on Thursday night 14:25:28 13 and culminating in discussions late Friday 14:25:36 14 and then from last Thursday through -- I've 14:25:36 15 got on the chart -- a very late last night. 14:25:40 16 It turns out I was optimistic in that chart. 14:25:45 17 The last chart actually came in about an hour 14:25:47 18 ago. So this is late-breaking news. 14:25:50 19 Aerospace ran a costing model for all 14:25:55 20 of the scenarios and the derivatives that we 14:25:58 21 identified, and these were based on a variety 14:26:01 22 of different launch vehicles, as you've heard 14:26:03 23 from Ed, and different assumed funding 14:26:09 24 levels, as you'll see as we go forward here. 14:26:09 25 We had a variety of different telecons and 14:26:12 68 1 other discussions, a lot of them three hours 14:26:17 2 or more, every day since Thursday between the 14:26:25 3 committee members, Aerospace and the NASA 14:26:25 4 team -- many tens of people on these 14:26:25 5 telecons -- to review the iterations of the 14:26:30 6 output and to validate the data that was 14:26:32 7 going into these models, resolve any issues, 14:26:35 8 and we had many robust debates between 14:26:40 9 committee members, between Aerospace and 14:26:44 10 NASA, between any combination of people you 14:26:46 11 can name in this group to get to where we are 14:26:48 12 today. Next slide. 14:26:52 13 So today's product is significantly 14:26:53 14 better than when we started 160 hours ago, 14:26:57 15 but as I said, it's a bit of a work in 14:27:00 16 progress. And I suspect that coming out of 14:27:03 17 the day we'll actually be asked to refine 14:27:06 18 certain areas of the analysis to try to get a 14:27:10 19 little bit better handle on some scenario 14:27:13 20 combinations that we might identify here. 14:27:17 21 Next slide. 14:27:20 22 Let me go through our key ground 14:27:22 23 rules and assumptions, because these are 14:27:25 24 important to understand as we go into looking 14:27:28 25 at the actual costing scenarios. 14:27:31 69 1 The first is that Aerospace used a 14:27:35 2 roughly 1.5 historical risk factor that is 14:27:40 3 based on a history of a broad set of over -- 14:27:45 4 of 77 different NASA programs that has been 14:27:47 5 established by the Congressional Budget 14:27:53 6 Office and used by several different groups. 14:27:56 7 They used that 1.5 (sic) actually historical 14:28:00 8 risk factor on all of the element development 14:28:05 9 costs of all scenarios on the cost left to go 14:28:08 10 in those scenarios. 14:28:11 11 We agreed on a lower historical risk 14:28:13 12 of 1.25 for the production of elements and 14:28:16 13 also on the operations costs, and it turns 14:28:23 14 out that that 1.25 vice 1.5 for operations 14:28:27 15 actually made a very, very large difference, 14:28:30 16 which was interesting to me and something 14:28:34 17 that I'm going to go back and try to 14:28:37 18 understand a little bit more. 14:28:41 19 The second on the list is that we 14:28:43 20 elected to add an additional 200 million -- 14:28:47 21 this is a one-time add -- to the COTS cargo 14:28:53 22 baseline in FY '11, and this is really 14:29:01 23 intended to incentivize the current COTS 14:29:01 24 cargo demonstrations. We've all come to 14:29:10 25 realize how important the COTS cargo is to 14:29:10 70 1 the future of ISS, and we want to make sure 14:29:10 2 that there's incentive for them to perform as 14:29:21 3 we all hope they will. 14:29:21 4 The next one, except for the current 14:29:21 5 international agreements that are assumed for 14:29:21 6 ISS and an extension of those same agreements 14:29:32 7 out through 2020, all of the elements in all 14:29:32 8 of the scenarios were fully costed, and we 14:29:32 9 did this just to make sure that we captured 14:29:43 10 the full costs of the scenarios. 14:29:43 11 In other words, we didn't take credit 14:29:43 12 if we thought that we could engage 14:29:43 13 international partners to help defray some of 14:29:43 14 the costs or take on the costing of some of 14:30:00 15 the elements. We thought that it was 14:30:00 16 premature to do that and it was better to get 14:30:00 17 the full costs at the very beginning of this 14:30:00 18 process. 14:30:00 19 Next, for each of the scenarios, with 14:30:00 20 the exception of the program of record, we 14:30:00 21 felt it was very, very important to introduce 14:30:00 22 a specific technology line, and we started 14:30:23 23 that technology program at $500 million in 14:30:23 24 FY '11. We ramped it up to 1.5 billion a 14:30:23 25 year over a five-year period, and then we 14:30:23 71 1 maintained it at $1.5 billion a year for the 14:30:23 2 rest of the time that we considered. 14:30:23 3 As we looked a little bit more 14:30:56 4 closely at this, we realized that there was a 14:30:56 5 possibility for a little bit of 14:30:56 6 double-counting in the technology that we 14:30:56 7 wanted to account for, both in the additions 14:30:56 8 that we've made to the ISS program as it's 14:30:56 9 extended and also in the existing EMSD lines, 14:30:56 10 the exploration lines. So the funding level 14:30:56 11 that we actually put in, as I said, all 14:30:56 12 scenarios except the program of record, which 14:30:56 13 we're using as a baseline, actually ramp from 14:30:56 14 250 million up to 750 million to help avoid 14:31:29 15 the double-counting that we think is in the 14:31:29 16 budget. 14:31:29 17 But the intent is to have a very 14:31:29 18 robust technology program that, in aggregate, 14:31:29 19 will be about 1.5 billion a year. Next. 14:31:29 20 For all of the scenarios that assume 14:31:29 21 Commercial Crew to LEO -- and you'll see that 14:31:29 22 that is, in fact, most of the scenarios 14:31:54 23 now -- we assume $2.5 billion in NASA 14:31:54 24 investment over the four years ranging from 14:31:54 25 FY '11 through '14. And that is to make sure 14:31:54 72 1 that, as Bo said, we have robust competition 14:31:54 2 in which all of those who are interested and 14:31:54 3 eligible to compete and to participate will. 14:32:17 4 We feel that this is very important. 14:32:17 5 We would like to be able to get NASA out of 14:32:17 6 the business of getting people to low Earth 14:32:17 7 orbit, and we think that if we're going to be 14:32:17 8 serious about this we have to put some money 14:32:17 9 into the budget to do that. So that line is 14:32:17 10 in every scenario where Commercial Crew to 14:32:17 11 LEO is foreseen. 14:32:43 12 MR. GREASON: Can I have one quick 14:32:43 13 one on that one, Sally? 14:32:43 14 DR. RIDE: Please. 14:32:43 15 MR. GREASON: That line item is 14:32:43 16 intended to be sufficiently large that 14:32:43 17 multiple well-funded competitors will come to 14:32:43 18 the table, so that we don't have to try to 14:32:43 19 pick the winner up front, we can use the 14:32:43 20 COTS-like model of funding several of them 14:32:43 21 and picking whichever ones wind up being 14:32:43 22 there. 14:32:43 23 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 14:32:43 24 MR. GREASON: So that's the reason 14:32:43 25 why that looks like a large number compared 14:32:43 73 1 to the cargo. 14:32:59 2 It also included a significant line 14:32:59 3 item for going through -- I hesitate to say 14:32:59 4 human rating but, you know, an enhanced 14:32:59 5 mission assurance process for some existing 14:32:59 6 booster that would be made available as one 14:32:59 7 of the options for all of the capsule 14:33:15 8 providers so that they don't have -- so that 14:33:15 9 even if we get new capsules but no new 14:33:15 10 booster, we still get the capability. 14:33:15 11 DR. RIDE: Thank you. 14:33:15 12 The next one is that we'd use 14:33:15 13 Aerospace's existing contract 14:33:29 14 termination/restart model and the actual 14:33:29 15 contract termination costs in the 14:33:29 16 Constellation programs. 14:33:29 17 The next one is that for all of the 14:33:29 18 scenarios that include refueling we're 14:33:29 19 assuming that the technology line actually 14:33:29 20 funds that development. So there's one 14:33:41 21 example of a technology that we would foresee 14:33:41 22 coming out of that technology line, and we 14:33:41 23 also add $1 billion, just a one-time infusion 14:33:41 24 to certify the fuel transfer kit. 14:33:58 25 The next one is that for all sorties 14:33:58 74 1 that are -- that assume the lunar -- sorry -- 14:33:58 2 for all scenarios that assume lunar sorties 14:33:58 3 and outposts we're actually using the 14:33:58 4 Constellation estimate for the Altair lander 14:33:58 5 and the lunar surface systems, just because 14:34:14 6 we didn't want to try to develop costs around 14:34:14 7 other systems. 14:34:14 8 For the Deep Space options we're 14:34:14 9 assuming a commercial lunar lander, but we're 14:34:14 10 assuming government-furnished ascent stage. 14:34:14 11 This is just to get -- just because when you 14:34:29 12 get to putting numbers into budget models, 14:34:29 13 you just have to specify a number for 14:34:29 14 everything. So we're trying to tell you the 14:34:29 15 work that we had to go through here. Next 14:34:29 16 slide. 14:34:41 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally, excuse me. 14:34:41 18 Where you said you used the Altair model, 14:34:41 19 that was adjusted, I assume, by Aerospace -- 14:34:41 20 DR. RIDE: Yes. 14:34:41 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- their factors? 14:34:41 22 DR. RIDE: Yes. And I'll get to that 14:34:41 23 in just a second. But thank you, Norm. 14:34:55 24 For all of the options that use 14:34:55 25 commercial heavy-lift launch vehicles, we're 14:34:55 75 1 costing them as if NASA doesn't build the 14:34:55 2 system. So this is a commercial buy, and we 14:35:13 3 use NASA infrastructure and the NASA 14:35:13 4 workforce only when it's required to conduct 14:35:13 5 the operations. And we'll have more on that 14:35:13 6 in a minute. 14:35:13 7 The next one is for a shuttle-derived 14:35:13 8 scenario. We're assuming sidemount costs, 14:35:34 9 but the Shuttle-Derived Systems scenario is 14:35:34 10 intended to be a surrogate for a sidemount 14:35:34 11 and an inline -- a very closely 14:35:34 12 shuttle-derived system. Again, we needed to 14:35:34 13 put in numbers from someplace and that's the 14:35:34 14 set of numbers that we put in, but it's a 14:35:34 15 surrogate. 14:35:53 16 As for the current program elements, 14:35:53 17 the shuttle and the station, for all 14:35:53 18 scenarios that envision the ISS de-orbiting 14:35:53 19 in 2016, we assumed an additional 14:35:53 20 $1.5 billion cost beyond what's currently in 14:35:53 21 NASA's budget for the decommissioning. That 14:36:08 22 is based on an independent Aerospace study 14:36:08 23 looking at -- a very quick study but looking 14:36:08 24 at an estimate of the order-of-magnitude job 14:36:08 25 that it would be to de-orbit this very large 14:36:25 76 1 and very impressive structure. 14:36:25 2 For any scenarios with -- that 14:36:25 3 contemplate just flying out the existing 14:36:25 4 shuttle manifest, as we have discussed, we're 14:36:25 5 assuming that it -- a more prudent fly-out 14:36:36 6 scenario that would take the current manifest 14:36:36 7 out to March of 2011. Next one. 14:36:36 8 MR. BEJMUK: Sally, may I? 14:36:45 9 DR. RIDE: Please. 14:36:45 10 MR. BEJMUK: You know, on this -- 14:36:45 11 just a question on this: For options using 14:36:45 12 EELV heavy-lift vehicles, cost as if NASA 14:36:53 13 does not build system and NASA infrastructure 14:36:53 14 and workforce only when required to conduct 14:36:58 15 the operations. 14:36:58 16 You know, NASA doesn't build today's 14:37:01 17 systems. NASA didn't build the previous 14:37:04 18 system. Contractors built it. I was one of 14:37:06 19 those guys, you know. So to say that this is 14:37:10 20 something new is really not all that 14:37:15 21 accurate. 14:37:15 22 NASA has always been the architect of 14:37:15 23 the system, has been a partner in the 14:37:20 24 design -- they had these so-called subsystem 14:37:25 25 engineers who were guys who knew, you know, 14:37:25 77 1 technical aspects of the various subsystems. 14:37:28 2 But the building of the vehicles was always 14:37:29 3 done by contractors. 14:37:32 4 So I'm just cautioning all of us so 14:37:33 5 we don't think like we are, like, creating 14:37:35 6 some kind of a drastically new scenario here. 14:37:41 7 I think we are talking about how you acquire 14:37:45 8 that same -- contractors will be building 14:37:49 9 things just like they always have in the 14:37:49 10 past. 14:37:53 11 DR. RIDE: You know, in part, that's 14:37:55 12 true. 14:37:57 13 MR. BEJMUK: We are buying it 14:37:57 14 differently. Is that correct? 14:37:57 15 DR. RIDE: We're buying differently. 14:37:58 16 And this was a shorthand to just say -- as is 14:37:59 17 going to hit us hard in the face in one of 14:38:04 18 these charts coming up later and we know that 14:38:07 19 you're going to comment on, Bo -- there's -- 14:38:13 20 we're doing one of these scenarios in a very 14:38:17 21 different buy model, and that is all that 14:38:20 22 we're trying to capture here -- was the 14:38:24 23 intent that we need to do -- that we have 14:38:26 24 done work around trying to identify what that 14:38:28 25 model is. So we're going to see the 14:38:30 78 1 implications of that model and more detail 14:38:37 2 about what we mean by it in -- I'm hoping 14:38:37 3 that I get pulled off of the stage before I 14:38:43 4 get to that one, but I don't think it's going 14:38:47 5 to happen. 14:38:50 6 DR. CHIAO: Sally, before you -- 14:38:50 7 DR. RIDE: Yes, please. 14:38:50 8 DR. CHIAO: -- jump into the numbers, 14:38:50 9 can I just -- you already kind of stated 14:38:52 10 it -- well, you stated it in your charts and 14:38:54 11 so did Ed, but I just wanted to make it clear 14:38:54 12 that in the options that we're -- or the 14:39:00 13 scenarios where we're talking about using 14:39:00 14 commercial for access to LEO, we're talking 14:39:00 15 about -- we're still going to use Orion for 14:39:05 16 exploration, but it's the -- the LEO vehicles 14:39:05 17 are the new ones that are going to be 14:39:13 18 developed. 14:39:13 19 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I think -- 14:39:13 20 DR. CHIAO: So I just wanted to make 14:39:13 21 sure that's clear. 14:39:13 22 DR. RIDE: Yeah. Thank you for that 14:39:28 23 clarification. 14:39:28 24 We'll see that Orion line in all of 14:39:28 25 the budget charts. But it's absolutely true 14:39:28 79 1 we're planning to use Orion as the 14:39:28 2 exploration vehicle, but Commercial Crew to 14:39:28 3 LEO would be with a commercial capsule and a 14:39:28 4 commercial -- and, you know, whatever the 14:39:28 5 commercial entities think is a good solution. 14:39:41 6 I should also probably -- before I 14:39:41 7 start talking to this first little reminder 14:39:41 8 of the budget situation chart -- that we've 14:39:41 9 got a whole variety of scenarios here. We've 14:39:57 10 talked about this before. Some of the 14:39:57 11 scenarios and some of the elements within the 14:39:57 12 different scenarios are much more mature than 14:39:57 13 others in terms of their definition, the 14:39:57 14 fidelity of their costing. 14:40:12 15 That's something that we had to deal 14:40:12 16 with head on and try to understand and try to 14:40:12 17 level the playing field. It's very difficult 14:40:12 18 to do when we're dealing with some things 14:40:12 19 that are close to reality and have at least 14:40:26 20 been through a preliminary design review and 14:40:26 21 other things that are -- as, I think, Ed has 14:40:26 22 certainly said, you know, it's like -- 14:40:26 23 they're like paper rockets. 14:40:26 24 So we spent a fair amount of time 14:40:38 25 trying to make sure that we were using a 14:40:38 80 1 level playing field, as level as we could 14:40:38 2 make it, in this assessment. 14:40:38 3 And I want to make it also clear that 14:40:38 4 all of these scenarios were handled by 14:40:38 5 Aerospace through their costing models using 14:40:52 6 the same formulation, the same methodology. 14:40:52 7 So we understand that there are risks in 14:40:52 8 comparing, you know, my rocket with your view 14:41:03 9 graphs, but that's -- you know, I want to 14:41:03 10 make the point that we tried as hard as we 14:41:03 11 could to level the playing field here and be 14:41:11 12 able to make reasonable comparisons. 14:41:11 13 So the chart that we've got up now is 14:41:20 14 actually -- it's a chart that you've seen 14:41:20 15 before. I showed it in Houston, I think. 14:41:20 16 And I think it's been shown at least one 14:41:28 17 other time. This is just a very quick 14:41:28 18 reminder of how we got to where we are. 14:41:28 19 The top line is the money that was 14:41:37 20 anticipated for the Constellation program 14:41:37 21 when the vision for space exploration was 14:41:37 22 adopted. You know, things happened over 14:41:43 23 time. 14:41:52 24 The second line was the FY '09 14:41:52 25 run-out of the budget for the exploration 14:41:52 81 1 program. 14:42:04 2 The Fiscal '10 budget that we are 14:42:04 3 asked to fit to is the third line down, the 14:42:04 4 orange line, and that shows you that quite 14:42:15 5 significant additional reductions were taken 14:42:15 6 just in going from the FY '09 budget to the 14:42:15 7 FY '10 budget. 14:42:22 8 And by the way, it's important to 14:42:22 9 remember, again, that the FY '10 budget 14:42:30 10 run-out assumes that ISS is de-orbited in 14:42:30 11 2016. So if you want to extend ISS, then the 14:42:39 12 money that you're presumably taking away from 14:42:39 13 the exploration program is also fairly 14:42:39 14 significant, and that's that green line. 14:42:50 15 So it's perhaps no surprise that 14:42:50 16 we're where we are. A program that was 14:42:50 17 envisioned to be funded at the top line on 14:42:50 18 that chart is now facing a budget at the 14:43:01 19 bottom line of the chart, and that's a 14:43:01 20 significant amount of money that's been taken 14:43:15 21 out of the entire program over a relatively 14:43:15 22 short period of time. 14:43:15 23 And if you just take a look at the 14:43:15 24 difference between the top line and the green 14:43:15 25 line right at the end of the chart, that's an 14:43:15 82 1 average of about $3 billion a year 14:43:33 2 difference. So it's not a small difference 14:43:33 3 that we're talking about. Next slide. 14:43:33 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally, because of the 14:43:33 5 amount of detail here, I think we better ask 14:43:33 6 questions as we go along, if that's all right 14:43:33 7 with you. 14:43:33 8 DR. RIDE: Please. Please. 14:43:57 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: The question I wanted 14:43:57 10 to ask -- and I've been chasing this, and 14:43:57 11 maybe you've got it nailed down. This top 14:43:57 12 line on anticipated funding, my question is 14:43:57 13 the authenticity of that line. 14:43:57 14 Was that a NASA want, or was that 14:43:57 15 something approved by the President and the 14:43:57 16 Congress? What's its authority? 14:43:57 17 DR. RIDE: You know, I have frankly 14:43:57 18 forgotten the answer to that question. 14:43:57 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Does anybody -- 14:43:57 20 DR. RIDE: I think that it is more 14:44:24 21 than NASA's ask, but it may be less than the 14:44:24 22 FY '06 budget. But the original funding for 14:44:24 23 the budget was quite a bit higher than the 14:44:24 24 FY '09 budget. 14:44:24 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: We need to nail that 14:44:24 83 1 down. 14:44:24 2 DR. RIDE: We do. We do. 14:44:24 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Sally, it's only a 14:44:24 4 little worse than this. Because I think that 14:44:52 5 at this point it's worth, once again, stating 14:44:52 6 that the numbers that we're going to show for 14:44:52 7 the budget are the analysis from the 14:44:52 8 Aerospace Corporation, which will include the 14:44:52 9 historical growth factors for cost over and 14:44:52 10 above the costs that have historically been 14:44:52 11 carried and reported by NASA in the program, 14:44:52 12 so that not only are we trying to fit under 14:44:52 13 the green line rather than -- well, even only 14:44:52 14 a few months ago under the red line -- but 14:45:19 15 that we're doing it with what we think are 14:45:19 16 much more historically valid maximum likely 14:45:19 17 estimated costs of the program. 14:45:19 18 DR. RIDE: I'll actually agree with 14:45:19 19 that but give NASA a little bit of credit 14:45:19 20 here. Because as you'll see, we've got a 14:45:19 21 case that somewhat serendipitously fits the 14:45:19 22 program of record to what we've called a less 14:45:43 23 constrained budget that, it turns out, is 14:45:43 24 actually rather similar to that top line and 14:45:43 25 it's pretty darn close to what NASA planned 14:45:43 84 1 the Constellation program to and the program 14:45:43 2 comes pretty close to performing as NASA 14:45:43 3 advertised it would even if that -- even with 14:46:06 4 that 1.5 historical risk put in. 14:46:06 5 So what that means is that NASA's 14:46:06 6 planning in the development of the -- the 14:46:06 7 development phase of the Constellation 14:46:06 8 program was actually pretty good. I think 14:46:06 9 that we've almost re-derived how they came up 14:46:06 10 with the costs that they came up with. And 14:46:06 11 we'll see that chart in a little while. 14:46:24 12 DR. CRAWLEY: But you understand that 14:46:24 13 I'm trying to emphasize this point because 14:46:24 14 there are some people in Washington -- for 14:46:24 15 example, the Congressional Budget Office -- 14:46:24 16 who have argued that there are historical 14:46:24 17 cost growths in NASA programs and that we 14:46:24 18 think that we've used an appropriate -- well, 14:46:24 19 we're trusting the input of the Aerospace 14:46:44 20 Corporation -- that we've used an appropriate 14:46:44 21 expectation multiple already in these 14:46:44 22 numbers. 14:46:44 23 DR. RIDE: Uh-huh. And it's not a 14:46:44 24 bad idea to take just another minute to talk 14:46:44 25 about that multiple. 14:46:44 85 1 You know, as I said, the 14:46:44 2 Congressional Budget Office did an assessment 14:46:44 3 of 77 NASA programs that ranged from, you 14:47:07 4 know, relatively small robotic programs up to 14:47:07 5 very large human programs and looked at the 14:47:07 6 average cost overrun and came up with this, 14:47:07 7 you know, factor of 1.5 to 1. And they also 14:47:07 8 looked at it from over the lifetime of the 14:47:07 9 program, the program from PDR until the end 14:47:07 10 of the program, the time from CDR to the end 14:47:35 11 of the program, et cetera. So it was a 14:47:35 12 reasonably complete analysis -- came up with 14:47:35 13 that 1.51. 14:47:35 14 I think the first question that 14:47:35 15 occurred to a lot of us was, well, wait a 14:47:35 16 minute, that included a lot of small robotics 14:47:35 17 programs, what would it look like if you did 14:47:35 18 it just with the human programs. And it 14:47:35 19 turns out that in that case it's a factor of 14:47:35 20 2, not a factor of 1.51. 14:47:35 21 So, you know, that made me believe 14:48:07 22 that, you know, the historical risk is 14:48:07 23 probably a very, very valuable thing to put 14:48:07 24 in. Because, you know, I think, as one of 14:48:07 25 our NASA colleagues said earlier, you know, 14:48:07 86 1 stuff happens and it just always does and 14:48:07 2 some of it you can plan for and some of you 14:48:07 3 put reserves in for but history shows that 14:48:07 4 that stuff gets you. 14:48:07 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: The problem, of 14:48:07 6 course, with this is that if you're a program 14:48:07 7 manager you're damned by your predecessors. 14:48:07 8 On the other hand, if you're going to 14:48:48 9 Las Vegas, this is the way to bet. 14:48:48 10 DR. RIDE: Yeah. That's right. And 14:48:48 11 I think that Wanda made the point, in seeing 14:48:48 12 this chart and talking about the 1.5 when we 14:48:48 13 were just having a brief discussion, that 14:48:48 14 often when this stuff happens, you know, you 14:48:48 15 might -- and you know stuff has just 14:48:48 16 happened, well, you might slip the 14:48:48 17 schedule or you might thin down the content a 14:48:48 18 little bit in order to meet the schedule. So 14:48:48 19 there are things that a program manager does 14:48:48 20 to try to manage this. 14:48:48 21 DR. AUSTIN: Sally, let me just add 14:49:22 22 one other point to that, which, I think, 14:49:22 23 we've touched on the past, which is it 14:49:22 24 doesn't do you a lot of good to get the 14:49:22 25 dollars later either, sort of adding more 14:49:22 87 1 dollars at the end, which is, you know, sort 14:49:22 2 of the argument that we get into, which is in 14:49:22 3 future years, you know, the money will be 14:49:22 4 there and we'll be able to execute that. 14:49:22 5 That's fraught with, you know, additional 14:49:22 6 risks and an additional costs in order to do 14:49:22 7 the program then in an un-optimum way. 14:49:22 8 DR. RIDE: Absolutely. 14:49:22 9 MR. McALISTER: One more thing to 14:49:22 10 add -- 14:49:22 11 DR. RIDE: Next slide. 14:49:22 12 MR. McALISTER: I'm sorry. 14:49:22 13 DR. RIDE: Go ahead. 14:49:22 14 MR. McALISTER: Norm, just to provide 14:49:22 15 a little bit of clarification on this top 14:49:22 16 line and why it's so difficult for you to get 14:49:55 17 that nailed down -- and I have to be very 14:49:55 18 careful when I speak here because the budget 14:49:55 19 is something that's -- there's a lot of 14:49:55 20 intense discussion about that. 14:49:55 21 But officially the President's budget 14:49:55 22 only goes out for five years. So when we got 14:49:55 23 the ESAS -- when NASA got the ESAS budget in 14:49:55 24 2004/2005, officially the only thing that was 14:49:55 25 agreed to by all parties was in that -- was 14:49:55 88 1 for a five-year period out to 2010. Beyond 14:49:55 2 that, it gets into assumptions, assumptions 14:49:55 3 of what the inflation rate is, assumptions of 14:49:55 4 what -- other factors that go into those 14:50:24 5 out-years, and it becomes -- and that sort of 14:50:24 6 gets negotiated at the staffer level. 14:50:24 7 So it's even inaccurate to say "the 14:50:24 8 President's budget request" and put a line 14:50:24 9 out that far. It's really just five years. 14:50:24 10 DR. RIDE: Sure. 14:50:24 11 MR. McALISTER: And then after that, 14:50:24 12 it becomes assumptions. So that's why it's 14:50:24 13 very difficult to answer that question 14:50:24 14 clearly. It's what we thought we had, what 14:50:24 15 parties thought they gave us and what was 14:50:24 16 agreed to. It's not really official except 14:50:24 17 that five-year budget. 14:50:24 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: But that's very bad 14:50:24 19 news. Because if in 2004 you had the next 14:50:24 20 five years, I would say in 2009 the only 14:50:56 21 thing you were assured of was the first point 14:50:56 22 on the blue line, which just about is where 14:50:56 23 the green line is today. So it says we're 14:50:56 24 just about where we were then. 14:50:56 25 MR. McALISTER: That's correct. 14:50:56 89 1 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 14:50:56 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: So everything above 14:50:56 3 that was wish list. 14:50:56 4 DR. RIDE: Yeah. Next slide. 14:50:56 5 Very quickly let me run through the 14:50:56 6 methodology that Aerospace used for, again, 14:50:56 7 all of the scenarios. They built up the 14:50:56 8 budget charts for a particular scenario. 14:51:24 9 They didn't constrain that -- didn't 14:51:24 10 constrain the budget. They just built up -- 14:51:24 11 build up the pieces. 14:51:24 12 Then in Step 2 they fit those 14:51:24 13 scenario costs to a given budget, perhaps the 14:51:24 14 FY '10 constrained budget that we were given 14:51:24 15 to work for, as an example, and they used 14:51:24 16 schedule as the independent variable and just 14:51:24 17 deterministically let the schedule fall where 14:51:24 18 it would. Then they allocated funding and 14:51:52 19 reserves to raise the total program costs to 14:51:52 20 about 60 percent -- 65 percent likelihood of 14:51:52 21 meeting that cost. 14:51:52 22 Then in Step 3 they went through 14:51:52 23 Monte Carlo analysis to take a look at the 14:51:52 24 impact of the technical historical risks -- 14:51:52 25 technical and historical risks on the actual 14:51:52 90 1 execution of this scenario. 14:51:52 2 And so that is how we got the results 14:52:21 3 that we've got. So next slide. 14:52:21 4 Let's start talking about budgets. 14:52:21 5 The first one we're going to take a look at 14:52:21 6 is the program of record. This is sort of 14:52:21 7 our derived baseline here. 14:52:21 8 This is the program of record, the 14:52:21 9 existing Constellation program, and its 14:52:21 10 budget. We're taking the realistic shuttle 14:52:46 11 fly-out to March 2011 because we just think 14:52:46 12 that that's a very prudent thing to do and 14:52:46 13 we're assuming ISS retirement in early 2016, 14:52:46 14 which the program of record assumes, and the 14:52:46 15 commercial and international engagement is as 14:52:46 16 it is in the current program. Next slide. 14:52:46 17 This is what it looks like. This is 14:53:08 18 the unconstrained budget. If I could see the 14:53:08 19 small print in each of those lines of sand, 14:53:08 20 I'd let you know what they are, but as you 14:53:08 21 can see, each different color represents an 14:53:08 22 element of the program. So the bottom light 14:53:08 23 green is Orion. I think the next one up is 14:53:28 24 Ares I. The next blue line up is Ares V. 14:53:28 25 Then I think we've got ground operations, 14:53:28 91 1 probably Altair next in the dark green, light 14:53:28 2 green... 14:53:28 3 Thank you, Leroy. 14:53:28 4 MR. McALISTER: Other Cx elements, 14:53:48 5 Lunar Surface systems in yellow and then 14:53:48 6 Other Non-CX elements in orange. 14:53:48 7 DR. RIDE: Thanks. 14:53:48 8 MR. McALISTER: And then you've got 14:53:48 9 the dark -- and towards the left is ISS. 14:53:48 10 Towards the left again is shuttle. 14:53:48 11 DR. RIDE: Right. And you'll see 14:53:48 12 that ISS -- that the shuttle extends only out 14:53:48 13 to 2011, and then there are some termination 14:53:48 14 retirement costs. ISS is terminated in early 14:54:03 15 2016. 14:54:03 16 So this is what all of the charts 14:54:03 17 that you're going to see are going to look 14:54:03 18 like. These are going to start blending 14:54:03 19 together after a while, but the format is 14:54:03 20 going to be consistent. I think even the 14:54:21 21 color scheme is consistent. The lines at the 14:54:21 22 top show particular milestones -- shuttle 14:54:21 23 retirement, ISS retirement. The red lines 14:54:21 24 are showing capabilities coming online. 14:54:21 25 So in the unconstrained budget, Orion 14:54:21 92 1 and Ares I, you know, arrive shortly after 14:54:38 2 ISS is de-orbited, and then you get human 14:54:38 3 lunar return in -- I think that's 2021. 14:54:38 4 Thank you, Leroy. 14:54:52 5 DR. CHIAO: You're welcome. 14:54:52 6 DR. RIDE: So this is in the 14:54:52 7 constrained budget. And then the thing to 14:54:52 8 look at is how much above the budget that we 14:54:52 9 are supposed to be fitting to it is. That 14:54:52 10 budget is the black dashed line that goes all 14:55:06 11 of the way across at roughly $9 billion a 14:55:06 12 year -- if you want to try to find that black 14:55:06 13 line. 14:55:06 14 So this shows you, in a given year, 14:55:06 15 how many billions of dollars over that budget 14:55:25 16 this unconstrained program of record would 14:55:25 17 be. Next slide. 14:55:25 18 MR. GREASON: Sally, before you move 14:55:25 19 on, this is a truly excellent slide to point 14:55:25 20 out graphically what we've talked about 14:55:25 21 verbally. 14:55:43 22 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 14:55:43 23 MR. GREASON: Which is the focus 14:55:43 24 tends to be very much on what do these 14:55:43 25 systems take to develop, but the really 14:55:43 93 1 dominant effect, as you look out at the right 14:55:43 2 part of the chart -- and you discover that we 14:55:43 3 are on a path right now for a system that 14:55:43 4 requires on the close order of double the 14:55:43 5 current budget just to operate. 14:55:43 6 DR. RIDE: Uh-huh. That's the 14:55:56 7 steady-state numbers. You see can you're 14:55:56 8 kind of approaching steady-state there out 14:55:56 9 in -- 14:55:56 10 MR. GREASON: Right. 14:55:56 11 DR. RIDE: -- 2028 or so, and that's 14:55:56 12 the operations. 14:55:56 13 MR. GREASON: If Santa Claus brought 14:55:56 14 us this system tomorrow fully developed and 14:56:07 15 the budget didn't change, our next action 14:56:07 16 would have to be to cancel it. 14:56:07 17 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 14:56:07 18 MR. McALISTER: And, Sally, could you 14:56:13 19 give us an estimate as to the integral 14:56:13 20 between the top line and the sort of dashed 14:56:13 21 line -- 14:56:17 22 DR. RIDE: Let's see. 14:56:17 23 MR. McALISTER: -- ballpark? 14:56:17 24 DR. RIDE: Leroy, is that -- 14:56:17 25 DR. CHIAO: 49. 14:56:17 94 1 DR. RIDE: Yeah. So it looks like 14:56:17 2 the integral FY '10 through '30 is 14:56:21 3 307 billion. 14:56:30 4 MR. McALISTER: No. Just above -- 14:56:32 5 what's just above the dashed line? 14:56:33 6 DR. RIDE: The dash -- 14:56:33 7 MR. McALISTER: What's the overages? 14:56:33 8 DR. RIDE: So the dash -- let's see. 14:56:34 9 The dash -- let me give you out through 2020, 14:56:34 10 because I know that, okay. 2020 the integral 14:56:37 11 under the dashed line is 99.2 billion. 14:56:42 12 MR. McALISTER: Okay. 14:56:42 13 DR. RIDE: That's not on the chart. 14:56:47 14 And then you can look here, the -- it's 149. 14:56:47 15 So it's 50 billion over out to 2020. 14:56:51 16 MR. McALISTER: Thank you. 14:56:54 17 DR. RIDE: Uh-huh. Next slide. 14:56:56 18 All right. This one is going to be 14:56:58 19 the fit of this program to the President's 14:57:01 20 budget. So, now, Aerospace is now doing 14:57:05 21 another set of runs that will essentially 14:57:09 22 squash and push to fit this program into the 14:57:13 23 budget that we have been asked to meet -- 14:57:17 24 that we've been asked to fit things to. So 14:57:19 25 we're still assuming the fly-out in twenty -- 14:57:24 95 1 March of '11, ISS retirement in 2016. Next 14:57:28 2 slide. 14:57:32 3 Okay. So that's what it looks like. 14:57:36 4 And, you know, it's a computer, so you can do 14:57:40 5 anything you want. You can actually make a 14:57:43 6 chart look like this that fits the budget, 14:57:48 7 but if you take a look at this budget, you 14:57:48 8 can see that there are a few things wrong 14:57:53 9 with it. 14:57:53 10 One is that you get, again, Orion and 14:57:53 11 Ares I capability of crew to LEO a couple of 14:57:59 12 years after ISS is gone. So there's nothing 14:57:59 13 for Ares I and Orion to go to. 14:58:07 14 You do get a heavy-lift out in 2028, 14:58:07 15 but you'll notice that there are no lunar 14:58:20 16 systems that have been developed. There was 14:58:20 17 not enough money to even start the lunar 14:58:20 18 systems. So you have a heavy-lift vehicle in 14:58:20 19 2028 but absolutely nothing to put in it to 14:58:31 20 send it to the Moon. 14:58:31 21 So this says it pretty well. You 14:58:31 22 cannot do this program on this budget. And 14:58:39 23 it's just back to Norm's basic message, you 14:58:39 24 know, if you want to do something, you have 14:58:45 25 to have the money to do it. 14:58:45 96 1 This chart and actually several of -- 14:58:49 2 as we started doing a lot of runs on a lot of 14:58:54 3 these different scenarios, we kept coming up 14:58:58 4 with a common theme, which was this budget is 14:59:00 5 very, very, very hard to fit within and still 14:59:04 6 have an exploration program. In fact, we are 14:59:10 7 still looking for an existence proof that we 14:59:13 8 can actually find one. So we haven't found 14:59:19 9 one yet, but we're still looking. We've only 14:59:22 10 been working on this for 160 hours. 14:59:27 11 Because of that, we decided that we 14:59:31 12 needed to ask a slightly different question. 14:59:31 13 We needed to say, well, what if we tried to 14:59:38 14 fit it to something that was a less 14:59:38 15 constrained budget. So next slide. 14:59:38 16 We tried to fit the program of record 14:59:47 17 to a less constrained budget. It's the same 14:59:47 18 thing. And go on to the next slide. 14:59:47 19 This is what we chose as the less 15:00:02 20 constrained budget. We had quite a 15:00:02 21 discussion about what budget line to choose. 15:00:02 22 We decided to kind of split the difference, 15:00:02 23 and we didn't want to make that budget line 15:00:02 24 too small, because then we were afraid that 15:00:23 25 we'd not be able to accomplish any 15:00:23 97 1 exploration. We didn't want to make it too 15:00:23 2 large because then we'd be just be laughed 15:00:23 3 off the stage. 15:00:23 4 So we chose the red line that you can 15:00:23 5 see there. It ramps up slowly to 3 billion a 15:00:23 6 year over the budget that we've been given, 15:00:23 7 and then it stays at a constant 3 billion a 15:00:50 8 year over that budget out until 2020. And 15:00:50 9 then we allow that red line to grow with 15:00:50 10 inflation at a rate of 2.4 percent per year. 15:00:50 11 Now, that's important because the run-out 15:00:50 12 budget that we've been given grows at 15:00:50 13 inflation -- at an inflation rate of only 15:00:50 14 1.4 percent per year all of the way out to 15:00:50 15 2030. 15:01:16 16 You can immediately understand the 15:01:16 17 problems that the program is in trying to fit 15:01:16 18 that budget. Every year you go, you have 15:01:16 19 less buying power than you had the year 15:01:16 20 before if inflation was actually greater than 15:01:16 21 1.4 percent. Next slide. 15:01:16 22 So this is the Constellation program, 15:01:16 23 the program of record, fit to the less 15:01:16 24 constrained budget. And this one, it -- you 15:01:16 25 know, again, this is a computer, so you can 15:01:46 98 1 always fit these things into whatever budget 15:01:46 2 you want hand the schedule kind of falls out. 15:01:46 3 And this turns out to be a fairly 15:01:46 4 reasonable program. Ares I and Orion arrive 15:01:46 5 in late 2016. That's not too much of a 15:01:46 6 delay. It's after ISS has been de-orbited. 15:01:46 7 So, again, there's nothing for them to 15:01:46 8 service, but they're there not too far behind 15:02:14 9 schedule. 15:02:14 10 You get human lunar return in 2025. 15:02:14 11 And, now, this is the chart that you can use 15:02:14 12 to envision -- it turns out that that red 15:02:14 13 line is pretty close to the envisioned 15:02:14 14 ESAS -- the envisioned program at the time of 15:02:14 15 the vision for space exploration. So this is 15:02:14 16 fairly close to the budget that Constellation 15:02:14 17 thought it was going to have. You know, at 15:02:39 18 least a first order, it's within that. 15:02:39 19 And if you think we're kind of almost 15:02:39 20 five years beyond that and this slips human 15:02:39 21 lunar return almost five years, you can see 15:02:39 22 that the Constellation program did a pretty 15:02:39 23 reasonable job of projecting and estimating 15:02:39 24 with the budget that they were working under. 15:02:39 25 Next slide. 15:03:02 99 1 So that's the program of record and 15:03:02 2 what it looks like. 15:03:02 3 Now I want to talk about some of the 15:03:02 4 new scenarios. 15:03:02 5 And I think that -- you know, that 15:03:02 6 fitting the program of record to the FY '10 15:03:02 7 President's budget and the run-out guidance 15:03:02 8 that we've been given that shows you -- 15:03:02 9 again, that's the "why are we here" slide. 15:03:02 10 That's the "what's the reason for this 15:03:28 11 committee." You know, the program of record 15:03:28 12 doesn't fit under the current budget. So we 15:03:28 13 have to be looking at different scenarios. 15:03:28 14 So now let's start looking at some of 15:03:28 15 the scenarios that Ed has described. For all 15:03:28 16 of these scenarios that follow, we added the 15:03:28 17 technology line that I described, we added 15:03:28 18 the initial -- the additional $200 million 15:03:28 19 for COTS cargo that I described. All that 15:03:56 20 envisioned Commercial Crew to LEO, we've 15:03:56 21 added the 2.5 billion between '11 and '14. 15:03:56 22 The next set of scenarios are the 15:03:56 23 ones that we thought actually had a chance to 15:03:56 24 fit under the constrained budget, the FY '10 15:03:56 25 budget. So these are the ones that on Ed's 15:04:23 100 1 chart showed fit to the FY '10 budget. Those 15:04:23 2 two are the ISS -- the ones we called 15:04:23 3 ISS Focused and the one we called Dash Out of 15:04:23 4 LEO. 15:04:23 5 Now, again, all of these have gone 15:04:23 6 through the same assessment process by 15:04:23 7 Aerospace Corporation using the methodology 15:04:23 8 that I just very briefly outlined and working 15:04:23 9 with the NASA teams to get the costing of the 15:04:23 10 elements and the assumptions. Next one. 15:04:57 11 So first let's look at ISS Focused. 15:04:57 12 This is with Commercial Crew to LEO. 15:04:57 13 I should say that we first ran this 15:04:57 14 case assuming Ares I, and it -- under these 15:04:57 15 budget constraints, it was not able to get to 15:04:57 16 ISS and service ISS until about a year left 15:04:57 17 in its life. So I don't remember what year 15:04:57 18 it came in. It might have been 2019 or so 15:04:57 19 with an ISS extension out to 2020. 15:05:30 20 It was very obvious with the first 15:05:30 21 run that the Ares I in this -- as part of 15:05:30 22 this scenario just didn't work, and so we 15:05:30 23 switched over to the commercial -- not 15:05:30 24 switched over. We were going to do that 15:05:30 25 anyway, but we -- we're just showing the 15:05:30 101 1 Commercial Crew to LEO. 15:05:30 2 So this scenario, we just -- our 15:05:30 3 focus is primarily on ISS in this decade, fit 15:05:30 4 to the FY '10 budget, shuttle fly-out in 15:05:30 5 March '11, ISS is extended into 2020 and 15:06:10 6 we're trying to foster the commercial and 15:06:10 7 international engagement. We haven't taken 15:06:10 8 any credits for international participation, 15:06:10 9 but you -- but we did put the money in for 15:06:10 10 Commercial Crew to LEO. Next slide. 15:06:10 11 This is what it looks like when it's 15:06:10 12 constrained to budget. 15:06:10 13 I've actually got these. Thanks. 15:06:10 14 So it fits. The commercial crew we 15:06:10 15 have getting there in mid 2016 to support 15:06:10 16 ISS. You need to buy a couple of extra Soyuz 15:06:10 17 flights to make up that time. But the 15:06:52 18 Commercial Crew to LEO can support ISS. This 15:06:52 19 does include the technology program. 15:06:52 20 But look at what happens to 15:06:52 21 exploration in this. We tried to keep 15:06:52 22 some -- I mean, the whole point of our work 15:06:52 23 is to try to develop a strategy for human 15:06:52 24 exploration, and so we did not want to just 15:06:52 25 throw away exploration but see what happened 15:06:52 102 1 to it in this scenario. And it essentially 15:06:52 2 disappears. 15:06:52 3 You get Ares V and Orion in 2028. So 15:06:52 4 you get a heavy lifter, but you, again, were 15:07:32 5 unable to afford even starting the lunar 15:07:32 6 surface systems. So, again, if you're 15:07:32 7 willing to wait until 2028, you've got a 15:07:32 8 heavy-lift vehicle, but you've got nothing to 15:07:32 9 lift. 15:07:32 10 Because of this problem with this 15:07:32 11 particular scenario, you know, we just didn't 15:07:32 12 like this. This is a don't do anything 15:07:32 13 different and don't -- you know, don't start 15:07:32 14 an exploration because it doesn't make sense. 15:07:32 15 You'd never design a program this way. 15:07:32 16 We actually decided to look at this 15:07:32 17 scenario under the less constrained case, the 15:07:32 18 different budget that I described. So that's 15:07:32 19 the next slide. 15:08:13 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Sally? 15:08:13 21 DR. RIDE: Yes. 15:08:13 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Before you leave this, 15:08:13 23 I think this chart -- just another way of 15:08:13 24 saying what you just said about you really 15:08:13 25 wouldn't do this is to look at the blue slug 15:08:13 103 1 in the next decade. 15:08:13 2 Although there's a broad political 15:08:13 3 consensus, I think, around town and there's, 15:08:13 4 I think, some consensus on our panel that 15:08:13 5 there are various reasons why it's desirable 15:08:13 6 to extend the ISS, if you try and do it 15:08:13 7 within this budget, it essentially is the 15:08:13 8 budget, other than the other sustaining 15:08:13 9 engineering functions of NASA, for the next 15:08:13 10 decade. 15:08:13 11 DR. RIDE: Yeah. You know, that's -- 15:08:13 12 you know, that is probably about a third of 15:08:46 13 the budget actually, although we may have 15:08:46 14 squashed it and squished it a little bit, 15:08:46 15 but, you know, it's -- you know, in our 15:08:46 16 scenarios, if you think of it as about 15:08:46 17 3 billion a year plus a little bit extra for 15:08:46 18 transportation. 15:08:46 19 DR. CRAWLEY: So let me be more 15:08:46 20 precise, which is that the combination of the 15:08:46 21 keeping alive of the NASA infrastructure and 15:08:46 22 the operation of the ISS -- 15:08:46 23 DR. RIDE: Yes. 15:08:46 24 DR. CRAWLEY: -- essentially eats up 15:08:46 25 the budget -- 15:08:46 104 1 DR. RIDE: Yes. 15:08:46 2 DR. CRAWLEY: -- for the decade. 15:08:46 3 DR. RIDE: Yes. That's right. 15:09:17 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Can I footnote that. 15:09:17 5 I think I feel as strongly as the other 15:09:17 6 members of the group do that technology 15:09:17 7 development is critical. But have we 15:09:17 8 increased it so much and so fast that we're 15:09:17 9 eating up all of the other options? I guess 15:09:17 10 I'm talking about the size, not the 15:09:17 11 principal. 15:09:17 12 MR. GREASON: I don't think the thing 15:09:17 13 that's eating up all of the other options is 15:09:17 14 the technology budget. 15:09:17 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: No -- 15:09:17 16 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:09:17 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- but it's helping 15:09:17 18 it. If you look at this -- if you cut the 15:09:49 19 technology budget in half, you still have 15:09:49 20 three quarters of a billion dollars. 15:09:49 21 MR. GREASON: Well, not really. 15:09:49 22 DR. RIDE: No. The line in here 15:09:49 23 is -- 15:09:49 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, you've got the 15:09:49 25 other half up in the ISS, so it's really 15:09:49 105 1 three quarters. 15:09:49 2 DR. CRAWLEY: That's right. Yeah. I 15:09:49 3 mean, we're only actually -- in this budget 15:09:49 4 exercise, only pricing the billion and a half 15:09:49 5 dollar technology program at three quarters 15:09:49 6 of a million. 15:09:49 7 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:09:49 8 DR. CRAWLEY: At three quarters of a 15:09:49 9 billion. 15:09:49 10 DR. RIDE: Three quarters of a 15:09:49 11 billion, right. 15:09:49 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: But, you know, I 15:09:49 13 strongly support the point here, but I guess 15:09:49 14 I'm trying to be the devil's advocate. If I 15:09:49 15 were a green eyeshade person, I'd look at 15:09:49 16 that big blue spot there and say you're goal 15:09:49 17 watching me here. 15:10:14 18 MR. GREASON: Well, let me frame the 15:10:14 19 question. Let me frame the choices -- the 15:10:14 20 policy choices. And this is a theme that's 15:10:14 21 going to recur several times. 15:10:14 22 You know, if you don't like what 15:10:14 23 you're doing -- if you don't like what you're 15:10:14 24 getting for your money, you can either spend 15:10:14 25 more money or you can change the price of 15:10:14 106 1 things over time, which is essentially what 15:10:34 2 research and development is about, or you can 15:10:34 3 turn some other things off, and the other 15:10:34 4 things are the other 60 percent of the 15:10:34 5 budget, the various fixed costs. Those are 15:10:34 6 your choices. 15:10:46 7 And so if you don't invest in 15:10:46 8 technology and you don't like today's picture 15:10:46 9 and you don't turn anything off, then when 15:10:46 10 the next commission gets up ten years from 15:10:46 11 now -- 15:10:55 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: I've been there, done 15:10:55 13 that. 15:10:55 14 MR. GREASON: -- the situation won't 15:10:55 15 have changed. 15:10:55 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Don't do that to me. 15:10:55 17 DR. CRAWLEY: But Jeff is still 15:11:05 18 young, so... 15:11:05 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah, the Greason 15:11:05 20 commission in 2019. 15:11:05 21 Okay. I give up. 15:11:09 22 MR. McALISTER: Well, but there are 15:11:09 23 hybrids to each one of these options, of 15:11:09 24 course, Norm, that you could run. We picked 15:11:14 25 these -- or they were picked because they 15:11:14 107 1 were representative differentiationable -- if 15:11:18 2 that's a word -- but certainly there's some 15:11:18 3 tweaks and hybrids that you could generate on 15:11:19 4 a lot of these. 15:11:20 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. I just wanted 15:11:22 6 to make that point. 15:11:23 7 So, Sally, please... 15:11:25 8 DR. RIDE: Next slide. So this is 15:11:26 9 fitting the same ISS Focused/Commercial Crew 15:11:29 10 to LEO to the less constrained budget, and 15:11:32 11 here you actually can begin to fund the lunar 15:11:36 12 surface programs. 15:11:42 13 Again, we're not saying that this is 15:11:44 14 exactly how you would run this program, but 15:11:47 15 we've got a bit of an existence proof here 15:11:48 16 that at least within this budget, you know, 15:11:51 17 you can get back to the Moon by, in this 15:11:54 18 case, 2030. You get Orion and the heavy 15:11:57 19 lifter in about 2020 -- 2023. 15:12:02 20 As I think, you know, Phil just 15:12:06 21 mentioned, you know, you can do the mixing 15:12:08 22 and matching here. We just kind of matched 15:12:09 23 this ISS Focused to, you know, kind of a -- 15:12:15 24 almost a program of record, sort of a 15:12:16 25 lunar -- not program of record but a lunar 15:12:20 108 1 sortie/outpost ending. If you wanted it to 15:12:25 2 be a little bit less expensive and maybe do a 15:12:30 3 little bit more in the decade of the '20s, 15:12:30 4 you might match it up with the Deep Space 15:12:30 5 option, which we'll see is a little bit more 15:12:36 6 cost effective. Okay. Next one. 15:12:36 7 Let's go on to Dash Out of LEO. 15:12:39 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally, before you 15:12:43 9 leave ISS -- I'm sorry -- I've got one more. 15:12:43 10 I'm trying to nail down exactly what the ISS 15:12:47 11 cost is. 15:12:47 12 On your Chart No. 7, as I do an 15:12:47 13 optical integration under that, it looks like 15:12:50 14 it's about 10 billion whereas -- or 15:12:52 15 9 billion. We said it was 14-. 15:12:54 16 Can we call up Chart 7 and see if 15:12:57 17 there's something wrong with it or if I just 15:13:00 18 can't integrate? 15:13:03 19 DR. RIDE: Which -- 15:13:03 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: The difference 15:13:05 21 between the orange and the green -- there it 15:13:09 22 is. The difference between the orange and 15:13:05 23 the green line looks like it's around 15:13:10 24 9 billion. 15:13:14 25 DR. CRAWLEY: This is the difference 15:13:16 109 1 between before and after the 1.5 and the 15:13:16 2 difference between then year and constant 15:13:16 3 year. 15:13:16 4 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:13:20 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Say that again. 15:13:20 6 MR. McALISTER: In English. 15:13:22 7 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm sorry. This curve, 15:13:22 8 which was drawn some time ago, would have put 15:13:26 9 in the factors in un-inflated dollars -- 15:13:29 10 DR. RIDE: That's right. 15:13:29 11 DR. CRAWLEY: -- and at a minimum, 15:13:34 12 the one that Sally just showed is in inflated 15:13:35 13 dollars. 15:13:40 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: For ISS extension. 15:13:40 15 DR. CRAWLEY: And we would have to go 15:13:43 16 back and look at what historical risk factor 15:13:43 17 was assigned to the ISS in the out-years. 15:13:46 18 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:13:53 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: So we need to update 15:13:53 20 this chart. 15:13:53 21 MR. GREASON: No. 15:13:53 22 DR. RIDE: Well, it's a historical 15:13:53 23 chart. 15:13:53 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, the ISS 15:13:53 25 extension wouldn't be a historical chart. 15:14:00 110 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. To be consistent, 15:14:00 2 the subsequent data, we would -- 15:14:00 3 DR. RIDE: You know, I think that 15:14:00 4 this was probably just done assuming ISS at 15:14:00 5 the current kind of very minimal utilization 15:14:09 6 level, which I believe that we've agreed 15:14:11 7 in -- 15:14:11 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 15:14:11 9 DR. RIDE: -- previous meetings -- 15:14:14 10 is, if you're going to keep running this 15:14:15 11 thing, you don't want to run it at this -- at 15:14:18 12 the level where it can't actually do 15:14:20 13 anything. You want to increase the 15:14:24 14 utilization by a few hundred million a year. 15:14:24 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think it's a 15:14:27 16 poor -- the other numbers, I think, have done 15:14:27 17 it correctly, right, with the one and a half 15:14:31 18 and all, but here the situation is much worse 15:14:31 19 than this summary chart makes it look really. 15:14:35 20 DR. CRAWLEY: It's the danger of 15:14:37 21 trying to show an expense on a budget 15:14:37 22 chart -- 15:14:37 23 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:14:37 24 DR. CRAWLEY: -- which is what we 15:14:38 25 tried to do. 15:14:38 111 1 DR. RIDE: Yeah. It's true. 15:14:47 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, let's update 15:14:47 3 that line. 15:14:50 4 DR. RIDE: Okay. 15:14:50 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Got it. Thank you. 15:14:50 6 DR. RIDE: Okay. Let's see. Can we 15:14:50 7 go back to... 15:15:01 8 Thank you. 15:15:01 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think you were on 15:15:01 10 19 or 20. 15:15:01 11 DR. CHIAO: 20, I think. 15:15:01 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: 20. 15:15:01 13 DR. RIDE: All right. Good. So Dash 15:15:01 14 Out of LEO was our other hope for matching 15:15:14 15 the constrained budget -- staying within the 15:15:14 16 constrained budget. 15:15:14 17 The point here was to get to -- get 15:15:14 18 out of low Earth orbit as soon as possible 15:15:23 19 and actually make it somewhere. We used the 15:15:23 20 Deep Space option as our destination -- set 15:15:29 21 of destinations. Again, we've got the 15:15:29 22 shuttle fly-out in March of 2011, ISS 15:15:32 23 de-orbit in early 2016. So all of our money 15:15:39 24 here is going to exploration as soon as 15:15:43 25 possible. And we've moved out the lunar 15:15:43 112 1 surface program a little bit in the future on 15:15:49 2 this one. Next slide. 15:15:49 3 Okay. So this is what the Dash Out 15:15:55 4 of LEO looks like. And we've actually now 15:16:00 5 renamed this, and we have our favorites. 15:16:04 6 When we first started the runs, I thought 15:16:09 7 that this looked more like a saunter out of 15:16:11 8 LEO. Then as we looked at it more closely, 15:16:15 9 it turns out that it's much more of a trudge 15:16:19 10 out of LEO. You essentially don't get -- you 15:16:19 11 know, you just don't get there. 15:16:21 12 You know, the message is you get the 15:16:23 13 heavy-lift vehicle in 2028 but, you know, you 15:16:27 14 just -- you lose the ability to make it even 15:16:34 15 to a near Earth orbit, you use the lunar 15:16:37 16 lander. So you just -- you know, you thought 15:17:01 17 you were designing something that would put 15:17:01 18 all of your efforts on getting out of low 15:17:01 19 Earth orbit. But, again, I think here's 15:17:01 20 where Jeff would make the point that the 15:17:01 21 fixed costs -- the carrying costs of just -- 15:17:01 22 you know, of the infrastructure that you've 15:17:18 23 got are kind of killing you and keeping you 15:17:18 24 from really getting going and developing the 15:17:18 25 systems that you need. 15:17:18 113 1 Now, again, we didn't try to optimize 15:17:18 2 this. We've only had time to iterate these a 15:17:18 3 certain number of times, but you don't have 15:17:34 4 to look too long to say you just would not 15:17:34 5 run a program this way, that this budget is 15:17:34 6 simply not friendly to exploration. And it's 15:17:34 7 actually very, very difficult to -- as I said 15:17:52 8 at the beginning of these, it's very 15:17:52 9 difficult to find an exploration scenario 15:17:52 10 that actually fits within this very 15:17:52 11 restrictive budget guidance that we've been 15:17:52 12 given. 15:17:52 13 MR. McALISTER: And, Sally, for the 15:17:52 14 public, could you just mention why there's 15:18:05 15 some dips and some overage on this chart? I 15:18:05 16 mean, this one is constrained to the 15:18:05 17 budget -- 15:18:05 18 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:18:05 19 MR. McALISTER: -- if people are 15:18:05 20 wondering. 15:18:05 21 DR. RIDE: Yeah. This is a little 15:18:05 22 bit -- this was a chart that we could get to 15:18:05 23 fit a little bit better given one -- given 15:18:23 24 time to do a little bit more tweaking. So 15:18:23 25 the process that goes on here is you first do 15:18:23 114 1 the unconstrained case and then you go in by 15:18:23 2 hand and you start moving things around to 15:18:23 3 match the peaks and then you do the run again 15:18:23 4 and you see where everything falls out. And 15:18:41 5 in some cases, it's relatively easy to match 15:18:41 6 perfectly. In other cases, when you've got 15:18:41 7 programs starting and stopping and peaks 15:18:41 8 start happening at about the same time, it's 15:18:41 9 a little bit harder. So that's just what's 15:18:41 10 happening in this case. 15:18:41 11 I think it's -- in some cases -- in 15:18:41 12 fact, this may be the case where -- you see 15:19:01 13 the -- where it dips below the line actually 15:19:01 14 twice, there we're kind of building up 15:19:01 15 reserves in some of the heavy-lift and beyond 15:19:01 16 LEO programs, because there's not quite 15:19:01 17 enough money to start them. And so the 15:19:01 18 reserves, just in the model, carry over to 15:19:01 19 the next year until you can use them, and 15:19:26 20 then they carry over again until the next -- 15:19:26 21 in the next year until you can use them. And 15:19:26 22 that's kind of -- I think that that bump 15:19:26 23 there is actually an artifact of reserves 15:19:26 24 bumping over. 15:19:26 25 So we could -- you know, we could 15:19:26 115 1 work harder and flatten this one to actually 15:19:26 2 constrain to the budget, but, you know, it's 15:19:26 3 just not worth the effort. As I said, you 15:19:26 4 would not run your program this way. You'd 15:19:54 5 go back and you'd rethink your whole program 15:19:54 6 before you tried to optimize this one. 15:19:54 7 MR. BEJMUK: Sally, does this -- in 15:19:54 8 this scenario -- and I think maybe Ed wants 15:19:54 9 to answer this. Are we using dual Ares for 15:19:54 10 this Dash Out of LEO or a single Ares V Lite? 15:19:54 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Dual. 15:19:54 12 DR. RIDE: Dual. Yeah. It's dual. 15:19:54 13 MR. BEJMUK: Why are we using dual? 15:19:54 14 We don't have a lander, do we? 15:20:24 15 DR. RIDE: But, you know, you choose 15:20:24 16 your heavy-lift vehicle. 15:20:24 17 DR. CRAWLEY: No. The rationale here 15:20:24 18 was to examine how much progress you could 15:20:24 19 make towards exploration -- 15:20:24 20 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:20:24 21 DR. CRAWLEY: -- beyond LEO retiring 15:20:24 22 the space station at the earliest practical 15:20:24 23 time and using the simplest systems that you 15:20:24 24 could use to get out of LEO. 15:20:24 25 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:20:24 116 1 DR. CRAWLEY: So that we retire the 15:20:24 2 space station at '15, we don't build the 15:20:24 3 Orion -- the Ares I -- 15:20:45 4 DR. RIDE: That's right. 15:20:45 5 DR. CRAWLEY: -- and we focus on 15:20:45 6 building the Ares V and we don't build the 15:20:45 7 lunar surface systems and the lunar lander 15:20:45 8 and, instead, we build the -- what's it 15:20:45 9 called -- in-space -- 15:20:45 10 DR. RIDE: Yeah. The in-space -- 15:20:45 11 DR. CRAWLEY: -- in-space elements -- 15:20:45 12 DR. RIDE: Yeah. In-space 15:20:45 13 elements -- 15:20:45 14 DR. CRAWLEY: -- and we still 15:20:45 15 don't -- 15:20:45 16 DR. RIDE: -- in-space habitat. 15:20:45 17 DR. CRAWLEY: -- and we still don't 15:20:45 18 get anywhere until the end of the next 15:21:12 19 decade. 15:21:12 20 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:21:12 21 MR. BEJMUK: Well, do you think -- 15:21:12 22 would your dashing be a little more graceful 15:21:12 23 if you use a single rocket in this case? 15:21:12 24 DR. CRAWLEY: We do use a single 15:21:12 25 rocket. 15:21:12 117 1 DR. RIDE: We do use a single -- 15:21:12 2 MR. BEJMUK: Well, that's why I asked 15:21:12 3 is it dual -- 15:21:12 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. 15:21:12 5 MR. BEJMUK: -- or is it single. 15:21:12 6 MR. McALISTER: It's a dual Ares V 15:21:12 7 rocket. That's what we priced in this one, 15:21:12 8 the Ares V rocket. 15:21:12 9 MR. BEJMUK: Two rockets or one 15:21:12 10 rocket? 15:21:12 11 MR. McALISTER: One rocket, two 15:21:12 12 launches for the mission. 15:21:12 13 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:21:12 14 DR. CRAWLEY: No. Actually we should 15:21:12 15 be careful that if -- the term is dual Ares V 15:21:12 16 because it's a dual launch when used for a 15:21:12 17 lunar piloted mission -- 15:21:12 18 MR. BEJMUK: I understand. 15:21:12 19 DR. CRAWLEY: -- but actually in 15:21:46 20 those missions, which don't yet actually 15:21:46 21 start beginning until just after the curve, 15:21:46 22 for many of them -- 15:21:46 23 DR. RIDE: Just one. 15:21:46 24 DR. CRAWLEY: -- you actually only 15:21:46 25 use a single launch. 15:21:46 118 1 MR. BEJMUK: A single launch? 15:21:46 2 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:21:46 3 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 15:21:46 4 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:21:46 5 MR. BEJMUK: That makes sense. 15:21:46 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris, you had a 15:21:46 7 question? 15:21:46 8 DR. CHYBA: It's really a comment. 15:21:46 9 You know, this really looks like a lot like 15:21:46 10 the program of record fit to the FY '10 15:21:46 11 budget. You give up Ares I and you get 15:21:46 12 technology development beyond LEO capability, 15:21:46 13 but you get your heavy lift online at the 15:21:46 14 same time you retire the station. 15:21:46 15 I mean, it's comforting that the 15:21:46 16 result is about the same. To fit within the 15:21:46 17 FY '10 budget, you don't do anything before 15:22:20 18 2028. 15:22:20 19 DR. RIDE: Yeah. And there really is 15:22:20 20 a consistent message that comes out of these 15:22:20 21 scenarios. And, as you said, I mean, it is a 15:22:20 22 little bit comforting. 15:22:20 23 DR. CHYBA: So to speak. 15:22:20 24 DR. RIDE: Yeah. So to speak. 15:22:20 25 Interesting choice of words. 15:22:20 119 1 MR. GREASON: Consistently bad. 15:22:20 2 DR. RIDE: Yeah. Next slide. 15:22:20 3 All right. So the summary for 15:22:20 4 constrained cases, we've already said this, 15:22:20 5 but the current budget guidance is very, 15:22:20 6 very, very limiting. And so far we haven't 15:22:20 7 found a scenario that includes exploration 15:22:20 8 that's viable. That's not to say that it's 15:22:54 9 not out there, but we haven't been able to 15:22:54 10 find it yet. 15:22:54 11 The ISS Focused, Ares I arrives too 15:22:54 12 late for the ISS, Commercial Crew to LEO can 15:22:54 13 support the ISS but the Ares V arrives in 15:22:54 14 2028 with no lunar surface systems. 15:22:54 15 The Dash Out of LEO, it isn't -- the 15:22:54 16 heavy-lift capabilities arrive in 2028, you 15:22:54 17 know, so you can start doing missions with 15:22:54 18 one launch, as Bo said, you know, in 2030 or 15:23:24 19 so. Next slide. 15:23:24 20 Okay. So moving on, we're going to 15:23:24 21 look at the next set, but with that 15:23:24 22 background, it's very clear that the next set 15:23:24 23 of options are -- don't have a chance of 15:23:24 24 fitting into the constrained budget. They're 15:23:24 25 going to look only worse than these ones that 15:23:24 120 1 we thought had at least, you know, some 15:23:24 2 possibility. So for all of this next set, we 15:23:54 3 looked at the less constrained case, that red 15:23:54 4 budget line that I described a little while 15:23:54 5 ago. 15:23:54 6 So the scenarios that we're looking 15:23:54 7 at are the Deep Space scenarios. We've got 15:23:54 8 three different variants of this 15:23:54 9 corresponding to three different heavy-lift 15:23:54 10 options -- Lunar Global, the Use Shuttle 15:23:54 11 Systems, which is close the gap -- and, Norm, 15:24:21 12 that's kind of your blue plate special -- and 15:24:21 13 Mars First. Next slide. 15:24:21 14 So moving into the Deep Space, the 15:24:21 15 assumptions are pretty much what we've been 15:24:21 16 seeing -- shuttle fly-out in March 2011, ISS 15:24:21 17 extended -- and in all of these scenarios, 15:24:43 18 you'll see that ISS is extended. We're using 15:24:43 19 dual Ares Lite vehicles in this. We've got 15:24:43 20 the technology development line. We're using 15:24:43 21 Commercial Crew to LEO, and our destinations 15:24:43 22 are Lagrange points, near Earth asteroids, 15:24:43 23 aiming at flybys -- a Mars flyby. We've 15:24:57 24 deferred the lunar lander and lunar systems 15:24:57 25 in this case, but that's not to say that this 15:24:57 121 1 architecture doesn't allow the lunar lander 15:24:57 2 and the lunar systems. They're just 15:25:16 3 deferred. And we would envision the lunar 15:25:16 4 lander and lunar systems being a combination 15:25:16 5 of commercial and government. Next slide. 15:25:16 6 This is what this one looks like in 15:25:16 7 the less constrained case. These are 15:25:16 8 starting to look a little better. This is 15:25:16 9 the case of the dual Ares V. You actually 15:25:36 10 have some destinations in the 2020's. You 15:25:36 11 make it to a Lagrange point in 2025, a near 15:25:36 12 Earth asteroid in 2030. You can do a Mars 15:25:36 13 flyby by 2034, and human lunar return 15:25:36 14 closes -- in this case you can actually do 15:25:53 15 it -- and you can do that in 2035. 15:25:53 16 So any questions on this case? This 15:25:53 17 just -- you know, you could almost 15:25:53 18 undoubtedly do some optimization around any 15:26:04 19 of these, but with the dual Ares V, this is 15:26:04 20 what this -- and this budget on the order of 15:26:04 21 3 billion a year above the budget guidance -- 15:26:11 22 ramping up to that but on that order in the 15:26:16 23 out-years, this is what you can achieve. 15:26:16 24 MR. GREASON: Sally? 15:26:22 25 DR. RIDE: Yes. 15:26:22 122 1 MR. GREASON: Since I haven't seen 15:26:23 2 the adjusted manifest for this yet, do you 15:26:25 3 have some idea of kind of what's the pace of 15:26:28 4 missions? I mean, are you doing a mission 15:26:28 5 every other year or every third year? 15:26:32 6 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I think it actually 15:26:35 7 comes out to about every other year. It 15:26:35 8 depends a little bit on the missions, as you 15:26:40 9 know. I haven't seen how the -- I haven't 15:26:44 10 seen the detailed manifest yet, but it's -- 15:26:44 11 you know, once you get going, you can roughly 15:26:55 12 follow the manifest. Next slide. 15:26:55 13 Now we're moving on to the directly 15:27:04 14 shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicle. This is 15:27:08 15 about a 100-metric-ton vehicle, and we're 15:27:10 16 using the shuttle-derived vehicle for cargo 15:27:16 17 only. We're still using Commercial Crew to 15:27:19 18 LEO for any scenarios that would use a crew 15:27:23 19 capsule. They would presumably be using the 15:27:27 20 Orion, and we'd be launching it with no 15:27:32 21 people on and then the people would be added 15:27:35 22 in space. Technology development line. Next 15:27:40 23 slide. 15:27:42 24 This is what this one looks like. 15:27:42 25 The shuttle-derived vehicle is a little bit 15:27:47 123 1 more cost effective primarily because it's 15:27:52 2 using the existing infrastructure and it's 15:27:55 3 pretty well known. Get to Lagrange points in 15:28:00 4 2023. That's a couple of years sooner. Near 15:28:03 5 Earth asteroids or objects in 2027, a few 15:28:09 6 years sooner. Mars flyby in 2029. Human 15:28:14 7 lunar return in 2030. Next slide. 15:28:17 8 Okay. Now we're moving on to the 15:28:24 9 case of a commercial buy, and this is to be 15:28:28 10 representative of a commercial large -- call 15:28:33 11 it 75-metric-ton hydrocarbon booster. So all 15:28:37 12 of the assumptions are the same except the 15:28:43 13 booster is different. That, for some of the 15:28:46 14 destinations, requires additional launches. 15:28:53 15 We've covered that in the manifesting in the 15:28:58 16 scenarios. Next slide. 15:28:58 17 Okay. The thing to say about this 15:29:05 18 slide is that it brings in considerable 15:29:05 19 efficiencies, because you're doing business a 15:29:11 20 new way. You're actually -- you're making a 15:29:19 21 commercial buy out of your heavy-lift 15:29:19 22 vehicle. You can see that there's 15:29:25 23 actually -- once you get -- once you get ISS 15:29:25 24 retired, you've actually got quite a nice 15:29:30 25 little dip there below the budget, and then 15:29:32 124 1 it kind of ramps up as you're going into 15:29:35 2 significant operations. 15:29:39 3 But if you just look at these, you 15:29:40 4 know, you get to Lagrange points by 2024; 15:29:44 5 near Earth objects, 2026; Mars flyby, 2028 15:29:49 6 and then human lunar return, 2029. 15:29:56 7 Now, it's important here to talk 15:30:02 8 about the disruptions that occur in the 15:30:02 9 effort to get to those efficiencies. So this 15:30:07 10 is a significantly different way of doing 15:30:13 11 business for NASA, and it would significantly 15:30:13 12 disrupt the NASA workforce and the NASA 15:30:17 13 infrastructure. It would require dismantling 15:30:20 14 a not insignificant part of the 15:30:25 15 infrastructure that we've built up over the 15:30:31 16 decades at Kennedy Space Center, at Michoud, 15:30:31 17 at our engine test facilities. 15:30:37 18 So notice the yellow highlighting 15:30:37 19 right in the middle of the graph that says 15:30:43 20 $3 billion for facility shutdown costs. We 15:30:43 21 spent a lot of time discussing how to take 15:30:48 22 into account the costs associated with this 15:30:52 23 disruption. So it's everything from closing 15:30:58 24 down facilities at some ramp-down, 15:30:58 25 mothballing facilities, safing facilities, to 15:31:03 125 1 reducing the civil service workforce by 15:31:07 2 actually, in this case, 3,000 people. So 15:31:11 3 this is not an insignificant change. 15:31:15 4 Even at midnight last night, there 15:31:19 5 was a lot of discussion and calculations 15:31:21 6 going on between the NASA folks and the 15:31:24 7 Aerospace folks -- primarily the NASA 15:31:33 8 folks -- just trying to get a handle on the 15:31:33 9 data and interacting actually with Jeff and 15:31:37 10 with me to try to come up with kind of a 15:31:37 11 bound of what these costs are. So we 15:31:42 12 actually have not come to a conclusion yet. 15:31:50 13 The NASA folks, even amongst themselves, have 15:31:50 14 not determined what they think these costs 15:31:57 15 should be. So we're still a ways off. This 15:31:57 16 is not an easy problem to figure this out. 15:32:03 17 So we've actually got a bound, and 15:32:03 18 it's not a small range. We've got this chart 15:32:09 19 at a $3 billion facilities closure and 15:32:09 20 workforce reduction cost. The next chart 15:32:17 21 shows an $11 billion facilities closing and 15:32:17 22 workforce reduction cost taken over the 15:32:25 23 period of around six years. So why don't we 15:32:25 24 go to the next chart that shows the effect of 15:32:29 25 that. 15:32:29 126 1 This -- you can see that that 15:32:33 2 wedge -- I think it's the yellow -- light -- 15:32:33 3 very pale yellow wedge that shows up there 15:32:37 4 right after the shuttle wedge. So that's 15:32:42 5 kind of how it plays out. So it's not a 15:32:46 6 small part of this thing. 15:32:48 7 You still get to the savings. You 15:32:50 8 get to them a little bit later. And it's -- 15:32:52 9 you know, it's not quite as deep once you get 15:32:58 10 there because you've got to be kind of making 15:32:58 11 up time, but you do get to the savings in the 15:33:04 12 out-years. 15:33:04 13 It does -- this does push things out 15:33:11 14 a little bit. The first Lagrange point is 15:33:11 15 2025; first NEO is 2027; Mars flyby, 2029; 15:33:11 16 human lunar return, 2030. 15:33:21 17 So we think with these two cases that 15:33:24 18 we've bounded the closure costs and the 15:33:32 19 disruption, but it is -- you know, you 15:33:32 20 shouldn't underestimate the magnitude of the 15:33:32 21 repercussions on this one because it's very 15:33:41 22 difficult to reduce the civil service 15:33:41 23 workforce by 3,000 over, you know, a period 15:33:48 24 of time like this. 15:33:48 25 DR. CHIAO: Sally, can I ask a 15:33:48 127 1 question? Maybe it's more for Ed, but for 15:33:53 2 both of you. 15:33:53 3 I'm just thinking here, if in this -- 15:33:53 4 like in this scenario, the Orion and RP 15:33:53 5 booster, is that launching unmanned and then 15:33:58 6 the commercial transport rendezvouses and 15:33:58 7 docks with it? 15:34:03 8 DR. RIDE: Uh-huh. 15:34:03 9 DR. CHIAO: I guess in all of these 15:34:03 10 scenarios where we're doing that kind of 15:34:07 11 thing -- especially where we're doing that 15:34:07 12 kind of thing, it begs the question do we 15:34:07 13 need the Orion. 15:34:07 14 MR. GREASON: Well, that leads 15:34:12 15 actually to a point I wanted to raise. 15:34:15 16 There's a whole bunch of things I want to say 15:34:18 17 about this, and I'll save some of them for 15:34:20 18 later in the discussion. 15:34:24 19 But one of them is, you know, the 15:34:25 20 least worse scenario that I have been able to 15:34:27 21 spot in terms of fitting to something least 15:34:30 22 far away from the President's guidance budget 15:34:35 23 that still does exploration would be to do 15:34:37 24 this and take the bitter pill -- and it's a 15:34:40 25 better pill -- of radical change in the way 15:34:45 128 1 that we do business -- and take two and call 15:34:48 2 me in the morning -- and to also cancel 15:34:53 3 Orion, which would allow you to re-scope the 15:34:56 4 size and mass of the capsule in a future 15:34:57 5 procurement to more closely match the 15:35:01 6 transportation infrastructure that you're 15:35:05 7 building up, and then you would delay the 15:35:07 8 acquisition of whatever your beyond LEO 15:35:09 9 capsules is until after the commercial crew 15:35:13 10 taxi capsules had entered service so you had 15:35:16 11 a different industrial base in the future 15:35:20 12 than you have today of people who have that 15:35:23 13 recent experience doing those kind of 15:35:26 14 capsules. So it's kind of like you go from 15:35:27 15 Mercury to Gemini. You would get a chance to 15:35:27 16 employ lessons learned and try it over again. 15:35:30 17 If you did that -- well -- and that's 15:35:33 18 one factor. And then the other factor is 15:35:36 19 this double bump appearance. This double 15:35:41 20 bump appearance is a product of a 15:35:43 21 considerable amount of ignorance that we've 15:35:48 22 got about what would the future in the 15:35:48 23 2025-plus time frame look like, and nobody on 15:35:52 24 the planet knows that. 15:35:56 25 In some sense, the point of 15:35:58 129 1 purchasing these elements more commercially 15:36:01 2 is to enable there to be innovation and 15:36:04 3 competition among multiple providers. And 15:36:07 4 yet when we are faced with the prospect of 15:36:09 5 how to cost these things, we have no way to 15:36:11 6 account for that. 15:36:14 7 So this second bump in the 2025-plus 15:36:16 8 time frame is of different character than the 15:36:19 9 high out-year costs and all of the other 15:36:22 10 scenarios. This is actually going to the 15:36:24 11 purchasing of incremental costs of more 15:36:26 12 flying hardware. In other words, you can 15:36:28 13 turn this wick up and down in this scenario, 15:36:33 14 which you essentially you can't do on all of 15:36:36 15 the other scenarios because they're all fixed 15:36:39 16 costs and this one is dominated by 15:36:39 17 incremental costs. So -- and the incremental 15:36:44 18 costs are the ones that we're hoping will 15:36:48 19 come down over time, but we have no idea by 15:36:48 20 how much. 15:36:52 21 So there is a chance -- by no means a 15:36:52 22 certainty -- and insert Bo's speech, which I 15:36:55 23 completely agree with, about this is a huge 15:36:55 24 radical change in doing business, it's a leap 15:36:59 25 into the unknown. But there is a chance that 15:37:00 130 1 if you took that set of steps you'd have 15:37:03 2 something that was somewhere between the 15:37:07 3 President's guidance and the higher number 15:37:09 4 that we're talking about. It still wouldn't 15:37:12 5 fall all of the way back down to the line, 15:37:15 6 but it might not be as far above it. 15:37:17 7 MR. BEJMUK: Sally, you know, this 15:37:25 8 whole wonderful idea of how to save money by 15:37:29 9 changing direction -- you know, there's a new 15:37:33 10 deal, new direction, new way of doing 15:37:35 11 business -- you know, it sounds good, you 15:37:38 12 know, and I'm sure that the older you are the 15:37:39 13 more of these turns you have lived through. 15:37:42 14 Let me just say to you all, how would we do 15:37:49 15 this. 15:37:49 16 So you actually destroy part of NASA, 15:37:52 17 you give it to the guys who today participate 15:37:54 18 in mission assurance and also provide 15:37:54 19 independent savvy to contractors -- and I was 15:38:00 20 contractors and I used to have NASA guys, 15:38:03 21 smart guys, looking over my shoulders to make 15:38:06 22 sure that I don't goof up and, God know, I 15:38:10 23 did enough of that. So you'd like to get rid 15:38:11 24 of it. So you would -- so that scenario 15:38:14 25 would get rid of that. 15:38:16 131 1 You would abandon what we do well -- 15:38:18 2 what we have developed doing well over 15:38:21 3 several decades and learn what Russians have 15:38:21 4 done well or buy their product, you know, in 15:38:25 5 terms of propulsion, and more importantly -- 15:38:29 6 most importantly, NASA really doesn't build 15:38:35 7 things. NASA buys things. On these major 15:38:37 8 programs typically NASA spends in-house about 15:38:41 9 20 percent. They buy from contractors about 15:38:43 10 80 percent. 15:38:46 11 And somehow you take -- you beat up 15:38:47 12 NASA, you push them back, you say you guys go 15:38:51 13 and do something else or get laid off -- and, 15:38:54 14 you know, I -- and turn it over to the guys 15:38:57 15 who take -- today provide 80 percent, you 15:39:02 16 know, of services and goods for NASA budget 15:39:02 17 and somehow out of that you're supposed to 15:39:06 18 come with this huge savings. And I think it 15:39:13 19 just violates common sense, in my mind. 15:39:13 20 I think what's going to happen is 15:39:24 21 we'll create havoc that will probably last -- 15:39:24 22 I don't know -- five years, ten years. You 15:39:24 23 know, there will be -- NASA is not, by the 15:39:24 24 way, very easily directable. I've been 15:39:37 25 interacting -- I've been NASA's contractor 15:39:37 132 1 forever. So they'll fight in the end and 15:39:37 2 that flight will create a lot of instability, 15:39:37 3 havoc, and when the dust is finally 15:39:37 4 settled -- it could be a decade later -- we 15:39:52 5 will wonder what have we done. 15:39:52 6 And Norm said something today which 15:39:52 7 was very wise, and I clearly agree with it. 15:39:52 8 Stability is important. You know, small 15:39:52 9 deviations from your direction are tolerable. 15:40:04 10 You know, if we think that NASA has too much 15:40:04 11 infrastructure, we ought to make a strong 15:40:04 12 recommendation to NASA -- reduce your 15:40:04 13 infrastructure, be a little more effective, 15:40:04 14 efficient. 15:40:15 15 But saying we are going to do this by 15:40:15 16 telling them -- well, first of all, we don't 15:40:15 17 tell anybody anything. We provide options. 15:40:15 18 But providing an option which -- which 15:40:15 19 somebody may think this is actually a pretty 15:40:21 20 good idea, get NASA out of this business, 15:40:21 21 create this situation and hope that at the 15:40:26 22 end you will be doing business at lower 15:40:26 23 costs. 15:40:31 24 And even you guys use this word 15:40:31 25 chance. Do you really want to provide an 15:40:31 133 1 option that will leave the future of America 15:40:36 2 in space to chance? I don't know. I've got 15:40:40 3 a little problem with that. 15:40:40 4 MR. GREASON: Unless more money 15:40:46 5 comes, we don't have a chance, we have a 15:40:46 6 certainty and the certainty is not good. 15:40:49 7 MR. BEJMUK: If the problem is money, 15:40:52 8 let's try to figure out how to help NASA get 15:40:52 9 more money. You know, let's look at the root 15:40:58 10 cause and not sort of try to work on the side 15:41:00 11 to allow then addressing the root cause. 15:41:03 12 In fact, I think what Sally 15:41:09 13 presented -- this, you know, slightly 15:41:09 14 increase funding of it 3 billion per year, 15:41:11 15 that does miracles to these charts -- several 15:41:13 16 of them -- a hell of a lot better -- excuse 15:41:17 17 me my language -- by suggesting that maybe 15:41:21 18 the country ought to spend an additional 15:41:23 19 3 million for -- billion for NASA programs. 15:41:23 20 But I think we ought to address what 15:41:26 21 problem we are solving. If it's a -- if it's 15:41:30 22 money, well, let's address money. If it's 15:41:30 23 NASA inefficiency or too big an 15:41:33 24 infrastructure, let's address that but not 15:41:39 25 say let's scramble what we have done well, 15:41:41 134 1 get ourselves on these new set of tracks and 15:41:43 2 take the chance that we'll be successful. 15:41:48 3 That's all. 15:41:51 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Chris, do you 15:41:52 5 want to follow that? 15:41:57 6 DR. CHYBA: This comment may be 15:41:57 7 better placed at the end of Sally's 15:41:59 8 presentation, but I'll toss it in now 15:41:59 9 inspired by Bo's remarks. 15:42:04 10 I think one thing I'm taking from 15:42:04 11 this is the importance of the question Norm 15:42:08 12 asked earlier about what actually is the 15:42:08 13 integrated shuttle fly-out cost from 2015 to 15:42:13 14 2020 including, I guess, de-orbiting at the 15:42:18 15 end of that. 15:42:18 16 The scenarios that at least have us 15:42:18 17 doing something in the '20s are these less 15:42:28 18 constrained scenarios that come in at budget 15:42:28 19 that are 23- or $25 billion over the budget 15:42:28 20 guidance, and it looks to me like station 15:42:35 21 with this 1.2 multiplier actually accounts 15:42:35 22 for the majority of that addition -- the 15:42:41 23 station fly-out from 2015 to 2020. 15:42:41 24 Although politics is certainly beyond 15:42:47 25 our competence or job description, there's 15:42:47 135 1 clearly going to be, I think, a strong 15:42:51 2 political constituency for not dropping 15:42:54 3 station into the ocean in 2016. And one 15:42:54 4 could imagine an understanding in which you 15:42:57 5 extend station as an above the budget -- 15:43:02 6 above the budget line, and that might really 15:43:07 7 account for most of this additional budget 15:43:07 8 that would have to be found. 15:43:10 9 So I think just knowing what that 15:43:14 10 number was -- and you obviously have the 15:43:14 11 data -- 15:43:20 12 DR. RIDE: We do. 15:43:20 13 DR. CHYBA: -- it would be very good 15:43:20 14 to know that number. 15:43:20 15 DR. RIDE: Yeah. In fact, we 15:43:20 16 actually -- that data is in the backup detail 15:43:20 17 that goes with these that, you know, just 15:43:28 18 arrived at, you know, 4:00 in the morning 15:43:28 19 and, you know, our eyes were too bleary to be 15:43:33 20 able to focus on those small line numbers. 15:43:39 21 But we've got the data. 15:43:39 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Sally, just different 15:43:43 23 way of expressing some concern about the 15:43:45 24 optimism expressed by this chart is that, as 15:43:47 25 we're flipping -- as I flip through these, 15:43:51 136 1 this is sort of one of the better looking 15:43:51 2 ones if I -- the less constrained Deep Space, 15:43:53 3 right -- one of the better looking ones, and 15:43:56 4 yet as you look at the buildup of costs in 15:43:59 5 this one, it's the one based on, in some 15:44:01 6 sense, the largest number of notional 15:44:05 7 systems. 15:44:10 8 And, you know, another truism is that 15:44:10 9 early in the scoping of a system one tends to 15:44:14 10 be more optimistic about its eventual costs 15:44:16 11 than one is as one gains more experience with 15:44:21 12 it. So, you know, it's the paper rocket 15:44:25 13 versus the real rocket problem reflected here 15:44:26 14 in almost every line. I'm not saying it 15:44:27 15 isn't right. 15:44:32 16 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:44:32 17 DR. CRAWLEY: But, you know, you 15:44:34 18 would have more uncertainty about these costs 15:44:34 19 than in some of the other charts we've seen. 15:44:38 20 DR. RIDE: I think that's a -- I 15:44:42 21 think that's fair. I think there's also an 15:44:44 22 enormous amount of uncertainty actually in 15:44:45 23 all of the charts. 15:44:52 24 Because once you get past Orion, 15:44:52 25 which we have a reasonable understanding of, 15:44:52 137 1 Ares I, which we have a reasonable 15:44:55 2 understanding of, Ares V, now Lite, which 15:44:58 3 is -- we don't have quite as good an 15:45:02 4 understanding of as Ares V, but we don't have 15:45:06 5 very good understanding frankly of Altair, 15:45:11 6 you know, or any of the systems. 15:45:14 7 So all of these charts suffer from 15:45:17 8 the problem that once you get out past -- you 15:45:17 9 know, you choose your favorite date, whether 15:45:23 10 it's 2015 or 2020 -- there's a lot of is it 15:45:27 11 fiction or is it uncertainty, and it's true 15:45:27 12 in all of the charts. And I think that, as 15:45:31 13 you said, we tried to level the playing 15:45:38 14 field, and I think that once you get out to 15:45:38 15 the mid -- the '20s it's really hard to 15:45:47 16 distinguish which ones there's more fiction 15:45:47 17 in or more uncertainty in than others. 15:45:53 18 I actually agree that there is less 15:45:57 19 certainty with some of these scenarios than 15:46:01 20 others, but I think that we're really fooling 15:46:04 21 ourselves if we think that there's certainty 15:46:06 22 with any of them. 15:46:08 23 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, I mean, I think 15:46:11 24 that's an excellent sort of commentary on the 15:46:13 25 whole process that we have to -- nobody in 15:46:15 138 1 this committee -- I'm sure I already know -- 15:46:17 2 and nobody who's looking at these charts 15:46:19 3 today should view them as actual budget 15:46:21 4 charts. 15:46:26 5 DR. RIDE: That's exactly right. 15:46:26 6 DR. CRAWLEY: I mean, they're sort of 15:46:29 7 examinations of what might occur in a budget 15:46:32 8 as a first order sensitivity. And that's the 15:46:34 9 way, I think it's clear, that we're viewing 15:46:37 10 them, and that's the way, it's clear, that 15:46:41 11 anyone else looking at them should be viewing 15:46:44 12 them. 15:46:47 13 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I'd say it even 15:46:47 14 more strongly than that. You know, this 15:46:47 15 methodology and the process that we're going 15:46:51 16 through, it's actually a very good process, 15:46:51 17 and it's very good methodology. And we've 15:46:51 18 had very, very good people from both 15:46:55 19 Aerospace and NASA who have been working very 15:46:58 20 hard trying to make it as good as they can. 15:47:01 21 Having said that, each run that you 15:47:03 22 do, you get smarter, and each run that you do 15:47:07 23 requires putting some intelligence into the 15:47:10 24 next run. And until you get to the point 15:47:13 25 where you've done four or five or six runs, 15:47:17 139 1 even with a given scenario, you haven't kind 15:47:21 2 of leveled out at a good understanding of how 15:47:21 3 the interactions in that scenario work. 15:47:24 4 We're -- at best, we've done two to three 15:47:29 5 runs of these scenarios. Some of them we 15:47:32 6 haven't even finished the less constrained 15:47:36 7 budget runs. 15:47:38 8 I mean, you're going to see that I'm 15:47:41 9 just about out of the sand charts because we 15:47:44 10 ran out of time. At, you know, 12:45 today 15:47:47 11 the last chart came in, and, you know, there 15:47:50 12 are two that we haven't got. So what that 15:47:52 13 speaks to is that we are right in the middle 15:47:55 14 of actually still the learning curve even in 15:47:59 15 doing the best job that we could in 15:48:02 16 optimizing these scenarios. 15:48:05 17 Having said that, though, I think 15:48:08 18 that we've learned an awful lot just from the 15:48:11 19 process that we've been through and there are 15:48:14 20 a lot of things that are starting to pop out 15:48:15 21 and there's not value in running each of 15:48:18 22 these scenarios ten times and trying to, you 15:48:22 23 know, get it down to the finest decimal point 15:48:25 24 you can. That's not the point of this 15:48:30 25 exercise. 15:48:34 140 1 The point of this exercise is to try 15:48:34 2 to understand which of these scenarios have a 15:48:39 3 chance of fitting under -- within particular 15:48:39 4 budgetary guidelines and which pieces of the 15:48:44 5 scenarios actually give you either the most 15:48:44 6 capability or the best -- the cost 15:48:49 7 effectiveness and being able to then say, 15:48:55 8 okay, well, had we been smarter, like we are 15:48:55 9 now, we might have taken this vehicle to 15:49:01 10 match it with this scenario. 15:49:01 11 And we've done a little bit of that. 15:49:01 12 The Deep Space attempt was actually an 15:49:07 13 attempt to try to get a look at the 15:49:07 14 sensitivity to the different launch vehicle 15:49:13 15 options -- the heavy-lift options. That's 15:49:13 16 why we ran this one with the three different 15:49:20 17 launch vehicles. But, you know, there's 15:49:20 18 plenty to still be learned from this in the 15:49:20 19 mixing and matching, and I don't want to 15:49:26 20 overstate the level of maturity of any of 15:49:26 21 these. 15:49:37 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, I'd like to 15:49:37 23 make two points. 15:49:37 24 One is that our objective today is to 15:49:37 25 define options and the costs will turn out to 15:49:37 141 1 be what the costs turn out to be. 15:49:37 2 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:49:37 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: So if we can agree on 15:49:47 4 costs -- excuse me. If we can agree on the 15:49:47 5 options today, then we're supposed to have 15:49:47 6 another 20 percent of our 90 days to make the 15:49:47 7 costs even more accurate. 15:49:47 8 Second observation is: If you change 15:49:57 9 the cost by 20 percent plus or minus, it 15:49:57 10 doesn't change any of the answers that we've 15:49:57 11 talked about so far. So, you know -- 15:50:09 12 MR. GREASON: Well, I don't agree 15:50:09 13 with that. 15:50:09 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- there's no 15:50:09 15 overwhelming -- 15:50:09 16 DR. CHYBA: If the 20 percent goes 15:50:09 17 the right way. 15:50:09 18 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:50:09 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- issues here on 15:50:09 20 that. 15:50:09 21 MR. GREASON: I still think when you 15:50:09 22 wade through all of the numbers, you know, 15:50:20 23 you've got a handful of overarching issues 15:50:20 24 that come out, you know, and this chart is 15:50:20 25 always the controversial one, not because of 15:50:20 142 1 the technical details but because surface is 15:50:33 2 one of the controversial issues. You know, 15:50:33 3 your choices are spend more, do less, or do 15:50:33 4 something radically different. And do 15:50:33 5 something radically different is cut the 15:50:44 6 fixed costs and deal with the pain. 15:50:44 7 And, you know, the reason groups like 15:50:44 8 this have such a varied composition is 15:50:44 9 there's all of those people who have, you 15:50:55 10 know, seen everything and know all of the 15:50:55 11 reasons why nothing can ever be changed and 15:50:55 12 there's, you know, idiots like me coming in 15:50:55 13 who haven't seen all of that stuff yet -- 15:50:55 14 but, you know, I lived through the transition 15:51:03 15 of the computer industry from when everything 15:51:03 16 came on Big Iron to when everything sat on 15:51:03 17 your desk, and some of you have lived through 15:51:03 18 the transition of the defense industry at the 15:51:07 19 end of the Cold War. 15:51:09 20 And you actually can change what the 15:51:11 21 fixed costs are. It's not fun. It's not 15:51:16 22 easy. But you actually -- it's also not 15:51:19 23 axiomatically impossible. 15:51:25 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Also you mentioned 15:51:27 25 three options. There's a fourth option, 15:51:27 143 1 which is to do some of each or at least some 15:51:32 2 of two of the things that you said, and that 15:51:32 3 probably is doable. 15:51:35 4 I suspect NASA is not as efficient as 15:51:38 5 it might be by a fair amount. And I also 15:51:42 6 suspect that if we are going to have a really 15:51:46 7 strong space program in this country, a Human 15:51:50 8 Space Flight program, we may have to face to 15:51:55 9 investing more -- face up to investing more 15:51:55 10 in it. I think that's -- but that's why 15:51:57 11 we're putting together options and we have a 15:52:06 12 President to make decisions. 15:52:06 13 Sally, why don't we let you go ahead. 15:52:06 14 DR. RIDE: Okay. How about the next 15:52:19 15 chart. 15:52:19 16 I think we've got one chart on the 15:52:19 17 Lunar Global scenario. This also has ISS 15:52:19 18 extension to 2020. It also has a Commercial 15:52:19 19 Crew to LEO. The heavy lifter is the Ares V 15:52:33 20 dual. It's the Lite. The technology 15:52:33 21 development line, and I think -- well, why 15:52:33 22 don't we just go on the next chart here. 15:52:48 23 This is one that came in latest, and 15:52:48 24 they haven't yet been able to do the 15:52:48 25 iterations to fit this. This one still looks 15:52:48 144 1 a little bit suspicious to me, you know, and 15:53:01 2 so I think that this is a good -- almost an 15:53:01 3 example of what we've been doing over the 15:53:01 4 last few days of saying, okay, that looks 15:53:01 5 good but it looks -- but some of the elements 15:53:10 6 look like they might not be as well specified 15:53:10 7 as they should be. 15:53:10 8 So we haven't had any time with this 15:53:16 9 one, but this gives you just a sense of the 15:53:16 10 status of the process to date. So this one 15:53:23 11 is also going to get you something. 15:53:23 12 We were running these cases both with 15:53:28 13 the Ares V dual and with the commercial buy 15:53:33 14 option, again, just to see the sensitivity to 15:53:33 15 the two ways of doing business to be able to 15:53:37 16 give the committee some options to think 15:53:42 17 about. Next slide. 15:53:46 18 The U.S. Shuttle Systems, we actually 15:53:46 19 have not got this chart yet. We have been 15:53:46 20 through the unconstrained version, and we 15:53:57 21 just ran out of time. So people are probably 15:53:57 22 sitting off -- trying to finish off this run 15:54:04 23 right now, but we don't have this one. 15:54:07 24 This case was extend the shuttle at 15:54:07 25 the minimum flight rate. Norm, as I said, 15:54:11 145 1 this was kind of your blue plate special. We 15:54:14 2 close the gap. We extend ISS to 2020. We 15:54:14 3 use Commercial Crew to LEO. This is the case 15:54:17 4 where we said: If you're going to extend the 15:54:24 5 shuttle, then it really does only make sense 15:54:26 6 to do that if you use the shuttle-derived 15:54:30 7 heavy lift. 15:54:33 8 As somebody mentioned earlier, you 15:54:33 9 can also run the argument backwards. It's 15:54:35 10 not as strong an argument, but even if you 15:54:37 11 retire the shuttle, there is some potential 15:54:41 12 value in using all of that infrastructure and 15:54:44 13 expertise and just -- and existing workforce 15:54:49 14 and facilities to build a directly 15:54:49 15 shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicle. Next 15:54:53 16 slide. 15:54:53 17 I think we don't have a chart for 15:54:59 18 that one. 15:55:01 19 Mars Direct, as we were sorting out 15:55:06 20 these scenarios and giving priorities to 15:55:09 21 Aerospace and NASA to do the costing and to 15:55:14 22 do the computer runs, we realized that this 15:55:17 23 one had quite a bit higher costs than some of 15:55:22 24 the other scenarios. Just the results that 15:55:29 25 we were seeing from some of the others, it 15:55:29 146 1 was pretty clear that this one was going to 15:55:29 2 be very, very difficult to fit even into our 15:55:29 3 constrained budget. So we asked them to get 15:55:37 4 to this run last of the runs, and this one is 15:55:37 5 still on the list. We haven't even seen the 15:55:47 6 unconstrained budget of this. 15:55:47 7 I think what is true, though, just 15:55:47 8 given what we've seen so far, is that a 15:55:47 9 likely approach under the sort of budgets 15:55:59 10 that we're talking about for a 15:55:59 11 Mars First/Mars Direct would be to focus hard 15:55:59 12 on robust technology development so that you 15:55:59 13 could improve your capabilities and make it 15:56:08 14 much more feasible to go to Mars in a 15:56:08 15 different way in the future. Next slide. 15:56:08 16 How about the next -- see if we 15:56:08 17 actually have a summary. There we go. 15:56:08 18 You know, so I think it is what it 15:56:16 19 is, we are where we are. There's more work 15:56:16 20 to be done in developing the costing, but I 15:56:18 21 think the more important thing is the work 15:56:21 22 that needs to be done in figuring out -- 15:56:26 23 Norm, just as you said -- the scenarios that 15:56:29 24 we want to focus on in the next round of 15:56:31 25 this. 15:56:33 147 1 The important components, we really 15:56:33 2 feel strongly about the technology program, 15:56:37 3 we feel strongly about the commercial crew 15:56:40 4 capability to get to LEO. That was one thing 15:56:42 5 that fell out of these runs, that the 15:56:48 6 Ares I/Orion option was much less attractive 15:56:51 7 than the commercial crew capability to LEO -- 15:56:55 8 and, again, properly motivated and 15:56:57 9 incentivized. So the 2.5 billion is to 15:57:05 10 encourage a wide variety of competitors. 15:57:13 11 Exploration -- 15:57:16 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Before you leave 15:57:16 13 that, Sally, the data that we saw in 15:57:18 14 preparing for the previous meetings showed 15:57:24 15 that if you pursued some version of Ares V 15:57:24 16 you got Ares I very inexpensively, quote, 15:57:33 17 unquote, the billion and a half or so. 15:57:33 18 Does that still look like it's true, 15:57:33 19 and is there any argument there? 15:57:42 20 DR. RIDE: I think that this is 15:57:42 21 partly where the fixed costs get you. 15:57:48 22 Jeff, would that be your assessment? 15:57:48 23 Yeah. 15:57:48 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: So once you get it, 15:57:48 25 you've got to do something with it. 15:57:53 148 1 MR. GREASON: Well, no, it's not 15:57:53 2 that. If you have all of the money you could 15:57:53 3 wish for, then maybe it looks like a rounding 15:57:53 4 error to tack on the Ares I capability. 15:57:59 5 When you have to start thinking about 15:58:07 6 living within a budget, a vaguely realistic 15:58:07 7 budget, things start to stretch out, and when 15:58:07 8 they stretch out and your fixed costs are 15:58:14 9 high, they cost a lot more. That's part of 15:58:14 10 the problem. 15:58:25 11 And the other part of the problem is: 15:58:25 12 Even when you look at what we're calling the 15:58:25 13 less constrained scenario, what's Ares I for? 15:58:25 14 Well, it's ultimately for bringing Orion to 15:58:25 15 the ISS. But we actually haven't got a 15:58:25 16 scenario in which you can get that capability 15:58:34 17 before ISS is about ready to splash. 15:58:34 18 If you retire ISS in 2015, you can 15:58:34 19 get Ares/Orion I (sic) in around 2016. 15:58:41 20 That's not so helpful. But if we extend ISS 15:58:47 21 to 2020, it tends to slip the availability of 15:58:47 22 Ares I/Orion to 2020. So it's questionable 15:58:55 23 whether this is an element that makes sense 15:58:55 24 to do. 15:58:55 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: But if there are no 15:58:55 149 1 human flights to LEO beyond 2020, the 15:59:08 2 benefits of human rating -- well, the 15:59:08 3 expendables are that you only get a couple of 15:59:08 4 years to the space station -- to ISS. 15:59:08 5 MR. GREASON: Well, but we also -- 15:59:19 6 there's an uncertain but potentially 15:59:19 7 significant cost associated with saying your 15:59:19 8 large heavy lifter also has to be human rated 15:59:25 9 and be a crew carrier. So in a very large 15:59:29 10 number of the scenarios that we're looking 15:59:32 11 at, even after the ISS ceases to continue, 15:59:32 12 commercial crew services are still used to 15:59:36 13 ferry the astronauts up to your exploration 15:59:40 14 system, whatever that may be. 15:59:46 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: But you could also 15:59:46 16 use the Ares I to do that too. 15:59:46 17 MR. GREASON: You could. But now 15:59:53 18 you're back to the problem that what did you 15:59:53 19 do with ISS while -- as long as you had it. 15:59:53 20 DR. CRAWLEY: It goes to also the 16:00:05 21 cost of maintaining the operability of two 16:00:05 22 federal systems, right. 16:00:05 23 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 16:00:05 24 DR. CRAWLEY: I mean, there's an 16:00:16 25 argument that the recurring cost of the 16:00:16 150 1 smaller vehicle is less, but there's also an 16:00:16 2 argument that you have two -- you basically 16:00:16 3 have two programs running, two launch 16:00:16 4 facilities running, two processing facilities 16:00:16 5 running and -- 16:00:30 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: But if you don't have 16:00:30 7 Ares I, you have to maintain one of the 16:00:30 8 expendables. 16:00:30 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Not in all scenarios. 16:00:30 10 In some of the scenarios the Ares V Lite is 16:00:30 11 human rated. 16:00:30 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's right. 16:00:30 13 DR. CRAWLEY: In every scenario 16:00:48 14 either -- other than the program of record, 16:00:48 15 either the Ares V Lite is human rated or 16:00:48 16 we've provided for commercial taxi to LEO. 16:00:48 17 DR. RIDE: Right. That's right. 16:00:48 18 Okay. You know, I think the points 16:00:48 19 here are fairly obvious. 16:00:48 20 Exploration really doesn't look 16:01:07 21 viable under the FY '10 budget guidance -- 16:01:07 22 the guidance and run-out that we've been 16:01:07 23 given. Even the Dash Out of LEO doesn't get 16:01:07 24 you anywhere, and we're still looking for 16:01:07 25 that existence proof. 16:01:26 151 1 Some things are more expensive than 16:01:26 2 others. We've seen that. Deep Space appears 16:01:26 3 to be the most cost effective of the 16:01:26 4 exploration scenarios, and it has earlier 16:01:26 5 return also. You know, so I'm sure we'll be 16:01:26 6 talking about these later on this afternoon. 16:01:26 7 And some heavy-lift options, other 16:01:48 8 than the program of record, appear more cost 16:01:48 9 effective, although less lift capability, and 16:01:48 10 they have other issues with them that we've 16:01:48 11 discussed. 16:01:48 12 And with that, Mr. Chairman, I'm 16:01:48 13 eager to get off of the stage. 16:02:06 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Very well done, 16:02:06 15 Sally. Thanks to you and your crew and all 16:02:06 16 of the folks from NASA and Aerospace who sure 16:02:06 17 put in a lot of hours on that, and we've 16:02:06 18 still got some more to do. 16:02:06 19 Bo... 16:02:28 20 MR. BEJMUK: Sally, you had a, I 16:02:28 21 thought, very useful comment before you 16:02:28 22 actually got up to the podium, and that had 16:02:28 23 to do with cost of operations and 16:02:28 24 operability. 16:02:28 25 And I've been trying to be on a 16:02:28 152 1 campaign since I -- ever since I retired 16:02:28 2 trying to suggest to NASA that it's 16:02:28 3 worthwhile to attempt to change its design 16:02:28 4 culture we design systems not for maximum 16:02:51 5 performance and minimum DDT&E cost but design 16:02:51 6 them a little more -- with a little more 16:02:51 7 eyesight toward the cost of operations, and I 16:02:51 8 don't know we -- you made the similar 16:02:51 9 comment. 16:02:51 10 Could you just say a few more 16:02:51 11 words -- how do you -- how could we, in our 16:02:51 12 report, maybe with the help of our chairman, 16:02:51 13 restate the recommendation to NASA that 16:03:09 14 minimum DDT&E and maximum performance should 16:03:09 15 perhaps not be the only criteria to avoid 16:03:09 16 spending decades later of paying through your 16:03:21 17 nose in terms of ops costs. 16:03:21 18 DR. RIDE: I think these charts 16:03:21 19 actually show that fairly well. 16:03:21 20 If you look even in the out-years at 16:03:29 21 the exploration programs where we've -- in 16:03:29 22 those cases where we've managed to achieve 16:03:29 23 some capability and we're actually starting 16:03:40 24 to explore the operations costs, the fixed 16:03:40 25 costs associated with operating those systems 16:03:40 153 1 is very charge. You know, the budget in the 16:03:52 2 out-years with only exploration around -- 16:03:52 3 there's no shuttle, there's no station to 16:03:52 4 blame these costs on -- it's all 16:03:52 5 exploration -- and they're quite large. 16:04:04 6 You know, and so looking at those and 16:04:04 7 seeing that those costs run out over long 16:04:04 8 periods of time, you know, the message is 16:04:04 9 really clear -- you should be working now to 16:04:04 10 minimize those costs. You should be working 16:04:19 11 to minimize the operations costs to the 16:04:19 12 maximum extent possible even if it costs you 16:04:19 13 a little bit more in the development phase, 16:04:19 14 even if it costs you a little bit of 16:04:34 15 capability. 16:04:34 16 You know, all engineers want as much 16:04:34 17 capability as they can get, and that's a good 16:04:34 18 thing. All operations people want operations 16:04:34 19 to be as simple as possible, and that's also 16:04:34 20 a good thing. And trying to find the right 16:04:34 21 mix of those is a bit of an art, and it's an 16:04:53 22 art that, I think, we lose track at our 16:04:53 23 peril. 16:04:53 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think, Bo, you make 16:04:53 25 a very good point. But just to be the 16:04:53 154 1 devil's advocate, I suspect you can't -- if 16:04:53 2 you properly cost-account, namely, if you 16:04:53 3 discount future costs, you can't afford to 16:05:16 4 spend very much more in development to save 16:05:16 5 operations costs 20 years from now. So I'm 16:05:16 6 just being difficult here but... 16:05:16 7 MR. BEJMUK: And that's what we 16:05:16 8 always do. The only thing is that 20 years 16:05:16 9 will come, you know, and we keep paying and 16:05:16 10 paying and paying and the time value of money 16:05:16 11 seems to matter little to NASA, you know, 16:05:30 12 like -- 16:05:30 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, the government 16:05:30 14 doesn't even discount -- 16:05:30 15 MR. BEJMUK: Yeah. 16:05:30 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- as far as I know. 16:05:30 17 That reminds me -- on the same kind of thing, 16:05:30 18 Sally, we used two -- or I think it was 16:05:30 19 you -- yeah. We used 2.4 percent for 16:05:30 20 inflation. That's double what the OMB is 16:05:48 21 using. I'd sure bet on us. But the question 16:05:48 22 is going to come up what makes you -- where 16:05:48 23 did the 2.4 come from. Was that -- do we 16:05:48 24 have any authority for that? 16:05:48 25 DR. RIDE: You're not going to take 16:05:48 155 1 the word of the physicist/astronaut on the 16:06:13 2 future rate of inflation? 16:06:13 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, you said you 16:06:13 4 studied English too. 16:06:13 5 DR. RIDE: Actually one of the things 16:06:13 6 that was illuminating to us is the cost of 16:06:13 7 inflation that NASA uses to inflate its 16:06:13 8 future costs going out. And I think that 16:06:13 9 number was 2.7 percent. Is that right? 16:06:13 10 Mike, do you know if that's right? 16:06:13 11 It's -- 2.4 to 2.7 percent is the 16:06:43 12 cost that NASA typically uses to take into 16:06:43 13 account inflation in the out-years. 16:06:43 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: So then you have 16:06:43 15 another built-in problem. OMB funds you at 16:06:43 16 1.2, if you're lucky, and NASA is putting 16:06:43 17 2.7 in -- 16:06:43 18 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 16:06:43 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- and we all know it 16:06:43 20 will be 3-1/2. 16:06:43 21 DR. RIDE: You know, that's right. 16:06:43 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: A fact of life. 16:06:43 23 Sally, thank you. 16:07:09 24 DR. RIDE: Thank you. 16:07:09 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: Terrific job. 16:07:09 156 1 Okay. Now we're going to -- we've 16:07:09 2 talked about the options. We've talked about 16:07:09 3 the cost of the options. And now we've been 16:07:09 4 working for most of the time since we've been 16:07:09 5 together on putting together the metrics by 16:07:09 6 which we want to evaluate these options or at 16:07:09 7 least assess the individual qualities of the 16:07:09 8 options, and Wanda has been leading that 16:07:34 9 effort along with a group of folks. 16:07:34 10 And so, Wanda, it's your turn to 16:07:34 11 report on that. 16:07:34 12 DR. AUSTIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 16:07:34 13 I think it's fair to say that all of 16:07:34 14 the committee members have invested some skin 16:07:34 15 in the game on this issue. So I'm pleased to 16:07:34 16 report out what I believe is a set of 16:07:34 17 criteria that reflect the interests and 16:08:02 18 concerns of everyone on the committee. Let's 16:08:02 19 go to the first chart. 16:08:02 20 This is just a little bit of a 16:08:02 21 revisit on the discussion that we had at KSC 16:08:02 22 where we talked about the importance of 16:08:02 23 defining the basis for evaluation. As with 16:08:02 24 any good systems engineering process, it's 16:08:02 25 really important to nail down the 16:08:22 157 1 requirements, which was captured for us by 16:08:22 2 our charter and statement of task, and then 16:08:22 3 assessing how you are going to be able to 16:08:22 4 validate or verify that, in fact, what you've 16:08:22 5 done meets those requirements. And so we 16:08:22 6 felt it was very important to start off by 16:08:22 7 a priori talking about what would be the 16:08:40 8 criteria or figures of merit that we would 16:08:40 9 want to assess. 16:08:40 10 So in terms of defining what it was 16:08:40 11 that we were asked to do, it was certainly to 16:08:40 12 expedite a new U.S. capability to support 16:08:40 13 utilization of the station, to support 16:08:56 14 missions to the Moon and other destinations 16:08:56 15 beyond low Earth orbit, to stimulate the 16:08:56 16 commercial space flight capability and 16:08:56 17 engagement and to fit within the current 16:08:56 18 budget. So those were clear guidance and 16:09:12 19 boundaries that were set for us from the 16:09:12 20 outset. 16:09:12 21 We also looked at some other metrics 16:09:12 22 that were determined by the panel members as 16:09:12 23 being key to coming forward with options that 16:09:12 24 we felt answered the charge. 16:09:12 25 And we also reviewed the metrics and 16:09:26 158 1 figures of merit that had been used in 16:09:26 2 previous studies. And the interesting thing 16:09:26 3 there was that there was a lot of commonality 16:09:26 4 with what we laid out and what others have 16:09:26 5 done in the past about what is really 16:09:39 6 critical in talking about human space flight 16:09:39 7 for the future. 16:09:39 8 I think it's important to also 16:09:39 9 mention that not all of the criteria are 16:09:39 10 equally weighted. And by that, I mean that, 16:09:53 11 as you look at different options, there are 16:09:53 12 some criteria that may have more weight or 16:09:53 13 have more of an import on the effectiveness 16:09:53 14 of that option than others. But I think it's 16:10:10 15 also very important to say that this is not a 16:10:10 16 quantitative, turn the crank, run the numbers 16:10:10 17 and get an answer out of the bottom, that 16:10:10 18 clearly there's a lot of judgment and other 16:10:10 19 factors that have to be weighed. 16:10:10 20 We will do that in our process as we 16:10:25 21 go thorough our evaluation, and I believe 16:10:25 22 that the other decision makers, when we 16:10:25 23 deliver our options, will also have an 16:10:25 24 opportunity to have a layer of assessing 16:10:25 25 which criteria they weight and how they 16:10:40 159 1 weight them. 16:10:40 2 So that's the methodology that we've 16:10:40 3 undertaken. Next chart. 16:10:40 4 Also when we were at KSC, I shared at 16:10:40 5 the public meeting a little bit of the 16:10:40 6 motivation of how we're thinking about this. 16:10:52 7 And this is a 3D representation or three 16:10:52 8 dimensional, if you will. But clearly in one 16:10:52 9 dimension you have the benefits to 16:10:52 10 stakeholders, which you want to try to 16:10:52 11 optimize, and you also have the reality of 16:11:03 12 cost profiles that are laid out year by year 16:11:03 13 in the President's budget that you have to 16:11:03 14 try to meet. 16:11:03 15 And our experience has been that when 16:11:03 16 you constrain a problem fairly significantly 16:11:03 17 then the one dimension in which you have some 16:11:15 18 option for movement, it is in the dimension 16:11:15 19 of risk. So as you over-constrain the 16:11:15 20 problem in the other directions, what you 16:11:25 21 then do is increase the risk to the program 16:11:25 22 and the ability to execute that program. 16:11:25 23 So I think we all recognize that. 16:11:25 24 Next chart. 16:11:40 25 And for any option that you might 16:11:40 160 1 choose, what you would find is that as you 16:11:40 2 look at all of the criteria in this 16:11:40 3 three-dimensional volume you'll see that 16:11:40 4 these items move relative to each other. So 16:11:40 5 they're not really independent. 16:11:51 6 The size of the circles are just 16:11:51 7 simply to indicate that, in fact, there's a 16:11:51 8 level of uncertainty about them, that it's 16:11:51 9 not a point solution and that you've got to 16:11:51 10 recognize, as we have with the options that 16:12:05 11 we've tried to come up with, that different 16:12:05 12 combinations may put you in a different 16:12:05 13 position in that space. So, here again, the 16:12:05 14 message is just one that it is not a black 16:12:05 15 and white single point that we're trying to 16:12:24 16 get to but try to identify options that are 16:12:24 17 in a reasonable space. 16:12:24 18 The dimension that's not reflected 16:12:24 19 here is that depending upon when you get a 16:12:24 20 capability may that move capability in this 16:12:24 21 space relative to the other options. For 16:12:24 22 example, if you don't get human lunar return 16:12:48 23 until 2028 versus getting it in 2020, that 16:12:48 24 you need to reflect that as well. So the 16:12:48 25 bottom line is we need to make sure that we 16:12:48 161 1 find options that are affordable, innovative, 16:12:48 2 safe and sustainable. 16:12:48 3 So with that, may I have the next 16:12:48 4 chart. And what I am going to do is walk 16:12:48 5 through the 12 criteria that we have settled 16:12:48 6 on -- we had 11 when we were at KSC, we've 16:13:15 7 added one -- to try to find a consistent way 16:13:15 8 to assess all of the options that are going 16:13:15 9 to be on our list of options to recommend or 16:13:15 10 to evaluate. The first one being Exploration 16:13:15 11 Preparation. 16:13:15 12 Now, let me just take a second to 16:13:15 13 explain the format of the chart. The top 16:13:15 14 gray area of the box is just a short 16:13:43 15 description of what we mean by that criteria, 16:13:43 16 what's included in that area. 16:13:43 17 Down the left-hand side is a relative 16:13:43 18 scoring. So zero represents the baseline 16:13:43 19 capability, a minus one says that you don't 16:13:43 20 deliver as much value as the baseline, minus 16:13:43 21 two says you deliver even less. And 16:13:43 22 similarly in the other direction, a one means 16:14:07 23 that, in fact, delivers more capability or 16:14:07 24 value than the baseline case, and a two says 16:14:07 25 it's significantly better than the baseline 16:14:07 162 1 case. 16:14:07 2 So in the area of exploration 16:14:07 3 preparation, the baseline means that we have 16:14:07 4 limited beyond LEO exploration capability. 16:14:07 5 And in some terminology, that would be flags 16:14:07 6 and footprints but not really an exploration 16:14:21 7 program that meets the goals that have been 16:14:21 8 laid out. 16:14:21 9 Going to the top of the chart there, 16:14:21 10 what you would expect to assess an option 16:14:29 11 where exploration is limited to LEO and, in 16:14:29 12 fact, you don't have much capability beyond 16:14:29 13 station or the space shuttle program, that 16:14:37 14 that would get a ranking of a minus two. 16:14:37 15 And on the other extreme, a plus two 16:14:43 16 would be something -- an option that provides 16:14:43 17 operational robustness, it provides 16:14:43 18 flexibility, it provides on-ramps for 16:14:48 19 technology and it provides an opportunity to 16:14:48 20 explore different destinations beyond LEO. 16:14:52 21 Next is Science Knowledge, and the 16:14:56 22 objective here is to address the critical 16:15:00 23 research areas consistent with the priorities 16:15:03 24 identified by the scientific community, and 16:15:08 25 for reference we use the decadal surveys. We 16:15:11 163 1 had briefings from representatives from that 16:15:15 2 community which were insightful in terms of 16:15:19 3 understanding what the opportunities might be 16:15:21 4 for scientific research. 16:15:23 5 The baseline case here is limited 16:15:26 6 opportunity for research that is, in fact, 16:15:29 7 consistent with the priorities, but it lacks 16:15:32 8 actually an implementation plan or an 16:15:36 9 execution plan to fully leverage the 16:15:39 10 opportunities that are presented. 16:15:42 11 Going in the positive side, a plus 16:15:44 12 one says that, in fact, you would address 16:15:48 13 some of the priorities that the scientific 16:15:50 14 community identified, and a plus two says 16:15:52 15 that you significantly address those critical 16:15:56 16 priorities with a plan and implement -- and 16:15:58 17 dollars to support actually the research 16:16:00 18 that's there. 16:16:02 19 The minus two category says that 16:16:03 20 really there is not a plan for science 16:16:06 21 research. It's not recognized as a priority 16:16:10 22 for the program for that option. 16:16:15 23 The next chart is Technology 16:16:15 24 Innovation. The focus here is whether or not 16:16:18 25 there's an opportunity to enable tech 16:16:21 164 1 maturity as well as new modes of exploration 16:16:24 2 as a result of technology insertion and to -- 16:16:28 3 and, in fact, gain national leadership in 16:16:32 4 innovation through technology. We feel that, 16:16:35 5 you know, the Human Space Flight program has 16:16:40 6 a potential to provide that capability or 16:16:41 7 that opportunity. 16:16:43 8 The baseline case here says that 16:16:45 9 technology maturation is, in fact, required 16:16:47 10 to support the exploration mission. 16:16:50 11 Going in the positive direction, a 16:16:52 12 plus two would provide significant enabling 16:16:55 13 technology innovation that could be applied 16:17:00 14 to the Human Space Flight program and beyond. 16:17:02 15 And minus two says that we use very 16:17:05 16 current or very near term technologies only. 16:17:07 17 So, you know, we would assess that from an 16:17:10 18 exploration program as probably not reaching 16:17:16 19 far enough. 16:17:20 20 DR. CHYBA: Wanda? 16:17:20 21 DR. AUSTIN: Yes. 16:17:20 22 DR. CHYBA: I'm sorry. Just a 16:17:22 23 clarification comment. 16:17:22 24 DR. AUSTIN: Sure. 16:17:22 25 DR. CHYBA: And this is back on your 16:17:22 165 1 previous slide, Science Knowledge. When we 16:17:24 2 say significantly addresses many critical 16:17:25 3 priorities of the scientific community, one 16:17:29 4 thing that became clear in the presentations 16:17:34 5 by members or chairs of the decadal surveys 16:17:34 6 in the four areas where there are decadal 16:17:37 7 underway, Earth science, physics and biology, 16:17:39 8 planetary science biology, one thing that 16:17:41 9 was -- I'm sorry -- and astrophysics, one 16:17:46 10 thing that was clear is that many of their 16:17:49 11 critical priorities -- and in some of those 16:17:51 12 cases all of their critical priorities -- 16:17:53 13 they view as really not intersecting with 16:17:58 14 human space flight at all. 16:18:01 15 So when we say significantly 16:17:25 16 addresses many critical priorities, I think 16:17:29 17 implicit in that has to be a sense of -- of 16:18:06 18 those that human space flight can hope to 16:18:06 19 address in a reasonable manner. We're not 16:18:06 20 certainly grading against the -- you know, in 16:18:12 21 Earth science, they have 17 missions they 16:18:12 22 want to fly, and none of those involve 16:18:12 23 astronauts. So we're not saying that somehow 16:18:22 24 we have to take over those missions. 16:18:22 25 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. Absolutely. And 16:18:22 166 1 another clarification I should have mentioned 16:18:33 2 on that is that we're not using that category 16:18:33 3 to assess research on humans in space, long 16:18:33 4 duration exposure or any of those crew 16:18:33 5 effects factors. That will be captured under 16:18:40 6 another category called Expanding Human 16:18:40 7 Civilization, which is the chart that we're 16:18:46 8 up to. 16:18:46 9 This category is really talking about 16:18:46 10 our ability with these options to get to a 16:18:53 11 presence off planet, and it would enable, in 16:18:53 12 fact, a sustained human presence and/or 16:18:59 13 bases. 16:18:59 14 This baseline case here says that it 16:18:59 15 would lead to a presence off planet and it 16:19:04 16 would support search for crew effects, which 16:19:10 17 would include radiation exposure, zero- or 16:19:10 18 low-g or psychological issues that would need 16:19:10 19 to be worked. 16:19:14 20 In the plus direction, it addresses 16:19:14 21 those crew oriented effects with an objective 16:19:17 22 to enable sustained human presence, and a 16:19:19 23 plus two says that we're moving toward 16:19:22 24 enabling a sustaining human presence 16:19:27 25 off planet utilizing in situ resources or 16:19:33 167 1 could also be used to enhance the protection 16:19:35 2 of the Earth. 16:19:40 3 In the minus direction, you have an 16:19:40 4 option that, in fact, does not enable human 16:19:50 5 presence, but a minus one would say that it 16:19:50 6 would enable a visit beyond LEO. So there is 16:19:50 7 some credit assessment there for getting 16:19:56 8 beyond LEO but not getting as far on 16:19:56 9 generating that sustained human presence. 16:20:03 10 DR. CHYBA: Wanda, I'm sorry. 16:20:03 11 DR. AUSTIN: Sure. 16:20:03 12 DR. CHYBA: One more comment on this 16:20:08 13 chart. I would add -- perhaps it's implicit 16:20:08 14 here. There's one other consideration with 16:20:10 15 respect to the human civilization category, I 16:20:13 16 think, which is -- well, to put it in terms 16:20:13 17 that we would rank numerically, I would argue 16:20:18 18 that missions that go to near Earth objects 16:20:18 19 should be weighted more heavily -- or 16:20:26 20 weighted in a separate category but factor in 16:20:29 21 from missions that help us develop sustained 16:20:32 22 human presence, because missions to NEOs will 16:20:34 23 help us understand how to mitigate the impact 16:20:38 24 hazard and that's important for sustaining 16:20:40 25 human civilization on this planet in the long 16:20:42 168 1 run. 16:20:46 2 DR. AUSTIN: Agreed. And it is 16:20:46 3 implicit here that you can define the 16:20:48 4 destination that, in fact, is on the path 16:20:50 5 that gets you to sustained human presence or 16:20:50 6 exploration to Mars. 16:20:53 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris, would you make 16:20:59 8 that a whole new category or part of this? 16:20:59 9 DR. CHYBA: You know, it's folded in 16:21:11 10 in the plus two category here. I would just 16:21:11 11 suggest that it sort of needs to factor in, 16:21:11 12 you know, in the plus one category as well at 16:21:11 13 least. 16:21:11 14 DR. AUSTIN: Okay. 16:21:11 15 MR. GREASON: In my own head when I 16:21:11 16 was doing this, my thought was having that 16:21:22 17 feature kind of bumps you up one in the 16:21:22 18 category chart, you know, whatever it is. 16:21:22 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, another way to 16:21:22 20 do it is to make it part of the title 16:21:22 21 including... 16:21:34 22 DR. AUSTIN: Including NEO. 16:21:34 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. So the whole 16:21:34 24 chart -- 16:21:34 25 DR. CHYBA: Expanding and protecting 16:21:34 169 1 human civilization, something like that. 16:21:34 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 16:21:34 3 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. 16:21:34 4 DR. CHYBA: We'll have to be careful 16:21:34 5 because we don't want to -- this is not meant 16:21:40 6 to capture, you know, global warming 16:21:40 7 observations or something -- 16:21:40 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: No. 16:21:40 9 DR. CHYBA: -- so we need to be 16:21:40 10 careful. 16:21:40 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: But maybe you could 16:21:40 12 do some wording that -- 16:21:48 13 DR. CHYBA: Yeah. I'm sure that -- 16:21:48 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- that way there's a 16:21:48 15 title that you could rate each of the systems 16:21:48 16 across the board against that. 16:21:48 17 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. I think it's good 16:21:48 18 to include it explicitly so that we recognize 16:21:48 19 that -- 16:21:54 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 16:21:54 21 DR. AUSTIN: -- that is a value 16:21:54 22 characteristic of a particular option. 16:21:54 23 Moving on to the next chart, Economic 16:21:59 24 Expansion, the issue that we're getting at 16:22:05 25 here is about assessing the impact the option 16:22:05 170 1 will have on the industrial base. The vision 16:22:12 2 would certainly be to have a growing, 16:22:12 3 profitable industrial base, that you would 16:22:12 4 look to see commercial engagement and 16:22:19 5 potentially an increase in U.S. development 16:22:19 6 and production capabilities in key areas. 16:22:19 7 The baseline here says that we would 16:22:28 8 sustain the current U.S. industrial base with 16:22:28 9 some new opportunities for engagement. 16:22:28 10 In the minus two capability, what you 16:22:36 11 would see is a diminish in technical 16:22:36 12 capability. So this is not just in business 16:22:36 13 base. This is not in dollars. It's about 16:22:44 14 our technical ability. But no opportunity 16:22:44 15 for commercial participation would get minus 16:22:44 16 two. 16:22:53 17 On the plus two side, what you'd see 16:22:53 18 is commercial systems being an integral part 16:22:53 19 or another way to think about it might be on 16:22:53 20 the critical path of the architecture where 16:23:02 21 it's not just, you know, if they get there, 16:23:02 22 fine, but, in fact, we are relying on the 16:23:02 23 commercial engagement in order to be 16:23:08 24 successful to the exploration program as a 16:23:08 25 whole. 16:23:13 171 1 The next chart is Global Partnership, 16:23:13 2 and this, again, is addressing one of the 16:23:15 3 critical objectives given to us in the -- in 16:23:18 4 our charter. But what we want to assess the 16:23:21 5 options here is whether or not they leverage 16:23:25 6 and expand our international partnerships. 16:23:29 7 We had a lot of input during our public 16:23:32 8 meetings from our international partners, and 16:23:37 9 we need to identify, I think, in the options 16:23:40 10 where they, in fact, support and really 16:23:45 11 leverage those partnerships going forward. 16:23:48 12 So the baseline case here says simply 16:23:51 13 sustaining existing partnership. 16:23:54 14 The plus two says we not only expand 16:23:56 15 the relationship with existing partners but 16:23:59 16 consider adding new partners. 16:24:02 17 And in the minus two says that the 16:24:04 18 option really discourages further 16:24:06 19 participation (sic) involvement. 16:24:12 20 The next chart is Public Engagement, 16:24:13 21 and this is one where -- 16:24:16 22 MR. BEJMUK: Wanda, may I ask you a 16:24:16 23 question? 16:24:20 24 DR. AUSTIN: Of course. 16:24:20 25 MR. BEJMUK: On this global 16:24:21 172 1 partnership or international partnership, are 16:24:22 2 you thinking more in terms of political or 16:24:24 3 world peacemaking implications, or are you 16:24:28 4 thinking in terms of if you bring 16:24:32 5 international partners and they bring value 16:24:35 6 or money to this joint project our costs will 16:24:37 7 go down or both? 16:24:41 8 DR. AUSTIN: I think the real answer 16:24:43 9 is yes and yes, that we think that there's an 16:24:46 10 opportunity for both. 16:24:49 11 We also would say that you would have 16:24:49 12 to look at the opportunity as, quote, 16:24:53 13 unquote, money saver very carefully. Because 16:24:55 14 our experience has shown that, you know, you 16:24:58 15 may have a hard time taking that to the bank 16:25:00 16 to get a real visible cost savings. 16:25:04 17 But clearly, I think, when Sally was 16:25:07 18 going through the options, we did not presume 16:25:08 19 that an international partnership involvement 16:25:11 20 in those options would save money and, 16:25:16 21 therefore, take credit for it. But I think 16:25:18 22 that there's certainly that opportunity, and 16:25:21 23 the partners expressed a desire to increase 16:25:22 24 their roles in this direction. 16:25:26 25 I would say, on the other hand, you 16:25:28 173 1 know, space is multinational and that there 16:25:30 2 are things that we can benefit from in terms 16:25:34 3 of collaboration in building relationships 16:25:35 4 and established communications, and we've 16:25:38 5 learned a lot and gained a lot from station 16:25:42 6 from that perspective. 16:25:45 7 And so I think that the sense is that 16:25:48 8 would be a good thing to assess the options 16:25:48 9 in terms of the opportunity for increased 16:25:52 10 partnership. 16:25:58 11 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 16:25:58 12 DR. AUSTIN: Sure. 16:25:58 13 Public Engagement is next. The focus 16:25:58 14 here is motivate and inspire -- it might also 16:26:03 15 include educate -- current and future 16:26:03 16 generations and also to provide societal 16:26:06 17 benefits where the general public would see 16:26:10 18 the benefit to society of this human space 16:26:12 19 flight capabilities. 16:26:16 20 The baseline case here, it says that, 16:26:16 21 you know, we gain public interest and focuses 16:26:19 22 on beyond LEO exploration. 16:26:23 23 The plus two category says you 16:26:28 24 actually galvanize a broad public interest 16:26:28 25 and engage the public in exploration, and 16:26:32 174 1 there's a number ways in which you can have 16:26:39 2 that. I think certainly the Teacher in Space 16:26:39 3 program was one of the ways that we have 16:26:39 4 attempted to do that in the past. 16:26:47 5 The minus two category here says that 16:26:47 6 we fail to capture or stimulate public 16:26:47 7 interest at all where the public, you know, 16:26:56 8 either fails to see the value or it fails to 16:26:56 9 see that it's a good investment for us to be 16:26:56 10 in human space flight for a particular 16:26:56 11 option. 16:27:03 12 Next is Safety and Mission Success. 16:27:03 13 This is, you know, one of our key areas that 16:27:03 14 we want to assess. It may be that, you know, 16:27:14 15 in particular, when we talk about, you know, 16:27:14 16 your PowerPoint charts versus my rocket that 16:27:27 17 we don't have sufficient insight into some of 16:27:27 18 the options at this point, but I think it is 16:27:27 19 important to understand where we'd like to 16:27:27 20 see the options -- you know, what we would 16:27:34 21 assess to be a good option relative to crew 16:27:34 22 safety and mission success. This also should 16:27:42 23 be thought of as not just ascent safety but 16:27:42 24 end-to-end mission safety so that you think 16:27:48 25 about, you know, the end game and what the 16:27:48 175 1 issues are there. 16:27:55 2 So the baseline here, again, tied to 16:27:55 3 the program of record is a crew safety risk 16:27:55 4 comparable to that which we have 16:27:55 5 statistically had on shuttle. 16:28:03 6 In the plus two category, you really 16:28:03 7 want to move the bar forward for crew safety 16:28:03 8 maybe as much as an order of magnitude. In 16:28:09 9 the minus two category, what you're looking 16:28:09 10 at is significant increased risk of loss of 16:28:17 11 crew or loss of mission throughout the 16:28:17 12 flight. 16:28:17 13 The next chart is the Life Cycle 16:28:25 14 Costs or affordability. This is really 16:28:25 15 looked at through 2020 consistent with the 16:28:25 16 program record, but it also reflects the fact 16:28:32 17 that we need to look at the Human Space 16:28:32 18 Flight program in concert with other national 16:28:40 19 needs, that clearly that there's not an 16:28:40 20 unlimited budget here. And so I think the 16:28:40 21 less constrained budget that Sally talked 16:28:50 22 about takes that into consideration as to say 16:28:50 23 that there are some limits. 16:28:50 24 The baseline here is very simple. It 16:28:50 25 meets the President's budget. 16:29:00 176 1 The minus one category, I think, is 16:29:00 2 consistent with the less constrained options 16:29:00 3 that we've been looking at. 16:29:00 4 And the minus two is probably more 16:29:00 5 like the unconstrained or greatly exceeds the 16:29:00 6 President's budget. 16:29:09 7 I didn't see any options that were 16:29:09 8 under the President's budget. So I don't 16:29:09 9 think we'll be getting any scores in that 16:29:17 10 category. 16:29:17 11 The next chart is Schedule and 16:29:24 12 Programmatic Risk. And programmatic risk is 16:29:24 13 really one of those areas in which a lot of 16:29:24 14 factors can be included, but it's really 16:29:34 15 about delivering a robust exploration 16:29:34 16 capability on schedule. And there are a lot 16:29:34 17 of ways in which you can do that. 16:29:34 18 One is you can take content out. One 16:29:34 19 is that you can make sure that your 16:29:34 20 technology is sufficiently mature that you 16:29:46 21 have very little technical risk. But there's 16:29:46 22 also the physical risk associated with that 16:29:46 23 as well. 16:29:46 24 In terms of evaluating it, we focused 16:29:46 25 on the schedule because we think that's a 16:29:55 177 1 good indicator of the overall programmatic 16:29:55 2 risk. And the baseline here is tied to the 16:29:55 3 program of record, which is human lunar 16:30:02 4 return in 2020. And so the other scores are 16:30:02 5 relative to that target. 16:30:07 6 What we're seeing is that, you know, 16:30:07 7 you may have options that provide no 16:30:07 8 exploration before the 2030 time frame where 16:30:14 9 we would give a minus one to something that 16:30:14 10 provided exploration in the 2020 time frame. 16:30:14 11 Programmatic Sustainability, the 16:30:21 12 issue that we're trying to assess here is the 16:30:26 13 likelihood of keeping the program sold, our 16:30:26 14 ability to meet near term and continuing 16:30:31 15 visible milestones, to not only continue to 16:30:35 16 get support from the public but also from 16:30:39 17 Congress and external agencies as well. 16:30:42 18 But one of the things that has a 16:30:46 19 potential of having value is if we had an 16:30:49 20 option that really engaged industry and 16:30:52 21 external agencies, for example, DOD. If you 16:30:54 22 could have an option where there's an opportunity16:30:56 23 for synergy there, we would look at that as 16:30:57 24 being an option that had a benefit. 16:31:01 25 If, in addition to that, you also had 16:31:04 178 1 broad additional support from the 16:31:09 2 international partners as seeing value, we 16:31:09 3 thought that that would be something that 16:31:13 4 we'd want to assess. 16:31:15 5 The next chart is actually two charts 16:31:15 6 that we're going to talk about on critical 16:31:19 7 skills and the impact on the workforce. 16:31:22 8 The first one is really talking about 16:31:22 9 the technical capability and the impact on 16:31:26 10 the nation's critical skills, our ability to 16:31:32 11 be -- to identify our core competencies and 16:31:32 12 make sure that we maintain those competencies 16:31:39 13 and our ability to develop new capabilities 16:31:39 14 and new competencies. 16:31:39 15 So the baseline here says that we 16:31:46 16 maintain selected critical skills and 16:31:46 17 expertise, meaning we identify those which we 16:31:46 18 think need to be continued for the 16:31:52 19 foreseeable future. 16:31:52 20 In the minus direction, what you have 16:31:58 21 is a significant loss of critical skills and 16:31:58 22 expertise in areas that we still think are 16:31:58 23 essential to being able to execute a 16:32:07 24 successful exploration program. 16:32:07 25 And in the plus direction is an 16:32:07 179 1 option which allowed you to really 16:32:15 2 strategically realign the workforce to ensure 16:32:15 3 the availability or development of critical 16:32:15 4 skills that are needed going forward. 16:32:15 5 And, Bo, you know, you might make the 16:32:24 6 point here that if you're developing skills 16:32:24 7 in an area where you don't have experience 16:32:24 8 that that might be viewed as more of a risk, 16:32:31 9 but I think that for a particular option 16:32:31 10 we'll need to factor that in. 16:32:31 11 The next chart is, again, about 16:32:38 12 workforce, but it's really from the side of 16:32:38 13 looking at the numbers of people in the space 16:32:44 14 business. And for the most part, that's 16:32:44 15 driven by the overall total budget. 16:32:51 16 So, again, the baseline case here is 16:32:51 17 maintaining the workforce. 16:32:51 18 And in the minus direction, if you 16:32:51 19 had a greater than 10 percent decrease in the 16:32:56 20 total workforce -- that's industry and 16:32:59 21 NASA -- because of a particular option, you 16:32:59 22 would rate it that way. 16:33:02 23 And a plus two would be if you had a 16:33:04 24 greater than 10 percent increase in the total 16:33:08 25 workforce in human space flight. 16:33:11 180 1 You know, we've had the comment 16:33:11 2 earlier today that clearly we have been 16:33:14 3 through that with different industries in 16:33:16 4 different times, but we think that it was 16:33:18 5 important to just lay that on the table as an 16:33:21 6 assessment that could be factored in. 16:33:25 7 MR. GREASON: Wanda? 16:33:27 8 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. 16:33:27 9 MR. GREASON: A question. 16:33:29 10 DR. AUSTIN: Sure. 16:33:29 11 MR. GREASON: Because this is 16:33:29 12 something we've gone around on and I'm not 16:33:32 13 actually sure where we ended up. 16:33:29 14 DR. AUSTIN: Okay. 16:33:29 15 MR. GREASON: If a job moves from a 16:33:38 16 NASA badge to a company badge or from a guy 16:33:38 17 wearing a company badge to a guy wearing a 16:33:38 18 NASA badge, is that neutral on this 16:33:38 19 chart? 16:33:45 20 DR. AUSTIN: In this chart it's 16:33:45 21 neutral, because we're looking at total 16:33:45 22 workforce. 16:33:50 23 MR. GREASON: Thank you. 16:33:50 24 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. Total U.S. 16:33:50 25 capability. 16:33:50 181 1 Okay. The next chart just in summary 16:33:50 2 with the -- 16:33:58 3 MR. BEJMUK: May I? 16:33:58 4 DR. AUSTIN: Sure. 16:33:58 5 MR. BEJMUK: You know, could you go 16:33:58 6 back to this previous chart. 16:33:58 7 It seems to me that the best scenario 16:33:58 8 is where you maintain critical skills and you 16:34:07 9 change over between the old program and new 16:34:07 10 program without either increasing or 16:34:11 11 decreasing. 16:34:14 12 Wouldn't that be like plus two? You 16:34:14 13 know, you've been saying that, you know, if 16:34:18 14 you have an increase by more than 10 percent 16:34:19 15 in a NASA workforce, it's a plus two; if it's 16:34:23 16 decreased by more than 10 percent, it's minus 16:34:29 17 two. So I would think that would be -- the 16:34:33 18 optimum scenario would be you've got these 16:34:36 19 critical skills, you recycle them onto the 16:34:37 20 new program, and I would have thought that 16:34:40 21 they would be plus two. 16:34:42 22 Am I off the base? 16:34:44 23 DR. AUSTIN: I think there's a couple 16:34:46 24 of ways of looking at that. 16:34:48 25 One, Bo, might be efficiency -- you 16:34:50 182 1 know, are you doing things smarter, are you 16:34:52 2 working smarter. You might still actually 16:34:54 3 get a decrease in total numbers, which you 16:34:57 4 actually may get a better product, or you get 16:35:00 5 to modernize the way in which you approach 16:35:04 6 something. 16:35:07 7 So I think that, you know, this 16:35:08 8 evaluation is really just trying to account 16:35:10 9 for the change in numbers. It's not trying 16:35:12 10 to pass judgment on whether it is good or not 16:35:14 11 good but just to simply make sure that we 16:35:17 12 recognize that a particular option may be 16:35:22 13 having an impact. 16:35:25 14 MR. BEJMUK: But you give -- this 16:35:27 15 rating would give a program that increases 16:35:29 16 NASA workforce positive credit. Is that 16:35:32 17 right? 16:35:32 18 DR. AUSTIN: In terms of increasing 16:35:32 19 the workforce -- 16:35:32 20 MR. BEJMUK: Is that how you 16:35:37 21 basically view this? 16:35:39 22 MR. GREASON: This is NASA. I asked 16:35:39 23 that earlier, Bo, because this is -- 16:35:40 24 DR. AUSTIN: It is NASA and industry. 16:35:40 25 MR. GREASON: -- this is the national 16:35:41 183 1 workforce. 16:35:43 2 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. 16:35:43 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. You know I -- 16:35:43 4 well, we've got two charts that I'm having -- 16:35:47 5 could we look at the other chart for just one 16:35:50 6 second. 16:35:53 7 Actually I think I got the titles -- 16:35:59 8 this one should be -- the National Critical 16:36:00 9 Skills Impact would be a better title for it. 16:36:05 10 DR. AUSTIN: It says impact on 16:36:07 11 nation's critical skills. 16:36:09 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: It means the same 16:36:10 13 thing, but it's the whole nation -- it is 16:36:12 14 critical skills in every one. 16:36:12 15 DR. AUSTIN: Right. 16:36:12 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think it's the 16:36:13 17 title that's the problem. National Critical 16:36:13 18 Skills Impact, and the next one would be the 16:36:20 19 NASA Workforce Impact. 16:36:22 20 DR. AUSTIN: Right. 16:36:22 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Or the total national 16:36:22 22 workforce impact -- national workforce impact 16:36:27 23 or just workforce impact would be better yet. 16:36:29 24 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. We can certainly 16:36:35 25 change the previous chart to be National 16:36:37 184 1 Critical Skills. 16:36:39 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: We can change the 16:36:39 3 title. It doesn't change the rating any 16:36:45 4 because that's -- 16:36:47 5 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. 16:36:47 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. 16:36:47 7 DR. AUSTIN: Okay. Go ahead, Joe. 16:36:47 8 Next chart. 16:36:47 9 These two are just summaries to 16:36:48 10 remind you of the general measure and to give 16:36:50 11 a quick reminder of the criteria involved. 16:36:54 12 Next chart. 16:36:57 13 We want to look at the options 16:37:03 14 against each of these measures. And the last 16:37:06 15 chart. 16:37:09 16 This is where I pass it over to Ed 16:37:09 17 and say, you know, all you've got to do, Ed, 16:37:09 18 is fill in the answers and... 16:37:13 19 DR. CRAWLEY: The Professor brought 16:37:13 20 the back of the book. 16:37:13 21 DR. AUSTIN: There we go. Super. 16:37:13 22 Yeah, Bo. 16:37:18 23 MR. BEJMUK: One last question from 16:37:19 24 me. Have we captured promoting education or 16:37:21 25 promoting learning at all levels, I mean, 16:37:25 185 1 from my daughter's fourth grade to 16:37:29 2 Dr. Crawley's graduate students, because I 16:37:33 3 don't think we captured that, you know, the 16:37:36 4 effect of the program to promote learning or 16:37:37 5 promote education? 16:37:41 6 DR. AUSTIN: We did in the -- we 16:37:42 7 tried to reflect that in the public 16:37:45 8 engagement where -- 16:37:48 9 MR. BEJMUK: Well, I looked at that. 16:37:50 10 DR. AUSTIN: And it may be that you 16:37:54 11 want to be more specific, but, you know, the 16:37:55 12 item 1 there is really about motivating STEM, 16:37:57 13 it's aimed at being current and future 16:38:03 14 generations. So the intent was that that 16:38:06 15 would be where you would look at an option to 16:38:09 16 see its ability to, you know, have an impact 16:38:11 17 with the public in that respect. 16:38:17 18 If you have a suggestion for a way to 16:38:21 19 present that more directly, you know, we 16:38:24 20 can -- 16:38:29 21 MR. BEJMUK: Sally, you have an 16:38:29 22 impact on education, I believe, you know. 16:38:32 23 Seriously, do you think we ought to have 16:38:34 24 something that gets a program created that 16:38:37 25 inspires kids as well as his graduate 16:38:37 186 1 students, you know? 16:38:41 2 DR. RIDE: Of course, that's a -- 16:38:43 3 that's important and it's critical and I 16:38:47 4 think that it's one of the things that a 16:38:51 5 well-designed space program does naturally 16:38:54 6 and can significantly contribute to. I think 16:38:55 7 that it's captured appropriately here. 16:38:59 8 MR. BEJMUK: You think -- okay. 16:39:03 9 DR. RIDE: I do. I do. 16:39:03 10 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Thank you. 16:39:10 11 DR. AUSTIN: Thank you. 16:39:14 12 Mr. Chairman, if there are no other 16:39:14 13 questions, I'll yield the podium to 16:39:17 14 Professor Crawley. 16:39:17 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, I think you've 16:39:20 16 done very well, but the Professor will fill 16:39:27 17 out the chart here with what we're doing. 16:39:27 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, the Professor 16:39:27 19 just realized that they only call me that 16:39:27 20 when I'm in trouble, by the way. 16:39:27 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, do they? 16:39:38 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. You know, it's 16:39:38 23 like when your mother calls you by your full 16:39:38 24 name, you know. 16:39:38 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's not good, 16:39:38 187 1 right? 16:39:38 2 DR. AUSTIN: Absolutely. 16:39:38 3 DR. CRAWLEY: That's not good. 16:39:46 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. The next thing 16:39:46 5 we want to do is to fill out the tables. And 16:39:46 6 we've asked Ed to take a crack at it just to 16:39:46 7 give us a starting point in preparation, and 16:39:53 8 the group here, as a whole, will weigh in on 16:39:53 9 it, I'm sure. 16:39:59 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. And I'm just 16:40:03 11 dealing with a logistical issue, Norm, which 16:40:03 12 is we got it printed for the committee to be 16:40:03 13 able to look at but we didn't get it into a 16:40:05 14 chart so that we can project it. So I'm 16:40:09 15 just -- 16:40:12 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, I see. So you're 16:40:12 17 doing graphics. 16:40:18 18 MR. McALISTER: I'm just going to 16:40:18 19 transfer it over to the driver. There we go. 16:40:18 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well done. 16:40:18 21 MR. McALISTER: We should announce 16:40:24 22 that we have smelling sauce in the back for 16:40:25 23 anybody that needs them after Sally's 16:40:30 24 presentation. 16:40:30 25 And also I thought it was kind of 16:40:31 188 1 amusing that Jeff thought that that one 16:40:32 2 commercial booster slide was the only 16:40:35 3 controversial slide in Sally's chart. I 16:40:38 4 thought that was kind of cute. 16:40:43 5 DR. RIDE: That's because Jeff was 16:40:43 6 part of the process, so he was well worn 16:40:46 7 down. 16:40:51 8 MR. GREASON: That one has drawn more 16:40:51 9 than its fair share of revisits in the -- 16:40:54 10 DR. CRAWLEY: True enough. 16:40:54 11 MR. GREASON: -- in the discussion. 16:40:55 12 MR. McALISTER: Well deserved. 16:40:55 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Mr. Chairman, 16:40:58 14 thank you for this opportunity to discuss 16:41:00 15 this easy topic at the end of the day. 16:41:02 16 So the process that we have engaged 16:41:05 17 in outside of the FACA meeting is -- well, 16:41:08 18 actually at the last meeting we presented the 16:41:11 19 evaluation system -- actually in 16:41:16 20 Cocoa Beach -- right, Wanda -- we presented 16:41:18 21 the evaluation system and recommended for its 16:41:22 22 approval to the group, which was agreed, and 16:41:24 23 then today we further defined the criteria 16:41:26 24 that went with it. 16:41:31 25 And these, by the way, are linked 16:41:34 189 1 back through backup documents to the 16:41:37 2 evaluation criteria that are contained in the 16:41:41 3 OSTP, a statement of task, which I'll make 16:41:44 4 reference to occasionally in this discussion, 16:41:48 5 as well as one I mentioned earlier today, to 16:41:51 6 other historic and important policy 16:41:53 7 documents, the Space Act, the vision for 16:41:58 8 space exploration and so forth. 16:42:00 9 So there are actually, in many of 16:42:01 10 these cases, more words that are in the 16:42:03 11 backup documents than have been presented in 16:42:06 12 the public meeting, but they were agreed for 16:42:12 13 inclusion by the committee. Oh, there it is. 16:42:14 14 Okay. 16:42:14 15 So this -- what can only be 16:42:20 16 considered an eye chart and probably not even 16:42:20 17 visible to the people in the front row -- 16:42:24 18 MR. McALISTER: So everybody move up 16:42:30 19 to the front row. 16:42:32 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 16:42:32 21 MR. McALISTER: We can maybe get some 16:42:32 22 printouts. 16:42:34 23 DR. CRAWLEY: Usually people drift to 16:42:34 24 the back of the room in my classes anyway. 16:42:36 25 So I'm used to it back there. 16:42:39 190 1 So what we've done is we've taken 16:42:42 2 about dozen options which basically were left 16:42:46 3 on the table, Norm, after Sally's -- after 16:42:53 4 the analysis which Sally briefed. 16:42:58 5 And in some cases this has expanded 16:43:00 6 since the list we showed last week. So, for 16:43:04 7 example, there's a Shuttle-Derived Deep Space 16:43:09 8 one in the list now. 16:43:12 9 And in some cases it's contracted 16:43:12 10 based on sort of the relatively obvious 16:43:17 11 things that were falling on the floor. 16:43:17 12 For example, the Dash Out of LEO, as 16:43:22 13 Sally proposed, just didn't come anywhere 16:43:25 14 close to its intent, which was to try and 16:43:28 15 find a way to get out of LEO as fast as 16:43:32 16 possible and, in fact, didn't produce a step 16:43:37 17 out of LEO until the end of the budget window 16:43:37 18 in the constrained situation. 16:43:37 19 So with the permission of the group, 16:43:40 20 what we've done is we have added a few here 16:43:43 21 and there and we've subtracted a few here and 16:43:46 22 there to produce this set for the final 16:43:51 23 discussion. 16:43:54 24 So what I'll do is I'll just read 16:43:54 25 down it for those of you who can't read it. 16:43:57 191 1 And if we had two projectors, at this point 16:44:04 2 we would project the last chart of the 16:44:08 3 morning, but, of course, we don't have two 16:44:08 4 projectors, so I'll try and make the 16:44:11 5 connections. 16:44:14 6 The first one is the program of 16:44:14 7 record adjusted for risk, as are all of the 16:44:18 8 ones, all of the analyses were done by Aerospace 16:44:25 9 unconstrained by the budget. That's what we 16:44:25 10 call -- that's our best estimate of what the 16:44:25 11 program would have executed had they been 16:44:31 12 given the budget. 16:44:31 13 The second one is the program of 16:44:31 14 record adjusted to risk constrained. 16:44:31 15 And the third one, which is called on 16:44:35 16 the sheet that we have in front of us 2$, is 16:44:38 17 the program of record risk adjusted with the 16:44:41 18 plussed up budget trend that Sally discussed. 16:44:44 19 So, in fact, there're three versions of 16:44:46 20 the program of record -- unconstrained, 16:44:50 21 constrained within the President's budget, and 16:44:53 22 constrained within this curve that we've 16:44:57 23 sketched in as what might be a reasonable 16:45:00 24 increase over the proposed budget. 16:45:03 25 The next one is 3B, which is ISS 16:45:06 192 1 Focused, commercial crew, because as Sally 16:45:12 2 pointed out, the ISS Focused Ares I option 16:45:15 3 just didn't make any sense because in 16:45:20 4 the Close the ISS in '15, the Ares I becomes 16:45:27 5 available in about '16 and in the Close the 16:45:33 6 ISS in '20, the Ares I becomes available in 16:45:33 7 about '19, just in enough time to see the end 16:45:35 8 of the space station. So there is no budget 16:45:38 9 scenario in which trying to build the ISS 16:45:41 10 (sic) in order to make it to the space 16:45:46 11 station makes sense if you have to pay for 16:45:48 12 the space station to keep it alive out of the 16:45:55 13 same budget. 16:45:55 14 Is that a fair statement, Sally? 16:45:55 15 DR. RIDE: Yeah, it is. 16:46:01 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. So what we've 16:46:01 17 done is we've taken out of the variant of ISS 16:46:01 18 Focused with Ares I and left in the ISS 16:46:06 19 Focused with commercial crew, which does show 16:46:11 20 on Sally's chart of an hour or two ago the 16:46:11 21 commercial crew access to the ISS by '16 or 16:46:11 22 so, sometime in the middle of the decade. 16:46:14 23 Now, this is color-coded to this last 16:46:21 24 chart, which the committee has, by the way, 16:46:27 25 from earlier this afternoon. The light blue 16:46:27 193 1 on this references back to the light blue on 16:46:34 2 Chart 28 of my earlier presentation. The 16:46:34 3 yellow references back to Chart 29 of the 16:46:40 4 previous presentation. And the green 16:46:40 5 references back to Chart 30 of the previous 16:46:46 6 presentation, which were the families that I 16:46:46 7 described. 16:46:50 8 So if we look at the yellow one, 16:46:50 9 these are basically all of the variants of 16:46:54 10 Deep Space, not all of which Sally had the 16:46:59 11 opportunity to present but which are in 16:46:59 12 consideration, which are basically the 16:47:07 13 Deep Space with the Ares V Lite, which are 16:47:07 14 the sixes, the Deep Space with the commercial 16:47:07 15 hydrocarbon booster, which are the sevens, 16:47:16 16 and the Deep Space with the shuttle-derived 16:47:16 17 vehicle, which we called 7S. 16:47:16 18 (Discussion off the record.) 16:47:16 19 DR. CRAWLEY: And then in each of 16:47:27 20 those there's an unconstrained budget and a 16:47:27 21 plus-up budget, indicated by the little extra 16:47:34 22 dollar sign after the number. 16:47:34 23 And then finally there are the last 16:47:34 24 three in the green family, which is the 16:47:42 25 alternate Mars forward exploration of the 16:47:42 194 1 Moon or the Mars First ones, 8 was the Lunar 16:47:42 2 Global with Ares V Lite, 9 was Lunar Global 16:47:48 3 with the commercial hydrocarbon and 10 was 16:47:52 4 Mars First with the unconstrained budget. 16:47:52 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Ed, which one of 16:47:57 6 these would be the one that would go above 16:47:57 7 the $3 billion that Sally described that 16:48:02 8 might go to $4 billion or $5 billion or 16:48:02 9 something like that? 16:48:06 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, we haven't done 16:48:06 11 yet that sort of second-order sensitivity, 16:48:11 12 Norm. We've got, for most of them -- 16:48:11 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Should we add one to 16:48:18 14 do that? I hate to be adding but -- either 16:48:18 15 replace one of these or add. It sounds like 16:48:18 16 it's an add. 16:48:28 17 DR. CRAWLEY: I would interpret the 16:48:28 18 plus-up ones as still having some -- 16:48:28 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Latitude to work on 16:48:28 20 them? 16:48:28 21 DR. CRAWLEY: -- latitude -- 16:48:39 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's fine. 16:48:39 23 DR. CRAWLEY: -- as to how much we're 16:48:39 24 going to plus it up. 16:48:39 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: So it's not 16:48:39 195 1 necessarily the $3 billion number? 16:48:39 2 DR. CRAWLEY: It's not exactly the 16:48:39 3 number. 16:48:39 4 Would you agree with that, Sally. 16:48:39 5 DR. RIDE: Absolutely. You know, we 16:48:39 6 picked that number, you know, late Saturday 16:48:50 7 night sometime, I think, and -- 16:48:50 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: So this falls in the 16:48:50 9 category of just an updating the basic 16:48:50 10 options that you defined? 16:48:50 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Rather than 16:49:05 12 defining a new option. 16:49:05 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Fine. 16:49:05 14 DR. CRAWLEY: And one of the things 16:49:05 15 we did want to go back -- and I think we've 16:49:05 16 almost done now -- is to compare that with 16:49:05 17 some of the earlier budgets just to see -- 16:49:05 18 early budget guidances just to see how it 16:49:05 19 compared. 16:49:18 20 So I would interpret these plus-up 16:49:18 21 ones as still have some margin to -- what 16:49:18 22 Norm is referring to is there are some of 16:49:18 23 these where we have a sense that if we move 16:49:31 24 the budget request up just a bit more it 16:49:31 25 would have a significant influence on 16:49:31 196 1 accelerating key milestones in the future and 16:49:31 2 that before we make the final recommendation 16:49:31 3 to the White House we might want to do that 16:49:46 4 sensitivity analysis. You know, if we can 16:49:46 5 buy a year or two for a modest increase in 16:49:46 6 the earlier years, that's probably a trade 16:49:46 7 worth making. 16:49:46 8 Does that answer your question, Norm? 16:50:02 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Thank you. 16:50:02 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, what you might be 16:50:02 11 able to, see if you read across, are the, 16:50:02 12 now, 13 evaluation criteria which Wanda just 16:50:02 13 went through. 16:50:16 14 And I'll read from right -- from left 16:50:16 15 to right for those who can't read -- 16:50:16 16 Exploration Preparation, Technology 16:50:16 17 Innovation, Science Knowledge, Human 16:50:16 18 Civilization, Economic Expansion, Public 16:50:23 19 Engagement and Global Partners, which are the 16:50:23 20 seven areas of defined benefit. Then there's 16:50:23 21 Sustainability, Safety and Mission Success, 16:50:28 22 NASA/Industry Workforce and National Skills, 16:50:33 23 which are the -- call them programmatic 16:50:33 24 considerations. 16:50:35 25 And then I've left blank the Schedule 16:50:35 197 1 and Program Risk and the Life Cycle Cost 16:50:38 2 because that information is really derived 16:50:41 3 from the Aerospace costing analysis rather 16:50:44 4 than an independent pass through the problem. 16:50:48 5 I mean, there's no sense filling that in 16:50:53 6 without having all of the -- it's a way to 16:50:56 7 report in this format what the cost and 16:51:01 8 schedule information from the Aerospace 16:51:01 9 analysis would show. 16:51:08 10 So I suggest, Norm, that we just 16:51:08 11 defer those two until we're able to see the 16:51:08 12 details of the analysis and focus on the 16:51:13 13 remaining 11 of them which is not a small 16:51:13 14 number. 16:51:18 15 MR. GREASON: I want another option 16:51:18 16 like I want a hole in the head. But what 16:51:24 17 happened to Scenario 5? 16:51:24 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Scenario 5... 16:51:30 19 MR. GREASON: That was the -- that 16:51:30 20 was the shuttle extension. 16:51:30 21 DR. RIDE: Shuttle extension. 16:51:30 22 DR. CRAWLEY: It was one of the ones 16:51:35 23 with the red line through it that -- 16:51:35 24 MR. GREASON: Okay. Well, I -- 16:51:39 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: It should be here. 16:51:39 198 1 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I think -- 16:51:39 2 MR. GREASON: I mean -- 16:51:39 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh, okay. 16:51:42 4 MR. GREASON: -- I'm actually not in 16:51:42 5 favor of this option. I'm just trying to see 16:51:44 6 that they get their due. 16:51:46 7 DR. CRAWLEY: I was under the 16:51:46 8 impression that it was another one that when 16:51:48 9 the analysis was done that the shuttle 16:51:50 10 extension cost caused the availability of the 16:51:52 11 shuttle-derived vehicle to move enough to the 16:51:55 12 left that you were recommending not 16:51:57 13 continuing it. 16:51:59 14 DR. RIDE: No. 16:51:59 15 DR. CRAWLEY: But if I misunderstood, 16:52:01 16 I'll be happy to add it back in. 16:52:04 17 DR. RIDE: Actually we haven't gotten 16:52:07 18 the constrained -- or the partially 16:52:07 19 constrained, less constrained, plus up -- 16:52:15 20 whatever we want to call it -- budget for 16:52:15 21 that one yet, and, you know, I think that 16:52:15 22 there were some mitigating circumstances that 16:52:22 23 we wanted to take a look at. 16:52:28 24 MR. GREASON: Okay. 16:52:28 25 DR. RIDE: We pushed it down on the 16:52:28 199 1 priority stack to get some of the other runs 16:52:28 2 out, but I don't think we've fully -- 16:52:34 3 MR. GREASON: Okay. 16:52:34 4 DR. RIDE: -- come full circle on 16:52:43 5 that one yet. 16:52:43 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So we'll put it 16:52:43 7 back in between 3 and 6, which raises the 16:52:43 8 question of what was 4. 16:52:49 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah, it does. What 16:52:49 10 was 4? 16:52:49 11 DR. CRAWLEY: The 4 was Dash Out of 16:52:49 12 LEO, and we discussed that one. 16:52:52 13 DR. RIDE: Dash Out of LEO, yeah. 16:52:52 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: I'm sorry. What was 16:52:54 15 4? 16:52:54 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Dash out of LEO. And 16:52:54 17 3A was the ISS Focused with the Ares V crew. 16:52:57 18 DR. CHIAO: Ares I. 16:52:59 19 DR. RIDE: Ares I. 16:52:59 20 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm sorry. Ares I 16:52:59 21 delivery. 16:52:59 22 Thank you. 16:53:01 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think one thing, 16:53:01 24 Ed, about this is that although we've got a 16:53:03 25 ton of options, which I didn't want to do, a 16:53:06 200 1 lot of them can be dismissed almost 16:53:11 2 immediately. So I think we show them because 16:53:11 3 there are people who are interested in 16:53:16 4 them -- 16:53:16 5 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 16:53:16 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- but not because 16:53:16 7 they're worthy of a great deal of thought. 16:53:20 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 16:53:20 9 MR. GREASON: Maybe we should go 16:53:26 10 through that exercise so we don't spend out 16:53:26 11 time and energy scoring options so that we 16:53:26 12 can delete them. 16:53:26 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Let me just say 16:53:29 14 one more sentence. 16:53:29 15 Because in a FACA process, it's 16:53:31 16 important to explain how this document in 16:53:34 17 front of you was derived -- and then I think 16:53:36 18 we should have that discussion, Norm -- which 16:53:38 19 is that a subgroup of the overall committee 16:53:39 20 deliberated -- many of them being as domain 16:53:43 21 experts on various columns -- so that, for 16:53:46 22 example, we worked with Wanda on the Safety 16:53:49 23 and Mission Success, with Leroy on Human 16:53:53 24 Civilization and Global Partnerships and 16:53:56 25 Safety, with Chris on Science, with Jeff on 16:53:59 201 1 Exploration Preparation and Technology 16:54:04 2 Innovation. 16:54:07 3 So this is a summing together of the 16:54:09 4 individual contributions with a little 16:54:11 5 adjusting by me in order to present a 16:54:13 6 proposal to the group here for deliberation 16:54:15 7 in public. 16:54:19 8 MR. BEJMUK: Norm, may I ask you a 16:54:22 9 question? 16:54:23 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh, can I just add one 16:54:25 11 more thing -- 16:54:28 12 MR. BEJMUK: Sure. 16:54:28 13 DR. CRAWLEY: -- is that, as a ground 16:54:29 14 rule, what I'd like to suggest is that in 16:54:29 15 this sort of subjective evaluation there's 16:54:32 16 pretty good social science research that 16:54:36 17 indicates that if you give people a 16:54:36 18 five-point scale to rate on that's even 16:54:39 19 with -- attached to rubrics, like the ones 16:54:41 20 Wanda produced, a difference of one increment 16:54:43 21 is essentially agreement. 16:54:45 22 In other words, Leroy and I could 16:54:48 23 argue all day whether a given number is -- 16:54:50 24 should be minus one or minus two, the real 16:54:52 25 disagreements occur if I think it should be 16:54:56 202 1 minus one and he thinks it should be plus 16:54:58 2 one. 16:54:58 3 So what I would do, as we're 16:54:58 4 reviewing this, is look for places where you 16:55:02 5 think the grading is off by more than one 16:55:08 6 increment as the places that are really 16:55:08 7 important to discuss. 16:55:16 8 I'm sorry, Bo. 16:55:16 9 MR. BEJMUK: The question I was going 16:55:16 10 to ask -- Norm, would you like us to dialogue 16:55:16 11 this, or do each one of us change the 16:55:16 12 numbers and somebody treats it as a voting? 16:55:24 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: No. I think I would 16:55:24 14 rather dialogue it, and I think, as Ed goes 16:55:33 15 through, we'll just pick those areas where we 16:55:33 16 have a two-point difference or something 16:55:33 17 profound and with the understanding that as 16:55:44 18 we get new data -- we're still collecting 16:55:44 19 data obviously -- it may change these but it 16:55:44 20 will be based on fact. 16:55:44 21 MR. BEJMUK: Well, because, for 16:55:44 22 example, I was looking at why is Technology 16:55:44 23 Innovation two for hydrocarbon booster? 16:55:44 24 MR. GREASON: Because those options 16:55:58 25 have propellant transfer integral to them, 16:56:02 203 1 and so we pull that capability in -- 16:56:04 2 DR. CHYBA: So is propellant transfer 16:56:04 3 marked -- 16:56:05 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, and it would 16:56:05 5 stimulate an order of $2 billion investment 16:56:08 6 in the development of a new large hydrocarbon 16:56:10 7 engine, which is currently not differentially 16:56:15 8 cost -- 16:56:18 9 MR. BEJMUK: But it's not 16:56:19 10 propulsion -- kerosene and LOX propulsion, is 16:56:24 11 it? Because we are either buying Russian 16:56:25 12 engines or doing what Russians have done for 16:56:29 13 decades and I would hardly call that 16:56:29 14 innovation. 16:56:30 15 MR. GREASON: Yeah. In my opinion, 16:56:32 16 it's not the hydrocarbon propulsion, it's the 16:56:33 17 reliance on propellant transfer that's the 16:56:36 18 big swinger. 16:56:36 19 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Well, I -- that I 16:56:36 20 can live with. Okay. Thank you. 16:56:40 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, I wonder if 16:56:40 22 we shouldn't go through these in sequence -- 16:56:42 23 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 16:56:42 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- and talk about 16:56:44 25 them, and I would do it by column. 16:56:47 204 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So we'll start 16:56:49 2 with the first one. 16:56:53 3 DR. RIDE: Ed, can I go back to 16:56:53 4 Norm's question about -- or maybe it was your 16:56:57 5 question about -- 16:57:01 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Should we take some 16:57:01 7 rows off? 16:57:01 8 DR. RIDE: Yeah. Should we take some 16:57:01 9 rows off -- 16:57:01 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 16:57:01 11 DR. RIDE: -- like the unconstrained 16:57:01 12 rows? 16:57:04 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 16:57:04 14 DR. RIDE: I mean, are we really 16:57:04 15 considering unconstrained? 16:57:09 16 MR. GREASON: That's a good question. 16:57:09 17 I don't know the answer to that question. 16:57:16 18 Maybe Norm does. 16:57:16 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Maybe he does. 16:57:16 20 DR. RIDE: I didn't show any of the 16:57:23 21 constrained budgets but -- 16:57:23 22 MR. GREASON: I have another cut that 16:57:23 23 we might be able to make more easily, which 16:57:30 24 is I'd like to suggest, given everything 16:57:30 25 we've heard and everything we've learned, 16:57:30 205 1 that however painful the budgetary 16:57:30 2 implications may be we just face up to the 16:57:30 3 fact that ISS is not going to splash in 2016 16:57:37 4 and we just admit it and we just take the 16:57:44 5 options that rely on ISS splashing in 2016 16:57:44 6 off the table. 16:57:44 7 DR. RIDE: I can agree with that. 16:57:54 8 MR. GREASON: Ed? I mean, you're -- 16:57:54 9 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm just flipping 16:57:54 10 through my notes here. 16:57:54 11 DR. CHYBA: Other than program of 16:57:54 12 record, which we -- 16:58:00 13 MR. GREASON: Well, actually I think 16:58:00 14 the implication of that would be that the 16:58:00 15 program of record would be only there for 16:58:00 16 purposes of comparison. 16:58:03 17 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 16:58:08 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Should we show one 16:58:08 19 option that does not continue ISS so it shows 16:58:10 20 the impact of not continuing it? 16:58:14 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, actually as of 16:58:17 22 now, having taken Dash Out of LEO off for 16:58:21 23 reasons that it didn't achieve its purposes, 16:58:23 24 the only option that ends the ISS in 2015 is 16:58:27 25 the program of record, and I think one of the 16:58:29 206 1 agreements we had -- or one of the thoughts 16:58:33 2 we had is that we would show the program of 16:58:38 3 record if it -- at least for a reference case 16:58:38 4 but we could go either way on that or we 16:58:46 5 could just change the ISS date in the program 16:58:52 6 of record to 2020. 16:58:52 7 DR. RIDE: Well, actually I was going 16:58:57 8 to propose that possibility. That we've been 16:58:57 9 dealing with the program of record as a 16:58:57 10 baseline, you know, a comparison case, I'm 16:59:04 11 wondering whether, almost for completeness, 16:59:04 12 we should consider one that is the program of 16:59:11 13 record with the ISS and with the technology 16:59:11 14 line included. 16:59:16 15 You know, we've got the -- the 16:59:20 16 program of record does not include the robust 16:59:20 17 technology line. I'm sure none of us would 16:59:24 18 think that that would be the right way to 16:59:28 19 continue forward, even if we went forward 16:59:28 20 with the program of record. 16:59:31 21 And it doesn't include the ISS 16:59:31 22 extension, and I think, if we want to keep 16:59:34 23 one without -- you know, that splashes the 16:59:39 24 ISS, then, you know, we sort of have one in 16:59:39 25 our baseline program of record. 16:59:44 207 1 But I'd actually be in favor of not 16:59:44 2 keeping -- not keeping an option that 16:59:49 3 de-orbits the ISS just for the sake of having 16:59:52 4 an option that de-orbits the ISS. 16:59:55 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I'm doing a 17:00:00 6 flip-flop here. I've been the one all along 17:00:00 7 that's been arguing for fewer options. 17:00:04 8 But there is a substantial body of 17:00:04 9 people that believe you ought to shut ISS 17:00:09 10 down and get on with life, spend your money 17:00:11 11 on new systems. Most everybody I talked to 17:00:15 12 from the science community feels that way. 17:00:18 13 And if we don't even have that option in 17:00:21 14 here, it's going to raise a lot of questions. 17:00:23 15 Also I think, although all of us 17:00:27 16 agree you should add the technology program, 17:00:29 17 the fact of life is that it's not in the 17:00:33 18 current program of reference. So it's really 17:00:38 19 not a program of reference if we add it to 17:00:44 20 it. 17:00:44 21 You know, I don't know. It's a tough 17:00:44 22 call, but my leaning would be to keep a pure 17:00:44 23 program of reference and live with more 17:00:52 24 options. 17:00:52 25 MR. GREASON: My suggestion actually 17:00:52 208 1 is we leave the program of record options in 17:00:52 2 but we state fairly clearly they are there 17:01:01 3 for reference and all of our going forward 17:01:01 4 suggestions are below that triple line. 17:01:01 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, I had thought 17:01:05 6 of that too. You don't even count those. 17:01:05 7 Yeah. Those are -- we're saying that they're 17:01:10 8 not doable, they're for reference. 17:01:10 9 MR. GREASON: Okay. 17:01:10 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: I like that. 17:01:13 11 DR. RIDE: But then I guess that I'd 17:01:13 12 ask whether -- you know, by the end of the 17:01:18 13 day, are we going to try to reduce this 17:01:18 14 number of scenarios some through whatever 17:01:22 15 deliberations and wisdom we want to apply, or 17:01:26 16 are we planning to come out of today with, 17:01:31 17 you know, sort of a broad set of scenarios 17:01:35 18 that we intend to carry forward? 17:01:37 19 You know, the question is, at some 17:01:42 20 level, whether we think we need -- you know, 17:01:45 21 we're at the stage where we can, you know, 17:01:47 22 talk about whether we think we need to have 17:01:49 23 an option that de-orbits the ISS in the 17:01:52 24 options that we take forward to the decision 17:01:58 25 makers. 17:02:00 209 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, let me comment, 17:02:00 2 Norm, that another -- because it's a coupled 17:02:02 3 idea, another desire that we have is to show 17:02:06 4 at least two options that are actually in 17:02:12 5 guidance. 17:02:14 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: That are actually 17:02:15 7 what? 17:02:17 8 DR. CRAWLEY: That are within the 17:02:17 9 budget guidance. 17:02:21 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: We've got to do that. 17:02:22 11 DR. CRAWLEY: And almost certainly 17:02:24 12 one of those could be the program of record, 17:02:26 13 splashing the ISS and executing the program 17:02:30 14 as rapidly as it would fit within the budget, 17:02:30 15 which I think is -- 17:02:34 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's another 17:02:34 17 important point. 17:02:36 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 17:02:37 19 MR. GREASON: So 2 and 3B are the 17:02:39 20 only ones we have right now that fall into 17:02:41 21 that category. 17:02:44 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Two and -- yes. 17:02:41 23 That's right. 17:02:46 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: 2 and 3B meet the -- 17:02:46 25 DR. CRAWLEY: 2 and 3B -- we were 17:02:46 210 1 carrying three, you'll recall, that we 17:02:49 2 thought would look not as bad as others 17:02:51 3 within the budget constraint, and one of 17:02:56 4 them, which was the Dash Out of Leo, really 17:02:57 5 didn't make any sense. 17:03:00 6 So the two that we have that are 17:03:01 7 likely within budget or can be made to be 17:03:03 8 within budget are the program of record 17:03:08 9 without the ISS extension and the ISS Focused 17:03:09 10 which has the ISS extension. So it sort of 17:03:13 11 represents the two cases of, you know, how 17:03:18 12 fast you can do anything within the budget, 17:03:21 13 turning off the ISS or leaving the ISS on for 17:03:26 14 another give years. 17:03:30 15 So that would argue we should keep 2 17:03:30 16 and 3B to satisfy the commitment we've made 17:03:34 17 to the White House to present options within 17:03:37 18 budget guidance. 17:03:40 19 MR. GREASON: Well, I'm not again -- 17:03:41 20 I'm not in favor of fewer options just for 17:03:42 21 the sake of few options. But, you know, even 17:03:42 22 I, who's been living with this for a long 17:03:46 23 time, feel like we've got too many things on 17:03:48 24 the Chinese menu. 17:03:51 25 What about taking off Lunar Global? 17:03:55 211 1 DR. CHIAO: Certainly the 17:03:58 2 unconstrained versions of Lunar Global. It 17:04:01 3 looks a lot like program of record. 17:04:01 4 MR. GREASON: And it's just not 17:04:02 5 obvious that from a national -- I mean, let's 17:04:02 6 not kid ourselves. We cannot design, you 17:04:03 7 know, right down to the manifest and the 17:04:07 8 system design and what all of the pieces are 17:04:10 9 anything. 17:04:13 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: I could get with 17:04:13 11 that. 17:04:15 12 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:04:15 13 MR. GREASON: And so we're talking 17:04:15 14 about giving broad-brush guidance, and it's 17:04:18 15 not -- it's pretty obvious that in a world of 17:04:22 16 constrained budgets, even though we may do a 17:04:24 17 lunar lander, it's not going to be Altair. 17:04:30 18 You know, the bunny is not there. 17:04:33 19 DR. CHIAO: Well, along those lines, 17:04:37 20 I mean, what about all of the unconstrained 17:04:37 21 budgets like the ones in yellow? 17:04:41 22 DR. RIDE: Right. 17:04:41 23 DR. AUSTIN: I heard that suggestion 17:04:41 24 earlier, and I think that -- you know, I 17:04:41 25 thought we had consensus that taking 17:04:41 212 1 something forward that is unconstrained and, 17:04:47 2 you know, doesn't factor in the realities of 17:04:47 3 the, you know, budget -- 17:04:53 4 MR. GREASON: Right. 17:04:53 5 DR. AUSTIN: -- implications -- which 17:04:53 6 would not do well overseas, so... 17:04:53 7 DR. CHIAO: We can leave the program 17:04:53 8 of record unconstrained just for reference. 17:04:53 9 MR. GREASON: Okay. 17:04:53 10 DR. RIDE: But then to leave all of 17:04:53 11 the other unconstrained -- 17:04:53 12 DR. CHIAO: You have to leave all of 17:04:53 13 the other unconstrained. 17:05:04 14 MR. GREASON: And then we might have 17:05:04 15 a second order of discussion -- some of 17:05:04 16 these, I think -- Norm already said some of 17:05:04 17 these might want to be constrained to a 17:05:08 18 little bit higher number, and I think there's 17:05:10 19 one that we might want to look at constrained 17:05:12 20 to a little bit lower number. But that's a 17:05:16 21 nuance. 17:05:20 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. That is, I 17:05:20 23 think, a nuance for our purpose. If you get 17:05:20 24 rid of lunar -- I would have no problem 17:05:28 25 getting rid of Lunar Global given what we now 17:05:28 213 1 know. 17:05:28 2 Is there anybody who would argue for 17:05:28 3 keeping Lunar Global? 17:05:28 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, I'm just being -- 17:05:35 5 one of the things that is making the 17:05:35 6 appearance of it being desirable to get rid 17:05:35 7 of Lunar Global is that the only two cases 17:05:44 8 we've actually run are both -- are the 17:05:44 9 unconstrained ones. 17:05:44 10 So if you just sort of read down the 17:05:44 11 list and say let's get rid of the 17:05:44 12 unconstrained ones, that ends up X'ing out 17:05:44 13 both of the Lunar Globals. 17:05:51 14 So what I'm doing, Norm, is I'm just 17:06:00 15 running my eye along the line 8 and the 17:06:00 16 line 1 -- which, if it were true that these 17:06:00 17 were the same program, would have about the 17:06:00 18 same scores -- and there's a few places where 17:06:07 19 they're different and I'm trying to 17:06:07 20 reconstruct in realtime why. 17:06:13 21 But you see there are other things 17:06:13 22 like in 8, in fact, the ISS continues whereas 17:06:16 23 in the POR it doesn't, right, and in 8 17:06:23 24 there's the technology wedge, which in 1 17:06:23 25 there isn't. 17:06:23 214 1 So, in fact, if you -- I think that 17:06:35 2 the way we've done the bookkeeping, 8 is -- 17:06:35 3 not that I'm fighting taking -- getting rid 17:06:35 4 of Lunar Global, but 8 is actually a better 17:06:35 5 proxy for what we think the program of record 17:06:48 6 would look like if we put the ISS extension 17:06:48 7 in and we put the technology wedge in, if you 17:06:48 8 follow that. 17:06:48 9 MR. McALISTER: But it's even worse 17:07:01 10 though. 17:07:01 11 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:07:01 12 MR. McALISTER: It's even worse than 17:07:01 13 the program of record though. 17:07:01 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, it's even worse 17:07:01 15 in what sense? 17:07:01 16 MR. McALISTER: It pushes everything 17:07:01 17 further out. 17:07:01 18 MR. GREASON: Well, we don't know 17:07:01 19 that yet. There's a lot of -- there's a big 17:07:01 20 question mark on some of the -- one of the 17:07:08 21 cost numbers -- 17:07:08 22 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:07:08 23 MR. GREASON: -- that's a big driver 17:07:08 24 on that chart. 17:07:08 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 17:07:08 215 1 MR. GREASON: But what I do think -- 17:07:08 2 versus program of record is not so obvious. 17:07:16 3 But when you compare Lunar Global to 17:07:16 4 Deep Space, it is obvious. 17:07:16 5 DR. CRAWLEY: That's right. 17:07:16 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 17:07:16 7 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:07:16 8 MR. GREASON: You know, the -- 17:07:16 9 DR. CRAWLEY: You know, I would take 17:07:16 10 the -- you know, correcting for this change 17:07:22 11 of the ISS and the technology line, I would 17:07:22 12 take the friendly amendment that Jeff has 17:07:27 13 proposed, that -- I think that the creation 17:07:29 14 of Lunar Global was an attempt to see if sort 17:07:29 15 of a different strategy for exploring the 17:07:37 16 Moon would produce significantly different 17:07:40 17 value or significantly different cost, and I 17:07:40 18 think that in the first approximation it 17:07:42 19 didn't. 17:07:49 20 So that at the sort of -- I wish it 17:07:49 21 were down as low as 30,000 feet -- 100,000 17:07:49 22 foot view that the White House will take of 17:07:53 23 this those would probably be viewed in the 17:07:53 24 same -- 17:07:53 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: Subtleties. 17:07:53 216 1 DR. CRAWLEY: -- as subtlety -- as 17:07:57 2 minor variants. 17:07:57 3 MR. GREASON: And now that we've 17:08:03 4 enhanced Deep Space with the off-ramp for 17:08:03 5 lunar presence -- 17:08:09 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 17:08:09 7 MR. GREASON: -- it really becomes a 17:08:09 8 manifesting nuance that NASA will spend a 17:08:09 9 man-century on for every year that we've 17:08:12 10 thought about this -- 17:08:13 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 17:08:13 12 MR. GREASON: -- figuring out exactly 17:08:15 13 which order of going to exactly which of 17:08:16 14 these destinations -- 17:08:20 15 DR. CRAWLEY: That's right. 17:08:20 16 MR. GREASON: -- is actually optimal. 17:08:22 17 DR. CRAWLEY: And, in fact, to be 17:08:23 18 completely fair and open, the actual program 17:08:25 19 of record -- the guys in Houston who think 17:08:28 20 about this every day -- still have, you know, 17:08:31 21 variants that are not dissimilar from 17:08:33 22 Deep Space within the trade space they're 17:08:37 23 working on, knowing that it's, you know, five 17:08:41 24 years away from making that decision. 17:08:41 25 So I agree with Jeff. I think that 17:08:46 217 1 we would not -- we would not lose anything by 17:08:46 2 taking those off. 17:08:52 3 MR. GREASON: Well, if we do that and 17:08:52 4 we took off unconstrained options with a 17:09:00 5 caveat I'm about to come to, we'd have a 17:09:00 6 reasonable set. 17:09:07 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 17:09:07 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Before we do the 17:09:07 9 bookkeeping, let's talk about Option 10. 17:09:07 10 MR. GREASON: That's the caveat. 17:09:12 11 DR. RIDE: That's the one, yeah. 17:09:12 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Dr. Ride, do you want 17:09:12 13 to talk to us about Option 10? 17:09:18 14 DR. RIDE: I'm not sure. I think 17:09:18 15 that, you know, from the perspective that 17:09:21 16 we've had just in the last four days where 17:09:21 17 we've been focused on the numbers and trying 17:09:29 18 to see whether these fit under any reasonable 17:09:29 19 budget assumption over the next few years, we 17:09:35 20 have not done the runs yet, so we don't know 17:09:37 21 how bad this is, but just knowing the 17:09:41 22 elements that built it up and the numbers 17:09:45 23 that go into the elements that built it up, 17:09:48 24 it's pretty clear that it's going to be worse 17:09:51 25 in a budget sense -- probably considerably 17:09:53 218 1 worse than any of the budgets that we've 17:09:56 2 looked at. 17:10:01 3 I think just a rough order of 17:10:02 4 magnitude that some of the NASA folks have 17:10:05 5 been carrying around in their heads is that 17:10:10 6 it's about a factor of two more than the 17:10:14 7 program of record, and, you know, for our 17:10:16 8 purposes today, that's not a horrible number 17:10:19 9 to be using. 17:10:22 10 So I think the decision that we have 17:10:26 11 to make on this particular one is whether we 17:10:26 12 want to consider it on the merits of the 17:10:31 13 option independent of how much it costs or 17:10:31 14 whether we want to say right now it is -- you 17:10:36 15 know, it's just quite a ways outside -- I 17:10:41 16 mean, it's way outside of the budget guidance 17:10:44 17 that we've been given so we could take it off 17:10:47 18 the table. 17:10:51 19 And I actually don't have -- I'm not 17:10:52 20 sure I have an opinion on that -- 17:10:56 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, Sally -- 17:10:56 22 DR. RIDE: -- on that yet. I almost 17:10:59 23 hate to get rid of it at this stage. 17:11:01 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: My leaning would be 17:11:04 25 to carry items that have merit. And if -- 17:11:05 219 1 the decision maker will go to the life cycle 17:11:09 2 cost column first and go down to it and cross 17:11:09 3 out the big ones and immediately focus on the 17:11:11 4 ones that are left. So I don't think they're 17:11:14 5 going to wind up with ten items to consider. 17:11:20 6 MR. GREASON: Well, I'd like to 17:11:24 7 discuss the merit of that option. 17:11:24 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Go ahead. 17:11:24 9 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:11:24 10 MR. GREASON: You know, I have 17:11:28 11 dreamed of going to Mars my whole life, and I 17:11:33 12 think the most destructive thing that we 17:11:36 13 could do as a nation that would put the 17:11:36 14 chance of actually extending human 17:11:38 15 civilization to Mars off for a generation, if 17:11:40 16 not forever, would be to do a headlong rush 17:11:44 17 to Mars right now. And the reason for that 17:11:51 18 is, you know, look at where we are now with 17:11:51 19 the Moon. 17:11:54 20 You know, smart people who've 17:11:57 21 followed this program their entire lives are 17:11:58 22 saying we can never do anything to make it 17:12:00 23 affordable to go to the Moon because we know 17:12:04 24 how that's going to be done and it's very 17:12:08 25 expensive. Now, I don't agree with that. 17:12:12 220 1 But that's the result. That's what happens 17:12:17 2 when you go a bridge too far and you say, 17:12:17 3 never mind what it costs, you know, let's 17:12:24 4 just do it. 17:12:24 5 And if we go to Mars in a hurry with 17:12:24 6 the technology that we have today, with the 17:12:32 7 architectures that we have today, with the 17:12:32 8 lack of time and investment to develop the 17:12:32 9 in-space infrastructure that we would need to 17:12:38 10 do this in an affordable way, it's literally 17:12:38 11 $2 billion per footprint, never mind the 17:12:47 12 development costs, the recurring costs, you 17:12:50 13 know. And I simply can't believe that for a 17:12:55 14 generation we're going to sustain that and 17:12:56 15 then when we get there not say, great, 17:12:59 16 mission accomplished, there's always a next 17:13:01 17 election, you know, let's stop. And that 17:13:02 18 would be a disaster. 17:13:05 19 So I don't think that the option of 17:13:05 20 going there this way -- I want to go to Mars 17:13:08 21 but not this way. I want to go to Mars the 17:13:12 22 right way, which is let's invest in the 17:13:16 23 buildup of infrastructure, let's invest in 17:13:20 24 the buildup of transportation, let's invest 17:13:26 25 in the buildup of technology so that we have 17:13:26 221 1 some idea of how we actually want to do it. 17:13:26 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let me play -- well, 17:13:34 3 go ahead, Chris. Then I'd like to play the 17:13:34 4 devil's advocate. 17:13:34 5 DR. CHYBA: Thank you. I'm 17:13:34 6 comfortable with where we're coming out, but 17:13:34 7 I want to make a kind of brief summary 17:13:42 8 statement to actually test whether I'm 17:13:42 9 comfortable with it. 17:13:48 10 What we're about to do, as we're 17:13:48 11 going down this direction, is to say to the 17:13:48 12 White House that, okay, you've got the 17:13:48 13 program of record scenarios for reference, 17:13:56 14 those involve a robust lunar program but, you 15 know, they all look absurd, they're either 16 way outside of the budget guidance or you 17 don't actually do anything within the time 18 scales we're looking at, Lunar Global and 19 Mars, they either look like the program of 20 record or Mars is impossible within, you 17:14:08 21 know, twice the budget of the program of 17:14:09 22 record. 17:14:11 23 So basically all of the options we're 17:14:11 24 going to present to the White House are 17:14:14 25 Deep Space options. Now, admittedly they 17:14:16 222 1 have off-ramps for lunar surface exploration. 17:14:21 2 But basically -- here are your options, 17:14:24 3 they're Deep Space options, oh, and by the 17:14:24 4 way, we've taken Ares I off of the table. 17:14:27 5 I just want to make it clear that 17:14:33 6 we're -- you know, in terms of presenting 17:14:33 7 options to the White House, in some sense, 17:14:38 8 we're presenting a fairly limited suite of 17:14:38 9 options to them. 17:14:38 10 DR. CRAWLEY: I don't think that's 17:14:44 11 factually quite correct, Chris. 17:14:44 12 DR. CHYBA: Great. Correct me. 17:14:44 13 DR. CRAWLEY: I think that what we've 17:14:48 14 agreed -- at least in my notes, Norm -- is 17:14:48 15 that when we decided to take the program of 17:14:52 16 record unconstrained and the program of 17:14:52 17 record risk adjusted -- 2$ -- off, we agreed 17:14:58 18 that we would replace it with the program of 17:14:58 19 record with the technology program and the 17:15:06 20 extension of the ISS, so that we've 17:15:06 21 essentially used that to carry the lunar 17:15:06 22 program. And there's still the one that we 17:15:15 23 penciled back in, No. 5, which is basically 17:15:15 24 the shuttle-derived way of doing that same 17:15:25 25 program. 17:15:25 223 1 So there are actually two programs that 17:15:25 2 lead to something like the current lunar 17:15:25 3 exploration strategy which differ primarily 17:15:35 4 in launch vehicle, and there are three 17:15:35 5 variants that are something like the Flexible 17:15:35 6 which differ primarily in exploration. 17:15:46 7 DR. CHYBA: And one of those 17:15:46 8 categories is 1, right, the program of record 17:15:46 9 plus ISS extension? No. That was a 17:15:46 10 commercial crew, wasn't it? 17:15:55 11 Okay. I just want to understand 17:15:55 12 where we stand. 17:15:55 13 DR. CRAWLEY: That was left -- that 17:15:55 14 was ambiguous in our discussion, whether in 17:15:55 15 that putting -- you know, modifying the 17:16:04 16 program of record to put in the technology 17:16:04 17 wedge and extend the ISS, we left the Ares I 17:16:12 18 in -- or we took it out? The sensitivity 17:16:12 19 analysis would say that would not be a good 17:16:12 20 trade. 17:16:19 21 DR. RIDE: It would say that. It 17:16:19 22 would say commercial crew would be a better 17:16:19 23 trade for that. 17:16:19 24 DR. CRAWLEY: So then maybe if -- 17:16:19 25 DR. RIDE: So then why don't we 17:16:27 224 1 discuss -- I had kind of missed that we were 17:16:27 2 keeping that program of record but with ISS 17:16:27 3 extended and technology line in. 17:16:34 4 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. I think that was 17:16:34 5 just -- I don't know that we had actually 17:16:34 6 adopted that. We were discussing it. 17:16:42 7 MR. GREASON: Yeah. That was just 17:16:42 8 discussion. 17:16:42 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh, okay. 17:16:42 10 DR. RIDE: Right. 17:16:42 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, I was taking 17:16:42 12 notes on the discussion, so I wrote it down. 17:16:42 13 MR. GREASON: If we wished, based on 17:16:53 14 what we learned, to sort of -- to look at 17:16:53 15 what would be reasonable with more money for 17:16:53 16 something looking like the program of record, 17:16:53 17 I think, based on what we learned, it looks 17:17:01 18 like 3B with more money. 17:17:01 19 DR. RIDE: Yes. 17:17:01 20 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. 17:17:01 21 DR. RIDE: That's right. 17:17:15 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that's right. 17:17:15 23 DR. RIDE: That's right. 17:17:15 24 DR. CRAWLEY: As you start changing 17:17:15 25 these, you know, one starts looking like the 17:17:15 225 1 other. 17:17:15 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 17:17:15 3 MR. McALISTER: You can see that with 17:17:15 4 a bunch of them. 17:17:15 5 DR. RIDE: Because, you know -- 17:17:15 6 you're exactly right. 3B, it does tack on to 17:17:15 7 something close to the program of record. 17:17:27 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Did 3B have the robust 17:17:27 9 technology program in it? 17:17:27 10 DR. RIDE: It does. 17:17:27 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah, it does. Okay. 17:17:27 12 DR. RIDE: It's got the robust 17:17:27 13 technology. It's got commercial crew, 17:17:27 14 because we did that trade and the commercial 17:17:27 15 crew won out. 17:17:39 16 And we actually looked at the less 17:17:39 17 constrained version of this, and it did get 17:17:39 18 you back to human lunar return sometime in 17:17:39 19 the late 2020s -- I don't remember -- 2028 17:17:54 20 or -- 17:17:54 21 MR. GREASON: So if we wanted to add 17:17:54 22 an option that's more POR-like but still 17:17:54 23 makes sense, a 3B+ might make -- might be 17:17:54 24 that option. 17:18:04 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. And, in fact, it 17:18:04 226 1 ends up having the same parameters as the one 17:18:04 2 I jotted down. 17:18:04 3 MR. GREASON: Yes. 17:18:04 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Because they would be 17:18:04 5 both based on the program of record, they 17:18:04 6 would both include the ISS, they would both 17:18:04 7 include the technology program and they would 17:18:12 8 both include commercial crew. 17:18:12 9 MR. GREASON: Right. 17:18:12 10 DR. CRAWLEY: So we just arrived at 17:18:12 11 it from two different angles. 17:18:21 12 MR. GREASON: Okay. 17:18:21 13 DR. CRAWLEY: So the easiest thing, 17:18:21 14 for the purposes of annotation, is just to -- 17:18:21 15 is to add a 3B$ to this sheet, which is the 17:18:21 16 3B allowed to go to the -- 17:18:28 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 17:18:28 18 DR. CRAWLEY: -- above guidance 17:18:28 19 level. 17:18:28 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. I saw Bo, 17:18:28 21 and then Leroy and then myself. 17:18:40 22 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. Ed, I'm 17:18:40 23 looking at the scenarios, and the Deep Space, 17:18:40 24 they only have Mars flyby, right, all of 17:18:47 25 them? 17:18:47 227 1 DR. CRAWLEY: That's what's been 17:18:47 2 budgeted into them, that's right. 17:18:53 3 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. 17:18:53 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Because there's a 17:18:53 5 significant technology investment in budget 17:18:53 6 to get to the next step. 17:18:57 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: But they could all 17:18:57 8 lead to Mars. 17:18:57 9 DR. CRAWLEY: They lead to Mars, 17:18:57 10 that's right. 17:18:57 11 MR. BEJMUK: They lead to Mars. 17:18:57 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: They just don't do it 17:18:57 13 during the period of time we looked at. 17:19:05 14 MR. BEJMUK: During the period of 17:19:05 15 time, okay. 17:19:05 16 So I think we should not recommend 17:19:05 17 that Americans don't plan to go to Mars. 17:19:13 18 This would be like, you know -- I feel like 17:19:13 19 we are capitulating -- I know we are -- money 17:19:22 20 is big and times are tough. You know, I know 17:19:22 21 all of that. But, you know, things may 17:19:22 22 change, or they will change -- conditional 17:19:32 23 probability, right. There's something that 17:19:32 24 says if things are really rotten right now, 17:19:32 25 they won't stay that way; if things are real 17:19:32 228 1 good, they won't stay that way either. 17:19:39 2 So I think it's absolutely important 17:19:39 3 that this -- in my opinion, that this panel 17:19:39 4 does recommend that we -- that Americans go 17:19:45 5 to Mars. And whether it's -- and I, you 17:19:45 6 know -- Jeff, you and I very infrequently 17:19:51 7 fail to see eye to eye, but in this case, I 17:19:51 8 do. 17:19:57 9 You've got to work on the technology 17:19:57 10 so we can have a more reasonable way to 17:19:57 11 getting to Mars, but by God, we ought to plan 17:19:57 12 to get to Mars, you know. We would sort of 17:20:07 13 like fail to -- we would recognize that we 17:20:07 14 are -- somebody said we would recognize that 17:20:07 15 we are less than we used to be, you know, and 17:20:07 16 I don't think that we should do that. 17:20:13 17 So I think we ought to have to go to 17:20:18 18 Mars one way or another. 17:20:18 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Leroy... 17:20:23 20 DR. CHIAO: I just wanted to say, 17:20:23 21 first of all, I love Mars too. I love the 17:20:25 22 Moon. When I was selected by NASA to be an 17:20:28 23 astronaut in 1990, it was looking actually 17:20:32 24 like I might have a shot at going to Mars, 17:20:35 25 and I certainly thought at a minimum I'd have 17:20:35 229 1 a pretty good shot at going to the Moon. I 17:20:36 2 never dreamed that 19 years later I'd be on 17:20:40 3 an Augustine commission. 17:20:40 4 But I agree with -- I want to go to 17:20:47 5 Mars, but I agree with Jeff. If we go to 17:20:51 6 Mars, it should be done the right way. 17:20:51 7 But I also agree with Bo. It's not 17:20:56 8 something we should give up on. So I think 17:20:56 9 we should carry this because I think it's 17:21:02 10 important that we do keep that goal. 17:21:02 11 But I also think it's important to 17:21:02 12 put the costs down at what we really think it 17:21:09 13 would be to do it right and present that, if 17:21:09 14 not as anoption, then as a point of reference 17:21:18 15 just like the program of record with the 17:21:18 16 unconstrained budget. You know, let the 17:21:18 17 decision makers know what it really would 17:21:18 18 cost. So I think it's important to keep -- 17:21:27 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally, did you want 17:21:27 20 to make -- I'm sorry. 17:21:27 21 DR. CHIAO: No. I'm sorry. I was 17:21:27 22 just saying I think it's important to keep 17:21:27 23 that option. 17:21:27 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally, did you want 17:21:27 25 to say something? 17:21:27 230 1 DR. RIDE: I actually think that's a 17:21:27 2 good point, and going -- taking it through 17:21:37 3 the budgeting exercise so that we've got a 17:21:37 4 cost on what we think is the program, I 17:21:37 5 think, would be valuable, knowing that it's 17:21:37 6 not, you know, the best costing of a trip to 17:21:51 7 Mars, but at least it puts a reference out 17:21:51 8 there for us. 17:21:51 9 What I was going to say was that, you 17:21:51 10 know, it seems to me that -- you know, I'm 17:21:51 11 not nearly as deeply involved in the 17:22:05 12 Deep Space scenario as the Beyond LEO group 17:22:05 13 has been, you know, but it strikes me that, 17:22:05 14 you know, that does not take Mars off of the 17:22:13 15 table. That doesn't leave out the -- 17:22:13 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's true. 17:22:13 17 DR. RIDE: -- possibility of an 17:22:13 18 off-ramp to Mars once the technology has 17:22:21 19 been -- 17:22:21 20 DR. CHIAO: Sure. 17:22:21 21 DR. RIDE: -- developed, and, in 17:22:21 22 fact, it actually develops -- you know, it's 17:22:21 23 got the technology line, but it also helps 17:22:29 24 develop some of the in-space infrastructures 17:22:29 25 that actually have a shot at making it much 17:22:29 231 1 more reasonable, much more feasible. 17:22:59 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: My turn. 17:22:59 3 MR. GREASON: Well, I have -- 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: My turn. Okay. 5 MR. GREASON: Do you want to go 6 or I'll go? It's your call. 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: I'll call on Norm. 8 Much of what I wanted to say has been 17:22:59 9 said, but I'd like -- at the risk of like in 17:22:59 10 football getting a penalty for piling on, I'd 17:22:59 11 like to do that. 17:22:59 12 The idea of having a Mars program 17:22:59 13 that's done properly -- we shouldn't do it if 17:22:59 14 we can't do it properly, clearly. So whatever 17:23:14 15 we define should be, quote, unquote, properly 17:23:14 16 carried out. 17:23:14 17 So why not show it and let the 17:23:14 18 numbers speak for themselves, and if the 17:23:14 19 numbers speak for themselves and they show it 17:23:14 20 comes in very late, that's fine, so be it. 17:23:28 21 Sally's point -- and the point I've 17:23:28 22 been making -- I think we have some 17:23:28 23 wordsmithing to do to make clear that these 17:23:28 24 intermediate -- this middle set of options do 17:23:44 25 include Mars. They're just not in the time 17:23:44 232 1 frame that we've talked about. We've tended 17:23:44 2 to gloss over that. 17:23:44 3 And then, lastly, there's a 17:23:44 4 substantial body of people who would like to 17:23:44 5 see their option at least looked at who take 17:23:56 6 the point of view that why would you want to 17:23:56 7 go back to the Moon, we did that 40 years 17:23:56 8 ago, we've been there. 17:23:56 9 There's the point of view of that 17:23:56 10 group of people that say, you know, why would 17:24:10 11 you go to L1, are you going to mine fuel at 17:24:10 12 L1 or what are you going to do at L1, why 17:24:10 13 would you want to land on an asteroid for a 17:24:10 14 brief time, kind of like a butterfly landing 17:24:27 15 on a flower, I mean, what's interesting about 17:24:27 16 that. 17:24:27 17 The only really interesting thing is 17:24:27 18 Mars. So it ought to be an option, and let 17:24:27 19 the facts fall where they may. So that would 17:24:27 20 be my argument. 17:24:37 21 Now, who else did I see. 17:24:37 22 Okay. You're going to rebut that. 17:24:37 23 MR. GREASON: No, not really. 17:24:37 24 DR. CRAWLEY: And I have a comment. 17:24:37 25 MR. GREASON: We're in a dilemma 17:24:37 233 1 that's as much driven by our running out of 17:24:37 2 time as anything else. So I'm going to see 17:24:37 3 if I can suggest a way out of it. 17:24:46 4 The basic problem is it's possible to 17:24:46 5 lay out a vision for how -- with the 17:24:51 6 insertion of advanced technology and the 17:24:55 7 insertion of space infrastructure, how you'd 17:24:55 8 get to Mars, and we have a feeling -- and 17:25:00 9 that's as far as I'll take it -- that the 17:25:05 10 beginning steps of that wind up looking not 17:25:12 11 too dissimilar from what we're calling 17:25:12 12 Deep Space. But it is absolutely not within 17:25:18 13 our capability, as a committee in the time 17:25:23 14 available, to attempt to produce a cost and a 17:25:23 15 budget and a schedule for that. 17:25:27 16 We could take on, you know, writing a 17:25:27 17 well-informed piece of science fiction, you 17:25:34 18 know, saying, you know, this is what the 17:25:39 19 future might look like and this is why we're 17:25:39 20 investing in technology and this is how you'd 17:25:45 21 develop from these kinds of capabilities to a 17:25:50 22 real Mars mission. We could probably do 17:25:50 23 that, but I guarantee we're not going to have 17:25:55 24 time to do that and then do manifest and then 17:25:55 25 do budgets and then do schedules. We just 17:25:58 234 1 can't do it. 17:26:04 2 Because part of the problem of 17:26:04 3 depending on advanced technologies and new 17:26:04 4 infrastructure is you aren't completely sure 17:26:11 5 what the world is going to look like after 17:26:11 6 you have them. 17:26:11 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: So -- let's see -- 17:26:19 8 you're suggesting basically you'd take 10 off 17:26:19 9 and deal with it as a discussion item? 17:26:19 10 MR. GREASON: I'm not committed 17:26:28 11 emotionally to whether 10 is on or off. 17:26:28 12 I feel we're doing a disservice to 17:26:28 13 our finding that we made as a committee that 17:26:36 14 we -- that human civilization getting to Mars 17:26:36 15 is why we do this. I feel we're doing a huge 17:26:36 16 disservice to that by holding up, you know, 17:26:45 17 the current design reference architecture 17:26:45 18 based on minimal investment of technology and 17:26:54 19 saying that's how you'd get to Mars, now 17:26:54 20 we've put a budget number on it, now it's 17:26:54 21 obviously unaffordable, so we shouldn't do 17:27:01 22 it. I don't think that's the posture we're 17:27:01 23 trying to get in. 17:27:01 24 I think the posture we're trying to 17:27:01 25 get in is we think it's possible to get to 17:27:01 235 1 Mars, we think that we're laying out what the 17:27:14 2 first couple of steps on that road are, we 17:27:14 3 know we don't know what Steps 4 through 10 17:27:14 4 are, although we might have some ideas. 17:27:14 5 Maybe instead of laying up this straw 17:27:29 6 man just to let the budget office knock it 17:27:29 7 over, maybe we would be better served by 17:27:29 8 saying qualitatively here's the steps that 17:27:29 9 come after. 17:27:43 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Norm, if I can, I tend 17:27:43 11 to agree with Jeff. Because I think if you 17:27:43 12 cost it with the current approach and the 17:27:43 13 current technology, you would leave an 17:27:56 14 impression that this was an unattainable 17:27:56 15 thing, much as it was left in 1991. 17:27:56 16 And I actually think that what we 17:27:56 17 should do is we should frame both of the 17:28:05 18 principal options we have left, which are 17:28:05 19 basically some version of Deep Space and some 17:28:05 20 version of Lunar Exploration, with the strong 17:28:05 21 flavor and the strong recommendation that 17:28:12 22 they actually be treated as preparatory steps 17:28:12 23 to going to Mars. 17:28:19 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. See, that's 17:28:19 25 been the point I've been after all along -- 17:28:19 236 1 is that we don't say that. They don't even 17:28:19 2 have that in a title. 17:28:31 3 MR. GREASON: Okay. Well, then 17:28:31 4 here's a concrete proposal. We can't cost 17:28:31 5 it, so we can't score it, because it's not a 17:28:31 6 different scenario. 17:28:31 7 Let's take the action item to write 17:28:45 8 out an exemplary scenario of what the steps 17:28:45 9 from here to Mars, given the technology 17:28:45 10 investment, might look like. 17:28:45 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: And then -- so 10 17:28:45 12 would not be quantitatively evaluated. It 17:29:02 13 would be this carefully written piece. But I 17:29:02 14 could live with that -- 17:29:02 15 MR. GREASON: It's not an option. 17:29:02 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- only if -- 17:29:02 17 MR. GREASON: It's a discussion about 17:29:02 18 how you get from the options above to Mars. 17:29:02 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I could live 17:29:02 20 with that only if you make very clear that on 17:29:22 21 Options 6 and 7 that they aim at Mars -- that 17:29:22 22 they do aim at Mars, and it's -- the problem 17:29:22 23 with it now is it sounds like they flyby Mars 17:29:22 24 and call it a day. 17:29:22 25 DR. AUSTIN: Norm, just one point of 17:29:22 237 1 clarification. I think the issue I have with 17:29:22 2 Option 10 is that we don't think that the 17:29:44 3 approach of Mars Direct is the right way to 17:29:44 4 be successful in getting to Mars. 17:29:44 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's true too. 17:29:44 6 DR. AUSTIN: I think what we -- I 17:29:44 7 thought what we were saying was that the 17:29:44 8 Deep Space options do lay the first steps to 17:29:44 9 how would you smartly plan to go to Mars. 17:29:44 10 What we failed to do is highlight 17:29:44 11 that, you know, our expectation is that you 17:29:44 12 would, in fact, execute those options with a 17:30:20 13 goal of getting to Mars, but that -- you 17:30:20 14 know, what you would get in the budget is the 17:30:20 15 flyby but -- and all of the other steps that 17:30:20 16 you would take, the technology -- you know, 17:30:20 17 all of the other planning that you would do 17:30:20 18 would be with an eye toward getting 17:30:20 19 yourselves to a point of being able to land 17:30:20 20 on Mars. 17:30:20 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, you know, if we 17:30:20 22 make clear that Deep Space is a Mars ultimate 17:30:20 23 option -- 17:30:20 24 DR. AUSTIN: I'm okay with that. 17:30:20 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I can get with 17:30:20 238 1 that. 17:30:20 2 DR. CRAWLEY: If we had a white board 17:30:20 3 here or a flip chart, I'd draw a little 17:30:20 4 sketch, so I'll draw it in the air, which is 17:30:20 5 really a set of future steps. 17:30:20 6 You know, the first step is either 17:31:03 7 something like the Lunar Exploration strategy 17:31:03 8 as proposed or something like Deep Space and 17:31:03 9 then -- then in some time Deep Space actually 17:31:03 10 has a branch back to Lunar and, in one or the 17:31:03 11 other way, they're aimed at going to Mars, 17:31:03 12 but it's really for the next Augustine 17:31:03 13 report. 17:31:03 14 You know, it's our responsibility to 17:31:03 15 do the preparatory work, and there are 17:31:03 16 basically two opportunities here to lay out 17:31:03 17 pathways to the preparatory work. 17:31:03 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I think it 17:31:03 19 gets to be a nuance that -- I would not be 17:31:03 20 happy saying here's a program for the next 17:31:03 21 15 years and, when that's done, we'll get on 17:31:03 22 with getting to Mars. 17:31:36 23 I would be happier with a program 17:31:36 24 that says we're going to go to Mars and 17:31:36 25 here's the first 15 years of the way to get 17:31:36 239 1 there. 17:31:36 2 DR. CRAWLEY: I think that's well 17:31:36 3 framed. 17:31:36 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Can you see the 17:31:36 5 difference? 17:31:36 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. 17:31:36 7 MR. GREASON: If you would -- if you 17:31:36 8 can accept that anything we say after that is 17:31:36 9 going to depend on a lot of assumptions about 17:31:36 10 how the technologies shake out and that will 17:31:36 11 tie back into the technology section where it 17:31:36 12 points out that we have multiple options for 17:31:36 13 each one of these capabilities, we can tell a 17:31:36 14 story like that. 17:31:36 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I think we can 17:31:36 16 too. Okay. 17:31:36 17 DR. CRAWLEY: Let me try and 17:31:36 18 summarize where I think we are. 17:32:10 19 That we have two options left on the 17:32:10 20 table which we will work on to the point 17:32:10 21 where they fit within the President's budget 17:32:10 22 guidance, which are 2 and 3B -- the program 17:32:10 23 of record without the ISS extension, without 17:32:10 24 the technology wedge, constrained by the '10 17:32:10 25 budget and the 3B, the ISS Focused, with 17:32:10 240 1 commercial crew, constrained to the '10 17:32:10 2 budget. 17:32:37 3 So those are the two we'll carry 17:32:37 4 forward in the anticipation that those will 17:32:37 5 be the ones that meet guidance. 17:32:37 6 That we'll retain 1 and 2$ just as a 17:32:37 7 reference, that is to say, that's basically 17:32:37 8 the unconstrained POR and the constrained 17:32:37 9 POR -- the plussed up -- the lightly 17:32:37 10 constrained POR. 17:32:37 11 Which is a very nice chart, as Sally 17:32:37 12 used today, to show that if the budget had 17:33:08 13 been about what the budget was expected to 17:33:08 14 be, darned all, if five years later, with all 17:33:08 15 of the sophisticated analysis and the 17:33:08 16 knowledge we have, it's not far from the 17:33:08 17 deadlines that they set. And I think that's 17:33:08 18 a very important message to send in our 17:33:08 19 report but as a reference case. 17:33:08 20 That we expand -- that we create a 3B 17:33:08 21 that allows it to go up to the plussed up 17:33:08 22 budget, which is really the program of record 17:33:45 23 allowed to drift back up in budget from the 17:33:45 24 President's current guidance with the 17:33:45 25 addition of commercial crew, the deletion of 17:33:45 241 1 Ares I, the ISS extension and the technology 17:33:45 2 program. 17:33:45 3 And that 5 is actually a variant of 17:33:45 4 that. 5 is -- that we had to pencil back 17:33:45 5 in -- is really just the change-out of the 17:33:45 6 launch vehicle on that. 17:33:45 7 MR. GREASON: Is 5 going to be 17:33:45 8 unconstrained, FY '10 constrained or loosely 17:34:16 9 constrained? 17:34:16 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Loosely constrained. 17:34:16 11 DR. RIDE: Loosely, yeah. 17:34:16 12 MR. GREASON: Okay. So it's kind of 17:34:16 13 5$? 17:34:16 14 DR. CRAWLEY: It's really 5$, right. 17:34:16 15 Yeah. It's the plussed up budget -- 17:34:16 16 MR. GREASON: Got it. 17:34:16 17 DR. CRAWLEY: -- on 5. 17:34:16 18 And the other major variant is the 17:34:16 19 Deep Space family, which really only varied 17:34:16 20 by the launch vehicle that's used -- the new 17:34:16 21 hydrocarbon vehicle, the shuttle-derived 17:34:16 22 vehicle or the Ares-derived vehicle. 17:34:16 23 So in some senses, Norm -- and that 17:34:50 24 we show the -- that we eliminate the 17:34:50 25 Global Lunar as independent things -- 17:34:50 242 1 independent variants and we put the Mars 17:34:50 2 discussion into the wrapper, that these are 17:34:50 3 ways to get us towards Mars rather than 17:34:50 4 explicitly costing the current technology 17:34:50 5 design reference mission proposal to get to 17:34:50 6 Mars. 17:34:50 7 So, in essence, you could note that 17:34:50 8 we've made sort of sweeping simplification 17:34:50 9 that there are only four -- there are only 17:35:18 10 four options left on the table. There's the 17:35:18 11 two that are within guidance, and there's the 17:35:18 12 two modes of exploration, going to the Moon 17:35:18 13 or Flexible, and the real variation -- the 17:35:18 14 variants within those three -- in those 17:35:18 15 latter two are the launch vehicles switching 17:35:18 16 in and out, which I think we all understand 17:35:18 17 are subject to further refinement of the 17:35:18 18 analysis before we're willing to make a 17:35:18 19 definitive statement about those. 17:35:18 20 Did that sound like a reasonable -- 17:35:43 21 MR. BEJMUK: It's very reasonable as 17:35:43 22 long as you explain what it means -- Mars 17:35:43 23 discussion. You mean identifying it as 17:35:43 24 destination or just discussion? I hope you 17:35:43 25 meant destination. 17:35:43 243 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Destination, yeah. 17:35:43 2 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Because we don't 17:35:43 3 want us to be known as -- 17:35:43 4 DR. CRAWLEY: I was just trying to 17:35:43 5 capture the spirit of what Jeff proposed. 17:35:43 6 MR. BEJMUK: -- a shrinking vision 17:35:43 7 bunch of guys, right. 17:36:05 8 DR. CRAWLEY: No. No shrinking 17:36:05 9 vision here, Bo. 17:36:05 10 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Thank you. 17:36:05 11 MR. GREASON: Yeah. I will state it 17:36:05 12 much more strongly. I think what we just 17:36:05 13 took on is the requirement to show 17:36:05 14 qualitatively how you get from the end state 17:36:05 15 of these -- of this option to human beings on 17:36:05 16 Mars. 17:36:05 17 DR. CHYBA: Or at least one scenario. 17:36:23 18 MR. GREASON: Yeah. 17:36:23 19 DR. CHYBA: Because as you said, we 17:36:23 20 don't actually know how we're going to do 17:36:23 21 that. 17:36:23 22 MR. GREASON: Right. We need to show 17:36:23 23 that there is at least one way. 17:36:23 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Existence theorem. 17:36:23 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So, Norm, we've 17:36:23 244 1 now made considerable progress in the sense 17:36:23 2 that we have started with about -- one, two, 17:36:38 3 three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 17:36:38 4 ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen -- 14 of 17:36:38 5 these -- actually 16 or 17 before we took a 17:36:38 6 few off, and we're now down to really about 17:36:38 7 four families of options, the two constrained 17:36:54 8 ones and the two which we're going to allow 17:36:54 9 to the plussed up line, and those two 17:36:54 10 families really differ primarily in the 17:36:54 11 launch to LEO vehicle, that we work as a 17:36:54 12 variant within them. 17:37:06 13 So you could actually say we're down 17:37:06 14 to four options subject to more analysis of 17:37:06 15 the launch vehicle. 17:37:06 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Plus our reference 17:37:06 17 cases. 17:37:06 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Plus the reference 17:37:06 19 cases. 17:37:20 20 MR. McALISTER: So we have 2, 3B, 5$ 17:37:20 21 and basically everything that's in yellow, 22 because they're all versions of Deep Space? 23 MR. GREASON: No. 24 DR. AUSTIN: Some of them are 25 unconstrained. 245 1 MR. McALISTER: Oh, take out the 2 unconstrained. 3 MR. GREASON: Let me try and give you 4 a complete list. 5 MR. McALISTER: Okay. 17:37:20 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, how about if we 17:37:20 7 go from -- 17:37:20 8 MR. GREASON: Yes, sir. 17:37:20 9 DR. CRAWLEY: -- my list. 17:37:20 10 No. 1 has become a reference. 17:37:29 11 No. 2 is in as one that will be 17:37:29 12 within guidance. 17:37:29 13 No. 2$ has become a reference, the 17:37:29 14 POR risk adjusted. 17:37:29 15 3B is in as one that will be within 17:37:37 16 guidance. 17:37:44 17 3B$, which was created, is 3B allowed 17:37:44 18 to rise up to the loose guidance, the 17:37:44 19 plus-up. 17:37:51 20 5 is still in, which is really 5$. 17:37:51 21 It's the shuttle extension version of that 17:37:55 22 which will be allowed to rise to the plus-up. 17:38:00 23 MR. McALISTER: I'm sorry, Ed. 3B$ 17:38:04 24 is in or out? 17:38:04 25 DR. CRAWLEY: 3B$ is in. 17:38:04 246 1 MR. McALISTER: Okay. As is 5$? 17:38:04 2 DR. CRAWLEY: As is 5$. 17:38:08 3 MR. McALISTER: Got you. 17:38:08 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Those are -- the dollar 17:38:08 5 sign implies plussed up budgets. 17:38:14 6 6 Deep Space is gone because we're 17:38:14 7 not keeping any unconstrained budget other 17:38:14 8 than the reference cases. 17:38:20 9 6$ Deep Space plussed up is still in. 17:38:20 10 7 is gone because it's unconstrained. 17:38:20 11 7$ is in. 17:38:25 12 7S Deep Space and the SDV is gone 17:38:29 13 because it's unconstrained. 17:38:33 14 And 7S$ is still in. 17:38:40 15 But those are all really the same 17:38:40 16 option -- all of those in yellow that are 17:38:40 17 left are the same option with three different 17:38:47 18 launchers, just as 3B$ and 5B$ are really the 17:38:47 19 same program with two different launchers. 17:38:54 20 MR. McALISTER: And then -- keep 17:38:54 21 going. 17:38:54 22 DR. CRAWLEY: And 8 is gone and 9 is 17:38:54 23 gone because they've collapsed into the other 17:39:00 24 lunar strategy, 3B$ and 5B$. 17:39:09 25 And 10 has become the objective and 17:39:09 247 1 the path on which we seek to place ourselves 17:39:15 2 rather than an independent option. 17:39:21 3 MR. McALISTER: Okay. While everyone 17:39:21 4 is assessing that, let me make a couple of 17:39:21 5 quick announcements. 17:39:21 6 We have handed out this paper to the 17:39:23 7 members of the public to facilitate the 17:39:26 8 discussion, but I want to just caveat that by 17:39:32 9 saying this was a snapshot in time done by a 17:39:32 10 subset of the committee. 17:39:37 11 So this is not in any way a final 17:39:37 12 output. So when people take this printout 17:39:37 13 out from the meeting, this is not the way we 17:39:43 14 ended up. 17:39:43 15 Secondly, we're holding the press 17:39:49 16 event until after we're done, which hopefully 17:39:49 17 will be in about 30 minutes or so. 17:39:49 18 And the presentations that we gave 19 today -- Ed's first one, Sally's and 20 Wanda's -- as well as this chart are on the 21 website -- not this chart yet -- the other 22 three are all on the website currently as of 23 now. 14:27:15 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: If this chart goes on 14:27:15 25 a website, it needs to be caveated -- 14:27:29 248 1 MR. McALISTER: Right. 14:27:53 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- pretty strongly. 14:27:54 3 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. We haven't put 14:28:04 4 that up yet. I was going to wait for that. 14:28:18 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Be sure that 14:28:25 6 gets caveated, or we'll mislead the world. 14:28:28 7 MR. McALISTER: Right. 14:28:41 8 MR. GREASON: Do we still need to now 14:28:47 9 go back and have the scoring discussion on 14:28:52 10 those that -- those which survived? 14:29:00 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. That's the 14:29:08 12 thing to do. 14:31:11 13 MR. GREASON: Okay. 14:31:13 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: And -- let's see. I 14:31:14 15 just want to double-check here. 7S$, the 14:31:28 16 last of the yellow ones -- 15:17:03 17 MR. McALISTER: 7S$? 15:17:55 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. That will -- 15:17:59 19 with a plus-up budget has a reasonable shot 15:18:34 20 of being a viable program, if I'm not 15:18:42 21 mistaken. Am I reading that right? 15:19:04 22 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 15:19:10 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Okay. 15:19:14 24 MR. GREASON: All three of them, we 15:20:17 25 think, have a reasonable shot or we wouldn't 15:20:22 249 1 leave them on the list. 15:20:34 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 15:20:43 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. At the plus-up 15:20:53 4 level where the plus-up has some funds on it 15:20:59 5 still. And, you know, they're not going to 15:21:48 6 come in at exactly the same price, but... 15:22:01 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: So those will be our 15:22:19 8 options, and the evaluation, to some extent, 15:22:21 9 will be adjusted based on new facts. 15:22:45 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. 15:22:53 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: But if -- okay. 15:22:55 12 That's the end of that. 15:23:02 13 Why don't we go ahead and discuss -- 15:23:07 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, okay. 15:23:07 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: I would suggest you 15:23:16 16 do it by column just for the ones -- 15:23:17 17 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 15:24:10 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- as Jeff says, that 15:24:12 19 are still on. 15:24:20 20 DR. CRAWLEY: And, Mr. Chairman, you 15:24:24 21 have to give us some guidance here as to -- 15:24:30 22 are we ordering in dinner or -- 15:24:57 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: We're going strong. 15:25:08 24 Let's try that. 15:25:16 25 DR. CRAWLEY: We're going strong, 15:25:19 250 1 okay. 15:25:24 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: For one thing, if you 15:25:37 3 made the ground rule that there are no 15:25:42 4 more -- you can't argue unless there's a 15:25:49 5 difference of two, there are none of these 15:25:55 6 that there are a difference of two. 15:26:11 7 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, it's between your 15:26:20 8 opinion and what these are. 15:26:24 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, I see. 15:26:32 10 DR. CRAWLEY: So just to -- now you 15:26:40 11 have to consult back to Wanda's charts, which 15:26:44 12 are also in front of you. 15:27:01 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 15:27:08 14 DR. CRAWLEY: So, you know, what 15:27:11 15 constitutes a zero, one, two, minus one and 15:27:31 16 minus two for -- let's start with Exploration 15:27:42 17 Preparation, which happens to be Chart 4 in 15:27:53 18 Wanda's charts. 15:28:03 19 And I have in front of me a 15:28:37 20 reference, the OSTP statement of task 15:28:47 21 guidance, which also helps clarify this. 15:28:57 22 So, for example, this one is 15:29:04 23 clarified in the OSTP guidance as overall 15:29:11 24 architecture capability, mission duration, 15:29:20 25 mass delivered to LEO and other selected 15:29:37 251 1 destinations, flexibility, et cetera. 15:29:47 2 So the scale was set up with the 15:30:15 3 intent that line 1 would usually be a zero, 15:30:20 4 which it is in this case, and then the 15:30:29 5 general tendency is that things that are in 15:30:37 6 more highly constrained budgets lose numbers 15:30:48 7 and things that have -- I've got to be 15:30:59 8 careful -- things that have less launch 15:31:07 9 capability lose numbers. That's the general 15:31:15 10 trend in this column. 15:31:23 11 MR. GREASON: That doesn't seem to 15:31:30 12 match Wanda's chart, because some of this is 15:31:34 13 also kind of about its ability to grow. It's 15:31:38 14 not just about how much you throw but -- 15:31:50 15 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:32:00 16 MR. GREASON: -- where it's going 15:32:03 17 from there. 15:32:17 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So tell me what 15:32:22 19 you differ by -- you disagree with by more 15:32:31 20 than one. 15:33:04 21 MR. GREASON: Okay. I think that all 15:33:06 22 of the yellow scenarios -- yellow dollar sign 15:33:11 23 scenarios are a one, and you've got one of 15:33:32 24 them scored as low as a minus one. And I 15:33:40 25 think they all provide exploration beyond LEO 15:33:55 252 1 with the ability to grow and evolve. 15:34:02 2 DR. RIDE: I actually had those 15:34:13 3 circled also because -- 15:34:15 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 15:35:15 5 DR. RIDE: -- I don't quite 15:35:17 6 understand. 15:35:24 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: They should be -- 15:36:04 8 particularly with the discussion we just had, 15:36:07 9 they should be plus ones instead of minus 15:36:12 10 ones, both of those. 15:36:21 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, there's a 15:36:29 12 question -- before we put them all at plus 15:36:36 13 one, there are substantial performance 15:36:41 14 differences amongst these vehicles. 15:36:47 15 So if you scored the ability to grow 15:36:54 16 and expand robustly in the future, you would, 15:36:58 17 I think, have to take into consideration the 15:37:12 18 fact that some vehicles are more capable than 15:37:20 19 other vehicles. 15:37:29 20 DR. RIDE: I'd argue that -- 15:37:51 21 MR. GREASON: But capable is one of 15:37:57 22 those fuzzy words. 15:38:15 23 Because, you know, in the long haul, 15:38:26 24 which is what growth is all about, it's 15:38:31 25 ultimately about dollars per kilogram, and, 15:38:41 253 1 you know, however much budget the nation has 15:38:53 2 got, we can throw that many kilograms. And 15:38:58 3 while I agree there may be differences 15:39:14 4 between these two in cost -- at least in cost 15:39:19 5 effectiveness, it's not at all obvious that, 15:39:35 6 you know, bigger/fewer is better. 15:39:46 7 And I don't think we're smart enough 15:40:01 8 yet to distinguish those shades of gray. So 15:40:04 9 I would just score them all as a one. 15:40:17 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that would be 15:40:23 11 consistent with your position. 15:40:25 12 MR. GREASON: It would. 15:41:14 13 DR. RIDE: But let me add something 15:41:17 14 to that too. 15:41:20 15 You know, the Exploration 15:41:24 16 Preparation, it's not just about the launch 15:42:18 17 vehicle, and the Deep Space, in particular -- 15:42:21 18 you know, these both -- you know, they 15:42:35 19 envision in-space architecture, they envision 15:43:01 20 the improved technology development. 15:43:10 21 You know, so if we're looking beyond 15:43:20 22 just the launch vehicle, then I -- you know, 15:43:25 23 I'd argue that those should be plus one. 15:43:29 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, and that, Sally, 15:43:38 25 was why the one that I was using as the key, 15:43:44 254 1 which is 6, compared to 1 is actually 15:43:53 2 incremented up one. With the same launch 15:44:14 3 vehicle and the same budget, I scored the 15:44:21 4 Deep Space options as more capable or 15:44:31 5 providing more exploration capability, right. 15:44:50 6 But then when you cut the budget -- 15:45:01 7 MR. GREASON: I just don't see budget 15:45:11 8 on the Exploration Preparation scoring 15:45:14 9 matrix. 15:45:20 10 DR. RIDE: Right. 15:45:23 11 DR. AUSTIN: I would also suggest, 15:46:31 12 Ed, that if we eliminated something from the 15:46:43 13 stack that we ought to set the evaluation 15:47:09 14 criteria for the range of options that we've 15:47:18 15 got. 15:47:26 16 You know, giving something a lot of 15:47:29 17 credit that we've already taken off of the 15:47:33 18 list doesn't help us to differentiate between 15:47:47 19 the ones that are left. 15:47:54 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, now we're 15:48:06 21 redefining the list and the evaluation 15:48:10 22 criteria. 15:48:17 23 MR. GREASON: Well, even if we don't 15:48:35 24 go that far, I just -- you know, I'm just 15:48:41 25 reading the chart, and I don't see the 15:48:47 255 1 parameters that you're down-scoring these on 15:49:11 2 there. 15:49:58 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, one of the 15:50:10 4 White House criteria is mass delivered to low 15:50:14 5 Earth orbit. And, in addition, as you 15:50:30 6 understand, these vehicles also have 15:50:34 7 considerably different fairing sizes -- 15:50:41 8 MR. GREASON: Yes. 15:50:54 9 DR. CRAWLEY: -- so that at least in 15:50:57 10 the budgeted case for the hydrocarbon booster 15:52:38 11 it's 6.8 meters compared -- which is already 15:52:53 12 a hammerhead fairing compared to 10 meters 15:53:03 13 without a hammerhead and potentially 15:53:32 14 12 meters with a hammerhead. I quoted an 15:53:40 15 exterior dimension in one case and an 15:54:40 16 interior dimension in another. Forgive me. 15:54:46 17 But the consistent numbers would be 7.2 and 15:54:54 18 10 or 12, right. 15:55:02 19 So, you know, if you want to put big 15:55:11 20 things into space, having a bigger vehicle 15:55:15 21 allows you to put bigger things into space. 15:55:22 22 I mean, that was my rationale for -- 15:55:28 23 DR. RIDE: It's going down. 15:55:43 24 DR. CRAWLEY: You're absolutely 15:55:54 25 right, Sally, that it's not just the launch 15:56:23 256 1 vehicle but the launch vehicle's first stage. 15:56:29 2 But if we were to go back by this 15:56:44 3 same criteria and score the line that's 15:56:51 4 missing, which is 3B$, which is the, you 15:57:01 5 know, exploration of the lunar surface, would 15:57:21 6 you call that a zero or a one? 15:57:41 7 DR. RIDE: Well, let me just point 15:57:52 8 out that now that we've -- I think this is 15:57:55 9 perhaps Wanda's point. 15:58:04 10 Now that we've eliminated some of 15:58:08 11 these scenarios, particularly the 15:58:12 12 unconstrained budget ones, we have none of 15:58:15 13 our supposed scenarios which actually score 15:58:22 14 above zero in Exploration Preparation. So 15:58:37 15 they're not growing our ability to explore, 15:58:45 16 and that just -- I mean, it just doesn't 15:59:15 17 sound right on the face of it. 15:59:19 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. And I -- 15:59:28 19 MR. BEJMUK: In fact, I was just 15:59:28 20 looking at this Deep Space dual Ares Lite 15:59:59 21 with plus-up budget, zero. And I read 16:01:10 22 what -- No. 2 in Exploration Preparation: 16:01:24 23 Develops operational robustness to explore 16:01:39 24 destination beyond LEO. 16:01:51 25 That's the most robust vehicle we 16:02:00 257 1 have in our list. That's the one that gets 16:02:10 2 you to the Moon, about -- I don't know -- 15, 16:02:16 3 20 metric tons on each of the two launches. 16:02:29 4 That's the one that may allow you to convert 16:02:40 5 Altair to hypergolic. That's the one that 16:02:57 6 flies a high-q at 700 psf. 16:03:41 7 I mean, that's the -- that, to me, is 16:09:14 8 robustness -- operational robustness. And I 16:09:30 9 would expect -- I'd argue to have it two 16:09:54 10 instead of zero for that case. 16:10:01 11 DR. CRAWLEY: And which case was 16:10:51 12 that? I'm sorry, Bo. 16:10:55 13 MR. GREASON: 6$. 16:11:47 14 DR. CRAWLEY: 6$. 16:18:37 15 MR. BEJMUK: Where you have zero -- 16:18:43 16 you see, I can't pick on you, Ed, because 16:18:46 17 you're starting to get -- unless I have a 16:31:52 18 beef over two points -- 16:33:34 19 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, no, everybody has 16:33:45 20 been picking on me, for one, so -- 16:33:53 21 MR. BEJMUK: -- that I do disagree by 16:34:42 22 two points, and I think that one should 16:35:14 23 have -- 6$ should have two. It's the most 16:36:14 24 robust case that we have on this list. 16:36:25 25 MR. GREASON: And I differ from Bo 16:36:33 258 1 but only by one. 16:36:40 2 DR. CRAWLEY: See, there you are. 16:36:57 3 DR. RIDE: And I think the other two 16:37:00 4 in the yellow that are left should be plus 16:37:07 5 one. You know, I'm happy -- 16:37:14 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: And I agree with 16:37:19 7 that. 16:37:21 8 DR. RIDE: I'm happy to go with the 16:37:21 9 two on the first one, but the other two 16:37:25 10 should definitely be plus one. 16:37:41 11 DR. CHIAO: Yeah, I agree with that. 16:37:51 12 MR. GREASON: I have no objection. 16:37:59 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Those are with ones 16:38:06 14 that look like you're not doing anything. 16:38:09 15 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, we have to be 16:38:15 16 careful because we also have to do the two 16:38:18 17 that have to be penciled in here, which are 16:38:23 18 3B -- 16:38:31 19 MR. GREASON: Dollar and 5$. 16:38:36 20 DR. CRAWLEY: -- yeah -- 3B$ and 5$, 16:38:49 21 right. 16:39:05 22 MR. GREASON: I don't see the how the 16:39:09 23 Exploration Preparation of 5$ is meaningfully 16:39:16 24 different from the Exploration Preparation of 16:40:44 25 7S$. 16:40:55 259 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Unless you think that 16:41:16 2 the destinations and activities in one mode 16:41:18 3 would be significantly different than the 16:41:30 4 explorations and activities in the other. 16:41:48 5 MR. GREASON: Okay. I hate to do 16:41:55 6 this, but since we're on this point, I have 16:41:57 7 to. 16:42:03 8 We're penalizing the Lunar Surface 16:42:06 9 because it's derived from the program of 16:42:25 10 record and the program of record had no plans 16:42:30 11 to make use of the Lunar Surface in a way 16:45:24 12 that robustly supported Exploration 16:45:31 13 Preparation. 16:45:41 14 It's not like the Lunar Surface is a 16:45:54 15 bad place to do it. It's just that we didn't 16:46:01 16 choose to take our time to go off and 16:46:07 17 redesign how a different, more 16:46:11 18 exploration-forward Lunar Surface set of 16:46:18 19 systems would look. 16:46:25 20 DR. CRAWLEY: I asked a question. I 16:46:30 21 didn't -- 16:46:33 22 MR. GREASON: Well, so the problem 16:46:34 23 is -- which way you answer that question -- 16:46:39 24 it's hard to score because are you scoring it 16:46:45 25 exactly the way it is now or are you scoring 16:46:53 260 1 it the way that you could do it if you really 16:46:59 2 valued this metric. 16:47:21 3 DR. CRAWLEY: I think you'd score 16:47:37 4 it -- since we've sort of redefined this to 16:47:44 5 be the more Mars-forward version of the Moon, 16:47:50 6 then you'd score it that way. 16:48:00 7 MR. GREASON: Then I would not 16:48:02 8 distinguish between them on the grounds of 16:48:08 9 destination -- 16:48:21 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 16:48:30 11 MR. GREASON: -- in my opinion. 16:48:33 12 DR. CRAWLEY: I would agree with 16:49:36 13 that. 16:49:39 14 MR. GREASON: But we have to write 16:49:42 15 some words around that. 16:49:45 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. Right. So we 16:49:50 17 would score 3B$ as a two and 5$ as a one, 16:49:59 18 which is consistent with -- 16:50:14 19 MR. GREASON: Yes. 16:50:18 20 DR. CRAWLEY: -- what I have below. 16:50:20 21 Norm? 16:50:26 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sure. 16:50:28 23 DR. CRAWLEY: A point here for 16:50:30 24 reference. Should we also score the two -- I 16:50:36 25 suppose we should -- that are the constrained 16:50:47 261 1 cases? 16:50:53 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 16:50:56 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Right? 16:50:58 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I think so. 16:51:02 5 DR. CRAWLEY: Because we have to show 16:51:05 6 the White House that -- 16:51:21 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: There are cases. 16:51:26 8 DR. CRAWLEY: -- there are cases. 16:51:28 9 MR. GREASON: Yes. And I agree with 16:52:03 10 your current scoring in those scenarios. 16:52:07 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 16:52:15 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I do too. 16:52:17 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay? 16:52:20 14 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 16:52:24 15 DR. CRAWLEY: So now we've got half 16:52:26 16 of the first column done. 16:52:31 17 MR. GREASON: We have the whole first 16:53:40 18 column done actually. 16:53:43 19 DR. RIDE: I think we have the whole 16:54:05 20 first column. I think we're done. 16:54:13 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, no, because we 16:54:18 22 haven't scored the two that are -- the 16:54:20 23 constrained ones. We have to now score 2 and 16:54:27 24 3B. 16:54:36 25 MR. GREASON: Well, that's what I 16:54:41 262 1 just thought I was saying, I agreed with your 16:54:44 2 scoring. 16:54:57 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh, you agreed with the 16:54:58 4 scoring? 16:55:20 5 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 16:55:21 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 16:55:25 7 DR. RIDE: We're done. 16:55:27 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 16:55:47 9 MR. GREASON: And if it's any 16:55:49 10 consolation, this is the only column I have 16:56:23 11 all of these notes on. 16:56:38 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 16:56:44 13 MR. McALISTER: Good. 16:56:50 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think maybe some 16:56:56 15 explanation is required for people who are 16:56:58 16 wondering why we're taking your time to do 16:57:20 17 this. 16:57:26 18 We're required by law to publicly 16:57:30 19 have this debate, and we couldn't sit down 16:57:37 20 ahead of time and kind of in a -- figure out 16:57:45 21 what we thought was right and come here and 16:57:53 22 agree upon it. So that's the reason for this 16:58:01 23 agonizing procedure. 16:58:13 24 And I'm prepared to stay here until 16:58:18 25 midnight until we're done. So get ready. 16:58:24 263 1 MR. GREASON: You don't have to stay. 16:59:01 2 We have to stay. 16:59:04 3 MR. McALISTER: And the stenographer 16:59:24 4 has the keep right on going. 17:00:10 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: But it's a law that I 17:00:26 6 don't understand. I think it's impossible to 17:00:35 7 work with, but that's the law. 17:00:37 8 And so we will stay for as long as we 17:00:42 9 have to. 17:01:12 10 DR. CRAWLEY: This is sunshine and 17:01:13 11 government at work. 17:01:21 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Column 2... 17:01:24 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So now we're -- 17:01:25 14 the dominant factor in the evaluation that 17:01:39 15 went into this was whether these programs had 17:01:45 16 either elements that had significant 17:01:51 17 technology associated with them -- in the 17:01:54 18 case of the hydrocarbon engine, that accounts 17:01:58 19 for the slight plus-up -- or whether they 17:02:06 20 were associated with scenarios where there 17:02:21 21 was the budget wedge. 17:02:28 22 Now, if we put the budget wedge in 17:02:31 23 all of them that we're carrying forward -- 17:02:35 24 ah, we're not carrying it in the two 17:02:58 25 baselines. 17:03:03 264 1 MR. GREASON: Correct. 17:03:59 2 DR. RIDE: Right. 17:04:01 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. So -- 17:04:02 4 MR. GREASON: I believe you have 17:04:33 5 scored this correctly for all of those 17:04:36 6 factors. 17:04:41 7 DR. AUSTIN: Or within one. 17:04:54 8 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:05:00 9 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. That looks good to 17:05:04 10 me. 17:05:09 11 DR. CRAWLEY: We have to put in 3B$, 17:05:12 12 which would be, I think, a one. 17:05:49 13 MR. GREASON: That would be a one. 17:05:54 14 DR. CRAWLEY: And 5B$ would also be a 17:06:17 15 one. 17:06:25 16 DR. RIDE: Also be a one. 17:06:26 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 17:07:22 18 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:07:34 19 DR. CRAWLEY: And 3B would clearly 17:07:38 20 not -- did 3B have the technology wedge in 17:07:44 21 it? 17:07:51 22 MR. GREASON: It did. 17:07:56 23 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:07:59 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh, it did? So it 17:08:00 25 would be a one. 17:08:10 265 1 MR. GREASON: Yes. 17:08:12 2 DR. CRAWLEY: And -- 17:08:15 3 MR. GREASON: And that's the whole 17:08:19 4 smack. 17:08:21 5 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, and -- no. We 17:08:35 6 need to do 2. 17:08:46 7 MR. GREASON: 2 is correctly scored 17:08:51 8 at a minus two. 17:08:54 9 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:08:58 10 DR. CRAWLEY: 3B had the technology 17:09:28 11 wedge in it. 17:09:32 12 DR. RIDE: Yes. 17:09:48 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 17:09:52 14 DR. CRAWLEY: And 2 did not. 17:09:54 15 DR. CHIAO: Right. 17:10:00 16 MR. McALISTER: Ed, we're going to 17:10:08 17 use your sheet as the master. So please make 17:10:12 18 sure you're capturing these comments, because 17:10:17 19 I lost -- I lost lock on this about 17:10:24 20 20 minutes ago. 17:10:34 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Well, in the 17:10:35 22 interest of assuring this master, we'll do -- 17:10:40 23 MR. McALISTER: A wrap-up maybe. 17:10:51 24 DR. CRAWLEY: We'll do read-back 17:10:58 25 here, but we'll do it in realtime. 17:11:02 266 1 So the way I have this scored -- and 17:11:23 2 forgive me -- because the order might be a 17:11:28 3 little different based on where you wrote 17:11:35 4 things in. I have 2 as a minus two, 3B as a 17:11:41 5 one, 3B$ as a one, 5$ as a one, 6$ as a one, 17:12:05 6 7$ as a two and 7S$ as a one. 17:12:25 7 DR. RIDE: Yep. 17:12:38 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Read-back correct? 17:12:40 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Wait a minute. Do 17:12:43 10 you have a one or a minus one? 17:12:52 11 MR. GREASON: We were just reading 17:13:45 12 the -- 17:13:47 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Excuse me. I'm 17:13:48 14 sorry. I read the wrong column. You've got 17:13:49 15 it right. Wrong column. 17:14:00 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Now, my good 17:14:10 17 colleague Professor Chyba has left, and he 17:14:15 18 was the domain expert for the 17:14:43 19 Science Knowledge column. 17:15:35 20 And it was very -- it was fairly 17:16:05 21 simple reasoning, which is that if we thought 17:16:09 22 there was a good chance to get -- if he 17:16:28 23 thought there was a good chance in the 17:16:48 24 scenario to get to either the Moon or a NEO, 17:16:54 25 it got a one, and if there was a good chance 17:17:29 267 1 to get to the Moon and a NEO, it got a two, 17:17:36 2 because those, he argued, were the principal 17:17:45 3 differentiating science objectives. 17:17:51 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: So he had four he 17:17:59 5 rated a two, and we took them all out. 17:18:04 6 MR. McALISTER: That's right. 17:19:31 7 They're all gone. I just took them out. 17:19:33 8 DR. CRAWLEY: So right now, if you 17:20:53 9 read down Science, in Option 2, my 17:20:56 10 recollection -- we would want to go back and 17:21:24 11 check this -- actually if we could agree to 17:21:31 12 that scoring, we could just -- we could just 17:21:37 13 take that as the rule and apply it, because, 17:21:47 14 otherwise, we would be remembering from 17:21:55 15 memory through Sally's charts what -- 17:21:59 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Why don't we 17:22:07 17 do that. 17:22:10 18 DR. CRAWLEY: -- what was and wasn't. 17:22:12 19 DR. AUSTIN: We just need to do a 3B$ 17:23:53 20 and 5B. 17:24:26 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 17:24:31 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. But, you 17:24:49 23 know -- and the Mars one is no longer 17:24:54 24 relevant. So the idea being, if you achieve 17:25:29 25 one significant science planetary or 17:25:38 268 1 subplanetary encounter, it's a one, and if 17:26:39 2 you encounter two of them, it's a two. 17:26:46 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. So 3B gets 17:27:13 4 a -- 17:27:20 5 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, what we have to 17:27:21 6 do is we have to go back and look at the 17:27:26 7 charts to see -- 17:27:35 8 DR. RIDE: That's right. 17:27:38 9 DR. CRAWLEY: -- what actually 17:27:44 10 happens. 17:27:52 11 DR. RIDE: That's right. And I think 17:27:53 12 those charts are, you know, one iteration 17:27:58 13 away from being able to look at that. 17:28:15 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 17:28:34 15 DR. RIDE: But we can fill in this. 17:28:36 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: But that's just going 17:28:42 17 to be -- 17:28:43 18 DR. RIDE: Because we agree on that, 17:28:44 19 then -- 17:29:19 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 17:29:24 21 DR. RIDE: -- we can fill this in. 17:29:27 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: That would just be a 17:30:15 23 fact that falls out. 17:30:34 24 DR. CRAWLEY: That's right. 17:30:42 25 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 17:30:43 269 1 DR. CRAWLEY: It's just a decision 17:30:44 2 rule that will apply. 17:30:48 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. 17:30:53 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Human 17:30:56 5 Civilization -- Leroy... 17:31:02 6 (Discussion off the record.) 17:32:20 7 DR. CRAWLEY: And actually if you 17:32:20 8 take off the corrections for more budget and 17:32:29 9 less budget, which -- the way we argued this 17:32:34 10 was that -- 17:32:45 11 MR. GREASON: Well, this subtract two 17:33:23 12 for constraints -- okay. 17:33:28 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that's just my 17:33:30 14 notes at the bottom. Okay. 17:33:32 15 If you didn't get past the ISS, for 17:36:21 16 all practical purposes, you got a minus one. 17:36:27 17 So the case -- the ISS -- Case 3B, 17:36:48 18 which is the ISS Focused, gets a -- makes, 17:37:00 19 arguably compared to Wanda's references, less 17:37:24 20 than a zero's worth of progress -- 17:37:35 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 17:37:46 22 DR. CRAWLEY: -- towards human 17:37:49 23 civilization away from the Earth, and 17:37:52 24 essentially you're still around the Earth. 17:37:58 25 And the other ones that are associated with 17:39:08 270 1 going to the Moon, which would be now 3$ and 17:39:13 2 3B$, would get a one because it addresses 17:39:20 3 crew-oriented effects to enable sustained 17:39:27 4 human presence off of the planet. 17:39:36 5 MR. GREASON: And I don't understand 17:39:48 6 why the yellow scenarios don't do the same 17:39:51 7 thing. 17:39:57 8 DR. CRAWLEY: So one could argue they 17:40:04 9 do, or one could argue that, as the ultimate 17:40:07 10 objective is civilization on a surface, they 17:40:20 11 should be penalized for not going to a 17:40:31 12 surface immediately. 17:40:41 13 Or also in this evaluation criteria 17:41:08 14 is the idea about protection of the 17:41:18 15 civilization on this planet, and you could 17:41:23 16 argue that going to NEOs should give them the 17:41:29 17 credit back. 17:41:36 18 That's sort of the reasoning here. 17:42:06 19 MR. GREASON: I would opine that, 17:42:09 20 first, extraterrestrial resources brought 17:42:13 21 from lunar space are interesting as a future 17:48:56 22 exploration enabler and both the Moon and 17:49:06 23 NEOs are in play there. 17:49:35 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 17:49:49 25 MR. GREASON: Second, that in terms 17:49:50 271 1 of studying the crew effects, i.e., how do 17:50:09 2 you keep people alive away from the Earth 17:50:20 3 long enough to get to Mars, both the Moon and 17:50:30 4 long NEO missions shed equal light on that. 17:51:01 5 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 17:51:29 6 MR. GREASON: Yeah. The Moon is a 18:01:55 7 bigger body, but the NEOs are also 18:01:58 8 interesting for reasons of civilization 18:01:58 9 protection here. So I think it's kind of a 18:02:01 10 wash. 18:02:01 11 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:02:01 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 18:02:03 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. I can buy 18:02:03 14 that. 18:02:08 15 DR. RIDE: I think so too. 18:02:08 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: So they're all ones? 18:02:08 17 DR. RIDE: They're ones. 18:02:11 18 DR. CRAWLEY: So they're all ones 18:02:11 19 except the two constrained ones. Let's go 18:02:11 20 back and check those. 18:02:11 21 The 3B, which is you don't get off of 18:02:15 22 the space station, is a minus one. 18:02:15 23 And the program of record adjusted 18:02:23 24 for risk constrained to FY '10, boy, it 18:02:23 25 doesn't really do anything more than going to 18:02:34 272 1 the space station either, does it? 18:02:34 2 DR. RIDE: No, it doesn't. 18:02:34 3 MR. GREASON: And it doesn't even 18:02:34 4 keep the space station up long enough to 18:02:34 5 get -- buy you out of the space station. So 18:02:34 6 that's -- 18:02:34 7 DR. RIDE: That's right. 18:02:34 8 MR. GREASON: -- why it scored a 18:02:51 9 minus two. 18:02:51 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Maybe minus two is 18:02:51 11 right. 18:02:51 12 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:02:51 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So let me do the 18:02:51 14 read-back on this one, which is Scenario 2 is 18:02:51 15 minus two, Scenario 3B is minus one, 3B$ is 18:02:51 16 one, 5$ is one, 6$, 7$ and 8S$ are all one. 18:03:09 17 MR. GREASON: 7S$, yes. 18:03:09 18 DR. CRAWLEY: 7S$. I'm sorry. 18:03:09 19 Right? 18:03:09 20 DR. RIDE: Yep. 18:03:09 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So on to 18:03:24 22 Economic Expansion. 18:03:24 23 Now, Economic Expansion includes 18:03:24 24 things like stimulation of the burgeoning 18:03:24 25 commercial space industry and sustaining the 18:03:29 273 1 established industrial base in technology and 18:03:33 2 aerospace. 18:03:37 3 So, for example, a minus one is a 18:03:40 4 weakens industrial base, limited opportunity 18:03:43 5 for commercial goods and services. And a 18:03:46 6 plus one is stimulates investment in new and 18:03:48 7 existing capabilities. 18:03:51 8 DR. RIDE: So why aren't all of the 18:03:55 9 ones that stimulate Commercial Crew to LEO 18:03:55 10 plus one? 18:04:03 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, because some of 18:04:03 12 them stimulate more things than others. 18:04:03 13 Right? 18:04:03 14 DR. RIDE: But shouldn't they all be 18:04:03 15 at least plus one as opposed to zero? Since 18:04:03 16 Commercial Crew to LEO -- 18:04:08 17 DR. CRAWLEY: That's probably right. 18:04:13 18 MR. GREASON: If and only if, I would 18:04:13 19 argue, the market that we're making for them 18:04:17 20 is sustained -- 18:04:17 21 DR. RIDE: Leads to a larger market. 18:04:17 22 MR. GREASON: -- enough that anybody 18:04:17 23 would actually invest in it. 18:04:23 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. But it is 18:04:23 25 certainly the intent to stimulate them with 18:04:31 274 1 the Commercial Crew and -- 18:04:31 2 MR. GREASON: As long as we actually 18:04:31 3 buy commercial crew missions for long enough 18:04:31 4 to make an industry, yes, I agree with you. 18:04:31 5 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:04:38 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: But these options 18:04:38 7 would do that. 18:04:38 8 MR. GREASON: Well, some of the 18:04:38 9 reference options don't but -- 18:04:38 10 DR. CRAWLEY: And that I believe 18:04:43 11 Commercial Crew is in all of these, right. 18:04:43 12 And then the question is -- and this 18:04:43 13 is sort of a double-edged sword -- if you 18:04:49 14 believe that along with the hydrocarbon 18:04:49 15 booster goes a different business model which 18:04:54 16 will end up producing less money flowing to 18:04:56 17 the commercial community because it saves 18:04:58 18 money -- right -- you can't take credit for 18:05:01 19 stimulating more business by spending less 18:05:04 20 money -- does that deserve any higher ranking 18:05:06 21 or not. 18:05:10 22 MR. GREASON: Yes, you can stimulate 18:05:12 23 new business by doing less money easily as 18:05:16 24 long as you spend your less money in a way 18:05:16 25 that's competitive. 18:05:17 275 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Fair to say. And is 18:05:21 2 there much competition for a heavy 18:05:21 3 hydrocarbon booster? 18:05:25 4 MR. GREASON: That's not obvious. 18:05:27 5 But the heavy hydrocarbon booster goes with 18:05:29 6 propellant transfer that most likely would be 18:05:33 7 an additional stimulus to the commercial 18:05:38 8 market by virtue of its smaller size. 18:05:42 9 Furthermore, all of the yellow 18:05:46 10 options, let us not forget, currently include 18:05:48 11 a commercially sourced lander -- 18:05:49 12 DR. RIDE: Right. 18:05:49 13 MR. GREASON: -- to match with the 18:05:51 14 government ascent stage. So I really do 18:05:53 15 think there's a significant qualitative 18:05:54 16 difference between those and the other 18:05:55 17 options. 18:05:57 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 18:05:58 19 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:05:58 20 DR. CRAWLEY: So do you want to go to 18:05:59 21 a two on those? 18:06:01 22 MR. GREASON: I want them to be one 18:06:04 23 more than the other one. I've lost track of 18:06:04 24 exactly what that is. 18:06:11 25 MR. McALISTER: That's within the 18:06:13 276 1 precision, right? 18:06:13 2 MR. GREASON: Well, I'm not sure. 18:06:13 3 DR. CRAWLEY: One more than the other 18:06:13 4 one meaning -- 18:06:13 5 MR. GREASON: One more than the 18:06:16 6 blue-derived options. 18:06:16 7 DR. CRAWLEY: -- than the 18:06:17 8 blue-derived options. 18:06:17 9 DR. RIDE: And those look like 18:06:17 10 zeroes. 18:06:20 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Zero. Okay. 18:06:20 12 MR. GREASON: As long as they're 18:06:20 13 distinguishable, I'm okay. 18:06:23 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 18:06:25 15 DR. RIDE: Although they're zeroes, 18:06:25 16 they do have Commercial Crew. 18:06:29 17 DR. CRAWLEY: They do have Commercial 18:06:31 18 Crew, so maybe we should make them ones and 18:06:30 19 twos. 18:06:32 20 DR. RIDE: I'm happy to make them -- 18:06:34 21 I think the difference between the blue and 18:06:34 22 the yellow is what's -- 18:06:36 23 DR. CHIAO: It's more important. 18:06:36 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. 18:06:36 25 DR. RIDE: -- the important one here. 18:06:40 277 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 18:06:40 2 MR. GREASON: I don't care if you 18:06:40 3 call them zero and one -- 18:06:40 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, because we also 18:06:43 5 have to make the difference to the baseline. 18:06:43 6 So let's call the blues one and the yellows 18:06:46 7 two. 18:06:52 8 MR. GREASON: Fine. 18:06:52 9 DR. CRAWLEY: And then two is 18:06:52 10 actually what Wanda's criteria are. Two is 18:06:54 11 commercial systems form an integral part of 18:06:58 12 the architecture -- 18:07:01 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:07:01 14 DR. CRAWLEY: -- which is accurately 18:07:02 15 reflected there. 18:07:02 16 Okay. So now let's go back and 18:07:04 17 check -- 18:07:08 18 MR. BEJMUK: You know, I've got -- I 18:07:08 19 have a problem with this. We are making too 18:07:08 20 many positives out of this propellant 18:07:13 21 transfer. 18:07:16 22 You know, it's a complexity. It's an 18:07:16 23 expense. It's a bad thing. You wish you 18:07:18 24 didn't have to do it. And somehow we are -- 18:07:20 25 you know, the second time I'm hearing that 18:07:22 278 1 that's a positive thing, we are to give it 18:07:24 2 credit. 18:07:28 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Because we gave it 18:07:28 4 credit in technology as well. 18:07:30 5 MR. BEJMUK: Well, okay. 18:07:30 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Actually we didn't give 18:07:32 7 the propellant transfer -- 18:07:34 8 MR. BEJMUK: It's not a robustness 18:07:36 9 case. 18:07:38 10 It's just the opposite. It's a 18:07:38 11 fragile situation when you have to count on 18:07:40 12 stopping in space someplace and do the 18:07:43 13 rendezvous and God knows what and not crash 18:07:45 14 and not blow up and not leak and -- you know, 18:07:48 15 and transfer propellant. 18:07:56 16 So I can't, you know, accept that 18:07:56 17 this is -- in Technology Innovation, yes, but 18:08:03 18 we somehow have to find a negative of it. 18:08:03 19 DR. RIDE: Well, we've got several 18:08:07 20 other columns here that would -- and probably 18:08:07 21 a few of those would speak to that. I don't 18:08:13 22 think this is the column, though, to score 18:08:13 23 that potential problem. 18:08:19 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Safety and Success 18:08:19 25 might pick that up. 18:08:19 279 1 DR. CHIAO: Yeah, Safety and Success 18:08:19 2 might. 18:08:24 3 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Maybe Safety. 18:08:24 4 Okay. I can live with that. 18:08:28 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. 18:08:30 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. It actually 18:08:30 7 goes -- it's a good point, Bo, because -- 18:08:30 8 MR. GREASON: Actually let me note in 18:08:33 9 passing, though, that the way we just scored 18:08:34 10 it we didn't actually invoke that -- 18:08:36 11 DR. CRAWLEY: No. 18:08:36 12 MR. GREASON: -- to give a higher 18:08:40 13 score to that option. 18:08:40 14 DR. CRAWLEY: No, we didn't. We 18:08:42 15 invoked one increment for commercial crew and 18:08:44 16 the second one for commercial in -- in 18:08:51 17 lander. 18:08:51 18 MR. GREASON: Yes. 18:08:51 19 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:08:51 20 DR. CRAWLEY: All right. So we're 18:08:54 21 still on Economic Expansion -- but we do want 18:08:54 22 to respect Bo's point -- is that when we go 18:08:56 23 and look at the schedule risk -- the Schedule 18:08:59 24 and Programmatic Risk, as the category is 18:09:01 25 called in full, it's not just simply a matter 18:09:04 280 1 of reading numbers off of the Aerospace 18:09:08 2 charts, but there has to be some additional 18:09:13 3 technology associated or programmatically 18:09:16 4 associated uncertainty or risk with those. 18:09:18 5 Now, you know, maybe the Aerospace 18:09:21 6 analysis with their correlation of cost and 18:09:23 7 schedule risk has already put that in but -- 18:09:27 8 MR. GREASON: Well, maybe not. 18:09:29 9 DR. CRAWLEY: But maybe not. 18:09:29 10 MR. GREASON: I happen to agree with 18:09:30 11 Bo's point, that the risk and technology are, 18:09:32 12 to a certain extent, duals of each other. 18:09:34 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 18:09:34 14 MR. GREASON: And the problem is, if 18:09:40 15 you always only minimize the risk, you never 18:09:40 16 get to the point where you wish to take the 18:09:44 17 risk concerning the technology, which is -- 18:09:49 18 we have ample experience operating the 18:09:49 19 program that way now, and we know what that 18:09:55 20 looks like. 18:09:55 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So we're still 18:09:55 22 on Economic Expansion, and we're going up to 18:09:55 23 3B, which is ISS Focused. And I think since 18:10:01 24 that has Commercial Crew in it the consistent 18:10:06 25 rating of that would be a one, right? 18:10:11 281 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think that's right. 18:10:13 2 MR. GREASON: Well, hang on. I lost 18:10:15 3 track again. The yellow options, did we call 18:10:16 4 those ones or twos? Because they're -- 18:10:22 5 DR. CRAWLEY: We called them twos. 18:10:24 6 MR. GREASON: Okay. Then that's a 18:10:25 7 one. 18:10:26 8 DR. CRAWLEY: And then the -- 18:10:28 9 MR. GREASON: 5$, ditto. 18:10:32 10 DR. CRAWLEY: No. No. The one we 18:10:34 11 haven't done is No. 2, which is the 18:10:37 12 constrained but -- and help me, Sally, 2 does 18:10:40 13 not extend the station? 18:10:49 14 MR. GREASON: Correct. 18:10:53 15 DR. RIDE: Correct. 18:10:53 16 DR. CRAWLEY: So you would call it at 18:10:55 17 least a zero. It has COTS cargo, but you 18:11:00 18 would never -- you'd never get a commercial 18:11:05 19 crew market going on a station that was going 18:11:05 20 to be ended. 18:11:05 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: If you did, it would 18:11:05 22 only be brief -- 18:11:05 23 DR. RIDE: Right. 18:11:12 24 MR. GREASON: And commercial cargo 18:11:12 25 would be just coming online about the time 18:11:12 282 1 that the station went away. 18:11:12 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. So I would 18:11:12 3 suggest we score that as zero. 18:11:17 4 MR. GREASON: Or lower. 18:11:17 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 18:11:17 6 DR. RIDE: Or lower. 18:11:17 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think it's a minus 18:11:17 8 one. 18:11:23 9 Read your definition. Zero is it 18:11:23 10 sustains the industrial base and has limited 18:11:23 11 opportunity -- 12 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 13 MR. GREASON: And it says limited 14 opportunity for commercial goods and 15 services. 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 18:11:27 17 DR. RIDE: Right. 18:11:27 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 18:11:27 19 DR. RIDE: And 2 does not have the 18:11:27 20 technology budget line in it either. 18:11:27 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So let me read 18:11:32 22 this back. The 2 is a minus one, that 3B is 18:11:32 23 a one, the 3B$ is a one, the 5$ is a one and 18:11:40 24 the yellow ones are all twos. Right? Okay. 18:11:50 25 DR. AUSTIN: This is Economic 18:11:59 283 1 Expansion you just did? 18:12:02 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah, Economic 18:12:02 3 Expansion. 18:12:03 4 MR. BEJMUK: Would you keep reminding 18:12:03 5 us of the columns, because we get lost? 18:12:03 6 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm sorry. That was 18:12:06 7 all on Economic Expansion. 18:12:07 8 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 18:12:09 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, the Public 18:12:10 10 Engagement one is frankly very subjective. 18:12:13 11 DR. RIDE: And those aren't? 18:12:19 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, because -- thank 18:12:22 13 you for that. That's why we went through all 18:12:24 14 of the work of doing this fine piece of work 18:12:27 15 on the rubrics, right. 18:12:29 16 Because -- but even by reading the 18:12:33 17 rubrics, one realizes that the main 18:12:33 18 distinguisher here is how much it interests 18:12:37 19 the public and how much it allows engagement 18:12:41 20 and how much it excites the youth -- 18:12:47 21 DR. AUSTIN: And education. 18:12:47 22 DR. CRAWLEY: -- and education. 18:12:47 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, then let me 18:12:47 24 propose a measure that has two criteria. 18:12:52 25 Criteria one is that it has us going 18:12:52 284 1 someplace or doing something really 18:12:58 2 interesting and, secondly, that you don't 18:13:02 3 have to wait 20 years to do the first event. 18:13:02 4 You have events along the way. 18:13:02 5 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 18:13:02 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: And if we use that, 18:13:05 7 it falls out, I think, pretty easily. 18:13:05 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. So what I -- 18:13:10 9 that was my rationale, Norm -- 18:13:10 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. 18:13:11 11 DR. CRAWLEY: -- is that the ones 18:13:11 12 were because this -- the Flexible Path takes 18:13:14 13 us to places that we have not been and is 18:13:18 14 designed to have a cadence of flights there. 18:13:21 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:13:29 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Whereas the lunar ones 18:13:30 17 suffer from the problem that -- when you 18:13:32 18 explain to many of your neighbors that we're 18:13:34 19 going to the Moon, they say haven't we done 18:13:37 20 that. 18:13:39 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 18:13:39 22 DR. CRAWLEY: And the ISS one was, 18:13:39 23 even by Leroy's agreement, one notch down 18:13:43 24 from that. 18:13:47 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think that's true. 18:13:50 285 1 DR. CRAWLEY: When Leroy tells people 18:13:55 2 he went to the ISS, they say where's that. 18:13:59 3 So if there is general agreement on 18:14:02 4 that, then I'll say -- then let me do the 18:14:05 5 read-through -- is that 2 is a zero, 3B is a 18:14:08 6 minus one -- we're doing Public Engagement. 18:14:11 7 DR. AUSTIN: All right. 3B is a 18:14:17 8 minus one? 18:14:11 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. I actually 18:14:20 10 don't think we changed any of these. 18:14:20 11 MR. GREASON: No. 18:14:20 12 DR. CRAWLEY: The shuttle extension, 18:14:25 13 which goes eventually -- I'm sorry. 18:14:25 14 DR. AUSTIN: It's a minus. 18:14:28 15 DR. CRAWLEY: 3B$ -- 18:14:31 16 DR. RIDE: Hold a second. Did you 18:14:34 17 say 2 was a zero? 18:14:36 18 DR. CRAWLEY: I said 2 was a zero. 18:14:39 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:14:39 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Or is that not true? 18:14:43 21 DR. RIDE: Well, I don't -- 18:14:43 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Does it get to the 18:14:43 23 Moon? 18:14:48 24 DR. RIDE: I don't see how it can be 18:14:48 25 rated higher than 3B. 18:14:48 286 1 DR. CHIAO: Yeah, I agree. 18:14:52 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Because -- 18:14:52 3 DR. CHIAO: I agree. 18:14:52 4 DR. RIDE: Yeah. You know, with 2 18:14:52 5 you lose the station. Although de-orbiting 18:14:52 6 the station would engage the public. 18:14:58 7 DR. CHIAO: There would be a surge in 18:14:58 8 interest, yeah. 18:15:05 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Who was it who told us 18:15:05 10 the story they sent the command to de-orbit 18:15:05 11 Skylab? 18:15:05 12 DR. CHIAO: That was Hawes. 18:15:05 13 DR. CRAWLEY: It was Hawes, yeah. 18:15:05 14 DR. RIDE: It was Hawes, yeah. 18:15:05 15 DR. CRAWLEY: Are you famous for 18:15:13 16 that, Mike? Oh, he's not here. 18:15:13 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: He landed in the 18:15:13 18 middle of Australia too. 18:15:19 19 DR. CRAWLEY: I would agree with 18:15:19 20 you -- 18:15:19 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. So what are 18:15:19 22 you going to give -- 18:15:25 23 DR. CRAWLEY: So we're going to give 18:15:25 24 2 a minus one at your recommendation and -- 18:15:25 25 2 a minus one and 3B a minus one and 3B$ -- 18:15:33 287 1 DR. CHIAO: The same. 18:15:45 2 MR. BEJMUK: Hey, Ed, in fairness -- 18:15:45 3 DR. CRAWLEY: No. Because 3B$ 18:15:45 4 actually gets to the Moon. 18:15:50 5 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:15:50 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 18:15:50 7 MR. BEJMUK: Ed, something doesn't 18:15:50 8 seem fair. On this Public Engagement, I 18:15:57 9 don't understand why POR is lower -- rated 18:15:57 10 lower than, let's say, dual Ares. 18:15:57 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, let me try to 18:16:05 12 explain, Bo. 18:16:05 13 MR. BEJMUK: Yeah. 18:16:05 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Line 2 is -- which is 18:16:05 15 POR constrained to the budget, doesn't 18:16:11 16 actually get -- 18:16:11 17 MR. BEJMUK: I'm talking 18:16:16 18 unconstrained budget. 18:16:16 19 DR. CRAWLEY: No. 2 is POR 18:16:16 20 constrained to the budget. 18:16:19 21 MR. BEJMUK: But my question was on 18:16:19 22 number -- line No. 1 -- 18:16:23 23 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh, we're not ranking 18:16:23 24 them by line number. 18:16:23 25 MR. BEJMUK: Oh, okay. Oh, okay. 18:16:23 288 1 All right. 18:16:27 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Because we're 18:16:27 3 not going to -- that's being shown for 18:16:31 4 reference but... 18:16:31 5 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. 18:16:34 6 DR. CRAWLEY: So line 2 -- Option 2 18:16:34 7 is minus one because it doesn't actually get 18:16:39 8 to the Moon. Line 3B is minus one. 18:16:43 9 Line 3B$, which we think does get to the 18:16:47 10 Moon, gets a zero. The shuttle extension, 18:16:53 11 which we think does get to the Moon, gets a 18:16:57 12 zero. And the yellows get a one. 18:17:01 13 DR. AUSTIN: What was 5B? I'm sorry. 18:17:09 14 MR. McALISTER: I'm sorry. 18:17:09 15 DR. AUSTIN: What was 5$? 18:17:12 16 DR. CRAWLEY: 5$ was a zero. It gets 18:17:12 17 to the Moon. 18:17:17 18 Okay. Now, Leroy's input on the 18:17:19 19 Global Partners one was interesting, which 18:17:28 20 essentially summarized the situation as 18:17:31 21 follows -- that right now what the global 18:17:35 22 partners care about is extending the ISS and 18:17:37 23 the things that terminate the ISS will 18:17:42 24 cause -- 18:17:46 25 DR. RIDE: A reaction. 18:17:46 289 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think those should 18:17:46 2 be minus twos. 18:17:53 3 DR. CRAWLEY: -- will cause -- I'm 18:17:53 4 trying to find the word -- 18:17:53 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: There will be a huge 18:17:53 6 setback in -- 18:17:53 7 DR. CRAWLEY: -- disrupt existing 18:17:53 8 international partnerships. 18:17:59 9 DR. RIDE: So I'd go with a minus 18:17:59 10 two. 18:18:07 11 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. I wouldn't -- 18:18:07 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Why don't we 18:18:07 13 do that. 18:18:07 14 DR. CHIAO: I'd go with a minus two. 18:18:07 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think those are 18:18:07 16 minus twos, and I think all of the yellow 18:18:07 17 ones we just ought to put TBD, because we 18:18:17 18 don't -- 18:18:17 19 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, what we did is we 18:18:17 20 assigned a zero to anything other than the 18:18:17 21 ones that turned off the space station. 18:18:17 22 DR. CHIAO: We assigned a zero to 18:18:29 23 anything that kept the space station. 18:18:29 24 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm sorry. We kept a 18:18:29 25 zero -- we assigned a zero to anything that 18:18:29 290 1 kept the space station. 18:18:29 2 DR. CHIAO: Because there's not a 18:18:29 3 definition to differentiate between the 18:18:29 4 different scenarios. 18:18:41 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think that's okay. 18:18:41 6 DR. CRAWLEY: And we argued that, you 18:18:41 7 know, in view of the fact that it requires 18:18:41 8 commitment by the IPs to be involved in 18:18:41 9 these, we would commit the sin of trying to 18:18:41 10 project onto the international partners what 18:18:54 11 we thought their intent was and, therefore, 18:18:54 12 was best left as just penalize the ones that 18:18:54 13 shut off the ISS and leave the others at 18:18:54 14 zero. 18:18:54 15 DR. AUSTIN: I agree. I think, you 18:19:08 16 know, in the report we can certainly reflect 18:19:08 17 that our view is that we think it is good to 18:19:08 18 engage the engagement but not -- 18:19:08 19 DR. CRAWLEY: Sure. 18:19:08 20 DR. AUSTIN: -- to take credit for 18:19:08 21 it. 18:19:08 22 DR. CRAWLEY: But presumably in Les' 18:19:08 23 section that there will be a discussion of 18:19:08 24 that. 18:19:08 25 DR. AUSTIN: I agree. 18:19:08 291 1 MR. GREASON: Right. Exactly. 18:19:08 2 DR. CRAWLEY: So it's the difference 18:19:22 3 between an evaluation criteria and an 18:19:22 4 additional finding. 18:19:22 5 DR. RIDE: You know, it may be worth 18:19:22 6 noting that all of the Flexible Path 18:19:22 7 scenarios probably leave quite a bit more 18:19:22 8 room for international partnership -- 18:19:22 9 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. 18:19:22 10 DR. RIDE: -- than the other 18:19:33 11 scenarios. 18:19:33 12 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm not sure I agree 18:19:33 13 with that. 18:19:33 14 You know, the internationals actually 18:19:33 15 have, in the course of the discussion that 18:19:33 16 NASA has had with them in the last year, 18:19:46 17 warmed to the idea of supplying components, 18:19:46 18 doing parallel logistics streams to the 18:19:46 19 surface. 18:19:46 20 You know, you would have to imagine 18:19:46 21 that -- we have pictures of American 18:19:55 22 astronauts on the Moon, and no other nation 18:19:55 23 does. So the appeal of having their national 18:19:55 24 astronauts stand with their flag on the Moon 18:20:06 25 would be quite compelling. 18:20:06 292 1 So I'm not sure that I would find a 18:20:06 2 basis for differentiating the two in terms of 18:20:14 3 international participation. 18:20:14 4 DR. RIDE: You know, I suppose it 18:20:14 5 depends on how much of the architecture you 18:20:27 6 think is relatively well determined already. 18:20:27 7 Because one of the things that we heard 18:20:27 8 pretty loud and clear is that they'd like to 18:20:27 9 be, you know, more directly involved in, you 18:20:27 10 know, the process of getting there -- 18:20:40 11 DR. CHIAO: Yeah, the critical path. 18:20:40 12 DR. RIDE: -- the critical path -- 18:20:40 13 and think that they have some systems to 18:20:40 14 contribute. 18:20:40 15 You know, I don't want to -- I'm not 18:20:40 16 making a big case for this one, but I -- you 18:20:40 17 know, I've come away with the impression that 18:20:50 18 there's -- there are more opportunities in 18:20:50 19 the Flexible Path scenario from the 18:20:50 20 international partners. 18:21:01 21 DR. CHIAO: Well, I agree, but I 18:21:01 22 think it's hard to determine, which is why we 18:21:01 23 kind of left it zero. 18:21:01 24 DR. RIDE: Yeah, I agree with that. 18:21:01 25 DR. CHIAO: But, I mean, it's hard 18:21:01 293 1 to -- I don't know. 18:21:01 2 DR. CRAWLEY: I would tend to leave 18:21:01 3 it at Leroy's suggestion here. 18:21:16 4 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I'm fine with that. 18:21:16 5 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So we have 18:21:16 6 line 2 -- now we're under Global Partners. 18:21:16 7 Line 2 is minus two because it's the one left 18:21:16 8 that closes the ISS, and the rest are all 18:21:16 9 zeroes. 18:21:31 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: All right. 18:21:31 11 DR. RIDE: Okay. 18:21:31 12 DR. AUSTIN: Agreed. 18:21:31 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sustainability. 18:21:31 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, Sustainability is 18:21:31 15 a rather complex one, and even within the 18:21:31 16 definitions, there's a lot of -- well, 18:21:44 17 actually the rubrics are sort of symptomatic 18:21:44 18 as opposed to descriptive. 18:21:44 19 You know, you would have to 18:21:44 20 understand that something was going well or 18:21:57 21 something was going poorly in order to 18:21:57 22 understand how much advocacy you would 18:21:57 23 require or would be -- would flow. So let me 18:21:57 24 read you the guidance from the statement of 18:22:06 25 task from OSTP that's under here. 18:22:06 294 1 Norm, this is where the input that -- 18:22:15 2 this is where we book-keep the input that's 18:22:15 3 been given to you by OSTP about contractual 18:22:15 4 implications. 18:22:15 5 The potential to enhance 18:22:15 6 sustainability of human space flight 18:22:24 7 activities -- which is a completely generic 18:22:24 8 statement -- the implications for transition 18:22:29 9 from the current human space flight 18:22:29 10 operations -- in other words, this is where 18:22:35 11 the transition risk and agony would be 18:22:35 12 reflected -- and the benefit to U.S. 18:22:41 13 government defense and intelligence 18:22:41 14 space-related capabilities. 18:22:46 15 So this is where the other government 18:22:46 16 agency benefits are also book-kept. So this 18:22:52 17 is actually sort of a rich category when you 18:22:52 18 analyze it this way. 18:22:57 19 So I think what we did in the -- 18:23:02 20 DR. AUSTIN: On the other hand, Ed, 18:23:02 21 if you also recognize there's a fiscal risk 18:23:05 22 here that applies across the board -- 18:23:08 23 MR. McALISTER: That there's what -- 18:23:10 24 I'm sorry -- Wanda? 18:23:11 25 DR. AUSTIN: Fiscal risk in the fact 18:23:11 295 1 of just trying to maintain the funding, as 18:23:14 2 we've seen with -- 18:23:17 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. But I would 18:23:17 4 argue that's an effect and not a cause. I 18:23:18 5 mean, you have trouble maintaining the budget 18:23:21 6 because of these other factors. 18:23:24 7 DR. AUSTIN: I guess it's about 18:23:29 8 commitment and will -- you know, do we have a 18:23:32 9 national will to do this. 18:23:32 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Uh-huh. So what you 18:23:36 11 see here is basically -- let's see. 18:23:39 12 Jeff, you did this, and I don't 18:23:44 13 remember how much of it you changed. 18:23:46 14 But what got graded down here is the 18:23:48 15 case where there's significant disruption in 18:23:52 16 the NASA organization in order to go to the 18:23:55 17 new change of business -- the new way of 18:23:59 18 doing business, which is associated with the 18:24:01 19 hydrocarbon booster, and, you know, we don't 18:24:03 20 disagree that that's the case. 18:24:06 21 You take it as a financial benefit 18:24:09 22 and you take -- you penalize the risk. And, 18:24:09 23 in fact, I scored at a minus one the Ares V 18:24:14 24 dual Lite because, of course, there is no 18:24:23 25 Ares V contract but there is an Ares I 18:24:26 296 1 contract. So the cancellation of the Ares I 18:24:32 2 would cause disruption. 18:24:39 3 Although there's a good deal of 18:24:39 4 commonality, there would be contractual 18:24:39 5 either renegotiation or recompetition that 18:24:39 6 would be associated with -- there. 18:24:48 7 And I didn't actually know how to 18:24:48 8 think through the shuttle-derived vehicle. I 18:24:48 9 suspect that would be, likewise, a fair 18:24:48 10 amount of -- I mean, you wouldn't 18:24:59 11 automatically give to Boeing the contract 18:24:59 12 for -- 18:24:59 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, it depends. 18:24:59 14 DR. CRAWLEY: -- the shuttle-derived 18:24:59 15 vehicle -- 18:24:59 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, you could 18:24:59 17 also argue that -- 18:25:15 18 DR. CRAWLEY: -- just because they 18:25:15 19 built the shuttle. 18:24:59 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- if you did 18:24:59 21 shuttle-derived vehicle and in that case you 18:25:15 22 said you ought to continue the shuttle, 18:25:15 23 that's the least disruptive. 18:25:15 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that's why we 18:25:15 25 scored it as zero, whereas -- 18:25:15 297 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: I thought you said -- 18:25:15 2 let's see. 18:25:15 3 DR. CRAWLEY: We're in 18:25:15 4 Sustainability. You see the SDV ones -- 18:25:15 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Okay. 18:25:15 6 DR. CRAWLEY: -- are a zero. The 18:25:31 7 Ares V, because it terminates the Ares I -- 18:25:31 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:25:31 9 DR. CRAWLEY: -- was a minus one, and 18:25:31 10 the hydrocarbon booster was a minus two 18:25:31 11 because it's not only a change in contract 18:25:31 12 but a change in organizational behavior of 18:25:31 13 NASA and workforce and so forth. 18:25:55 14 MR. GREASON: I think the 18:25:55 15 continuation of the shuttle goes to the 18:25:55 16 scenario not listed here, the 5$. 18:25:55 17 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. That's right. 18:25:55 18 MR. GREASON: Because I think he's 18:25:55 19 saying that might actually be more popular 18:25:55 20 because it's -- you know, all of those people 18:25:55 21 who current -- not only does everybody keep 18:25:55 22 doing what they're doing, but all of those 18:25:55 23 people who are afraid they were going to stop 18:25:55 24 doing what they're doing get told they -- 18:26:16 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 18:26:16 298 1 MR. GREASON: -- get to keep doing 18:26:16 2 it. 18:26:16 3 DR. CRAWLEY: So, you know, we could 18:26:16 4 move them to plus one, zero and minus one. 18:26:16 5 But, you know, I was reading the 18:26:16 6 rubrics, and zero is sufficient public and 18:26:16 7 congressional support. You know, one is plus 18:26:16 8 broad support from industry and external 18:26:16 9 agencies, i.e., the DOD. 18:26:16 10 MR. GREASON: It's more popular but 18:26:33 11 not with more stakeholders. 18:26:33 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 18:26:33 13 MR. GREASON: Okay. 18:26:33 14 DR. CRAWLEY: I mean, in order to get 18:26:33 15 to a two here -- well -- 18:26:33 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think we need to be 18:26:33 17 careful that we don't redefine Sustainability 18:26:33 18 to just mean non-disruptiveness. It's more 18:26:33 19 than that. 18:26:52 20 MR. GREASON: I was going to raise 18:26:52 21 the point that, while I absolutely agree that 18:26:52 22 a change in the way of doing business is 18:26:52 23 radical as we've contemplated under Option 7 18:26:52 24 is a huge disruption, I also think that, you 18:26:52 25 know, at the end of the day, DOD is getting a 18:27:07 299 1 much better booster in their stable, and I'm 18:27:07 2 not at all sure that that's not a partially 18:27:07 3 offsetting factor under this metric, the way 18:27:07 4 you have it defined. 18:27:25 5 DR. CHIAO: Does DOD want this 18:27:25 6 booster though? 18:27:25 7 MR. GREASON: As long as they don't 18:27:25 8 have to pay for it and as long as they get -- 18:27:25 9 as long as they get to manage the program 18:27:25 10 with other people's money, those are good 18:27:25 11 things. 18:27:25 12 DR. CRAWLEY: There's a complex 18:27:25 13 statement. 18:27:36 14 MR. GREASON: There is. I'm asking 18:27:36 15 the question. I'm not taking the position. 18:27:36 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Also, Norm, in this 18:27:36 17 category it would be the pattern of interim 18:27:36 18 accomplishments which would probably tend to 18:27:36 19 cause the yellow ones to drift up a bit. 18:27:48 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:27:48 21 DR. CRAWLEY: You know, that every 18:27:48 22 year you can tell the Congress and every two 18:27:48 23 years you can tell the President that you did 18:27:48 24 something, you know. 18:28:00 25 So if we wanted to cause all of the 18:28:00 300 1 yellow ones to drift up as a group because of 18:28:00 2 that pattern -- 18:28:00 3 MR. GREASON: I'm good with that. 18:28:13 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, we've got 18:28:13 5 to be very careful in defining this because a 18:28:13 6 big factor in Sustainability is going to be 18:28:13 7 the cost -- the magnitude of it, but we've 18:28:13 8 really stripped that out. 18:28:13 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that's right. 18:28:13 10 The cost is reflected in the cost category, 18:28:13 11 and the schedule is in the schedule category. 18:28:23 12 This is, you know, for fixed costs and 18:28:23 13 schedule, how easily are you going to find 18:28:23 14 advocacy -- to use Wanda's term -- within the 18:28:23 15 policy community. 18:28:34 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: So how about 18:28:34 17 rereading where we think we are. 18:28:34 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, I think there 18:28:34 19 was -- everyone just sort of nodded if we 18:28:44 20 said we took the yellow ones and bumped them 18:28:44 21 up one so that -- 18:28:44 22 DR. AUSTIN: 7S is minus one. 18:28:44 23 DR. CRAWLEY: And -- let's see -- did 18:28:44 24 we -- 18:28:44 25 DR. AUSTIN: 6$ is zero. 18:28:55 301 1 DR. CRAWLEY: So let me try -- I'm 18:29:01 2 not sure we've actually gone through the 18:29:02 3 whole list. 18:29:04 4 The 2, the program of record adjusted 18:29:05 5 to budget, I would think would be about a 18:29:07 6 minus one on this scale. 18:29:11 7 MR. GREASON: Because of lack of 18:29:15 8 results. 18:29:18 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Because of lack of 18:29:18 10 results. I mean, you know, we're just going 18:29:20 11 to go an entire decade before something gets 18:29:22 12 flown there in the '20s as it's currently now 18:29:22 13 structured. The ISS would be about a -- that 18:29:24 14 is to say, 3B would be about a zero. 18:29:27 15 And I think 3B star (sic) -- here you 18:29:31 16 have to weigh how much support you'll get for 18:29:36 17 the continuation of the shuttle-based system. 18:29:41 18 I'm sorry. No. I'm sorry. I misspoke. 18:29:45 19 3B star does not have the 18:29:49 20 shuttle-based system. So I think we'd call 18:29:52 21 that a zero. And 5$, you would probably take 18:29:55 22 some credit for the shuttle extension, I 18:30:05 23 would think. 18:30:08 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: A one or something. 18:30:09 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Let's call that a one. 18:30:13 302 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: And then you'd bump 18:30:16 2 up the yellows to zero, minus one and one. 18:30:16 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 18:30:20 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. 18:30:20 5 DR. CRAWLEY: So let me read that 18:30:20 6 back -- 18:30:24 7 DR. AUSTIN: Can I be just a little 18:30:24 8 argumentative here for a moment. You know, I 18:30:24 9 believe there's a cadre of people that would 18:30:32 10 argue shuttle extension slows us down from 18:30:32 11 doing other things that we'd like to do. 18:30:32 12 So I don't know that it uniformly 18:30:40 13 would be viewed as something that would 18:30:40 14 support. 18:30:51 15 DR. CRAWLEY: You're absolutely 18:30:51 16 right. And I'm trying to think about the way 18:30:51 17 to say this without sounding like a 18:30:51 18 professor. 18:30:51 19 What I want to say is you've got to 18:30:57 20 decide whether it's the partial derivative or 18:30:57 21 the total derivative. 18:30:57 22 MR. GREASON: You were unsuccessful 18:31:02 23 in that -- 18:31:02 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Thank you for that. 18:31:02 25 DR. RIDE: I think an engineer could 18:31:05 303 1 probably understand that one too. 18:31:08 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think it's the 18:31:08 3 partial derivative. 18:31:10 4 DR. CRAWLEY: In the sense that -- 18:31:10 5 really the way we sort of set this up, Wanda, 18:31:10 6 I think, is that each of these should be 18:31:14 7 judged as an individual consideration rather 18:31:16 8 than coupling it back through a bunch of -- 18:31:16 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Partial derivative. 18:31:16 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. So if you just 18:31:20 11 looked at the policy aspects independent of 18:31:20 12 schedule change and -- you know, would it be 18:31:23 13 more difficult to find advocacy for this one 18:31:26 14 or that one. 18:31:28 15 DR. AUSTIN: Right. 18:31:30 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Did I do that better 18:31:32 17 that time? 18:31:34 18 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. That was -- you 18:31:34 19 could run for office now. 18:31:35 20 MR. GREASON: I want to make a very 18:31:35 21 quick comment just -- it doesn't change 18:31:37 22 anything -- about this whole notion of, you 18:31:39 23 know, contract disruption as an element of 18:31:42 24 Sustainability. It's real. The people who 18:31:46 25 are losing something always fight harder than 18:31:53 304 1 the -- against it than the people who are 18:31:53 2 gaining something will fight for it -- 18:31:53 3 always. 18:31:55 4 But it's -- having that under 18:31:56 5 Sustainability is an odd place to book-keep 18:32:03 6 it, because those are sort of transitional 18:32:06 7 pain. You know, four or five years down the 18:32:09 8 road that's all over and the new winners 18:32:13 9 become the established stakeholders and the 18:32:17 10 old losers have moved on. 18:32:21 11 And so while it's a real effect and 18:32:22 12 it drives a figure of merit, it's just a -- 18:32:22 13 the nomenclature is strange. 18:32:24 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Well -- 18:32:24 15 MR. GREASON: So I vote we note it 18:32:37 16 and move on. 18:32:40 17 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. Thank you. 18:32:42 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Safety/Success. 18:32:42 19 DR. CRAWLEY: So let's review 18:32:42 20 Sustainability. 2 is a minus one. 3B has a 18:32:47 21 zero. 3B$ also has a zero. 5$ has a one. 18:32:54 22 6$ has a zero. 7$ has a minus one. And 7S$ 18:32:59 23 has a one. 18:33:08 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: One. 18:33:12 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 18:33:12 305 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sold. 18:33:15 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, this is -- the 18:33:15 3 next category of Safety and Mission Success 18:33:17 4 and so forth is -- 18:33:20 5 MR. BEJMUK: Ed, are you saying 18:33:22 6 that -- say it, again, what 7 and -- 7 is 18:33:23 7 one? 18:33:27 8 DR. CRAWLEY: 7S$ is one. 18:33:27 9 MR. BEJMUK: Oh, okay. 18:33:32 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Now, in the 18:33:33 11 Safety category there has been quite a debate 18:33:37 12 which has gone back and forth within the 18:33:44 13 subgroup that was working on defining these 18:33:46 14 metrics, which Wanda alluded to in her 18:33:50 15 introduction of them yesterday. 18:33:57 16 MR. BEJMUK: I have a suggestion 18:34:00 17 to -- 18:34:00 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Earlier today, I guess 18:34:01 19 it was. 18:34:02 20 MR. BEJMUK: Ed, I have a suggestion 18:34:03 21 to make life easier. Everything that has a 18:34:05 22 commercial crew, minus one. Everything that 18:34:09 23 has a refueling, minus two. It's a good 18:34:12 24 starting point. 18:34:15 25 MR. GREASON: I oppose that 18:34:15 306 1 suggestion. 18:34:18 2 DR. CRAWLEY: So here are the -- here 18:34:18 3 is the idea that's captured in Wanda's 18:34:21 4 rubrics. First, that this is -- this is loss 18:34:25 5 of crew and loss of mission for the entire 18:34:31 6 mission, not just ascent, right. 18:34:34 7 So making an assertion, which we did 18:34:36 8 in the rubric, that zero was a loss of crew 18:34:41 9 comparable to the shuttle is actually 18:34:44 10 synonymous with saying that we have a far 18:34:47 11 more reliable launch system -- because there 18:34:51 12 are so many other things that the crew will 18:34:53 13 be exposed to as potential hazards that if 18:34:55 14 the whole system ends up being comparable to 18:34:58 15 the shuttle, we'll have done well, right. 18:35:05 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: I don't see how, for 18:35:07 17 example, circumnavigating Mars doesn't have 18:35:07 18 to be much more risky than flying a shuttle. 18:35:13 19 MR. GREASON: And in some of these 18:35:20 20 scenarios -- 18:35:20 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Given the choice, 18:35:25 22 which would you rather do? 18:35:25 23 DR. CRAWLEY: Both. 18:35:25 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: See, that's why 18:35:31 25 you're not an astronaut and these two are. 18:35:31 307 1 DR. CHIAO: Well, I've done shuttle. 18:35:31 2 I'll go around Mars. 18:35:31 3 DR. RIDE: Yeah. Me too. 18:35:40 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: We're going to get 18:35:40 5 you both another shot at it. You know, John 18:35:40 6 Glenn got a second bite at the apple. You 18:35:40 7 may yet. 18:35:40 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. Well, we'll talk 18:35:40 9 about that later. 18:35:51 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Shouldn't they be a 18:35:51 11 minus one or something? 18:35:51 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, the other point, 18:35:51 13 which maybe is the one Wanda should make 18:35:51 14 because it's her point -- there's actually 18:36:00 15 two issues. 18:36:00 16 One is that at the level of analysis 18:36:00 17 that we've done it's actually very difficult 18:36:00 18 to figure out the relative hazards and safety 18:36:00 19 levels of these concepts. 18:36:08 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: But you can do a 18:36:08 21 relative mission challenge -- mission 18:36:08 22 difficulty, and certainly the yellow ones are 18:36:15 23 more difficult missions than the shuttle. 18:36:15 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, the yellow ones 18:36:19 25 involve two launches from planetary surfaces. 18:36:22 308 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's what I said. 18:36:28 2 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm sorry. The blue 18:36:28 3 ones -- the blue ones, you land and take off 18:36:28 4 twice. Those are the riskiest part of human 18:36:34 5 space flight. The yellow one, you only land 18:36:34 6 and take off once. 18:36:41 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, that may be. 18:36:41 8 I'm just arguing that there shouldn't be 18:36:41 9 zeroes. There should be negatives on these 18:36:41 10 things. 18:36:50 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh, that they're all 18:36:50 12 more risky -- they're all riskier than flying 18:36:50 13 in the shuttle? 18:36:50 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: That would be my 18:36:50 15 view. Here are the two experts. So we -- 18:36:50 16 MR. GREASON: That can't be right. 18:37:03 17 Because one of these options is, you know, we 18:37:03 18 just -- we don't do anything except go to ISS 18:37:03 19 for rest of the time. You know, that better 18:37:03 20 not be more risky than what we're doing now. 18:37:11 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: I sure hope not. 18:37:11 22 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. 3B and 5 were 18:37:11 23 zeroes. 18:37:11 24 MR. McALISTER: Just the yellow 18:37:11 25 options were minus. 18:37:11 309 1 MR. GREASON: Okay. 18:37:11 2 MR. McALISTER: Not all of them, 18:37:11 3 right? 18:37:11 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: No. I think 18:37:11 5 everything -- well, let's see. The ones that 18:37:18 6 just go to the space station, I guess, could 18:37:18 7 be a zero, but the rest of them, I think, are 18:37:18 8 minus ones. Anyway... 18:37:27 9 MR. GREASON: Well, none of the 18:37:27 10 options for crew transport to the ISS, 18:37:27 11 commercial or government, lack the addition 18:37:27 12 of a serious escape capability. So if those 18:37:36 13 aren't significantly safer than the shuttle, 18:37:39 14 we're doing something wrong. 18:37:42 15 DR. CHIAO: And, Ed, you kind of 18:37:44 16 changed the numbers after our discussion. 18:37:45 17 Because we had talked about -- because the 18:37:47 18 commercials are unknown, we had said that 18:37:50 19 that's probably a little less safe just 18:37:50 20 because -- 18:37:53 21 DR. CRAWLEY: You're right. I did 18:37:53 22 that. 18:37:53 23 DR. CHIAO: -- just because we don't 18:37:53 24 know and they don't have a pedigree. I would 18:37:53 25 almost say that this Safety, you know, should 18:38:01 310 1 be moved over with the other things because 18:38:03 2 we just don't know with the -- I mean, with 18:38:03 3 the schedule program risk and life cycle 18:38:05 4 costs, which are left undefined, because I 18:38:08 5 don't know how we -- 18:38:10 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, the schedule life 18:38:12 7 cycle costs are intended that we will fill in 18:38:14 8 when we get the data, I guess. I mean, now 18:38:16 9 you're actually coming back to Wanda's 18:38:18 10 original position -- 18:38:20 11 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. 18:38:20 12 DR. CRAWLEY: -- which is that you 18:38:21 13 basically set a safety criteria -- 18:38:22 14 MR. GREASON: And it's not a 18:38:26 15 differentiator. 18:38:27 16 DR. CRAWLEY: -- and it's not a 18:38:29 17 differentiator, that you would not fly crew 18:38:31 18 unless you could convince yourself in one of 18:38:33 19 these concepts -- 18:38:37 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, maybe we should 18:38:37 21 change the title to be Safety Success 18:38:37 22 Challenge -- the challenge. Because as you 18:38:42 23 say, they're all going to be safe or we won't 18:38:42 24 do them. 18:38:47 25 On the other hand, the challenge is 18:38:47 311 1 something that's just a lot greater, and 18:38:47 2 that's important in making a decision. 18:38:53 3 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. There's difficulty 18:38:53 4 in making it safe enough to go. 18:38:53 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Exactly. 18:38:58 6 DR. RIDE: Yeah. And safety -- I 18:38:58 7 mean, it's interesting to lump these -- a 18:38:58 8 whole scenario into one number on safety. 18:39:04 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 18:39:04 10 DR. RIDE: Because every scenario 18:39:08 11 includes getting the crew to and from LEO. 18:39:11 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:39:11 13 DR. RIDE: And most of these 18:39:16 14 scenarios involve taking people a long way 18:39:20 15 out and exposing them to significantly higher 18:39:25 16 risks for a variety of different reasons. 18:39:25 17 You know, so -- 18:39:31 18 MR. GREASON: Apollo would clearly 18:39:31 19 not score as comparable to the shuttle in 18:39:35 20 safety, if you were to take an honest look at 18:39:31 21 it. 18:39:31 22 DR. RIDE: A what? 18:39:31 23 MR. GREASON: Apollo would clearly 18:39:33 24 not score as -- 18:39:35 25 DR. RIDE: Right. Yeah. That's 18:39:36 312 1 right. 18:39:36 2 DR. CRAWLEY: And you see -- 18:39:41 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: And, yet, Apollo was 18:39:41 4 ten for ten, and the shuttle is two for -- 18:39:41 5 or -- 18:39:48 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. So what you've 18:39:48 7 sort of done is define this as hazards in the 18:39:48 8 safety arena, right. This is the hazards 18:39:53 9 analysis, what hazards will be encountered. 18:40:00 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. You could call 18:40:00 11 it Safety Success Hazards -- whatever -- or 18:40:00 12 the challenge. 18:40:10 13 DR. CRAWLEY: But now the problem is, 18:40:10 14 you know, do we have actually enough insight 18:40:10 15 to know that it's more hazardous to spend 18:40:10 16 180 days in free space as opposed to 180 days 18:40:10 17 on a planetary surface -- 18:40:16 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 18:40:16 19 DR. CRAWLEY: -- which are both in 18:40:16 20 the plan? 18:40:16 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Because you have to 18:40:16 22 land on the planetary surface. 18:40:16 23 DR. RIDE: Land and get off again. 18:40:16 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: You've got to get off 18:40:16 25 of it. 18:40:21 313 1 MR. GREASON: Yeah. But then the 18:40:21 2 radiation risks are a large unknown and are a 18:40:21 3 bigger problem in deep space than they are on 18:40:24 4 the planetary surface. 18:40:28 5 DR. CHIAO: Right. 18:40:28 6 DR. CRAWLEY: Because you have twice 18:40:28 7 the galactic cosmic -- cosmic galactic 18:40:30 8 radiation. 18:40:32 9 MR. BEJMUK: But in going back to 18:40:32 10 this refueling, I have a problem accepting 18:40:35 11 the fact that fueling on the ground and 18:40:35 12 flying is not safer than fueling on the 18:40:39 13 ground, flying and then trying to refuel it 18:40:46 14 again in space. It's a huge complexity. And 18:40:46 15 if you were to try to write hazard analysis, 18:40:51 16 you know, you'd do it forever almost. 18:40:59 17 So I think there should be a 18:40:59 18 differentiation between those that do and -- 18:40:59 19 and from those that do not require refueling 18:41:05 20 on orbit or in space. 18:41:10 21 DR. RIDE: Well, I'm not sure that 18:41:10 22 that -- you know, given the overall 18:41:10 23 complexity of each of the scenarios, I'm not 18:41:20 24 certain that the refueling ones -- just 18:41:20 25 looking only at the refueling, I'd say it's 18:41:20 314 1 less safe. 18:41:20 2 You know, that -- I mean, space 18:41:30 3 station -- we've learned to do an 18:41:30 4 unbelievable number of things on space 18:41:30 5 station. I mean, it's absolutely incredible, 18:41:30 6 you know, what we're able to do with EVAs and 18:41:38 7 also with robotics and just putting things 18:41:38 8 together and moving things around. I mean, 18:41:45 9 it's incredible. 18:41:45 10 So we've learned a ton and we'll 18:41:45 11 learn a lot more that are going to help 18:41:51 12 mitigate those risks. 18:41:51 13 But, you know, my main point is, you 18:41:51 14 know, for these scenarios that envision 18:41:55 15 refueling, that's really just a part of it, 18:41:57 16 and the ones that don't may have 180-day 18:42:03 17 transit times with exposure to galactic 18:42:08 18 radiation. They may have, you know, 18:42:10 19 different landing scenarios. They may have 18:42:13 20 launch scenarios that are riskier. 18:42:15 21 So there's just -- you know, I'm 18:42:18 22 actually right back on zeroes for all of them 18:42:19 23 because I don't know how to differentiate 18:42:25 24 because they're -- you know, we're really 18:42:26 25 talking apples and oranges within every 18:42:27 315 1 different scenario -- 18:42:27 2 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. That's the 18:42:27 3 problem. 18:42:27 4 DR. RIDE: -- and then, you know, 18:42:27 5 pears and kumquats from scenario to scenario 18:42:30 6 but -- and this is -- it's too -- you know, 18:42:34 7 it's too simplistic a system and too complex 18:42:37 8 a problem to try to differentiate, and there 18:42:43 9 are -- you know, basically exploration is 18:42:47 10 risky. Space flight is risky. We're going 18:42:47 11 to do it as safely as we can or we're not 18:42:50 12 going to be doing it. 18:42:54 13 DR. AUSTIN: I would say that, for 18:42:54 14 all of the options we have, we didn't see 18:42:54 15 anything that said we could not get 18:43:00 16 comfortable, that we could design it to be 18:43:00 17 safe. 18:43:00 18 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. And that's why 18:43:00 19 like Norm's suggestion. Let's change this to 18:43:04 20 kind of the challenge of what it would -- 18:43:04 21 your difficulty factor of -- 18:43:05 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:43:05 23 DR. CHIAO: -- getting it to that 18:43:07 24 point. 18:43:09 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: If you do -- 18:43:09 316 1 DR. CHIAO: You can kind of -- 18:43:09 2 MR. GREASON: If you could even 18:43:10 3 narrow -- we have such huge uncertainty 18:43:10 4 over -- I mean, just over which elements are 18:43:11 5 really the hard ones to go solve. 18:43:14 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, let's -- 18:43:17 7 DR. CHIAO: But, I mean, you look at 18:43:21 8 ISS -- and I don't care -- we're going back 18:43:21 9 to ISS with a -- you know, either shuttle or 18:43:23 10 something like that -- 18:43:25 11 MR. GREASON: Yeah. If you say going 18:43:27 12 to the ISS is easier than going into 18:43:27 13 Deep Space, whoo-hoo. 18:43:28 14 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:43:30 15 DR. CHIAO: But then if you -- well, 18:43:30 16 and I have to agree with Bo. I mean, if 18:43:30 17 you're going to do refueling, maybe that's 18:43:33 18 something that will turn out to be relatively 18:43:37 19 easy to do, but, nonetheless, you've added 18:43:40 20 that operation. So by definition -- 18:43:40 21 MR. McALISTER: As a hazard. 18:43:42 22 DR. CHIAO: -- it's a little more 18:43:42 23 difficult. 18:43:42 24 MR. BEJMUK: It's a hazard to the -- 18:43:42 25 DR. CRAWLEY: You know, and, Sally, I 18:43:42 317 1 think I have to support Bo on this, that, you 18:43:45 2 know, the comparison between transferring 18:43:48 3 water and so forth in the space station as 18:43:50 4 opposed to fueling a deep cryogenic stage on 18:43:52 5 orbit -- 6 MR. McALISTER: Well, cryo is a 7 different thing, you know. 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that's what 9 refueling is. 10 MR. McALISTER: Well, but, I mean, if 18:43:58 11 we're talking -- 18:43:58 12 DR. CHIAO: It depends on the fuel. 18:44:00 13 Because on the station, we do UDMH and -- 18:44:02 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, no. But the fuel 18:44:04 15 we're talking about is liquid hydrogen. 18:44:05 16 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. Liquid hydrogen is 18:44:05 17 a whole different thing. 18:44:05 18 MR. McALISTER: And we have received 18:44:05 19 testimony after testimony on -- 18:44:07 20 MR. BEJMUK: Do you know how many 18:44:07 21 launches are scratched on the ground because 22 of hydrogen leakage? 23 DR. CHIAO: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I 24 know. 25 MR. BEJMUK: On ground. 318 1 DR. CHIAO: On ground. 2 MR. BEJMUK: We couldn't launch, you 3 know, on the ground. 18:44:18 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, you've got a 18:44:18 5 lot of air around on the ground, and you 18:44:18 6 don't in space. 18:44:18 7 (Discussion off the record.) 18:44:26 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: How about this. 18:44:26 9 We're not trying to compare these things with 18:44:34 10 each other. 18:44:36 11 We're trying to compare -- or let me 18:44:37 12 propose that we compare the challenge of 18:44:41 13 doing this and we're not comparing them so 18:44:44 14 much with each other as we are -- it says 18:44:47 15 here, risk compared to the shuttle. 18:44:49 16 And so the ISS flights get a zero. 18:44:52 17 Everything else, I give a minus two, just 18:44:57 18 because it's that much more difficult than 18:45:00 19 flying a shuttle. 18:45:03 20 DR. AUSTIN: But a minus two would 18:45:05 21 say we wouldn't do it or that we would advise 18:45:08 22 against it, I guess, as opposed to -- 18:45:12 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, maybe -- 18:45:12 24 MR. McALISTER: But it's the 18:45:12 25 challenge. It's not -- remember we changed 18:45:12 319 1 it. 18:45:12 2 DR. AUSTIN: Okay. 18:45:18 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Challenge. We're 18:45:18 4 going to meet the challenge and make them all 18:45:18 5 zeroes, as Sally says. 18:45:18 6 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. I mean, it's 18:45:29 7 almost like we could rename this Technical 18:45:29 8 Challenge instead of Safety and Mission 18:45:29 9 Success, because we're going to try to -- 18:45:29 10 we're going to do this -- 18:45:29 11 MR. GREASON: No. It's the 18:45:29 12 challenges that are associated with creating 18:45:29 13 hazards that impact life and -- 18:45:29 14 DR. CHIAO: Well, we're dealing 18:45:29 15 with -- technically dealing with those 18:45:29 16 technical -- 18:45:37 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: But there are other 18:45:37 18 technical challenges that we wouldn't want to 18:45:37 19 weigh in on here, I think. 18:45:37 20 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. Let's keep it 18:45:37 21 then. 18:45:37 22 (Discussion off the record.) 18:45:41 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Safety challenge, 18:45:41 24 two. Space station is a zero because that's 18:45:43 25 comparable to shuttle, and everything else is 18:45:46 320 1 a minus two. 18:45:49 2 But then we make the point that that 18:45:49 3 doesn't mean you're going to live with that. 18:45:52 4 DR. CRAWLEY: I mean, if you look at 18:45:56 5 the rubrics that Wanda derived, maybe it's 18:46:00 6 one and minus one. Because the rubric for 18:46:00 7 one is enhanced crew safety consistent with 18:46:03 8 new human rating requirements. 18:46:03 9 Now, I realize that really is a 18:46:08 10 safety -- not a hazards -- statement, right. 18:46:08 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, I think we've 18:46:08 12 got to redefine this block to be consistent 18:46:12 13 with the notion of challenge as opposed to 18:46:12 14 mission success. 18:46:19 15 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 18:46:19 16 MR. GREASON: Either way, it's a 18:46:24 17 Delta 2. 18:46:24 18 MR. BEJMUK: Well, but, you know, if 18:46:24 19 you redefine it as challenge, you even more 18:46:24 20 should be concerned about these missions that 18:46:24 21 involve refueling in space. 18:46:31 22 (Discussion off the record.) 23 MR. BEJMUK: To get this refueling in 24 space done and GN&C and Ground and Mission 25 Control and sensors -- I mean, you know -- 321 1 and you have to do it so you don't collide 2 and so you transfer safely. 3 To me, it's a huge safety risk. It 4 sounds like coming to a gas station and 5 filling your car, and I -- 18:47:01 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: To draw this to a 18:47:02 7 close, why don't we redefine this challenge, 18:47:04 8 show it's a much greater challenge than the 18:47:07 9 shuttle, and change the wording here so that 18:47:10 10 it matches the challenge as opposed to an 18:47:13 11 assessment of the safety. 18:47:16 12 DR. CRAWLEY: I have to say I have to 18:47:16 13 agree with Bo on this. I think that 18:47:16 14 someplace on here -- if we're taking the 18:47:18 15 credit for the fuel transfer, multiple 18:47:21 16 vehicle operations with smaller vehicles, we 18:47:25 17 have to someplace show the associated risk 18:47:26 18 with that. 18:47:30 19 MR. GREASON: Well, you already 18:47:32 20 scored it lower on Sustainability, quote, 18:47:32 21 unquote. 18:47:33 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Or you can make it 18:47:33 23 minus one and minus two if you want. If 18:47:36 24 you're going to transfer fuel, you make it 18:47:36 25 minus two. Everything else is a minus one. 18:47:40 322 1 DR. CRAWLEY: We scored it low on 18:47:41 2 Sustainability because of the transition in 18:47:45 3 contractual arrangements, not having anything 18:47:47 4 to do with the fact that it had big tanks or 18:47:49 5 small tanks. 18:47:51 6 MR. GREASON: Just let me say this, 18:47:51 7 and then I will bow out, okay. 18:47:53 8 We have never seen a scenario -- I 18:47:54 9 mean, we say we're trying to go to Mars. We 18:47:58 10 have never seen a credible scenario that does 18:48:01 11 not involve propellant transfer in space. 18:48:04 12 None. 18:48:07 13 So, you know, we can make all of the 18:48:07 14 song and dance we want about, oh, my God, 18:48:09 15 it's hard -- and it may be. It may be really 18:48:13 16 hard. Guess what? If we're serious, we have 18:48:16 17 no choice. 18:48:22 18 DR. CHIAO: Well, I don't think -- 18:48:22 19 rating it down doesn't mean we're not going 18:48:22 20 to do it. No. I mean, just I think it's -- 18:48:25 21 we're trying to do a relative risk. 18:48:25 22 MR. GREASON: So with that, I will 18:48:32 23 acquiesce. 18:48:32 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Well, let me 18:48:32 25 make a suggestion and see how it works here. 18:48:32 323 1 Which is that I think we should call 18:48:36 2 the ISS Focused on a one under the principle 18:48:36 3 that going up and down to the ISS in a new 18:48:45 4 vehicle should -- new vehicle in the -- well, 18:48:47 5 now it's whether they are hazards or failure 18:48:49 6 effects. 18:48:53 7 What I was trying to get to is that, 18:48:58 8 you know, doing it in a new vehicle would be 18:49:00 9 less hazardous because the vehicle would have 18:49:00 10 been developed under the new standards, but 18:49:02 11 I'm not sure I'm -- 18:49:03 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's what they 18:49:04 13 thought about the shuttle. 18:49:08 14 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:49:08 15 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So let's do 18:49:08 16 it -- 18:49:14 17 DR. RIDE: Never assess safety until 18:49:14 18 you've flown a few times. 18:49:14 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. Never fly on 18:49:20 20 an airplane with a -- 18:49:20 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that's the 22 consistent -- 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- tail number less 24 than ten. 25 DR. CRAWLEY: -- position of the crew 324 1 office. 18:49:24 2 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. Never fly the A 18:49:24 3 model. 18:49:24 4 DR. RIDE: Never fly the A model. 18:49:24 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Give us a proposal 18:49:24 6 here, Ed. 18:49:26 7 DR. CRAWLEY: So if we reference the 18:49:26 8 3B ISS Focused, commercial crew, et cetera, 18:49:29 9 it's a zero. I would recommend that the ones 18:49:34 10 that involve either going in the yellow zone 18:49:38 11 or the blue zone to be minus one but that the 18:49:44 12 ones that involve significantly more fueling 18:49:48 13 and launch operations in order to do that get 18:49:52 14 minus two. 18:49:56 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: I could live with 18:49:56 16 that. 18:49:59 17 MR. McALISTER: Before we go on to 18:49:59 18 the next one, Ed, just a point of 18:50:02 19 clarification. You may be surprised to hear 18:50:08 20 that we still have an audience on NASA TV. 18:50:08 21 And in terms of the dollar signs, 18:50:14 22 that is consistent with the less constrained 18:50:14 23 options. Is that correct? 18:50:18 24 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. That's right. 18:50:18 25 MR. McALISTER: Okay. So we have the 18:50:18 325 1 constrained options which fit within the 18:50:18 2 budget. Then we had unconstrained, which we 18:50:23 3 have eliminated. And now the ones with the 18:50:23 4 dollar sign are in the less constrained 18:50:24 5 category consistent with Sally's presentation 18:50:26 6 earlier where we bumped it up to what we 18:50:29 7 thought was a reasonable level, just so 18:50:32 8 people can follow along on NASA TV. 18:50:34 9 Okay. Keep going, Ed. Thanks. 18:50:37 10 DR. AUSTIN: Do you want to call it 18:50:41 11 out, Ed, on Safety? 18:50:42 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. I'm trying to 18:50:42 13 figure out what the actual implication -- 18:50:44 14 MR. McALISTER: It was the 5 -- 18:50:44 15 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:50:44 16 MR. McALISTER: -- 5$ and 3B$. Since 18:50:44 17 they're not on the sheet, that's where people 18:50:47 18 were confused. 18:50:49 19 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. So let's start 18:50:52 20 from the top by those rules. 18:50:55 21 The program of record would be a 18:50:57 22 minus one. That's No. 2. 3B would be a 18:51:01 23 zero. The shuttle extension would be -- 18:51:12 24 MR. McALISTER: That's 5. 18:51:16 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 18:51:16 326 1 MR. McALISTER: 5$. 18:51:20 2 DR. CRAWLEY: It's 5$. 18:51:21 3 MR. GREASON: I'm sorry to do this to 18:51:21 4 you, Ed. But if No. 2, which is the 18:51:23 5 constrained to the budget -- we don't 18:51:26 6 actually ever go beyond ISS in that option. 18:51:28 7 DR. CRAWLEY: That's true. 18:51:31 8 DR. RIDE: It's a point. 18:51:31 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Do we give it credit 18:51:36 10 for going nowhere? 18:51:36 11 MR. McALISTER: It's 2028. 18:51:39 12 DR. RIDE: Sure. 18:51:39 13 MR. GREASON: To use this whole, if 18:51:44 14 take with the one hand, you have to give with 18:51:44 15 other, I think, yeah. 18:51:44 16 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 18:51:44 17 MR. GREASON: It's not like we scored 18:51:47 18 it for all of the things it wanted to do. 18:51:47 19 MR. McALISTER: I thought Ares V flew 18:51:51 20 in 2028. 18:51:54 21 MR. GREASON: But it doesn't leave 18:51:58 22 LEO because it's got nowhere to go. 18:52:01 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: It doesn't go 18:52:01 24 anywhere. It doesn't have anything to -- 18:52:01 25 DR. RIDE: It's ready. 18:52:01 327 1 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. All right. 18:52:01 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: It's all dressed up. 18:52:01 3 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. 18:52:04 4 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. I can live 18:52:04 5 with that. Our standards are going down. 18:52:04 6 DR. CRAWLEY: What I'm struggling 18:52:08 7 with here is whether we differentiate in 18:52:11 8 terms of this operational complexity the 18:52:11 9 shuttle-derived vehicles and the EELVs from 18:52:17 10 the Ares or do we put the shuttle-derived 18:52:21 11 vehicles at about 108-ton capacity with the 18:52:26 12 Ares and differentiate the other one. It's 18:52:29 13 almost like -- 18:52:31 14 MR. GREASON: Are they different only 18:52:31 15 by one? 18:52:31 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. 18:52:32 17 MR. GREASON: I don't care. 18:52:34 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Well, okay. 18:52:36 19 Then here's my proposal that -- and remind me 18:52:38 20 what 3B$ is. Oh, yeah. That's right. So 18:52:43 21 that would be a minus one. Okay. 18:52:47 22 So here's the proposal -- that No. 2 18:52:48 23 gets a zero by virtue of the fact that it 18:52:54 24 doesn't get anywhere. 18:52:57 25 No. 3B gets a zero by virtue of the 18:53:01 328 1 fact that it's just going up and down to the 18:53:07 2 space station. The shuttle extension -- I'm 18:53:12 3 sorry. 18:53:12 4 3B$ gets a minus one because of the 18:53:12 5 inherent risks of going towards the Moon. 18:53:22 6 5$ also gets a minus one due to the 18:53:22 7 inherent risks of going to the Moon. 18:53:22 8 6$ gets a minus one due to the 18:53:31 9 inherent risks in going various places away 18:53:31 10 from the Earth. 18:53:31 11 And the other two get minus twos 18:53:31 12 because of both the inherent risks of going 18:53:38 13 those places and the complexity -- except I 18:53:38 14 mis-scored the shuttle extension. So let me 18:53:45 15 do that again. 18:53:45 16 No. 2 -- well, Norm said we'd be here 18:53:45 17 until midnight. I think we'll make it by 18:53:52 18 9:00. 18:53:52 19 No. 2 is zero. No. 3B is zero. 18:53:52 20 No. 3B$ that gets out of low Earth orbit is 18:54:02 21 minus one. No. 5$, which gets out of low 18:54:02 22 Earth orbit and has the operational 18:54:13 23 complexity, is minus two. 18:54:13 24 DR. AUSTIN: Minus two? 18:54:13 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Minus two. The 18:54:23 329 1 Deep Space 6 star -- 6$ is minus one. The 18:54:23 2 7$ is minus two. And the 7S$ is minus two. 18:54:23 3 Unless you just wanted to take all of those 18:54:29 4 and add one so that instead of having zero, 18:54:36 5 minus one and minus two, you had minus one, 18:54:36 6 zero and plus one. 18:54:36 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think you better 18:54:36 8 leave it the way it is. 18:54:44 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Leave it the way it is. 18:54:44 10 MR. BEJMUK: Yeah. It's good. 18:54:44 11 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Now, the next 18:54:44 12 category is NASA and Industry Workforce. 18:54:44 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Here's one, Ed, I 18:54:51 14 might interject -- the changes we've been 18:54:51 15 working on, we've really broken that into two 18:54:51 16 columns. One is critical skills, which is 18:54:59 17 the next one here, and the first one is the 18:54:59 18 NASA workforce. And those are just going to 18:54:59 19 fall out of the dollars. 18:55:08 20 So there's really no -- the ratings 18:55:08 21 are going to come out automatically from the 18:55:08 22 computer. So I don't think we have to do 18:55:08 23 anything on those. I think the computer will 18:55:24 24 fill in the blanks. 18:55:24 25 MR. GREASON: Fill out the algorithm. 18:55:24 330 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. I'll tell you -- 18:55:24 2 you notice my notation down there on the HC, 18:55:24 3 which I think merits a little discussion 18:55:24 4 before we go -- I think the workforce one -- 18:55:40 5 you're right, Norm. I think the workforce 18:55:40 6 one approximation is dollars. 18:55:40 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, you're 18:55:40 8 right. I misspoke. You're absolutely right. 18:55:40 9 DR. CRAWLEY: I think the skills -- 18:55:40 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: The skills one is 18:55:40 11 different. 18:55:40 12 DR. CRAWLEY: -- is a little 18:55:40 13 different. 18:55:40 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Absolutely. 18:55:40 15 DR. CRAWLEY: So in order to 18:55:40 16 highlight that difference -- you see that 18:55:56 17 little annotation there? I couldn't figure 18:55:56 18 out whether I'd score 7 -- Scenario 7 as a 18:55:56 19 plus one or minus one. And here was the 18:55:56 20 reasoning. 18:55:56 21 It's a plus one because you train a 18:55:56 22 whole generation of people to build a new big 18:55:56 23 hydrocarbon engine, and it's a minus one 18:56:08 24 because you lose the solids. So is that a -- 18:56:08 25 so it's a value judgment as to which part of 18:56:08 331 1 the skilled workforce is more important. 18:56:08 2 I don't mean to put such a sharp edge 18:56:18 3 on it, but there's a flavor of that that 18:56:18 4 there's a value judgment about what is the 18:56:18 5 skilled workforce you have to maintain before 18:56:24 6 it makes sense to rate this, which is 18:56:24 7 unfortunately -- 18:56:24 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think you can build 18:56:24 9 the argument that being good in one area 18:56:31 10 doesn't offset being poor in another area. 18:56:31 11 So I would give it the lower number. 18:56:40 12 You know, you can't offset not being 18:56:40 13 able to build microchips by being good at 18:56:40 14 energy propellants. So I think that gets 18:56:40 15 taken down. 18:56:52 16 DR. CRAWLEY: So you would look at 18:56:52 17 the most important or severe loss of a key 18:56:54 18 national skill as the way you would rate it? 18:56:58 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think for the level 18:57:01 20 of detail we're doing here that's what I'd 18:57:06 21 do. I'd give it a minus one. 18:57:06 22 MR. GREASON: I mean, politically -- 18:57:09 23 again, you know, stakeholders losing 18:57:12 24 something always care more than the 18:57:17 25 stakeholders gaining something. 18:57:19 332 1 DR. CRAWLEY: The theory of regret. 18:57:19 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:57:19 3 DR. CRAWLEY: That you have to deal 18:57:19 4 with regret created by a decision more than 18:57:23 5 the benefits created. 18:57:23 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Then you've got one 18:57:26 7 that sits somewhere between a zero and minus 18:57:29 8 two. 18:57:32 9 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that was just the 18:57:32 10 same one shifted. So you can ignore it. 18:57:34 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 18:57:38 12 DR. CRAWLEY: While using that 18:57:42 13 criteria, let's try -- I think in this case 18:57:49 14 you would say the program of record -- oh, 18:57:52 15 I'm sorry. 18:57:57 16 Well, I think you'd say No. 2 was 18:58:02 17 something like a minus one just because it 18:58:07 18 will take so long and the investment will be 18:58:11 19 so low -- 18:58:14 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. 18:58:14 21 DR. CRAWLEY: -- that, you know, it 18:58:15 22 will be difficult to maintain the skill base, 18:58:20 23 and I think you'd assign the same score to 18:58:23 24 the other constrained budget case, No. 3B. 18:58:27 25 Then you would go to 3B star -- 3B$, 18:58:30 333 1 and you would say, is the acceleration of the 18:58:38 2 program in that one going to create 18:58:44 3 significant? -- so I guess that probably goes 18:58:48 4 to something like a zero, which is defined in 18:58:48 5 the rubric as maintains selected critical 18:58:52 6 skills and experience. 18:58:57 7 MR. GREASON: None of these options, 18:58:59 8 with the exception of 5, do we get rid of the 18:59:01 9 big gap in operation of shuttle heritage 18:59:06 10 systems. 18:59:10 11 And so, yeah, there are things that 18:59:11 12 are accelerating, but, you know, the only 18:59:13 13 things that you're afraid of losing in those 18:59:16 14 scenarios, you have to be afraid of losing 18:59:19 15 whether you spend more money or less. 18:59:22 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, but to a certain 18:59:24 17 extent -- Sally has just left the room. To a 18:59:26 18 certain extent, that -- we've put in the 18:59:30 19 carrying costs in order to keep those 18:59:32 20 capabilities alive. The consistent thing 18:59:34 21 would be to give it credit for keeping them 18:59:38 22 alive. 18:59:42 23 MR. GREASON: But this is about 18:59:46 24 critical skills, and the skill we're talking 18:59:46 25 about is the skill of operations. And I 18:59:46 334 1 don't know, as an operator, whether -- 18:59:46 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's an important 18:59:54 3 point. I think that's right. I think you 18:59:54 4 take it down. 19:00:03 5 MR. GREASON: I mean, if I -- I think 19:00:03 6 this is the case where there's -- you know, 19:00:03 7 if -- the only thing that scores high on this 19:00:03 8 is the shuttle exception, because that's the 19:00:15 9 only scenario in which you don't have people 19:00:15 10 standing around for five years going I wonder 19:00:15 11 if I remember how to do this. 19:00:15 12 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. That's true. 19:00:15 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: You're probably 19:00:24 14 right. 19:00:24 15 DR. CRAWLEY: So you'd make the 19:00:24 16 shuttle extension a zero. 19:00:24 17 MR. GREASON: Or a one maybe. I 19:00:24 18 don't -- yeah, a zero. 19:00:24 19 DR. CRAWLEY: A zero. 19:00:24 20 MR. GREASON: Because it just 19:00:32 21 maintains. This doesn't do any improvement. 19:00:32 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Baseline. 19:00:32 23 DR. CHIAO: Right. 19:00:32 24 DR. CRAWLEY: And you would move the 19:00:32 25 3B$ to a minus one because of the gap -- 19:00:32 335 1 MR. GREASON: Uh-huh. 19:00:32 2 DR. CRAWLEY: -- is what you're 19:00:40 3 saying. And the other ones would be minus 19:00:40 4 ones probably as well, right? 19:00:44 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Right. It's the only 19:00:47 6 one that doesn't continue the shuttle. 19:00:47 7 DR. CRAWLEY: If the criteria is the 19:00:55 8 worse thing that happens. 19:00:55 9 So let me try reading you that. Now, 19:01:02 10 before we go off of that, is it really true 19:01:06 11 that when you defined this, Norm, as critical 19:01:12 12 skills -- critical national skills that you 19:01:15 13 were thinking about the operational -- 19:01:18 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, that was one of 19:01:20 15 the many things. It would be can we power 19:01:22 16 large solid propellant rocket motors, things 19:01:25 17 of that type. 19:01:29 18 DR. RIDE: But I think -- 19:01:32 19 DR. CRAWLEY: If you made a short 19:01:33 20 list, we could test the hypothesis that these 19:01:37 21 should all be minus ones. Because, I mean, 19:01:39 22 some have the solid rocket motors and some 19:01:42 23 don't. So if you thought that was on your 19:01:44 24 list of key skills -- 19:01:46 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: Maybe they're all -- 19:01:48 336 1 DR. RIDE: You shouldn't 19:01:48 2 underestimate the operational skills. 19:01:51 3 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. 19:01:51 4 DR. RIDE: That's -- 19:01:51 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: It's a big one. 19:01:51 6 DR. RIDE: That's a big one. That's 19:01:54 7 hard stuff. 19:02:00 8 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, I understand. I 19:02:00 9 also know that from 1973 to 1981 there was 19:02:00 10 one five-day mission and we -- ASTP. 19:02:06 11 DR. CHIAO: Well, it doesn't mean 19:02:11 12 it's not overcomable, but it's an impact. 19:02:16 13 MR. GREASON: All technologies that 19:02:16 14 you lose, if you want them badly enough, you 19:02:16 15 can get them back. 19:02:16 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Eventually. 19:02:18 17 DR. CHIAO: Yeah, eventually. 19:02:18 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: All right. Ed, to 19:02:18 19 maintain your point, you might -- 19:02:20 20 DR. CRAWLEY: I was just making sure 19:02:24 21 that in our discussion there we didn't just 19:02:24 22 focus on one key skill. 19:02:29 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Maybe that -- it's a 19:02:29 24 minus one. Everything else is a minus two. 19:02:34 25 DR. AUSTIN: I was going to offer to up 19:02:34 337 1 that -- 19:02:34 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, that's not going 19:02:34 3 to differentiate -- 19:02:34 4 DR. AUSTIN: -- that maybe we need to 19:02:39 5 amend the description to really focus on the 19:02:39 6 operational skills if that's what we're 19:02:39 7 worried about. Because I think if you 19:02:45 8 generically say critical skills -- I know 19:02:45 9 what comes to my mind is more engineering 19:02:45 10 skills, technical skills that you need -- 19:02:49 11 MR. McALISTER: For development. 19:02:49 12 DR. AUSTIN: -- yeah -- for 19:02:49 13 development. 19:02:52 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. I mean, if you 19:02:52 15 look -- if you look at the criteria that we 19:02:55 16 elaborated that go with this, it reads 19:02:56 17 potential to sustain key industrial 19:03:02 18 workforce, which could be interpreted many 19:03:02 19 ways, the potential to engage the appropriate 19:03:04 20 scientific and engineering resources of the 19:03:06 21 nation and the potential for a sustainability 19:03:07 22 workforce in the maintenance of high quality 19:03:12 23 stable employment in the technical workforce. 19:03:15 24 So it's -- as you said, it's a little 19:03:17 25 more broad. 19:03:19 338 1 MR. GREASON: Not to make a complex 19:03:19 2 problem more complex, but we also have on the 19:03:22 3 scoring sheet this thing about attracting and 19:03:26 4 retaining a highly capable technical 19:03:28 5 workforce. 19:03:28 6 And how do you cope with the fact 19:03:32 7 that there is a duality that if we turn off 19:03:34 8 old things so that we can do new things, the 19:03:38 9 graduating engineers are going to go, great, 19:03:41 10 I get to come in and work on a program that 19:03:42 11 does all kinds of new things, which is a good 19:03:43 12 things, but it goes along with the fact that 19:03:46 13 there are some old things you're not going to 19:03:46 14 do anymore, that's a negative. 19:03:51 15 I guess I'm questioning Norm's 19:03:53 16 statement, before he gets out of earshot 19:03:56 17 here, that you just take the minimum of all 19:03:56 18 possible scoring criteria and say whatever is 19:04:01 19 the worse thing is what you score. 19:04:02 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, I haven't heard a 19:04:09 21 better suggestion than the one we had before 19:04:15 22 I raised the objection. So let me tell 19:04:17 23 you -- 19:04:20 24 DR. CHIAO: Do you want to retract 19:04:20 25 your objection? 19:04:22 339 1 DR. CRAWLEY: I'll retract my 19:04:23 2 objection. 19:04:24 3 DR. RIDE: All in favor? 19:04:24 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Since I made it, I can 19:04:25 5 retract it. 19:04:27 6 So let me tell you what I think we 19:04:28 7 scored there, which is on item 2 -- Option 2 19:04:31 8 it was minus one. On Option 4 it was a minus 19:04:34 9 one. 10 DR. AUSTIN: Option 4. 11 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm sorry. I'm 12 starting to get -- 13 MR. McALISTER: 3B. 14 DR. CRAWLEY: Option 3B, which is on 19:04:46 15 line 4, it's a minus one. Option 3B$ is a 19:04:48 16 minus one. Option 5$ is a zero. Option 6$ 19:04:52 17 is a minus one. 7$ is a minus one. And 7S$ 19:04:59 18 is a minus one. 19:05:08 19 Now, we agreed that we would use a 19:05:08 20 rule on the workforce just like we used a 19:05:12 21 rule on science, which is basically to scale 19:05:17 22 it off the total expenditure or the 19:05:23 23 principal. The way to make jobs is to spend 19:05:23 24 money, and you can't make jobs -- well, 19:05:27 25 there's an efficiency argument. 19:05:30 340 1 Now, let's talk for a minute about 19:05:35 2 the last two, which we left blank, and just 19:05:35 3 make sure that we're comfortable with taking 19:05:38 4 the outcomes of the Aerospace analysis and 19:05:42 5 using it to inform these. 19:05:46 6 Sally, do you want to -- you're the 19:05:51 7 one who knows that the best. Do you want to 19:05:52 8 comment on that? 19:05:55 9 In other words, it would go to the 19:05:55 10 fact of -- let's take schedule for a minute. 19:05:55 11 Is this schedule performance, or is this -- 19:05:59 12 you know, is this sort of confidence in the 19:06:01 13 schedule and risk? 19:06:05 14 DR. RIDE: You know, it's -- the way 19:06:07 15 that the scenarios will come out is they'll 19:06:10 16 spit out a budget that the methodology 19:06:16 17 believes will give you 65 percent confidence 19:06:21 18 of making that. 19:06:26 19 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 19:06:26 20 DR. RIDE: So it will not 19:06:27 21 discriminate between these two. 19:06:29 22 Do you agree with that, Wanda? 19:06:32 23 DR. AUSTIN: Yes, I do. Absolutely. 19:06:33 24 DR. RIDE: And similarly -- so I 19:06:35 25 would say that it's not going to be -- it's 19:06:40 341 1 not going to be a way to discriminate -- 19:06:42 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 19:06:46 3 DR. RIDE: -- between -- 19:06:46 4 DR. CRAWLEY: In other words, the 19:06:46 5 schedule dates will be at a consistent level 19:06:46 6 of -- 19:06:50 7 DR. RIDE: Yes. 19:06:50 8 DR. CRAWLEY: -- predictable risk? 19:06:53 9 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. But the schedule 19:06:55 10 that we had in the rubrics here was when do 19:06:55 11 you get human lunar return, when do you get 19:06:55 12 beyond LEO. 19:06:58 13 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes. That's right. So 19:06:58 14 it's the absolute answers. 19:06:59 15 DR. RIDE: Right. 19:07:03 16 DR. AUSTIN: Yeah. So once you have 19:07:03 17 that data, then you can say, hey, this -- 19:07:04 18 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 19:07:04 19 DR. AUSTIN: -- comes too late, 19:07:06 20 therefore -- 19:07:08 21 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. Let's go back 19:07:08 22 and look at that. 19:07:09 23 DR. CHIAO: Every one is going to get 19:07:09 24 a negative one or two. 19:07:09 25 DR. RIDE: Yeah. And those will -- 19:07:13 342 1 DR. AUSTIN: Right. 19:07:13 2 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. Actually you're 19:07:13 3 right. 19:07:15 4 DR. RIDE: Right. 19:07:15 5 DR. CRAWLEY: So the schedule rubrics 19:07:15 6 are associated with dates of key events -- 19:07:17 7 DR. AUSTIN: Right. 19:07:17 8 DR. CRAWLEY: -- at the 65 percent 19:07:23 9 confidence level, which is what the analysis 19:07:23 10 will produce. And the life cycle cost is 19:07:28 11 relevant to the budget. 19:07:28 12 MR. BEJMUK: It's a little more than 19:07:31 13 that, Ed, it seems like. I think what these 19:07:31 14 ladies are saying is exactly right. You 19:07:31 15 know, here's a schedule with a 65 percent 19:07:34 16 probability, and that's great. 19:07:39 17 I think more important for us is to 19:07:39 18 judge on the basis -- do you get Ares I by 19:07:43 19 the time ISS is still in orbit or does it 19:07:46 20 come after it went into the drink. That, to 19:07:51 21 me -- that aspect is more important in 19:07:56 22 judging these scenarios. Do we -- you 19:08:05 23 know -- 19:08:05 24 MR. GREASON: You eliminated a 19:08:05 25 scenario that's already -- 19:08:05 343 1 MR. BEJMUK: -- you're making up 19:08:05 2 things that are built for a function and the 19:08:05 3 function is gone, you know. And I don't know 19:08:10 4 if we have -- we had cases today in Sally's 19:08:10 5 presentations -- 19:08:19 6 DR. RIDE: We did. I think those are 19:08:19 7 gone though. I think. 19:08:19 8 MR. BEJMUK: They're all gone? The 19:08:19 9 ones that didn't make sense -- 19:08:19 10 DR. RIDE: Yeah. They didn't make 19:08:19 11 sense, and so they -- they just didn't hold 19:08:19 12 together is all. 19:08:23 13 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. So we don't have 19:08:23 14 to worry about that. 19:08:23 15 DR. RIDE: I don't think we have 19:08:23 16 any -- 19:08:23 17 MR. GREASON: To the best of our 19:08:28 18 ability, we don't have any of those left -- 19:08:28 19 DR. RIDE: Right. 19:08:28 20 MR. GREASON: -- the ones that didn't 19:08:28 21 make sense. 19:08:32 22 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 19:08:32 23 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Good. 19:08:32 24 DR. RIDE: It's hard to tell from 19:08:32 25 this sheet. 19:08:34 344 1 MR. GREASON: Yeah. Right now 19:08:34 2 nothing is making a lot of sense but -- 19:08:36 3 DR. CRAWLEY: We're deliberating in a 19:08:39 4 public meeting, so this is a good discussion. 19:08:41 5 DR. RIDE: All good. 19:08:44 6 DR. CRAWLEY: So it seems to me that, 19:08:44 7 as Wanda points out, if you actually look at 19:08:46 8 the rubrics on Charts 12 and 13 that this is 19:08:48 9 information that you could pretty readily 19:08:53 10 read off the Aerospace analysis. 19:08:54 11 DR. RIDE: Yeah. 19:08:54 12 MR. GREASON: I agree. 19:08:54 13 DR. CRAWLEY: So it's fair to leave 19:08:56 14 those to be based on rule. 19:08:59 15 DR. AUSTIN: I think so. 19:09:01 16 DR. RIDE: Good. 19:09:03 17 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So, 19:09:03 18 Mr. Chairman, I think we're done. 19:09:05 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: I thought you were 19:09:08 20 playing bingo out there. You won. 19:09:13 21 DR. CRAWLEY: We have -- why don't we 19:09:17 22 just summarize. Without actually reading any 19:09:17 23 specific numbers, we have agreed to ratings 19:09:22 24 under Exploration Preparation, Technology 19:09:24 25 Innovation, Human Civilization, Economic 19:09:25 345 1 Expansion, Public Engagement and Inspiration, 19:09:29 2 Global Partnerships, Programmatic 19:09:33 3 Sustainability, then this slightly redefined 19:09:35 4 Safety Challenge and National Skills. 19:09:39 5 And we have agreed to basically use a 19:09:42 6 schedule or budget-driven set of rules for 19:09:46 7 Science Knowledge, Workforce, Schedule and 19:09:50 8 Life Cycle Costs, which will be driven by the 19:09:56 9 output of the independent costing analysis. 19:10:00 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think that's well 19:10:04 11 done. 19:10:06 12 And I have one other thing that I 19:10:06 13 hesitate to raise, but just as we had a 19:10:09 14 Case 10 that we said we would discuss, I 19:10:14 15 think there's a Case Zero that we've got to 19:10:17 16 put on here, which basically is the program 19:10:23 17 of record. 19:10:25 18 In other words, it's hard to ignore 19:10:27 19 the program that exists, but then we will -- 19:10:27 20 in all of the boxes where you would score it, 19:10:29 21 we would put not executable. We'll just put 19:10:33 22 the words Not Executable or something, 19:10:36 23 because I don't think we can ignore the 19:10:39 24 program that's the program that's funded 19:10:41 25 today that people are working to. 19:10:43 346 1 MR. GREASON: Right. Our notes said 19:10:46 2 that was -- go ahead. 19:10:46 3 DR. CRAWLEY: That's right. There is 19:10:46 4 actually two reference cases that we'll have. 19:10:46 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 19:10:46 6 DR. CRAWLEY: The program of record 19:10:49 7 unconstrained and the program of record with 19:10:51 8 the plus-up budget level, which very closely 19:10:56 9 re-covers the -- 19:11:00 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: No. I'm talking 19:11:00 11 about a forward record, not adjusted for 19:11:01 12 risk, not -- it's just the way that it is 19:11:03 13 today with -- you allegedly end the shuttle 19:11:09 14 in 2010, 2015 ISS, no money to splash the 19:11:17 15 space station and so on, that -- 19:11:23 16 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 19:11:23 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: And it has today's 19:11:23 18 budget. 19:11:25 19 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. 19:11:25 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: We ought to show that 19:11:25 21 here somewhere -- 19:11:29 22 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. That's right. 19:11:29 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- that would just 19:11:29 24 put it as not executable. 19:11:29 25 DR. CRAWLEY: And you're absolutely 19:11:32 347 1 right. And, in fact, you'll remember that, 19:11:32 2 heaven forbid, the longer version of this 19:11:35 3 list actually had three cases that we had 19:11:37 4 agreed at our meeting last week that we were 19:11:42 5 going to show for reference. 19:11:42 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Exactly. 19:11:42 7 DR. CRAWLEY: Which were the -- which 19:11:46 8 was exactly the program of record and two 19:11:46 9 variants, I think the program which had been 19:11:52 10 originally designed in the 2007 time 19:11:58 11 period, the sort of post-ESAS record, and 19:12:01 12 there was another one I can't remember, but 19:12:01 13 it would certainly be there. 19:12:03 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. I think we're 19:12:06 15 getting near the end here. 19:12:06 16 Does anybody -- 19:12:10 17 DR. CRAWLEY: Before we leave this, I 19:12:11 18 think we just want to, in the public meeting, 19:12:18 19 reiterate that if in the course of the 19:12:18 20 deliberations and -- additional information 19:12:18 21 that comes to us in the next days -- or as 19:12:22 22 we're writing our report, you know, there's 19:12:22 23 information that would cause us to change 19:12:29 24 this slightly, I think the committee should 19:12:29 25 reserve the right to do that. 19:12:34 348 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, I think if 19:12:34 2 there's new factual information we obviously 19:12:34 3 would reflect that. If there's just a new -- 19:12:39 4 DR. CRAWLEY: Right. But I think 19:12:46 5 that in this public meeting the logic and 19:12:46 6 thought process that we used to arrive at 19:12:46 7 this was sufficiently explained that if new 19:12:51 8 information comes along we -- 19:12:51 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Reflect it. 19:12:56 10 DR. CRAWLEY: -- we should reflect 19:12:56 11 it. 19:12:56 12 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I think I'd also 19:12:56 13 like to just get on record in the public 19:13:03 14 meeting that I think that what we would like 19:13:03 15 to do in running the budget scenarios further 19:13:08 16 is use our judgment, based on the data that 19:13:10 17 comes out of these, to determine which ones 19:13:14 18 we need to run again to get more fidelity 19:13:17 19 when we've learned the most we think we can 19:13:20 20 reasonably learn with a particular scenario, 19:13:25 21 you know, so that we've got some closure on 19:13:29 22 this. 19:13:32 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, that sounds 19:13:32 24 very good. And what I would suggest -- we're 19:13:38 25 supposed to meet tomorrow at 8:00. I would 19:13:38 349 1 suggest we slip that to 9:00 to give us time 19:13:38 2 to do our homework tonight so we'll be ready 19:13:38 3 to go -- we're losing Ed now -- so that -- 19:13:46 4 DR. RIDE: Our homework? 19:13:46 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 19:13:46 6 DR. CHIAO: Our homework. 19:13:51 7 DR. CRAWLEY: Dr. Ride and I have 19:13:51 8 agreed there's no homework tonight. 19:13:53 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: No, Professor, there 19:13:53 10 is homework. So we can do our homework this 19:13:55 11 evening, and we'll start at 9:00 tomorrow. 19:14:01 12 Would you mind alerting by e-mail or 19:14:06 13 Blackberry or whatever those who are not here 19:14:06 14 that we'll plan to start at 9:00, if that's 19:14:09 15 all right, unless somebody wants to start 19:14:13 16 earlier? 19:14:15 17 MR. McALISTER: And just for 19:14:15 18 clarification, that's not a -- tomorrow at 19:14:16 19 9:00 is not a committee meeting. We're just 19:14:17 20 getting together to write the final report 19:14:17 21 and to clean up our various activities. 19:14:20 22 There will be no deliberations, and it's not 19:14:22 23 going to be in a public forum. 19:14:25 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Good point. I'm glad 19:14:31 25 you said that. 19:14:31 350 1 Well, to all of you who stuck with us 19:14:31 2 all of this time, congratulations, you 19:14:41 3 deserve some kind of an award. That's the 19:14:41 4 end of the meeting. 19:14:41 5 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned 19:14:41 6 at 7:15 p.m.) 19:14:41 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25