1 1 2 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 3 4 5 REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT 6 PLANS COMMITTEE 7 8 9 Public Meeting 10 South Shore Harbour 11 Resort and Conference Center 12 2500 South Shore Boulevard 13 League City, Texas 14 July 28, 2009 15 10:00 a.m. 16 17 18 19 20 REPORTED BY JANA MULHOLLAN 21 Registered Professional Reporter 22 23 VALADOR, INC. 24 25 2 1 MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 2 (Appearances) 3 4 5 Chairman 6 NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE 7 8 Executive Director 9 Designated Federal Official (DFO) 10 PHIL MCALISTER 11 12 13 Members Listed Alphabetically 14 15 WANDA M. AUSTIN, PH.D. 16 BOHDAN BEJMUK 17 LEROY CHIAO, PH.D. 18 CHRISTOPHER CHYBA, PH.D. 19 EDWARD F. CRAWLEY, PH.D. 20 JEFF GREASON 21 CHARLES F. KENNEL, PH.D. 22 GENERAL LESTER L. LYLES 23 SALLY RIDE, PH.D. 24 25 3 1 I N D E X 2 3 MORNING SESSION 4 Introduction and Opening Remarks 5 Phil McAlister/Norman Augustine.... 5 6 Johnson Space Center Perspective 7 Mike Coats........................ 15 8 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison Letter... 59 9 (Presented by Norman Augustine) 10 Senator John Cornyn Video............. 65 11 Congressman Pete Olson Video.......... 68 12 Congressman John Culberson Video...... 73 13 Astronaut Office 14 Steve Lindsey..................... 80 15 Lunch Break........................... 117 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 4 1 I N D E X 2 (Continued) 3 4 AFTERNOON SESSION 5 Constellation Program 6 Jeff Hanley....................... 117 7 Project Orion 8 Mark Geyer........................ 121 9 ISS/Shuttle Subgroup Briefing 10 Sally Ride........................ 184 11 Lester Lyles...................... 213 12 Leroy Chiao....................... 221 13 Charles Kennel.................... 230 14 Deliberations......................... 241 15 Public Comments....................... 280 16 Meeting adjourned..................... 321 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5 1 MR. McALISTER: Good morning, 11:06:21 2 everybody, and welcome to the Review of 11:06:22 3 U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee 11:06:22 4 Meeting. My name is Phil McAlister. I'm the 11:06:24 5 executive director, and on behalf of the 11:06:27 6 committee, we're very happy to be here in 11:06:30 7 Houston, even with the heat. 11:06:31 8 This is a public meeting obviously, 11:06:32 9 and it is governed by the Federal Advisory 11:06:34 10 Committee Act, FACA. Thus, the discussion 11:06:36 11 today, the presentations, the comments that 11:06:37 12 are made are all on the record. 11:06:39 13 There will be a public comment period 11:06:41 14 at the end of the day. This will be first 11:06:43 15 come/first serve. When we get to that part, 11:06:47 16 we'll just ask you come up to the microphone. 11:06:51 17 We're going to ask that everybody keep it to 11:06:51 18 a two-minute limit, and those -- the comment 11:06:53 19 period is really for comments. 11:06:55 20 If you have questions, those should 11:06:57 21 be submitted via the website where we've got 11:06:59 22 a specific area to ask questions and the 11:06:59 23 committee can respond in public with the 11:07:04 24 answers. 11:07:06 25 And also for the media, if there's 11:07:06 6 1 any members of the media here today, there 11:07:08 2 will be a half-hour session at the end of 11:07:10 3 today where you will have the chairman, Norm 11:07:13 4 Augustine. So if the media -- we ask that 11:07:17 5 you not use the public comment period for 11:07:19 6 your questions because that's what the period 11:07:22 7 at the end of the day is for. 11:07:26 8 Also if we don't get to you -- if we 11:07:28 9 have a queue at the end of the day and we 11:07:31 10 don't get to all of the comments, keep in 11:07:33 11 mind that the committee is available 11:07:34 12 essentially 24/7. We do have a website, 11:07:37 13 which is http://hsf.nasa.gov. You can ask 11:07:41 14 questions, provide comments, upload 11:07:41 15 documents, and, believe me, thousands of 11:07:48 16 people have availed themselves of that 11:07:50 17 capability. So please do that. 11:07:53 18 Transcripts and the video will be 11:07:56 19 available on that website as soon as we can 11:07:56 20 get them up there. It usually takes about a 11:07:56 21 week. But if you want to view the video 11:08:00 22 stream, you can, and also written transcripts 11:08:04 23 will be made available. 11:08:06 24 Please do not interrupt the 11:08:08 25 presentations or the committee members during 11:08:11 7 1 the discussion. This is a public meeting but 11:08:13 2 we've got a lot of work to do and we'd like 11:08:15 3 to get through those deliberations as quickly 11:08:18 4 as possible and that's why we've carved out 11:08:21 5 the time for the public comment period. 11:08:23 6 Also just a -- the hotel wanted me to 11:08:26 7 make an announcement that the restaurant in 11:08:27 8 the hotel has made a buffet for members of 11:08:30 9 the public and the government here for $10. 11:08:32 10 So if you want to avail yourselves of that, 11:08:36 11 the hotel restaurant is set up to take 11:08:39 12 advantage of that. 11:08:41 13 And, now, Chairman Norm Augustine... 11:08:42 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, good morning, 11:08:42 15 everyone, and thank you so much for your 11:08:44 16 presence today and your interest in the 11:08:47 17 subject and a particular thank you for the 11:08:49 18 input we have received from many in this room 11:08:51 19 and, as Phil said, many others. 11:08:54 20 We have really had an outpouring of 11:08:56 21 interest in this undertaking, perhaps more so 11:09:00 22 than almost any other undertaking of the type 11:09:04 23 that I've ever been involved in. We've had 11:09:07 24 numerous comments, suggestions, unfortunately 11:09:10 25 most of it contradictory, but that's our job. 11:09:13 8 1 We do have a full agenda today. As 11:09:20 2 Phil said, we will have time for public 11:09:23 3 comments. We wish we had more time, but I 11:09:26 4 hope you'll understand the predicament. 11:09:28 5 I'm not going to introduce my 11:09:32 6 colleagues in order to save time, but I think 11:09:34 7 you know most of them and we've got nametags 11:09:36 8 up here, which hopefully you can see. 11:09:39 9 In the way of reporting what's been 11:09:41 10 taking place since our last public meeting, 11:09:44 11 we've had a number of preparatory sessions 11:09:46 12 for this meeting and a number of visits to 11:09:49 13 various locations. We have sought 11:09:52 14 independent outside input. Our committee has 11:09:55 15 employed the Aerospace Corporation to do some 11:10:01 16 work for us so that we can go into a depth 11:10:05 17 that's not possible for the ten of us to do, 11:10:07 18 either because of time or competence 11:10:09 19 probably. 11:10:11 20 As you've heard, we have a website. 11:10:15 21 We have e-mails. I think we're even 11:10:18 22 twittering now. And my hope is that we will 11:10:21 23 continue to receive inputs from those who 11:10:24 24 have an opinion or a suggestion to share. 11:10:28 25 Our charter gave us 90 days for this 11:10:36 9 1 task, and I should say that the reason for 11:10:38 2 that was that there's a budget that's going 11:10:41 3 to go together about 90 days from now and the 11:10:45 4 White House had requested some input -- or an 11:10:50 5 input from us before then -- our final report 11:10:53 6 by then. 11:10:57 7 So the schedule we're on is to -- 11:10:57 8 90 days -- at the end of 90 days, which is 11:11:00 9 the end of August, to provide a draft -- a 11:11:03 10 final draft, if you will, ready for formal 11:11:05 11 printing -- printer ready, if you want, of 11:11:08 12 our report. So the actual report will be out 11:11:13 13 sometime hopefully shortly after the 31st of 11:11:18 14 August, although it will be available in 11:11:22 15 informal form at about that time. 11:11:24 16 I would emphasize that our role is to 11:11:26 17 offer options to the White House and to the 11:11:30 18 administrator of NASA. We've not been asked 11:11:34 19 to make a specific recommendation. That's a 11:11:39 20 bit unusual. On the other hand, it has a 11:11:41 21 benefit that we really have the opportunity 11:11:44 22 to try to weigh and balance the various 11:11:46 23 options as objectively as we know how to do 11:11:51 24 and we don't have to defend any particular 11:11:55 25 option. 11:11:57 10 1 We have organized ourselves into a 11:11:59 2 number of work groups -- really four primary 11:12:02 3 groups that I will just take a moment to 11:12:05 4 describe. 11:12:09 5 One is the group that is addressing a 11:12:10 6 couple of very underlying important 11:12:13 7 problems -- or issues that face -- that 11:12:16 8 impact various issues downstream, and those 11:12:18 9 are -- as you could guess, one is the shuttle 11:12:22 10 and its fly-out in the future, second is the 11:12:25 11 ISS and its future, and both of these things 11:12:28 12 impact everything else both in technical 11:12:35 13 sense and also in a -- certainly in a 11:12:38 14 budgetary sense. That's one of the 11:12:41 15 challenges we face -- is these things are all 11:12:44 16 so interconnected. 11:12:49 17 A second group we have set up is 11:12:50 18 addressing what we call, in short form, Earth 11:12:52 19 to LEO, which I think is self-explanatory, 11:12:55 20 but it is looking at options well into the 11:13:00 21 future. And in each case, of course, our 11:13:03 22 baseline option is the existing option that's 11:13:06 23 being pursued to date. 11:13:09 24 The third group is, not surprisingly, 11:13:12 25 the beyond LEO group looking at not only 11:13:17 11 1 destinations but we've tried to begin with 11:13:24 2 objectives and goals -- what is it we would 11:13:26 3 like to accomplish -- is it science, is it to 11:13:29 4 establish the U.S. as a space-faring nation, 11:13:32 5 is it to strengthen the economy -- what is 11:13:35 6 the purpose -- and then out of that to try to 11:13:38 7 define missions and objectives and, as you 11:13:41 8 will hear -- probably not today but it will 11:13:46 9 be covered at a subsequent meeting -- the 11:13:47 10 various destinations we've been looking at, 11:13:49 11 but it's a fairly broad list. 11:13:52 12 And finally an integration group 11:13:55 13 that's addressing the issue of trying to pull 11:13:59 14 all of this together and presenting it in a 11:14:02 15 reasonable fashion. We'll be addressing what 11:14:02 16 we've called the commercial roles of 11:14:06 17 commercial suppliers particularly of Earth to 11:14:09 18 low Earth orbit launch capacity. It will be 11:14:15 19 addressing international considerations, our 11:14:19 20 partners both in the present program and 11:14:21 21 possible future programs, and it will also be 11:14:24 22 addressing the relationship of what NASA is 11:14:27 23 asked to do with what others in our country 11:14:31 24 need and are doing in this general area. And 11:14:35 25 obviously that would refer primarily to the 11:14:39 12 1 Department of Defense. 11:14:43 2 Today is the first in a three-day 11:14:45 3 series of meetings, and today we'll be 11:14:47 4 focusing, to a considerable degree, on the 11:14:51 5 first of those subcommittees' reports, that 11:14:54 6 group that is chaired by Sally Ride and later 11:14:58 7 on around noon we'll be hearing that group's 11:15:03 8 findings. 11:15:05 9 We will be going from here to 11:15:06 10 Huntsville and then to the Cape this week and 11:15:08 11 having similar meetings and covering 11:15:11 12 subsequent subcommittees just according to 11:15:14 13 how the schedule happens to work out. 11:15:17 14 I would that emphasize that because 11:15:19 15 of the FACA rules -- what's FACA stand for -- 11:15:21 16 MR. McALISTER: Federal Advisory 11:06:16 17 Committee Act. 11:15:26 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- thank you -- that 11:15:26 19 because of those rules we have really not had 11:15:28 20 the opportunity to talk to each other other 11:15:32 21 than subgroup by subgroup in terms of trying 11:15:35 22 to come up with any sort of recommendations 11:15:37 23 or specific options as this point. So some 11:15:39 24 of what -- or most of what you hear today we, 11:15:43 25 too, will be hearing for the first time. 11:15:48 13 1 Because since our last public meeting, our 11:15:51 2 efforts have been conducted by the subgroups, 11:15:53 3 and they have been traveling widely and 11:15:53 4 talking to a huge number of people and 11:15:53 5 reading an awful lot of e-mails and so forth. 11:15:56 6 The schedule, as I have said, is to 11:16:03 7 have a printer ready report on August 31st. 11:16:07 8 That gives us exactly 35 days to go. As you 11:16:11 9 can imagine, 90 days isn't a very long period 11:16:15 10 of time for a task like this, particularly 11:16:19 11 when most of us have other responsibilities 11:16:21 12 and we didn't know we were going to be doing 11:16:24 13 this until sort of the last minute. 11:16:27 14 Nonetheless, you can be assured that we're 11:16:28 15 giving this number one priority in our lives 11:16:30 16 and -- for this period of time and devoting a 11:16:34 17 great deal of attention to the issues. 11:16:35 18 I would like to caution the audience 11:16:40 19 and those with whom we all may communicate 11:16:42 20 that we will be asking a lot of hard 11:16:45 21 questions. That's what we're, I think, paid 11:16:48 22 to do. And the fact that we're asking hard 11:16:52 23 questions -- controversial questions, that we 11:16:54 24 may even be a bit cantankerous in trying to 11:16:57 25 draw out information, please don't take that 11:17:01 14 1 as a view that any of us hold individually or 11:17:05 2 collectively. 11:17:07 3 We're trying to gain knowledge so we 11:17:09 4 can hopefully do the right thing when all is 11:17:12 5 said and done. So please don't assign to 11:17:15 6 much significance to the nature of the 11:17:18 7 questions here today. When we get to the end 11:17:19 8 of August, that would be a more appropriate 11:17:21 9 thing to do. 11:17:24 10 And I guess that I would just say 11:17:25 11 that one of my beliefs has always been that 11:17:27 12 the difference between a great program 11:17:31 13 manager and a good manager is reserves. And 11:17:34 14 I have just gained our committee 15 minutes 11:17:38 15 of reserve. 11:17:40 16 And so with that, we're 15 minutes 11:17:42 17 ahead of schedule, Sally, and -- but the 11:17:45 18 first thing we want to do today is to -- I 11:17:49 19 should have thanked our host who -- from NASA 11:17:56 20 here for all of your courtesies not only 11:18:00 21 today but all of the information you've 11:18:04 22 provided to us. I think I could speak fairly 11:18:06 23 for the committee that we couldn't have asked 11:18:09 24 for more in terms of responsiveness. 11:18:12 25 So the first thing we want to do is 11:18:14 15 1 get the JSC perspective kind of on the record 11:18:16 2 here. Most of us are very familiar with JSC 11:18:21 3 for many years, but Mike Coats will, of 11:18:27 4 course, be our speaker and Mike needs no 11:18:28 5 introduction to this group. 11:18:28 6 So you now have 14 minutes of 11:18:29 7 reserve. Mike... 11:18:31 8 MR. COATS: Well, good morning. I'd 11:18:41 9 like to use up all of your 14 minutes of 11:18:52 10 reserve here, if I can, today. I'm being 11:18:55 11 selfish about it. 11:18:58 12 I'd like to pass out a paper a little 11:19:00 13 bit later with a detailed description of some 11:19:02 14 of the capabilities at the Johnson Space 11:19:07 15 Center. I would like to highlight some of 11:19:11 16 those capabilities here in just a minute, 11:19:13 17 some of the things you may not really be 11:19:17 18 aware of here. But I don't want to spend an 11:19:20 19 awful lot of time doing that unless you have 11:19:22 20 questions. 11:19:25 21 I'd also like to explain some of the 11:19:27 22 steps we're taking to meet the challenges of 11:19:28 23 exploration. But I'd like to start off if I 11:19:31 24 might be so presumptive as to give you my 11:19:32 25 personal perspective and observations right 11:19:33 16 1 upfront. 11:19:38 2 I've been involved in the space 11:19:39 3 business one way or another for 31 years now. 11:19:41 4 Sally and I came in the same class. I was 11:19:45 5 32, and she was 16. 11:19:50 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: You're doing well. 11:19:58 7 DR. RIDE: Take all 14 extra minutes. 11:19:58 8 MR. COATS: Well, that worked. 11:20:01 9 That's good. 11:20:01 10 I spent 13 years as an astronaut and 11:20:03 11 then left to go out to industry and was with 11:20:06 12 Lockheed Martin or heritage Lockheed Martin 11:20:10 13 for a little over 14 years, almost 15 years, 11:20:14 14 and I came back to Johnson Space Center 11:20:15 15 almost four years ago as the center director 11:20:15 16 here. 11:20:17 17 I'm obviously a strong believer in 11:20:18 18 the Human Space Flight program and the value 11:20:21 19 of human space flight to our nation out here. 11:20:25 20 Some of the things I feel pretty strongly 11:20:25 21 about and I've learned -- and I hope all of 11:20:32 22 these are obvious to everybody, but I've 11:20:32 23 learned to feel pretty strongly about some of 11:20:36 24 those observations in my 31 years, if you 11:20:40 25 will. 11:20:44 17 1 Number one, I don't think we can take 11:20:45 2 for granted the Human Space Flight program. 11:20:46 3 I think it's very important, but I think 11:20:53 4 there's a lot of risk and a lot of threat 11:20:55 5 right now to our Human Space Flight program. 11:20:58 6 And I know, Norm, in your 1990 report 11:21:02 7 you fortunately listed human space flight as 11:21:04 8 we something we ought to be doing. 11:21:07 9 Unfortunately you had it down on the priority 11:21:07 10 list a little further than I would, but I 11:21:07 11 happen to think it's very important to the 11:21:11 12 country. 11:21:13 13 And there are a couple of things 11:21:13 14 right now that I think are threats to our 11:21:15 15 Human Space Flight program. One is the 11:21:17 16 gap -- you've all heard the term the gap 11:21:21 17 between the shuttle and the next vehicle -- 11:21:23 18 and, secondly, it's the threat of being stuck 11:21:26 19 in low Earth orbit. I really believe we need 11:21:29 20 to minimize that gap, and I think we need to 11:21:35 21 have an objective beyond low Earth orbit or 11:21:37 22 we're not going to have a Human Space Flight 11:21:41 23 program. And that worries me a lot. 11:21:47 24 Next, I think one of the things I've 11:21:48 25 come to appreciate is the incredible value of 11:21:50 18 1 the team of human space flight professionals 11:21:53 2 that this country has assembled during the 11:21:56 3 first 50 years of the space program. I get 11:21:59 4 to see it up close and personal. It is truly 11:22:02 5 a national asset. It's a wonderful team of 11:22:06 6 civil servants and contractors who do amazing 11:22:06 7 things all day long, and I get to see it 11:22:06 8 almost every day. I think I've got the best 11:22:06 9 job in the world because I do get to work 11:22:14 10 with an amazing team, watching them do 11:22:16 11 amazing things. It's a talented and highly 11:22:18 12 motivated group of people that love what 11:22:22 13 they're doing, and the country needs to take 11:22:24 14 advantage of it. We cannot waste that kind 11:22:27 15 of talent here. 11:22:30 16 I think we need a sustainable and 11:22:31 17 unswerving human exploration program beyond 11:22:34 18 low Earth orbit, and to get that we have to 11:22:38 19 have strong national leadership. We have 11:22:42 20 changed directions too many times over too 11:22:44 21 many administrations in the decades past. We 11:22:47 22 need to have -- pick a direction frankly and 11:22:50 23 stick to it for a while. 11:22:53 24 I believe that we should utilize the 11:22:55 25 International Space Station to the fullest. 11:22:59 19 1 Abandoning it, which some people talk about 11:23:02 2 doing in 2016, is simply inexcusable and, I 11:23:05 3 believe, irresponsible. We need to fly and 11:23:11 4 utilize this amazing laboratory, the finest 11:23:13 5 laboratory in or out of the world for the 11:23:14 6 foreseeable future. 11:23:17 7 I happen to believe international 11:23:19 8 partners can make a real contribution to the 11:23:22 9 exploration program. We need to use them in 11:23:26 10 a meaningful way. We've seen what's going on 11:23:29 11 with the International Space Station working 11:23:32 12 with our international partners. They're 11:23:35 13 doing a fantastic group. As a team we're 11:23:37 14 doing amazing things up there, assembling and 11:23:41 15 beginning to do research on the International 11:23:44 16 Space Station. 11:23:44 17 We need to use those international 11:23:47 18 partners in any kind of future space 11:23:49 19 endeavor/exploration program, if you will. 11:23:52 20 That means putting them sometimes in a 11:23:55 21 critical path. And that's been a problem 11:23:57 22 historically, a reluctance to put our 11:24:01 23 international partners in a critical path. I 11:24:02 24 think we need to do that. They've proven 11:24:04 25 themselves. We need to prove ourselves in an 11:24:05 20 1 international space team out there. 11:24:08 2 What that really means too is giving 11:24:10 3 them clearly defined work packages, to use an 11:24:13 4 industry term -- what do they contribute, 11:24:17 5 what are they going to be responsible for. 11:24:19 6 Working with them, I think we ought to define 11:24:22 7 that as a space team internationally. 11:24:24 8 Commercial space operators should be 11:24:29 9 used when they're available and when they're 11:24:32 10 cost effective. Now, they're not going to be 11:24:36 11 available at the time table that they claimed 11:24:38 12 they were going to be available, but they 11:24:42 13 will be available soon and we need to take 11:24:44 14 advantage of those space -- commercial space 11:24:47 15 operators. 11:24:51 16 To be a space-faring nation, we need 11:24:51 17 a spacecraft. We have to be able to put our 11:24:55 18 astronauts into space and bring them home. 11:24:59 19 And to go beyond LEO, we need a heavy-lift 11:25:01 20 vehicle. That should be pretty obvious to 11:25:04 21 everybody. But we need both a space 11:25:08 22 spacecraft -- and right now the Orion is the 11:25:12 23 only one that makes any sense -- and we need 11:25:13 24 a heavy-lift vehicle. We need both of those. 11:25:14 25 I believe that Mars should be the 11:25:18 21 1 real goal. The Moon and, to some extent, the 11:25:21 2 International Space Station are training 11:25:27 3 venues that can prepare us to go to Mars, but 11:25:29 4 this should not be a return to the Moon 11:25:32 5 program. This should be we're going to Mars 11:25:35 6 and we're going to use the Moon to learn how 11:25:38 7 to do it most efficiently and safely out 11:25:42 8 there. 11:25:46 9 I believe a vital space program 11:25:46 10 inspires future generations. Education is a 11:25:49 11 major issue with all of us right now. Fewer 11:25:53 12 and fewer young people are going into the 11:25:55 13 math and science and engineering vocations. 11:25:59 14 It bothers me a lot. 11:26:03 15 I could give you statistics all day 11:26:06 16 long on the dwindling supply of engineers 11:26:07 17 that we had to choose from. I believe we 11:26:11 18 picked the best and the brightest in the 11:26:14 19 space program, both contractors and civil 11:26:16 20 servants, but we have dwindling pools of 11:26:18 21 people to choose from out there. 11:26:20 22 I think a space program inspires 11:26:22 23 young kids to go into math and science and 11:26:24 24 engineering, and frankly that's our future. 11:26:29 25 Both economically -- if we want an economic 11:26:30 22 1 growth engineer, space is it out there. 11:26:32 2 Space spurs technology development 11:26:35 3 and an economic engine. I think the billions 11:26:38 4 that we invested in the Apollo program paid 11:26:42 5 off handsomely. One of the reasons we have 11:26:45 6 the most robust economy on the face of the 11:26:49 7 Earth is because of the money we invested 11:26:52 8 during the Cold War, including the Apollo 11:26:55 9 program. 11:26:56 10 And, of course, the space program is 11:26:57 11 a basis for world influence out there. 11:26:59 12 Geopolitics is not my specialty, but if we 11:26:59 13 want to have influence in the world, it's 11:27:04 14 important to have a viable space program. 11:27:07 15 But there are no shortcuts to space, 11:27:09 16 and space is not cheap. And by that I mean, 11:27:11 17 if we try to save money getting to space, 11:27:18 18 it's going to cost us more in the long term. 11:27:23 19 A lot of the commercial companies are finding 11:27:23 20 out view graphs and promises were easier than 11:27:27 21 actually building hardware. They will get 11:27:30 22 there, but it's going to cost more than they 11:27:33 23 thought it was going to cost. There aren't 11:27:36 24 any shortcuts to space. 11:27:38 25 So I'm going to discuss a little bit 11:27:40 23 1 how JSC can support and provide leadership in 11:27:42 2 carrying out a sustainable Human Space Flight 11:27:45 3 program. I'm going to review our 11:27:51 4 capabilities very briefly here just hitting 11:27:51 5 the highlights. Please look at the handouts 11:27:53 6 we'll pass out later for more details there. 11:27:56 7 I'm going to talk about some of the 11:27:59 8 actions that we're taking at JSC to meet the 11:28:00 9 challenges of exploration as far as altering 11:28:04 10 the workforce and so forth and addressing 11:28:09 11 some of the transition issues that we have. 11:28:11 12 Go to the next slide. 11:28:15 13 JSC has been deeply involved from the 11:28:15 14 very beginning in both the development of 11:28:18 15 spacecraft and operations of spacecraft, and 11:28:20 16 that continues today with the ongoing support 11:28:25 17 for both the space shuttle and the 11:28:27 18 International Space Station missions. And in 11:28:32 19 the development world we're very involved 11:28:34 20 with Constellation's development of Orion 11:28:37 21 and, of course, the Ares rockets as well. 11:28:43 22 JSC's areas of expertise have been 11:28:45 23 developed over the first half century of 11:28:45 24 space flight here. We have supported every 11:28:50 25 Human Space Flight program starting with 11:28:52 24 1 Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, 11:28:54 2 shuttle, space station and now Constellation. 11:28:58 3 We've learned a lot in the first 50 years. 11:29:02 4 We have not wasted our time. 11:29:05 5 I wish you could see from my knothole 11:29:07 6 the wonderful things we've done as a team in 11:29:09 7 supporting the incredibly complex missions as 11:29:12 8 we assembled the International Space Station. 11:29:16 9 The space walks that we do -- four or five 11:29:16 10 space walks on every mission up to a space 11:29:20 11 station are incredibly complex and involved. 11:29:22 12 We've learned a lot about how to 11:29:25 13 operate in space. We need to put that to 11:29:28 14 good use in the future. 11:29:31 15 JSC's capabilities combine 11:29:33 16 experienced people and specialized 11:29:34 17 facilities. Some of the facilities -- all of 11:29:37 18 the facilities shown right here in these four 11:29:38 19 charts are, obviously, the main campus here 11:29:41 20 at the Johnson Space Center, we've also got 11:29:44 21 responsibility for the White Sands Test 11:29:46 22 Facility up in New Mexico, Ellington Field 11:29:48 23 here where our aircraft are home based and, 11:29:52 24 of course, the Sonny Carter Training Facility 11:29:57 25 where the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory is 11:29:57 25 1 located. Next chart, Joe. 11:30:00 2 Let me address those capabilities 11:30:01 3 very briefly. Starting in the lower left 11:30:05 4 side there, Engineering, we have a full range 11:30:10 5 of design, development, test and analysis in 11:30:14 6 our engineering organization here at the 11:30:19 7 Johnson Space Center. 11:30:22 8 I think that was really shown 11:30:23 9 obviously on the mission about nine months 11:30:25 10 ago where we repaired a torn solar array up 11:30:28 11 on the International Space Station. I wish 11:30:28 12 you could have been here for those 72 hours 11:30:28 13 when both the shuttle team, the station team 11:30:35 14 and the engineering team -- in fact, all of 11:30:37 15 NASA -- the whole agency was involved in 11:30:39 16 figuring out how to solve that problem. They 11:30:41 17 came up with a very elegant solution, and 11:30:44 18 that was a pretty special day driving home 11:30:47 19 when that solar array fully extended out 11:30:50 20 there with the repairs. Amazing capability. 11:30:53 21 Our engineering folks have developed 11:30:54 22 things like the lunar rover, low impact 11:30:56 23 docking system, and the list goes on and on. 11:31:01 24 We have a good development capability here. 11:31:03 25 Mission Planning, Training and 11:31:06 26 1 Execution -- of course, we have the 11:31:07 2 facilities like the Mission Control Center, 11:31:09 3 the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory, all of the 11:31:12 4 mock-ups and simulators that we use. And 11:31:14 5 you've got to remember, too, we're tied in to 11:31:16 6 simulators and control centers all around the 11:31:21 7 world. We have five different control 11:31:24 8 centers supporting the International Space 11:31:26 9 Station, and we coordinate with each of them 11:31:28 10 constantly here. 11:31:30 11 Crew selection and training at the 11:31:34 12 top of the chart here. You know, nowadays 11:31:35 13 especially when you're selecting 11:31:38 14 long-duration crew members and our 11:31:39 15 international crew members, the selection 11:31:41 16 criteria are considerably different than when 11:31:45 17 Sally and I came in, for example. 11:31:45 18 You have -- the example last in the 11:31:48 19 last class -- about 30 percent of the folks 11:31:52 20 that we considered highly qualified were not 11:31:54 21 medically qualified for long-duration 11:31:57 22 missions. That's a really high percentage. 11:31:57 23 A lot of work is done to select crews for 11:32:00 24 long-duration missions, and we've learned a 11:32:04 25 lot here. 11:32:06 27 1 EVA, extravehicular activities. Of 11:32:08 2 course, we're extending the life of our EMUs 11:32:11 3 that we've used on the shuttle and the 11:32:14 4 station for many years. We're extending that 11:32:17 5 life out to 40 years or so. 11:32:19 6 We are developing two new suit 11:32:19 7 configurations for the Constellation program. 11:32:23 8 Of course, those are the launch and entry 11:32:25 9 suits that the crew will wear in the Orion 11:32:26 10 and also the lunar surface suits. We are not 11:32:29 11 developing a new EVA suit for the Orion. So 11:32:32 12 we will use the EMUs if we should have to go 11:32:35 13 out in EVAs, but we're not developing a new 11:32:39 14 suit right now for the Orion vehicle other 11:32:44 15 than the launch and entry suit and the lunar 11:32:46 16 surface suits. 11:32:51 17 Human health and performance. I'm 11:32:52 18 really proud of our space and life sciences 11:32:54 19 group and what they've done in taking a 11:32:55 20 risk-based approach to human space flight, 11:32:56 21 identifying the biggest risks and allocating 11:32:59 22 resources to meet those risks. They do an 11:33:02 23 awful lot of work ranging, of course, from 11:33:05 24 real-time crew health to research for 11:33:07 25 long-duration missions. We're doing an awful 11:33:10 28 1 lot of good research in things like radiation 11:33:13 2 and the effects of zero gravity on crew 11:33:16 3 members over extended periods of time. 11:33:19 4 Astromaterials in the lower right 11:33:19 5 corner of that chart up there. Everything 11:33:24 6 that comes back from space -- material that 11:33:29 7 comes back from space comes to the Johnson 11:33:29 8 Space Center. The reason is the Moon rocks 11:33:32 9 came here first and we've got wonderful 11:33:34 10 laboratories and some very expensive machines 11:33:38 11 and instruments to analyze material that 11:33:41 12 comes back. We've had the Genesis solar wind 11:33:42 13 samples, the Stardust comet and interstellar 11:33:46 14 dust come back as well. Any meteorites that 11:33:48 15 are found here on Earth also come here to the 11:33:51 16 Johnson Space Center. And, of course, we 11:33:53 17 have the Moon rocks out there. 11:33:57 18 I'd like to emphasize the large, 11:33:58 19 complex program management and integration. 11:34:03 20 I happen to think that managing a large, 11:34:03 21 complex, high tech, highly integrated program 11:34:08 22 is one of the toughest management challenges 11:34:13 23 any of us ever face. Norm certainly saw that 11:34:16 24 at Lockheed Martin. 11:34:18 25 We've got three large programs -- 11:34:18 29 1 multibillion dollar programs here that are 11:34:21 2 truly integration challenges. We integrate 11:34:25 3 across all of the centers, across many, many 11:34:28 4 projects, across many, many companies out 11:34:29 5 here and, of course, with our international 11:34:34 6 partners. This is a huge integration 11:34:37 7 challenge, if you will, in a very high tech 11:34:40 8 environment. And it's a skill I'm very, very 11:34:43 9 proud of here. 11:34:47 10 I'll talk a little bit more in a 11:34:48 11 minute about our programs to develop our 11:34:50 12 project and program managers here at the 11:34:52 13 Johnson Space Center and at NASA. 11:34:54 14 International and commercial 11:34:56 15 partnerships. It's kind of interesting right 11:34:58 16 now up on the International Space Station -- 11:35:00 17 we have, of course, the six-person screw on 11:35:03 18 the space station and the visiting crew, but 11:35:06 19 the six-person crew has representatives from 11:35:08 20 all five space agencies that participate in 11:35:11 21 the International Space Station at this 11:35:14 22 moment. We work with international partners 11:35:18 23 at many different levels, and we're awful 11:35:22 24 proud of the core competency that we've 11:35:25 25 developed to manage our international 11:35:25 30 1 relationships here. 11:35:28 2 In the center here is safety and 11:35:29 3 mission assurance, which is first and 11:35:32 4 foremost. I want to stress that I, as center 11:35:34 5 director, have an independent authority role 11:35:37 6 for both safety and mission assurance, for 11:35:40 7 technical and for crew health reasons -- 11:35:43 8 three different things. We have a check and 11:35:46 9 balance system that's been set up. So I have 11:35:49 10 responsibility if somebody feels like a 11:35:52 11 program -- if they disagree with what any of 11:35:52 12 the programs do, they can come to me as well. 11:35:55 13 And that's our check and balance internally 11:35:58 14 here. Next chart, Joe. 11:36:01 15 As far as preparing the workforce for 11:36:04 16 the future -- and we're trying very hard to 11:36:11 17 look ahead and get ready for the 11:36:13 18 Constellation program -- we're moving people, 11:36:17 19 of course, from operations where the emphasis 11:36:20 20 has been for the last 30 years over to 11:36:22 21 development. We've always done development. 11:36:25 22 We've always done operations. But the 11:36:27 23 emphasis had been on operations during he 11:36:31 24 shuttle era. 11:36:31 25 We are moving folks over to the 11:36:32 31 1 Constellation program, and we have more folks 11:36:33 2 working on development right now than we do 11:36:35 3 in operations. In fact, more people support 11:36:38 4 the Constellation program than support the 11:36:42 5 shuttle program at this moment. In fact, we 11:36:46 6 operate both the shuttle and the station with 11:36:49 7 70 percent of the workforce that in 1991 just 11:36:51 8 supported the shuttle. So we have achieved 11:36:56 9 efficiencies over the years. 11:36:59 10 Right now about 60 percent of the 11:37:01 11 folks who charge to one program also work on 11:37:02 12 other programs -- charge to most -- with 11:37:06 13 programs. So we are using the workforce 11:37:08 14 across programs here more and more. 11:37:12 15 Two of the biggest skill needs, if 11:37:12 16 you will, are program and project managers 11:37:20 17 and systems engineers. It seems like we 11:37:21 18 never have enough good ones out here. Our 11:37:24 19 human resources department has done a 11:37:28 20 marvelous job of creating development 11:37:32 21 programs which have received a lot of praise 11:37:35 22 out here. 11:37:37 23 The one I'm especially involved in is 11:37:38 24 a Program/Project Management Development 11:37:41 25 program, PPMD. We bring a lot of our 11:37:42 32 1 "gray beards," if you will, the experienced 11:37:47 2 program managers and executives, back from 11:37:49 3 both industry and NASA to talk to our classes 11:37:52 4 repeatedly. And Boeing, Lockheed Martin, all 11:37:57 5 of the big contractors have supported us 11:37:59 6 wonderfully in bringing folks back to pass on 11:38:02 7 their lessons learned from the problems 11:38:06 8 they've had in some of their programs here. 11:38:06 9 And that knowledge transfer, I think, is 11:38:09 10 priceless. 11:38:11 11 Knowledge capture and knowledge 11:38:12 12 management. You know, with that 50 years of 11:38:18 13 space flight experience that we've got, a lot 11:38:21 14 of us folks are retiring, walking out the 11:38:25 15 door right now. We're trying very hard to 11:38:27 16 capture that experience. It's priceless. 11:38:29 17 We're trying to document all of the lessons 11:38:32 18 learned, all of the flight rationale that 11:38:34 19 we've developed over the years. We have a 11:38:37 20 number of programs to do that. 11:38:39 21 We've got a wonderful mentoring 11:38:42 22 program here at Johnson Space Center, and 11:38:44 23 hundreds of folks take advantage and 11:38:46 24 participate in that mentoring program, trying 11:38:49 25 to capture and pass on knowledge here. 11:38:51 33 1 We have a good oral history program. 11:38:54 2 We are bringing folks back. In the picture 11:38:54 3 you can see Chris Craft and Tommy Holloway. 11:38:58 4 Both of them come and talk to our classes on 11:39:01 5 a regular basis. And I'm real excited about 11:39:03 6 the flight directors and center directors and 11:39:06 7 program managers that come back and talk to 11:39:10 8 us. 11:39:12 9 And my next -- we've got all ten 11:39:13 10 centers involved in our program management 11:39:16 11 development now. They participate in 11:39:19 12 classes. And my next step is to try to get 11:39:21 13 industry involved. And that's important. 11:39:25 14 I know Norm was famous for making it 11:39:27 15 a priority, when he was CEO of Lockheed 11:39:29 16 Martin, to address the classes of executives. 11:39:33 17 Vance Coffman and Bob Stevens have done the 11:39:37 18 same thing. It is a priority, and it's 11:39:40 19 important to us as well. 11:39:43 20 We've increased our emphasis on 11:39:45 21 collaborations tremendously. Teamwork is 11:39:50 22 what it's all about. Constellation has 11:39:51 23 distributed work to all ten NASA centers out 11:39:53 24 here. Our institutional organizations as 11:39:56 25 well -- like engineering, S&MA, MOD and so 11:39:58 34 1 forth -- have also distributed work to the 11:40:03 2 other centers out here. So we're very much 11:40:05 3 an integrated NASA team, much more so than 11:40:08 4 I've seen in 30 years in this business, and 11:40:11 5 I'm really proud of the teamwork that's going 11:40:13 6 on. 11:40:17 7 Replacing -- an increased emphasis on 11:40:17 8 attracting and retaining valuable employees 11:40:21 9 out there. I'm really proud of the fact that 11:40:24 10 the Johnson Space Center was ranked as the 11:40:26 11 No. 4 best place to work among government 11:40:29 12 agencies -- over 200 government agencies. 11:40:33 13 Before we get a big head, the Inspector 11:40:36 14 General's Office was ranked No. 2. So we 11:40:40 15 haven't fixed all of that. We're not there 11:40:40 16 quite yet, but we're working on it. We've 11:40:45 17 got a ways to go obviously. 11:40:48 18 But the team loves working in the 11:40:51 19 space business, and I'm really proud of them. 11:40:53 20 Next chart, Joe. 11:40:57 21 Let me talk for a second about 11:40:58 22 facilities, because we've got a funding gap, 11:41:02 23 if you will, in our facilities. We've 11:41:05 24 developed an extensive database of our 11:41:08 25 facilities. We've got about four hundred -- 11:41:08 35 1 if you count buildings and rooms and test 11:41:08 2 stands and laboratories and special 11:41:15 3 specialized equipment and so forth, we've 11:41:18 4 identified about 475 facilities or 11:41:21 5 capabilities here at the Johnson Space 11:41:25 6 Center. 69 of those are candidates for 11:41:25 7 closeout when the shuttle quits flying. 11:41:28 8 Things like the shuttle motion simulator, the 11:41:31 9 SMS, the shuttle training aircraft, 11:41:34 10 White Sands Space Harbor, we're not going to 11:41:34 11 need anymore, and we're going to close those 11:41:34 12 down and quite a few laboratories as well. 11:41:41 13 Constellation has identified, of 11:41:46 14 course, a number of these facilities that are 11:41:46 15 going to be needed in the future, but they 11:41:48 16 don't need them right now. And that's a 11:41:49 17 problem. We've got a gap between shuttle 11:41:52 18 paying for these facilities and Constellation 11:41:54 19 that doesn't need them right now and doesn't 11:41:57 20 want to pay for them until they need them in 11:42:00 21 the future. 11:42:02 22 Things like the hypergolic test 11:42:03 23 facility out at White Sands, the Neutral 11:42:04 24 Buoyancy Laboratory, the arc jet facility and 11:42:06 25 so forth we're using heavily now. There will 11:42:10 36 1 be a period of time before Constellation 11:42:11 2 needs them -- how do we maintain and fund 11:42:14 3 those facilities -- and that's our challenge 11:42:14 4 right now. 11:42:14 5 We are looking for reimbursable 11:42:14 6 customers for those facilities, where 11:42:23 7 possible. We have a number of military 11:42:23 8 usage -- and commercial customers using the 11:42:27 9 White Sands test facilities, but the volume 11:42:31 10 is -- it kind of goes up and down on that, 11:42:36 11 not real reliable out there. 11:42:37 12 We also have a potential for outside 11:42:38 13 customers for the Neutral Buoyancy 11:42:40 14 Laboratory, but so far we haven't pursued 11:42:44 15 that as much as we need to. And we really 11:42:46 16 can't depend on reimbursable usage from other 11:42:50 17 government agencies or commercial operators 11:42:55 18 to keep those facilities going so that 11:42:56 19 facilities is a real challenge during the 11:42:59 20 down period here. Joe, next chart. 11:43:02 21 I'm going to take your 14 minutes 11:43:02 22 here, Sally, if it's okay. 11:43:05 23 When I came to Johnson Space Center 11:43:08 24 from Lockheed Martin, one of the questions I 11:43:11 25 was asked was what's the big difference 11:43:15 37 1 between industry and government. The biggest 11:43:17 2 difference, if I will -- and there are a 11:43:23 3 whole lot more things in common than there 11:43:24 4 are differences, but the biggest difference, 11:43:27 5 of course, is competition. 11:43:28 6 In industry you're always looking for 11:43:30 7 discriminators. You're always looking to 11:43:33 8 win. Everything you think of is customer 11:43:33 9 focused, if you will. 11:43:37 10 I believe strongly that NASA needs to 11:43:39 11 be more that way. We need to think around 11:43:41 12 our competition. We need to have a sense of 11:43:43 13 urgency that industry has that the government 11:43:46 14 frequently doesn't have, because we are 11:43:48 15 competing. 11:43:50 16 We're competing with other government 11:43:50 17 agencies for budget resources. We're 11:43:51 18 competing globally with other space programs. 11:43:53 19 And, believe me, we're competing for the 11:43:56 20 dwindling supply of engineers and scientists 11:43:57 21 out there that we need in this business. So 11:44:01 22 we are competing. 11:44:04 23 To be competitive, I believe NASA and 11:44:05 24 JSC needed and is being more open minded. We 11:44:09 25 need to be more inclusive, more 11:44:13 38 1 collaborative, more team oriented and more 11:44:16 2 customer focused. And frankly our customer 11:44:23 3 is the White House, Congress and the American 11:44:25 4 public, and we need to communicate better 11:44:27 5 with them all of the time. 11:44:29 6 We have encouraged more and more 11:44:31 7 benchmarking. We're going outside NASA, 11:44:33 8 outside industry -- outside the space 11:44:35 9 industry, if you will, to do benchmarking, 11:44:37 10 and it's been a real eye-opener for a lot of 11:44:41 11 folks out there. We found out we're not the 11:44:45 12 only ones in the world building control 11:44:49 13 centers and so forth. We've learned an awful 11:44:52 14 lot. 11:44:54 15 And with mission operations, for 11:44:54 16 example -- let me give you one example -- 11:44:55 17 what we call Top Gun. We have -- they have 11:44:56 18 implemented a top gun approach to training 11:45:00 19 where we take the best people that we have, 11:45:03 20 the best flight controllers, and say, okay, 11:45:05 21 now you're going to be instructors to teach. 11:45:08 22 You need to have your best people teaching as 11:45:09 23 well. The Navy did that years ago, the 11:45:12 24 Air Force as well and now we're doing it here 11:45:15 25 at NASA as well. 11:45:18 39 1 We offer prizes in life science and 11:45:19 2 engineering areas at the Rice Business Plan 11:45:23 3 Competition, and that's the world's largest 11:45:23 4 such competition and brings in three or four 11:45:25 5 dozen teams from the top MBA programs to 11:45:28 6 present new technology business plans. We've 11:45:32 7 began offering prizes and participating in 11:45:36 8 that as well. 11:45:37 9 We have a mix of in-house and 11:45:37 10 external technology development, in-house to 11:45:39 11 keep our engineering workforce engaged in 11:45:41 12 hands-on activities and, of course, external 11:45:44 13 to bring in good ideas out there. An example 11:45:47 14 I mentioned, the lunar electric rover is an 11:45:51 15 in-house development that we did. We have 11:45:54 16 several others -- low impact docking system 11:45:57 17 and so forth -- that our engineering 11:46:00 18 organization developed. 11:46:01 19 I'm proud of our space and life 11:46:03 20 sciences group. They went out and actually 11:46:06 21 came up with an industry spectrophotometer 11:46:09 22 using paint matching that we're using to 11:46:14 23 measure levels of iodine and silver in the 11:46:15 24 water on the space station. So we will steal 11:46:19 25 from the best, if you will allow me a little 11:46:20 40 1 poetic license. 11:46:24 2 And we're proud that folks want to 11:46:25 3 work with NASA. Both industry and other 11:46:27 4 government agencies are proud to work with 11:46:31 5 NASA and share their ideas out there. We're 11:46:33 6 trying to take advantage of that. Next 11:46:36 7 chart, Joe. 11:46:39 8 We do have some transition issues, of 11:46:40 9 course. With the lunar budget that was 11:46:43 10 removed from the budget plan in 2011 to 2015, 11:46:47 11 we've got a significant challenge. We plan 11:46:52 12 to transfer most of our shuttle workforce 11:46:55 13 over to work lunar activities because our 11:46:57 14 Constellation workforce is essentially 11:47:00 15 already in place. 11:47:02 16 Right now that money has been taken 11:47:03 17 out of the budget, about $3.5 billion over 11:47:05 18 those years. So we've got about 500 shuttle 11:47:09 19 personnel -- civil service shuttle personnel 11:47:12 20 and several thousand contractors that we're 11:47:16 21 worried about getting through this transition 11:47:17 22 period. Okay. The last chart, Joe. 11:47:20 23 Well, the most efficient and 11:47:23 24 effective use of our facilities here at JSC 11:47:30 25 and the workforce depends on a timely 11:47:33 41 1 transition between the shuttle and 11:47:36 2 Constellation. We're not resting on our 11:47:37 3 laurels. We're taking aggressive steps as 11:47:42 4 much as we possibly can to meet the 11:47:44 5 challenges of the Constellation program and 11:47:45 6 the Human Exploration program. 11:47:47 7 As I mentioned, we're setting up 11:47:50 8 development programs and have set up 11:47:51 9 development programs to make sure our skills 11:47:52 10 match the needs of the Constellation program. 11:47:54 11 We're flexibly deploying people to different 11:47:57 12 programs and moving them around as we need to 11:47:59 13 to make sure we fly out the shuttle safely 11:48:02 14 while we're developing the Constellation 11:48:05 15 program and that our folks will have 11:48:06 16 meaningful work when the last shuttle lands 11:48:09 17 out here as well. 11:48:12 18 We're encouraging collaboration at 11:48:12 19 every level possible. We're emphasizing 11:48:15 20 innovative ways of doing business. We need 11:48:17 21 to be as open minded as we can possibly be 11:48:21 22 and frankly be reaching out to engage the 11:48:26 23 future employees of NASA. 11:48:28 24 We have an awful lot of involvement 11:48:30 25 with the schools and the young people in a 11:48:31 42 1 number of different programs. We'd love to 11:48:34 2 expand that as budget would permit. We've 11:48:37 3 got to get the young people interested in 11:48:39 4 math and science and engineering. That's the 11:48:42 5 investment we need to make for the future if 11:48:43 6 we're going to grow our economy once again. 11:48:45 7 Thank you very much for your time, 11:48:47 8 and I want to express my appreciation. I 11:48:49 9 know you've made this a priority in your busy 11:48:52 10 business schedules, but it's important not 11:48:57 11 only to the space program but to the country 11:48:59 12 and I want to say thank you for the time 11:48:59 13 you're investing here. Thank you. 11:49:04 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Mike, thank you for 11:49:04 15 those comments and thank you for your 11:49:07 16 contribution and that of your colleagues. 11:49:09 17 We do have a little bit of time. If 11:49:11 18 you're willing, we'd like to ask you a few 11:49:13 19 questions. I've got a number, but I know my 11:49:16 20 colleagues do too. I can't see everybody. 11:49:17 21 So if I leave somebody out, wave or come tap 11:49:21 22 me on the shoulder or something. 11:49:24 23 Okay. Well, first of all, I see Les. 11:49:25 24 GENERAL LYLES: Mike, thank you again 11:49:30 25 for your very great comments and thank you 11:49:31 43 1 for everything that your people do here at 11:49:34 2 JSC. 11:49:35 3 You're probably aware that the 11:49:36 4 White House -- the National Security Council 11:49:37 5 specifically -- is doing a national space 11:49:40 6 policy review, and one of the different 11:49:43 7 elements of the -- of that policy review is 11:49:45 8 to look at how can in space programs -- both 11:49:48 9 civil space and national security space, how 11:49:51 10 can we improve acquisition reform or program 11:49:55 11 management. 11:49:55 12 So I was very interested in your 11:49:57 13 program and project management development, 11:49:58 14 but I was curious, maybe because of my 11:50:00 15 background, that in terms of collaboration, 11:50:03 16 lessons learned, bringing people in, 11:50:07 17 et cetera, you didn't mention reaching out to 11:50:09 18 the national security space team. Certainly 11:50:13 19 the National Security Council sees the two as 11:50:15 20 sort of symbiotic, if you will, common 11:50:15 21 industrial base, et cetera. 11:50:15 22 I'm wondering if as part of your 11:50:20 23 program management development you're also 11:50:23 24 looking out for lessons learned and reaching 11:50:25 25 out to the other element of space, the 11:50:27 44 1 national security space team. 11:50:30 2 MR. COATS: We have -- Les, we've 11:50:33 3 actually had some of our joint strike fighter 11:50:36 4 colleagues at Lockheed Martin come down -- 11:50:37 5 Tom Burbage and so forth -- and explain some 11:50:40 6 of the challenges they've had with the 11:50:43 7 programs they've had. 11:50:45 8 Of course, we -- I've invited a lot 11:50:46 9 of my former colleagues at Lockheed Martin to 11:50:47 10 come and talk. They've got some constraints 11:50:50 11 on the classified programs obviously, but 11:50:52 12 they've been very good about sharing what 11:50:56 13 information they can about the issues they've 11:50:58 14 had with these classes. 11:51:00 15 And we're looking for ways frankly to 11:51:02 16 disseminate that more widely than just the 11:51:04 17 folks that are in the class right now. 11:51:08 18 GENERAL LYLES: But, Mike, that's 11:51:13 19 sort of an industrial-based perspective if 11:51:13 20 you were a contractor, but you're a 11:51:14 21 government agency. I'm talking about the 11:51:14 22 government side of the national security 11:51:14 23 space, whether it's the Air Force or National 11:51:16 24 Security Space Office in the Pentagon, the 11:51:20 25 government side of the venture. 11:51:23 45 1 MR. COATS: Yeah. And we need to 11:51:26 2 more of that. We have not done as much with 11:51:28 3 DOD as I'd like to do from the government 11:51:31 4 side, if you will. 11:51:32 5 Mike Griffin was getting spun up to 11:51:33 6 help us with that because he knew an awful 11:51:35 7 lot of the folks over there. Mike came and 11:51:38 8 talked to all of our classes and spent a 11:51:38 9 great deal of time with them, was anxious to 11:51:43 10 bring in DOD folks. I think Charlie will 11:51:45 11 help us with that -- Charlie Bolden -- as 11:51:48 12 well. 11:51:48 13 GENERAL LYLES: Okay. Thank you. 11:51:49 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris, I saw you 11:51:49 15 next. 11:51:51 16 DR. CHYBA: Director Coats, thanks 11:51:53 17 for your remarks. In your early -- the 11:51:56 18 remarks at the beginning of your 11:51:58 19 presentation, you advocated all of the right 11:51:58 20 things for NASA, that we want to get beyond 11:52:00 21 low Earth orbit, the good arguments for 11:52:01 22 extending space station, it's clearly 11:52:06 23 desirable to minimize the gap in launch 11:52:09 24 vehicle availability with respect to getting 11:52:14 25 to station. 11:52:16 46 1 As you know, the Constellation 11:52:16 2 program of record out to 2020 originally 11:52:17 3 assumed an $108 billion budget. The current 11:52:18 4 budget anticipated after 2020 is 11:52:21 5 81.5 billion -- you know, 20 billion, 11:52:26 6 $25 billion less. If you fly station out to 11:52:29 7 2020, that's $2 billion or so a year. So now 11:52:32 8 we're looking at 70 billion instead of 11:52:34 9 108 billion. 11:52:37 10 So I'm wondering how these objectives 11:52:38 11 get reconciled. Freeman Dyson once 11:52:41 12 contrasted what he called the paper NASA with 11:52:43 13 the real NASA. And what we don't want, I 11:52:45 14 think, is a future where we have wonderful 11:52:48 15 flip charts about our glorious future in 11:52:50 16 space but those objectives are never 11:52:55 17 realizable because the combination of things 11:52:57 18 we're trying to do can't possibly fit within 11:53:00 19 the budget we have. 11:53:04 20 But since you're advocating that we 11:53:04 21 do these things, I wonder if you've thought 11:53:04 22 about innovative ways that we can somehow 11:53:06 23 accomplish them within the budget picture as 11:53:09 24 it exists. Thank you. 11:53:16 25 MR. COATS: Oh, boy, you're asking 11:53:16 47 1 the impossible here. You're trying to -- 11:51:53 2 DR. CHYBA: That's our charter. 11:51:53 3 MR. COATS: Yeah. And it's -- you've 11:53:16 4 got a challenge, and I don't -- and I've 11:53:20 5 talked with Bo a couple of times about it. I 11:53:23 6 don't know you fit 50 pounds into a 5-pound 11:53:28 7 bag here. 11:53:31 8 We're obviously looking for the most 11:53:32 9 efficient ways to get things done. I know 11:53:35 10 Mike Griffin, when he was designing -- 11:53:37 11 helping us design the exploration program, 11:53:39 12 wanted to minimize life cycle costs. We 11:53:42 13 don't want to pass on things to the future 11:53:46 14 generations knowing they're going to pay a 11:53:49 15 lot more because we're unwilling to pay 11:53:50 16 up front. 11:53:54 17 If you're going to have an 11:53:55 18 exploration program -- a serious one -- it's 11:53:57 19 pretty obvious you need the heaviest 11:53:58 20 heavy-lift vehicle you can possibly get, but 11:54:01 21 that requires a tremendous investment up 11:54:03 22 front -- frankly an investment we probably 11:54:07 23 can't afford right now. So my personal 11:54:10 24 opinion is we probably are going to have to 11:54:12 25 spend more later because we can't afford to 11:54:13 48 1 spend more up front. We may not have the 11:54:17 2 optimum vehicle to minimize life cycle costs, 11:54:21 3 but we need a heavy-lift vehicle. 11:54:26 4 You've got the challenge of comparing 11:54:29 5 apples to oranges because everybody that 11:54:30 6 comes in with their own architecture is going 11:54:31 7 to say here are my two graphs and here's what 11:54:32 8 it's going to cost -- and, believe me, the 11:54:36 9 costs vary dramatically depending on what 11:54:37 10 assumptions you want to come in with -- and 11:54:42 11 it's almost an impossible task as to say 11:54:43 12 which one is cheapest even in the long run 11:54:44 13 and most effective. 11:54:48 14 I don't have a good answer for you. 11:54:50 15 This is a tough one. 11:54:51 16 DR. CHYBA: Thank you. So backing 11:54:56 17 off of the 125-metric-ton vehicle is 11:54:57 18 something that you would see as necessary? 11:54:59 19 MR. COATS: Certainly it's an option. 11:55:01 20 If you're talking about a 70-metric-ton 11:55:04 21 vehicle that is more affordable right now, 11:55:07 22 you're going to have to launch more of them 11:55:09 23 to achieve our objective. 11:55:12 24 It's not that hard -- you know, if 11:55:14 25 you have to have a million pounds in space to 11:55:14 49 1 go to Mars, for example, how are you going to 11:55:15 2 get it there, what's the most effective way 11:55:18 3 to get it there, how do you get things to the 11:55:20 4 Moon to learn how to explore most 11:55:20 5 effectively. 11:55:23 6 The largest vehicle we can develop 11:55:24 7 would pay off in the long run, but it's very 11:55:28 8 expensive up front. And that's an investment 11:55:30 9 I don't think we can afford -- personal 11:55:34 10 opinion -- right now. 11:55:36 11 So what's the cheapest -- you know, I 11:55:37 12 hate to use that word, but what's the least 11:55:38 13 expensive heavy-lift vehicle that we can 11:55:42 14 develop in a timely manner to get us there, 11:55:44 15 because we're going to have to live within a 11:55:48 16 very constrained budget. There's just no 11:55:51 17 alternate reality out there. 11:55:51 18 And there's not enough in any budget 11:55:51 19 to meet all of the things that you've talked 11:55:54 20 about -- operating the space station, 11:55:56 21 developing a heavy-lift vehicle, developing 11:55:58 22 the Orion and so forth. 11:56:02 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: It's my turn, Mike. 11:56:06 24 You had talked about the importance of 11:56:07 25 international programs and -- or meaningful 11:56:10 50 1 programs that sort of put our partner nations 11:56:15 2 on the critical path, and I gathered you 11:56:20 3 supported that. At the same time we hear a 11:56:21 4 lot of criticism about the fact that we've 11:56:24 5 got a gap today by virtue of doing that very 11:56:28 6 thing. 11:56:30 7 And this is kind of a dirty question, 11:56:31 8 but, I guess, are you saying we sort of have 11:56:32 9 to live with the gap sort of problem if we're 11:56:34 10 going to have meaning international programs? 11:56:36 11 MR. COATS: No. My personal opinion, 11:53:16 12 Norm, is that we have a gap because we 11:56:43 13 changed directions too many times in 11:56:46 14 developing a follow-on vehicle. 11:56:50 15 I used to have a T-shirt when I was 11:56:50 16 at Lockheed Martin that I listed all of the 11:56:53 17 programs that we had contracts -- had won 11:56:55 18 contracts for that had been canceled -- OSP, 11:56:56 19 2GRLV, SLI and so forth and so on. 11:56:59 20 My point before was we need to pick a 11:57:03 21 direction and stick to it. We have a gap 11:57:06 22 because we didn't pick a direction and stick 11:57:09 23 to it. We changed every few years -- my 11:57:12 24 personal opinion. There's not much we can do 11:57:14 25 about the gap. It's there. If we're going 11:57:18 51 1 to retire the shuttle, the gap is there. 11:57:19 2 I'd like to minimize the gap. It's 11:57:22 3 very uncomfortable for me frankly not to be a 11:57:24 4 space-faring nation, as a former astronaut. 11:57:31 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: I'll ask a follow-up 11:57:36 6 question unless somebody else has something 11:57:38 7 they want to raise. 11:57:44 8 MR. GREASON: I've got one -- 11:57:44 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Please -- 11:57:44 10 MR. GREASON: -- but after you. 11:57:44 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: No. Go ahead, 11:57:44 12 please. 11:57:44 13 MR. GREASON: When you talked about 11:57:44 14 commercial -- you know, the commercial 11:57:45 15 guys -- and I'm picking on you because you're 11:57:46 16 the first one to say this in front of me, not 11:57:51 17 because of you particular -- you know, other 11:57:52 18 people would have said it if you hadn't. 11:57:54 19 You know, you said, in essence -- 11:57:56 20 paraphrasing -- you know, well, when they 11:57:58 21 show up we'll be glad to use them but they 11:57:59 22 probably won't be there as early as we -- as 11:58:02 23 they think. And that's probably true. But 11:58:04 24 that's not unique. 11:58:07 25 I mean, it's not as though when we go 11:58:09 52 1 after the traditional contractor base that 11:58:09 2 everything shows up exactly when we expect or 11:58:14 3 exactly on the budget that you might predict. 11:58:16 4 And there's a false choice there between, 11:58:19 5 well, we can just stand back and wait for the 11:58:25 6 commercial guys to show up or we can do the 11:58:28 7 traditional stuff, when in some cases the 11:58:31 8 amount of incremental money that would be 11:58:34 9 needed to increase the likelihood of the 11:58:37 10 commercial option showing up might be smaller 11:58:39 11 than it would be to go out to a traditional 11:58:43 12 contractor base. 11:58:44 13 And I would like to hear your 11:58:45 14 discourse on that a little bit. 11:58:46 15 MR. COATS: Well, first of all, I 11:58:49 16 think our commercial operators are finding 11:58:52 17 out -- the new ones that are developing 11:58:54 18 capabilities like Orbital and SpaceX and so 11:58:54 19 forth are finding out it's challenging to 11:58:57 20 meet the milestones that they laid out that 11:58:59 21 we agreed to and that we funded. 11:58:59 22 They're encountering problems that we 11:59:04 23 have encountered before, and we have shared 11:59:07 24 information with them as much as they want. 11:59:09 25 We don't force ourselves on them. We can't 11:59:11 53 1 do that. We've learned a lot in the EELV 11:59:14 2 business -- Atlas and Delta -- over the years 11:59:19 3 by commercial operations. 11:59:23 4 First of all, let me say I don't 11:59:28 5 think NASA ought to be in the business of 11:59:30 6 carrying cargo to space now. Okay. We can 11:59:32 7 turn that over to commercial operators. We 11:59:35 8 should turn that over to commercial 11:59:38 9 operators, because it's -- the market is 11:59:40 10 ready to support that. 11:59:41 11 NASA ought to be doing research and 11:59:43 12 development. Let me repeat that. NASA 11:59:46 13 should be doing research and development. 11:59:49 14 That includes research on the International 11:59:49 15 Space Station. That includes exploration. 11:59:51 16 Let's go out there and discover what's out 11:59:54 17 there. 11:59:58 18 Commercial companies can't do that. 11:59:58 19 They can't afford to do that. That's what 12:00:01 20 governments are for. Christopher Columbus 12:00:03 21 was paid for by the Queen of Spain, for 12:00:03 22 heaven's sake. It wasn't a commercial 12:00:08 23 venture until much later, but look what it 12:00:09 24 opened up. 12:00:11 25 That's what governments do. They 12:00:11 54 1 make the investments to develop the 12:00:14 2 technologies that commercial operators can 12:00:16 3 take advantage of in the future. And that's 12:00:19 4 what the government should be doing. NASA 12:00:22 5 should be and needs to get back to being a 12:00:24 6 research and development agency. 12:00:28 7 Now, the shuttle is marvelous 12:00:29 8 vehicle. And it's not just that we took 12:00:31 9 cargo to and from space. We learned how to 12:00:32 10 operate in space using the space shuttle, and 12:00:36 11 we've learned tremendous lessons. I could 12:00:36 12 stand up here for hours telling you the neat 12:00:41 13 things that we've learned to do in space. 12:00:42 14 It's pretty exciting. 12:00:45 15 So that was, I think, a terrific 12:00:46 16 investment. It's going to break my heart 12:00:49 17 when the shuttle retires next year or 12:00:51 18 whenever, because it is a truly amazing 12:00:54 19 capability. We'd love to maintain it, but 12:00:56 20 it's an expensive vehicle to operate. 12:00:59 21 Frankly commercial operators can do 12:01:01 22 things cheaper than the government can do. 12:01:04 23 Because we have so many constraints on being 12:01:06 24 fair, running competitions and that sort of 12:01:12 25 thing, we pay an overhead to do things in the 12:01:14 55 1 government. 12:01:17 2 I wouldn't change anything, but when 12:01:19 3 it's time and the commercial operators are 12:01:21 4 ready, let them do that and let's go explore, 12:01:23 5 let's go do the things that captures the 12:01:26 6 public's imagination and that they think 12:01:31 7 we're doing. 12:01:34 8 We conducted surveys at Admiral 12:01:34 9 Steidle's request when I was at Lockheed 12:01:34 10 Martin. He asked us to go out and conduct 12:01:37 11 focus group surveys, and we hired a company 12:01:38 12 to do that and participated. And we'd 12:01:41 13 conduct the surveys and carefully select a 12:01:45 14 cross-section of people around the company -- 12:01:45 15 nobody near a space center -- to find out 12:01:48 16 what they thought about the space program. 12:01:51 17 And it balanced out -- what the survey 12:01:54 18 said -- it reinforced what the general survey 12:01:55 19 said, they had a very high opinion of NASA, 12:01:57 20 they think we do that cutting edge stuff 12:02:00 21 that's really cool. 12:02:02 22 I'd like to get more into that 12:02:03 23 cutting edge stuff. That's what NASA ought 12:02:04 24 to be doing to get the public excited. 12:02:07 25 They had a tremendous recognition of 12:02:10 56 1 the Hubble Space Telescope, the two rovers, 12:02:11 2 Spirit and Opportunity, on Mars. Not so many 12:02:13 3 knew we were flying the shuttle again. Very 12:02:17 4 few knew we had a space station up there, and 12:02:19 5 not a single person of all of the hundreds we 12:02:21 6 interviewed had ever heard of the 12:02:23 7 Constellation program. 12:02:23 8 We're not doing a very good job of 12:02:25 9 fulfilling our Space Act -- 1958 Space Act 12:02:28 10 obligation of informing the public, 12:02:32 11 disseminating information on our activities. 12:02:36 12 We just don't do that well enough. We need 12:02:38 13 to be telling the public why they should have 12:02:42 14 a space program, what the benefits are to 12:02:44 15 them. I think we have an opportunity to do 12:02:47 16 that even better. 12:02:49 17 Charlie, I think, is a gifted 12:02:51 18 communicator and so is Lori Garver. They 12:02:53 19 will bring the passion to the space program 12:02:58 20 that the public can relate to. I think 12:03:01 21 they'll be wonderful representatives and 12:03:04 22 salesmen for the space program. 12:03:06 23 MR. GREASON: Thank you. 11:57:44 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: There's time for one 12:03:08 25 last question, which I will ask -- 12:03:09 57 1 MR. BEJMUK: I have one. 12:03:12 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay, Bo. 12:03:12 3 MR. BEJMUK: Mike, in the environment 12:03:12 4 in government where you cannot lay off 12:03:14 5 people, is it difficult to maintain technical 12:03:17 6 excellence? 12:03:22 7 You know, most of my days were in 12:03:22 8 industry, and cutbacks gave us an opportunity 12:03:24 9 to refresh the quality of our team. And you 12:03:24 10 don't seem to have that variable, I believe, 12:03:28 11 and I wonder is it difficult in an 12:03:31 12 environment where you cannot lay off people 12:03:34 13 to maintain these top performers and 12:03:37 14 dispensing some of the people who are not 12:03:41 15 producers. 12:03:45 16 MR. COATS: Well, first of all, you 12:03:47 17 know, the -- one of the things I learned when 12:03:48 18 I came back to NASA as a manager -- you know, 12:03:49 19 the rumor is that you can't lay off civil 12:03:52 20 servants -- can't terminate civil servants -- 12:03:55 21 is just not true. We terminate a number 12:03:57 22 every year for job performance, other 12:04:02 23 activities, and we actually post the 12:04:05 24 statistics for everybody to read. 12:04:08 25 We have to document everything, but 12:04:10 58 1 the process is in place. We do, in fact, 12:04:14 2 terminate poor performance in the civil 12:04:15 3 service. 12:04:17 4 Now, to address your question in a 12:04:18 5 little different way, I am worried about 12:04:20 6 technical excellence, but I'm worried about 12:04:22 7 it from a team point of view. We have a 12:04:25 8 wonderful contractor workforce and civil 12:04:29 9 service workforce that are intertwined. We 12:04:33 10 work hand in hand. We obviously have defined 12:04:36 11 roles between civil servants and contractors, 12:04:39 12 but, in fact, it's a well-functioning team 12:04:43 13 right now and it's going to kill me when we 12:04:43 14 start laying off people and we're starting to 12:04:45 15 lay off now. 12:04:48 16 With the shuttle retirement, some of 12:04:49 17 the companies are already starting to 12:04:51 18 announce layoffs. Those layoffs will 12:04:54 19 accelerate next year as the shuttle 12:04:54 20 retirement gets closer. Losing that 12:04:57 21 experience is going to be very painful, 12:04:59 22 because we've invested a lot to build up that 12:05:03 23 kind of capability. 12:05:07 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Mike, thank you so 12:05:09 25 much for your comments. Thanks for your 12:05:11 59 1 leadership. We'll probably be back with more 12:05:13 2 questions as time goes on. 12:05:15 3 MR. COATS: Thank you, sir. 12:05:17 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: All right. The 12:05:18 5 committee has received a request from several 12:05:19 6 members of the congressional delegation to 12:05:23 7 meet with us. Given the pressures on their 12:05:26 8 time and our time, we've arranged for three 12:05:30 9 of them to do so by brief videotapes, which 12:05:33 10 we'll play in a moment here, and one has 12:05:39 11 provided a letter. 12:05:42 12 Let me read the letter. It's from 12:05:43 13 Senator Hutchison, with whom I had the 12:05:46 14 occasion to meet with a few weeks ago about 12:05:49 15 this project, and her letter goes as 12:05:52 16 follows... 12:05:52 17 (Whereupon, Mr. Augustine presented 12:05:52 18 Senator Hutchison's letter as follows: 12:05:56 19 SENATOR HUTCHISON: Mr. Chairman and 12:05:56 20 Members of the Human Space Flight Review 12:05:58 21 Panel, I want to thank you for the 12:06:00 22 opportunity to provide a statement in this 12:06:05 23 hearing to underscore the importance of NASA 12:06:06 24 to Texas and the need for minimizing the 12:06:09 25 space gap. You have a huge challenge and a 12:06:11 60 1 critical responsibility, and I appreciate 12:06:15 2 your willingness to hold a hearing in Texas. 12:06:16 3 The possible five-year gap in manned 12:06:18 4 U.S. space launches between the planned 12:06:20 5 retirement of the shuttle program next year 12:06:24 6 and the earliest possible inauguration of the 12:06:24 7 new Ares rocket and Orion crew capsule in 12:06:29 8 2015 could have potentially devastating 12:06:30 9 effects on Texas. NASA has long been a 12:06:33 10 central component of my state's growing tech 12:06:36 11 industry. 12:06:39 12 The Johnson Space Center in Houston 12:06:40 13 is the premier NASA center for the 12:06:41 14 International Space Station and human space 12:06:46 15 flight, scientific and medical research 12:06:48 16 efforts. The JSC directly employs over 12:06:51 17 3,400 civil servants and more than 12:06:53 18 13,000 contract employees. In total, the JSC 12:06:57 19 supports the Houston area by generating an 12:06:59 20 economic impact of over $4 billion and 12:07:00 21 35,000 jobs. 12:07:04 22 The potential loss of this 12:07:06 23 workforce's skills during the transition has 12:07:07 24 long-term implications for Texas and its 12:07:10 25 continued support of space flight programs. 12:07:13 61 1 This was outlined clearly in the Rising Above 12:07:17 2 the Gathering Storm report to Congress. 12:07:20 3 The 2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization 12:07:22 4 Acts reflect broad, bipartisan, bicameral 12:07:22 5 support for the U.S. human space flight 12:07:30 6 programs. More specifically, both bills 12:07:33 7 express support for the goal of returning to 12:07:35 8 the Moon to conduct the kind of sustained 12:07:38 9 human exploration that was not possible in 12:07:40 10 the Apollo program. They express support for 12:07:42 11 completing the International Space Station 12:07:42 12 and making the maximum possible use of its 12:07:42 13 laboratory facilities for microgravity 12:07:42 14 research across a broad range of scientific 12:07:53 15 disciplines. 12:07:53 16 The 2005 act designated the space 12:07:55 17 station as a national laboratory and began 12:07:57 18 its evolution to a facility that not only can 12:08:00 19 meet NASA's research needs but those of other 12:08:03 20 government agencies, educational consortia 12:08:06 21 and private research and development 12:08:07 22 concerns. In fiscal year 2008 NASA worked 12:08:12 23 with 63 universities and educational centers 12:08:13 24 in Texas to provide grants, contracts and 12:08:16 25 commitments valued at approximately 12:08:19 62 1 $51 million. 12:08:21 2 Beyond the looming space gap, one of 12:08:23 3 the questions the panel has been charged with 12:08:28 4 addressing is the question of continuing 12:08:28 5 space station operations beyond 2015. I want 12:08:30 6 to be very sure that the panel understands 12:08:34 7 that the Congress has expressed itself 12:08:37 8 clearly in the reauthorization law passed 12:08:38 9 last year that it considers full and extended 12:08:41 10 utilization of the space station to be a 12:08:44 11 critical necessity. In the 2008 act the 12:08:45 12 Congress directed NASA to take no action that 12:08:49 13 would preclude operations of the space 12:08:53 14 station beyond 2015 for at least five years 12:08:55 15 to 2020. 12:08:58 16 We then required NASA to provide a 12:09:00 17 report to Congress due July 15th, 2009, two 12:09:03 18 weeks ago, outlining the specific plans and 12:09:07 19 requirements needed to support operations, 12:09:10 20 maintenance and full utilization of the ISS 12:09:12 21 as a national laboratory through at least 12:09:16 22 2020. I am advised that the required report 12:09:18 23 has been completed and the final draft has 12:09:21 24 been under review at NASA headquarters for 12:09:23 25 the past two weeks. It then must be reviewed 12:09:26 63 1 by the Office of Management and Budget, and 12:09:26 2 my office has been assured that OMB has 12:09:30 3 agreed to expedite that review. 12:09:31 4 I underscore the pending availability 12:09:31 5 of this report today because it should 12:09:35 6 contain, if it is responsive to the 12:09:37 7 requirements of the law, the type of 12:09:41 8 information this panel must have if it is to 12:09:43 9 accurately address the issue of space station 12:09:47 10 operations beyond 2015. My staff has advised 12:09:49 11 NASA that the information comprising the 12:09:54 12 content of this report should be provided to 12:09:56 13 the panel, and I believe this could and 12:09:58 14 should be done immediately, regardless of 12:10:01 15 whether the report has been finalized prior 12:10:01 16 to formal presentation to the Congress. 12:10:04 17 Congress, in turn, needs the 12:10:07 18 information in this report to help us craft a 12:10:09 19 new NASA authorization bill, which we have 12:10:14 20 been working on in this past several months. 12:10:15 21 A portion of that bill will address the space 12:10:16 22 station utilization issue by taking the 12:10:18 23 evolution of the national laboratory concept 12:10:20 24 to the next steps of formal organizational 12:10:23 25 development and providing the authority 12:10:26 64 1 necessary for it to effectively operate. 12:10:28 2 I will continue to press for the 12:10:31 3 timely submission of the formal report but 12:10:32 4 bring it to the attention of the panel as 12:10:35 5 something I believe they need access to now, 12:10:36 6 if they have not already been provided all of 12:10:38 7 the factual data used in preparing the 12:10:41 8 report. 12:10:44 9 Finally I want to stress my belief 12:10:45 10 that you must be able to consider any and all 12:10:47 11 possible options and alternatives to ensure 12:10:47 12 the continuation and future success of the 12:10:50 13 U.S. Human Space Flight programs. I believe 12:10:53 14 it is essential for your review to be 12:10:57 15 unconstrained by any binding consideration, 12:11:00 16 whether budgetary or programmatic. 12:11:03 17 We in the Congress and, I believe, 12:11:06 18 the Administration must be given a clear 12:11:07 19 picture of what is attainable and what 12:11:10 20 resources would be required. We will then be 12:11:11 21 in a position to make the judgments necessary 12:11:13 22 to achieve the best possible and most 12:11:16 23 affordable result for the American taxpayer. 12:11:18 24 Again, I want to thank you for coming 12:11:18 25 to the great state of Texas and your 12:11:18 65 1 commitment to this enormous task. I look 12:11:24 2 afford to seeing the results of your efforts. 12:11:26 3 I commend you for joining with the 12:11:29 4 Administration and my colleagues in the 12:11:31 5 Congress to derive the best possible path 12:11:33 6 forward to sustain an essential national 12:11:34 7 asset and preserve our country's leadership 12:11:38 8 in space. 12:11:39 9 (Whereupon, the presentation of 10:50:36 10 Senator Hutchison's letter concluded.) 10:50:36 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: And it's signed by 12:11:39 12 Senator Hutchison. 12:11:40 13 All right. The next input we 12:11:44 14 received was from Senator Cornyn. We have 12:11:47 15 that on a videotape. If we could play that, 12:11:50 16 please. 12:11:50 17 (Whereupon, Senator Cornyn presented 12:11:50 18 his comments via videotape as follows: 12:11:50 19 SENATOR CORNYN: Hi, I'm United 12:11:50 20 States Senator John Cornyn. Thank you for 12:12:03 21 the opportunity to share my thoughts on the 12:12:05 22 importance of our nation's Human Space Flight 12:12:05 23 program and what the future holds for it. 12:12:09 24 Earlier this month we marked the 12:12:12 25 40th anniversary of NASA's ingenuity in 12:12:13 66 1 successfully landing astronauts on the 12:12:14 2 surface of the Moon. Since that milestone, 12:12:14 3 human space flight has remained a source of 12:12:14 4 inspiration and wonder for generations of 12:12:22 5 Americans, and I believe it's vital to our 12:12:25 6 security and prosperity on multiple levels. 12:12:27 7 I welcome the Human Space Flight 12:12:31 8 Plans Committee to Texas, home of Johnson 12:12:31 9 Space Center. This is the heart of our 12:12:34 10 nation's Human Space Flight program. Its 12:12:35 11 storied history is known, but I believe the 12:12:40 12 best is yet to come. 12:12:41 13 I thank the committee for holding 12:12:42 14 today's public meeting. By meeting with NASA 12:12:45 15 employees, contractors and community members, 12:12:48 16 the committee will be able to fully 12:12:49 17 appreciate how much the Johnson Space Center 12:12:51 18 and human space flight has contributed to our 12:12:52 19 understanding of the universe that we live in 12:12:56 20 and how human space missions will play a 12:12:59 21 critical role informing discovery and 12:13:01 22 scientific research as our nation looks to 12:13:02 23 explore further and go back to the Moon and 12:13:05 24 even on to Mars. 12:13:08 25 Space exploration has contributed to 12:13:09 67 1 many notable achievements and development in 12:13:12 2 technology and science. Think like GPS 12:13:14 3 navigational systems and satellite technology 12:13:18 4 would not be around today if not for NASA 12:13:18 5 research and innovation as well as the 12:13:23 6 life-saving medical advances like the 12:13:23 7 artificial heart. 12:13:26 8 I hope the work of this commission 12:13:26 9 recognizes the years of development and 12:13:28 10 planning that has gone into the bold vision 12:13:29 11 laid out for NASA and encourages the new 12:13:32 12 Administration to strongly embrace those 12:13:35 13 goals going forward. It's essential that at 12:13:39 14 the end of this process the commission and 12:13:41 15 the Administration send a strong message of 12:13:44 16 support for human space exploration to lay 12:13:44 17 the groundwork for our nation's continued 12:13:48 18 success in space. 12:13:51 19 For my part, I pledge to do all I can 12:13:52 20 to support the nation's space program and the 12:13:53 21 hard work being done by the men and women of 12:13:55 22 the Johnson Space Center, because this 12:13:58 23 program is important not only to our nation, 12:14:01 24 it's important to Houston and one of the 12:14:04 25 greatest sources of pride for all Texans. 12:14:06 68 1 (Whereupon, Senator Cornyn's video 12:14:06 2 presentation concluded.) 12:14:11 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. We also 12:14:11 4 have a video that was provided by Congressman 12:14:12 5 Olson. If we play that at this point. 12:14:16 6 (Whereupon, Congressman Olson 12:14:16 7 presented his comments via videotape as 12:14:16 8 follows: 12:14:24 9 CONGRESSMAN OLSON: Mr. Augustine and 12:14:24 10 Members of the Review Panel, thank you for 12:14:34 11 the opportunity to speak to you today, and I 12:14:37 12 sincerely apologize that I could not be with 12:14:39 13 you in person but appreciate the opportunity 12:14:41 14 to submit this tape to you. I would have 12:14:44 15 preferred to be there, but we're wrapping up 12:14:46 16 the appropriations process and debating 12:14:47 17 health care reform on the floor. 12:14:50 18 Thank you so much for coming to 12:14:52 19 Houston and for holding this public meeting. 12:14:54 20 Your initial schedule didn't indicate such a 12:14:57 21 forum, and I appreciate your considering my 12:14:59 22 request and subsequent decision to come here. 12:15:03 23 You do not have the time and there's 12:15:06 24 not enough tape for me to herald the 12:15:07 25 achievements of the Johnson Space Center and 12:15:10 69 1 the aerospace community in Houston. I am so 12:15:11 2 proud to represent the men and women hof the 12:15:15 3 22nd District in the U.S. Congress. To me 12:15:18 4 the Johnson Space Center is a shining example 12:15:21 5 of the past, present and future of space 12:15:24 6 exploration. The men and women who work at 12:15:27 7 JSC are the best in their fields. 12:15:31 8 But make no mistake, that excellence 12:15:33 9 is not limited to within the walls of JSC. 12:15:35 10 One of the things that should be a shining 12:15:38 11 example across the nation is the partnership 12:15:40 12 between JSC and its contractors. The working 12:15:43 13 relationship between civil servants and 12:15:46 14 private contractors is a critical one that 12:15:49 15 needs to be cultivated as we harvest the 12:15:51 16 abilities and funding from different avenues 12:15:55 17 to achieve our common goals. 12:15:57 18 And let me be perfectly frank with 12:15:59 19 you all. It is not an understatement to say 12:16:02 20 that the world is watching the work of this 12:16:05 21 commission. The public is watching. The 12:16:07 22 blogsphere is watching. And I can assure you 12:16:09 23 Congress is watching. The options you 12:16:13 24 provide will be the guiding force for our 12:16:16 25 Human Space Flight program for a generation 12:16:18 70 1 or more. 12:16:20 2 I understand you are looking at 12:16:20 3 technical aspects of our current program. I 12:16:22 4 am not qualified to speak of those, except to 12:16:25 5 say that, if you told the men and women in 12:16:27 6 the hall today that all they had was an old 12:16:31 7 telephone booth, duct tape and a box of 12:16:32 8 matches, they could get it to the Moon and 12:16:34 9 you'd have a line of folks willing to ride it 12:16:37 10 there. These are the men and women who fit a 12:16:39 11 scare peg into a round hole on Apollo 13. 12:16:44 12 My primary focus is on the budget 12:16:48 13 challenges and overall mission for our 12:16:48 14 nation's Human Space Flight program. I 12:16:52 15 fundamentally believe that the path we're on 12:16:52 16 is the right one. President Bush announced 12:16:55 17 in 2004 and President Obama endorsed during 12:16:59 18 the campaign a human space flight plan that, 12:17:03 19 I feel, is the proper way to go forward. 12:17:04 20 This is a twofold question of funding 12:17:06 21 and mission. As I had said, I believe we 12:17:09 22 have a defined mission, and it's one I hope 12:17:12 23 you will help solidify within the 12:17:15 24 Administration and Congress and in the media. 12:17:18 25 Our nation must begin exploring beyond low 12:17:21 71 1 Earth orbit again. 12:17:21 2 We celebrated the 40th anniversary of 12:17:24 3 the Apollo 11 mission last week. Where will 12:17:28 4 we be 40 years from now? Apollo will be in 12:17:31 5 our history books forever. But if in 12:17:33 6 40 years all we have is grainy footage from 12:17:35 7 the Sea of Tranquility, we will have failed 12:17:37 8 in our responsibilities as an exploring 12:17:41 9 nation. 12:17:43 10 I've been in Congress for seven 12:17:44 11 months now, and we have spent money at a 12:17:44 12 mind-boggling rate. There are those that 12:17:47 13 have suggested that NASA needs a bailout. I 12:17:49 14 don't hold to that terminology, because NASA 12:17:53 15 doesn't need money for something that it's 12:17:55 16 done wrong or failed to do. It doesn't need 12:17:57 17 to be bailed out. It needs to be invested 12:18:01 18 in. 12:18:04 19 I've said it before and I'll say it 12:18:04 20 again: The problem facing our human space 12:18:06 21 program is not a vision problem, it's a 12:18:10 22 commitment problem. Help us make the case 12:18:14 23 for that national commitment that we need. 12:18:16 24 The men and women who are at this 12:18:18 25 hearing -- both those that you will be 12:18:20 72 1 hearing from, those in attendance -- and 12:18:22 2 those watching or following have a deep and 12:18:23 3 abiding interest in what NASA is doing. We 12:18:26 4 need to translate that interest to our 12:18:30 5 neighbors, to those districts without a 12:18:31 6 center in them and to those who are skeptical 12:18:34 7 and think NASA's best days are behind it. 12:18:36 8 What you are discussing is not a JSC 12:18:39 9 pet project or the direction of one federal 12:18:42 10 agency. You are laying out a pathway that 12:18:44 11 will lead to scientific discoveries, the 12:18:47 12 creation of thousands of good-paying jobs, a 12:18:47 13 means to inspire youth to become engineers 12:18:50 14 and the not so little principle that great 12:18:53 15 nations explore. 12:18:56 16 Your task is not enviable in a lot of 12:18:57 17 ways. It is difficult and has far-reaching 12:19:00 18 consequences, but if you want inspiration as 12:19:03 19 to how to achieve a seemingly impossible 12:19:06 20 task, you, once again, made the right choice 12:19:10 21 to come to Houston and talk with the people 12:19:12 22 from the Johnson Space Center. 12:19:15 23 Thanks again. I stand ready and 12:19:16 24 willing to help you all. 12:19:19 25 (Whereupon, Congressman Olson's video 12:19:19 73 1 presentation concluded.) 12:19:21 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: And we have an input 12:19:21 3 also from Congressman Culberson. 12:19:23 4 (Whereupon, Congressman Culberson 12:19:23 5 presented his comments via videotape as 12:19:23 6 follows: 12:19:31 7 CONGRESSMAN CULBERSON: I'm 12:19:31 8 Congressman John Culberson. I'm delighted 12:19:40 9 you're at the Johnson Space Center. I'm 12:19:43 10 sorry I can't be there in person, but 12:19:46 11 Congress is voting today. 12:19:49 12 And I want to urge you in the 12:19:50 13 strongest possible terms to recommend full 12:19:51 14 funding for a robust manned space program 12:19:55 15 that has proven to be so vital to the success 12:19:58 16 of the United States as a world leader in the 12:20:00 17 spin-offs in technology, in the advancements 12:20:04 18 in rocket propulsion and aviation and 12:20:06 19 aeronautics -- and so many ways the manned 12:20:11 20 space program has been vital to our success 12:20:15 21 as a nation. 12:20:17 22 But I think the most important 12:20:18 23 contribution that the manned space program 12:20:21 24 has made to America is the inspiration that 12:20:23 25 our astronauts and engineers and scientists 12:20:26 74 1 provide to the human spirit, and there's no 12:20:27 2 substitute for touching the human heart to 12:20:30 3 inspire people to achieve above and beyond 12:20:33 4 what they think they can do. 12:20:35 5 It's hard to imagine where America 12:20:37 6 would be today but for the Lewis and Clark 12:20:39 7 Expedition. My hero, Thomas Jefferson, sent 12:20:43 8 Meriwether Lewis and Captain Clark out into 12:20:46 9 an unknown wilderness just over 200 years ago 12:20:48 10 to bring back specimens of animals and plant 12:20:54 11 life and meet new civilizations and go where 12:20:59 12 no man had gone before. And that role of the 12:20:59 13 explorer is one that has always touched the 12:21:03 14 American heart and inspires us as a country, 12:21:06 15 lifted us up 200 years ago, lifted Americans 12:21:09 16 up over our entire history to travel out west 12:21:13 17 to settle new frontiers. 12:21:16 18 And it is something that we, as a 12:21:19 19 people, are genetically, I think, wired to be 12:21:22 20 leaders and explorers and innovators in 12:21:25 21 America, and the manned space program is the 12:21:28 22 linchpin of American innovation. It embodies 12:21:31 23 the American spirit of exploration and 12:21:36 24 innovation and does more, I think, than any 12:21:37 25 other endeavor in America to touch the hearts 12:21:40 75 1 of young people and lift them up and inspire 12:21:43 2 them. 12:21:47 3 So because of the practical economic, 12:21:47 4 technological, scientific -- and all of those 12:21:51 5 other tangible important spin-offs that we 12:21:54 6 benefit from as a nation to increase 12:21:58 7 productivity, to make us more successful as a 12:22:00 8 nation economically and scientifically, the 12:22:04 9 medical advancements -- all of those things 12:22:06 10 are vitally important reasons that you should 12:22:10 11 recommend a robust and fully funded manned 12:22:12 12 space program out into the 21st and 12:22:14 13 22nd Century. 12:22:19 14 But more than any of those reasons, I 12:22:19 15 hope you'll recommend as a commission to 12:22:22 16 fully fund our space program because of the 12:22:22 17 incalculable effect on the human heart, and 12:22:25 18 the inspiration that is provided to me as a 12:22:28 19 native Houstonian -- there are so many other 12:22:31 20 young people that touched our hearts. 12:22:35 21 If I weren't so flatfooted and bad at 12:22:35 22 mathematics, I'd have applied to be an 12:22:38 23 astronaut and wanted to become an 12:22:40 24 astrophysicist or an astronaut as a young man 12:22:42 25 growing up in Houston and West University. 12:22:45 76 1 The Gemini program, the Apollo program, the 12:22:47 2 manned program has truly touched my heart, 12:22:50 3 continues to inspire me, and I admire them 12:22:50 4 immensely. 12:22:50 5 We have an obligation as a Congress, 12:22:55 6 as a country, to stand behind our astronauts 12:22:58 7 and our space program and support them 12:23:01 8 proudly. Where would the Hubble be without 12:23:04 9 the manned space program that could go up and 12:23:07 10 repair it? We would have lost Skylab. The 12:23:08 11 stuck solar panel had to be repaired by a 12:23:10 12 space walk and the innovation and 12:23:14 13 determination of astronauts who figured out a 12:23:15 14 way to tie themselves off so they could break 12:23:19 15 loose that stuck solar panel. We would have 12:23:22 16 lost Skylab. 12:23:23 17 We would have -- I can't imagine what 12:23:24 18 would have happened to Buzz Aldrin and Neil 12:23:25 19 Armstrong on the Moon if they hadn't had two 12:23:30 20 astronauts there using their own creativity. 12:23:30 21 When they broke the switch on the ascent 12:23:33 22 engine, they had to -- Buzz Aldrin had a 12:23:35 23 felt-tip pen with him that they were able to 12:23:37 24 jam in and arm the engine to get off of the 12:23:40 25 Moon for our first lunar landing. And, of 12:23:42 77 1 course, Neil Armstrong was able to fly past 12:23:45 2 the field of boulders and the crater to find 12:23:47 3 a safe landing spot. 12:23:49 4 It is absolutely essential that we 12:23:51 5 have a robust, fully funded manned space 12:23:53 6 program. Robots can't do it all. They can't 12:23:55 7 think for themselves. And you're so far out 12:23:57 8 in space with a lag time between the time the 12:23:59 9 transmission leaves the spacecraft, gets back 12:24:02 10 to the Earth and then back, you must have a 12:24:05 11 human being there to make these decisions. 12:24:06 12 And sadly the previous Administration 12:24:08 13 made bold recommendations for the space 12:24:11 14 program, got all of our expectations up and 12:24:14 15 then never recommended adequate funding. So 12:24:17 16 it's essential not only that you recommend a 12:24:21 17 robust, fully -- a robust manned space 12:24:22 18 program but that you insist that Congress and 12:24:24 19 the Administration fully fund it. 12:24:27 20 Never again should we ever lift up 12:24:29 21 the hopes of these wonderful men and women at 12:24:31 22 NASA and people all over the nation that 12:24:37 23 we're going to go to -- go to Mars or go to 12:24:38 24 the Moon or set some big goal for the space 12:24:41 25 program and then not fully fund it. Help 12:24:44 78 1 give us that challenge to set the goal. 12:24:46 2 My personal opinion, I think it's 12:24:48 3 essential we go to the Moon. It's only three 12:24:49 4 days away. It's a shallow gravity well. 12:24:51 5 There's a lot of natural resources there that 12:24:54 6 we can tank up and use to carry us on to the 12:24:56 7 next step and to sustain a lunar station 12:24:59 8 there. The Moon is as essential a 12:25:01 9 destination as was the space station in low 12:25:03 10 Earth orbit. We've got to have it there as a 12:25:08 11 weigh point to go beyond and to help develop 12:25:11 12 the technology needed to go beyond. 12:25:14 13 So I'm grateful to you for your 12:25:16 14 commitment and support to the space program. 12:25:18 15 I'm glad you're at the Johnson Space Center. 12:25:21 16 These magnificent men and women who are so 12:25:24 17 committed to technological excellence, to 12:25:25 18 carrying us on to the next frontier, to 12:25:27 19 boldly go where no man has gone beyond, to 12:25:29 20 reach out and touch the face of new worlds 12:25:32 21 and one day new civilizations -- that is all 12:25:35 22 possible. If you will make the 12:25:38 23 recommendation to give us a clearly defined 12:25:40 24 goal to go to the Moon and beyond, to have a 12:25:42 25 manned space program that is fully funded, we 12:25:46 79 1 will meet the challenge. We'll make that 12:25:50 2 commitment as well in Congress, and I'm 12:25:53 3 confident the Administration will do the 12:25:56 4 same. 12:25:58 5 And I thank you very much for being 12:26:00 6 here today at the Johnson Space Center. 12:26:01 7 Again, I'm sorry I can't join you, and 12:26:03 8 Godspeed and good luck to you in your 12:26:05 9 recommendations. And you can certainly count 12:26:07 10 on me. 12:26:08 11 That's why I asked to serve on a NASA 12:26:09 12 science subcommittee on appropriations -- 12:26:11 13 although I say no to virtually all spending 12:26:13 14 requests unless it's medical, scientific or 12:26:14 15 the space program or national defense -- this 12:26:17 16 is a great passion of mine. It's essential 12:26:20 17 for the survival of our nation, for the human 12:26:22 18 heart and for the American spirit that we 12:26:25 19 have a manned space program that's fully 12:26:27 20 funded and robust. 12:26:30 21 Thank you very much for being here, 12:26:31 22 and I hope I get to meet you personally. 12:26:32 23 (Whereupon, Congressman Culberson's 12:26:32 24 video presentation concluded.) 12:26:35 25 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, I should thank 12:26:35 80 1 each of the members for their submissions, 12:26:37 2 and I appreciate your understanding of our 12:26:40 3 schedule and their schedule as well. 12:26:43 4 I should probably also say that, on 12:26:45 5 behalf of my colleagues, I've met with a 12:26:46 6 number of other members of Congress about our 12:26:49 7 work and have received a lot of very good 12:26:51 8 advice. 12:26:54 9 We are a little bit ahead of schedule 12:26:56 10 here, and I would like to jump ahead, if we 12:26:58 11 can. We've got the Astronaut Office 12:27:04 12 scheduled at 12:30. Steve, I understand, is 12:27:06 13 here. Am I right about that? 12:27:10 14 There you are, okay. We can hardly 12:27:11 15 see out there. But, Steve, if you wouldn't 12:27:14 16 mind coming up now and making your 12:27:19 17 presentation, and then we'll proceed after 12:27:21 18 lunch. 12:27:24 19 So this is Steve Lindsey, of course, 12:27:25 20 representing the Astronaut Office. 12:27:29 21 Steve... 12:27:31 22 MR. LINDSEY: Thank you very much, 12:27:31 23 and thank you for the opportunity to get a 12:27:36 24 chance to talk to your committee today. You 12:27:36 25 have a lot of big decisions to make and 12:27:38 81 1 options to look at. 12:27:39 2 What I wanted to do today just for a 12:27:41 3 few minutes is to kind of give you the 12:27:43 4 Astronaut Office perspective of how we think 12:27:45 5 about these things. 12:27:48 6 We're obviously primarily an 12:27:50 7 operational organization. You know, we go 12:27:52 8 execute the missions, we fly the missions 12:27:52 9 and -- but we also work with all of the 12:27:55 10 programs. So we've been heavily involved 12:27:58 11 with every next program we've gone off to 12:28:01 12 develop certainly since the inception -- 12:28:04 13 shuttle, space station. 12:28:07 14 When I came into the office in 1995, 12:28:08 15 we only really had one program operating. 12:28:11 16 That was space shuttle, and we were starting 12:28:14 17 to develop station. Since that time 12:28:17 18 fast-forward to now, we're now supporting 12:28:19 19 three major programs at the same time and 12:28:22 20 flying on two of them. So we're quite busy. 12:28:26 21 But what I wanted to offer was kind 12:28:29 22 of an Astronaut Office perspective on how 12:28:31 23 we're viewing where we're headed and what we 12:28:33 24 think we should do. And the way we did this 12:28:38 25 is did a series of town hall meetings with 12:28:41 82 1 the office trying to get an office consensus, 12:28:42 2 if you will, on what our office believes what 12:28:46 3 our position is on all of the activities that 12:28:48 4 are occurring. 12:28:51 5 For those of you that have been in 12:28:51 6 Astronaut Office -- and there's a lot out 12:28:53 7 here -- everybody knows how impossible it is 12:28:55 8 to get a consensus out of our office, but 12:28:57 9 this is our best shot at it. So I want to 12:29:01 10 talk kind of in general terms of 12:29:03 11 philosophically what we think about where we 12:29:05 12 should go, what we should do, and just 12:29:08 13 provide that kind of as food for thought for 12:29:09 14 you. 12:29:11 15 I want to start with the next system. 12:29:12 16 And I know we're all talking about a 12:29:13 17 capability beyond low Earth orbit, but we 12:29:16 18 strongly believe as an office that the next 12:29:19 19 system we build or the architecture that we 12:29:22 20 put into place needs to have capability 12:29:25 21 beyond low Earth orbit. 12:29:28 22 We believe a low Earth orbit only 12:29:29 23 system is a dead-end for our program. I 12:29:30 24 think Mike mentioned that earlier, and we 12:29:30 25 hardily concur with that. We think a LEO 12:29:34 83 1 system would end when the ISS does, and we 12:29:36 2 think we need to go after an architecture or 12:29:36 3 whatever we decide here -- something that 12:29:43 4 goes beyond low Earth orbit to other 12:29:43 5 destinations. 12:29:44 6 Speaking of the next architecture, we 12:29:45 7 believe the next architecture should be able 12:29:45 8 to accommodate several potential 12:29:52 9 destinations. There's a lot of ideas out 12:29:52 10 there, whether we should go to the Moon or go 12:29:54 11 to an astroid or a Lagrangian point. We 12:29:58 12 think the architecture should be able to 12:29:58 13 support all of those types of places. We 12:30:05 14 believe that the building blocks of this 12:30:06 15 architecture will probably be in place for at 12:30:10 16 least the next 30-plus years, maybe longer 12:30:12 17 than that. 12:30:15 18 And along those lines, the heavy lift 12:30:15 19 that we all know that we have to build to go 12:30:16 20 beyond low Earth orbit needs to be heavy 12:30:20 21 enough. And when I say heavy enough, that 12:30:23 22 means both in mass in terms of the lift -- 12:30:25 23 lifting capability but also the volume in 12:30:27 24 terms of shroud sizes and things like that to 12:30:29 25 be able to have a reasonable chance of going 12:30:29 84 1 to more distant destinations such as Mars 12:30:36 2 with a few launches as opposed to many, many 12:30:37 3 launches. 12:30:40 4 We're learning now, as we struggle 12:30:42 5 with the upmass challenges for the space 12:30:46 6 station program in the shuttle, for example, 12:30:48 7 is that oftentimes we are constrained by mass 12:30:50 8 to space station and oftentimes we are 12:30:54 9 constrained by volume to space station. 12:30:56 10 Sometime we have the mass but not the volume, 12:30:57 11 and sometimes vice versa. So whatever 12:30:59 12 architecture we choose needs to be able to 12:31:03 13 support both the mass and the volume to do 12:31:05 14 the missions we want to go do. 12:31:07 15 We also believe as an office that we 12:31:10 16 can't afford nor should we anticipate support 12:31:10 17 to develop another heavy-lift capability for 12:31:12 18 many, many years if we elect to accept a 12:31:15 19 stopgap measure today that doesn't 12:31:20 20 accommodate several potential destinations. 12:31:20 21 Next slide, please. 12:31:24 22 And I just want to talk a little bit 12:31:25 23 now about the next system. And to give you a 12:31:28 24 little bit of history, after Columbia our 12:31:32 25 office met a lot in Newark with the CAIB and 12:31:36 85 1 a lot of other folks, but we also sat down as 12:31:40 2 an office and we wrote a couple of white 12:31:42 3 papers back in the 2003-2004 time frame, one 12:31:43 4 dealing with the OSP and dealing with, for 12:31:46 5 example, whether we wanted to put retrofit 12:31:50 6 crew escape into the shuttle and some 12:31:53 7 questions like that. 12:31:56 8 There's a couple of quotes I put on 12:31:57 9 this -- these charts for you that kind of 12:32:00 10 refers to what our position was at the time. 12:32:01 11 The first one being that we strongly 12:32:03 12 recommended that NASA change the OSP Level 1 12:32:06 13 program requirements to mandate an 12:32:07 14 order-of-magnitude improvement over the 12:32:10 15 shuttle in crew survivability. 12:32:11 16 The second quote from a second white 12:32:12 17 paper: We believe an order-of-magnitude 12:32:17 18 reduction in the risk of loss of human life 12:32:19 19 during ascent compared to the space shuttle 12:32:22 20 is both achievable with current technology 12:32:24 21 and consistent with NASA's focus on steadily 12:32:27 22 improving rocket reliability and, therefore, 12:32:29 23 should represent a minimum safety benchmark. 12:32:31 24 As we've worked the Constellation 12:32:32 25 program over the last five years, these are 12:32:32 86 1 kind of what we've been looking at, and this 12:32:37 2 is what we've been trying to design that 12:32:38 3 system to do. The bottom statement probably 12:32:40 4 says it best for us, and I want to explain 12:32:43 5 that a little bit. 12:32:46 6 What we believe is the acceptance of 12:32:47 7 risk that we take should be commensurate with 12:32:50 8 our level of experience. And what I mean by 12:32:51 9 that is that we've been flying in and out of 12:32:54 10 low Earth orbit for about -- almost 50 years 12:32:57 11 now, and we have a lot of experience with 12:32:57 12 that. So we think it's very reasonable that 12:33:00 13 the next system should have a significant 12:33:01 14 improvement over the previous system. 12:33:05 15 From a national standpoint and a 12:33:08 16 public standpoint, when we had the Columbia 12:33:09 17 accident, we almost lost the shuttle program 12:33:14 18 for good. I have no doubt that if we were to 12:33:17 19 lose another shuttle the program would end. 12:33:18 20 And I wonder about the tolerance of the 12:33:20 21 public and the nation and our government for 12:33:23 22 another accident in ascent and entry given 12:33:26 23 how long we've been doing it. 12:33:30 24 So we know that in the future we're 12:33:32 25 going to take a lot of risk. We know in the 12:33:34 87 1 present we're going to take a lot of risk. 12:33:36 2 We know even with an order-of-magnitude 12:33:36 3 improvement we're still going to take a lot 12:33:38 4 of risk, but we think our risk should be 12:33:40 5 commensurate with our level of experience. 12:33:42 6 We're willing to take those risks, we 12:33:44 7 accept that as our job and we're proud to do 12:33:46 8 that job. But in the exploration avenue, in 12:33:50 9 lunar or Mars return, things like that, we 12:33:54 10 know we're going to take the risk, and we 12:33:55 11 understand that. But ascent and entry we 12:33:57 12 have a pretty good understanding on how to do 12:34:00 13 that, and we ought to -- whatever we choose 12:34:03 14 to do next, ought to reduce that risk. Next 12:34:04 15 slide, please. 12:34:07 16 Here's just a few more details about 12:34:07 17 what we view a safer launch and entry system 12:34:13 18 should have. 12:34:14 19 The first one, abort/escape 12:34:15 20 capability from hatch closure through orbital 12:34:18 21 insertion. 12:34:19 22 A full-envelope escape system free of 12:34:20 23 "black zones" during nominal ascent 12:34:22 24 trajectory. 12:34:25 25 The third bullet is key for us, 12:34:27 88 1 Designed and built to meet NASA Human Rating 12:34:30 2 Requirements. There's an entire document 12:34:31 3 that describes a lot of these things, but 12:34:33 4 some of the elements are the structural 12:34:35 5 factors of safety, crew situational 12:34:36 6 awareness, manual control, robustness, 12:34:39 7 redundancy and things like that. 12:34:41 8 I don't want to get into the details 12:34:44 9 of document, but a second sub-bullet there, 12:34:45 10 not waived or rationalized away, one thing we 12:34:46 11 get very concerned about is when we hear 12:34:51 12 about systems and where they're discussing on 12:34:51 13 how we're going to waive these requirements 12:34:55 14 or why we don't need to meet these 12:34:57 15 requirements because our system has X. We 12:34:59 16 will weigh any new system as well as the 12:34:59 17 current system in terms of human rating 12:35:05 18 requirements and what we think the vehicle 12:35:07 19 needs to have in the context of those 12:35:08 20 requirements and not, you know, how they're 12:35:11 21 rationalized away. 12:35:16 22 The last bullet, Substantial Test and 12:35:17 23 Verification, we review reliability derived 12:35:20 24 from only modeling or analysis with 12:35:20 25 skepticism until substantiated with test and 12:35:27 89 1 verification. And everybody has heard the 12:35:27 2 term paper rockets are always better, faster, 12:35:30 3 safer and cheaper, and I think until you get 12:35:33 4 into the details of the design and really, 12:35:36 5 really look at it and you do an in-depth 12:35:38 6 analysis of it, at least to start with, it's 12:35:40 7 very difficult to say whether they can meet 12:35:42 8 what they claim they can meet. Next slide, 12:35:44 9 please. 12:35:44 10 Just a few closing thoughts and then 12:35:48 11 you can ask me any questions you'd like. We 12:35:50 12 believe strongly that we have to have a 12:35:52 13 commitment. The budget must match the 12:35:53 14 program. If we have a program that doesn't 12:35:55 15 have an adequate budget or the budget profile 12:35:57 16 changes, that program is not going to be 12:36:02 17 successful. I think we all know that, and we 12:36:04 18 know how we got here today. But if you don't 12:36:06 19 have the budget to execute the program, it's 12:36:10 20 not a good program. 12:36:13 21 If we commit to the program, however, 12:36:13 22 we need to have the will to follow through. 12:36:13 23 Like Mike Coats mentioned earlier, in our 12:36:15 24 town hall we talked a lot -- you know, how 12:36:19 25 many more times are we going to change our 12:36:21 90 1 program, how many more times are we going to 12:36:24 2 start over, how many more times can we do 12:36:26 3 that until -- before everyone loses 12:36:29 4 confidence in our ability to develop and 12:36:33 5 execute a program. 12:36:34 6 There's always a better architecture 12:36:35 7 or plan out there ready to replace the 12:36:35 8 current one, and we're very concerned about 12:36:38 9 that. We believe as an office that a change 12:36:41 10 in architecture is going to delay IOC and 12:36:44 11 it's going to increase costs. We also 12:36:48 12 believe that it will trade one set of 12:36:50 13 technical challenges for another. 12:36:50 14 A quick word about gaps in access to 12:36:53 15 space. We think there are two gaps that we 12:36:57 16 need to be worried about. 12:36:59 17 The first one is obviously the one 12:37:00 18 that most people talk about. That's the 12:37:03 19 access to space station after the space 12:37:04 20 shuttle program ends and the gap as we fly on 12:37:07 21 Russian Soyuzes to get to space station. 12:37:11 22 Then the other gap to worry about, I 12:37:12 23 think, is what happens between the end of the 12:37:16 24 space station program and our next 12:37:17 25 destination, whatever that ends up being. 12:37:19 91 1 We think any new architecture or plan 12:37:23 2 or change needs to really look carefully at 12:37:25 3 both of those gaps within our likely budget 12:37:27 4 and what we think we can sustain. 12:37:30 5 And, finally, we believe as an office 12:37:32 6 we committed to both our nation and our 12:37:34 7 international partnerships with the 12:37:37 8 International Space Station program, and we 12:37:39 9 think we need to honor that commitment and 12:37:41 10 get our return on investment and do what we 12:37:45 11 said we were going to do with space station. 12:37:45 12 So that's a real brief kind of 12:37:48 13 summary of where we are. I tried to talk in 12:37:50 14 general terms. I didn't want to talk about 12:37:53 15 specific systems. 12:37:54 16 So at this point I guess I could open 12:37:55 17 it up for any questions you might have for 12:37:57 18 me. 12:37:58 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chief, thank you very 12:37:58 20 much. Those were helpful comments, and I'm 12:37:58 21 sure we've got questions. I've got of a list 12:38:01 22 of them myself. 12:38:01 23 Wanda, do you want to start it out? 12:38:04 24 DR. AUSTIN: If I may, sir, I'd like 12:38:08 25 to start out. 12:38:08 92 1 Thank you very much for your comments 12:38:08 2 and for trying to get consensus across the 12:38:09 3 group. 12:38:12 4 One of the things that we've heard is 12:38:13 5 that the NASA culture has become very risk 12:38:14 6 averse, particularly after the 2003 CAIB 12:38:19 7 study, and at the same time there's a clear 12:38:22 8 message that I see in your charts that says 12:38:26 9 we have to go beyond LEO, which is something 12:38:28 10 that we haven't done before. 12:38:35 11 Can you shed any light for us on how 12:38:35 12 you balance those two objectives of being 12:38:35 13 safer than we are today or at least as safe 12:38:39 14 as we are today -- you said an order of 12:38:42 15 magnitude would be desirable -- and yet still 12:38:44 16 be able to reach for things that we don't 12:38:46 17 completely understand yet? 12:38:50 18 MR. LINDSEY: Yeah, certainly. 12:27:31 19 That's a good question. And I've heard the 12:27:31 20 comments about risk adverse. 12:38:54 21 Right now we're flying the shuttle, 12:38:55 22 which is a 1-in-77 vehicle approximately. 12:38:58 23 You can debate -- I think pure statistically 12:39:02 24 it's like 1 in 64, but, you know, we can 12:39:03 25 debate the numbers. What's that comparable 12:39:05 93 1 to? Climbing Mt. Everest is 1 in 62, I 12:39:10 2 think, somewhere around there. Believe it or 12:39:15 3 not, a soldier on D-Day was about a 1-in-62 12:39:17 4 risk. 12:39:20 5 So to give you an idea of the types 12:39:20 6 of -- the magnitude of risk, there's a show 12:39:23 7 on TV -- I don't know if you've ever seen 12:39:26 8 it -- it's dangerous -- Most Dangerous Catch 12:39:28 9 or something like that. It talks about the 12:39:28 10 dangers of Alaskan fishing. The dangers of 12:39:32 11 that job don't even compare to the dangers of 12:39:35 12 this job. It's not even worth talking about 12:39:38 13 it because they're so different. It's so 12:39:38 14 much safer to go fishing in Alaska than it is 12:39:41 15 to do what we do. 12:39:44 16 So I don't think as an office we are 12:39:45 17 risk averse. I don't think as an agency we 12:39:48 18 are risk averse. When I look at it -- and 12:39:51 19 this is my opinion -- every time we launch a 12:39:53 20 shuttle mission, we are rolling the dice with 12:39:55 21 the entire agency. We're probably one of the 12:39:57 22 only government agencies -- if not the only 12:39:59 23 government agency -- that lays it on the line 12:40:01 24 every time we launch a mission. So I don't 12:40:05 25 think we are risk averse. 12:40:06 94 1 What I meant about the 12:40:07 2 order-of-magnitude safer risk, I was 12:40:09 3 referring to risk commensurate with our level 12:40:12 4 of experience. If we have almost 50 years of 12:40:14 5 experience getting in and out of low Earth 12:40:17 6 orbit, it seems reasonable to me that the 12:40:20 7 next vehicle we build ought to be able -- and 12:40:23 8 we believe it's achievable -- ought to be a 12:40:25 9 lot safer than the last time we flew -- than 12:40:28 10 the last vehicle we flew. Why would be build 12:40:30 11 another vehicle getting in and out of low 12:40:32 12 Earth orbit that has the same level of risk 12:40:33 13 as the current vehicle. 12:40:35 14 What I worry about is whether we can 12:40:36 15 sustain another accident in the ascent and 12:40:39 16 entry environment -- when we've already 12:40:43 17 sustained so many accidents and we've lost a 12:40:45 18 couple of crews doing it -- whether we can 12:40:47 19 continue to lose crews doing the same thing. 12:40:50 20 Now, recognize that the flight of any 12:40:53 21 new vehicle will have a lot more risk and 12:40:54 22 your true risk reduction that you achieve may 12:40:56 23 not happen until the ninth or tenth flight or 12:40:59 24 even further down the road. At least you 12:40:59 25 won't know that. So we accept the risk with 12:41:04 95 1 first flight. 12:41:05 2 So I think the risk I'm referring to 12:41:06 3 is a level of risk commensurate with our 12:41:08 4 experience base and, you know, we understand 12:41:11 5 the risks and we take them every day. 12:41:13 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Great. 12:41:16 7 Leroy... 12:41:16 8 MR. GREASON: I'd like to follow up 12:41:16 9 on that a little. 12:41:16 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let me get Leroy 12:41:16 11 because I saw him, Jeff. We'll come back to 12:41:16 12 you next. 12:41:21 13 DR. CHIAO: Hey, Steve, thanks for 12:41:21 14 coming out from what I know is a very busy 12:41:23 15 schedule to talk to us. 12:41:25 16 Kind of following up with Wanda, I 12:41:28 17 also had a question about this risk averse 12:41:30 18 because we've been hearing a lot from 12:41:31 19 different people that the impression 12:41:32 20 certainly is that NASA has become too risk 12:41:34 21 averse. And you just said you don't feel 12:41:34 22 that the Astronaut Office is, and I think I'd 12:41:37 23 agree with you. 12:41:40 24 Do you feel that the agency as a 12:41:41 25 whole has become too risk averse -- and as 12:41:42 96 1 you know, CB, of course, is a pretty 12:41:43 2 significant influence on the agency -- and if 12:41:47 3 so, what can CB do to try to help swing the 12:41:48 4 pendulum back? 12:41:53 5 MR. LINDSEY: Honestly, Leroy, I 12:41:53 6 don't believe that the agency is too risk 12:41:56 7 averse. I mean, I've heard a lot of talk 12:41:57 8 about it. 12:41:57 9 We focused an awful lot about -- on 12:41:59 10 safety and risk post Columbia, as I'm pretty 12:42:02 11 sure we probably did post Challenger as well, 12:42:07 12 although I wasn't here during that time 12:42:10 13 frame, and we spent a lot of time. We spent 12:42:12 14 a lot of money. We worked really hard on 12:42:14 15 shuttle. We revamped organizationally how we 12:42:17 16 deal with dissenting opinion, how we run 12:42:19 17 missions. The mission management process of 12:42:19 18 a shuttle mission and an ISS mission is 12:42:23 19 nothing like what it was, you know, ten years 12:42:26 20 ago. 12:42:28 21 But as an agency I don't believe 12:42:29 22 we're risk averse. I believe -- as I 12:42:31 23 mentioned before, as a government agency I 12:42:33 24 think we take more risk than any other agency 12:42:36 25 out there. 12:42:39 97 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Jeff... 12:42:43 2 MR. GREASON: Yeah. I guess I've got 12:42:43 3 two now. I want to -- risk averse is one of 12:42:44 4 those -- I'm going to do a follow-up on the 12:42:46 5 risk averse one and then come back to another 12:42:47 6 safety issue. 12:42:48 7 The risk averse thing is -- it's easy 12:42:49 8 to throw that around as a qualitative term 12:42:51 9 "we are" or "we aren't." But many times 12:42:56 10 during the course of the fact-finding that 12:42:59 11 we've been doing, you know, I've pulled up a 12:43:00 12 system that somebody has looked at and I've 12:43:01 13 said how come that's so much heavier per 12:43:03 14 person or per pound of payload delivered than 12:43:05 15 it was back in the Apollo days, and the 12:43:09 16 answer I get is some variant of we're just 12:43:10 17 that much safer now. 12:43:13 18 So it's hard to reconcile that 12:43:15 19 statement with the statement that -- not in 12:43:17 20 the Astronaut Office, not in the overall 12:43:19 21 goals and objectives, but when you drive down 12:43:22 22 to the decisions that are being made every 12:43:24 23 day, it does seem like there's been a change 12:43:24 24 in the weighting. 12:43:24 25 And, you know, do you not see that or 12:43:29 98 1 am I just confused or what? 12:43:30 2 MR. LINDSEY: Are you saying that 12:43:34 3 something is heavier as in mass -- 12:43:36 4 MR. GREASON: Yeah. 12:42:43 5 MR. LINDSEY: -- for safety? 12:43:34 6 MR. GREASON: Yeah. 12:43:50 7 MR. LINDSEY: Yeah. I don't -- I 12:43:55 8 guess I don't correlate mass with safety. I 12:43:55 9 correlate design with safety, and so -- it's 12:43:55 10 a difficult question. I don't know what the 12:43:55 11 risk numbers with Apollo were getting in and 12:43:55 12 out of low Earth orbit, for example, and 12:43:56 13 that's really what they're talking about. 12:43:56 14 MR. GREASON: Okay. 12:42:43 15 MR. LINDSEY: I know we were 12:43:34 16 successful at every Apollo launch, but we 12:43:59 17 also did -- 12:44:02 18 MR. GREASON: It was close. 12:44:04 19 MR. LINDSEY: Yeah. It was -- we 12:42:43 20 probably took significant risk. 12:44:07 21 You can argue in between Columbia 12:44:11 22 and -- or in between Challenger and Columbia, 12:44:14 23 I think we went 87 for 87 in launches. And 12:44:15 24 if you'd take that statistics by itself, 12:44:18 25 you'd say, wow, that's pretty good, and it 12:44:21 99 1 actually is pretty good. 12:44:23 2 But I don't see that. We work 12:44:25 3 real -- I can tell you, from my perspective, 12:44:27 4 since we're riding the rockets, we work 12:44:30 5 really hard on making sure those systems are 12:44:33 6 as safe as possible, as does everybody else. 12:44:35 7 MR. GREASON: Let me come back to 12:44:36 8 that because that's -- 12:44:37 9 MR. LINDSEY: Okay. 12:42:43 10 MR. GREASON: -- the second question. 12:42:43 11 MR. LINDSEY: Okay. 12:42:43 12 MR. GREASON: It's easy to look at 12:42:43 13 things like the CAIB recommendations with -- 12:44:41 14 and it's hard to disagree with them. You 12:44:44 15 know, it's hard to disagree that what we do 12:44:45 16 next should be a significant improvement over 12:44:48 17 what we have done in terms of safety in terms 12:44:51 18 of there at the LEOPs. 12:44:54 19 I'm quite concerned that because that 12:44:55 20 is such an important value and has become 12:45:00 21 such a flagship of what we want to do that 12:45:03 22 every possible agenda that -- of any possible 12:45:08 23 point of view has been justified in terms of, 12:45:11 24 well, you have to do it my way because it's 12:45:12 25 safer. And there's a difference between 12:45:15 100 1 saying we've got to be a whole lot safer than 12:45:17 2 we were -- absolutely -- and saying you have 12:45:20 3 to pick my system instead of this system or 12:45:23 4 instead of that system because, you know, on 12:45:25 5 the one thousandth flight when all other 12:45:27 6 sources of failure have been eliminated and 12:45:30 7 we are only talking of thermal ballistic 12:45:31 8 risks hardware and there's no design issues, 12:45:32 9 there's no infant mortality issues, there's 12:45:38 10 no operational mistakes and everything is 12:45:38 11 done with perfect workmanship, you know, my 12:45:40 12 system -- this system is 20 percent 12:45:41 13 different, you know, on a number we know 12:45:44 14 within a factor of two, if we're lucky, than 12:45:46 15 that number is. 12:45:48 16 You know, do you see elements of 12:45:50 17 this, or are you worried about this at all 12:45:52 18 because these choices have consequences? 12:45:54 19 MR. LINDSEY: I'm not sure I quite -- 12:45:58 20 are you asking me whether I'm worried 12:45:59 21 about -- 12:46:02 22 MR. GREASON: What I'm asking you -- 12:46:02 23 I'll make it more succinct. 12:46:04 24 MR. LINDSEY: Okay. 12:46:04 25 MR. GREASON: Stipulated that the new 12:46:06 101 1 system has to be a whole lot safer than the 12:46:07 2 old system, should we then design the new 12:46:11 3 system, you know, with the only consideration 12:46:14 4 being every safety parameter has to be turned 12:46:16 5 to the highest possible number, or if we just 12:46:18 6 get a whole lot better, are we in the 12:46:20 7 ballpark? 12:46:23 8 MR. LINDSEY: Absolutely not. We 12:46:23 9 shouldn't design a system where every single 12:46:25 10 thing is only -- the only metric for success 12:46:26 11 is the safety question. It has to accomplish 12:46:28 12 the mission. In the end a design is always a 12:46:31 13 compromise between -- there's no point in 12:46:35 14 designing a system that is absolutely safe 12:46:37 15 that can't accomplish the mission. You have 12:46:38 16 to be able to do the mission as well. 12:46:41 17 What our office opinion is about is 12:46:44 18 in the launch and entry area we can do both. 12:46:45 19 We have 50 years of experience, we can do 12:46:48 20 both and our designs should address both. 12:46:50 21 Is that going to answer the question? 12:46:53 22 MR. GREASON: Yes. Thanks you. 12:46:55 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Bo... 12:46:57 24 MR. BEJMUK: Steve, as a gentleman 12:47:02 25 who is representing people who actually have 12:47:05 102 1 to fly and -- and, of course, safety has to 12:47:05 2 be a very dominant concern -- my question to 12:47:07 3 you is -- I'd like to hear your opinion if -- 12:47:08 4 if you believe that the smaller companies -- 12:47:11 5 like people who are engaged in COTS with 12:47:14 6 NASA, are they capable of developing a safe 12:47:19 7 system for crew transportation to LEO? 12:47:25 8 MR. LINDSEY: Are they capable? 12:47:02 9 MR. BEJMUK: Yes. 12:47:02 10 MR. LINDSEY: First of all, I'm real 12:47:26 11 excited about the COTS, and I would tell you 12:47:30 12 that personally I would like nothing better 12:47:32 13 than to see the low Earth orbit mission 12:47:35 14 turned over to commercial companies so that 12:47:36 15 we could spend all of our bucks on going out 12:47:40 16 and doing exploration. 12:47:42 17 With regard to COTS, you know, right 12:47:43 18 now we have COTS engaged obviously in 12:47:45 19 resupply to space station. And I guess the 12:47:51 20 way I would answer your question is -- 12:47:52 21 they're engaged with that. As a matter of 12:47:55 22 fact, we're depending on that after 2011 for 12:47:57 23 space station to have the COTS folks show up 12:48:00 24 and do that. And I want to see them succeed 12:48:00 25 at that, and I think we should enable them to 12:48:03 103 1 succeed at that. 12:48:05 2 And once they've succeeded with that, 12:48:06 3 then the next step may be a human-rated 12:48:07 4 capsule or something like that or the 12:48:10 5 human-rated rocket. When we get to that 12:48:12 6 point, once they've demonstrated that they 12:48:14 7 can do the cargo resupply, that's when I'd 12:48:16 8 like to see that kick off, and then when that 12:48:19 9 kicks off, we'll go ahead and weigh the 12:48:23 10 design against the criteria I kind of set out 12:48:26 11 in my slides. 12:48:26 12 So I think, again, in the long term I 12:48:30 13 would like to see commercial entities take 12:48:31 14 over low Earth orbit, and I think everybody 12:48:35 15 would. And so I'm excited for that day to 12:48:37 16 happen. I hope it does. 12:48:39 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. I'd like 12:48:40 18 to call on Sally for a question and then to 12:48:41 19 ask a question myself after that. 12:48:44 20 DR. KENNEL: I have one down here. 12:48:48 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, you do? Okay. 12:48:48 22 Fine. 12:48:52 23 DR. RIDE: Thanks. Steve, thank you 12:48:52 24 for coming and sharing that perspective with 12:48:53 25 us. 12:48:53 104 1 You mentioned the gap between the 12:48:54 2 retirement of shuttle and the coming on of 12:48:58 3 the next system, and we're particularly 12:49:00 4 concerned about the ability to support ISS 12:49:04 5 during that gap. You also talked about some 12:49:08 6 of the issues that you have even today with 12:49:13 7 the shuttle system in meeting the mass 12:49:15 8 constraints and meeting the volume 12:49:18 9 constraints, and, of course, those are 12:49:21 10 exacerbated the moment the shuttle retires. 12:49:25 11 And I wonder if you could just talk 12:49:28 12 for a minute about the challenge that you see 12:49:30 13 in supporting ISS after shuttle retires, even 12:49:31 14 assuming good COTS capability relatively 12:49:35 15 soon, and the support that's projected from 12:49:38 16 the international partners. 12:49:41 17 MR. LINDSEY: Well, obviously 12:47:02 18 there's -- the space station was designed and 12:49:45 19 built for shuttle support. And when you 12:49:50 20 refer to space shuttle support, that means 12:49:58 21 upmass, and it means downmass. 12:50:01 22 In the future when the shuttle 12:50:01 23 program ends, we're going to have an upmass 12:50:02 24 challenge, which we hope to meet with our 12:50:04 25 partners, the HTV from JAXA and the ATV from 12:50:06 105 1 Europe and continued progress vehicles and 12:50:13 2 hopefully COTS. Like I said, I hope that 12:50:13 3 really succeeds. And that's how we're going 12:50:15 4 to do it in the short term. 12:50:18 5 The challenge, though, is how we 12:50:20 6 operate space station without the downmass. 12:50:22 7 So what that means to us -- and we're 12:50:25 8 actually looking at this in office and, as I 12:50:29 9 know, the space station program in the agency 12:50:31 10 is -- how we operate space station and how we 12:50:34 11 do the science and things like that on space 12:50:38 12 station, our paradigm is going to have to 12:50:41 13 change, and we're going to have to operate in 12:50:46 14 a different way. We're going to have to take 12:50:46 15 more advantage of the facilities on orbit 12:50:47 16 without the downmass to go with some of those 12:50:50 17 facilities. 12:50:53 18 And so I think that's probably the 12:50:54 19 biggest challenge we're going to face in 12:50:55 20 operations, maintaining supplies to keep the 12:50:56 21 crews alive obviously and then as well as 12:50:58 22 doing the science. So I think -- I think 12:51:00 23 that's a big challenge we're working on now 12:51:02 24 and we have to continue working on. 12:51:06 25 I guess the way I would equate this 12:51:07 106 1 is I've been involved in a lot of -- flown a 12:51:10 2 lot of different airplanes and watched 12:51:11 3 airplane development over the years and -- as 12:51:14 4 well as the shuttle. The shuttle's role 12:51:17 5 since I've been in the office has changed 12:51:19 6 dramatically from what it was when I first 12:51:21 7 got here. 12:51:24 8 When I first got here, we were doing 12:51:25 9 science missions. If you did an EVA or you 12:51:25 10 had a robotic arm on your flight, it was a 12:51:25 11 very rare event. Now, if you have a mission 12:51:28 12 that has only three EVAs on it, we kind of 12:51:31 13 look on it as kind of, well, that's not a 12:51:35 14 real complex mission. Things have changed, 12:51:37 15 but the role the shuttle has taken on has 12:51:40 16 evolved. 12:51:42 17 If you look at an airplane like the 12:51:43 18 B-52, which will be operational over 90 years 12:51:44 19 when it completes its mission, it is not 12:51:45 20 doing a mission now in any way, shape or form 12:51:48 21 envisioned that it would be doing when they 12:51:52 22 built it back in the 1950s. I can list many, 12:51:54 23 many aircraft and other things that are doing 12:51:58 24 missions today that they were never intended 12:52:00 25 to do. 12:52:02 107 1 What I would argue with you is the 12:52:03 2 space station is a capability and how we're 12:52:04 3 going to use that in the future is hard to 12:52:06 4 say. We couldn't envision it when we made 12:52:09 5 it. We are where we are now, and we're going 12:52:12 6 to go figure out a way to make that better 12:52:14 7 and make that work. 12:52:17 8 I think whatever our next exploration 12:52:18 9 program will be the same thing. We may 12:52:19 10 design it for a specific place, the Moon or 12:52:20 11 an asteroid or something else, and we will no 12:52:22 12 doubt end up using it in a different way in 12:52:25 13 the future. And so the key to any 12:52:28 14 architecture is the flexibility to be able to 12:52:31 15 go after those additional goals. 12:52:34 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: All right. 12:52:37 17 DR. KENNEL: I hope I can be forgiven 12:52:39 18 what you'll see is a far out question. 12:52:42 19 I'm fully sympathetic with your views 12:52:46 20 that we should be as safe as possible with 12:52:50 21 the things that we can do something about. 12:52:53 22 But when you start thinking about exploration 12:52:55 23 beyond LEO, there seems to be a long-term 12:52:58 24 irreducible risk that you will run from 12:53:04 25 galactic cosmic rays. And if you look at 12:53:07 108 1 today's standards for current lifetime doses, 12:53:11 2 it would seem to limit the ability for an 12:53:16 3 astronaut who's never been in space beyond 12:53:18 4 the Earth's magnetic field -- limit their 12:53:21 5 time in space to about 200 days. 12:53:23 6 Do you believe that such a factor 12:53:26 7 should limit our mission architecture and, 12:53:29 8 thus, in one way or another influence the 12:53:33 9 choices we make about launch and capsule 12:53:35 10 infrastructure? 12:53:40 11 MR. LINDSEY: Well, I understand 12:53:42 12 precisely what you're asking in terms of 12:53:43 13 long-term exposure because I deal with that 12:53:46 14 today in the -- in terms of the number of 12:53:51 15 missions I can assign an astronaut to go fly 12:53:52 16 that are in the long-duration nature because 12:53:56 17 we look at lifetime radiation exposure and I, 12:53:59 18 in fact, have some crew members that I can't 12:54:00 19 refly because of that very reason on space 12:54:02 20 station. 12:54:05 21 Certainly going anywhere outside low 12:54:05 22 Earth orbit, the radiation exposure is going 12:54:07 23 to be greater, and I think that is a problem 12:54:09 24 we have to go solve or we're not going 12:54:13 25 anywhere. So I worry about that. 12:54:15 109 1 There are ways to design to limit 12:54:18 2 that exposure and I think we need to go 12:54:21 3 address that and we need to come up with ways 12:54:24 4 to limit the exposure. I don't think I could 12:54:27 5 stand up here and say that I'm comfortable 12:54:32 6 sending an astronaut on a mission that I know 12:54:34 7 that will give him a fatal dose of radiation, 12:54:36 8 if that's your question. I don't think we 12:54:36 9 should be doing that. 12:54:39 10 DR. KENNEL: I don't think the -- the 12:52:39 11 standards don't apply to fatal dose but a 12:54:42 12 lifetime long-term increase in, I guess, 12:54:44 13 morbidity. It's not an immediate fatal dose, 12:54:50 14 in any event. 12:54:55 15 MR. LINDSEY: That's a fair question. 12:54:57 16 In fact, I can be accused in one meeting with 12:54:57 17 life sciences suggesting that can't we 12:54:59 18 just -- because the way radiation doses work 12:55:01 19 is it's calculated over your expected 12:55:04 20 lifetime, and so one of my suggestions was, 12:55:06 21 well, can we just ground rule out that 12:55:10 22 astronauts only live to age 60 and then we 12:55:10 23 can get a bigger dosage. But that wasn't too 12:55:13 24 popular. 12:55:17 25 But I think we need to -- I think we 12:55:17 110 1 need to go look at that and see -- you know, 12:55:19 2 like one of the things we're trying to do on 12:55:23 3 space station now is we're trying to get some 12:55:24 4 additional equipment -- radiation equipment 12:55:26 5 up there to measure different types of 12:55:27 6 radiation so we can get a better handle on 12:55:30 7 what we can really take. But this is a 12:55:33 8 serious problem that we have to go solve or 12:55:35 9 we're not going anywhere. 12:55:38 10 So I -- you know, we've also talked 12:55:41 11 about potentially having astronauts sign 12:55:41 12 waivers in the future and things like that. 12:55:42 13 So we're talking about all of that. I don't 12:55:44 14 think I can speak for my office and give you 12:55:47 15 a good answer to that one. 12:55:49 16 It depends on the individual. I 12:55:50 17 mean, I've got crew members that will fly in 12:55:51 18 anything, you know, even one SRB with a 12:55:52 19 shuttle, but quite frankly it's my job to 12:55:56 20 make sure that we don't put them in that 12:55:59 21 situation. 12:56:01 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Charlie, that's a 12:56:01 23 good question. 12:56:03 24 And if you have any follow-up you'd 12:56:03 25 like to provide us in terms of the impact of 12:56:06 111 1 particularly galactic cosmic radiation on 12:56:09 2 architecture and the likes, that would be 12:56:15 3 very helpful to us. 12:56:16 4 MR. LINDSEY: Okay. And just so I 12:56:17 5 understand, the question is -- the question 12:56:18 6 you're asking is: Are we willing to go 12:56:20 7 without the radiation protection? 12:56:22 8 DR. CHYBA: Maybe, Mr. Chairman, if I 12:56:29 9 may just jump in, the current limit, as we 12:56:29 10 understand it, is 3 percent by 12:56:31 11 exposure-induced death over lifetime. 12:56:35 12 MR. LINDSEY: Over the standard 12:56:37 13 20 percent, yeah, for a radiation worker. 12:56:38 14 DR. CHYBA: Yeah. And so I don't 12:56:44 15 want to interpret Charlie's question for 12:56:44 16 Charlie, but I think your question was 12:56:47 17 whether the Astronaut Office would or would 12:56:48 18 not be a comfortable with a change in that 12:56:50 19 level. 12:56:52 20 DR. KENNEL: That's another way of 12:56:53 21 looking at it, yeah. 12:56:55 22 DR. CHYBA: And then I would just 12:56:56 23 add, as a separate note, that our impression 12:56:57 24 currently from briefings we've had is that 12:57:00 25 it's very -- it's going to be very difficult 12:57:01 112 1 to do something physically that limits the 12:57:02 2 galactic cosmic ray risk certainly in deep 12:57:06 3 space missions, but there may be biological 12:57:09 4 remediation measures and there's an awful lot 12:57:14 5 of basic research that has to be done that 12:57:15 6 could have important bearing on the problem. 12:57:19 7 DR. KENNEL: Thank you. That's an 12:57:19 8 important clarification. Thank you. 12:57:20 9 MR. LINDSEY: Yeah. And there's a -- 12:57:22 10 you know, we've taken specific steps on space 12:57:23 11 station to minimize radiation for members 12:57:25 12 that are up there for six months. I don't 12:57:28 13 know if you're aware that we actually have 12:57:29 14 specifically designed sleep stations with 12:57:30 15 mitigations in place to limit radiation 12:57:34 16 exposure while on space station. And in 12:57:35 17 terms of -- there are some things you can do 12:57:38 18 going interplanetary and there are some 12:57:42 19 things you can't do and then certainly the 12:57:44 20 effect that that has will be limited. 12:57:46 21 So if you would go to the office and 12:57:48 22 ask the individuals, it depends on who you 12:57:52 23 ask whether they'd be willing to accept a 12:57:54 24 higher radiation dosage or not. I would 12:57:56 25 suspect most probably would. 12:58:00 113 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Steve, anything you 12:58:02 2 could give us on that subject certainly would 12:58:03 3 be helpful, particularly, as I say -- coming 12:58:04 4 back to the question of how it would impact 12:58:06 5 mission duration and mission design. 6 MR. LINDSEY: Right. Okay. 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: I'd like to ask the 8 last question, if my colleagues would permit 9 that. 10 My question pertains to the 11 importance of going to the Moon on the way to 12 Mars, and you talked about concern about 12:58:22 13 public reaction and risk and commented if we 12:58:27 14 had lost another shuttle it probably would 12:58:29 15 have been the end of the shuttle program. 12:58:29 16 And if we were to go back to the Moon 12:58:32 17 and lose a spacecraft on the way to the Moon 12:58:35 18 or at the Moon, the consequences for the 12:58:38 19 Human Space Flight program would probably be 12:58:39 20 pretty severe. And I ask this question also 12:58:42 21 in the context of ISS, which you had 12:58:46 22 indicated, Steve, you thought it was 12:58:53 23 important to continue to use it. Much of the 12:58:54 24 science community has said that they don't 12:58:57 25 see great science benefit from continuing use 12:59:00 114 1 of ISS. So one of the major benefits of 12:59:04 2 continued ISS must be helping us to get ready 12:59:08 3 to go to Mars or wherever we decide to go. 12:59:12 4 And so really the question in that 12:59:15 5 context is: Could you do things at ISS and 12:59:15 6 not go to the Moon? Is it important to go to 12:59:17 7 the Moon? Is ISS of any value to the 12:59:21 8 astronauts if, indeed, it's not of value to 12:59:23 9 the science community? And I overstated that 12:59:26 10 but for the point of question. 12:59:28 11 MR. LINDSEY: I think both would be 12:59:30 12 valuable. 12:59:32 13 Let me address the Moon first. And 12:59:33 14 this is my opinion on this subject in that I 12:59:35 15 think we need to go to the Moon first to 12:59:39 16 practice, much like Mike said earlier, before 12:59:41 17 we go to Mars. I think learning how to 12:59:43 18 operate on another planet that's four days 12:59:47 19 away is something you ought to do before you 12:59:50 20 try to do one that's, you know, eight or nine 12:59:53 21 months away, because it can be very 12:59:56 22 different. 12:59:57 23 Space station right now is a 12:59:57 24 fantastic vehicle that's primarily operated 12:59:58 25 by the ground. Any vehicle we build to go 12:59:59 115 1 interplanetary has to be autonomous in 13:00:02 2 nature. Those are the lessons we need to 13:00:08 3 learn. 13:00:08 4 So, for example, with ISS, one of the 13:00:08 5 things we could do with ISS -- that we ought 13:00:09 6 to learn how to operate that spacecraft 13:00:12 7 autonomously, build a -- and I've heard this 13:00:14 8 suggested before so it's not -- certainly not 13:00:18 9 my idea -- but, you know, build a 20-minute 13:00:19 10 delay into the communications of the ISS and 13:00:21 11 go practice working autonomously. There are 13:00:22 12 a number of things we can learn about ISS. 13:00:26 13 Right now we are learning extensive 13:00:26 14 lessons on ISS for any type of future 13:00:29 15 exploration. We are fixing systems that we 13:00:33 16 never thought we could fix. We're doing -- 13:00:37 17 we are learning right now with a six-person 13:00:39 18 crew how we do provisioning, how a crew 13:00:41 19 handles obviously long durations together and 13:00:44 20 all of the issues that go with that. From an 13:00:46 21 international perspective, we're learning an 13:00:48 22 incredible amount. 13:00:50 23 So we are already learning so much 13:00:52 24 today for interplanetary that it's really 13:00:53 25 hard for me to measure, but I could talk for 13:00:57 116 1 you all day -- talk to you all day about the 13:00:59 2 lessons we're already learning. 13:01:01 3 I think there are many things we can 13:01:02 4 look at in the future for ISS. There are 13:01:05 5 potential to, you know, again, get this 13:01:07 6 radiation thing -- that question. We can 13:01:10 7 answer a lot of that on ISS. I think that's 13:01:12 8 important. 13:01:15 9 So I think ISS can be utilized for 13:01:15 10 long-duration -- preparation for 13:01:18 11 long-duration missions, and I think the Moon 13:01:22 12 is an important place to go learn how to 13:01:22 13 operate. We're only a short distance away. 13:01:22 14 So I would support going to the Moon prior to 13:01:25 15 going to Mars. 13:01:28 16 One other comment I'd make about the 13:01:29 17 Moon -- and I'm certainly no scientist -- but 13:01:31 18 I really wonder whether we understand the 13:01:34 19 Moon as well as we think we do, and I think 13:01:36 20 there is some benefit to going there because 13:01:39 21 I really -- my personal opinion is we don't 13:01:40 22 understand it as well as we think we do at 13:01:40 23 this point. 13:01:43 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Steve, thank you very 13:01:43 25 much for your comments. We appreciate it. 13:01:45 117 1 MR. LINDSEY: Thank you. 13:01:47 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: It's now time to take 13:01:48 3 a break for lunch. We're right on schedule. 13:01:50 4 Could we meet back here -- let's see. We'll 13:01:55 5 take a ten-minute break and be back promptly 13:01:59 6 in 35 minutes. So that's 12:35. 13:02:02 7 (Lunch recess.) 13:43:34 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: We need to pick up 13:43:34 9 the afternoon session. Thank you all for 13:43:41 10 getting back so promptly. 13:43:45 11 Two of our members that have already 13:43:46 12 heard as part of the subcommittee the 13:43:51 13 briefing that's about to occur are going to 13:43:54 14 step out for about 20 minutes so they can be 13:43:56 15 with some of the local NASA folks, and 13:43:57 16 they'll rejoin us in about 15, 20 minutes. 13:44:00 17 And our next briefing is one of great 13:44:05 18 importance obviously. It concerns the 13:44:08 19 Constellation project, and we have several 13:44:11 20 briefers who are going to be presenting. 13:44:16 21 And, Phil, let me ask you, who will 13:44:21 22 be first -- the first briefer? 13:44:22 23 (Discussion off the record.) 13:44:22 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Jeff, it's all yours. 13:44:22 25 MR. HANLEY: Good afternoon, 13:44:45 118 1 everybody. Thank you for this opportunity to 13:44:46 2 bring you up to date on the progress of our 13:44:49 3 Constellation plan. We've spent a lot within 13:44:51 4 this environment talking about what could 13:44:55 5 be -- what could be done. We wanted to spend 13:44:57 6 a little bit time over the next three days 13:45:00 7 talking about what we are doing presently. 13:45:02 8 Along with the charter of this 13:45:06 9 commission, we were also given explicit 13:45:07 10 guidance from the office of Dr. Holdren 13:45:11 11 essentially to go ahead and proceed with our 13:45:17 12 current program of record as it stands while 13:45:20 13 this commission deliberates. And so that's 13:45:21 14 what you'll see us doing in the things that 13:45:24 15 you'll see here in the next three days. The 13:45:27 16 next three days we've set out -- we've got a 13:45:27 17 little bit of time with you at each center. 13:45:30 18 Today we're going to talk about 13:45:31 19 Project Orion and the progress that that team 13:45:33 20 has made. 13:45:37 21 Tomorrow we'll hear about the Ares 13:45:37 22 project and its status. We'll also spend 13:45:41 23 just the few minutes talking about the Mars 13:45:45 24 architecture work that we have done as it 13:45:48 25 relates to informing the plans that we are 13:45:51 119 1 making for the lunar surface activities. 13:45:53 2 And then at Kennedy on Thursday we'll 13:45:56 3 have a segment of time with you to overview 13:45:59 4 the ground operations infrastructure plans 13:46:04 5 and progress there. We'll status you a 13:46:07 6 little bit on the Ares I-X test flight that 13:46:10 7 is in the midst of processing at KSC, talk 13:46:12 8 about the Constellation space technology -- 13:46:17 9 space transportation program office, which is 13:46:19 10 an ops command/development command kind of 13:46:23 11 model that NASA is moving to with respect to 13:46:26 12 the way that we do spacecraft development 13:46:29 13 versus spacecraft operations, and we'll have 13:46:35 14 more to say about that on Thursday when we 13:46:35 15 touch on that and then some closing remarks 13:46:39 16 Thursday. 13:46:39 17 While here at the Johnson Space 13:46:43 18 Center, of course, Project Orion is the 13:46:44 19 largest effort that we have ongoing here as 13:46:47 20 part of the JSC effort for Constellation, but 13:46:49 21 we also have four other projects within 13:46:52 22 Constellation that are also in progress -- 13:46:56 23 two projects that are executing, two projects 13:46:59 24 that are formulating. 13:47:02 25 The executing projects are the 13:47:04 120 1 mission ops project. This is the mission 13:47:07 2 control simulators, all of the planned 13:47:10 3 train/fly activities that we undergo here, 13:47:14 4 and that team is doing detailed planning not 13:47:18 5 only in how to bring forward the next 13:47:21 6 generation mission control center but also in 13:47:23 7 forming the designs of spacecraft and the 13:47:26 8 rocket as we go forward and, of course, the 13:47:31 9 EVA project, which is our next generation 13:47:33 10 spacesuit. 13:47:39 11 Unfortunately we don't have time to 13:47:39 12 describe to you more detail about those two 13:47:42 13 projects, but we can provide that offline, if 13:47:45 14 you wish. 13:47:47 15 And then two projects in formulation, 13:47:47 16 Altair lunar lander and lunar surface 13:47:48 17 systems, both are projects in preformulation 13:47:51 18 in anticipation of a lunar program. 13:47:55 19 Around Constellation this week, just 13:47:59 20 to give you a little bit of status before I 13:48:01 21 introduce the project manager for Project 13:48:04 22 Orion, the Ares team is preparing a test 13:48:07 23 firing of the Ares I first stage out in Utah. 13:48:11 24 There's a five-segment motor sitting on its 13:48:14 25 side on the test stand, all instrumented, and 13:48:17 121 1 it will be fired August the 25th. 13:48:20 2 Down at KSC we're stacking, as I 13:48:23 3 said, the Ares I-X test vehicle. We've 13:48:26 4 begun -- we've got the solid motor fully 13:48:31 5 stacked, and this week we should commence the 13:48:34 6 stacking of the upper stage simulator. There 13:48:36 7 will be more about that in tomorrow's 13:48:39 8 briefing and then a processing status for you 13:48:42 9 on Thursday. 13:48:43 10 We just released the exploration 13:48:44 11 ground launch services request for proposals 13:48:47 12 to industry. This is the ground operations 13:48:51 13 processing contract that is out for 13:48:54 14 solicitation at present. 13:48:59 15 And then here at the Johnson Space 13:49:02 16 Center -- and really across the country -- we 13:49:05 17 have the Orion team conducting -- in the 13:49:06 18 midst of conducting their preliminary design 13:49:10 19 review, and here to tell you more about that 13:49:11 20 and more about the Project Orion progress is 13:49:16 21 Mark Geyer, the project manager here at JSC. 13:49:19 22 Mark... 13:49:24 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thanks, Jeff. 13:49:24 24 MR. GEYER: Good afternoon. My name 13:49:29 25 is Mark Geyer obviously. I'm the project 13:49:32 122 1 manager. I've got -- I've put together a 13:49:33 2 presentation with, I think, the key points 13:49:35 3 about Orion, but obviously the presentation 13:49:37 4 is for you. If I'm missing something or you 13:49:39 5 have a question, please don't hesitate to 13:49:42 6 stop me. Let's go ahead to the first chart. 13:49:48 7 Some of the key points I'm going to 13:49:48 8 talk about today is Orion is part of a 13:49:50 9 architecture. So its design is driven by the 13:49:53 10 architecture in which we function. 13:49:56 11 Second of all, we are completing the 13:49:58 12 preliminary design review. The board is 13:50:00 13 actually at the end of August. I'll go 13:50:03 14 through the details of that. 13:50:05 15 We've completed significant and 13:50:06 16 extensive engineering and development 13:50:09 17 testing. You'll see some of that in this 13:50:09 18 presentation. 13:50:10 19 We're also optimizing the details of 13:50:12 20 our 2015 launch date. 13:50:15 21 And we're using a risk-informed 13:50:15 22 design to build a safe vehicle and assure 13:50:20 23 mission success. 13:50:22 24 And we've already started production. 13:50:22 25 So you'll see all of those key points in this 13:50:22 123 1 presentation. 13:50:22 2 We'll go to the agenda next. So I'll 13:50:26 3 talk about an overview of the vehicle, talk 13:50:30 4 about PDR, talk about the progress in our 13:50:32 5 hardware development, the schedule, mass 13:50:34 6 management and human rating, and I'll give 13:50:37 7 you a summary at the end. Next page. 13:50:39 8 I think people know -- go ahead and 13:50:42 9 go to the next page. 13:50:44 10 This is an overview of the Orion 13:50:46 11 system. It shows the launch abort system at 13:50:48 12 the top. This is how we get the crew module 13:50:48 13 off of the stack in an emergency. You'll see 13:50:52 14 the crew module itself and the service module 13:50:54 15 below that provides support function and the 13:51:02 16 spacecraft adapter that links us to the Ares 13:51:02 17 launch vehicle. 13:51:02 18 I think an important point I'd like 13:51:03 19 to make here is that in the integrated Orion 13:51:04 20 system the focus is really the crew module. 13:51:07 21 The crew module is where the crew obviously 13:51:10 22 is unless they're in the lander on the 13:51:12 23 surface of the Moon. So it's a focus of our 13:51:13 24 crew safety discussions. 13:51:15 25 And it's also a big mass driver. The 13:51:16 124 1 mass of the CM -- the CM is the one element 13:51:20 2 that goes all of the way to the -- in orbit 13:51:21 3 around the Moon and then actually returns to 13:51:24 4 the surface of the Earth. So every pound 13:51:26 5 that's on the crew module is multiplied many 13:51:29 6 times by -- in the architecture itself. 13:51:31 7 So that process drives really that 13:51:32 8 the -- the only key functionality that's 13:51:36 9 needed in the CM for CM operation and for 13:51:37 10 crew safety remains in the CM. There is no 13:51:41 11 superfluous bells and whistles and other 13:51:44 12 functions in that element. 13:51:44 13 The next phase -- next page, rather, 13:51:47 14 I'll show you a little bit about the 13:51:49 15 architecture I talked about. We are a 13:51:50 16 lunar-capable vehicle that can also support 13:51:53 17 ISS. So on the bottom you see the Orion 13:51:56 18 there after launched on Ares I. That can 13:51:58 19 dock and be used for crew supply and also 13:52:02 20 stay the full six months. 13:52:05 21 And at the top we are part of the 13:52:06 22 lunar architecture in conjunction with the 13:52:06 23 EDS -- and the lander you see going to the 13:52:09 24 Moon -- and then orbiting the Moon while the 13:52:10 25 lander goes to the surface. Next page. 13:52:11 125 1 This is architecture is a robust 13:52:14 2 architecture, and it actually enables 13:52:17 3 extensibility to other missions. And so we 13:52:20 4 talked about a few of those things. Some of 13:52:23 5 those would require some upgrades, but 13:52:26 6 actually the Orion capability gives you a lot 13:52:28 7 of functionality that can be used for these 13:52:30 8 extensible missions. 13:52:34 9 What I'd like to do next is I'll go 13:52:36 10 through the specific elements and talk about 13:52:38 11 them and talk about -- a little bit about 13:52:40 12 where we are and what's driving them. So if 13:52:41 13 you go two pages to the crew module chart. 13:52:42 14 Thank you. 13:52:42 15 I talked already that the crew module 13:52:46 16 is unique and it's the one element that is 13:52:48 17 launched from the surface and actually 13:52:50 18 returns to the surface of the Earth. It also 13:52:50 19 acts as our docking interface to the space 13:52:50 20 station and the lunar lander, and it carries 13:52:58 21 the four people to the ISS and to the Moon. 13:52:59 22 On the lower chart you'll see 13:53:03 23 pictures of the flight test article that 13:53:04 24 we're going to fly for Pad Abort 1, and it 13:53:06 25 gives you a rough idea of the size and the 13:53:11 126 1 mass properties of the vehicle. 13:53:13 2 The next page is another picture 13:53:15 3 relative to the CM. We talk a lot -- I'll 13:53:18 4 show you some pictures of hardware, and 13:53:22 5 sometimes it's hard to really convey the 13:53:24 6 amount of work that goes into analysis to 13:53:28 7 come up with a good design. And I think this 13:53:31 8 is a really cool chart, but that probably 13:53:31 9 says more about me than about the chart. 13:53:31 10 But if you look at the pressurized 13:53:34 11 element within the Orion, which is on the 13:53:36 12 left -- you'll see I've pulled that out in 13:53:39 13 the upper left of that box -- it's a key 13:53:42 14 piece obviously because the crew resides in 13:53:45 15 there and it becomes one piece of structure, 13:53:47 16 but it is driven by -- and because it has to 13:53:49 17 fly the whole mission to the Moon and back, 13:53:49 18 it's driven by five different load cases. In 13:53:53 19 other words, there are pieces -- different 13:53:55 20 pieces within this structure that are driven 13:53:56 21 by different load cases and we have to 13:53:58 22 optimize for those load cases. 13:54:01 23 At the top you'll see that the 13:54:02 24 docking interface is driven by the translunar 13:54:05 25 injection loads. A little lower than that 13:54:08 127 1 are driven by a board ignition from the LAS 13:54:10 2 when we have the abort case where we need to 13:54:12 3 pull the CM off the stack. Below that the 13:54:13 4 structure is driven by internal pressure. 13:54:15 5 Below that it's driven by a water landing. 13:54:18 6 And then at the top we have some combination 13:54:19 7 also with drogue chute loads. 13:54:19 8 So, number one, it's a structure that 13:54:22 9 needs to be well integrated, well designed, 13:54:25 10 and it takes a lot of analysis to figure out 13:54:28 11 what those driving load cases are. So let's 13:54:32 12 go to the next page and show you a little bit 13:54:34 13 about how that comes about. 13:54:35 14 So you start out with your design. 13:54:36 15 You obviously have to turn that into models. 13:54:39 16 You have mass properties for -- and today we 13:54:42 17 have a 4,000 line item master equipment list 13:54:45 18 by component down to the structure and 13:54:47 19 secondary structure. 13:54:50 20 Then you develop finite element 13:54:51 21 models, as you know. 13:54:51 22 Then we fly those through the mission 13:54:51 23 design trajectories. We have to understand 13:54:55 24 how the propulsion system works, what loads 13:54:58 25 they drive into the vehicle. 13:54:58 128 1 We do wind tunnel tests to understand 13:55:01 2 the aero loads which are difficult to predict 13:55:04 3 in computer modelings in the special cases 13:55:07 4 that we fly. 13:55:10 5 Then we roll that into a loads 13:55:12 6 analysis, and that's what drives the design. 13:55:14 7 There's a couple of things I'd like 13:55:17 8 to pull on. For example, I mentioned that 13:55:19 9 the bottom of the spacecraft is driven by 13:55:22 10 water landing loads, but it's actually much 13:55:23 11 more complex than that because there is not 13:55:23 12 just one water landing case. 13:55:26 13 The nominal, we assume, lands in a 13:55:30 14 Sea State 3, which are relatively calm 13:55:31 15 waters, but we have to assume that we can 13:55:32 16 handle one parachute failing. So it's a 13:55:35 17 two-parachute case, with one failed out. So 13:55:38 18 that drives certain loads. 13:55:40 19 We also have an abort case where I 13:55:42 20 can assume I have all three chutes but I land 13:55:43 21 in the North Atlantic, so it's a Sea State 5, 13:55:45 22 waves as high as 10 to 12 feet. That drives 13:55:49 23 different loads into the vehicle. 13:55:52 24 So you have to understand the full 13:55:54 25 range of cases. You have to run those to 13:55:54 129 1 really define the driving loads and then 13:55:56 2 effect the structure based on those. 13:55:57 3 It's the same with launch abort. 13:55:59 4 There's not just one launch abort. We can 13:56:01 5 launch off -- we can abort off the pad, we 13:56:03 6 abort in a transonic mode, we can abort at 13:56:04 7 max Q -- all sorts of different abort modes 13:56:08 8 which drive different loads into the vehicle. 13:56:12 9 You have to do all of that analysis with the 13:56:12 10 proper models for the launch abort system to 13:56:14 11 understand fully what your pressurized 13:56:17 12 structure is going to see and design it 13:56:19 13 appropriately. 13:56:21 14 So we've done that work over several 13:56:21 15 DAC cycles, and we have a primary structure 13:56:23 16 that we've shown works, meets those 13:56:24 17 requirements and will get us ready to build. 13:56:28 18 In fact, I'm going to show you that we're 13:56:32 19 already building a ground test article today 13:56:33 20 at Michoud that we're going to test. So 13:56:37 21 we're well on our way. 13:56:38 22 The next page is another example of 13:56:38 23 the complexity of integrated analysis that 13:56:41 24 needs to be done in a vehicle like this. 13:56:42 25 Power and thermal are very complicated, not 13:56:45 130 1 because -- you know, everybody understands 13:56:47 2 they've got solar rays and batteries. 13:56:49 3 But you have to -- again, you have to 13:56:49 4 take your complement list, you have to 13:56:52 5 understand when they need to be turned on. 13:56:55 6 So you need a mission timeline. 13:56:57 7 You need to understand how much power 13:56:58 8 they're going to draw. So you need to 13:56:59 9 calculate those things. 13:57:01 10 You need to understand what attitudes 13:57:02 11 you're flying which affects where the -- 13:57:03 12 obviously because the sun heats the vehicle 13:57:04 13 differently. 13:57:07 14 So we've run Orion through all of the 13:57:08 15 space station cases through all times of the 13:57:09 16 year. We've run it through flying to the 13:57:11 17 Moon and all possible Sun/solar locations and 13:57:12 18 even in our failure cases and identified that 13:57:15 19 we have a power and thermal system that 13:57:18 20 closes. 13:57:26 21 So now I'll show you a little bit 13:57:26 22 about the hardware. If you go to TPS -- 13:57:27 23 obviously TPS gets a lot of attention. It's 13:57:30 24 a very dramatic environment, very hostile 13:57:33 25 environment. 13:57:34 131 1 We started out with six different 13:57:34 2 materials. The NASA team which has great 13:57:37 3 experience with TPS led that. We did 13:57:40 4 hundreds of Arcjet tests and down-selected to 13:57:44 5 two materials and then eventually 13:57:48 6 down-selected to one, which is Avcoat, which 13:57:49 7 is similar to what we flew in Apollo. 13:57:52 8 We used figures of merit like 13:57:52 9 reliability, maintainability 13:57:55 10 manufacturability, thermal properties and 13:57:58 11 everything else, and Avcoat was the clear 13:58:02 12 winner. 13:58:03 13 On the backshell we're using a tile 13:58:03 14 similar to shuttle. It gives us -- it gives 13:58:05 15 us the thermal properties we need, which is a 13:58:06 16 much -- much less challenging environment on 13:58:06 17 the backshell than it is obviously on the 13:58:06 18 heat shield. And also this particular 13:58:16 19 material is much more resilient to MMOD 13:58:18 20 strikes than other materials we examined, 13:58:21 21 because now we have -- we have to not only 13:58:23 22 consider its thermal properties but also the 13:58:25 23 fact it will be on ISS for six months and so 13:58:28 24 it needs to be able to be more resilient to 13:58:31 25 MMOD strikes. 13:58:34 132 1 The other thing I want to mention is 13:58:34 2 that we have a vehicle both in the backshell 13:58:36 3 and the heat shield that are built for both 13:58:38 4 ISS and lunar. This heat shield is built to 13:58:42 5 withstand the heating we're going to see on a 13:58:42 6 lunar reentry. So we have one system to do 13:58:47 7 both jobs. Next page. 13:58:49 8 I want to talk a little bit about 13:58:49 9 docking. As I said, this is our docking 13:58:49 10 interface to ISS and also to the lander. We 13:58:53 11 have a low impact docking system that's 13:58:57 12 developed here at JSC. You'll see a picture 13:58:59 13 of the capture ring, and they're -- this team 13:59:01 14 has already built an engineering development 13:59:04 15 unit for a similar design. 13:59:07 16 Crew cockpit interface, next page. 13:59:10 17 Obviously the layout is very important. The 13:59:13 18 crew needs to be able to see all of the 13:59:16 19 displays and be able to handle cases where, 13:59:19 20 for example, one display goes out and they 13:59:22 21 still need to be able to see the other two. 13:59:24 22 So the layout is very important. 13:59:28 23 We've done mock-ups looking at these 13:59:28 24 layouts. We've actually designed now -- and 13:59:28 25 you can see in that bottom picture we 13:59:29 133 1 actually have a hardware now for these 13:59:32 2 display units. That's one of three that 13:59:35 3 we'll be flying. These display units are 13:59:38 4 already in test for nominal loads and abort 13:59:39 5 loads. 13:59:42 6 The next page is the service module, 13:59:44 7 obviously a very critical element. Not only 13:59:47 8 does it do a lot of our propulsive maneuvers 13:59:50 9 for ISS and lunar, but it also is a big part 13:59:53 10 of our abort capability. It allows us to 13:59:57 11 abort after the LAS has left. It can get us 14:00:00 12 to orbit -- an abort to orbit or actually get 14:00:01 13 us to Ireland or back to New Foundland and 14:00:02 14 keep out of that worse case north Atlantic 14:00:07 15 zone. So it's a very important system in 14:00:07 16 that case. 14:00:07 17 It also does our power, storage and 14:00:10 18 consumables. It also -- we also have the 14:00:12 19 capability to accommodate unpressurized cargo 14:00:15 20 in the back end. So where one of those 14:00:17 21 radiators on the bottom would not be needed, 14:00:21 22 there's locations in there for the ISS 14:00:23 23 version, which has only two tanks, instead of 14:00:24 24 four needed for lunar, where we can launch or 14:00:27 25 use for the ISS or unpressurized payloads. 14:00:27 134 1 And at the bottom you can see we're 14:00:34 2 already testing auxiliary thrusters, solar 14:00:36 3 rays, RCS thrusters, and there's an example 14:00:40 4 of the tanks that we're going to be flying. 14:00:43 5 The next page is the launch abort 14:00:45 6 system again. This is a key element for us 14:00:47 7 to meet our safety goals to be able to get 14:00:49 8 the crew off the vehicle if there's a 14:00:52 9 problem. 14:00:54 10 It's a three solid rocket motor 14:00:55 11 system for the reliability. The first one 14:00:58 12 is -- we call the abort motor. That's the 14:01:00 13 one that gets you off of the stack. It's a 14:01:02 14 500,000-pound thrust. 14:01:05 15 The next motor up the chain is the 14:01:07 16 jettison motor. That gets this ALAS 14:01:09 17 structure off of the crew module both in a 14:01:12 18 nominal flight, if we don't need it, and also 14:01:14 19 after an abort. 14:01:16 20 And then at the top is an attitude 14:01:18 21 control motor that allows us to fly in these 14:01:18 22 difficult regimes to minimize the loads and 14:01:21 23 also orients the vehicle before we pop the 14:01:25 24 top off and actually deploy the chutes in the 14:01:25 25 right attitude. 14:01:25 135 1 And I'll show some of those actually 14:01:30 2 that we have built and fired. 14:01:33 3 The next page -- I wanted to talk a 14:01:34 4 little bit about -- you know, there's a whole 14:01:41 5 bunch of other stuff, so I was trying to 14:01:43 6 figure out what would be good to focus on. 14:01:45 7 I'm going to talk about the safety analysis 14:01:48 8 later on, so I'll leave that for later. 14:01:49 9 But we do a lot of other analysis 14:01:52 10 that is -- I think it's important to ensure 14:01:54 11 that we have a safe and reliable vehicle. 14:01:55 12 Obviously we do a lot of abort coverage/ gap 14:01:59 13 analysis so we can make sure that for every 14:01:59 14 phase of flight of the launch vehicle that we 14:02:02 15 can get the crew off in an emergency. We've 14:02:04 16 done that. We have no gaps in our abort 14:02:06 17 coverage. 14:02:09 18 We do landing accuracy analysis to 14:02:10 19 make sure we know where we need to land in 14:02:13 20 Southern California so that Pepper's recovery 14:02:17 21 guys can get us in time. We've done that 14:02:19 22 analysis. We meet the requirements for 14:02:22 23 landing recovery. 14:02:24 24 We also calculate crew loads at 14:02:25 25 landing. Because it's not just important 14:02:27 136 1 that the vehicle structure survives but that 14:02:28 2 we understand the loads on the crew. We've 14:02:28 3 modeled that extensively, and we also meet 14:02:32 4 those requirements. Why don't we go to the 14:02:37 5 next page. 14:02:38 6 Let's talk a little bit about PDR. 14:02:39 7 PDR is a critical milestone in the 14:02:42 8 development of any vehicle. The criteria for 14:02:45 9 PDR are not defined by Orion. They're 14:02:48 10 actually set by the independent technical 14:02:48 11 authority at NASA, and they're very rigorous 14:02:55 12 to make sure that we felt comfortable we had 14:02:57 13 the right vehicle and that our customers did. 14:03:00 14 And we set up a set of documents to be 14:03:02 15 delivered and also a set of reviews to be 14:03:05 16 held to go over that design, which 14:03:07 17 culminates, again, in the PDR board, which is 14:03:09 18 at the end of next month. 14:03:13 19 So we've had many reviews -- go ahead 14:03:13 20 to the next chart. Sorry. Sorry about that. 14:03:15 21 So we've had lots of technical peer 14:03:16 22 reviews. Those are really tabletops where 14:03:20 23 the engineers get across the table and go 14:03:23 24 mark up the design and ask each other 14:03:24 25 questions. So those we have completed. 14:03:25 137 1 We had 18 subsystem design reviews, 14:03:27 2 16 of which were in a two-week period in 14:03:30 3 Denver. And I think this is probably a good 14:03:33 4 time to talk about what happens in those 14:03:37 5 design reviews. 14:03:39 6 So it's a large number of experts. 14:03:40 7 So, for example, a subsystem design review 14:03:42 8 would be the key subsystems -- ECLS, GN&C, 14:03:44 9 for example. So I think of the ECLS 14:03:49 10 subsystem design review where at that meeting 14:03:50 11 not only were the key Lockheed designers and 14:03:52 12 their subs, Hansung, Strand, and the other 14:03:55 13 people that were there that are key to 14:03:57 14 building the hardware but also the NASA 14:03:58 15 expertise over the last 40 years, people who 14:04:00 16 had been part of Apollo, people who had flown 14:04:07 17 and built the shuttle hardware, people that 14:04:08 18 had been part of the space station ECLS 14:04:09 19 system were in the room critiquing the 14:04:11 20 design, adding suggestions, not only in 14:04:14 21 design but also in test, which to me is a 14:04:20 22 critical part of this process, that those 14:04:21 23 teams are embedded together working through 14:04:22 24 these issues because that gives me much more 14:04:24 25 confidence that we're using the lessons that 14:04:29 138 1 we've learned in those past systems to make 14:04:31 2 sure we have fewer issues as we go forward. 14:04:35 3 So the next big review we had was a 14:04:38 4 system and module review, which is we talk 14:04:38 5 about the integrated products, power balance, 14:04:38 6 integrated thermal, integrated loads. That 14:04:38 7 was done about a week and a half ago. That 14:04:47 8 was completed. So now we're in the process 14:04:48 9 of reviewing the documents and heading on to 14:04:51 10 the PDR board at the end of August. 14:04:53 11 The next page, I want to talk -- give 14:04:56 12 you some pictures of the hardware, but I want 14:04:59 13 to start with this one because this is a 14:05:02 14 great picture of the assembly area in Michoud 14:05:05 15 in Louisiana. You'll see the tooling on the 14:05:09 16 left and actually parts of the ground test 14:05:11 17 article for the crew module are actually 14:05:12 18 mounted there and being welded. So we are on 14:05:12 19 our way to producing this vehicle. Next 14:05:15 20 page. 14:05:18 21 Obviously it's essential that when 14:05:18 22 you fly people you need to be -- you need to 14:05:23 23 be in a position you can say the people can 14:05:25 24 actually operate the vehicle. It's important 14:05:27 25 to do that very early. We've been doing 14:05:29 139 1 these kind of evaluations since 2005. But 14:05:32 2 just to give you a snapshot, since April 2009 14:05:35 3 alone we've had 47 days of testing. We've 14:05:39 4 had the crew in there, again, looking at 14:05:40 5 viewing, stowage and emergency egress to make 14:05:43 6 sure that if there are any fundamental issues 14:05:46 7 with the vehicle we can get it now before 14:05:48 8 PDR. 14:05:50 9 The next page is post-landing 14:05:50 10 recovery. We built an Orion mock-up here 14:05:54 11 where we actually were able to take it out 14:06:01 12 into the waters -- into the sea states we're 14:06:01 13 going to be seeing, had actual recovery 14:06:05 14 forces participate in that, looked at what it 14:06:05 15 took to actually install the floatation ring, 14:06:08 16 how hard it was to get on the vehicle. We 14:06:11 17 looked at different ways to stabilize the 14:06:14 18 vehicle. 14:06:17 19 So, again, great data -- great data 14:06:17 20 now before PDR to help us design the best 14:06:18 21 vehicle possible. Next page. 14:06:22 22 I talked a little bit about landing. 14:06:23 23 We've done a huge amount of drop tests, both 14:06:26 24 when we were looking at air bags and 14:06:30 25 retrorockets, all sorts of soil 14:06:30 140 1 characterization. 14:06:30 2 What we show on this page is the most 14:06:34 3 recent testing where we're looking for a test 14:06:35 4 fixture that allows us to calibrate the 14:06:39 5 struts. So we have -- within the crew module 14:06:42 6 obviously we have a crew pallet. That crew 14:06:44 7 pallet then is attached to the structure with 14:06:44 8 struts. We use this to calibrate those to 14:06:47 9 make sure we understand fully in real drop 14:06:50 10 tests that we can calibrate our analytical 14:06:53 11 models to see -- to make sure we're 14:06:53 12 calculating the crew loads effectively. So a 14:06:55 13 great move by that team. 14:07:00 14 Parachutes -- on the next page -- are 14:07:01 15 obviously key parts of the architecture. So 14:07:04 16 we've already had 15 drop tests, both single 14:07:06 17 tests as well as cluster on the drogues, the 14:07:09 18 mains and the pilots. So, again, much more 14:07:12 19 testing to go on here but well on our way. 14:07:15 20 Next page, the solar ray deploy. You 14:07:18 21 may recognize that this solar ray looks 14:07:22 22 similar to what was flown on Phoenix. So we 14:07:24 23 were modeling the size that we're going to 14:07:26 24 see on Orion and did a deployment test on 14:07:28 25 this mechanism, and it worked very well. 14:07:30 141 1 Next page. 14:07:31 2 Okay. We'll talk a little about the 14:07:32 3 fire and smoke. Again, this is the abort 14:07:37 4 motor. 14:07:39 5 The first upper left is the attitude 14:07:40 6 control motor. That's a single valve. The 14:07:43 7 attitude control motor actually has eight 14:07:46 8 valves. So that's a single test, single 14:07:46 9 valve. 14:07:50 10 The jettison motor on the right, 14:07:50 11 then, is a full-scale jettison motor. We 14:07:52 12 fired two of those. 14:07:55 13 And then the abort motor on the 14:07:58 14 bottom is the 500,000-pound one, and we fired 14:08:00 15 that one last year as well. 14:08:02 16 So for the jettison motor and abort 14:08:02 17 motor we've fired full scale, they're ready 14:08:05 18 to go, and actually we have those guys at 14:08:06 19 WSMR today. The attitude control motor we'll 14:08:08 20 be firing a full eight valve ACM at the end 14:08:11 21 of September. Next page. 14:08:20 22 So this is a little bit about Pad 14:08:20 23 Abort 1. So this is the -- again, Pad 14:08:28 24 Abort 1 is one of our abort tests we're going 14:08:28 25 to use to verify and validate our abort plan. 14:08:29 142 1 The pad abort is one of the most stressing 14:08:34 2 cases in that we need to get the thrust -- 14:08:37 3 the abort motor needs to get you high enough 14:08:38 4 and far enough out that you can make sure you 14:08:39 5 can deploy the parachutes before you hit the 14:08:42 6 water. So it's an important test for us. 14:08:50 7 Langley Research Center built this 14:08:50 8 crew module. It's now got the avionics. We 14:08:50 9 can go to the next page. 14:08:51 10 There's more testing, and on the left 14:08:52 11 you can see the real fly hardware for the 14:08:54 12 jettison motor and abort motor on the left 14:08:56 13 and the crew module going through integrated 14:08:58 14 testing on the right. 14:09:01 15 The next page is a picture of the 14:09:03 16 avionics that's installed within the crew 14:09:08 17 module. All of that is going through its 14:09:08 18 final testing now. 14:09:09 19 And then the next page is the 14:09:12 20 facility. We're doing these abort tests at 14:09:15 21 White Sands missile range much like Little 14:09:18 22 Joe was done in Apollo. In fact, you can see 14:09:21 23 that facility not far from where we're 14:09:24 24 launching our stuff. 14:09:26 25 On the lower left is actually a 14:09:27 143 1 flight integration and test facility. We are 14:09:29 2 actually assembling the launch abort system 14:09:32 3 in that building much like -- exactly the way 14:09:32 4 we'll assemble it at Kennedy eventually. 14:09:35 5 The mobile ops flight test control 14:09:35 6 room is basically a trailer -- you see it 14:09:39 7 down in the middle there -- where we do our 14:09:42 8 flight control. So we can -- actually we've 14:09:44 9 had that at Dryden checking out the system. 14:09:46 10 Now we can roll it to WSMR and actually use 14:09:49 11 it for the flight itself. 14:09:49 12 The gantry at the top is actually 14:09:51 13 going to be used for ascent abort to assemble 14:09:55 14 the vehicle. So the facility for Pad Abort 1 14:09:56 15 is ready to go. Next page. 14:09:59 16 NASA did an investigation -- or 14:10:03 17 actually a competition to select the facility 14:10:06 18 we want to do our qualification in for this 14:10:09 19 vehicle, and we wanted this -- this 14:10:11 20 particular facility was picked, in large 14:10:13 21 part, because we're able to do all of the key 14:10:17 22 tests within this one facility. This is 14:10:33 23 obviously at Plumbrook in Northern Ohio. 14:10:35 24 And on the right are two different 14:10:35 25 pictures of getting the acoustic chamber 14:10:37 144 1 built. 14:10:41 2 Relative to production, if we go to 14:10:43 3 the next page, how are we activating our 14:10:47 4 production system. 14:10:50 5 The O&C building -- I don't know if 14:10:50 6 you've been at the Cape. I guess we'll be 14:10:51 7 there in two days. But you'll see the lower 14:10:53 8 right is actually a picture of the O&C 14:10:54 9 building, and if you've ever been there 14:10:54 10 before, it was completed -- you know how much 14:10:54 11 work was done both here and -- and you can't 14:11:00 12 see the basement, which was also an 14:11:01 13 incredible amount of work. That building was 14:11:06 14 completed below cost and ahead of schedule -- 14:11:09 15 great job. And the tools now are being 14:11:10 16 designed for the O&C. 14:11:11 17 The lower left is, again, MAF, 14:11:12 18 Michoud Assembly Facility. You'll see the 14:11:12 19 tooling there. And our welding fixture is up 14:11:12 20 and ready to go, and we're using it today to 14:11:12 21 build the GTA. 14:11:22 22 At Kennedy we'll be using the 14:11:22 23 canister rotation facility for assembly of 14:11:22 24 the LAS, and we're in the process of making 14:11:28 25 the minor mods necessary to get that building 14:11:32 145 1 ready for production. Next page. 14:11:34 2 So how are we using it? The GTA is 14:11:39 3 obviously being used at MAF -- being built at 14:11:42 4 MAF. We're using launch abort procedures at 14:11:46 5 WSMR to actually assemble the launch abort 14:11:46 6 system. So we're actually doing that 14:11:48 7 production. 14:11:50 8 The service module is still -- we're 14:11:50 9 still in design for its GTA and getting its 14:11:53 10 tooling finally completed. 14:11:58 11 On the next page, since we're talking 14:12:00 12 production, I thought it would good -- again, 14:12:02 13 easy to show hardware pictures. The question 14:12:06 14 now is what are we doing to minimize the 14:12:06 15 life-cycle costs -- what are we doing today. 14:12:12 16 It's easy to think about at the end, but what 14:12:12 17 are we doing up front. 14:12:12 18 What I tried to show on this very, 14:12:15 19 very crowded chart is a couple of things. 14:12:18 20 Upper left is we track on a monthly 14:12:20 21 basis where we stand relative to days in the 14:12:24 22 critical path in the assembly so we can -- 14:12:26 23 this is our metric to say are we as lean and 14:12:29 24 as streamlined as we can possibly be. 14:12:33 25 On the lower left is a list of 14:12:36 146 1 structured improvement activities -- 14:12:39 2 caissons, Lean Six Sigma -- other things that 14:12:40 3 have been done relative to all of the 14:12:42 4 different production phases. So we've done a 14:12:44 5 lot of those. 14:12:47 6 And on the right are specific 14:12:47 7 improvements incorporated into the vehicle 14:12:49 8 design, either in the building, in the Orion 14:12:52 9 itself or in the ground support equipment. 14:12:54 10 The last page then is -- on this 14:12:57 11 stuff is basically that production has 14:13:00 12 started, so... 14:13:02 13 Go one more page. Sorry. There you 14:13:04 14 go. 14:13:06 15 Again, more pictures of the 14:13:07 16 production and the welding that's being done. 14:13:07 17 So that upper right is just a picture of the 14:13:11 18 friction stir weld. It's a part of the -- as 14:13:16 19 we put together the ground test article. 14:13:17 20 The ground test article will start -- 14:13:29 21 the first test we'll do is put it in through 14:13:32 22 an acoustic chamber to make sure we 14:13:34 23 understand how it transmits the acoustic 14:13:34 24 levels we think we're going to see. And then 14:13:36 25 we'll also use it in our drop tests to make 14:13:38 147 1 sure we calibrate the structure to the 14:13:41 2 landing modes that we think we're going to 14:13:42 3 see. 14:13:45 4 The next page is -- will give you a 14:13:46 5 sense -- I showed you a lot of analysis, a 14:13:48 6 lot of hardware, so where is all of this work 14:13:50 7 done. These are all of the locations. You 14:13:51 8 can see the NASA centers. You can see the 14:13:53 9 key areas where Lockheed is located and also 14:13:56 10 its major subs. So it's across the country. 14:14:00 11 Roughly about 3100 people work on 14:14:01 12 this project. About 10 percent of that I 14:14:04 13 would classify as oversight. There are about 14:14:09 14 800 NASA folks, but the majority of those 14:14:12 15 NASA folks are actually producing products -- 14:14:16 16 the parachute system, worked on TPS, working 14:14:20 17 on the docking system, also part of the GN&C 14:14:26 18 mode team -- working on the things that NASA 14:14:28 19 knows how to do. But oversight itself is 14:14:30 20 only 10 percent of that number. 14:14:34 21 So next I'll go to the schedule. So, 14:14:35 22 yeah, go ahead one more page. 14:14:41 23 So what I'm going to do is kind of 14:14:42 24 describe the critical path and build it up 14:14:45 25 for you. I'm going to start from the launch 14:14:48 148 1 date and go left, talk through each of the 14:14:50 2 major functions, what we've done to 14:14:54 3 streamline those and what we're doing to give 14:14:55 4 us more and more confidence on this launch 14:14:57 5 date. 14:14:58 6 So if you start on the lower right, 14:14:59 7 you see the launch date of Orion 2, our 14:15:02 8 commit date now at March of 2015. Go ahead. 14:15:05 9 Another click -- there you go -- to see those 14:15:11 10 launches. 14:15:13 11 So at this time Pepper's guys are 14:15:14 12 assuming around six months processing. So we 14:15:18 13 hand off before that. 14:15:18 14 If you go to the next chart, what 14:15:25 15 we've done is we've pushed that further to 14:15:25 16 the left. We're being more aggressive on the 14:15:26 17 schedule to give ourselves more runway in 14:15:26 18 front of this. So we're actually going to 14:15:29 19 deliver the vehicle ahead of when ground ops 14:15:31 20 need it. So we're going to deliver in June 14:15:34 21 of 2014. 14:15:37 22 What that does, then, is that pushes 14:15:39 23 the rest of these milestones to the left, and 14:15:41 24 we'll talk about that. 14:15:44 25 The next thing -- if you look at that 14:15:44 149 1 chart and you see that -- the dotted red 14:15:45 2 line, it turns out that the critical path is 14:15:45 3 not in the assembly of Orion 2 but actually 14:15:51 4 qualifying the design prior to launching 14:15:51 5 Orion 1 and Orion 2. 14:15:51 6 So what we didn't need to do in the 14:15:55 7 critical path -- now let's move up to the 14:15:58 8 system qual, which is basically a flight 14:15:59 9 element going through qualification. So in 14:16:01 10 the next -- go ahead and click it one more 14:16:03 11 time. 14:16:03 12 You'll see it right there, system 14:16:04 13 qual prior to Orion 2 delivery for launch 14:16:07 14 processing. So I will break that down for 14:16:09 15 you, and you'll see the pieces that go into 14:16:11 16 that. 14:16:13 17 Now, before we can qualify the flight 14:16:14 18 vehicle, we have to build the flight vehicle. 14:16:14 19 So the next piece is AI&P, which is assembly, 14:16:19 20 integration and production. So go ahead and 14:16:23 21 hit the next -- there we are. 14:16:23 22 So that's -- I'll talk through 14:16:23 23 exactly how we come up with that schedule. 14:16:23 24 And then before we can assemble the vehicle, 14:16:28 25 obviously the components need to be 14:16:28 150 1 fabricated and delivered. So one more click, 14:16:31 2 and there we are. 14:16:34 3 Okay. So I'll walk you through each 14:16:35 4 one of those. I'm going to start off again 14:16:37 5 with the flight qual on the next chart. 14:16:39 6 Okay. This shows you for the flight 14:16:44 7 element. It arrives. We do the assembly, 14:16:45 8 because we ship it in pieces, the SM, CM and 14:16:48 9 the LAS. We do a final assembly. Then we go 14:16:52 10 through vibe, we go acoustics, we go pyro 14:16:54 11 shock for the SM. We do pyro shock for the 14:17:03 12 other pieces, SM/SA. We do thermal vac. We 14:17:03 13 do EMI/EMC, and then we do pyro shock between 14:17:07 14 the CM and the SM. 14:17:07 15 Then on the next page we do a fairing 14:17:07 16 separation. We do lightning. We do 14:17:12 17 vibration. We do pyro shock for the 14:17:17 18 separation with the other systems at landing, 14:17:20 19 and then we do human in the loop demos to 14:17:22 20 make sure we validate -- verified all of the 14:17:25 21 requirements for the human interface. 14:17:27 22 So it's a lot of stuff. That's a lot 14:17:27 23 of testing. It is right now a serial process 14:17:31 24 where we bring the flight element into that 14:17:34 25 system. Right now we're looking at -- as you 14:17:37 151 1 can see, you can see that we believe -- the 14:17:43 2 tests needed for Orion 1 qualification and 14:17:43 3 after the SM fairing separation, because 14:17:43 4 Orion 1 is unmanned. It's also a flight 14:17:47 5 test. So now there's further testing, then, 14:17:50 6 required between that and the launch of 14:17:53 7 Orion 2. 14:17:56 8 So we have defined these specific 14:17:56 9 tests in detail. We've defined these 14:17:58 10 durations in detail. They're rounded up to 14:18:02 11 the nearest month just because it got -- the 14:18:05 12 chart got to complicated. So it gives you a 14:18:06 13 sense about how long these tests take. 14:18:07 14 We are working now to make sure we 14:18:09 15 understand are there ways -- and actually we 14:18:11 16 have some ideas already -- are there ways to 14:18:14 17 get some parallelism in the schedule, in 14:18:16 18 other words, take things out, I guess, in 14:18:18 19 fairing separation and actually do that on 14:18:21 20 the structural test article so that we're not 14:18:24 21 waiting on that to qualify the vehicle. 14:18:24 22 Also we're looking at ways for the 14:18:27 23 ECLS system to actually do a testbed offline 14:18:29 24 from this to actually do its qualification as 14:18:32 25 well as integration with EVA. So, again, it 14:18:35 152 1 would take some of the schedule criticality 14:18:36 2 out of this. 14:18:36 3 So we have a plan. It fits. We're 14:18:37 4 working hard to find other ways to add 14:18:40 5 confidence to the schedule by removing some 14:18:44 6 of the serial nature of these testing. 14:18:47 7 Also there's a lot of -- you know, we 14:18:49 8 need to look hard at what are really the 14:18:50 9 requirements for launch Orion 1 since it is 14:18:53 10 unmanned and it is a test flight and how much 14:18:54 11 of that test flight experience we can 14:18:56 12 actually use in our qualification. 14:18:58 13 Okay. So now we have a qual plan. 14:19:01 14 Now we need to go to how to assemble that 14:19:03 15 vehicle. So go to the next page. 14:19:06 16 This is the factory again. I showed 14:19:06 17 you a photo of the real factory. This is a 14:19:08 18 layout of where the different stations are. 14:19:11 19 I won't go through this. 14:19:14 20 But we take this, then the team, as I 14:19:15 21 mentioned, in very detailed analysis, talks 14:19:18 22 about then where the components need to show 14:19:20 23 up and where they're assembled. 14:19:22 24 And that generates the next chart, 14:19:25 25 which is the schedule chart for this assembly 14:19:27 153 1 and integration and production flow. So on 14:19:31 2 the lower right you can see the qual test 14:19:31 3 itself. So we're building up on the upper 14:19:32 4 lower part the CM, on the lower part the SM. 14:19:36 5 It talks about every station. It talks about 14:19:38 6 every task. It talks about where each 14:19:41 7 component needs to show up to give us the 14:19:44 8 best assembly flow. So, now, we take this, 14:19:45 9 and it drives the component need dates. 14:19:48 10 And if you go to the next chart, we 14:19:52 11 get very detailed schedules on each 14:19:53 12 component. This is an example of only the 14:19:53 13 CM -- some of the CM items, as you can see 14:19:57 14 that in the details. 14:20:00 15 Again, I don't -- it's hard to read, 14:20:01 16 but I wanted to show you that we are at this 14:20:04 17 level. In fact, this is only one page of 14:20:07 18 many showing -- lining out of the 14:20:09 19 360 components needed to do this assembly. 14:20:11 20 So we take this then and we bang it up 14:20:13 21 against -- if we go -- go to the next chart. 14:20:17 22 Which each component, as you know, 14:20:20 23 before you can go buy it, you need a spec, 14:20:22 24 you need to turn on the contractor and then 14:20:26 25 you need to lay that in the hardware delivery 14:20:27 154 1 date. So we take each one and work with the 14:20:31 2 subcontractors on when they need to be turned 14:20:33 3 on in order to meet the delivery date that 14:20:35 4 we've been given. 14:20:37 5 There are ways, now, to add margin to 14:20:38 6 these as well. There's some flexibility in 14:20:40 7 the assembly process. Those guys obviously 14:20:43 8 optimize for what made sense for them, but we 14:20:44 9 can talk about it. If I've got one element 14:20:47 10 that takes a little bit longer, we want to 14:20:48 11 deliver that one later, that gives me some 14:20:49 12 options there too. 14:20:51 13 Most of these component delivery 14:20:53 14 dates we got were delivered when the budget 14:20:55 15 was much less in '09 -- in '08. But the 14:20:59 16 program has enhanced our budget. So now we 14:20:59 17 have more money to help accelerate those 14:21:02 18 components and give them some flexibility. 14:21:05 19 And there's also some things you can 14:21:08 20 do to stop pounding flat some of the mass 14:21:08 21 things. For example, some pumps, you can go 14:21:08 22 ahead and inspect them at a wider range. 14:21:14 23 They're a little bit heavy, two to five 14:21:17 24 pounds, but rather than optimizing and 14:21:20 25 analyzing to death, we can go out and buy the 14:21:22 155 1 pump and take some mass inefficiency but get 14:21:25 2 the pumps moving. 14:21:25 3 So that's another example of things 14:21:27 4 that we can do. And we are using -- doing 14:21:28 5 that component by component to give us more 14:21:30 6 and more confidence in our launch date. 14:21:33 7 Well, if you go to the next page -- 14:21:37 8 so I think I summarized -- yeah. Go ahead. 14:21:38 9 Click off of that. 14:21:38 10 So we did get significantly more 14:21:45 11 money from Level 2. Some of it was stimulus 14:21:47 12 money. Some of it was money back from the 14:21:52 13 pass-back. We've used that money to increase 14:21:54 14 the engineering development units, which 14:21:57 15 increase our confidence that when we build 14:21:59 16 the production units they're going to work. 14:22:02 17 It also helps us by starting our higher 14:22:03 18 critical path items early. 14:22:07 19 As I mentioned, I pushed -- we pushed 14:22:08 20 the delivery date to be 2014 -- mid 2014 even 14:22:10 21 though it's not required, and we also pushed 14:22:13 22 the AI&P guys to the left as well even though 14:22:18 23 it's not required because I want runway in 14:22:22 24 front of me and that way we force out the big 14:22:24 25 drivers. So this work has helped us do that. 14:22:25 156 1 I think that's the key for that 14:22:28 2 chart. Let's go ahead -- let's talk mass, 14:22:31 3 because it's on everybody's mind, I think. 14:22:37 4 Go ahead to the next chart. 14:22:42 5 So, again, I'll talk about where we 14:22:44 6 are at mass but I want -- it's also important 14:22:46 7 to know that, again, this is not a high level 14:22:49 8 mass estimating relationship, this is a -- 14:22:51 9 generated by a 4,000-line master equipment 14:22:51 10 list detail down to the component about how 14:22:55 11 much each one weighs. 14:23:00 12 We do very extensive center of 14:23:02 13 gravity measurements, ballasting, so we 14:23:03 14 understand how much ballast is necessary to 14:23:03 15 meet our L-over-D requirements. So when that 14:23:10 16 is racked up today, even for the previous -- 14:23:11 17 the six-person crew design, we are under. In 14:23:16 18 other words, we are 200 pounds lighter than 14:23:20 19 our requirement. 14:23:23 20 This does not yet even take into 14:23:24 21 account the mass management -- my reserve, my 14:23:27 22 2,000-pound reserve, or taking any credit for 14:23:30 23 any of the mass growth allowance that we know 14:23:34 24 we'll probably use so we don't take credit 14:23:37 25 for that. So for ISS, we are under. 14:23:37 157 1 For the lunar, you see below that we 14:23:39 2 have -- we are 1800 pounds over at this point 14:23:43 3 in a 62,000-pound vehicle. Again, this does 14:23:47 4 not -- I have not taken any -- I have not 14:23:51 5 used the 2,000-pound reserve and I'm not 14:23:53 6 taking any credit for weight growth 14:23:57 7 allowance. I assume I'm going to use all of 14:23:59 8 that, so that I need to find a way to resolve 14:24:01 9 this 1800-pound upper. 14:24:04 10 There are ways to do that for the 14:24:04 11 lunar vehicle, several different things we 14:24:04 12 know that for -- for space shuttle and also 14:24:07 13 Apollo at the beginning, they were all 14:24:12 14 heavier. We learned a lot about the 14:24:15 15 structural efficiency and structural factors 14:24:17 16 of safety that we were able to back off on 14:24:22 17 once we actually saw the real loads when we 14:24:22 18 were flying and reduced several hundred 14:24:24 19 pounds in both of those programs. We expect 14:24:26 20 to see that in this case as well as we fly 14:24:29 21 the ISS mission. 14:24:32 22 We know we'll be able to take 14:24:33 23 advantage of avionics upgrades. We have an 14:24:35 24 open architecture. We know that avionics for 14:24:35 25 Altair and so forth are going to be delivered 14:24:35 158 1 that we can take advantage of their mass 14:24:35 2 reductions. 14:24:35 3 And we have a significant amount, you 14:24:43 4 know, of propellant flexibility here. We're 14:24:44 5 maxed for anytime return, any launch, any 14:24:48 6 location on the Moon. We're flying 14:24:52 7 18,000 pounds of props. So there's obviously 14:24:57 8 some flexibility there in the early missions 14:24:59 9 of using some of that prop offload to help 14:25:01 10 this issue. 14:25:03 11 Let's go ahead to the next page, the 14:25:09 12 human rating. Because I think this is a very 14:25:12 13 special thing about Orion and Ares I and this 14:25:16 14 whole Constellation architecture that makes 14:25:22 15 us a little bit different. Let's go to the 14:25:22 16 next page there. 14:25:24 17 So there is a requirement -- an NPR 14:25:25 18 that was released in May of 2009 that talked 14:25:28 19 about the human rating requirements and fall 14:25:31 20 tolerance, and it talks about that having at 14:25:34 21 least a minimum of one fall tolerant but 14:25:36 22 basically using your brain, right, let's 14:25:36 23 figure out the right level of fall tolerance 14:25:43 24 based on risk-based, integrated design and 14:25:45 25 safety analysis. Again, a very, very wise 14:25:49 159 1 approach. 14:25:51 2 NASA has generated a process for 14:25:52 3 identifying this and making sure that we 14:25:55 4 believe we meet the intent of this 14:25:57 5 requirement. It uses PRA, probabilistic risk 14:25:59 6 assessment, which I'll talk about more, and a 14:26:03 7 lot of the usual safety products -- failure 14:26:06 8 modes and effects analysis, reliability, 14:26:09 9 other engineering analysis hazards and so 14:26:10 10 forth. 14:26:12 11 We've used these products 14:26:13 12 iteratively. It's not like we just started 14:26:16 13 thinking about them. They've been part of 14:26:17 14 the process since the beginning and have 14:26:17 15 actually influenced our design quite a bit. 14:26:20 16 Let's go to the next page. 14:26:22 17 The other important thing, I think, 14:26:24 18 to mention is that Lockheed and the NASA 14:26:31 19 Orion team do not get to by themselves judge 14:26:34 20 whether we have met the intent of this 14:26:39 21 requirement. I mean, we are obviously a key 14:26:41 22 part of that. We need to be comfortable that 14:26:41 23 we think we've met the intent and that we 14:26:45 24 believe the crew is safe, but there is an 14:26:46 25 independent -- totally independent safety 14:26:49 160 1 panel at Constellation that makes the final 14:26:50 2 judgment on whether we have met the intent. 14:26:53 3 Part of that process is a Phase I 14:26:56 4 safety review, which there are 78 hazards 14:26:58 5 that we have actually identified and 14:27:01 6 developed mitigations for that are in the 14:27:04 7 process of being reviewed, 57 have been 14:27:07 8 reviewed today. 14:27:09 9 We also use the other safety products 14:27:10 10 to help us identify the risks and use them in 14:27:12 11 our design process. For example, there were 14:27:15 12 4500 preliminary FMEAs developed and reviewed 14:27:18 13 for PDR. 14:27:18 14 We used the CILs and the subsystem 14:27:22 15 design reviews. Again, the engineers need to 14:27:23 16 take ownership for these safety products. 14:27:26 17 And the chief engineers meet and go over the 14:27:26 18 vulnerabilities list to identify ways that we 14:27:30 19 can fix these vulnerabilities at a system 14:27:33 20 level before the design gets set. 14:27:37 21 And for that process we've -- over 14:27:39 22 60 design changes have been identified to 14:27:42 23 reduce the risks of the crew and increase 14:27:44 24 mission success. So it's a critical process 14:27:51 25 throughout. 14:27:51 161 1 The last thing I'd like to talk about 14:27:52 2 relative to this is probabilistic risk 14:27:53 3 assessment, which is -- we'll go ahead and 14:27:56 4 flip to the next page. It's a great tool. 14:27:58 5 It is -- you know, you need to be careful 14:28:01 6 about fixating too much on the actual number. 14:28:05 7 It's much more important, I think -- much 14:28:07 8 more valuable in the way of comparing 14:28:10 9 relative value of choices that you might 14:28:12 10 make. 14:28:15 11 It also needs to be -- this 14:28:17 12 probabilistic risk assessment needs to be a 14:28:19 13 validated model. In other words, you need to 14:28:23 14 agree on the techniques, how you're measuring 14:28:23 15 it, how you validate the data that goes into 14:28:25 16 it. That is, again, a process that is 14:28:29 17 validated and confirmed at Level 2. It is 14:28:31 18 not strictly an Orion process. We get 14:28:33 19 overviewed, we get audited and confirm that 14:28:39 20 we have the right technique. 14:28:39 21 But then you can use that tool to do 14:28:39 22 several things. Number one, it identifies 14:28:41 23 the top risk drivers while you're in the 14:28:42 24 design process. So the upper left chart is a 14:28:45 25 loss of crew calculation and allows us to see 14:28:49 162 1 that the key elements that are driving -- in 14:28:52 2 the ISS case, driving loss of crew are MMOD, 14:28:55 3 the parachute architecture, the CM/SM 14:28:58 4 separation mechanism and the jettison motor. 14:29:02 5 So then we can take those and make 14:29:06 6 sure we're attacking the right things when we 14:29:07 7 go through our design process, and we've done 14:29:09 8 that on those items. 14:29:11 9 It also allows us to enable 14:29:12 10 risk-based decisions. So on the upper right 14:29:13 11 is a loss of mission calculation, because PRA 14:29:16 12 is not just used for loss of crew but also 14:29:18 13 mission success and the loss of mission 14:29:22 14 calculation. 14:29:24 15 This is actually a chart used at our 14:29:25 16 engineering review board at the end of last 14:29:27 17 year where they looked at specific detailed 14:29:29 18 hardware changes and their effect on loss of 14:29:32 19 mission and also their impact on cost and 14:29:35 20 mass. 14:29:39 21 So we can make -- again, are we 14:29:39 22 balancing the risk correctly across the 14:29:40 23 vehicle. So a great tool. 14:29:44 24 And at the bottom it says that it 14:29:45 25 helps us reduce overall risk. That is our 14:29:47 163 1 loss of crew trend. It shows you a couple of 14:29:50 2 things, both as the design changes were made 14:29:52 3 and also as the model fidelity was wrung 14:29:55 4 out -- that's that little hump as we came 14:29:59 5 over that and into the last part of DAC-3. 14:30:02 6 So using this tool has helped us reduce 14:30:02 7 overall risk to the crew. 14:30:07 8 And so with that, I think I'll 14:30:08 9 summarize. Go to the next page. 14:30:12 10 So it's fascinating job, and I think 14:30:18 11 our team has done a great job and met the 14:30:22 12 challenge of this complicated system. We 14:30:25 13 have a lunar-capable system that will support 14:30:27 14 ISS. It took a lot of rigorous system 14:30:30 15 engineering to get a good design. I believe 14:30:34 16 we have that. This risk-based process has 14:30:36 17 given us a robust system and safe system, and 14:30:39 18 we're working hard to lower the life cycle 14:30:43 19 costs. And I've shown you some of those 14:30:46 20 things. 14:30:47 21 I think the other important thing is 14:30:47 22 we have a stable design. We are in the 14:30:47 23 process of PDR, but all of the products that 14:30:50 24 I'm seeing -- and I believe when we come out 14:30:54 25 of the board we will show that we have a 14:30:56 164 1 great design to move forward into production. 14:30:58 2 And we've actually started production 14:31:02 3 on some of the key systems that are the long 14:31:03 4 lead. 14:31:04 5 So with that, I'm done and open for 14:31:04 6 questions. 14:31:08 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: That was a very good 14:31:08 8 briefing. 14:31:10 9 Les... 14:31:10 10 GENERAL LYLES: Mark, thank you very 14:31:18 11 much. That was a very good briefing. I'm 14:31:18 12 wondering, looking at schedule risk -- 14:31:18 13 contrary to most programs that I'm familiar 14:31:18 14 with and, I think, had experience with where 14:31:20 15 program directors/program managers want to 14:31:23 16 try to build in as much margin as possible, 14:31:24 17 you started, as you said, by fixing the 14:31:26 18 launch date and then moving the key events 14:31:29 19 back to the left, which actually takes margin 14:31:34 20 away in a normal way of looking at things, 14:31:34 21 and then you're trying to buy back margin by 14:31:36 22 doing some creative sort of activities and 14:31:38 23 experiences. 14:31:38 24 Could you just sort of comment on 14:31:42 25 those two -- 14:31:42 165 1 MR. GEYER: Yeah. 14:31:18 2 GENERAL LYLES: -- dichotomies of 14:31:18 3 thought. 14:31:44 4 MR. GEYER: I'm glad you mentioned it 14:31:48 5 that way because I didn't communicate it very 14:31:48 6 well. 14:31:48 7 I did it as a communication tool to 14:31:49 8 show you how things end up with the launch 14:31:52 9 date. But if you saw that, we actually 14:31:54 10 pushed dates earlier to give me margin at the 14:31:57 11 end. So I pushed delivery earlier, I pushed 14:32:00 12 AI&P earlier to give me margin on the end, 14:32:02 13 which then made it harder up front which is 14:32:05 14 the way I want it to be -- right -- because 14:32:06 15 I've got runway in front of me. So I just 14:32:09 16 didn't communicate it very well. 14:32:09 17 I did -- I backed it up so you could 14:32:10 18 see how it linked to the launch date. That's 14:32:13 19 all. 14:32:16 20 GENERAL LYLES: Okay. Good. Thank 14:32:16 21 you. 14:32:16 22 MR. GEYER: Sorry. 14:31:18 23 GENERAL LYLES: I feel much better. 14:31:18 24 Let me ask you about PDR though. 14:32:17 25 Again, in my experience, very few new 14:32:20 166 1 programs ever get through a PDR completely 14:32:22 2 clean. 14:32:22 3 Could you just comment a little bit 14:32:22 4 on what kind of challenges or issues you came 14:32:25 5 across in PDR and how you've handled those? 14:32:28 6 MR. GEYER: Yeah. Very good. First 14:32:31 7 of all, I would say we got into -- well, I 14:32:34 8 want to talk a little bit about last year 14:32:36 9 because we had a plan to do the PDR last 14:32:38 10 October and we looked at the state of the 14:32:40 11 design and where we were and it was the 14:32:42 12 judgment, I think, of the whole team and with 14:32:45 13 our management that we weren't ready, that we 14:32:47 14 needed time to mature the design. 14:32:49 15 So although there were systems that 14:32:52 16 were ready, the full integrated system 14:32:55 17 wasn't. So we've taken advantage of that, 14:32:55 18 and that's why we're getting -- I think the 14:32:57 19 products we're seeing today are much -- are 14:32:58 20 ready to go. But I'll talk about the few 14:33:00 21 things I think we're going to see open. 14:33:03 22 We know on the -- relative to design, 14:33:06 23 the parachute architecture and how we deploy 14:33:08 24 the forward bay cover, we have an 14:33:08 25 architecture today. It's a little heavy. 14:33:08 167 1 Actually I think there's probably a more 14:33:16 2 simple way to go get that forward bay cover 14:33:19 3 off. So we're -- we've actually got a 14:33:19 4 separate independent team looking at that and 14:33:21 5 talking about how to improve that design. So 14:33:22 6 I'd say there's an architecture thing that 14:33:26 7 we're poking on. 14:33:28 8 I think -- I talked about the qual 14:33:31 9 tests. We all want to give ourselves more 14:33:32 10 margin in that qual testing bar and those 14:33:38 11 things, but we also want to make sure we've 14:33:39 12 qualified it enough to make sure it's safe to 14:33:39 13 put the crew. 14:33:42 14 So we need special emphasis to make 14:33:43 15 sure that we can close that and look at ways, 14:33:47 16 as I said, to pull things off of that serial 14:33:49 17 testing and get them off on the side 14:33:52 18 parallel. So like the ECLS testbed, moving 14:33:53 19 fairing sep off to the STA, we need to flush 14:33:57 20 those out and make -- and fit those into our 14:33:57 21 budget plan. So those are the two big things 14:34:01 22 that I think we're working on. 14:34:04 23 GENERAL LYLES: Thank you. 14:34:04 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Ed... 14:34:13 25 DR. CRAWLEY: Mark, thanks for this 14:34:11 168 1 thorough overview. I apologize for not being 14:34:13 2 here for the first part of it, but I flipped 14:34:16 3 back and didn't find the answer to this 14:34:17 4 question, which actually has two parts that 14:34:17 5 have the same ending. 14:34:19 6 Let me explain, the motivation for 14:34:21 7 the question is that some have proposed -- as 14:34:24 8 a matter of fact, Steve Lindsey proposed 14:34:28 9 before lunch that it might be appropriate to 14:34:30 10 allow the commercial sector to take care of 14:34:34 11 manned flight -- human flight to LEO and ISS 14:34:37 12 and reserve the NASA capability for what we 14:34:44 13 might call the hard problems, going to the 14:34:45 14 Moon and beyond. 14:34:48 15 So you, as the program manager -- I'd 14:34:49 16 like to get some sense, first, in sort of a 14:34:53 17 rubber-vehicle sense -- in a sort of 14:34:56 18 hypothetical sense, if you relaxed the 14:34:58 19 requirement from going to the ISS off of the 14:35:01 20 Orion, to what extent, if any, it would 14:35:05 21 simplify the design. That's question number 14:35:10 22 one, okay. 14:35:12 23 Question number two is, in the real 14:35:12 24 sense of where you are today in the program 14:35:16 25 with all of the contracts in place and test 14:35:18 169 1 programs established and so forth, if you 14:35:21 2 relaxed the requirement to go off -- to go to 14:35:24 3 the ISS from the Orion, how much it would 14:35:27 4 simplify the program. 14:35:30 5 Do you understand the two questions 14:35:32 6 I'm trying to get at? 14:35:34 7 MR. GEYER: Maybe you could help with 14:35:35 8 the second one. I think I got the first one. 14:35:37 9 If I took the ISS requirements off of Orion, 14:35:40 10 how much would that help me, was that -- 14:35:40 11 DR. CRAWLEY: In principle. 14:35:45 12 MR. GEYER: Okay. 14:35:46 13 DR. CRAWLEY: And then the second one 14:35:45 14 is, based on where you are today with a real 14:35:47 15 set of hardware and a real set of design and 14:35:49 16 PDR already, you know, largely passing and so 14:35:51 17 forth, how much it would actually help you. 14:35:54 18 MR. GEYER: Oh, great. Okay. Good. 14:35:56 19 I understand now. 14:35:57 20 DR. CRAWLEY: So it's two quite 14:36:01 21 different questions that end the same way but 14:36:02 22 start out slightly different. 14:36:04 23 MR. GEYER: I think -- yeah. Great 14:36:04 24 question. The fascinating thing about the 14:36:04 25 architecture is that actually a lot of the 14:36:06 170 1 driving cases are similar. For the lunar 14:36:08 2 outpost case, we are a six-month stay around 14:36:11 3 the orbit of the Moon. The ISS case is a 14:36:14 4 six-month stay as well. So they're similar 14:36:18 5 in that case. 14:36:20 6 So a lot of systems, I would say, are 14:36:24 7 actually sized by the lunar case, not by the 14:36:26 8 ISS case. So, for example, for the service 14:36:30 9 module in the lunar case, we fly four tanks. 14:36:33 10 The ISS case is just two tanks, but, of 14:36:36 11 course, if we take advantage of that, we can 14:36:39 12 fly payloads in the back end. 14:36:42 13 So taking the ISS requirements off is 14:36:45 14 a not a huge driver -- not a big driver for 14:36:47 15 us, and I think you hit on it -- especially 14:36:49 16 not now. I have a design that can do both, 14:36:51 17 and we're in the midst of testing it and 14:36:54 18 qualifying and getting ready to fly it. So 14:36:56 19 it would not help me much at all today. 14:36:58 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Thank you. 14:37:03 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Leroy... 14:37:05 22 DR. CHIAO: Hi, Mark. It's good to 14:37:11 23 see you again. 14:37:11 24 MR. GEYER: Hi, Leroy. How are you. 14:37:11 25 DR. CHIAO: Thanks for your brief. 14:37:11 171 1 As you were saying at the end of your 14:37:11 2 presentation, mass and volume of the Orion 14:37:14 3 drives a lot of the rest of the architecture, 14:37:16 4 and, of course, what drives the size and mass 14:37:19 5 of Orion -- one of the big drivers is the 14:37:20 6 crew size. 14:37:21 7 And we've been asking the question -- 14:37:22 8 excuse me. We've been asking the question 14:37:24 9 where did this requirement for six crew come 14:37:26 10 from and could it be relaxed down to four. 14:37:29 11 And, you know, in fact, of course, it kind of 14:37:32 12 already has been because for ISS the 14:37:34 13 requirement is four, for lunar the 14:37:36 14 requirement is four. 14:37:38 15 And as Steve said this morning and 14:37:39 16 other people have said, we're designing 14:37:40 17 presumably the vehicle for the 30-plus years, 14:37:43 18 and lot of your challenges may get a lot 14:37:45 19 easier if we take a pause and say, well, do 14:37:48 20 we need to -- should we relax the requirement 14:37:51 21 down to a crew of four and reduce the size 14:37:53 22 and the mass. 14:37:57 23 And, you know, that, of course, would 14:37:57 24 have costs to the schedule impacts, but in 14:37:58 25 light of a 30-plus year vehicle, is that 14:38:00 172 1 question a fair question to ask? 14:38:02 2 MR. GEYER: Yeah, it's a great 14:38:05 3 question. So actually the program, in 14:38:07 4 concert with headquarters, has agreed that 14:38:09 5 that -- you know, we have a system -- I 14:38:12 6 actually have PDR design that will 14:38:13 7 accommodate six people. But they've agreed 14:38:15 8 that since the ISS mission is really four and 14:38:18 9 the lunar mission is four that we focus on 14:38:22 10 flying that mission. 14:38:25 11 So that gives me some flexibility on 14:38:26 12 the life support system, for example -- some 14:38:28 13 choices I can make there -- on mass. Rather 14:38:31 14 than continue to pound flat and file 14:38:35 15 everything right, I can use that mass -- some 14:38:36 16 of that mass to help me get -- to getting 14:38:37 17 moving. Others I can use for ISS payload. 14:38:39 18 So basically headquarters and the 14:38:43 19 program have given me that flexibility today 14:38:45 20 to assume four for ISS. 14:38:46 21 DR. CHIAO: Okay. But really what 14:38:50 22 I'm asking, I guess, if we change the mold 14:38:50 23 line to the smaller base and make the overall 14:38:53 24 mass -- the capsule even smaller, I mean, is 14:38:56 25 that a fair question to ask? 14:38:58 173 1 MR. GEYER: Yeah. I can tell -- and 14:38:58 2 I'll answer it -- because it was a great 14:39:00 3 question about what that means today as 14:39:02 4 opposed to what it might have meant four 14:39:04 5 years ago. 14:39:07 6 If you look -- Leroy, I think the way 14:39:07 7 I'd look at that is, if you remember the 14:39:10 8 chart I had that showed the pressurized 14:39:14 9 vessel and all of the analysis that goes into 14:39:14 10 determining what the driving load cases are 14:39:16 11 and how you have to turn that into a design, 14:39:17 12 do a finite element model, do a load cases -- 14:39:22 13 plus the fact that I would have to redo the 14:39:24 14 packaging. 14:39:28 15 The packaging is very important for 14:39:29 16 CG and so forth, and just because it's 14:39:31 17 smaller -- the system size and mass and 14:39:33 18 volume is not going to change significantly 14:39:36 19 now that I'm at four people, because, again, 14:39:39 20 a lot of that was driven by the lunar case. 14:39:40 21 So I'm going to have packaging issues with a 14:39:44 22 smaller vehicle. 14:39:44 23 But to redo that, to redo the design, 14:39:45 24 to redo a finite element model, to redo the 14:39:47 25 load cases, I could do it, but it would be a 14:39:54 174 1 significant schedule setback. And like you 14:39:56 2 saw, I'm already building the GTA to the 14:39:59 3 design I have today. 14:40:00 4 DR. CHIAO: Okay. 14:40:00 5 MR. GEYER: So it depends on when the 14:40:02 6 question was asked. Four years ago would 14:40:05 7 have been different. 14:40:07 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally... 14:40:16 9 DR. RIDE: Okay. I have, I guess, a 14:40:16 10 quick follow-up to Leroy's question, because 14:40:16 11 we've been hearing a lot from a variety of 14:40:16 12 different people about the importance of 14:40:18 13 calculating life cycle costs and that it's 14:40:25 14 always the tendency to try to minimize the 14:40:29 15 development costs but then you end up paying 14:40:32 16 for it in the end with the ops cost. 14:40:35 17 And I wonder whether you could 14:40:39 18 address -- or whether you have thought about 14:40:39 19 or anyone in the program has thought about -- 14:40:41 20 you know, if you're wise, you've probably 14:40:44 21 resisted even thinking about this. But, you 14:40:47 22 know, if the capsule were smaller, would 14:40:50 23 there be a reduction, significant or 14:40:53 24 insignificant, on the ops costs? 14:40:56 25 And, again, we're looking at the case 14:40:59 175 1 where this could be the vehicle for the next 14:41:01 2 30 years, so ops costs become, by far, the 14:41:05 3 overall driving factor in the life cycle 14:41:08 4 costs. 14:41:08 5 MR. MEYER: Yeah. Good -- let me 14:41:08 6 think about that for a minute. I'm trying to 14:41:08 7 think of -- so we've done extensive studies 14:41:15 8 on what drives life cycle costs in Orion, and 14:41:17 9 a lot of -- as you can imagine, a lot of it 14:41:21 10 is, okay, the people that it takes to build 14:41:23 11 the structure and to bill the components. 14:41:27 12 We've done extensive study on what makes 14:41:30 13 sense to reuse in Orion, none of which, I 14:41:33 14 think, would be driven by the size of the 14:41:36 15 vehicle. 14:41:38 16 Based on our assessments and based on 14:41:38 17 our -- the looks we've done, our intent -- we 14:41:41 18 found that the cost trade didn't make sense 14:41:44 19 to reuse the primary structure but to reuse 14:41:46 20 key expensive avionics and ECLS boxes. So, 14:41:55 21 again, I don't think that has any -- is not 14:41:55 22 driven at all by the size of the vehicle. 14:41:56 23 Regardless, you would do those same kind of 14:41:57 24 things. 14:42:01 25 So -- yeah. So I guess I don't 14:42:01 176 1 see -- and, again, the pounds we're talking 14:42:06 2 about and decrease in size would not be 14:42:07 3 significant. So I don't see that as really 14:42:10 4 being a cost driver, Sally. 14:42:12 5 DR. RIDE: Okay. 14:42:16 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Les and then Jeff. 14:42:16 7 GENERAL LYLES: Yeah, Mark. The 14:42:23 8 management approach for this program has been 14:42:23 9 a little bit different for NASA than in more 14:42:23 10 recent programs. NASA as the integrator, if 14:42:24 11 you will, has the design and drawing release 14:42:26 12 authority. So their role is a little bit 14:42:29 13 contrary to perhaps recent major programs. 14:42:32 14 And as our committee went around, we 14:42:35 15 heard some comments and concerns expressed by 14:42:37 16 contractors -- probably not surprising, if 14:42:40 17 you will -- probably more along the lines of 14:42:42 18 the maturity of the process and some awkward 14:42:45 19 roles and responsibilities issue. 14:42:49 20 I wonder if you could comment if you 14:42:51 21 think -- if you think, one, you had the right 14:42:52 22 role and responsibility, would you change 14:42:53 23 anything or are there some lessons learned 14:42:56 24 or -- that you would do a little differently 14:42:57 25 in that -- 14:42:57 177 1 MR. GEYER: Well, let me make sure 14:43:01 2 I'm answering the right question, General. 14:43:01 3 Are you talk -- I'm not sure you're talking 14:43:02 4 about Orion. You might be talking about 14:43:04 5 Ares. Can you ask it again? Was it about -- 14:43:06 6 GENERAL LYLES: We heard it sort of 14:42:23 7 in general, and I've been -- perhaps I'm 14:42:23 8 wrong. Perhaps it's not Orion. Perhaps it's 14:43:09 9 just Ares. 14:43:10 10 But we've heard it in general when 14:43:11 11 talking about the role that NASA plays in 14:43:12 12 management of the overall Constellation 14:43:15 13 activities vis-a-vis previous programs. 14:43:17 14 MR. GEYER: Okay. Yeah. So at a 14:43:21 15 program level, right, NASA has been doing 14:43:22 16 the, I would say, detailed integrated 14:43:26 17 analysis, which in some of the other programs 14:43:29 18 was actually farmed out to the -- or actually 14:43:32 19 allocated to contractor. Yes. You're right. 14:43:37 20 In Orion itself it is more of a 14:43:39 21 traditional prime with NASA oversight. So 14:43:42 22 just -- so, no. So you're talking about the 14:43:48 23 program itself. That's probably better 14:43:49 24 answered by Jeff, but I can give you my 14:43:51 25 opinion. 14:43:53 178 1 I think the stuff that we're talking 14:43:53 2 about, the integrated stack analysis and 14:43:55 3 those kind of things, are things that NASA 14:43:58 4 has a lot of experience based on what we've 14:43:59 5 been doing for the shuttle for a long period 14:44:02 6 of time. So I don't think there's any risk 14:44:04 7 in that. 14:44:07 8 Also since the way we've contracted 14:44:07 9 these things with, of course, Ares, in order 14:44:10 10 to get the costs and doing the right kind of 14:44:12 11 competition, they're not the same contractor 14:44:14 12 as Orion. So you'd have to pay someone else 14:44:16 13 to be a integrated contractor. Now, we've 14:44:19 14 seen that issue on space station before. 14:44:21 15 When they're not owning the pieces, it 14:44:21 16 doesn't work so as well. 14:44:23 17 So I think it was a reason -- I know 14:44:25 18 it was a good strategy, and I think we've 14:44:27 19 seen that so far. 14:44:28 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: All right. Jeff... 14:44:30 21 MR. GREASON: What is -- what is, 14:44:35 22 after IOC and all of the initial phasing and 14:44:36 23 tests are done, the ongoing annual and 14:44:39 24 incremental cost of adding Orion missions? 14:44:41 25 MR. GEYER: Oh, per flight? 14:44:46 179 1 MR. GREASON: Yeah. 14:44:46 2 MR. GEYER: Yeah. I don't have it 14:44:52 3 off the top of my head. I'll have to get it 14:44:53 4 to you. 14:44:54 5 You mean -- our current budget shows 14:44:54 6 two Orion flights a year, basically the six 14:44:57 7 months per flight. So are you looking for 14:44:59 8 just Orion or the full -- 14:45:01 9 MR. GREASON: Just Orion. 14:45:03 10 MR. GEYER: -- Orion, Ares -- 14:45:05 11 MR. GREASON: No. Independent of the 14:45:05 12 issue of the launcher. 14:45:06 13 MR. GEYER: Yeah. I have a number in 14:45:08 14 my head, but I'd rather get it officially and 14:45:09 15 get it to you and make sure I've got the 14:45:09 16 right number. 14:45:09 17 MR. GREASON: Quickly, please. I 14:45:09 18 mean, like -- 14:45:09 19 MR. GEYER: No. I'll do it before 14:45:13 20 I -- 14:45:13 21 MR. GREASON: -- later today. 14:45:13 22 MR. GEYER: -- leave the building. 14:45:15 23 MR. GREASON: Thank you. 14:45:15 24 MR. GEYER: Yeah. Yeah. Sorry. I 14:45:15 25 just don't want to give you the wrong number. 14:45:16 180 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Bo... 14:45:16 2 MR. BEJMUK: Yeah. Hey, Mark, first 14:45:22 3 of all, thank you for a very nice briefing. 14:45:22 4 And my question -- please don't 14:45:23 5 interpret my question as some kind of a 14:45:25 6 leaning towards some kind of a launch 14:45:27 7 architecture. It's too early for to us lean 14:45:30 8 anywhere. 14:45:34 9 MR. GEYER: Okay. 14:45:34 10 MR. BEJMUK: But the question has to 14:45:34 11 do with we've been hearing and some people 14:45:34 12 have talked to us about this potential dual 14:45:40 13 launch architecture. 14:45:40 14 What would that mean to Orion in 14:45:42 15 terms of increasing its size so it can do its 14:45:45 16 own lunar orbit injection and, more 14:45:48 17 importantly, how practical that is? Can you 14:45:51 18 envision -- or have you guys looked at what 14:45:54 19 it would take? 14:45:57 20 You know, it's very easy to draw a 14:45:57 21 picture of bigger tanks. You know, I've 14:45:59 22 drawn some of them myself. 14:46:01 23 But is a practical change to Orion to 14:46:02 24 give it Delta V capability so it can do its 14:46:06 25 own orbit injection in a dual launch 14:46:09 181 1 scenario? 14:46:12 2 MR. GEYER: You know, Bo, I guess I'm 14:46:13 3 at a disadvantage. I'm not sure entirely 14:46:15 4 what that architecture looks like and what 14:46:17 5 the assumptions would be for Orion. 14:46:18 6 I know we are optimized for the 14:46:19 7 current -- for the current plan where EDS 14:46:22 8 sends us there in the lander, gets us into 14:46:25 9 lunar orbit and SM sends us back. So I'd to 14:46:27 10 have -- you'd have to look at specifically 14:46:29 11 what the changes would be. 14:46:31 12 We do know that the SM, though, is a 14:46:33 13 key part of the abort strategy. It is a key 14:46:36 14 part of how we get the crew off after the LAS 14:46:38 15 is jettisoned. So any fundamental change to 14:46:41 16 the SM, that has to be integrated into the 14:46:45 17 considerations. 14:46:48 18 MR. BEJMUK: Let me ask you -- hey, 14:46:57 19 Jeff, if we wanted to get some feeling of 14:46:57 20 what it would mean to Orion, do we ask you, 14:46:58 21 or do we ask Mark? 14:46:59 22 MR. HANLEY: You can ask him, and 14:47:06 23 he'll ask me, when we figure out which one -- 14:47:06 24 yes. From an integrated architecture 14:47:06 25 perspective, of course, the program is -- 14:47:09 182 1 would be answerable for the systems 14:47:10 2 engineering and the allocation of the 14:47:13 3 functionality to Mark and to the launch 14:47:15 4 vehicle. And so we, at the program level, 14:47:19 5 have looked at these potential dual 14:47:22 6 heavy-lift launch architectures. 14:47:24 7 And I think what you're suggesting, 14:47:27 8 Bo, is that -- yes -- the Orion -- the Orion 14:47:29 9 service module would have to grow 14:47:32 10 considerably with today's present design. It 14:47:35 11 would grow from about 20 metric tons at the 14:47:38 12 translunar injection point to about double 14:47:41 13 that in terms of its mass. 14:47:45 14 Now, within the capability of a 14:47:46 15 heavy-lift launch vehicle, if we -- if we 14:47:50 16 build one that's suitable -- but now we're -- 14:47:53 17 we've got to address the ways in which we're 14:47:56 18 complicating the Orion and that massive of a 14:47:59 19 vehicle. 14:48:05 20 MR. BEJMUK: My question really had 14:48:08 21 to do with the practicality of that change to 14:48:09 22 Orion. 14:48:11 23 MR. HANLEY: And that is the part 14:48:13 24 that Mark is at a disadvantage about, because 14:48:14 25 we haven't really asked Orion, hey, if we 14:48:16 183 1 really had to do this, what would it really 14:48:16 2 take, and that's the part where -- this has 14:48:18 3 all entered the conversation here just in the 14:48:21 4 last few weeks and -- 14:48:23 5 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 14:48:23 6 MR. HANLEY: -- and the Orion team 14:48:25 7 has been heads down driving to PDR. 14:48:26 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: That's probably a 14:48:32 9 good place to break. We thank you very 14:48:32 10 much -- both of you. We will have a chance 14:48:34 11 to hear more about Constellation during the 14:48:34 12 next couple of days and beyond, in fact. 14:48:35 13 I think it's time to shift gears a 14:48:38 14 little bit. As I mentioned at the outset of 14:48:41 15 the morning, our group has divided itself 14:48:44 16 into four subgroups that have tackled 14:48:47 17 specific issues, but I won't reiterate them 14:48:50 18 now other than to say that the first of those 14:48:52 19 is one that's very fundamental because it 14:48:54 20 does impact the options that one would 14:48:56 21 consider in the other three areas. And that 14:49:00 22 first group has to do with the shuttle usage 14:49:06 23 and the space station usage and related 14:49:12 24 issues. 14:49:16 25 We had asked Sally Ride to chair that 14:49:17 184 1 subcommittee, which she has done, and during 14:49:22 2 the next few days, we'll be hearing a report 14:49:24 3 from each committee. Sally's committee will 14:49:28 4 be reporting now. As I said, a few of us 14:49:32 5 have heard parts of this. The ones on the 14:49:32 6 committee have heard it all and -- but this 14:49:33 7 will be our first time to really be exposed 14:49:35 8 thoroughly too. 14:49:39 9 So, Sally, the floor is yours. 14:49:40 10 DR. RIDE: Thank you, I think, and 14:49:44 11 you've got our presentation. I will say, 14:49:47 12 though, that it's a relief to be on this side 14:49:49 13 not looking into the lights. You should all 14:49:51 14 be very envious of me up here. 14:49:54 15 We are the ISS/STS subcommittee. 14:49:57 16 It's myself, Leroy, Charlie and Les, and 14:49:59 17 you'll be hearing from all of us today. 14:50:01 18 The master questions that we were 14:50:06 19 asked to address are how long is the gap and 14:50:08 20 can be it shortened, what is a prudent 14:50:11 21 shuttle fly-out plan and are there any 14:50:15 22 extension scenarios that could bring 14:50:19 23 significant benefit that are worth looking at 14:50:22 24 and, finally, should ISS be extended and, if 14:50:25 25 so, at what capability should it be extended. 14:50:29 185 1 So our group is the one that's 14:50:31 2 dealing most directly with the current 14:50:34 3 elements of the infrastructure -- the shuttle 14:50:36 4 and the ISS -- and the relatively near-term 14:50:39 5 issues that come with those including -- not 14:50:42 6 the least of which is the budget constraints 14:50:44 7 that we're going to be working under. 14:50:48 8 And as you know, the full committee 14:50:50 9 mandate is to come up with at least two 14:50:52 10 options that fit under the budget profile we 14:50:56 11 were given, and one of the things you'll be 14:50:58 12 seeing today is that that is not an easy 14:51:00 13 task. 14:51:04 14 I think we have come to believe very 14:51:05 15 firmly -- and, Norm, we took this principle 14:51:09 16 from you -- that it's important to have a 14:51:13 17 realistic view of what the existing program, 14:51:16 18 as it will realistically unfold, most likely 14:51:21 19 will cost and not put any smoke and mirrors 14:51:25 20 to the budget to make it look like it fits 14:51:29 21 under the budget profile. 14:51:32 22 So we've been doing a fair amount of 14:51:33 23 work trying to get at what we think is a 14:51:36 24 realistic unfolding of the current near-term 14:51:40 25 parts of the program and costing those. So 14:51:43 186 1 in some sense, we have what is either an 14:51:47 2 advantage or a disadvantage over the other 14:51:51 3 subteams which that we're -- is that we're 14:51:53 4 definitely more constrained by reality, which 14:51:55 5 you could take as either a good thing or a 14:51:58 6 bad thing. 14:52:00 7 We're actually just hoping that we 14:52:02 8 escape from this day without being nicknamed 14:52:03 9 the doom and gloom subcommittee. We actually 14:52:03 10 have been considering whether we should have 14:52:03 11 a subgroup logo, and if so, it should 14:52:03 12 definitely be the Gordian knot. So with 14:52:11 13 that, can we go on to the next slide. 14:52:15 14 I'll just give you the quick schedule 14:52:18 15 of what we're thinking about today. I'll 14:52:20 16 give the background, particularly on the 14:52:24 17 current program, just very, very quickly and 14:52:27 18 some context, particularly the budgetary 14:52:29 19 context, and describe the three shuttle 14:52:33 20 scenarios that we have come up with. 14:52:38 21 Then Les will give us the benefit of 14:52:40 22 some of the things that he's been hearing, 14:52:40 23 both in our subcommittee and his 14:52:42 24 international subcommittee, on the 14:52:46 25 international considerations, which leads 14:52:49 187 1 very naturally into a discussion of the space 14:52:51 2 station scenarios, which Leroy will lead. 14:52:54 3 And then Charlie will be our 14:52:58 4 summarizer and facilitator in what we hope 14:53:03 5 will be a discussion among the whole 14:53:06 6 committee. Because we would really like to 14:53:08 7 come out of -- if not today, this week, after 14:53:09 8 we've heard from all of the different 14:53:12 9 subcommittees -- on some consensus on what 14:53:13 10 work you would like us to be doing in the 14:53:17 11 next couple of weeks but, maybe more 14:53:20 12 importantly, which of our pieces you think 14:53:23 13 mesh with scenarios that the other groups are 14:53:25 14 doing so that we can start doing a good 14:53:28 15 integrated budgetary look at some combined 14:53:32 16 scenarios. What you're going to be seeing 14:53:36 17 today just came out of our group. Next one. 14:53:40 18 Very, very quickly, the current 14:53:42 19 program, the shuttle, there are seven flights 14:53:43 20 remaining. The last flight is scheduled for 14:53:45 21 September 2010. That's the very end of the 14:53:48 22 fiscal year 2010. The retirement is intended 14:53:51 23 to free some amount of money for 14:53:57 24 Constellation, and we'll talk about that more 14:53:59 25 in a second. 14:54:00 188 1 ISS is to be completed next year. 14:54:02 2 The current budget plan is to de-orbit ISS in 14:54:05 3 early 2016. And that de-orbiting of ISS 14:54:10 4 frees, again, some money for the 14:54:17 5 Constellation program. 14:54:17 6 Constellation, as we just heard, 14:54:17 7 should be IOC in March of 2015 with the Orion 14:54:19 8 initially going to ISS. Next one. 14:54:25 9 Okay. This is the program, and we 14:54:28 10 wanted to give you just very quickly a layout 14:54:30 11 of the baseline budget that our full 14:54:32 12 committee has been working with from now 14:54:35 13 through 2020 or 2010 until -- through FY 2020 14:54:38 14 and show you what the different elements take 14:54:43 15 up of that. 14:54:45 16 This is the space station -- sorry -- 14:54:46 17 the space shuttle's contribution to that 14:54:49 18 budget. And you see shuttle retirement in 14:54:53 19 the very end of FY '10 with some transition 14:54:56 20 costs going into '11 -- retirement and 14:55:02 21 transition costs. Next. 14:55:04 22 Here's Constellation coming in. 14:55:07 23 Constellation takes over some of the money 14:55:08 24 that is freed up by shuttle retirement. Next 14:55:10 25 one. 14:55:13 189 1 That shows you the gap that we've 14:55:14 2 been talking about that, in this plan, goes 14:55:15 3 from end of FY '10 to mid FY '15. Next one. 14:55:18 4 Here is ISS. ISS under this budget 14:55:26 5 goes through FY '15 and is de-orbited very 14:55:28 6 early in 2016. Then you see the arrow to ISS 14:55:32 7 retirement. Now, could we go on to the next 14:55:39 8 slide, because we wanted to use this to 14:55:42 9 illustrate -- sorry. 14:55:44 10 This one is important because that 14:55:46 11 black line shows what our entire committee 14:55:48 12 has been given as the available budget for 14:55:51 13 this exercise, and two of our options are 14:55:53 14 supposed to come in within that black line. 14:55:57 15 All right. Next one. 14:56:01 16 One of the issues that we've gotten 14:56:03 17 into some and I think it's important, as we 14:56:10 18 do budgeting of our full scenarios, to get a 14:56:13 19 very clear handle on -- and we're working 14:56:17 20 closely with actually -- I'm working with Bo 14:56:19 21 and have worked with Ed to try to get an 14:56:21 22 understanding of this across the group. So 14:56:24 23 we've still got a ways to go, but this is 14:56:27 24 illustrative. 14:56:29 25 We've asked that the -- we've asked 14:56:30 190 1 NASA's PA&E group, the independent group, to 14:56:33 2 give us a cost of the shuttle program fiscal 14:56:37 3 '10 broken down into the carrying costs -- 14:56:42 4 that is, the costs that the shuttle is 14:56:45 5 currently now bookkeeping -- that will be 14:56:47 6 transferred to some other program, presumably 14:56:50 7 Constellation but not necessarily all of 14:56:54 8 Constellation, but someplace else in NASA the 14:56:56 9 day the shuttle retires -- or the moment the 14:57:00 10 shuttle retires. 14:57:03 11 The middle bar is the additional 14:57:04 12 shuttle costs associated with the solid 14:57:08 13 rockets and ATK. And the far right bar is 14:57:10 14 the -- in some sense, the real cost savings, 14:57:14 15 if you want to look at it that way -- of 14:57:18 16 retiring the space shuttle -- the real cost 14:57:21 17 savings to NASA, as a whole, that can be used 14:57:22 18 for actually programmatic development. 14:57:23 19 Now, there's work to be done in 14:57:27 20 getting the specific elements within those 14:57:29 21 bars. But I just wanted to make the point 14:57:32 22 that it's very easy to fool yourself and 14:57:34 23 think that by retiring the shuttle or, in 14:57:37 24 fact, retiring the station you're gaining all 14:57:40 25 of this money that can be used in any way 14:57:43 191 1 that you might so choose, and that's not 14:57:47 2 entirely correct. And it's important that we 14:57:50 3 have an appreciation for that as we go on. 14:57:52 4 Next slide. 14:57:57 5 All right. Now, again, we wanted to 14:58:19 6 try to get a sense of how we thought the 14:58:19 7 current program would most likely unfold to 14:58:17 8 try to get a sense at, if we were to lay out 14:58:20 9 a baseline budget along with a more realistic 14:58:22 10 program, what would that baseline look 14:58:26 11 like -- a more realistic unfolding of this 14:58:29 12 program. 14:58:31 13 So the first thing that we looked at 14:58:32 14 on that, we looked at both the shuttle, the 14:58:34 15 Constellation and the space station in the 14:58:40 16 2010 to 2020 time frame and just said, okay, 14:58:43 17 what do we think is perhaps more realistic. 14:58:46 18 Well, we think the shuttle fly-out is 14:58:49 19 likely to extend into FY '11. The shuttle 14:58:53 20 program would not disagree with that. 14:58:57 21 There's little margin remaining in the 14:59:00 22 current manifest. The Administration, in 14:59:03 23 fact, has directed NASA to fly out at a safe 14:59:06 24 rate and not worry about making it by 14:59:10 25 September 30th, FY '10. So we appreciate the 14:59:14 192 1 importance of a prudent manifest. 14:59:18 2 But, of course, there's currently no 14:59:21 3 funding reflected in the FY '11 bundle for 14:59:23 4 that possible fly-out into 2011, and so 14:59:27 5 that's setting you up right away for a budget 14:59:33 6 problem in '11. To estimate what a 14:59:38 7 reasonable fly-out scenario might be, just 14:59:41 8 for budgetary purposes, for planning, we 14:59:43 9 compared the real post-Columbia flight rate 14:59:47 10 to the currently projected flight rate. And 14:59:50 11 there are some anomalies in the post-Columbia 14:59:53 12 flight rate, so we don't say that this is the 14:59:57 13 number that should be taken. 14:59:59 14 But post-Columbia the average number 15:00:01 15 of days between flights was 115 days. The 15:00:04 16 currently projected manifest number of days 15:00:08 17 between flights on average is about 62 days. 15:00:10 18 And those are numbers are, you know, plus or 15:00:11 19 minus a day. They were done actually before 15:00:13 20 the most current -- the most current launch, 15:00:16 21 the flight that's up there now. 15:00:18 22 We said 115 days is a little bit 15:00:21 23 long, the more recent experience is actually 15:00:23 24 closer to 90 days, let's assume an average of 15:00:25 25 90 days, what does that do for your fly-out 15:00:28 193 1 of the existing manifest. And it implies a 15:00:31 2 fly-out to March of 2011. 15:00:34 3 So that is what we've taken for 15:00:36 4 prudent budget planning, and we think that 15:00:39 5 would be a wise number to just put into a 15:00:42 6 plan budget. Next slide. 15:00:45 7 All right. Now, what about 15:00:46 8 Constellation? 15:00:49 9 Bo's LEO Access team and my sub-team 15:00:54 10 asked Aerospace to perform an independent 15:01:00 11 assessment of the Constellation program. We 15:01:03 12 didn't think it was fair to ask NASA to try 15:01:04 13 to conduct an independent assessment of 15:01:07 14 itself in its own program. 15:01:10 15 We asked Aerospace to take a look at 15:01:12 16 the cost of the program, schedule, technical 15:01:15 17 challenges and risk. They did this very 15:01:16 18 quickly. This was just about a three-week 15:01:18 19 endeavor, but they have quite a bit of 15:01:20 20 experience at this and this is something that 15:01:24 21 they are used to being asked to do for a 15:01:26 22 variety of other programs of comparable 15:01:29 23 complexity. 15:01:32 24 And the results of that program 15:01:32 25 indicate, what have been indications from 15:01:34 194 1 other sources, that Constellation is likely 15:01:39 2 to slip. Next slide. 15:01:43 3 Now, let me give you a good 15:01:45 4 perspective on why Constellation is likely to 15:01:49 5 slip, and it's -- I think a lot of it is tied 15:01:54 6 to the budget that Constellation thought it 15:01:58 7 was going to get when the vision was 15:02:02 8 established compared to the budget that 15:02:04 9 Constellation is currently looking at. And 15:02:08 10 it's a huge change. 15:02:11 11 The top blue line is the anticipated 15:02:13 12 funding at the time of ESAS, about the time 15:02:17 13 of the vision. So that's the number that 15:02:22 14 Constellation thought it was going to get out 15:02:24 15 through -- out through 2020, I think. 15:02:26 16 Then the red line is actually the 15:02:29 17 FY '09 budget. So this was, you know, last 15:02:32 18 year's budget. So this is what it's been 15:02:36 19 living under for a while now. 15:02:41 20 The orange line is the more recent 15:02:43 21 FY '10 budget, and you can see that it's yet 15:02:46 22 another reduction. 15:02:50 23 And then if you assume that ISS is 15:02:51 24 extended, there's an additional chunk of 15:02:54 25 money that needs to come from somewhere. And 15:02:57 195 1 we asked Aerospace to take a look at, if it 15:03:00 2 came from the Constellation program, because 15:03:04 3 Constellation was supposed to get that extra 15:03:06 4 ISS money, what would that do to the program. 15:03:09 5 So Aerospace folded this budgetary 15:03:12 6 information in, took a look at the technical 15:03:15 7 risks and costs and came out with a 15:03:17 8 projection. Next one. 15:03:20 9 Overall their results -- a lot of 15:03:21 10 error bars on this, but they felt that there 15:03:24 11 was a potential one-and-a-half-year impact to 15:03:28 12 IOC based solely on the budget, that the 15:03:30 13 FY -- the effects of the FY '10 bundle 15:03:36 14 reduction would stretch the program out a 15:03:39 15 year and a half beyond current IOC. 15:03:41 16 They tried to separate out, to the 15:03:45 17 extent that it's possible, the effects of 15:03:48 18 technical cost and schedule risk and 15:03:51 19 estimated that there's about a two-year 15:03:51 20 impact due to the technical risk/schedule 15:03:55 21 risk. 15:03:58 22 And then taking a look at how ISS 15:03:58 23 extension would affect that, they estimated 15:04:00 24 about another half year on the IOC. So next 15:04:03 25 chart. 15:04:11 196 1 If you look at this graphically, this 15:04:11 2 is what they came up with. And you're all 15:04:12 3 going to be hearing more about this in some 15:04:18 4 more detail from Bo's group tomorrow, but we 15:04:20 5 wanted to give the overall view here to start 15:04:24 6 getting at the motivation for our budget 15:04:26 7 planning. 15:04:28 8 You can see the bar at the bottom 15:04:29 9 shows these effects concatenated. You see 15:04:32 10 the FY '10 budget effects in the dark red. 15:04:36 11 Then the yellow is the technical cost risks 15:04:39 12 and the ISS extension risks. When you add 15:04:41 13 all of those together, it's a big number. 15:04:45 14 We decided that that was more 15:04:47 15 conservative than we needed to be, but that 15:04:49 16 just looking at this and applying our best 15:04:52 17 judgment, we said it would be wise to assume 15:04:55 18 a two-year slip to the Constellation IOC just 15:04:58 19 for prudent planning at this stage. Next 15:05:01 20 slide. 15:05:05 21 We also took a look at ISS, and I've 15:05:05 22 actually just summarized it here because 15:05:15 23 we're going to discuss it later. These are 15:05:18 24 the elements that we took into what we called 15:05:20 25 a more realistic budget profile -- shuttle 15:05:23 197 1 fly-out through March 2011, Constellation IOC 15:05:28 2 in mid 2017 -- it's a two-year delay -- and 15:05:30 3 we assumed that ISS extends to 2020. And 15:05:34 4 we'll discuss that, as I said, in some detail 15:05:36 5 later. 15:05:39 6 But if you want to think of it 15:05:39 7 that -- you know, de-orbiting it in 2016 15:05:43 8 would give it only about five years worth of 15:05:47 9 operational lifetime. And by the way, if you 15:05:47 10 de-orbit it in 2016, if Constellation IOC is 15:05:53 11 2017, there's nothing for Orion to fly to. 15:05:56 12 So it just made sense to have at least a 15:06:01 13 story that hung together in this discussion. 15:06:07 14 So we actually asked NASA's 15:06:07 15 independent PA&E group to do an estimate of 15:06:07 16 the program based on these assumptions. Next 15:06:11 17 one. 15:06:15 18 So here we are going to build up the 15:06:15 19 elements again for you. This is the -- the 15:06:18 20 shuttle program that you've seen, now we've 15:06:20 21 got retirement scheduled for mid FY '11. 15:06:23 22 Next one. 15:06:24 23 Here are the additional shuttle costs 15:06:27 24 that come on as a result of that extension. 15:06:29 25 Next. 15:06:32 198 1 Here is Constellation. Next one. 15:06:34 2 And these are the additional costs 15:06:38 3 that accrue to Constellation as a result of 15:06:41 4 the slip in IOC. 15:06:45 5 Some of that, by the way, is 15:06:47 6 additional Soyuz flights that you would have 15:06:50 7 to purchase. They were just book-kept under 15:06:52 8 the Constellation budget. We won't argue 15:06:54 9 about that now, but they are costs that 15:06:57 10 needed to be captured in this. So there are 15:07:00 11 additional Soyuzes that you need to buy 15:07:03 12 because the Constellation Orion has slipped. 15:07:05 13 Next one. 15:07:08 14 That shows you the gap. The gap is 15:07:09 15 now longer. We've now got over a six-year 15:07:12 16 gap, by the way, the longest since we've 15:07:17 17 started flying people into space in the 15:07:19 18 United States. Next one. 15:07:23 19 There's ISS. And next. 15:07:23 20 If you continue ISS, there's the 15:07:26 21 addition to the budget. Next. 15:07:28 22 There's our black line. Next. Go 15:07:32 23 ahead. One more. 15:07:40 24 Here is -- the integral under that is 15:07:41 25 the current budget that we're planning to. 15:07:46 199 1 Next. 15:07:49 2 There's the addition on top. Next. 15:07:49 3 If you want to look at what these 15:07:51 4 numbers are, I can just tell you that the 15:07:54 5 integral under that crosshatched curve is 15:07:58 6 $15.3 billion. And the components that make 15:08:01 7 it up are -- shuttle is about 1.3 billion, 15:08:06 8 Constellation is about 4.7 and ISS is about 15:08:11 9 9.3 billion, and that is ISS not fully 15:08:15 10 utilized. So it's not any sort of an 15:08:19 11 enhanced ISS at all. An enhanced ISS would 15:08:22 12 be another about -- not another -- it would 15:08:25 13 be a total of about 14 billion, I believe. 15:08:27 14 So we think that -- that previous 15:08:29 15 chart a few back that shows this more 15:08:33 16 realistic unfolding of the budget with the 15:08:36 17 budget line that we're constrained too, we 15:08:39 18 think that's why we're here. That's the 15:08:42 19 reason that this review is taking place. 15:08:45 20 Next slide. 15:08:48 21 To motivate some of our scenarios, I 15:08:48 22 wanted to have one quick slide on the gap. 15:08:54 23 This is what it looks like, again, in this 15:08:57 24 perhaps more realistic scenario. 15:08:59 25 As Bo's group will discuss in more 15:09:03 200 1 detail, we don't believe that other options 15:09:08 2 besides Constellation reduce this gap from 15:09:11 3 the right by very much. You might be able to 15:09:14 4 get a year, maybe a year and a half, maybe 15:09:18 5 not, and we'll leave that to Bo's discussion 15:09:21 6 time tomorrow. 15:09:26 7 But this gap produces a gap in our 15:09:26 8 ability to launch people into says from this 15:09:32 9 country, as a couple of people have alluded 15:09:34 10 to several times in our public hearings. It 15:09:36 11 creates a reliance on Soyuz for crew 15:09:40 12 transportation. It's also a significant 15:09:43 13 impact to the workforce. 15:09:45 14 Perhaps more important, there's a 15:09:47 15 potential loss of skills that we've spent 15:09:49 16 literally decades building up in this country 15:09:53 17 of how to launch and operate spacecraft. And 15:09:56 18 we're going to have at least six years where 15:10:00 19 we're just -- we just get out of practice on 15:10:04 20 that and do not have a way of training the 15:10:07 21 next group -- the next generation that's 15:10:12 22 actually going to be operating the vehicle 15:10:12 23 that succeeds the shuttle. 15:10:15 24 The gap is also a significant 15:10:16 25 reduction in our ability to carry things up 15:10:20 201 1 to and really a significant impact to our 15:10:22 2 ability to carry things down from ISS. The 15:10:25 3 station is going to be reliant on new and, we 15:10:29 4 think, actually very exciting and promising 15:10:34 5 but still unproven launch systems, and these 15:10:38 6 are the H-IIB along with the HTV from Japan, 15:10:41 7 Falcon 9 and Dragon and Taurus II and Cygnus. 15:10:46 8 And that even with those working perfectly, 15:10:51 9 it still limits the shuttle -- the station 15:10:55 10 utilization. Next slide. 15:11:00 11 Now, let me go through just a couple 15:11:02 12 of the shuttle scenarios that we looked at. 15:11:04 13 We've actually selected three shuttle fly-out 15:11:07 14 or extension scenarios that we'd like the 15:11:10 15 full committee to consider, and we actually 15:11:13 16 think that these do a pretty good job of 15:11:16 17 spanning the reasonable trade space. And 15:11:18 18 they're scenarios that you can kind of put a 15:11:21 19 story together that make some sense. 15:11:25 20 The first one is to fly out the 15:11:28 21 existing manifest through March 2011. The 15:11:30 22 second is to add one additional shuttle 15:11:34 23 flight in 2012. And smart people in the room 15:11:37 24 will say why only one, and we'll get to that. 15:11:40 25 And the third is to extend the shuttle at two 15:11:44 202 1 'flights a year or fewer -- one to two 15:11:48 2 flights a year through 2014 to partially -- 15:11:52 3 actually significantly close the gap. 15:11:55 4 And we note right here -- and we're 15:11:58 5 going to really emphasize this later on -- it 15:12:00 6 only makes sense to analyze this option in 15:12:03 7 conjunction with some sort of a shuttle 15:12:06 8 derived heavy-lift vehicle. So this is where 15:12:09 9 the committee would have to come together and 15:12:14 10 decide whether this entire option makes sense 15:12:16 11 to consider as an integrated set. Next one. 15:12:19 12 All right. Scenario No. 1, I've 15:12:24 13 already talked about this some. The 15:12:25 14 rationale behind it is there is not much 15:12:26 15 margin left in the shuttle schedule. Our 15:12:31 16 experience suggests that it's going to take a 15:12:32 17 little bit longer than is currently allowed 15:12:32 18 for in the manifest to safely fly it out. We 15:12:37 19 think this is just a more realistic scenario, 15:12:40 20 and it would avoid undue pressure to complete 15:12:43 21 flights within a particular budget year. 15:12:46 22 And having said that, it's been our 15:12:49 23 impression that NASA is currently doing a 15:12:52 24 magnificent job actually of taking the 15:12:52 25 flights one at a time and considering safety 15:12:53 203 1 first as whether to launch on a particular 15:12:57 2 day or to delay the flight a day, a week, a 15:13:01 3 month. But the closer you get to a 15:13:03 4 hard-and-fast deadline, the more difficult 15:13:07 5 that becomes. 15:13:10 6 We've got plenty of experience to 15:13:11 7 illustrate that in the past. And so we just 15:13:15 8 think it would be very prudent to just go 15:13:17 9 ahead right now and plan for flying out in 15:13:21 10 2011 -- budgetary planning for it. 15:13:25 11 So advantages, prudent fly-out 15:13:26 12 schedule, realistic budget planning. 15:13:28 13 Disadvantages, it adds some money. But on 15:13:30 14 the other hand, it's likely to cost that much 15:13:33 15 money anyway, so you might as well plan for 15:13:34 16 it. Next. 15:13:40 17 The cost of this, as estimated by the 15:13:40 18 shuttle program, is about 1.5 billion. We'd 15:13:42 19 actually like to get the independent 15:13:47 20 assessment group to take a look at that. We 15:13:48 21 think that may include some of those carrying 15:13:50 22 costs that might have been picked up by 15:13:52 23 Constellation in FY '11. We're not sure. 15:13:55 24 Most of those costs do come in in FY 'll. So 15:13:59 25 there may be a little bit of double counting 15:14:00 204 1 in this number. We're not positive. 15:14:02 2 We do note that there is not an 15:14:04 3 operational impact to the Constellation 15:14:08 4 program. It would take some money away from 15:14:08 5 it potentially, but it doesn't affect the 15:14:10 6 turnover of facilities and it doesn't affect 15:14:13 7 the other resources. It doesn't, however, 15:14:19 8 help very much in the workforce transition. 15:14:23 9 Next. 15:14:28 10 The second scenario, add one shuttle 15:14:29 11 flight in 2012. So I've got it as a note on 15:14:29 12 the next slide, but I might as well say it up 15:14:32 13 front, we weren't smart enough to ask about 15:14:34 14 only one shuttle flight at first. 15:14:36 15 We asked about adding two or three 15:14:40 16 additional shuttle flights, and we were told 15:14:42 17 quickly that there is one and only one extra 15:14:44 18 external tank and if you want to add more 15:14:49 19 than one shuttle flight you have to restart 15:14:54 20 ET production with some costs, which means 15:14:54 21 rehiring a few people and restarting a 15:14:58 22 production line. So the costs go up quite a 15:15:01 23 bit if you go for -- the costs per flight 15:15:04 24 actually go up quite a bit if you add more 15:15:07 25 than one flight. 15:15:09 205 1 So we said, okay, we understand, talk 15:15:09 2 to us about adding one flight. So that's the 15:15:12 3 reason for one as opposed to two or three. 15:15:15 4 The rationale behind this, you know, 15:15:18 5 does this make sense at all. Well, now we're 15:15:20 6 thinking about ISS. ISS is totally dependent 15:15:23 7 on four new vehicle, slash, capsules for all 15:15:28 8 of the logistical, maintenance and 15:15:34 9 utilization support. Three of them haven't 15:15:35 10 flow yet. They've got a lot of promise, but 15:15:37 11 they haven't flown. One has only flown once. 15:15:38 12 That's the ATV. 15:15:42 13 There's a risk of delays in any one 15:15:43 14 of them, and those could adversely affect 15:15:48 15 station utilization. They wouldn't -- the 15:15:52 16 station itself can survive going down to just 15:15:54 17 operations and maintenance. Really reducing 15:15:59 18 utilization, reducing crew, if necessary, 15:16:02 19 they can handle a delay of a year or two 15:16:05 20 years in these capabilities coming on line. 15:16:10 21 But then you have to ask yourself, 15:16:14 22 well, what's the purpose of the station in 15:16:16 23 the first place. It's to actually use it. 15:16:19 24 And so we're putting ISS in a very fragile 15:16:22 25 situation the moment we retire shuttle. 15:16:29 206 1 As, I think it was, Steve said, you 15:16:31 2 know, station was conceived and designed and 15:16:32 3 built -- and its operational philosophy was 15:16:34 4 built around the thought that we'd have the 15:16:38 5 shuttle. And that means a certain amount of 15:16:41 6 upmass and a certain amount of downmass -- 15:16:41 7 you know, you can carry a bring certain 15:16:45 8 amount of stuff up, you can bring a certain 15:16:45 9 amount of stuff down -- and it affected the 15:16:46 10 way that they think about everything, 15:16:47 11 including things like spare parts. You don't 15:16:49 12 buy a new spare part every time you need one. 15:16:53 13 You bring the one down that isn't working, 15:16:55 14 you refurbish it and you send it back up. 15:16:58 15 So there are a lot of things that 15:17:01 16 need to change in this -- in the thinking. 15:17:03 17 And we think that it's possible that even one 15:17:05 18 extra shuttle flight could send up, you know, 15:17:08 19 kind of a slug of utilization either 15:17:12 20 experiments or infrastructure, could take 15:17:14 21 into account any unforeseen delays in the 15:17:18 22 providers or into account any unforeseen 15:17:24 23 requirements for upmass or, by the way, 15:17:29 24 downmass. So it's almost one protection 15:17:33 25 flight in your manifest. 15:17:37 207 1 So the advantages: Mitigate ISS 15:17:38 2 reliance on an unproven resupply capability 15:17:41 3 just in the very short time; enable some 15:17:44 4 additional utilization support, which our 15:17:48 5 international partners will tell us is 15:17:51 6 important; retain our human launch capability 15:17:53 7 a little bit longer but not much. 15:17:56 8 Disadvantage: It's an additional 15:17:58 9 cost, especially just for one flight. Next 15:18:00 10 slide. 15:18:03 11 But here is a graphic to drive it 15:18:03 12 home to you. Upmass and downmass 15:18:06 13 capabilities of the shuttle compared to all 15:18:09 14 of the vehicles that are available to replace 15:18:11 15 it. And we had seen this chart before, but 15:18:14 16 it hadn't been to scale and I told them I 15:18:18 17 wanted it to scale, because it really drives 15:18:22 18 the point home. 15:18:25 19 You know, shuttle is a very, very 15:18:25 20 capable vehicle. It can get a lot of stuff 15:18:26 21 up to station, and it can bring a lot of 15:18:27 22 stuff back. And as soon as you retire it, 15:18:31 23 you are really constraining what you can do 15:18:34 24 on station. You're making it very, very 15:18:37 25 reliant on all of the other providers. And 15:18:39 208 1 all you need to do is take your little ruler 15:18:42 2 and kind of add up number of flights that are 15:18:45 3 required to equal one shuttle flight to ISS. 15:18:48 4 Next slide. 15:18:52 5 The cost of this is 4.2 billion over 15:18:53 6 the current baseline. It's 2.7 billion over 15:18:57 7 Scenario 1, which we think is the more 15:19:01 8 reasonable one. So if you subtract out the 15:19:04 9 1.5 that I showed on Scenario 1 from the 4.2, 15:19:05 10 that's how you get the additional 2.7. 15:19:09 11 Again, there's possibility for double 15:19:11 12 counting in this number. We're going to try 15:19:14 13 to get refinement on it, but it's a pretty 15:19:17 14 good first stab at it. 15:19:19 15 I mentioned one ET. We would phase 15:19:21 16 the flights appropriately to support ISS. It 15:19:25 17 really doesn't provide much relief for the 15:19:30 18 workforce transition problem, because you do 15:19:32 19 still have a potential loss as a result of 15:19:35 20 the gap of a significant part of your skilled 15:19:35 21 operations workforce. Next slide. 15:19:35 22 Scenario No. 3, this is extend the 15:19:46 23 shuttle at one to three flights a year 15:19:48 24 through 2014 to significantly close the gap. 15:19:50 25 And, again, although we didn't start 15:19:53 209 1 this way, we realized very quickly that the 15:19:56 2 rest of the panel would disown us if we tried 15:20:01 3 to promote this scenario in conjunction with 15:20:05 4 anything other than a shuttle-derived 15:20:09 5 heavy-lift vehicle. So you're actually not 15:20:14 6 going to see budget numbers associated with 15:20:18 7 this, and I'll get to that reason in a 15:20:18 8 second. 15:20:18 9 The rationale for this one is that 15:20:21 10 it's the most realistic way to significantly 15:20:22 11 reduce the gap. And it's also the most 15:20:25 12 realistic way to robustly use the ISS's full 15:20:28 13 capacity. And, again, we can talk about this 15:20:34 14 at some length a little bit later in the 15:20:36 15 hour -- in the afternoon. 15:20:39 16 When you couple this with a 15:20:41 17 shuttle-derived vehicle, the synergy could 15:20:43 18 mitigate the cost of the shuttle extension, 15:20:46 19 because there's an enormous sharing of 15:20:49 20 vehicles, of infrastructure and of production 15:20:52 21 infrastructure, ops infrastructure 15:20:55 22 capabilities if you go this way. 15:20:59 23 So the advantages: Reduces the gap 15:21:01 24 in launch capability; supports robust US and 15:21:03 25 international utilization of ISS -- and we'll 15:21:07 210 1 get to some closer definition of robust later 15:21:11 2 on in the afternoon. It does provide a 15:21:14 3 smooth workforce transition. You don't lose 15:21:17 4 those ops people or the production folks, and 15:21:20 5 it does take maximum advantage of the 15:21:26 6 existing infrastructure. It minimizes the 15:21:30 7 number of changes that you need to make to 15:21:33 8 the infrastructure. 15:21:35 9 Disadvantages: Cost, mitigated a 15:21:37 10 reasonable amount when coupled with a 15:21:40 11 shuttle-derived HLV. But we don't pretend to 15:21:42 12 comment on that relative to other 15:21:46 13 architectures that Ed's group is going to 15:21:48 14 present. It does extend the life of the 15:21:52 15 shuttle, and we would suggest that an 15:21:55 16 independent assessment of the risk of that 15:21:57 17 would be an important thing. 15:21:59 18 We do recognize -- and I actually 15:22:02 19 agree with the point of view -- that when the 15:22:04 20 CAIB said the shuttle should either be 15:22:08 21 retired in 2010 or recertified by 2010 in 15:22:11 22 order to extend its life that NASA has, as 15:22:15 23 part of the return to flight program and on, 15:22:19 24 been piece by piece recertifying that and 15:22:22 25 that that largely meets the intent of the 15:22:26 211 1 CAIB. But I think you would -- we should 15:22:30 2 have an independent assessment of that fact 15:22:33 3 before we go anywhere down that road. Next 15:22:35 4 slide. 15:22:40 5 Cost: Very difficult to compare 15:22:41 6 directly with Scenarios 1 and 2 at this 15:22:48 7 stage, and it's because of the different 15:22:48 8 carrying cost profiles. 15:22:53 9 As I said, we got a costing of the 15:22:55 10 combined shuttle and shuttle-derived 15:22:57 11 infrastructure. But when I tried to pull out 15:22:59 12 the pieces and see what numbers would be 15:23:02 13 useful to give to this panel for a direct 15:23:05 14 comparison, it was impossible to do, and it 15:23:08 15 was impossible because there were still 15:23:11 16 pieces of Constellation that were in the 15:23:13 17 budget that we got and we didn't know which 15:23:14 18 were being carried and which weren't. 15:23:17 19 There was a future infrastructure 15:23:20 20 architecture that was partially assumed in 15:23:22 21 the budget we got, and it just didn't make 15:23:25 22 sense for us to be doing the analysis of 15:23:28 23 that. So we've got a place for an integrated 15:23:30 24 scenario to start from should the committee 15:23:34 25 decide to go that way. But we want to kick 15:23:37 212 1 the can down the road to the beyond LEO group 15:23:41 2 with this one. 15:23:46 3 So some notes: The preliminary 15:23:47 4 estimate for the shuttle-derived IOC was 15:23:49 5 2016. Take that just for what it is. We 15:23:54 6 would defer to Bo's group to assess that 15:23:57 7 number. We just took it. The shuttle and 15:24:01 8 shuttle-derived, the program did not believe 15:24:06 9 that they would compete for facilities or for 15:24:09 10 resources on the schedule that they 15:24:15 11 developed, and there is some savings costs in 15:24:17 12 a few different places. And I know just one 15:24:20 13 of them. One is in the Soyuz costs for ISS. 15:24:22 14 Next slide. 15:24:26 15 Okay. I think the next thing that 15:24:27 16 we're going to do is make the transition into 15:24:29 17 a discussion of station and station 15:24:32 18 scenarios. And I'd invite questions right 15:24:36 19 now, but I suspect that we're going to be 15:24:39 20 better off if we lay out everything on the 15:24:42 21 table because this really is kind of an 15:24:44 22 integrated story, as you can see from the 15:24:48 23 shuttle scenario discussions. 15:24:49 24 So I think we'd do well to get 15:24:51 25 through the ISS discussions first. And Les 15:24:54 213 1 is going to kick that off with some 15:24:57 2 observations from the international 15:25:00 3 community. 15:25:04 4 GENERAL LYLES: Yeah. And I will do 15:25:11 5 that here from the table, in part, because we 15:25:11 6 have a committee that's going to be reporting 15:25:11 7 out tomorrow in our public session in 15:25:13 8 Huntsville about international, interagency 15:25:14 9 and other considerations, and this is sort of 15:25:17 10 a segueway to Leroy's presentation on ISS. 15:25:20 11 So let me just give you sort of a 15:25:20 12 thumbnail summary, if you will, of the key 15:25:24 13 elements and what was important about this 15:25:25 14 and how it relates to both the ISS and STS 15:25:28 15 discussions. As you might imagine, 15:25:32 16 international considerations is a big, big 15:25:35 17 part of our deliberations here. 15:25:37 18 And sort of the key questions that we 15:25:39 19 have to ask ourselves are: Should 15:25:41 20 international cooperation be expanded for our 15:25:43 21 overall human space flight program; are there 15:25:44 22 some valuable roles or extended roles for our 15:25:49 23 international partners today to play in the 15:25:52 24 programs or are additional partners in the 15:25:56 25 future; are there issues that need to be 15:25:57 214 1 addressed to expand international 15:25:57 2 cooperation; if possible, what countries 15:26:01 3 should be included in our expanded 15:26:03 4 cooperative human space flight program; and, 15:26:06 5 probably more importantly relative to how we 15:26:09 6 approach this, what do the international 15:26:09 7 partners think about this topic themselves. 15:26:32 8 And then finally from an interagency 15:26:32 9 perspective, we wanted to make sure that as 10 we looked at international cooperation, are 11 there any exigencies, issues relative to 12 other agencies, particularly Department of 13 Defense and intel activities in our national 14 security space arena, and are there any 15:26:33 15 policy issues from the nation that might be 15:26:34 16 considered. 15:26:36 17 So in trying to address those 15:26:37 18 different factors, our approach was really 15:26:40 19 sort of a qualitative one, if you will. It's 15:26:42 20 hard to try to quantify some of the specifics 15:26:46 21 in this arena, and so basically we've talked 15:26:48 22 to everybody we possibly could -- all of the 15:26:51 23 international space agencies -- the ESA, 15:26:55 24 Canadian Space Agency, the Korean Aerospace 15:26:58 25 Research Institute, German Aerospace Council. 15:27:03 215 1 We talked to the Russian Space Agency 15:27:07 2 obviously, and we engaged with everybody we 15:27:09 3 could to talk about and get their deliberate 15:27:12 4 views and comments on this particular topic. 15:27:14 5 Lots of discussions internal with 15:27:17 6 NASA, both in terms of their international 15:27:19 7 activities there and talking to their PA&E 15:27:21 8 folks. And then finally to ensure that we 15:27:25 9 got the broad interagency and policy 15:27:29 10 perspective, we talked to the Department of 15:27:31 11 Defense, both the OSD, Secretary of Defense 15:27:33 12 policy office -- and I'll explain that in a 15:27:35 13 second as to why -- but the NSSO, the 15:27:37 14 National Security Space Office that resides 15:27:41 15 in the Pentagon and then the National 15:27:44 16 Security Council to get sort of a White House 15:27:47 17 view on this particular topic. 15:27:53 18 We also did the literature search, as 15:27:53 19 you might imagine, which included the most 15:27:54 20 recent National Research Council report on 15:27:55 21 rationale and goals for our civil space 15:27:59 22 programs which had a quite a lot of content 15:28:01 23 it in about international cooperation and the 15:28:05 24 value of international cooperation. 15:28:07 25 We went all of the way back to the 15:28:11 216 1 Aldridge report that sort of kicked off the 15:28:13 2 implementation for exploration back in 2004. 15:28:14 3 And then finally there was even some 15:28:16 4 international space cooperation aspects in a 15:28:19 5 national security space report done on behalf 15:28:23 6 of Congress early last year. So our 15:28:27 7 literature search included everything we 15:28:31 8 possibly could find relative to international 15:28:35 9 cooperation. 15:28:43 10 Sort of the bottom line, if you will, 15:28:43 11 so we don't repeat everything we're going to 15:28:43 12 be discussing over the next day or so -- the 15:28:43 13 sort of bottom line methods, as you might 15:28:43 14 imagine, was extremely positive but with some 15:28:46 15 concerns on the part of the international 15:28:47 16 partners. I would say there was strong 15:28:49 17 unanimous support for greater international 15:29:02 18 cooperation and involvement both in the 15:29:02 19 International Space Station program, in 15:29:02 20 exploration and in the broad category of the 15:29:02 21 Human Space Flight program. 15:29:04 22 I think the nations in the space 15:29:04 23 agencies we talked to all basically 15:29:07 24 unanimously said that there's growing 15:29:10 25 political and media interest in space, space 15:29:13 217 1 exploration and programs including human 15:29:17 2 space flight activities. Each one of them 15:29:21 3 expressed very, very strong concern that 15:29:24 4 their political leaders are looking for 15:29:25 5 payoffs, if you will, particularly in the 15:29:29 6 area of the International Space Station. 15:29:32 7 And so there's very, very strong 15:29:33 8 interest in continuing the space station 15:29:35 9 program beyond 2015. They want to see the 15:29:39 10 benefits, they want to see the payoffs and 15:29:42 11 that's very, very important to each one of 15:29:44 12 their nations. Their politicians are looking 15:29:44 13 for that return on investment, as was -- as I 15:29:49 14 stated earlier. 15:29:50 15 Strong support for expanded 15:29:52 16 partnership with everybody we talked to, 15:29:55 17 taking advantage of the expertise and 15:29:58 18 capabilities that each country can bring to 15:30:00 19 this big, big complicated but very, very 15:30:02 20 important picture. To them the International 15:30:06 21 Space Station particularly is proof of the 15:30:10 22 value of international cooperation, but to 15:30:11 23 show that value, they are strongly looking 15:30:14 24 for the United States to make a very positive 15:30:17 25 step relative to the future of the 15:30:20 218 1 International Space Station beyond 2015. 15:30:22 2 I think in the discussions we've 15:30:25 3 had -- I think it was almost unanimous but 15:30:27 4 not everybody -- talked about the value of 15:30:30 5 space exploration to addressing other 15:30:32 6 elements besides the space programs in and of 15:30:35 7 themselves. They were looking at other 15:30:38 8 national priorities. Whether it was climate 15:30:40 9 change, environmental energy issues, if you 15:30:41 10 will, every nation -- every program we talked 15:30:44 11 to saw the value of using the International 15:30:46 12 Space Station as a laboratory platform to 15:30:50 13 help them to address these other greater 15:30:52 14 national priorities, and they saw doing that 15:30:55 15 as a way to continue to sell -- my word -- 15:30:57 16 sell the program to the leadership in each 15:31:01 17 one of their particular nations. 15:31:05 18 Strong interest in looking at -- 15:31:07 19 making sure they do the part they can with 15:31:09 20 whatever help we can provide in showing both 15:31:12 21 the public and politicians in each country 15:31:15 22 that there's a connection between exploration 15:31:18 23 like to Mars and things we need to do in 15:31:20 24 space capabilities here on Earth. 15:31:23 25 And, finally, very strong interest in 15:31:26 219 1 looking at using the International Space 15:31:30 2 Station as a way to mature the technologies 15:31:32 3 needed to go back to the Moon and go to Mars. 15:31:34 4 So I think the methods was sort of 15:31:37 5 unanimous and very, very strong on the part 15:31:40 6 of everybody that we engaged. When we looked 15:31:42 7 at other agencies and particularly looking at 15:31:45 8 the national security space activities and 15:31:48 9 looking at the National Space Council, I 15:31:51 10 found -- since I did most of that research 15:31:54 11 myself, I found a little bit surprising word 15:31:55 12 that the national security space arena seems 15:31:59 13 to be taking the lead in supporting the value 15:32:03 14 of international space cooperation. That 15:32:05 15 comment was even made by the national 15:32:09 16 space -- excuse me -- the National Security 15:32:10 17 Council in the White House. 15:32:12 18 There is very, very strong interest 15:32:14 19 from a policy perspective in the White House 15:32:16 20 to figure out a major policy question of how 15:32:19 21 do we do better and more cooperation 15:32:22 22 internationally in space. And they were 15:32:24 23 surprised but very, very pleased to see that 15:32:28 24 the national security space individuals are 15:32:30 25 taking a very strong line along those -- that 15:32:33 220 1 particular viewpoint. 15:32:36 2 From an NSS perspective, they see 15:32:38 3 great value in having greater cooperation in 15:32:41 4 space, both internationally from a civil 15:32:43 5 space program standpoint and also sort of 15:32:48 6 military to military cooperation from a 15:32:49 7 national security standpoint with different 15:32:51 8 nations. And so there's seems to be no 15:32:54 9 objection, if you will, from the standpoint 15:32:59 10 of greater international cooperation across 15:33:00 11 board. 15:33:03 12 And then, finally, just a comment on 15:33:03 13 concerns and what people are concerned about. 15:33:06 14 ITAR is a major concern. Industrial-based 15:33:09 15 issues are a major concern, but probably the 15:33:14 16 very -- strongest message we heard from all 15:33:14 17 of the space agencies and the other nations 15:33:19 18 that we talked to was that they are looking 15:33:21 19 for and hoping that the United States will 15:33:22 20 step forward and show its support for greater 15:33:25 21 international cooperation with a very, very 15:33:30 22 strong message from the top -- from the very 15:33:33 23 top. 15:33:37 24 Specifically they're looking for 15:33:38 25 President Obama to actually state very 15:33:38 221 1 strongly his indication of support for 15:33:41 2 international cooperation. Some of them 15:33:43 3 actually expressed an interest in having our 15:33:45 4 president talk to their leaders in their 15:33:47 5 particular nations, but the message, I think, 15:33:51 6 was very, very common there, they are looking 15:33:53 7 for the tone from the top from the 15:33:55 8 United States that international cooperation 15:33:57 9 is something we support and something we will 15:33:58 10 wholeheartedly put interest in for the 15:34:03 11 future. 15:34:05 12 And, Sally, that's sort of a 15:34:11 13 perspective and considerations there, both 15:34:11 14 interagency and internationally, and I'll 15:34:11 15 turn it over to Leroy. 15:34:14 16 DR. RIDE: Thank you. I think that's 15:34:17 17 the perfect lead-in to Leroy. 15:34:17 18 DR. CHIAO: Okay. Thanks. 15:34:17 19 Okay. Now we'll begin the discussion 15:34:18 20 on ISS post 2015 options. Next slide, 15:34:20 21 please. 15:34:24 22 I wanted to put this up there first 15:34:24 23 just to kind of frame our discussions. This 15:34:26 24 is from the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 15:34:28 25 and basically says the administrator shall 15:34:30 222 1 ensure that we have the capability to 15:34:33 2 continue robust utilization of ISS through 15:34:34 3 2020 and certainly not take any steps to 15:34:37 4 preclude operation past 2015. Next slide, 15:34:41 5 please. 15:34:41 6 As you heard Sally mention a little 15:34:45 7 bit ago, though, the current plan is to end 15:34:47 8 U.S. participation in ISS at the end of 2015. 15:34:49 9 So that's option No. 1 that we've 15:34:53 10 considered -- the baseline, if you will. 15:34:56 11 We also considered two other options 15:34:59 12 which continue U.S. participation through at 15:35:03 13 least 2020. Option 2 is to continue 15:35:04 14 basically at current levels, and Option 2(a) 15:35:05 15 is what we call an enhanced participation, 15:35:08 16 which I'll get into. Next slide, please. 15:35:13 17 So Option 1: End U.S. participation 18 in ISS, the baseline option, at the end of 19 2015. 20 The advantage, of course, that some 21 of the funds can be shifted to the 22 Constellation program, but as Sally kind of 23 alluded to for shuttle and certainly true 24 also for station, there are certain costs 15:35:29 25 that you're going to carry over, and a lot of 15:35:31 223 1 those fixed costs are pretty significant. So 15:35:32 2 the actual savings would not be the total 15:35:36 3 amount that you're spending to operate ISS 15:35:39 4 today. 15:35:41 5 Also decommissioning costs would have 15:35:42 6 to be deducted from the money that you would 15:35:45 7 shift over, and those plans aren't really 15:35:47 8 well defined right now. Next, please. 15:35:49 9 Some disadvantages: The U.S. would 15:35:50 10 cede leadership position in human space 15:35:53 11 flight. And that's a pretty big loss in 15:35:54 12 international prestige, and that would carry 15:35:56 13 over, we believe, to other areas, not only in 15:35:58 14 space exploration. 15:36:02 15 And this is an important point. If 15:36:04 16 Orion gets delayed -- if Orion IOC get 15:36:04 17 delayed, as Sally's charts indicated it might 15:36:07 18 well, U.S. Human Space Flight stops. That 15:36:08 19 is, we would be carrying out no human space 15:36:13 20 flight activities at all during that gap. 15:36:16 21 And so the U.S. would assume a third-place 15:36:18 22 position basically behind Russia and China. 15:36:21 23 Damage to international relations, as 15:36:21 24 Les was just talking about, the international 15:36:21 25 partners all expressed a very strong desire 15:36:21 224 1 for continued cooperation, not only in ISS 15:36:21 2 but in other areas as well and, you know, 15:36:34 3 basically wanting that high level commitment 15:36:35 4 from the United States. And we'd also lose 15:36:38 5 that functioning international framework that 15:36:41 6 is working very well right now in the 15:36:43 7 International Space Station program. 15:36:46 8 We'd lose the -- we'd have a loss of 15:36:47 9 national and international assets in the 15:36:50 10 station. We'd have a minimal ROI, return on 15:36:53 11 investment, on that -- the investment that we 15:36:53 12 put into creating it. And it would be a 15:36:56 13 disruption in current HSF medical research, 15:36:59 14 some of which may actually have some 15:37:03 15 applications here on the ground. Next, 15:37:05 16 please. 15:37:07 17 Continuing with the potential 15:37:07 18 disadvantages, we'd have a potential loss in 15:37:09 19 this national lab concept because other folks 15:37:12 20 looking to participate in this may be weary 15:37:15 21 about expending much resources and funding to 15:37:18 22 begin work on developing experiments and 15:37:22 23 other applications that may only go until 15:37:24 24 2015. There would be an obvious negative 15:37:28 25 impact for COTS providers and additional 15:37:30 225 1 workforce impacts if the Orion gets delayed 15:37:32 2 much past the end of 2015. Next, please. 15:37:36 3 Some notes on this option: The 15:37:40 4 international partners issued a very strong 15:37:41 5 joint statement in support of continuing ISS 15:37:43 6 past 2015 at the heads of agencies meeting 15:37:46 7 last summer. 15:37:46 8 Russia has publicly stated several 15:37:49 9 times that it will continue ISS operations 15:37:49 10 independently of what the U.S. decides to do. 15:37:49 11 Now, the U.S. position is that, well, 15:37:59 12 technically, you know, that may not be 15:37:59 13 possible, but having worked with the Russians 15:38:01 14 quite a bit and for folks who have, you know, 15:38:03 15 they're pretty clever and we should not 15:38:05 16 underestimate their ability to do something 15:38:06 17 like that. Next, please. 15:38:10 18 More notes. Estimates show that the 15:38:12 19 costs could not be borne by the IPs. It 15:38:14 20 doesn't seem like they could be -- they would 15:38:14 21 be able to absorb the costs. And as Les just 15:38:14 22 said, ITAR is a major issue even in 15:38:20 23 discussing whether or not that could happen. 15:38:24 24 We also asked for an analysis of, 15:38:26 25 well, can't we just mothball ISS and kind of 15:38:28 226 1 save it for another day. Sure, the ISS can 15:38:32 2 be operated in automatic mode, but the 15:38:33 3 analysis shows an order-of-magnitude increase 15:38:38 4 in the risk of loss of vehicle. And, of 15:38:40 5 course, that means that you're -- you could 15:38:41 6 have an uncontrolled entry which has 15:38:42 7 liability and image issues. 15:38:46 8 We also asked for a look at a minimal 15:38:49 9 operating mode, just basically conducting 10 operations to keep ISS going but not really 11 doing any utilization, but the utilization 12 costs are pretty small compared to the ops 13 costs. So there's really not much money 14 being saved, so why are you saving this asset 15 if you don't plan to exploit it. 16 And, furthermore, you'd have to do a 17 full analysis for the de-orbit case, and that 18 really are to begin now pretty soon if you're 19 really going to de-orbit at the end of '15. 20 Next, please. 15:39:16 21 Option 2, the second one we looked 15:39:16 22 at, is basically continue current levels of 15:39:20 23 preparation -- U.S. participation through at 15:39:22 24 least 2020. 15:39:25 25 Advantages: We'd maintain our 15:39:26 227 1 leadership position in human space flight, 15:39:28 2 maintain our international partnerships and 15:39:32 3 there would be opportunities for innovation 15:39:32 4 in the National Lab concept to be encouraging 15:39:34 5 people to participate in this National Lab. 15:39:36 6 We'd also be encouraging other folks to do 15:39:38 7 new research, and even some commercial 15:39:41 8 companies may express some interest in doing 15:39:45 9 research. And it would also be a good thing 15:39:45 10 for the COTS providers. Next, please. 15:39:48 11 The disadvantage, of course, is it's 15:39:50 12 going to require additional funding, as you 15:39:52 13 saw in the earlier charts. Next, please. 15:39:54 14 Some notes on Option 2. You know, 15:39:58 15 leadership in space is really a high 15:40:02 16 visibility thing, and I think it's easy to 15:40:06 17 underestimate how important that is. 15:40:08 18 In the operations-only case, again, 15:40:11 19 the majority of operations costs are fixed 15:40:13 20 costs, and so only some of that fund -- some 15:40:13 21 of that funding would be able to be brought 15:40:17 22 over to the Constellation program. Next 15:40:19 23 slide. 15:40:19 24 Option 2(a) is what we call the 15:40:23 25 enhanced participation through at least 2020, 15:40:26 228 1 and that means to expend a little more money 15:40:27 2 and fully utilize the capability of the ISS. 15:40:29 3 And that means that -- an expanded U.S. 15:40:33 4 leadership position with a clear commitment 15:40:35 5 to full utilization of ISS. 15:40:36 6 It's an opportunity to expand our 15:40:38 7 international partnerships and, as Les was 15:40:40 8 saying, to further align the space program 15:40:42 9 with national objectives. It's an 15:40:45 10 opportunity to build on the ISS partnership 15:40:48 11 for exploration, and for lack of a better 15:40:48 12 term, you know, this partnership could be 15:40:50 13 viewed as kind of the training wheels or 15:40:52 14 training ground on how we would do an 15:40:55 15 international exploration effort. 15:40:57 16 It's an opportunity for full 15:41:00 17 realization of the National Lab concept, and 15:41:01 18 you'd get a maximum ROI on your investment. 15:41:03 19 Also, as some of the other committee 15:41:03 20 members talked about today, ISS could be then 15:41:08 21 utilized as a testbed for technologies for 15:41:11 22 exploration programs and other national 15:41:15 23 needs. Next, please. 15:41:15 24 Disadvantages: It's a slightly 15:41:18 25 higher cost than Option 2. We're still 15:41:19 229 1 sharpening our pencils to determine what that 15:41:21 2 number might be. 15:41:25 3 But, again, most of the ISS operating 15:41:26 4 costs are fixed. So the additional costs we 15:41:28 5 anticipate would not be that big. 15:41:32 6 And, of course, transportation is a 15:41:32 7 variable. It would be -- it could e a very 15:41:35 8 significant variable. Next, please. 15:41:37 9 Some notes on Option 2(a). If you 15:41:38 10 include new partners, it definitely should be 15:41:42 11 aligned with national interests. 15:41:44 12 New international partner plans 15:41:47 13 should be integrated. That is, all of the -- 15:41:47 14 you know, you ought to think about how you're 15:41:50 15 going to bring new partners in and what order 15:41:51 16 you might bring them in and what 15:41:53 17 interactions -- political interactions you 15:41:57 18 might have to deal with. 15:41:58 19 Some potential candidate nations are 15:42:00 20 financially pretty healthy, and so it's not 15:42:00 21 unreasonable to think that there could be 15:42:04 22 some cost offsets for the current partners. 15:42:06 23 Next, please. 15:42:06 24 Some more notes. The new partners 15:42:10 25 may offer game changing opportunities. And, 15:42:12 230 1 one example, China is only the third nation 15:42:15 2 capable of independent human space flight. 15:42:18 3 So there could be some very exciting 15:42:20 4 opportunities with some new partners. Next, 15:42:22 5 please. 15:42:25 6 Okay. And I think that's it. And 15:42:25 7 Charlie Kennel is going to kind of summarize 15:42:29 8 for us and then lead a discussion. 15:42:32 9 DR. RIDE: I'd like to say that last 15:42:44 10 night we discovered that Charlie had written 15:42:44 11 out his notes on an air sickness bag on the 15:42:47 12 flight here, and we suggested that, you know, 15:42:48 13 perhaps that wasn't the best choice of note 15:42:50 14 paper but -- but might say it all. 15:42:54 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: We should do our 15:42:57 16 report on that. 15:43:00 17 DR. KENNEL: So my job is to try to 15:43:00 18 summarize how we got to where we are but to 15:43:03 19 do so in language that you could with a 15:43:09 20 decision-maker who's not particularly 15:43:12 21 technically adept or familiar with NASA. So 15:43:12 22 I'm going to give a very high level view of 15:43:15 23 these arguments. 15:43:19 24 And as Sally said, I didn't quite 15:43:20 25 know what we were going to say before I got 15:43:23 231 1 here because these slides were integrated 15:43:25 2 yesterday. But I did write down my thoughts 15:43:27 3 on the air sickness bag on the airplane, 15:43:30 4 which I brought, and then when -- in view of 15:43:34 5 Sally's rather pessimistic assessment of the 15:43:36 6 budget, we all thought that might be 15:43:41 7 appropriate. 15:43:45 8 But in any case, this is the way I 15:43:45 9 would start with a brief introduction of the 15:43:47 10 context in which we find ourselves, and this 15:43:49 11 I'm speaking only -- trying to summarize my 15:43:52 12 view of what our subcommittee has said and 15:43:55 13 not what the whole committee has said. 15:43:57 14 But, in general, for the last three 15:43:57 15 or so years there have been many 15:44:03 16 commentators, including especially Mike 15:44:07 17 Griffin, who has said that NASA has been 15:44:08 18 asked to do too many things with too little 15:44:11 19 budget. And nothing that we have seen in 15:44:14 20 this review changes this conclusion. 15:44:17 21 And as Sally noted so eloquently, a 15:44:20 22 combination of technical issues and 15:44:24 23 especially the recent budget reallocation 15:44:26 24 makes what had been a difficult situation 15:44:29 25 three years ago even worse for the overall 15:44:33 232 1 program. 15:44:36 2 But our job was not to assess all of 15:44:40 3 the vision for space exploration or 15:44:43 4 Constellation or any other exploration 15:44:46 5 architecture you'd like to look at. Our job 15:44:49 6 was to examine the two critical assumptions 15:44:51 7 that underlie all human space flight 15:44:54 8 budgeting either for the current program of 15:44:58 9 record or any other one that you want, and 15:45:01 10 those were for the hard stops to shuttle in 15:45:03 11 2010 and ISS in 2016 and the gap that follows 15:45:07 12 from the shuttle stop in the ability of the 15:45:14 13 U.S. to launch humans into space until a new 15:45:17 14 vehicle is completed. 15:45:22 15 Now, for the shuttle the two main 15:45:24 16 questions were: Is the assumption of the 15:45:28 17 hard stop realistic and prudent, and what 15:45:30 18 fraction of the savings attributed to the 15:45:35 19 shuttle -- stopping the shuttle program 15:45:38 20 actually can be available and free for the 15:45:41 21 development of further human space flight 15:45:44 22 capacity. 15:45:47 23 And with regard to the realistic and 15:45:48 24 prudent issue, we just noticed that the 15:45:52 25 manifest, as currently stated through 2010, 15:45:54 233 1 is exceptionally ambitious and requires a 15:45:58 2 flight rate that has been approximately twice 15:46:03 3 what the post-Columbia flight rate has been. 15:46:06 4 And so, therefore, it is more realistic and 15:46:10 5 prudent to assume, for safety and other 15:46:13 6 operational reasons, that you should relax 15:46:15 7 the schedule somewhat and to fly the manifest 15:46:19 8 out and to expect to have done so perhaps by 15:46:24 9 the middle of 2011. 15:46:27 10 Now, this would cost about an 15:46:30 11 additional $1.2 billion, but we think it is 15:46:33 12 both realistic and prudent. And we would 15:46:37 13 recommend that that particular extension of 15:46:40 14 the shuttle program become part of the 15:46:42 15 baseline for any of our future 15:46:44 16 considerations. 15:46:47 17 Now, there's a very complex and 15:46:47 18 technical budgetary issue associated with how 15:46:51 19 much money will be freed by the end of the 15:46:56 20 shuttle program for other development, but 15:46:58 21 suffice it to say, because shuttle has been 15:46:58 22 carrying many of the institutional costs and 15:47:01 23 many of the costs of retention of capacity 15:47:03 24 and creative personnel, that the amount of 15:47:07 25 available will be -- for development will be 15:47:10 234 1 significantly less than the amount budgeted 15:47:14 2 for the shuttle program. 15:47:17 3 In the case of the gap, its length 15:47:19 4 depends, of course, on a number of factors -- 15:47:23 5 when the new vehicle will be ready, budgetary 15:47:25 6 issues and so on and so forth. But our 15:47:29 7 assessment has been that due to those factors 15:47:31 8 indicated earlier it is likely that the 15:47:34 9 initial operating capability for the next 15:47:37 10 human-rated U.S. launch vehicle will come no 15:47:40 11 earlier than 2017 in the program of record, 15:47:46 12 and if, with much greater uncertainty you 15:47:49 13 examine the alternatives, you reach the 15:47:54 14 conclusion that there's a vanishingly small 15:47:57 15 probability that we'll shorten the gap and a 15:47:57 16 significant probability that it will be 15:48:00 17 several years longer. 15:48:02 18 So the consequences -- the one 15:48:04 19 mentioned all of the time in the newspaper is 15:48:05 20 on raw employment, but for NASA that implies 15:48:08 21 critical skills, operational continuity and 15:48:14 22 many other features that are important to any 15:48:18 23 Human Space Flight program. 15:48:21 24 Just as interestingly, it implies a 15:48:22 25 new regime for ISS resupply in which the 15:48:24 235 1 United States -- it's a partially familiar 15:48:29 2 regime, but the United States and the whole 15:48:33 3 ISS partnership will be dependent on -- 15:48:36 4 partly on the vehicles and systems that have 15:48:40 5 yet to fly but are very promising -- ATV and 15:48:44 6 HTV from Europe and Japan, continuation of 15:48:49 7 dependence on the Soviets, both Soyuz and 15:48:54 8 Progress, but also -- and very interestingly 15:48:55 9 so -- on new commercial partners, the COTS 15:48:58 10 vehicles. And they will become increasingly 15:49:03 11 critical, and as we will see, perhaps 15:49:08 12 utilization will depend on their success. 15:49:10 13 And that's the most attractive part 15:49:13 14 of this new regime in which our partners are 15:49:16 15 in the critical path for IS resupply. And 15:49:18 16 I'll come back to this later. 15:49:22 17 As far as ISS hard stop in 2015 is 15:49:24 18 concerned, in addition to the reasons that 15:49:29 19 Leroy put out, I think I would add a couple 15:49:33 20 of more. 15:49:36 21 One, 15 years of continuous human 15:49:37 22 occupation of space will have been 15:49:42 23 interrupted, and they will be replaced by 15:49:45 24 intermittent sorties after the gap ends. And 15:49:51 25 so the opportunities for continuous public 15:49:55 236 1 outreach involving astronaut activity will be 15:49:57 2 strongly diminished. 15:50:02 3 Secondly, as you heard, the 15:50:03 4 international partners will be disappointed, 15:50:06 5 and the question I would have is which leader 15:50:09 6 of a partner country or, for that matter, 15:50:12 7 ours would be comfortable to operate a 15:50:16 8 capacity -- operate the station for only five 15:50:22 9 years when it took 25 years to build. 15:50:26 10 And finally, of course, as just the 15:50:28 11 same consideration of supply to the financial 15:50:33 12 return from ISS hard stop as did from the 15:50:35 13 shuttle, only a certain portion will be 15:50:40 14 available for program development and new 15:50:42 15 technology. 15:50:44 16 But finally -- and this is the point 15:50:46 17 I'd like to make -- the station is an area of 15:50:48 18 clear and unchallenged U.S. leadership. 15:50:52 19 Other countries can and are building new 15:50:58 20 launch vehicles equivalent -- all of the way 15:51:01 21 up to, say, heavy lift. Other stations (sic) 15:51:04 22 are building human capsules. No one is 15:51:09 23 building a space station and we have a 15:51:12 24 20-year lead in that area and that is an 15:51:15 25 assess in being -- a leadership asset in 15:51:18 237 1 being. 15:51:22 2 So then that -- we turn then to the 15:51:23 3 question, well, if all of those downsides are 15:51:26 4 true and we're not sure it's worth the 15:51:29 5 savings, what about ISS renewal beyond 2016 15:51:31 6 through at least 2020 with no implication 15:51:37 7 that it stops at 2020 but no implication that 15:51:40 8 it would continue. And it's our view that we 15:51:42 9 would like to propose to the rest of the 15:51:48 10 committee that ISS renewal be part of sort of 15:51:50 11 a base foundational part of whatever strategy 15:51:54 12 for exploration the rest of us want to build. 15:51:59 13 So then looking at the U.S. and 15:52:03 14 international partners, it's clear they'll 15:52:06 15 feel there's a greater return on their 15:52:10 16 investment, and as we've noted, they've all 15:52:13 17 stated they want an extension. 15:52:16 18 For us one of the most important 15:52:18 19 reasons we think is that it will encourage 15:52:21 20 the COTS launch industry and give them 15:52:24 21 assurance of a market and a place to go for 15:52:28 22 their independent ventures for another five 15:52:32 23 years. 15:52:34 24 I think it will promote innovation in 15:52:34 25 the following way. We've never really had 15:52:37 238 1 operational -- a full utilization experience 15:52:40 2 of a fully operating station. And somebody 15:52:44 3 who has a bright idea now probably won't be 15:52:48 4 able to get it implemented in the next five 15:52:53 5 years, but with a five-year extension after 15:52:55 6 that, there's a greater certainty that you -- 15:52:58 7 a new idea now can actually reach -- can 15:52:59 8 actually make it onto the station. 15:53:01 9 And so as a result, we think this 15:53:04 10 will promote the National Lab, as Leroy has 15:53:07 11 mentioned, commercial ventures besides COTS 15:53:10 12 and particularly U.S. science, which was 15:53:14 13 sacrificed in favor of the development of 15:53:20 14 several of our human space flight capacities. 15:53:23 15 That program needs to be reconstructed, and 15:53:25 16 the PI who wanted to start now probably 15:53:28 17 wouldn't fly with a new idea until 2016 or 15:53:31 18 beyond. 15:53:36 19 Finally, here's something -- when the 15:53:37 20 station was first proposed, there wasn't an 15:53:40 21 exploration objective. Now NASA has one. We 15:53:45 22 all share it. And the addition of an 15:53:48 23 exploration objective to the activities of 15:53:53 24 shuttle -- of station -- sorry -- really 15:53:56 25 strengthens its use, because now the station 15:54:01 239 1 can become a testbed for the technologies and 15:54:05 2 operational procedures that support 15:54:07 3 exploration goals. 15:54:08 4 Finally, with the extension and the 15:54:11 5 greater emphasis on utilization for all of 15:54:14 6 these reasons, it becomes prudent to consider 15:54:18 7 whether or not we ought to redesign the user 15:54:21 8 interface and management operation and 15:54:27 9 redesign it institutionally to better suit 15:54:29 10 the operation and utilization needs of the 15:54:30 11 future. And one of the ideas that we've 15:54:34 12 heard is something like the Hubble Space 15:54:37 13 Telescope Science Institute but obviously 15:54:39 14 optimized for human work. 15:54:42 15 Another option that is opened by 15:54:45 16 shuttle extension is the renegotiation of the 15:54:48 17 agreement itself in 2016. All of the 15:54:52 18 partners would need to be involved rather 15:54:55 19 soon in discussions, and the content of that 15:54:57 20 agreement could be enlarged in ways that 15:55:02 21 might be useful to the United States, and 15:55:05 22 we've identified two ways. First, to 15:55:07 23 consider ways to broaden the international 15:55:10 24 ISS partnership in line with our foreign 15:55:13 25 policy goals, but another one, which could be 15:55:16 240 1 just as interesting, is -- and here, Leroy, 15:55:20 2 you mentioned it again -- to broaden the 15:55:24 3 goals perhaps of that ISS partnership to 15:55:27 4 include exploration so that the ISS 15:55:30 5 partnership begins to work in the way that it 15:55:33 6 would when we have a full up exploration 15:55:36 7 program. 15:55:40 8 So then having -- if you, in fact, 15:55:41 9 think that ISS extension and -- sorry -- ISS 15:55:44 10 renewal is the word I ought to use -- should 15:55:48 11 be part of our baseline in that period, then 15:55:52 12 we come back full circle to the arguments 15:55:55 13 that Sally made about shuttle's supplementary 15:55:59 14 Options 1 and 2. 15:56:04 15 It may, for example, be worthwhile to 15:56:07 16 launch additional shuttle flights for the 15:56:10 17 purposes of resupply of a longer living 15:56:13 18 station and putting up critical and large 15:56:15 19 parts in orbit. Everybody -- we have seen no 15:56:21 20 lack of confidence that the station can be 15:56:25 21 resupplied by the international partnership, 15:56:27 22 but one thing is certain that the events 15:56:30 23 won't -- with the new players and new 15:56:33 24 systems, events won't unfold as planned, so 15:56:35 25 that having a shuttle capacity on hand may be 15:56:38 241 1 useful. 15:56:42 2 And certainly because of its heavy up 15:56:42 3 and downmass capacity, it can strong -- it 15:56:46 4 can give a boost to early utilization. So it 15:56:48 5 will backstop the new international resupply. 15:56:53 6 It, of course, would have a smoother 15:56:57 7 workforce and operations transition, but as 15:57:00 8 Sally pointed out, financially any extension 15:57:00 9 of shuttle beyond the 2011 shutdown probably 15:57:03 10 makes sense only in the context in which the 15:57:08 11 rest of you may decide that the world and 15:57:11 12 NASA needs a heavy-lift vehicle that is 15:57:15 13 shuttle-derived. 15:57:20 14 So that's how we -- in some ways, 15:57:29 15 that's one gloss over how we got to where we 15:57:29 16 are, and that's what -- somehow those are -- 15:57:29 17 I'm hoping to provide you some words to offer 15:57:29 18 when the time comes. So thank you. 15:57:36 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 15:43:00 20 DR. KENNEL: Now, I think we can have 15:43:00 21 questions. 15:57:40 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sally, do you want to 15:57:40 23 add a last word? 15:57:40 24 DR. RIDE: You know, I think that my 15:57:44 25 last word would be that we're now -- we want 15:57:46 242 1 to hear from the rest of the panel. We've 15:57:47 2 got a lot of detail behind each of these 15:57:50 3 scenarios that we've looked at. We've looked 15:57:54 4 at other things in addition and narrowed it 15:57:56 5 down to these. 15:57:59 6 We think that we -- you know, we've 15:58:00 7 tried to identify the big issues, and we've 15:58:03 8 try to put at least a logical thread through 15:58:05 9 some of the scenarios that we looked at and 15:58:13 10 give you a sense of why we picked these as 15:58:14 11 ones to bring forward to the committee. But, 15:58:15 12 you know, now we're really interested in 15:58:19 13 trying to narrow down our scenarios and begin 15:58:20 14 to integrate them or at least do work that 15:58:26 15 would help to integrate them with things that 15:58:29 16 the other panel members might have. 15:58:31 17 I would add one thing, and that is -- 15:58:34 18 I think you probably gathered this from -- a 15:58:37 19 little bit from my presentation, quite a bit 15:58:41 20 from Leroy and Charlie. One thing that we 15:58:44 21 would like to recommend to the full committee 15:58:49 22 just for consideration is that all of the 15:58:51 23 options that we put forward contain an 15:58:53 24 extension of ISS. 15:58:56 25 We didn't start off with that 15:58:59 243 1 perspective. But just the last, I think -- 15:59:02 2 the last month and then particularly the last 15:59:05 3 two weeks when we've really delved into the 15:59:07 4 issue of ISS and gotten a wide variety of 15:59:12 5 perspectives, I think that we have 15:59:16 6 individually and as a group come to the 15:59:19 7 conclusion that we don't think that de-orbit 15:59:22 8 of ISS in 2016 makes sense, and we also think 15:59:24 9 that if de-orbit were going to be 15:59:30 10 contemplated that there is an awful lot of 15:59:33 11 work to do in thinking about exactly how that 15:59:36 12 would be done and what the implications might 15:59:39 13 be and that we're not certain that -- we're 15:59:43 14 fairly certain that all of those costs have 15:59:47 15 not been captured. So there may be a little 15:59:50 16 bit of a false choice here just in the budget 15:59:55 17 that you could gain in 2016. 15:59:58 18 So, you know, I think that we would 16:00:01 19 like to put forward that, yes, we know we 16:00:02 20 need to review the program of record as it 16:00:05 21 stands in the plan but we think that all of 16:00:08 22 the options going forward should continue ISS 16:00:13 23 extension in some form. 16:00:16 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you all. 16:00:16 25 I certainly have to say it's one of the finer 16:00:18 244 1 pieces of work I've seen on an airline bag, 16:00:20 2 if nothing else. 16:00:20 3 I think I'm going to take the liberty 16:00:26 4 of starting out, if I may. I'd like to just 16:00:28 5 for test purposes make three controversial 16:00:32 6 provocative statements -- emphasis this is 16:00:37 7 hypothetical, all right. 16:00:40 8 And the first one would be that there 16:00:41 9 seems to be great arguments for international 16:00:45 10 participation/partnerships. From our 16:00:50 11 partners' standpoint, if they're not on the 16:00:56 12 critical path occasionally, they're fairly 16:00:59 13 hallow partnerships. From our standpoint, we 16:01:03 14 probably don't benefit that much if they're 16:01:03 15 not occasionally on this critical path. 16:01:05 16 We currently have such a situation 16:01:07 17 where we have a partner on a critical path, 16:01:07 18 and everybody is all unhappy about it. It 16:01:07 19 seems to me we can't have it both ways. 16:01:07 20 The second provocative statement: 16:01:17 21 Would the U.S. taxpayer have been so excited 16:01:22 22 about paying for Apollo if Neil and Buzz had 16:01:28 23 put a UN flag on the Moon. 16:01:30 24 And, thirdly -- I'm now going to put 16:01:34 25 aside geopolitics, which I've just been 16:01:38 245 1 talking about here -- talking about ISS, if 16:01:41 2 one accepts that much of the science 16:01:45 3 community believes there's no value in 16:01:49 4 continuing the ISS -- and we would put aside 16:01:52 5 geopolitics -- then presumably the only real 16:01:55 6 reason for continuing the ISS would be as 16:02:00 7 testbed, but testbed for what. 16:02:00 8 Is it a testbed for the Moon? The 16:02:03 9 answer is probably no because we know how to 16:02:05 10 go to the Moon. So it must be a testbed for 16:02:08 11 Mars. But we've just said going to the Moon 16:02:11 12 is our testbed for Mars. And if you don't 16:02:12 13 commit to going to -- and, secondly, if you 16:02:16 14 don't commit to going to Mars, does it make 16:02:19 15 any sense to having an ISS testbed. 16:02:21 16 So those are three provocative 16:02:24 17 statements with a subset B of the third one. 16:02:26 18 And you've got 20 words or less. 16:02:29 19 DR. RIDE: Well, let's see. Which 16:02:33 20 one of those do I want to wade into first? 16:02:34 21 MR. McALISTER: I wrote them down. 16:02:41 22 DR. RIDE: Oh, yeah. 16:02:43 23 MR. McALISTER: Oh, you wrote them 16:02:42 24 down too? 16:02:42 25 DR. RIDE: I wrote them down. 16:02:43 246 1 Actually so let me start with Neil 16:02:44 2 and Buzz planting the UN flag and what would 16:02:48 3 the public have thought about that. I'm 16:02:50 4 going to just skirt what the public might 16:02:50 5 have thought about it in 1969 and just say 16:02:51 6 that I don't pretend to be the expert in 16:02:54 7 geopolitics nor do I want to be and we've got 16:03:00 8 others on the panel who have got more 16:03:05 9 experience than I do. But I would say that 16:03:08 10 we're in a different world and that the world 16:03:11 11 of the race to the Moon was a world of 16:03:13 12 competition. The world of today is much more 16:03:16 13 a multipolar world. It's much more a world 16:03:19 14 of global cooperation. It's been moving more 16:03:23 15 and more towards that. 16:03:27 16 And as I'm sure Les would remind me 16:03:29 17 if I didn't say it, it's really important 16:03:33 18 that we align the space program -- whatever 16:03:37 19 space program we come up with, we have to 16:03:40 20 make sure that it's aligned to national needs 16:03:44 21 to what the United States believes is 16:03:46 22 important to help it accomplish its broader 16:03:49 23 goals. 16:03:52 24 And I think it's -- you know, we all 16:03:53 25 like designing rockets and we all like 16:03:57 247 1 designing architectures, but at the end of 16:04:00 2 the day, the space program is a national 16:04:03 3 program and it really needs to reflect what 16:04:05 4 we, as a country, think is important to us 16:04:09 5 today. 16:04:12 6 And that having been said, I think 16:04:13 7 that I'd like to dispense with the argument 16:04:17 8 that, you know, we should go back to the idea 16:04:26 9 of Apollo and U.S. pride and U.S. go it alone 16:04:29 10 and be the leader in the space station and go 16:04:36 11 to the Moon and decide how to get there and 16:04:40 12 invite some others to join us. I'd rather 16:04:42 13 say that the illustration and demonstration 16:04:45 14 of leadership in today's world is more to 16:04:47 15 forge international partnership and to use 16:04:52 16 that partnership to promote a common goal. 16:04:56 17 GENERAL LYLES: If I could add on 16:05:08 18 that particular topic, this was a major theme 16:05:08 19 at the recent NASA Research Council study 16:05:08 20 about the goals and rationales for our civil 16:05:10 21 space programs. And, sure, we talked about 16:05:13 22 alignment to national needs, but we also 16:05:15 23 talked a lot about international cooperation 16:05:17 24 and we put it in the context of preeminence 16:05:20 25 for our space program. 16:05:22 248 1 And I think we all, particularly in 16:05:24 2 this subcommittee, agree that maintaining 16:05:25 3 preeminence for the United States is 16:05:22 4 something that we do not want to give us. 16:05:29 5 But preeminence does not mean dominate, and 16:05:32 6 it doesn't mean dominance. 16:05:32 7 And the sign today in this 16:05:37 8 international global world of a good leader 16:05:38 9 is not somebody who dominates something but 16:05:38 10 somebody knows when to lead, when to follow 16:05:41 11 or when to get out of the way. And to be a 16:05:43 12 good leader, you have to really be able to 16:05:47 13 play all of those three roles. 16:05:50 14 And I think that becomes very, very 16:05:51 15 important in developing our further 16:05:52 16 international partnerships and figuring out 16:05:52 17 the roles that we will play vis-à-vis other 16:05:54 18 nations and the capabilities they can bring 19 to the picture even if it's on a critical 20 path. 21 And on that topic, critical path, I 22 just have to take a lesson from my DOD 23 experience -- and yours obviously also, Norm. 24 In sometimes getting cooperation in major 16:06:10 25 programs -- call it, for instance, an F-16 or 16:06:13 249 1 something else -- we look for partnership 16:06:16 2 arrangements, and we look for offsets. And 16:06:18 3 those offsets don't always weigh in favor of 16:06:21 4 the United States' best industrial interests, 16:06:26 5 but in the long run, they end up being good 16:06:26 6 for the overall good of the nation and good 16:06:28 7 of the total program. 16:06:29 8 And there may be a lesson learned we 16:06:30 9 can look at in that context for NASA's space 16:06:34 10 programs too. 16:06:40 11 DR. KENNEL: Norm, if I could add a 16:06:40 12 couple of comments. First of all, I don't 16:06:42 13 think the UN has a space agency, and so I'm 16:06:44 14 not sure they can build a spacecraft. 16:06:48 15 But in a more general sense, there's 16:06:53 16 now an increasing collection of fairly 16:06:54 17 competent space agencies around the world, 16:06:57 18 and one can ask -- one can ask what together 16:07:00 19 can we do that we might not be able to do 16:07:02 20 alone. And in that regard, I've heard a 16:07:07 21 rather eloquent definition of soft power, 16:07:11 22 which is that the U.S., through technical 16:07:11 23 excellence and considerate behavior, make 16:07:15 24 people want to do what you want them to do. 16:07:21 25 And so that's the way we can exert 16:07:24 250 1 leadership, and I think it's possible to have 16:07:27 2 national pride in the fact that we are 16:07:30 3 leading the fleet. 16:07:33 4 DR. RIDE: I think I'd add one more 16:07:41 5 thing on the international discussion. 16:07:41 6 It's been a long -- (inaudible) -- 16:07:41 7 we've heard from all of the international 16:07:41 8 partners about the value -- (inaudible) -- of 16:07:57 9 ISS was not the station itself but was the 16:07:57 10 international framework -- the partnership 16:08:05 11 framework that has allowed, you know, these 16:08:07 12 five entities, 14 countries, to successfully 16:08:10 13 collaborate through good times and bad for 16:08:16 14 decades now and that that is very unusual and 16:08:19 15 it's not something to be -- it's not 16:08:22 16 something to be tossed out lightly, that it's 16:08:25 17 an excellent -- it's an existing framework, 16:08:29 18 it works well and it's something that we can 16:08:31 19 use to build on in the future. 16:08:34 20 You want us to go down your list, 16:08:37 21 don't you? 16:08:41 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: I do. I would 16:08:42 23 emphasize I raise these because I think they 16:08:44 24 ought to be on the record. 16:08:45 25 And also I think that Leroy had an 16:08:47 251 1 important point that I would footnote. That 16:08:52 2 is that the ISS partnership is a wonderful 16:08:54 3 foundation as far as further exploration -- 16:08:57 4 international partnership -- a great place to 16:09:01 5 build from. 16:09:06 6 DR. CHIAO: Absolutely. And the 16:09:09 7 point should also be underscored that not 16:09:11 8 only does it serve as a good foundation for 16:09:11 9 future space exploration but, as Les and 16:09:13 10 Sally have talked about, also for future 16:09:15 11 international cooperation in other areas as 16:09:18 12 well. 16:09:22 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think you answered 16:09:22 14 the first two really, Sally, between you and 16:09:24 15 your partners there. Why don't you do the 16:09:26 16 third one. 16:09:29 17 DR. RIDE: Okay. I'll just make one 16:09:30 18 more comment -- avoiding the third one for as 19 long as possible -- 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. 21 DR. RIDE: -- I'll make one more 22 comment. 23 Another thing that we heard 16:09:39 24 consistently from the international 16:09:39 25 partners -- and I think both Leroy and 16:09:41 252 1 Charlie mentioned it, but it's worth 16:09:41 2 highlighting -- they all saw ISS as a 16:09:44 3 potential path towards exploration, and each 16:09:47 4 had a different perspective on that and a 16:09:51 5 slightly different point of view and a 16:09:55 6 different way that they'd implement it. But 16:09:57 7 they saw ISS as their way of starting to get 16:10:00 8 into exploration. 16:10:03 9 That's not the way that we've been 16:10:04 10 viewing ISS in this country, but it's 16:10:06 11 important to know that that's the perspective 16:10:09 12 that they've got. And so if ISS is extended, 16:10:10 13 they'd like it to be its -- you know, kind of 16:10:14 14 its charter to be expanded to allow them to 16:10:19 15 be thinking about that as they go forward. 16:10:22 16 Which is why we thought that it's actually a 16:10:25 17 very natural framework to build from to form 16:10:27 18 an international partnership around 16:10:31 19 exploration should that be something that we 16:10:34 20 wanted to lay out as one of the options or 16:10:36 21 wanted to recommend. 16:10:40 22 DR. AUSTIN: Sally, as an extension 16:10:42 23 to ISS, we could also consider redefining the 16:10:44 24 model and the relationship of, you know, our 16:10:48 25 involvement in that partnership as well. So 16:10:50 253 1 I think that there's some opportunities there 16:10:53 2 that say that we don't have to do business 16:10:55 3 exactly the way we've been doing business. 16:10:57 4 DR. RIDE: Yeah. We actually agree 16:11:00 5 with that. 16:11:02 6 And, Charlie, Leroy, I don't know if 16:11:02 7 you want to weigh in here. 16:11:04 8 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. Exactly. We do 16:11:09 9 agree with, and especially if we're going to 16:11:10 10 expand the partnership, that's an excellent 16:11:13 11 opportunity to kind of open it all up and 16:11:14 12 say, okay, what makes sense going forward, 16:11:18 13 what should the partnership look like, what 16:11:18 14 should be modified. 16:11:20 15 DR. RIDE: And we think that it's -- 16:11:20 16 there are opportunities here, in thinking 16:11:22 17 about the years beyond 2015, to think 16:11:24 18 reasonably creatively -- and, you know 16:11:28 19 probably happily we don't have time to do 16:11:31 20 that in the next two weeks, but I think that 16:11:34 21 there's definitely room for some creative 16:11:38 22 thought on what a management structure might 16:11:42 23 look like, how the partnership might evolve 16:11:46 24 and also how the management structure might 16:11:48 25 evolve, possibly for some cost savings, some 16:11:53 254 1 increased efficiency or just to focus it more 16:11:56 2 on utilization. 16:11:59 3 And, you know, we started to ask 16:12:02 4 those questions, and it became very clear 16:12:04 5 that in the time frame that we've got and the 16:12:04 6 number of issues that we have to deal with we 16:12:09 7 just weren't going to get very far on that 16:12:12 8 particular area. But we actually think that 16:12:15 9 should the station be extended that that's a 16:12:18 10 very important thing to follow up on. 16:12:22 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. I saw 16:12:25 12 Jeff next and then -- everybody? Okay. 16:12:25 13 Everybody. 16:12:32 14 MR. GREASON: Well, let me first 16:12:32 15 do -- this is actually the very first time 16:12:33 16 that we've actually been able to start 16:12:35 17 something like a discussion, which is all 16:12:36 18 supposed to happen in public. So you're 16:12:38 19 seeing the sausage being made. 16:12:40 20 DR. RIDE: Scary. 16:12:43 21 MR. GREASON: But, you know, having 16:12:45 22 said that, I love the idea of using ISS as an 16:12:46 23 exploration platform. And the pain of 16:12:51 24 sponsoring ISS is obviously horrific to 16:12:53 25 contemplate. 16:12:57 255 1 But, you know, if we extend ISS so 16:12:58 2 that we can use it as a platform to get ready 16:13:01 3 for exploration, we're using it to get ready 16:13:03 4 for exploration which we may no longer be 16:13:03 5 able to afford to do. And, you know, we've 16:13:08 6 been hearing for many weeks from a lot of 16:13:11 7 dedicated people who have given years of 16:13:14 8 their life to doing an exploration 16:13:18 9 architecture -- which you can sort of kind of 16:13:20 10 maybe imagine if you sharpen your pencil very 16:13:21 11 carefully you might shoehorn into something, 16:13:24 12 and then if you take 15 billion out of the 16:13:26 13 top of that, it's just like game over, you 16:13:27 14 know. 16:13:27 15 So is it -- granted that it's 16:13:29 16 valuable, is it that valuable? 16:13:32 17 DR. RIDE: Yes. You know, so I 16:13:38 18 think -- I think that that's a very fair 16:13:40 19 question, and it's exactly -- you know, it's 16:13:42 20 at the heart of what we're wrestling with. 16:13:44 21 And, you know, I just -- I think that 16:13:49 22 with the investment that our country has made 16:13:50 23 in the space station -- and that, by the way, 16:13:52 24 we have encouraged other countries to make 16:13:56 25 out of -- at significant portions of their 16:13:59 256 1 entire space budgets to make -- that, first 16:14:04 2 of all, you have to ask whether this is even 16:14:08 3 our decision to make alone. And, you know, 16:14:11 4 I'm not sure that it is. So clearly there's 16:14:14 5 a broader discussion that needs to happen if, 16:14:17 6 in fact, we do decide to de-orbit ISS. 16:14:22 7 And then if we do decide to de-orbit 16:14:23 8 it because there's the next neat thing, 16:14:27 9 exploration beyond it, then, you know, you 16:14:32 10 have to step back and say, okay, so wait a 16:14:34 11 second, how did we get ourselves into all of 16:14:34 12 this. Well, we had Apollo and we had a 16:14:38 13 Saturn V, which was a heavy-lift launch 16:14:42 14 vehicle, and we threw that away so that we 16:14:44 15 can build the next cool thing, which at the 16:14:47 16 time ended up being the space shuttle, which 16:14:52 17 would then assemble a space station. So the 16:14:55 18 space shuttle has been used for now a very 16:14:59 19 long time to assemble and develop this 16:14:59 20 absolutely -- actually unbelievable 16:15:03 21 capability in low Earth orbit. And, okay -- 16:15:06 22 (verbally indicating) -- got that built. Now 16:15:09 23 let's get rid of it and start something else. 16:15:11 24 And, you know, that's just a -- 16:15:15 25 that's a philosophy that I don't like. So if 16:15:18 257 1 I were asked to make that trade today, which 16:15:23 2 is an extremely painful trade to make 16:15:25 3 because, you know, exploration is what -- 16:15:28 4 it's why I went into the space program, it's 16:15:31 5 why Leroy went into the space program, it's 16:15:36 6 why there is a space program, you know, 16:15:38 7 it's -- or it's why there's an astronaut 16:15:39 8 office in the space program. 16:15:41 9 You know, if I were asked to make 16:15:43 10 that trade today, I would really have trouble 16:15:45 11 choosing exploration over the space station. 16:15:48 12 And I hope it's one -- Ed, we're leaving it 16:15:51 13 to your subgroup to keep that from being a 16:15:53 14 trade that we have to make as a panel. 16:15:59 15 DR. CRAWLEY: May I respond, 16:16:01 16 Mr. Chairman? 16:16:03 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yes. Since you're 16:16:03 18 under attack, we'll let you go first and then 16:16:05 19 we'll just -- 16:16:13 20 DR. CRAWLEY: No, no. 16:16:13 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- we'll work down 16:16:08 22 this way, I think. 16:16:08 23 DR. CRAWLEY: I think Dr. Ride has 16:16:14 24 invited the response -- and I will rise to it 16:16:16 25 as a sort of loyal opposition -- to reveal to 16:16:17 258 1 the American people that we have not, in 16:16:18 2 fact, come to any decision but are genuinely 16:16:19 3 debating this. 16:16:22 4 I have in front of me the task from 16:16:23 5 the White House, which has four bullets, 16:16:25 6 three of which are to expedite a new 16:16:29 7 capability for the ISS, the second is to 16:16:29 8 support missions to the Moon and destinations 16:16:34 9 beyond and the third is to fit within the 16:16:37 10 budget. 16:16:39 11 And I think what we have revealed 16:16:40 12 before us today is the beginning of the 16:16:41 13 tension reflected by this charter to us and 16:16:44 14 the wisdom of entrusting this problem, Norm, 16:16:47 15 to you to act in a Solomon-like way and find 16:16:53 16 a solution by the end of the month, not even 16:16:58 17 the end of the decade as Kennedy gave us. 16:17:02 18 But while the arguments put forward 16:17:06 19 by my colleagues, each one of which 16:17:09 20 individually is entirely rational and sound, 16:17:12 21 on mass they propose a policy of 16:17:16 22 continuation. And it is always comfortable 16:17:21 23 for organizations to propose continuation 16:17:23 24 because it's what you do and what you know, 16:17:28 25 what your stakeholders are engaged in, but 16:17:29 259 1 the essential policy of continuation which 16:17:34 2 has been proposed is to take the two programs 16:17:38 3 which have absorbed the vast majority, if not 16:17:41 4 all, of the human space flight budget of the 16:17:46 5 nation for the last 20 to 40 years, in the 16:17:49 6 case of the shuttle, and to extend them an 16:17:51 7 additional five -- or parts of five years 16:17:54 8 each. 16:17:56 9 DR. KENNEL: (Inaudible.) 16:17:59 10 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, you have a 16:18:01 11 proposal that goes -- and has several flights 16:18:03 12 out into the period up to '14. 16:18:06 13 DR. KENNEL: Only in -- only in one. 16:18:09 14 DR. RIDE: That's only -- that's only 16:18:12 15 one. 16:18:01 16 DR. CRAWLEY: In one of several -- 16:18:01 17 DR. RIDE: That's actually not our -- 16:18:01 18 I want to be clear that's not our 16:18:12 19 recommendation. We're making no 16:18:13 20 recommendation between our three shuttle 16:18:15 21 scenarios and -- 16:18:19 22 DR. CRAWLEY: You have proposed 16:18:19 23 options which go this far. 16:18:21 24 DR. RIDE: We've proposed three 16:18:21 25 shuttle options just to span the trade space. 16:18:23 260 1 We are suggested, however, among the ISS 16:18:25 2 options that the ISS continue in some form. 16:18:27 3 DR. CRAWLEY: But what this 16:18:31 4 essentially does, in view of the 16:18:33 5 understanding that we have, as Jeff started 16:18:34 6 to get at, of the fixed cost -- marginal cost 16:18:38 7 structure, is that the effect of this would 16:18:38 8 be to push off exploration probably within 16:18:42 9 the fixed budget constraints by a not 16:18:44 10 incommensurate amount of time. So that the 16:18:48 11 policy proposed by the president in 2004, 16:18:54 12 reaffirmed by the Congress in 2006 and 2008, 16:18:56 13 invited by the new president in 2009 would, 16:19:00 14 in fact, not be implemented until well into 16:19:04 15 the next decade. 16:19:07 16 And I think that this is something 16:19:08 17 that really does reveal the fundamental 16:19:10 18 tension that we're struggling with. And I'm 16:19:14 19 not trying to pick a fight even though I'm 16:19:17 20 happy to -- 16:19:20 21 DR. RIDE: I think that's why they 16:19:21 22 put us so far away from each other, Ed. 16:19:23 23 DR. CRAWLEY: But we do -- but this 16:19:35 24 is -- this is in some senses -- and tomorrow 16:19:35 25 we hear from Bo about just how easy or 16:19:35 261 1 difficult this is in order to support from a 16:19:35 2 launch vehicle perspective, but it is a real 16:19:35 3 difficult challenge. And I think, once 16:19:38 4 again, this is something that the committee 16:19:39 5 has discussed. 16:19:41 6 DR. RIDE: And actually, Ed, you 16:19:42 7 know, you're not going to surprised to hear 16:19:43 8 that I actually agree with you. 16:19:45 9 I mean, I think that our subgroup -- 16:19:46 10 you know, we had the shuttle and the station 16:19:50 11 to look at and we've looked at them and we've 16:19:54 12 come up with options on one and a point of 16:19:57 13 view on the other. 16:19:59 14 But I think that what this is really 16:20:02 15 revealing, besides, you know, the difficult 16:20:05 16 job that, you know, we have all got 16:20:09 17 collectively to try to mesh what our 16:20:12 18 subcommittees are uncovering, is that -- just 16:20:15 19 as Norm said at the beginning, you know, NASA 16:20:19 20 has traditionally been given broad goals and 16:20:23 21 inadequate funding, and you can't have -- you 16:20:29 22 can't expect the agency to achieve grand and 16:20:32 23 glorious goals and not -- if you're not going 16:20:37 24 to give them the resources that are required 16:20:41 25 to do it. 16:20:43 262 1 And if our group showed nothing else, 16:20:44 2 we hope it showed that NASA has not been 16:20:48 3 given the resources to support this vision 16:20:51 4 that now two presidents have been supporting 16:20:54 5 and that a congress has been supporting. You 16:20:58 6 know, these are the people that should be 16:21:02 7 giving the agency the money and the agency 16:21:04 8 has not been given the money and we're 16:21:07 9 looking at the result of that. 16:21:10 10 So to try to fit a program into this 16:21:12 11 budget that already isn't enough and to make 16:21:17 12 it, you know, more grand and glorious is 16:21:22 13 almost falling into the same trap of saying, 16:21:26 14 yeah, we really want to do something cool 16:21:31 15 because, you know, we're -- I mean, we all 16:21:33 16 love this stuff, and we want to be doing cool 16:21:35 17 things. So, you know, you give us 20 bucks 16:21:38 18 and we can do anything. 16:21:41 19 And so I think that part of our job 16:21:42 20 is going to be to not let -- not let the 16:21:44 21 Administration and Congress put NASA back in 16:21:50 22 this box and to make it really clear that if 16:21:54 23 you want -- if you want this program, you 16:21:57 24 have to pay for this program; if you want 16:22:00 25 this program, you have to pay for this 16:22:04 263 1 program and you can't cut the corners and 16:22:06 2 start cutting back the costs even in the 16:22:08 3 out-years. 16:22:12 4 DR. CRAWLEY: And just to show the 16:22:13 5 agreement that we're violently in here, I 16:22:15 6 think, Norm, this is -- reflects on something 16:22:18 7 the committee has discussed in its subgroups, 16:22:21 8 which is this -- what we've come to call 16:22:25 9 NASA's conundrum. This is sort of NASA's 16:22:29 10 conundrum at the highest level, which is that 16:22:34 11 the agency really doesn't in the current 16:22:36 12 budgetary structure have the resources to 16:22:37 13 continue a world-class, world-leading space 16:22:39 14 program and also simultaneously develop the 16:22:45 15 next step in a world-class, world-leading 16:22:48 16 space program. 16:22:53 17 And this is the tension. You know, 16:22:54 18 in some senses, my group has to examine what 16:22:56 19 we will do, Sally has to examine what we are 16:22:59 20 doing and the two don't staple together 16:23:01 21 inside the budget. 16:23:04 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, I think the 16:23:04 23 thing that we have to do is be sure that we 16:23:06 24 don't continue to choose the program for 16:23:08 25 Option A and the budget for Option E. 16:23:11 264 1 (Inaudible.) 16:23:11 2 I think I made someone mad there. 16:23:28 3 DR. CRAWLEY: There are two unstable 16:23:28 4 poles in that system. 16:23:30 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. 16:23:31 6 DR. CRAWLEY: At least. 16:23:28 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Who's next? 16:23:32 8 Okay. Bo, it's your turn. 16:23:34 9 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Well, I love -- I 16:23:38 10 see the value of ISS. It's a potential 16:23:38 11 destination for growth of commercials -- 16:23:42 12 wonderful. It's a wonderful testbed for 16:23:46 13 international cooperation, and if you want to 16:23:49 14 do some of the things we'll hear from Ed, we 16:23:52 15 will need to learn how to do that more. 16:23:55 16 I hate destruction of a perfect 16:23:58 17 asset. And I think we ought to think -- I 16:24:00 18 don't know if we can think all of that big, 16:24:04 19 but we ought to think bigger and paint some 16:24:06 20 scenarios which involve usage of that asset. 16:24:12 21 What I have a little bit of a problem with is 16:24:14 22 today for us to commit ourselves or 16:24:17 23 declare -- before we've heard from Ed -- is 16:24:22 24 that we should make ISS as a part of every 16:24:24 25 scenario. It's too early. 16:24:27 265 1 We need to look at that in an 16:24:29 2 integrated picture -- launch vehicles, ISS 16:24:31 3 and SSP and Ed's beyond LEO scenarios -- and 16:24:35 4 then -- only then we can look at the 16:24:42 5 integrated picture of the several 16:24:44 6 scenarios and see how we can make or make not 16:24:46 7 ISS fit into these scenarios. 16:24:48 8 In my opinion, it's too early today 16:24:49 9 to suggest that we should do every scenario, 16:24:51 10 which we haven't heard yet, to say that ISS 16:24:55 11 is a part of each one of those. But I do 16:24:59 12 believe that we are to have more than one 16:25:02 13 scenario that does involve extension of that 16:25:07 14 valuable asset for the reasons that 16:25:08 15 everyone -- 16:25:09 16 DR. RIDE: We agree that we don't 16:25:09 17 want to make that decision today, but we 16:25:11 18 wanted to get it out on the table today as 16:25:15 19 our recommendation that it be included in 16:25:16 20 every scenario, because I know that you folks 16:25:17 21 are doing -- thinking around budgets that are 16:25:21 22 very likely, in many cases, already taking 16:25:25 23 that assumed savings so that you can build 16:25:28 24 larger programs. 16:25:32 25 And so we want to have it in your 16:25:33 266 1 mind, you know, in the next day and a half, 16:25:37 2 you know, as you're getting ready to present 16:25:39 3 your options of certainly, number one, 16:25:43 4 appreciating what you're doing if you take 16:25:46 5 that money for the exploration program and 16:25:48 6 also begin to just think about -- you know, 16:25:51 7 just expand your thinking a little bit now 16:25:55 8 that you've had a chance to hear from us for 16:25:57 9 literally the first time on this 16:26:00 10 particular -- you know, this particular 16:26:02 11 subject. 16:26:04 12 So I think that that's -- you know, 16:26:04 13 as I said at the beginning, our goal is to 16:26:06 14 come out of this week of, you know, kind of 16:26:09 15 the discussions and debate with some 16:26:11 16 decisions on what we've suggested and some 16:26:15 17 more integrated approaches. 16:26:19 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let me call on Chris, 16:26:23 19 and then I think I'll -- oh, we've got one 16:26:25 20 more comment. 16:26:27 21 DR. CHIAO: Yeah. I just wanted to 16:26:29 22 add to that -- to what Sally is saying. And, 16:26:30 23 Bo, I don't disagree with what you're saying. 16:26:32 24 And like Sally said, we wanted to get that 16:26:33 25 out on the table because we have each 16:26:33 267 1 independently and then collectively agreed 16:26:36 2 that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages 16:26:38 3 of keeping ISS around until at least 2020 but 16:26:42 4 agree that, as a committee, it's too early to 16:26:46 5 say, okay, we can't have any option paths 16:26:49 6 stitched together that don't keep ISS. 16:26:52 7 But what we have to realize is that 16:26:54 8 we've heard very strongly from all of the IPs 16:26:56 9 that if, in fact, we end this in 2016 -- they 16:27:00 10 haven't come right out and said it, but I 16:27:03 11 think we can forget about having 16:27:05 12 international participation in exploration. 16:27:05 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Chris, then 16:27:09 14 Jeff and then I'd like to wrap this up to 16:27:11 15 keep us somewhat on our schedule, because we 16:27:13 16 want some public time. 16:27:14 17 DR. CHYBA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 16:27:34 18 I'd like to give a set of reactions to the 19 comments we've heard so far today and then 20 ask a few questions. 21 I think I've heard five arguments so 22 far for extending ISS. And I'd characterized 23 two of those as political, one as political 24 with a strong technical component and two as 16:27:35 25 basically technical. The ones I find most 16:27:35 268 1 impressive are the ones with the political 16:27:39 2 component. 16:27:41 3 The first is just this sort of 16:27:42 4 fundamental absurdity of de-orbiting a 16:27:43 5 $60 billion investment five years after you 16:27:47 6 finally get it operational. 16:27:50 7 The second is the importance to our 16:27:50 8 international partners and what that portends 16:27:53 9 for our ability to engage them in future 16:27:55 10 exploration but also the possibility that 16:27:59 11 this could be a useful model in future 16:28:01 12 international partnerships. Although if 16:28:04 13 we're going to use it that way, it actually 16:28:05 14 has to somehow be extended to other areas of 16:28:07 15 intergovernment cooperation, and there has to 16:28:11 16 be some thought given to how to do that. 16:28:12 17 The third argument, which I consider 16:28:14 18 to be potentially extremely important, is 16:28:18 19 encouraging the private sector to develop a 16:28:21 20 variety of new ways to have competition in 16:28:24 21 getting cargo and then ultimately humans to 16:28:27 22 orbit, the COTS encouragement that we've been 16:28:30 23 talking about. 16:28:33 24 If, in fact, station can be used that 16:28:34 25 way, then, in fact, extending -- there's an 16:28:38 269 1 argument -- and I don't know where I come out 16:28:41 2 on this yet because I don't understand it 16:28:43 3 well enough. 16:28:44 4 There's an argument that extending 16:28:44 5 station, in fact, ultimately is an enabler 16:28:46 6 for getting beyond low Earth orbit because it 16:28:48 7 would help us potentially solve NASA's 16:28:51 8 chronic problem by relieving NASA of the need 16:28:56 9 to get us to low Earth orbit, having the 16:28:57 10 private sector fill in what we know how to do 16:28:59 11 and then having NASA concentrate on the more 16:29:02 12 ambitious type of exploration. 16:29:06 13 So, in fact, I see the potential that 16:29:08 14 the argument for extending station cuts both 16:29:10 15 ways with respect to getting beyond low Earth 16:29:13 16 orbit, and if it's the case -- and we'll talk 16:29:17 17 about this on Thursday -- if it's the case 16:29:19 18 that we can't get beyond low Earth orbit even 16:29:23 19 if we send station into the ocean in 2016 in 16:29:26 20 the budget that we're given, then maybe what 16:29:27 21 we need to think about is how we have to 16:29:28 22 change the current paradigm a bit in order to 16:29:32 23 actually get to where we want to go, which is 16:29:37 24 certainly out into the solar system. 16:29:37 25 There are two technical arguments 16:29:37 270 1 we've heard. And Norm's questions, both of 16:29:41 2 them, I just want to circle back for a moment 16:29:42 3 to them. 16:29:42 4 One is the potential that we'll be 16:29:44 5 doing important science on station now that 16:29:47 6 we finally can have a full crew complement on 16:29:50 7 it. I'm open to that argument. What I want 16:29:56 8 to make sure we do, as a committee, though, 16:29:57 9 is that if we make recommendations that 16:29:57 10 they're highly credible. I don't want to go 16:30:00 11 down the path again where we try to pretend 16:30:03 12 that we -- where we make claims about the 16:30:06 13 science that are going to be achieved on 16:30:09 14 station and the scientific community looks at 16:30:12 15 it and it's a joke. 16:30:15 16 There's an argument, though, I would 16:30:16 17 very much like to hear for the value of the 16:30:17 18 science that will be done and whether it's 16:30:19 19 worth the 10- to $14 billion investment 16:30:22 20 that's going to be required to keep station 16:30:26 21 flying. I'm open to that, but if it's not a 16:30:29 22 major component, we should try to sell this 23 extension on that ground. I just -- I 24 personally doubt that it's what sells the 25 extension, but I'm open to that argument. 271 1 The same thing for using it as a 2 testbed, another technical argument. If 3 there's an honest technical argument to be 4 made there, I'm very open to it and, I would 16:30:43 5 love to see station be used that way. But, 16:30:47 6 again, I don't want a kind of vague 16:30:50 7 overselling of station. I'd rather us be 16:30:51 8 very clear about what it's good for and what 16:30:54 9 it's not so good for. 16:30:57 10 So I'd like to hear at some point 16:30:59 11 those two last technical arguments better 16:31:01 12 articulated, more detailed arguments. 16:31:03 13 And then finally my last question has 16:31:05 14 to do with shuttle extension. And it's a 16:31:08 15 question of whether there isn't some tension 16:31:11 16 between really extending shuttle out to -- 16:31:12 17 Sally, I think you said 2014 in that 16:31:14 18 scenario -- and the importance of using 16:31:16 19 station as supporting the development of a 16:31:20 20 private sector in servicing the station. 16:31:23 21 If that's really an important reason 16:31:26 22 for extending station, then do we undercut 16:31:27 23 that by extending the shuttle out to 2014? 16:31:29 24 DR. RIDE: Yeah. I'm actually 16:31:32 25 glad -- I'll tackle the last one. And then, 16:31:34 272 1 Leroy or Charlie, you want to chime in on 16:31:37 2 Chris' first question. 16:31:38 3 I'm glad you brought that up because 16:31:40 4 that was something that we were hoping would 16:31:42 5 surface as a topic in this discussion. And, 16:31:44 6 again, let me emphasize that we don't really 16:31:48 7 have a point of view on shuttle extension 16:31:52 8 between our three scenarios, but we do think 16:31:57 9 that there's value in considering whether it 16:32:02 10 should be extended in order to provide robust 16:32:05 11 support for station. 16:32:10 12 And our point of view is that that 16:32:11 13 need not and should not diminish the 16:32:13 14 commitment to the COTS providers at all. 16:32:16 15 There is plenty of upmass and a significant 16:32:20 16 amount of downmass that you could envision in 16:32:25 17 a scenario of robust support for station that 16:32:28 18 the COTS providers -- between now and 2014, 16:32:33 19 they just can't provide the HTV and ATV. 16:32:37 20 We've got commitments for those already. I 16:32:41 21 think it's one per year. Just look at our 16:32:45 22 to-scale chart, and you can see how much mass 16:32:47 23 that gets up to station. 16:32:49 24 And then the COTS providers, even 16:32:53 25 assuming that they come in on schedule and at 16:32:54 273 1 the flight rate projected, can't support a 16:32:57 2 robust -- it's not an expansion of station. 16:33:01 3 It's a full utilizing the capacity that's 16:33:06 4 already up there. 16:33:09 5 Right now with our current plans, we 16:33:10 6 will not be using all of the racks, for 16:33:13 7 example, that are on station. I can't 16:33:15 8 remember the percentage occupation right now, 16:33:18 9 but it's at someplace between 50 and 16:33:21 10 75 percent. I just can't remember the 16:33:25 11 number, but we've got it someplace. And then 16:33:26 12 once you've got the additional 16:33:29 13 transportation, you really can't fully 16:33:31 14 utilize it. 16:33:33 15 So, you know, again, all of these 16:33:34 16 things are coupled. If you extend the 16:33:37 17 shuttle, then the only reason to do it -- and 16:33:40 18 we want to make very clear that it should 16:33:44 19 not, cannot, must not compete with and take 16:33:46 20 business away from the COTS providers. It 16:33:50 21 should only be used -- or should be used to 16:33:55 22 make sure that we've got -- that we don't set 16:33:59 23 up station to be, you know, sort of a fragile 16:34:04 24 asset but that we, rather, give it robust 16:34:06 25 support and use that capability to build its 16:34:11 274 1 utilization capacity, you know, to kind of 16:34:14 2 get the throughput of upmass and downmass 16:34:16 3 that's required to get full utilization while 16:34:21 4 the COTS providers are developing the 16:34:22 5 capability to support it at a flight rate 16:34:23 6 that could continue that robust nature of 16:34:24 7 station. 16:34:30 8 So it is definitely not our view that 16:34:30 9 an extension of shuttle would, should or 16:34:33 10 could compete with the COTS providers. We're 16:34:37 11 actually very -- we would love -- we also 16:34:40 12 would love to see NASA get out of the 16:34:43 13 business of, you know, first, cargo resupply 16:34:45 14 to station to low Earth orbit and then 16:34:49 15 eventually human transportation to LEO. 16:34:54 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Jeff... 16:35:03 17 MR. GREASON: Well, I couldn't have 16:35:03 18 asked for a better segueway. Because you 16:35:04 19 said one thing that I wanted to take strong 16:35:04 20 issue with, which is that there's no way to 16:35:07 21 fill in the gap, you know, before 2017. I 16:35:10 22 don't think that's true. 16:35:13 23 I think that's a reflection of the 16:35:13 24 reality that everything always takes longer 16:35:13 25 and costs more, which is reality. What it's 16:35:13 275 1 not a reflection of is, if you want to get to 16:35:13 2 the end of the track faster, you put three 16:35:29 3 horses on it and you pick the fast one, you 16:35:30 4 know. 16:35:30 5 And we have in these emerging 16:35:32 6 commercial providers the option of some 16:35:35 7 alternatives that are cheap enough that we 16:35:37 8 could actually afford to buy a couple of them 16:35:39 9 and pick whichever one comes out faster. And 16:35:42 10 does that guarantee that we're going to fill 16:35:45 11 the gap in? No, it doesn't. But, you know, 16:35:48 12 you're really not talking about filling the 16:35:50 13 gap in. You're talking about assuming it 16:35:53 14 will stretch out. 16:35:55 15 DR. RIDE: Are you talking about 16:35:56 16 the -- you're talking about the gap -- 16:35:57 17 MR. GREASON: The crew. 16:35:57 18 DR. RIDE: -- the crew -- 16:35:58 19 MR. GREASON: Yeah. 16:36:02 20 DR. RIDE: -- as opposed to the -- 16:36:02 21 MR. GREASON: No. If we turned on -- 16:36:02 22 DR. RIDE: -- the cargo issue? 16:36:02 23 MR. GREASON: -- multiple competing 16:36:02 24 crew providers, then it is -- my view -- no 16:36:04 25 longer a certainty that they will all slip 16:36:07 276 1 out past their projected initial operating 16:36:10 2 capability by a lot. You know, some of them 16:36:12 3 will. And none of us are smart enough to 16:36:14 4 predict who that will be. 16:36:18 5 That's the whole point of having a 16:36:20 6 competitive environment. But if you have a 16:36:24 7 competitive environment, there's always a 16:36:24 8 chance that at least one or two of them might 16:36:25 9 actually do what they say. 16:36:25 10 DR. RIDE: That's very true. And 16:36:28 11 Bo's group, you know, has done some analysis 16:36:30 12 of, you know, what they think might be 16:36:34 13 reasonable for all of the different possible 16:36:36 14 options for low Earth orbit. 16:36:39 15 Our group's job was not to look into 16:36:41 16 those in detail but to take a little bit of 16:36:46 17 the -- you know, kind of the bottom lines 16:36:48 18 from Bo's group. And when we said 2017, we 16:36:50 19 were talking about Constellation. And I 16:36:54 20 think I said that, you know, we thought that 16:36:56 21 there might be some option to pull the gap 16:36:58 22 to -- by a year to a year and a half with 16:37:01 23 other options. 16:37:04 24 I'm skeptical about being able to 16:37:05 25 close it beyond that, but, you know, I take 16:37:08 277 1 your point. 16:37:11 2 MR. GREASON: Oh, I agree. 16:37:12 3 DR. RIDE: I take your point. 16:37:14 4 MR. GREASON: I agree. 16:37:12 5 DR. RIDE: Yeah. But the competition 16:37:15 6 between shuttle and COTS that I was 16:37:17 7 addressing was really the cargo resupply 16:37:19 8 capability. 16:37:19 9 So we want to make it really clear 16:37:21 10 that our intent in that would be for shuttle 16:37:24 11 to support the part of the cargo carrying 16:37:27 12 that the COTS providers could not provide in 16:37:31 13 that -- the next few years -- the next very 16:37:37 14 few years. 16:37:40 15 And I know that -- do you want -- it 16:37:41 16 looks like Charlie is ready to talk to Chris' 16:37:44 17 first question. 16:37:49 18 DR. KENNEL: Chris, when you raised 16:37:51 19 your issue doesn't shuttle extension compete 16:37:54 20 with COTS, that was my first reaction as 16:37:56 21 well, that it would not be a good thing and, 16:37:57 22 in particular, if over the long run the most 16:38:00 23 robust way of supporting science might, in 16:38:04 24 fact, be to get the scientists to work with 16:38:09 25 the commercial -- the commercial COTS people 16:38:13 278 1 for their access to space. 16:38:15 2 And so then, just to repeat, the 16:38:19 3 deviltry in Sally's proposal is all in the 16:38:24 4 details. For example, what would you 16:38:28 5 manifest on a 2013 flight? Will there be -- 16:38:30 6 yes, there will be empty racks. Will there 16:38:36 7 be enough possible experiments ready by 2013? 16:38:38 8 What would you put on it? What would you put 16:38:42 9 on such a -- on such a flight for shuttle -- 16:38:45 10 for ISS extension and resupply purposes? 16:38:50 11 And so until I heard the answer to 16:38:53 12 that, I couldn't really come down very 16:38:56 13 positively for Sally's suggestion, except 16:39:01 14 that it might make sense from the gap point 16:39:04 15 of view, the workforce point of view, if, in 16:39:07 16 fact, there was a shuttle-derived, heavy-lift 16:39:10 17 vehicle on the horizon. And then you ought 16:39:14 18 to study all of these issues very carefully 16:39:15 19 before you decide it. 16:39:18 20 That was my point of view. So I was 16:39:19 21 concerned that it would conflict with COTS. 16:39:21 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think we better 16:39:24 23 draw this particular discussion to a close. 16:39:26 24 Sally, when you and your team finished 16:39:30 25 speaking, I thought I saw a path here, and 16:39:33 279 1 with the clarifying discussion, I'm not so 16:39:35 2 sure I do. 16:39:39 3 The path I thought I saw was to fly 16:39:40 4 out seven shuttles, put budget in to support 16:39:43 5 the time it's likely to take to do that in a 16:39:49 6 reasonable risk environment, to learn to live 16:39:55 7 with the gap and to put -- support ISS for 16:39:57 8 another five years primarily to support 16:40:02 9 future beyond LEO flight activities. And 16:40:06 10 with the discussions, I think we've attacked 16:40:13 11 each part of that rather successfully. 16:40:17 12 And we fortunately don't have to make 16:40:19 13 a decision today, and these things have to 16:40:23 14 match up, as several have pointed out -- I 16:40:26 15 think Bo was the first -- that you've got to 16:40:27 16 match these with the rest of the things we 16:40:28 17 have to hear, and so we should probably wait 16:40:30 18 to hear. 16:40:32 19 But I would still like to keep that 16:40:33 20 group of things kind of in front of 16:40:37 21 everybody. Because as our options, we can't 16:40:39 22 just offer five blue-plate specials. You 16:40:41 23 know, we've got to offer some affordable 16:40:46 24 specials too. 16:40:49 25 And on that happy thought, I think 16:40:49 280 1 it's time to get some advice from the real 16:40:52 2 pros here and to call on folks. 16:40:52 3 We're going to ask you -- I hope 16:40:55 4 you'll, out of respect for your colleagues, 16:40:57 5 hold your comments -- we said two minutes -- 16:41:00 6 we'll allow 50 percent overrun -- to three 16:41:02 7 minutes. But we really would like to cut it 16:41:05 8 off because we want to hear as many people as 16:41:06 9 we can. 16:41:08 10 And I can't see anybody out there, so 16:41:09 11 you'll have to sort of control your own -- 16:41:12 12 and maybe line up or whatever you want to do. 16:41:15 13 (Discussion off the record.) 16:41:15 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: We're kind of like 16:41:15 15 we're sitting in a furnace and looking into 16:41:15 16 the darkness out there. 16:41:15 17 So why don't we start off -- we'll go 16:41:29 18 back and forth mic to mic. I think we have 16:41:31 19 two microphones. And please do stick to two 16:41:31 20 or three minutes. I'll try to remind you, 16:41:36 21 but I'd like not to have to. 16:41:36 22 MR. CARSON: My name is Christopher 16:41:44 23 Carson. I'm a resident of Fort Worth, Texas. 16:41:46 24 Chairman Augustine, Honorable Members of the 16:41:46 25 Committee, there's something I want to bring 16:41:52 281 1 to your attention. There's been very little 16:41:54 2 discussion of a fundamental basis of manned 16:41:56 3 space flight operations, which breaks down 16:41:59 4 really into two halves. There's exploration 16:42:01 5 and applications. 16:42:03 6 Now, Apollo was purely an exploration 16:42:04 7 program as far as it went. There was an 16:42:07 8 applications component, and that got the ax, 16:42:13 9 except for Skylab, which we did very little 16:42:13 10 with. 16:42:13 11 And shuttle was purely an 16:42:16 12 applications program. The idea was we would 16:42:16 13 fly the space transportation system, we would 16:42:19 14 integrate not only shuttle but also station 16:42:22 15 and the orbital transfer vehicle and we would 16:42:25 16 be able to do a lot of unique things. 16:42:26 17 We would fly 50 missions a year. We 16:42:29 18 would take -- you know, you've got 16:42:32 19 human-tinted experiments, you've got down 16:42:37 20 cargo, you've got the possibility for 16:42:38 21 human-tinted orbital platforms. And all of 16:42:40 22 those things were in the sort of 16:42:42 23 developmental stage when Challenger was 16:42:44 24 destroyed, and there was this great cutback. 16:42:47 25 And a lot of those things were just 16:42:50 282 1 eliminated until we got towards the ISS era. 16:42:52 2 And then, of course, we had Columbia, 16:42:57 3 and, again, things were cut back and back and 16:43:00 4 back. And for the past few years we've been 16:43:04 5 doing two or three manned space missions a 16:43:06 6 year, which is not anything like the number 16:43:08 7 necessary to realize the applications 16:43:09 8 potential. 16:43:12 9 Now, the great weakness of the 16:43:12 10 Constellation program is it takes that 16:43:15 11 absolute minimum level of manned space 16:43:17 12 activity as a maximum, as a baseline. 16:43:20 13 Constellation/Ares/Orion is designed around 16:43:23 14 two missions per year. 16:43:28 15 Ladies and gentlemen of the 16:43:28 16 commission, if you believe that that is 16:43:31 17 acceptable, you have betrayed the dream, and 16:43:32 18 you are unfit to sit in this committee. 16:43:35 19 Now, that said, I am going to give 16:43:38 20 you a suggestion. I suggest that manned 16:43:39 21 space program activities immediately be 16:43:43 22 realigned to an application section and an 16:43:45 23 exploration section. 16:43:49 24 The application section will focus on 16:43:51 25 things that aren't really NASA's job but that 16:43:53 283 1 NASA gets involved in anyway because NASA is 16:43:55 2 the only people doing these things, and that 16:43:58 3 is things like manned orbital experiments, 16:44:00 4 that type of thing. And you need to 16:44:04 5 immediately partner with anybody who's 16:44:06 6 interested. I'm not just talking Lockheed 16:44:09 7 and Boeing. I'm talking any possible 16:44:11 8 commercial partners. Because that way you 16:44:15 9 can bring in their money. 16:44:15 10 Now, as we saw in the early shuttle 16:44:18 11 era, NASA was only able to do this by 16:44:18 12 offering very large discounts, very large 16:44:20 13 subsidies. But if you actually get some 16:44:24 14 level of involvement -- and particularly once 16:44:25 15 you get in COTS and specifically COTS-D, you 16:44:27 16 know, the manned orbital transportation -- 16:44:31 17 the quantity of subsidy necessary declines 16:44:33 18 substantially. 16:44:38 19 Then the exploration segment focuses 16:44:40 20 on the things that NASA does, core NASA 16:44:40 21 competencies, which require -- as much of 16:44:44 22 NASA's current activity does not require -- 16:44:46 23 things which actually require NASA-owned and 16:44:47 24 NASA-operated assets. 16:44:50 25 MR. McALISTER: All right. Can you 16:44:59 284 1 wrap it up? We're over our allotted time. 16:45:00 2 MR. CARSON: Well, what I'm going to 16:45:00 3 suggest is simply that those jobs you're 16:45:00 4 worried about losing can be found much more 16:45:00 5 profitably working with industry to do 16:45:00 6 something useful rather than just to preserve 16:45:02 7 themselves. 16:45:05 8 Anyway, I thank you gentlemen. 16:45:05 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you for your 16:45:07 10 comments. 16:45:07 11 (Discussion off the record.) 16:45:15 12 MR. HOOK: First of all, thank you 16:45:15 13 very much for the opportunity to comment. 16:45:15 14 I'm Dave Hook. I'm the president of 16:45:16 15 Planehook Aviation Services. I'm also the 16:45:20 16 producer and the host for a show called Space 16:45:21 17 and Security News for Space Entrepreneurs. 16:45:23 18 And based upon the collective wisdom gained 16:45:28 19 from the many guests to my show, I find two 16:45:29 20 major topics which are relevant to the 16:45:32 21 committee's charter. 16:45:34 22 First, I wish to state that safety is 16:45:36 23 a misnomer when it comes to practical 16:45:38 24 considerations of manned operations in space. 16:45:40 25 Space, as an environment, is not safe. We 16:45:43 285 1 make use of risk mitigation measures to lower 16:45:47 2 the mission risk to an acceptable level, but 16:45:50 3 in the pursuit of providing a public image of 16:45:53 4 relative safety, I think we've pushed the 16:45:56 5 risk acceptance levels too low. 16:45:56 6 Now, I have no desire for our 16:46:00 7 astronaut corps to suffer the loss of life 16:46:02 8 while conducting space operations, but I do 16:46:06 9 think that the institutional thinking that 16:46:07 10 comes from a risk-averse culture seeps its 16:46:08 11 way into other governmental bodies and these 16:46:14 12 bodies have the ability to regulate 16:46:16 13 commercial space flight operations, manned 16:46:17 14 and unmanned. 16:46:21 15 Therefore, I request you consider a 16:46:23 16 recommendation that NASA examine its current 16:46:23 17 risk calculus for processes and measures 16:46:26 18 which are outmoded and no longer relevant and 16:46:28 19 either update or dispose of them. 16:46:31 20 Second, I find one particular program 16:46:31 21 that is at odds with the charter to seek 16:46:35 22 innovation, affordability and sustainability, 16:46:37 23 and that program is ITAR. The International 16:46:42 24 Traffic in Arms Regulation, as it's currently 16:46:45 25 written and applied, is a self-imposed trade 16:46:48 286 1 barrier against the citizens and commercial 16:46:52 2 entities of the United States. ITAR keeps 16:46:53 3 U.S. companies from competing fairly in 16:46:56 4 international markets, and it hinders them 16:46:59 5 from establishing sustainable research, 16:47:02 6 development, acquisition and procurement life 16:47:05 7 cycles. 16:47:07 8 It is this international market which 16:47:09 9 allows other industries to weather poor 16:47:13 10 economic environments within their own 16:47:18 11 homelands and sustain themselves with the 16:47:20 12 positive economies abroad. 16:47:24 13 As it's currently standing, ITAR is 16:47:25 14 an interagency quagmire. In short, you 16:47:31 15 cannot truly have an innovative, affordable 16:47:32 16 and sustainable commercial space industry 16:47:33 17 while clinging onto an outmoded program like 16:47:36 18 ITAR. 16:47:39 19 I would ask that the committee 16:47:39 20 challenge the regulatory assumptions put 16:47:40 21 before it to see if they truly remain 16:47:43 22 relevant to the 21st Century. 16:47:46 23 Thank you very much. 16:47:49 24 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 16:47:50 25 MR. STRICKLAND: I'm John Strickland 16:47:53 287 1 from Austin, Texas. I'm just going to go 16:47:54 2 down sort of a list of the major points. 16:47:57 3 First of all, it's much more 16:48:00 4 important to design to reduce operational 16:48:02 5 costs than it is to merely reduce the 16:48:05 6 development costs. Because the shuttle they 16:48:08 7 made at site saved $10 billion in the 16:48:10 8 development costs to go the shuttle we have 16:48:13 9 today, that they've used up an additional 16:48:17 10 $100 billion in operational costs. 16:48:20 11 So this is -- it's clearly 16:48:22 12 something -- in terms of like reusable versus 16:48:23 13 expendable vehicles, it's very high on that 16:48:27 14 priority list to think about. 16:48:30 15 Okay. Then also we should give full 16:48:33 16 support to COTS-D funding for other companies 16:48:34 17 to be able to launch people for NASA, and I 16:48:37 18 would think we should also retire -- try to 16:48:40 19 retire the shuttle by 2011 to reduce the cost 16:48:41 20 of losing the entire program due to another 16:48:46 21 catastrophe and the political reaction to it, 16:48:50 22 which is another cost that should be added to 16:48:54 23 the list. 16:48:55 24 We should guarantee in NASA's future 16:48:56 25 research for the future funding of about 16:49:00 288 1 5 percent of the annual budget. For things 16:49:03 2 that have been just chopped off for the last 16:49:07 3 several years, they should be reestablished. 16:49:08 4 We should shift surface to Earth 16:49:09 5 launch operations from NASA to private 16:49:13 6 companies and let NASA focus on those things 16:49:15 7 that it's good at, such as designing and 16:49:18 8 building a set of fully reusable in-space 16:49:21 9 manned and cargo vehicles to operate lunar, 16:49:25 10 Mars and other programs operating in and 16:49:30 11 beyond Earth orbit. 16:49:34 12 We should support hypersonic research 16:49:45 13 to help private industry create a fly-back, 16:49:45 14 first-stage crew launch vehicle. 16:49:45 15 We should definitely support space 16:49:45 16 station. Obviously one of the major things 16:49:48 17 was cuts in the program, which was a large 16:49:51 18 centrifuge facility which would have allowed 16:49:56 19 us to put small mammals through their life 16:49:57 20 cycle to see if mammals could survive in 16:49:59 21 one-sixth gravity and one-third gravity. The 16:50:01 22 only other way is to take the mammals to the 16:50:03 23 Mars or the Moon, and the astronauts don't 16:50:07 24 like mammals' cages in their quarters. 16:50:11 25 So this is something a large 16:50:13 289 1 centrifuge facility sealed from the rest of 16:50:15 2 the station would be very good at. 16:50:17 3 MR. McALISTER: John. Final 16:50:20 4 comments, please. 16:50:23 5 MR. STRICKLAND: Okay. We need to 16:50:23 6 create and place the large solar-powered 16:50:23 7 propellant depots in orbit which should be 16:50:25 8 resupplied by private contractors using their 16:50:29 9 own reusable tanker vehicles. 16:50:32 10 Thank you very much. 16:50:34 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 16:50:36 12 MR. BRAUN: Good afternoon. My name 16:50:38 13 is David Braun, and I'm a city council member 16:50:39 14 in the city of Nassau Bay. We've got about 16:50:41 15 5,000 residents, and we're located directly 16:50:44 16 across the street from JSC. Our city was 16:50:46 17 born when JSC was born, and many, many of our 16:50:48 18 residents are employees at JSC. 16:50:52 19 When talking with my neighbors who 16:50:53 20 work at NASA, in addition to being proud of 16:50:55 21 the overall accomplishments they have, like 16:50:59 22 putting a man on the Moon, they're equally 16:51:01 23 proud of the technology and advancements in 16:51:05 24 safety, telecommunications and health care 16:51:05 25 that has spun from the work they do at NASA. 16:51:09 290 1 Even in NASA's mistakes, like the 16:51:10 2 original lens on the Hubble telescope, the 16:51:15 3 technology developed to correct that lens is 16:51:15 4 now used in breast cancer biopsy procedures. 16:51:18 5 Quoting a Space Technology Innovation article 16:51:23 6 from October 1994: A new nonsurgical, less 16:51:26 7 traumatic breast cancer biopsy technology 16:51:30 8 based on technology from the Hubble telescope 16:51:35 9 will spare women the pain, scars and 16:51:39 10 radiation exposures typically associated with 16:51:39 11 the procedure, with more than 500,000 women 16:51:42 12 undergoing biopsies each year, and it's 16:51:46 13 estimated that by reducing the biopsy costs 16:51:47 14 from $3500 to $850 with this new technology 16:51:50 15 national health care costs will be reduced by 16:51:56 16 about $1 billion annually. 16:51:58 17 Isn't that a timely topic right now. 16:51:58 18 And that's in 1994 dollars. 16:52:02 19 Currently, through a space act 16:52:02 20 agreement, NASA is working with the Texas 16:52:05 21 Children's Hospital to share technology used 16:52:07 22 to isolate vibrations on the exercise 16:52:09 23 equipment on the International Space Station 16:52:15 24 to help the hospital to improve their infant 16:52:15 25 transporter. This transporter is used to 16:52:19 291 1 bring small premie babies, smaller than your 16:52:20 2 hand, to the hospital in Houston where they 16:52:23 3 stand a better chance of survival. 16:52:24 4 Vibrations in the current transporter and the 16:52:28 5 ambulance they ride in are often detrimental 16:52:30 6 to the lives of these fragile infants. We're 16:52:33 7 looking forward to NASA's help in finding the 16:52:33 8 solutions to this vibration problem in the 16:52:37 9 near future. 16:52:39 10 These are just two examples of how 16:52:40 11 human exploration in space leads to 16:52:41 12 technology that saves lives here on Earth 16:52:43 13 every day. I hope in years to come there 16:52:46 14 will be many, many more. Thank you. 16:52:50 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: We appreciate your 16:52:51 16 comments. 16:52:51 17 MS. GREEN: Hello there. My name is 16:52:53 18 Carol Green. I want to thank the committee 16:52:53 19 very much for the opportunity for public 16:52:57 20 comment. 16:52:59 21 People have had the need to aspire to 16:53:00 22 something amazing and work together to 16:53:05 23 achieve spectacular goals. Landing people on 16:53:08 24 Mars and setting up bases, for example, won't 16:53:12 25 occur for many years, but we need to continue 16:53:13 292 1 the process of striving towards this goal as 16:53:16 2 well as others related to people exploring 16:53:19 3 the cosmos. 16:53:21 4 The need to explore sits deep within 16:53:22 5 the human psyche. Teaching math and science 16:53:27 6 to our children must be a priority along with 16:53:30 7 teaching critical thinking to every child. 16:53:32 8 This can only be beneficial for us all. 16:53:35 9 Men and women exploring space is 16:53:39 10 expensive, but the technological benefits and 16:53:41 11 practical advances for us who are Earth bound 16:53:45 12 would be many as witnessed by what NASA has 16:53:51 13 already achieved. And the costs would not be 16:53:52 14 borne by our nation alone. We have several 16:53:56 15 models of cooperation in space, as 16:53:59 16 General Lyles and Dr. Ride have alluded to. 16:54:03 17 NASA has announced an $18.69 billion 16:54:06 18 budget for fiscal year 2010 to advance Earth 16:54:12 19 science including climate change research, 16:54:16 20 complete the International Space Station, 16:54:19 21 explore the Solar System and conduct 16:54:22 22 aeronautics research. NASA plans to do all 16:54:26 23 of this with about one half of 1 percent of 16:54:29 24 the federal budget. As Dr. Chris Chavez has 16:54:33 25 indicated, there is a need for money to be 16:54:38 293 1 budgeted. 16:54:42 2 I don't have the answer to this, but 16:54:43 3 in the Apollo Era NASA received about 16:54:45 4 2 percent of allocated governmental funds. 16:54:50 5 Just imagine. Isn't it time to increase this 16:54:53 6 investment in our future? 16:54:57 7 I would like to close my comments 16:54:58 8 with a quote from my brother -- astronomer, 16:55:00 9 NASA metal honoree and Pulitzer Prize winning 16:55:02 10 author -- Carl Sagan: 16:55:07 11 If we manage to avoid 16:55:10 12 self-destruction so that there are future 16:55:13 13 historians, our time will be remembered, in 16:55:15 14 part, because this was when we first set sail 16:55:18 15 for other worlds. In the long run, as we 16:55:21 16 straighten things out down here, there will 16:55:25 17 be more of us up there. There will be robot 16:55:27 18 emissaries and human outposts throughout the 16:55:31 19 Solar System. We will become a multi-planet 16:55:35 20 species. 16:55:40 21 This was Carl's vision. Please let 16:55:40 22 it be yours. Thank you. 16:55:42 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 16:55:45 24 DR. KUZNETZ: Hi, my name is Lawrence 16:55:48 25 Kuznetz. I'm a senior scientist with USRA 16:55:51 294 1 for advanced DBA systems, developing 16:55:54 2 bioinformatics, talking spacesuits, but I'm 16:55:55 3 actually here today as a person who gives a 16:55:58 4 lot of lectures. I spent ten years at 16:56:01 5 USC-Berkeley teaching a class called Mars by 16:56:04 6 2012, and I currently go out and lecture to 16:56:07 7 the public. 16:56:11 8 And I thought the first thing is to 16:56:12 9 offer you, Norm, condolences. Because every 16:56:14 10 20 years or so, they seem to haul you before 16:56:19 11 a committee and have you review a program 16:56:21 12 just like this. 16:56:23 13 So you know about SEI, you know about 16:56:24 14 the 90-day study and you also -- and Sally 16:56:29 15 does too -- probably know one of the options 16:56:29 16 of the original Freedom design was a garage 16:56:31 17 from which from a space station we launched 16:56:35 18 to the Moon and Mars. That was the original 16:56:38 19 exploration vision. And we went round and 16:56:42 20 round in circles, and now the best thing we 16:56:44 21 can say about station is exactly what several 16:56:46 22 people have said, it's a great platform for 16:56:47 23 working together. 16:56:50 24 I was also a life science experiment 16:56:51 25 manager on station overseeing 43 experiments, 16:56:53 295 1 and I can't really say what my opinion of 16:56:56 2 that is but you probably are well aware of 16:56:58 3 it. 16:57:01 4 So what I want to mention here is 16:57:03 5 that I put together a survey of all of the 16:57:05 6 talks I've given over the years getting 16:57:08 7 public and undergraduate and high school 16:57:11 8 reaction to some of the fundamental questions 16:57:15 9 from an education standpoint and vis-à-vis a 16:57:17 10 comparison of Moon versus Mars. And I'm not 16:57:21 11 advocating one or the other, but I thought it 16:57:25 12 would instructive to hear what my exposure to 16:57:30 13 the public and to the educational community 16:57:32 14 is. 16:57:32 15 Public interest in the Moon -- 16:57:33 16 questionable. 16:57:36 17 Public interest in Mars -- 16:57:36 18 3.5 website hits for every human being on 16:57:39 19 Earth. 16:57:42 20 Soil on the Moon -- not similar to 16:57:43 21 Earth. 16:57:47 22 Soil on Mars -- similar to Earth. 16:57:47 23 Atmosphere on the Moon -- none. 16:57:48 24 Atmosphere on Mars -- primarily there 16:57:49 25 is one. It's mostly CO2. 16:57:51 296 1 Day on the Moon -- one month. 16:57:52 2 Day on Mars -- 24 hours, 39 minutes. 16:57:55 3 Temperature on the Moon -- minus 250 16:57:59 4 to plus 250 degrees Fahrenheit 16:58:04 5 simultaneously. 16:58:04 6 Temperature on the Moon -- cold dry 16:58:05 7 desert. 16:58:08 8 Gravity on the Moon -- .166. 16:58:09 9 Gravity on Mars -- .38 G's, 16:58:13 10 sufficient for continued presence, probably 16:58:15 11 enough to correct any problems during the 16:58:18 12 zero G transit for six months. But we can 16:58:21 13 find that out on Earth. 16:58:23 14 The transit time -- three days -- 16:58:25 15 versus transit time to Mars -- similar to an 16:58:29 16 ISS stay, six months. 16:58:33 17 Water on the Moon -- maybe. 16:58:33 18 Water on Mars -- yes. 16:58:33 19 ISU and -- (unintelligible) -- 16:58:36 20 utilization -- not Earth like on the Moon, 16:58:39 21 Earth like on Mars. 16:58:42 22 Best analog for the Moon -- vacuum 16:58:44 23 chamber and ISS. 16:58:44 24 Best analog for Mars -- Antarctica. 16:58:49 25 Risk to the Moon -- understood. 16:58:52 297 1 Risk to Mars -- greater than Moon but 16:58:55 2 less than Apollo before we went there. 16:58:56 3 And I could read down the whole list. 16:58:58 4 The biggest worry that people expressed for 16:59:01 5 going to the Moon was on amorphous goal and 16:59:04 6 amorphous cost -- no clear pathway. 16:59:08 7 As far as going to Mars -- let's got 16:59:10 8 there, let's settle, let's have another place 16:59:14 9 for our species to survive if some disaster 16:59:16 10 happens. 16:59:19 11 MR. McALISTER: Lawrence, final 16:59:19 12 comments, please. 16:59:19 13 DR. KUZNETZ: Final comments are 16:59:21 14 that I think Sally made a point, NASA -- you 16:59:23 15 know, not advocating any one of these things 16:59:26 16 personally, the issue is where do you go from 16:59:29 17 here. NASA has always been a can-do 16:59:32 18 organization -- we can do, we can do, we can 16:59:37 19 do. 16:59:39 20 But if you look at that can-do 16:59:40 21 organization within the context of a budget, 16:59:42 22 we've ended up getting screwed every step of 16:59:45 23 the way, because we are given a budget and we 16:59:47 24 say we can do it. This is now a time for, I 16:59:50 25 believe, this panel to stand up and say "can 16:59:53 298 1 don't." We cannot do this job for this 16:59:55 2 budget. And whatever you choose to do, you 16:59:59 3 should say we're only going to do it if you 17:00:02 4 give us the budget. 17:00:06 5 Thank you. 17:00:07 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 17:00:07 7 MR. ACKERMAN: My name is Jim 17:00:11 8 Ackerman, but I answer to, hey, dummy too. 17:00:12 9 I've got a couple of questions here. 17:00:17 10 I guess I want to make clear I was employed 17:00:20 11 by NASA for 36 years. You've got to remember 17:00:22 12 I was employed. I didn't work for NASA. The 17:00:26 13 contractor is supposed to do all of the work. 17:00:30 14 Anyway, being with NASA for 36 years was a 17:00:33 15 trying environment for an engineer. 17:00:36 16 But I think -- if we look at the 17:00:41 17 problem from a bigger viewpoint, I think we 17:00:44 18 can come to some conclusions that I think 17:00:49 19 might help you guys out. 17:00:51 20 What's the big issue with manned 17:00:53 21 space flight today? 17:00:57 22 Sally, I think you've made the point 17:00:59 23 as well as any, it's the budget, the cost. I 17:01:01 24 mean, everybody that's talked here today has 17:01:04 25 talked about problems with the budget. 17:01:07 299 1 So the next question is: Well, 17:01:11 2 what's the biggest thing in the budget? We 17:01:14 3 want to attack the problem where it can be 17:01:17 4 affected the most. What's the biggest thing 17:01:21 5 in the budget? 17:01:23 6 Sally, I think you came up with that 17:01:25 7 too. 17:01:27 8 DR. RIDE: This is your time. 17:01:29 9 MR. ACKERMAN: The launch vehicle, 17:01:31 10 delivery, the orbit. That's the big 17:01:33 11 challenge. 17:01:36 12 Now, okay, what's the big problem? 17:01:36 13 What's the challenge with the budget to 17:01:40 14 orbit? What makes it so high? Why is it the 17:01:43 15 big issue? 17:01:47 16 I've got two documents here, one from 17:01:49 17 Marshall Space Flight Center, November 1968, 17:01:51 18 where von Braun made the analogy that it 17:01:55 19 takes about the same amount of energy to get 17:01:59 20 from Earth to orbit as it takes to get from 17:02:02 21 New York to Paris in an airplane. 17:02:02 22 Norm, you've probably heard that. 17:02:06 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: I've read it. 17:02:08 24 MR. ACKERMAN: You've read that book. 17:02:10 25 It's a good one. 17:02:12 300 1 There's another one here -- LEO on 17:02:12 2 the Cheap. This fellow Gordon London wrote a 17:02:12 3 book that basically says the same thing as 17:02:19 4 von Braun did -- if we can build a vehicle 17:02:23 5 that uses low cost propellant and is totally 17:02:25 6 reusable, we ought to be able get there for 17:02:30 7 the cost of intercontinental travel, which 17:02:34 8 is, by the way, about 5 to $10 a pound. 17:02:36 9 Do you know how much it costs to get 17:02:39 10 there today on the shuttle? Well, we won't 17:02:41 11 talk about that. 17:02:43 12 But the ones that are being proposed 17:02:44 13 by COTS -- by the way, our earlier 17:02:46 14 organization proposed too and it was 17:02:48 15 rejected -- but with COTS it's still 17:02:50 16 thousands of dollars a pound. 17:02:52 17 I went to India, talked to them, 17:02:55 18 tried to get them to do something 17:02:58 19 inexpensive. Hell, we've got the best 17:03:00 20 engineers in the world, how do you think you 17:03:02 21 can make it best and lower costs. Anyway, 17:03:05 22 our company was rejected, again, one more 17:03:06 23 time. 17:03:08 24 MR. McALISTER: Jim, final comments, 17:03:10 25 please. 17:03:10 301 1 MR. ACKERMAN: But the problem is 17:03:12 2 that we need to get back to basics on our 17:03:13 3 launch vehicle. If we can build one that 17:03:16 4 uses methane at a nickel a pound instead of 17:03:19 5 solid propellants at $25 a pound, we can get 17:03:22 6 the cost of delivery to orbit down, and the 17:03:25 7 space program will take off like a rocket. 17:03:26 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 17:03:30 9 MR. MITCHELL: Good afternoon. My 17:03:32 10 name is Bob Mitchell, and I'm president of 17:03:35 11 the Bay Area Houston Economic Partnership. 17:03:38 12 So just with that title, you know 17:03:38 13 that I'm not going to sit here and talk about 17:03:40 14 technical or architecture or which direction 17:03:40 15 you ought to go. What I want to say to you, 17:03:43 16 though, is I want to thank you for all of the 17:03:47 17 good work that you're doing for doing this. 17:03:47 18 It's very important to our community. 17:03:50 19 I'm not going to talk about a lot of 17:03:53 20 job losses. Yes, that's very important to 17:03:55 21 this region. The NASA Johnson Space Center 17:03:57 22 is the heart and soul of this area. I mean, 17:03:59 23 it makes us tick. 17:04:02 24 But what I want to do -- what I want 17:04:03 25 to talk about is something that I hadn't 17:04:04 302 1 heard of until at the very end, and that's 17:04:07 2 the public, public perception and how the 17:04:07 3 American public feels about the space 17:04:11 4 program. 17:04:13 5 What I don't want to happen is for us 17:04:13 6 to completely change directions. Again, I'm 17:04:16 7 not going to talk about architecture, but we 17:04:17 8 have to continue human space exploration. 17:04:20 9 The American public today is on board with 17:04:22 10 that. 17:04:24 11 An example of that is last year 17:04:26 12 during the budget cycle whenever the House 17:04:28 13 passed the budget with a $2 billion markup 17:04:30 14 above what the President asked for -- 17:04:34 15 $2 billion -- passed 409 to 15. The Senate 17:04:34 16 passed it unanimously. 17:04:40 17 Now, I can't tell you when -- the 17:04:42 18 last time we had that kind of a support from 17:04:44 19 the House and/or the Senate with a $2 billion 17:04:46 20 markup. 17:04:47 21 So what I'm asking you to do, as you 17:04:48 22 look to this, listen to what the American 17:04:50 23 public has to say. If you look at the most 17:04:54 24 recent surveys, the American public want to 17:04:56 25 do human space exploration. 17:04:58 303 1 Again, I'm not going to try to tell 17:05:00 2 you how to get there or how to get -- how to 17:05:01 3 do it, but the worst thing that we can do as 17:05:04 4 NASA is to go out and tell the public that 17:05:05 5 we've made a mistake and we're going to 17:05:08 6 change directions. We can't lose that public 17:05:10 7 support. We lost it six, eight years ago. 17:05:13 8 You don't read in the paper any 17:05:16 9 longer about the waste -- the NASA waste of 17:05:17 10 money. You don't read in the paper any 17:05:19 11 longer that NASA doesn't have a vision. NASA 17:05:21 12 does have a vision. The American public 17:05:23 13 understands that. Again, we need to continue 17:05:26 14 human space exploration. 17:05:29 15 So as you go through this process and 17:05:31 16 you listen to all of the technical issues 17:05:33 17 that arise and what we should and shouldn't 17:05:38 18 do, let's not forget about the American 17:05:38 19 public. Because if you don't have their 17:05:38 20 support, then you're not going to get 17:05:45 21 Congress' support. 17:05:45 22 Thank you. 17:05:45 23 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 17:05:45 24 MR. MORALES: Hi, my name is Jake 17:05:47 25 Morales. And I work over in MOD in the 17:05:48 304 1 Constellation program in a lab that supports 17:05:51 2 prototyping for Mission Control, and I really 17:05:53 3 love being there. 17:05:57 4 And I have to say to you welcome to 17:05:58 5 Houston. JFK was right -- the pavement 17:05:59 6 outside really is as hot as the heat of 17:06:03 7 reentry. And I appreciate you coming here to 17:06:05 8 hear from all of us and to share your 17:06:07 9 deliberations with us, because they've very 17:06:11 10 informative to me, some of the particular 17:06:13 11 insights, which I read about, but to hear 17:06:16 12 them talked about and discussed firsthand is 17:06:18 13 very enlightening. 17:06:21 14 When you're the seventh or eighth 17:06:24 15 person in line, other people have sometimes 17:06:24 16 stolen your thunder, and that's okay. What 17:06:26 17 the gentleman just said a moment ago is 17:06:29 18 something that I wanted to talk about. 17:06:30 19 There are some people that believe 17:06:31 20 that NASA is adrift -- and our current 17:06:33 21 President has suggested as much -- NASA is 17:06:36 22 beset by a sense of drift, but I don't see 17:06:39 23 that from where I work. 17:06:41 24 I believe that we do have a vision, 17:06:43 25 and it has been touched upon here some -- 17:06:44 305 1 Moon, Mars and beyond -- the Constellation 17:06:46 2 vision. Four simple words -- you could fit 17:06:48 3 them on a mission patch. And I believe that 17:06:54 4 Mars built upon Lunar built upon ISS is an 17:06:57 5 effective way to accomplish that vision. 17:07:02 6 I believe that we should go back to 17:07:04 7 the Moon on its own merits. Imagine if you 17:07:07 8 sent Antarctic -- or rainforest scientists 17:07:08 9 into the rainforest for two weeks and that's 17:07:10 10 all they could do for 50 years -- what they 17:07:11 11 could learn in two weeks. It would be nuts. 17:07:11 12 So I believe that one option that you 17:07:16 13 should present to the Congress and the 17:07:18 14 President -- and I understand that you're not 17:07:18 15 about making recommendations but about 17:07:19 16 providing options -- is the option simply to 17:07:22 17 stay the course. 17:07:24 18 My mom once told me that God has no 17:07:27 19 grandchildren. God has to rule every 17:07:31 20 generation anew, and every new generation of 17:07:33 21 political leadership has to reown the vision 17:07:34 22 that their predecessors crafted. Otherwise, 17:07:38 23 it's not their own. And so that's why an 17:07:41 24 Augustine commission is reformed every so 17:07:41 25 often to do this sort of thing. 17:07:47 306 1 But that's costly in a democracy, and 17:07:48 2 we've kind of talked about that on the budget 17:07:48 3 side. You're familiar with Delta V, the cost 17:07:50 4 of changing trajectory of a spacecraft. 17:07:53 5 Well, there's a concept I like to speak of as 17:07:55 6 Delta B, budgetary cost. The Delta B is the 17:07:59 7 cost to change the trajectory of a space 17:08:01 8 agency from one direction to another. 17:08:04 9 And I think that's a legitimate 17:08:06 10 consideration, and many of you have talked 17:08:08 11 about that. Mike Coats and Mark Geyer both 17:08:10 12 got very specific about that and very pointed 17:08:14 13 about that earlier today. 17:08:16 14 So I want to encourage you that -- my 17:08:17 15 belief is that the United States should stay 17:08:20 16 the course. 17:08:22 17 We've had a vision before. In the 17:08:22 18 1960s JFK said that our vision was: We 17:08:25 19 choose the Moon. Like "Moon, Mars and 17:08:29 20 beyond," it's four simple words that got us 17:08:32 21 from Rice University all of the way to the 17:08:37 22 Sea of Tranquility. And it informed our 17:08:39 23 space program then, it informed all of the 17:08:41 24 things that we developed, all of the 17:08:41 25 technologies that we have built upon since. 17:08:43 307 1 And like then, now we have a vision, 17:08:47 2 and I believe that we should continue to 17:08:48 3 pursue it. 17:08:50 4 MR. McALISTER: Jake, final comments, 17:08:50 5 please. 17:08:50 6 MR. MORALES: Final comments. I 17:08:52 7 believe that it's a risky decision 17:08:54 8 politically. In some ways, you'll be 17:08:55 9 criticized for it -- you should be doing 17:08:56 10 other things, you should be like Columbus 17:08:59 11 leaving from a different port, traveling on a 17:09:00 12 different ships, going to a different 17:09:01 13 destination. 17:09:04 14 Maybe we should go back and start 17:09:05 15 over again. I think that that's a poor 17:09:06 16 choice of policy. We're on a course. It's a 17:09:10 17 good course. Let's stay the course. 17:09:13 18 Thank you. 17:09:14 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 17:09:14 20 MR. HOWARD: Good afternoon. My name 17:09:16 21 is Robert Howard. I'm the -- I'm a human 17:09:17 22 factors lead over at NASA for the lunar 17:09:19 23 lander, lunar rover and lunar outpost, and in 17:09:23 24 my spare time, I volunteer at the National 17:09:26 25 Society of Black Engineers because I'm 17:09:26 308 1 president of our local chapter and director 17:09:27 2 of our national special interests group. 17:09:29 3 I have two minor technical nits 17:09:29 4 before I get to what I want to say. I'm a 17:09:33 5 little disappointed that the ISS committee 17:09:36 6 didn't look at the use of Ares V for cargo 17:09:37 7 upmass or downmass potential. With that 17:09:42 8 vehicle it seems like an obvious gap that 17:09:43 9 we've forgotten to look at what we can do 17:09:44 10 with that booster or with any of the other 17:09:47 11 heavy-lift vehicle concepts. 17:09:49 12 Also it bothers me that we spent so 17:09:51 13 much time first promoting ISS and its 17:09:54 14 benefits but we're so quick to walk away from 17:09:55 15 it now. That seems shortsighted. 17:09:57 16 But what I want to really get to is 17:09:59 17 it seems to our detriment that we use the 17:10:02 18 words space exploration and human space 17:10:03 19 flight as if they were interchangeable but 17:10:04 20 they're really not. They're no more the same 17:10:05 21 than exploration of the air is the same as 17:10:08 22 aviation. 17:10:11 23 Exploration is just one of many 17:10:12 24 things that we should be doing in space. And 17:10:15 25 I think our focus on exploration is why we 17:10:17 309 1 lose the public. We like to think that we 17:10:18 2 have the attention and imagination of the 17:10:18 3 public -- and we do have it of a lot of 17:10:18 4 people, but we don't have it to the extent we 17:10:22 5 used to have. I would speak to groups of 17:10:23 6 students, since I was a student myself, and I 17:10:27 7 see the interest decline over time. It's not 17:10:29 8 what it used to be. 17:10:32 9 And I want to disagree with a lot of 17:10:34 10 my colleagues, that I don't think Mars is the 17:10:36 11 answer. I do want to go to Mars, I want to 17:10:38 12 develop Mars vehicles in my career, but I 17:10:41 13 don't think that's the answer to the reasons 17:10:42 14 of why we should be in space, why we should 17:10:44 15 be on the Moon, why we should have the 17:10:46 16 space station and so forth. 17:10:46 17 When I was a child, NASA people would 17:10:48 18 come and say, when you grow up, we're going 17:10:49 19 to be going to Mars. Now that I'm here 17:10:53 20 working at the agency, we're going out and 17:10:53 21 telling children, when you grow up, we're 17:10:55 22 going to go to Mars. It's just pushing it 17:10:58 23 over to the right and saying don't worry 17:11:01 24 about the problems, it's the next 17:11:03 25 generation's duty. 17:11:04 310 1 I think we need to own our destiny as 17:11:06 2 an agency, and I think that destiny needs to 17:11:06 3 be to use space to revolutionize the human 17:11:09 4 experience. Apollo did that, but it was easy 17:11:11 5 for Apollo. Just to go to any destination 17:11:13 6 would do that because that was beyond human 17:11:16 7 comprehension. 17:11:19 8 That's no longer the case, and I 17:11:20 9 think we would have to go to Alpha Centauri 17:11:24 10 to really excite people about a destination. 17:11:24 11 I think it's more about what do we do with 17:11:27 12 that destination that can revolutionize 17:11:30 13 humanity. 17:11:34 14 And I wish we weren't going to the 17:11:34 15 Moon in order to go to Mars, even though I 17:11:34 16 want to go to Mars. I wish we were going to 17:11:35 17 the Moon, and I wish our goal for going to 17:11:39 18 the Moon was that we would use energy on the 17:11:41 19 Moon so that we could eliminate coal -- we 17:11:42 20 could eliminate the use of petroleum on Earth 17:11:45 21 in 50 years. I think that's attainable. I 17:11:45 22 think that's something that people would 17:11:49 23 rally around, because I think that would 17:11:50 24 revolutionize the human experience. 17:11:54 25 I wish we could go beyond what I call 17:11:56 311 1 the boilerplate, the spinoffs to the 17:11:57 2 rationales for space that have been used 17:12:00 3 since I was a child, and I wish we'd go to 17:12:02 4 space for things that would dramatically and 17:12:04 5 visibly and immediately transform life on 17:12:06 6 Earth. 17:12:08 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 17:12:09 8 Sir... 17:12:09 9 MR. KAZAROONI: My name is Alex 17:12:09 10 Kazarooni. I'm an intern for the summer, and 17:12:13 11 I had -- from the University of Michigan -- 17:12:15 12 and I had a nice opportunity actually to 17:12:18 13 draft a report with my students and submit it 17:12:18 14 to the NRC. So that's the -- 17:12:18 15 (unintelligible) -- again. 17:12:23 16 The quick comments I have and sort of 17:12:23 17 my comments on the cheap on the back of my 17:12:23 18 dollar bill is that, you know, if you're 17:12:29 19 looking for particular sciences that ISS is a 17:12:29 20 part of and to facilitate our understanding 17:12:32 21 for exploration, there is a whole host of 17:12:36 22 people that believe ISS is perfect for space 17:12:36 23 radiation studies, South Atlantic Anomaly, 17:12:39 24 cracks in the radiation belts, and that's 25 actually reserved for long-term exploration. 312 1 So that's something that should be looked at 2 and merited and an infrastructure built 3 around that. So maybe that's one bullpen 4 plan of a science application to come. 5 And then for my comments at NRC, I 6 had actually suggested I would actually draft 17:12:56 7 a lesson plan for my computer science 17:13:01 8 students where I teach the Computer 17:13:01 9 Science 101. And so I did that as based on 17:13:02 10 the Phobos/Ida mission that Buzz Aldrin likes 17:13:03 11 to promote and actually found at the end of 17:13:06 12 the semester they actually enjoyed that 17:13:11 13 lesson much more than the other technical 17:13:12 14 computer science labs we gave them, because 17:13:12 15 they had to think through the fundamental 17:13:14 16 skill set and then choose what technical 17:13:15 17 aspect to apply to solve their computer 17:13:15 18 program. 17:13:15 19 And I think that what I noticed when 17:13:20 20 I asked the students -- first, they didn't 17:13:22 21 hear about Phobos. They didn't realize what 17:13:24 22 it was. And, secondly, when they did, they 17:13:24 23 realized it was a whole new place of 17:13:28 24 imagination for them. So, you know, bottom 17:13:30 25 of the gravity well argument or not, I think 17:13:33 313 1 there is some traction to be gained from that 17:13:34 2 as far as young people's enthusiasm to take 17:13:37 3 away from that. 17:13:37 4 As far as from what I understand 17:13:37 5 about heavy-lift vehicles, my only comment is 17:13:44 6 I would say I would probably want to always 17:13:55 7 see NASA involved in heavy-lift vehicles. 17:13:55 8 You can require that for the materials that 17:13:55 9 you have to get up into low Earth orbit or 17:13:55 10 for long-duration exploration. So I don't 17:13:59 11 want to see COTS be the only heavy-lift 17:14:01 12 vehicle out there. I think NASA has to 17:14:03 13 always stay in that role. 17:14:03 14 And overall, just like a last 17:14:05 15 comment, that it is nice to see the NRC take 17:14:07 16 in the science community's opinion. It's 17:14:07 17 even better to see you guys come out and 17:14:12 18 embrace the public and the workers at each of 17:14:13 19 the centers. I used to work at the space 17:14:16 20 center before going back for my doctoral 17:14:18 21 studies, and I think it's -- 17:14:20 22 MR. McALISTER: Wrap it up, Alex. 17:14:20 23 Final comments. 17:14:20 24 MR. KAZAROONI: My final comments is 17:14:22 25 that the transparency is nice. Obviously 17:14:22 314 1 there's got to be some big subchanges that 17:14:27 2 everybody agrees on. And I think that budget 17:14:27 3 and uplift are the two big problems, and 17:14:30 4 somebody is going to have to develop 17:14:33 5 something to that. 17:14:35 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 17:14:35 7 Let's see. I think there are four 17:14:36 8 people in line, and so we don't miss our 17:14:38 9 airplane, we'll cut it off at four more 17:14:38 10 comments. 17:14:46 11 MR. MONCHAK: My name is Alex 17:14:46 12 Monchak. I'm a student in the engineering 17:14:48 13 management program at the University of 17:14:51 14 Houston-Clear Lake, working on new business 17:14:54 15 development this semester for human space 17:14:56 16 exploration. 17:14:58 17 Consistent with Director Coats' 17:14:59 18 comments that NASA is not in the business of 17:15:02 19 carrying cargo to space but R&D, where people 17:15:05 20 will pay the company I'm -- the company I'm 17:15:10 21 doing for -- new business development for 17:15:13 22 remote access lunar development as a 17:15:15 23 precursor to human exploration there and 17:15:18 24 they'll pay for launch at $100 an hour to 17:15:23 25 mirror the backroom operations of a launch 17:15:28 315 1 during the whole launch process and they'll 17:15:33 2 pay for testing before the launch and they'll 17:15:36 3 pay for planning before the testing, before 17:15:39 4 the launch and before the remote development 17:15:42 5 on the Moon, consistent with market research 17:15:46 6 done by Dr. Dittmar and the research done by 17:15:48 7 Dr. Moran. 17:15:54 8 MR. MAYER: Thank you. Good 17:15:56 9 afternoon. Thank you for coming to Houston 17:15:58 10 to be with us today. My name is Joe Mayer. 17:16:00 11 I chair a national group called the 17:16:04 12 Citizens For Space Exploration. We're a 17:16:06 13 grassroots taxpayers group. We go to 17:16:09 14 Washington, D.C. We've been doing that for 17:16:12 15 about the past 20 years. This past May we 17:16:15 16 traveled to Washington, D.C., and we met with 17:16:18 17 341 congressional offices. We had 17:16:22 18 representation from 24 different states. We 17:16:26 19 had about 30 university students who attended 17:16:28 20 with us. We are there to support and promote 17:16:32 21 NASA and space exploration. 17:16:36 22 I'd like to read you an excerpt of a 17:16:39 23 letter that we received from one of our 17:16:43 24 students, a third-year graduate student 17:16:47 25 studying astrophysics at Arizona State 17:16:47 316 1 University. I think his words reflect some 17:16:52 2 of the sentiments of the young people and of 17:16:53 3 students who have hopes and dreams for the 17:16:57 4 future for space exploration. 17:17:00 5 And I quote: As a student in 17:17:02 6 astrophysics, I recognize that the only 17:17:07 7 reason the United States is the leader in the 17:17:07 8 field of space and astrophysical research is 17:17:10 9 because Americans, through their federal 17:17:12 10 government, have continued to support the 17:17:14 11 mission of NASA, but if our representatives 17:17:16 12 are not continually made aware of the impact 17:17:20 13 that NASA has on every aspect of American 17:17:23 14 life, they will undoubtedly pare down its 17:17:27 15 budget. Especially as we enter into a new 17:17:31 16 difficult economic and social era in which 17:17:34 17 America risks losing this advantage on the 17:17:38 18 world stage, it is critical that citizens 17:17:41 19 press the issue of full funding to NASA from 17:17:44 20 our elected representatives so that they too 17:17:48 21 might realize how important full support of 17:17:52 22 NASA is to American competitiveness, jobs and 17:17:52 23 our way of life. 17:17:57 24 Astrophysical research of the sort 17:17:59 25 that I do with the Hubble Space Telescope is 17:18:02 317 1 not simply a matter of sending a telescope 17:18:05 2 into orbit, as if that itself is a simple 17:18:09 3 task. Hidden within the phrase orbiting 17:18:13 4 laboratory or observatory is an 17:18:17 5 infrastructure that makes America the envy of 17:18:19 6 the world. My research is only possible 17:18:20 7 because of thousands of talented engineers, 17:18:23 8 machinists, designers and managers. It is 17:18:28 9 possible because America has chosen -- has 17:18:30 10 chosen -- to support human space flight, and 17:18:32 11 it is possible because America recognizes 17:18:36 12 that the industrialization of space is a sure 17:18:39 13 means of solidifying our preeminence on the 17:18:43 14 global stage. 17:18:50 15 MR. McALISTER: Joe, final comments, 17:18:51 16 please. 17:18:51 17 MR. MAYER: You bet you. 17:18:51 18 On behalf of the Citizens for Space 17:18:52 19 Exploration, I want to communicate to the 17:18:54 20 committee our strong emphasis that you bring 17:18:57 21 to the President a set of recommendations, a 17:19:00 22 set of options, that will provide the 17:19:02 23 United States the opportunity to continue to 17:19:04 24 lead in space, to derive benefits from space 17:19:08 25 and to offer this student and other students 17:19:11 318 1 who will follow behind him a hope and a 17:19:14 2 promise for the future. 17:19:17 3 And I thank you very much. 17:19:18 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you for your 17:19:20 5 comments. 17:19:22 6 MR. BRIDGE: Hi, my name is Jeff 17:19:23 7 Bridge. I'm an undergraduate engineering 17:19:25 8 student at Rice University. 17:19:25 9 I've heard a lot of talk about how 17:19:27 10 the space program needs to reflect what the 17:19:29 11 national goals are for the space program, but 17:19:32 12 I haven't heard a very specific discussion 17:19:35 13 among these ten people of what those goals 17:19:39 14 actually are. And I think that if you're 17:19:42 15 going to form a set of options for the space 17:19:44 16 program that reflect what those goals are 17:19:48 17 that you need to discuss them among 17:19:51 18 yourselves. 17:19:54 19 I have my own biases about what is a 17:19:55 20 good goal -- in particular, exploration of 17:19:58 21 Mars -- and I think that the reason why that 17:20:02 22 is a good goal is because it involves going 17:20:04 23 where people have not gone before. 17:20:09 24 And I think that a lot of -- we all 17:20:12 25 know that there's a lack of young people 17:20:17 319 1 going into math and science, and I've seen 17:20:20 2 that in my peers as well. And I think that 17:20:23 3 only going and doing something that we have 17:20:26 4 not done before is the thing that will 17:20:27 5 inspire more people to join the space 17:20:31 6 program. 17:20:34 7 Thank you. 17:20:34 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 17:20:35 9 And the last comment... 17:20:37 10 MS. TORRES: My name is Candy Torres 17:20:38 11 and my parents were born in Puerto Rico and 17:20:39 12 so it's a little different cultural 17:20:42 13 perspective. 17:20:46 14 I wanted to be an astronaut very 17:20:47 15 young. I applied at the same time Sally did. 17:20:50 16 If I weren't too short and so nearsighted, I 17:20:50 17 might have had a chance, but I'm here. 17:20:53 18 I grew up in New Jersey, born in 17:20:55 19 New York, lived in housing project. Yes, it 17:20:58 20 was the Bronx. In that time period it was 17:21:01 21 very difficult for women to struggle, but I 17:21:03 22 did it. But, you know, I've also taught at 17:21:03 23 an alternative high school where the kids had 17:21:03 24 been in prison or they've had babies when 17:21:10 25 they were young. I could go on. 17:21:12 320 1 So I've always been socially 17:21:15 2 sensitive to the aspect of space exploration. 17:21:18 3 I would like to see a vision that is worded 17:21:21 4 where people in the inner city or other 17:21:24 5 parts -- you know, cultures can visualize 17:21:26 6 themselves doing things, not necessarily just 17:21:30 7 as an astronaut. And I have nothing to say 17:21:34 8 about astronauts. I was a flight controller, 17:21:36 9 and I've worked both programs. 17:21:37 10 But that's part of the problem 17:21:39 11 because I did do research for my master's 17:21:42 12 degree in studies of the future. In the 17:21:43 13 polls the people are not actively supported. 17:21:45 14 That's not important. What you need is the 17:21:47 15 demographics don't match up, and you can see 17:21:50 16 the results of that in the audience. 17:21:53 17 We need to really get more people 17:21:56 18 involved but on their level, not from our -- 17:21:59 19 from the position of up down, but to really 17:22:03 20 get in there and tell them you can do it. 17:22:04 21 Thank you. 17:22:07 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much 17:22:08 23 for those words. We appreciate all of the 17:22:09 24 public comments both today and on other 17:22:11 25 occasions. 17:22:15 321 1 Let me just say I think you can see 17:22:15 2 that our task is a daunting one. We have 17:22:18 3 35 days remaining to resolve these issues. 17:22:24 4 Today we've just discussed only, you know, 17:22:26 5 the tip of the iceberg. So we'll continue on 17:22:29 6 tomorrow. 17:22:33 7 And with that, on behalf of all of my 17:22:33 8 colleagues on the committee, I thank everyone 17:22:36 9 in this room for your interest in the 17:22:39 10 discussions. I guess this may be on 17:22:41 11 television too. I didn't ask, but if it is, 17:22:45 12 we thank the folks who are out there watching 17:22:48 13 in that environment. 17:22:51 14 So this meeting is adjourned. 17:22:51 15 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned 17:22:51 16 at 4:22 p.m.) 17:22:51 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25