4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you very 15:55:20 5 much for your presentation. We will take it 15:55:22 6 very seriously. 15:55:25 7 Let's turn then to the final scheduled 15:55:27 8 speaker for the day, and we're going to hear 15:55:33 9 about side-mount options from John Shannon. 15:55:36 10 MR. SHANNON: You guys didn't tell me 15:55:47 11 there was blood in the water before I 15:55:49 12 volunteered to do this. 13 And just as a senior NASA manager, let 14 me say, I don't agree with that, and I felt 15 perfectly comfortable coming up here and talking 16 about an alternate architecture, something that 17 we've looked at for many years. And, you know, 18 Jeff and Steve Cook and company have embraced, 19 and we've talked about it. We talk about 20 transition between programs all of the time. 21 Sir, if you're worried about going to 22 talk to anybody, come talk to me. Talk to Wayne 325 1 Hale. Talk to Mike Suffredini. Talk to -- just 2 come talk to us, and we'll -- you know, if you 3 don't want us to attribute things to you, we can 4 certainly do that, but we're always looking for 5 good ideas. 6 And I think just the fact that I'm 7 standing up here talking about something that 8 departs from the current baseline should maybe 9 prove that to you. 10 Stay on the title page for a minute. 11 I want to preface the presentation 15:56:45 12 with some other comments here that NASA has a 15:56:48 13 plan -- NASA has a baseline plan, and I think it 15:56:52 14 was a well-thought-out plan in the time of ESAS 15:56:57 15 and in that the Constellation program has put 15:57:00 16 together a viable architecture. And I'm not 15:57:05 17 going to talk about an architecture. I'm just 15:57:09 18 going to talk about a launch vehicle. 15:57:10 19 But it has not been funded. It has 15:57:12 20 not been funded to the level that we would need 15:57:15 21 to see it through. And I see that on the 15:57:17 22 shuttle side from the transition. 15:57:19 326 1 Jeff Hanley and myself worked with our 15:57:22 2 teams. We had a very close-knit transition 15:57:25 3 plan, not just for civil servants but also for 15:57:27 4 contractors. And because of the funding 15:57:29 5 problems, that has become un-knit, and we have 15:57:32 6 gaps in the industrial capability and in the 15:57:36 7 workforce, which is causing all of this. 15:57:38 8 I don't think it is some big 15:57:41 9 conspiracy. I don't think they've had cost 15:57:43 10 overruns. I think they've just not been funded 15:57:44 11 the way that they were -- the plan was 15:57:47 12 originally produced. 15:57:48 13 You know, we talked about this a 15:57:49 14 couple of weeks ago, and I think that the first 15:57:50 15 option should be to fund the plan that we have. 15:57:54 16 But if we can't do that, I don't think we're 15:57:57 17 ready to cede human space flight, like Elon 15:58:00 18 said. We're not ready to cede support of the 15:58:05 19 ISS. We're not ready to cede the opportunity to 15:58:06 20 go outside of low Earth orbit. 15:58:10 21 So I've had a small team inside the 15:58:10 22 shuttle program that has kept alive some of the 15:58:12 327 1 side-mount decisions, and when I say small, it 15:58:13 2 is three people that go and grab some 15:58:16 3 information from other people to think about new 15:58:19 4 things. And I'm going to talk a little bit 15:58:21 5 about that. 15:58:24 6 But you need to realize it has been a 15:58:25 7 small effort. It has not been across NASA. It 15:58:27 8 has not had the advantage of being looked at 15:58:31 9 across the Agency -- for good reason. It's 15:58:35 10 because we have another plan, and it's just now 15:58:37 11 that we're looking at and seeing the budget does 15:58:41 12 not quite align with it. 15:58:44 13 So what I'm going to tell you today -- 15:58:46 14 is promising that it has some benefit, some 15:58:48 15 things that could -- that are obvious advantages 15:58:49 16 but it needs to be looked at to a much greater 15:58:51 17 level than what my team has been able to do. 15:58:55 18 Now, I want to -- we're still on the 15:58:58 19 title page and I've burned like four minutes. 15:58:59 20 This does not look at Shuttle C. I 15:59:03 21 don't even call it Shuttle C. We call it a 15:59:05 22 heavy-lift vehicle. Shuttle C was an autonomous 15:59:07 328 1 vehicle that separated from the external tank 15:59:12 2 just like the orbiters had orbital maneuvering 15:59:12 3 capability added to capability -- thermal 15:59:16 4 capability -- a lot of different things that 15:59:17 5 this does not have. 15:59:19 6 This is simply a first and second 15:59:20 7 stage to inject the payload into a 8 30-nautical-mile by 120-nautical mile orbit. 9 That payload is assumed to be autonomous. It 10 takes care of itself. When it's injected, it 11 goes off and does its thing. 12 And all that you see in the title page 13 picture goes into the ocean. So it's just a -- 14 it's a foundational kind of a launch capability. 15 Let's go to the next chart. 16 We've looked at this a lot. It's been 17 called a lot of different things. You can see 18 what I was talking about on the upper left. It 19 was looked at by industry five years ago. It 20 was a two-year study. So there is a lot of data 21 out there. I know we've provided a lot of that 22 to you. 329 1 We do not have a deployable fairing. 2 When you get out of the atmosphere -- and this 16:00:03 3 team I have, added that, which will give you a 16:00:04 4 little bit more performance. It also -- the 16:00:06 5 beauty of, I think, the most recent concept the 16:00:10 6 team has come up with is that it does not try to 16:00:14 7 reuse engines. 16:00:19 8 We have learned from life-cycle costs 16:00:20 9 on SSMEs that you never -- reusability is a 16:00:22 10 myth, in my opinion. You don't buy your engines 16:00:27 11 and then you never have to talk to the engine 16:00:29 12 manufacturer again, you just keeping using them. 16:00:32 13 That's not true at all -- because parts wear 16:00:35 14 out, you have failures, you have design issues. 16:00:38 15 So you have to keep your production 16:00:41 16 line going or at least available to you, and 16:00:43 17 that's a significant cost. And then you buy 16:00:46 18 "one of" pieces whenever you need new parts, and 16:00:47 19 that gets to be extremely expensive. 16:00:51 20 So we would take, I think, the 16:00:53 21 approach of you get rid of the very -- I'll say 16:00:55 22 hazardous -- it's probably the most hazardous 16:01:00 330 1 part, I think, on the orbiter -- of that 16:01:05 2 interface between the main engines and the 16:01:06 3 external tank and you just have straight pipes. 16:01:08 4 You don't have all of your disconnects and your 16:01:10 5 pyro systems and all of those things. Let's go 16:01:10 6 to the next chart. 16:01:14 7 So that chart was just supposed to say 16:01:16 8 we've looked at this many times over many years, 16:01:18 9 and I think most of the people in this room are 16:01:20 10 familiar with a lot of that. 16:01:22 11 This is just a basic cargo 16:01:24 12 configuration. If you notice, it doesn't modify 16:01:27 13 the external tank at all. It's exactly -- the 16:01:30 14 external tank we produce right now. It's the 16:01:32 15 solid rocket boosters we produce right now. The 16:01:34 16 boat tail that holds the SSMEs that are 16:01:37 17 unchanged is simplified because it is bolted 16:01:40 18 directly onto the external tank. 16:01:40 19 It does not have the separation plane 16:01:40 20 which causes a complexity. An avionics module 16:01:44 21 in front of it -- I'll talk about avionics in a 16:01:48 22 minute -- and then a separable fairing that 16:01:53 331 1 provides a performance boost up to about 16:01:55 2 72-metric tons to that 30-by-120 orbit. Next 16:01:56 3 chart. 16:02:03 4 This is an important chart here. What 16:02:03 5 I would -- let me back up for a second here. 16:02:06 6 I think Elon Musk hit it exactly 16:02:11 7 right. The way the Russians do things is really 16:02:14 8 smart. I wish we would have done Shuttle C in 16:02:18 9 the '80s or the '90s. I think the space shuttle 16:02:22 10 orbiter would be a safer vehicle to fly if we 16:02:22 11 had done Shuttle C back then. 16:02:27 12 Because if you have a cargo vehicle 16:02:29 13 that is the same configuration as your crewed 16:02:32 14 vehicle, you have the opportunity to roll in new 16:02:35 15 design, new enhancements on the cargo vehicle 16:02:39 16 much easier than you do on your manned vehicle. 16:02:44 17 And that's what the Russians do. For 16:02:44 18 the most part, they'll fly new hardware on their 16:02:46 19 Progress several times before they roll it into 16:02:48 20 the Soyuz. 16:02:51 21 And we have a terrible track record in 16:02:53 22 the space shuttle program from upgrades. We did 16:02:53 332 1 main engine upgrades, controller upgrades, some 16:02:57 2 things like that. It costs us way too much 16:02:58 3 money. It took way too much time. I think that 16:03:01 4 is because you do not have a combined 16:03:03 5 environments test capability except to go fly 16:03:06 6 the vehicle with a crew on it. So that made it 16:03:09 7 very difficult. 16:03:13 8 I think if we had done Shuttle C we 16:03:15 9 would have been able to roll in those upgrades 16:03:17 10 on the cargo vehicle and verified through 11 combined environment flight testing they 12 actually are effective and then you can roll 13 them into the crewed vehicle. And I'm just 14 guessing, but I think that our upgrades program 15 would have been much more successful from that 16 standpoint. 17 So the thought here was that you build 18 this Block I, which is just a two-stage 19 capability to get to low Earth orbit. As I said 20 before, no change to the external tank. No 21 change to the SRBs. No change to the SSMEs. 22 You use existing avionics. 333 1 And I grew up in the guidance, 2 navigation and control world, and that is 3 absolutely possible. 4 The one thing that nobody has talked 5 about in all of the rocket designs that we've 6 seen that is an enormous bullet -- and those of 7 you that have been -- that have ever worked with 8 rockets or even -- or modern aircraft -- is 16:04:10 9 flight software. It is -- it will eat your 16:04:10 10 lunch. It is critical path from the day you put 16:04:12 11 the first rocket drawing down a paper. 16:04:15 12 And getting flight software to work 16:04:18 13 with your hardware from a timing standpoint is 16:04:21 14 extremely difficult. We've been flying the 16:04:24 15 space shuttle for 30 years, and we'll still find 16:04:27 16 things through simulation that we did not expect 16:04:27 17 in the way software interacts with hardware. 16:04:29 18 This Block I capability, you can use 16:04:31 19 your existing flight software. You can use the 16:04:33 20 computers that we have right now. You can use 16:04:36 21 the rate gyros, the IMUs, the accelerometer 16:04:37 22 assemblies -- all of those things required to 16:04:42 334 1 fly any spacecraft but you've already got 16:04:45 2 30 years of flight test behind it and use it. 16:04:48 3 Now, I would not use the full suite 16:04:48 4 that we use. On an orbiter you can use one of 16:04:51 5 each, and it would be perfectly safe. The 16:04:53 6 flight software can be modified just to no-op 16:04:56 7 the channels that you're not flying on that 16:04:59 8 particular spacecraft. 16:05:03 9 The other one that nobody has talked 16:05:05 10 about that we spent a lot of time and money on 16:05:07 11 is your systems integration tools. The acoustic 16:05:08 12 models, your aerodynamic models, structural 16:05:13 13 models, loads, your trajectory models -- 16:05:19 14 extremely important. 16:05:19 15 As you all know -- and Bo actually 16:05:23 16 wrote a paper on it not too long ago -- we 16:05:24 17 totally blew the acoustics for STS-1 and almost 16:05:29 18 lost the vehicle. We had a structural member 16:05:34 19 buckle in the OMS pod just because we did not 16:05:35 20 have the water flow and the acoustics right. 12:00:38 21 So if you use a more evolutionary 12:06:59 22 approach that has the same or similar mold line 12:07:07 335 1 of the space shuttle stack now -- you already 12:07:18 2 have that history -- and you can roll it into 12:07:27 3 your next vehicle and that's a big deal. 12:07:34 4 Those are two things, I think, one, 12:08:16 5 software and your environmental tools that 12:08:27 6 people really overlook when they're starting to 12:08:35 7 design a vehicle and don't understand very well. 12:08:54 8 Existing pad structure, that follows. 12:09:13 9 The launch and ground control 12:09:24 10 software, that's important because that -- 12:09:54 11 again, it's software and it will eat your lunch 12:10:01 12 if you don't get it right. 12:10:07 13 That high-risk aft interface, it's 12:10:15 14 just bolted on, so you got rid of that. 12:10:31 15 You don't have fuel cells, you'd have 12:10:42 16 batteries, you don't have the cryo systems 12:10:50 17 because you don't have fuel cells or people on 12:10:58 18 it. Nitrogen tanks, the cooling systems, your 12:11:04 19 orbital maneuvering system, your RC -- you don't 12:11:36 20 have any hypergols on it at all. So it's a very 12:11:49 21 slim-down and stream-lined kind of vehicle. 12:12:13 22 And that's all very different from the 12:12:48 336 1 Shuttle C. 12:12:53 2 Block II, of course, you can do things 12:12:56 3 to get more performance. And at some point we 12:13:37 4 will run out of spares in hardware that is 12:13:47 5 cannibalized from orbital vehicles, and you 12:14:03 6 would end up building. But the nice thing is 12:14:19 7 you're doing flight tests with your basic design 12:14:30 8 as you're beginning to procure your follow-on 12:14:37 9 avionics. Next chart. 12:14:52 10 I already talked about 12:15:50 11 infrastructure/facilities. Y'all know how we do 12:16:05 12 space shuttle. You can obviously see that 12:16:12 13 that -- you don't have to buy a new ET barge. 12:16:19 14 Nobody has talked about that. You know, you 12:17:02 15 don't have to buy a new Pegasus. You don't have 12:17:05 16 to do solid rocket booster or anything like that 12:17:15 17 that changes. 12:17:28 18 And my complete ineptness at 12:17:52 19 PowerPoint means that the cargo carrier is 12:18:04 20 really fat there. I just noticed that. But I 12:18:26 21 just stretched the picture out, and that's why 12:18:35 22 it looks like that. Next chart. Don't laugh. 12:18:42 337 1 The last one great graphics. That was good. 12:19:30 2 The team has looked at payload 12:19:39 3 envelopes and designs, and actually I think we 12:20:04 4 found from the industry study that we would have 12:20:12 5 a CG problem, and the center main engine would 12:20:16 6 hit its gimbal limits. So we actually shrunk 12:20:39 7 the payload envelope a little bit. 12:21:02 8 They've done some studies -- again, 12:21:12 9 this is something that needs a great deal of 12:21:17 10 work from the broader community -- from the NASA 12:21:23 11 team, from the Aerospace -- to show. It does 12:21:30 12 look like, you know, with the 72-metric tons 12:22:53 13 that you could do quite a bit with that payload 12:23:04 14 capacity. Next chart. 12:23:33 15 Everyone had one incomprehensible 12:23:40 16 chart. So this is mine. And it is just the -- 12:23:53 17 it is just the flow of avionics and hardware 12:25:11 18 required between Block I and then a follow-on 12:25:23 19 Block I that has some new stuff and then a 12:25:57 20 Block II, where you get all of the new stuff. 12:26:05 21 And basically if you look across the 12:26:37 22 top, there's no really new builds for avionics 12:26:41 338 1 in the Block I architecture. We could build it 12:26:51 2 with the hardware we have in hand right now. 12:27:07 3 Next chart. 12:28:34 4 This is, to me, sort of like everybody 12:28:38 5 comes, ah, Shuttle C is great but you've got to 12:30:02 6 throw your SSMEs away and that makes it 12:30:21 7 unsustainable and it's unaffordable and let's 12:30:51 8 move on to the next vehicle. 12:31:12 9 SSME, we have a million seconds of 12:33:05 10 runtime on. We understand SSME performance very 12:33:14 11 well. I have 14 assets right now limited by 12:33:54 12 nozzles that you could go fly in a test program. 12:34:25 13 We have all of the hardware. We're set up to do 12:34:35 14 the test. 12:34:41 15 There is -- Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne 12:34:45 16 can provide you books of data on the RS-25E, 12:35:53 17 which is expendable, which is your channel wall 12:36:11 18 nozzle, the non-refurbished turbo pumps. The 12:36:22 19 fact that you're not trying to refly these 12:36:34 20 engines means you don't have inspection ports 12:36:40 21 and you don't have a lot of different 12:36:46 22 requirements that you would -- that we have 12:36:52 339 1 built into the SSME that has caused the cost to 12:36:57 2 be significant. 12:37:08 3 And you can't really take an SSME cost 12:37:10 4 and say, well, that's what the expendable cost 12:37:23 5 would be. Because what you do for expendables 12:37:28 6 is you put them on a production line and you 12:37:36 7 would commoditize it basically. And that's 12:37:47 8 how -- you would build a certain number per 12:38:24 9 year, and then you'd have the economy of scale 12:38:33 10 to do that. 12:38:39 11 So there is a lot of -- a lot of data 12:38:42 12 on there in bullet PWR. Go get it if you guys 12:38:48 13 want. Next chart. 12:39:04 14 I really debated cost -- putting cost 12:39:23 15 estimates in here. The team needs to validate 12:39:51 16 these. I wasn't going to put them in because I 12:40:00 17 said, well, you guys haven't spent enough time 12:40:08 18 on this. Then I looked at the industry study 12:40:14 19 that was done in '04, '05. The costs were 12:40:20 20 almost exactly the same. 12:40:38 21 I put them in here for your interest. 12:40:41 22 Take your big grain of salt right now. And we 12:40:46 340 1 need to go validate these numbers externally. 12:40:54 2 Next chart. 12:41:08 3 Everything I just said about cost I'll 12:41:10 4 say about schedule. The industry team and the 12:41:35 5 NASA team, somewhat independently, came up with, 12:41:41 6 if you turn it on, it's a 4-1/2-year project to 12:41:51 7 fly your first test flight. We need to work on 12:42:12 8 this some more and debate it and get a better 12:42:22 9 schedule. So take your second big grain of salt 12:42:33 10 now. Next chart. 12:42:45 11 We did some design reference mission 12:42:50 12 just to show is this even something that would 12:43:37 13 be useful. It is obviously. It's 70-plus 12:43:43 14 metric tons, a heavy-lifter, that is -- there is 12:43:59 15 not another vehicle right now other than the 12:44:15 16 space shuttle that provides that kind of 12:44:23 17 injection capability. But would it be useful. 12:44:27 18 And this gets a little bit into 12:44:48 19 architecture, and I don't want to get into 12:44:59 20 architecture. I just want to talk to you about 12:45:24 21 the launch vehicle. 12:45:30 22 But these are some of the -- some of 12:45:34 341 1 the ideas the team has thrown out. And, again, 12:45:39 2 I would say that this needs a lot of work with 12:45:51 3 the broader community. Next chart. 12:45:57 4 The thought being this is -- you can 12:46:01 5 kind of see the approach, normal solid rocket 16:11:19 6 booster separation, fairing separation, you hit 16:11:23 7 MECO and off goes your upper stage with 16:11:25 8 autonomous rendezvous and docking capability -- 16:11:29 9 which actually if we would have launched this 16:11:32 10 morning, we were going to demonstrate the 16:11:34 11 autonomous rendezvous and docking capability. 16:11:36 12 We put some sensors on in the payload 16:11:39 13 bay of Endeavour and we'll demonstrate that 16:11:42 14 software and I hope -- although doing it within 16:11:46 15 eight flights is going to be difficult. I hope 16:11:48 16 to have the capability to demonstrate the 16:11:53 17 shuttle autonomous docking to the ISS. At least 16:11:55 18 we'll get the sensor data and then put it on the 16:11:56 19 ground through simulation and be able to show 16:11:59 20 that. 16:12:02 21 And then you toss your external tank 16:12:03 22 with the big heel structure that goes up to the 16:12:05 342 1 bipod fitting that holds the boat tail into the 16:12:09 2 Pacific Ocean. Next chart. 16:12:14 3 Design Reference Mission, just what it 16:12:14 4 looks like, and obviously you phase with 16:12:14 5 station. Next chart. 16:12:33 6 We have looked at crewed options. 16:12:33 7 This was the ISS crew piece. We have done some 8 early assessments on the launch abort system, 9 being close to the inner tank, and it looks 10 doable. Again, this is a prime area of heavy 11 study to look at the LAS. You'll see a chart 12 where it shows safety. It all depends on how 13 effective we can make a launch abort system 14 work. 15 The thought here would be that you 16 would end up injecting the carrier with an MPLM 17 or external payloads, and you would fly it 18 actually around and dock with it and then fly it 19 to the station. Next chart. 20 This is the crew and logistics launch 21 just like before. Next chart. 22 There was also a profile where you 16:13:06 343 1 could do a two launch, one from Pad A, one from 16:13:08 2 Pad B. You may have noticed before Hubble we 16:13:11 3 had a shuttle sitting out at each of the two 16:13:13 4 pads. So from a ground-up standpoint, that was 16:13:15 5 maybe a precursor look at how you could do that. 16:13:19 6 Lunar lander with an Earth departure 16:13:21 7 stage on it. 16:13:25 8 And then fly Orion. Same discussion 16:13:26 9 we had on LAS with its Earth departure stage. 16:13:30 10 Next chart. 16:13:30 11 And, again, we're into architecture. 16:13:33 12 What I would do is, as opposed to training two 16:13:33 13 EDSs with a lander and a CV, I would go and put 16:13:37 14 my -- put the lunar lander in lunar orbit, and 16:13:40 15 then if it has hypergols on it, you can go 16:13:45 16 whenever you want, you can launch your crewed 16:13:50 17 vehicle. 16:13:53 18 I'll say right -- this is not the 16:13:53 19 lunar lander that is currently in the baseline 16:13:57 20 architecture. This is a different lunar lander. 16:14:01 21 The guys just were running some calculations. 16:14:04 22 It was a 28-metric ton lander. 16:14:04 344 1 Doug, what's the -- Altair right now 16:14:08 2 is 45-ish. Apollo was 16-ish. So it's a 16:14:12 3 different architecture, and that's something you 16:14:17 4 have to understand right off. It's not as 16:14:19 5 capable as what the Ares V architecture looks 16:14:21 6 like. 16:14:25 7 You know, we can talk the same depot 16:14:25 8 discussion. I like depots, but there's -- 16:14:30 9 again, they're different architectures than what 16:14:30 10 we have right now, and this has not received 16:14:32 11 sufficient study time from the broader community 16:14:35 12 to say this is the answer in any -- in any way 16:14:39 13 at all. Next chart. 16:14:42 14 Well, okay. I've got two 16:14:42 15 incomprehensible charts. This is a baseball 16:14:42 16 card of just performance between the cargo 16:14:42 17 version for Block I and Block II and then the 16:14:42 18 crewed version. Next chart. 16:14:42 19 This is -- I'm not going to spend a 16:14:58 20 lot of time on this. We are flying at the max 16:15:00 21 rate on the shuttle program in fiscal year 10. 16:15:03 22 If we were going to move into something like 16:15:08 345 1 this, I would lobby strongly to spread out the 16:15:09 2 fiscal year 10 launches into 11 and in 12 and as 16:15:09 3 we restarted production for solid rocket 16:15:16 4 boosters and external tanks. 16:15:19 5 And the configuration is so similar, 16:15:21 6 you know, production is really what you have to 16:15:24 7 worry about, and you could essentially get rid 16:15:26 8 of most of the gap by doing that. Now, you will 16:15:30 9 have a gap because Orion -- the Orion 16:15:33 10 development time is what would pace the next 16:15:35 11 crewed vehicle. Next chart. 16:15:39 12 There are some growth options from the 16:15:40 13 81 tons. I didn't just magically go from 72 to 16:15:42 14 81. It's a suborbital staging. You load up the 16:15:45 15 vehicle more, you end up with MECO that is a 16:15:50 16 suborbital, but then you separate your third 16:15:51 17 stage with either J-2 or an SSME and off you go. 16:15:55 18 You get to 81 tons by doing that suborbital 16:15:55 19 staging. If you ran your SSMEs at 16:16:00 20 109 percent -- and I wouldn't let you do that 16:16:03 21 with crew on it, but with cargo on it, you might 16:16:05 22 want to do it. 16:16:08 346 1 Five-segment SRBs we've talked about 2 before. If you had an SSME on your Earth 3 departure stage -- there's a few things you 4 could do to maybe get above 90-metric tons. 5 There are some -- these things are lines on a 6 chart, but there would be great expense and a 7 significant amount of development testing 8 required before you would sign up to do any of 9 these. 16:16:09 10 So I wouldn't say, hey, this idea will 16:16:09 11 get you above 90-metric tons. It's -- those are 16:16:09 12 thoughts. Next chart. 16:16:32 13 I asked my guys to go off and say, 16:16:32 14 hey, let's just do a PRA. We know what all of 16:16:35 15 the different pieces are -- all of the different 16:16:40 16 components are, except I don't know the EDS or I 16:16:40 17 don't know what -- what's under the fairing, but 16:16:42 18 for the stuff that you see in the little picture 16:16:44 19 on the lower right, where would you get -- and 16:16:47 20 we did a 5 percent/95 percent study, and you can 16:16:48 21 see the numbers for the loss of vehicle that we 16:16:52 22 got. Again, this is your third big grain of 16:16:55 347 1 salt here. Next chart. 16:16:59 2 Boy, this just makes sense, right, is 16:17:00 3 that -- if your launch abort system is 16:17:05 4 100 percent successful, you're flying a pretty 16:17:07 5 safe rocket. It will not be. And it actually 16:17:12 6 may be low if we look at the shock interactions 16:17:15 7 between the LAS and the external tank. 16:17:19 8 This is an area that needs a 16:17:22 9 significant amount of study. And I think if we 16:17:24 10 were at all serious about doing something like 16:17:29 11 this we would go work on that as a -- as the 16:17:31 12 first thing we would go do. Next chart. 16:17:32 13 Sep design. I told them I didn't want 16:17:34 14 any RCS, I didn't want any extra propulsion. So 15 post MECO, of course, your fairing is gone, and 16 it's -- they designed -- some of the guys at 17 JSC -- a spring mechanism that just pops it out, 18 and you would add the ET tumble valve back on to 19 give you a good clean separation. We think this 20 is a very solvable problem. Next chart. 21 Yeah. We did a little thing there. 22 Next chart. 348 1 The first bullet is the most important 2 bullet. The HLV design, it is less capable than 3 the current baseline. And we need to stress 4 that fact. 5 And it has not been studied to the 6 amount where I feel very comfortable coming up 7 here and telling you a whole lot about it. I 8 think it is something that if we decided we were 9 not going to get the money to do the baseline 10 plan and we wanted a backup that would provide a 11 lunar capability or a human servicing of the 12 station capability that this is something that 13 we would want to go study again. 14 And, again, we've spent 30 years 15 studying it. So we have a lot of background to 16 do that. 17 Benefits are obvious. We basically 16:18:30 18 have the parts to build everything. What we 19 don't have is some structural parts for the keel 20 for the fairing and for the boat tail to mount 21 up the engines. If you're going to have a 22 development or a program, I think the structural 349 1 piece is probably the one you would pick. It 2 wouldn't be flight software or engines or 3 anything else like that. 4 Another thing that's kind of near and 5 dear to my heart is that the HLV retains 6 essential the contractor and civil servant skill 7 base that we have right now, especially in 16:19:21 8 concert with spreading out some of the shuttle 16:19:23 9 flights that we currently have on the manifest. 16:19:26 10 I'm very concerned about the 16:19:28 11 industrial base. I'll tell you that, you know, 16:19:30 12 the congressional budget numbers that have been 16:19:32 13 provided to NASA basically took away the lunar 16:19:35 14 program, and that's where all of my space 16:19:40 15 shuttle civil servants were going to go. 16:19:44 16 The folks at Marshall were going to go 16:19:46 17 to Ares V. The folks at Johnson Space Center 16:19:46 18 were going to go work on Altair. Of course, if 16:19:51 19 the lunar program is gone, I have got to make a 16:19:52 20 place for civil servants. And it's just worse 16:19:54 21 on the contractor side if the lunar program goes 16:19:56 22 away. 16:20:00 350 1 Potentially support ISS for crew and 16:20:00 2 cargo, we talked about that a little bit. And I 16:20:05 3 really don't want to get into architecture 16:20:08 4 discussions, especially with Dr. Crawley because 16:20:12 5 he knows a whole lot more about it than I do. 16:20:12 6 But he left, so okay. Let's talk 16:20:13 7 architecture for a minute. 16:20:16 8 You know, because this is -- that's 16:20:18 9 not what I'm hear to talk about. I'm talking 16:20:20 10 about a capability to provide heavy-lift 16:20:23 11 capability into low Earth orbit and then off you 16:20:29 12 go. 16:20:30 13 I did have a -- because this is a 16:20:31 14 little bit different than shuttle, see, I had a 16:20:34 15 short movie, a couple of minutes. 16:20:36 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Go ahead. 16:20:36 17 MR. SHANNON: I think it just helps 16:20:40 18 you. The music is really corny. I did not pick 16:20:42 19 up the music on it. So maybe if the sound is 20 turned off, I'll tip somebody really good. Or 21 not. 22 And it just shows the build-up of the 351 1 vehicle. And this is very simplistic, right, 2 but it shows you fairing and there's a whole 3 bunch of different things. My graphics guys got 4 really excited on me here. 5 What I really want you to see is the 6 launch and the fairing separations. Oh, here it 7 comes. Great. No tip for you. 8 (Whereupon, informational video 9 began.) 10 MR. SHANNON: And as people are 11 watching, we could ask questions that are really 12 loud and drowned out the sound, if you would 13 like. 14 And this was just a conceptual lunar 15 lander. He's on an EDS to be designed. 16 All right. That's probably all we can 17 stand of it. 18 (Whereupon, informational video 19 concluded.) 20 MR. SHANNON: Okay. So that gives you 16:22:18 21 a little better idea. And, again, I want to 16:22:20 22 really stress the fact that this has not been 16:22:22 352 1 vetted or discussed in the level of detail it 16:22:26 2 needs to be throughout the entire NASA and 16:22:30 3 contracting communities. It's an old idea, and 16:22:35 4 there's a few changes to an old idea. 16:22:38 5 And that's all I was going to present 16:22:40 6 today. 16:22:42 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Terrific. That was 16:22:42 8 very well done. 16:22:45 9 Please, go ahead, Leroy. 16:22:47 10 MR. CHIAO: Thanks, John. Let's see. 16:22:50 11 I just wanted to ask you about your first 16:22:50 12 conclusion, HLV design is less capable than the 16:22:53 13 current baseline. 16:22:59 14 You mean that it's less capable than 16:22:59 15 the current baseline because the current 16:22:59 16 baseline includes Ares V. Is that correct? 16:23:02 17 MR. SHANNON: Yes. 16:22:50 18 MR. CHIAO: Okay. And so -- 16:22:50 19 MR. SHANNON: And the current baseline 16:23:06 20 is an architecture that has a very large, very 16:23:07 21 capable lander, and there's no way -- 16:23:07 22 MR. CHIAO: Sure. 16:22:50 353 1 MR. SHANNON: -- to do that on this 16:23:11 2 vehicle, both from the volume side or the 16:23:12 3 propulsion side. 16:23:17 4 MR. CHIAO: Right. But if we're just 16:22:50 5 thinking of Ares I -- comparing this to Ares I, 16:23:21 6 let me make sure I'm understanding that your 16:23:21 7 numbers are extremely preliminary and haven't 16:23:21 8 been vetted by the community: 4-1/2 years, 16:23:24 9 6.6 billion, 72-metric tons of cargo and Orion 16:23:29 10 with crew to orbit? 16:23:35 11 MR. SHANNON: With your caveats, I 16:23:37 12 would say -- 16:23:43 13 MR. CHIAO: With the caveats, right? 16:23:43 14 MR. SHANNON: Yes. 16:23:37 15 MR. CHIAO: Okay. So in that context, 16:23:43 16 maybe you or maybe Doug can kind of give us a 16:23:44 17 high level answer -- but, I mean, I'm sure ESAS 16:23:44 18 looked at this kind of architecture as well as 16:23:47 19 the Direct-type architecture. 16:23:49 20 Can you kind of give us a high big 16:23:51 21 picture of why the current architecture was 16:23:54 22 selected over -- why these architectures were 16:23:55 354 1 rejected? 16:23:57 2 MR. SHANNON: It's a require -- well, 16:24:03 3 no. It's a requirements discussion. It's what 16:24:04 4 kind of lander do you want to put on the Moon, 16:24:05 5 what kind of capability do you want to put on 16:24:08 6 the Moon? 16:24:10 7 MR. CHIAO: So driven by the lander, 16:24:11 8 right? Okay. 16:24:11 9 MR. SHANNON: And they were given a 16:24:13 10 mission, and they built an architecture that 16:24:15 11 would support that mission. This vehicle will 16:24:18 12 not support that mission. It will support a 16:24:19 13 different mission, but we'd have to go and 16:24:24 14 change that architecture. 16:24:25 15 MR. CHIAO: Okay. 16:24:25 16 MR. SHANNON: Is that fair, Doug? 16:24:25 17 It's a requirements discussion. 16:23:43 18 MR. CHIAO: So it was pretty much 16:23:43 19 driven by the lunar mission and the lander 16:24:26 20 requirements? 16:24:29 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Why don't you come up 16:24:29 22 so everybody can hear you. 16:24:29 355 1 MR. COOKE: I don't think they 16:24:42 2 actually studied -- or they didn't look at 16:24:43 3 directly the crewed version of it, because they 16:24:47 4 considered it a safety issue. I think probably 16:24:50 5 because it was next to the tank. But they 16:24:53 6 looked at the cargo capability, and they were 16:24:55 7 looking at the mission overall, I think. 16:24:58 8 MR. CHIAO: Okay. Thanks. 16:25:01 9 MR. SHANNON: And if you automatically 16:25:04 10 said it was uncrewed, that gives you three 16:25:06 11 launches, right, because you're going to put the 16:25:08 12 crew on Ares and then you had your -- you had an 16:25:09 13 EDS with a lander and another EDS for the crewed 16:25:11 14 thing that went up. And three launches is, I 16:25:16 15 think -- 16:25:22 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: My question relates to 16:25:22 17 that same sort of line of thinking. 16:25:23 18 Many years ago I was involved in a 16:25:26 19 study where we had actually recommended building 16:25:27 20 a Shuttle C or something very similar to it, and 16:25:31 21 at that time it seemed to make sense because you 16:25:36 22 could pair it with the shuttle. And so you 16:25:39 356 1 didn't have to risk astronauts to provide 16:25:41 2 trucking and you could use astronauts the fix 16:25:46 3 Hubbles and the likes and it seemed to make more 16:25:50 4 sense to us. 16:25:53 5 And today if you were to say you 16:25:54 6 aren't going to have a shuttle for whatever 16:25:56 7 reason, if you weren't, then you've almost got 16:25:58 8 to go to the Orion version or something like 16:26:01 9 that. But your reliability figures -- loss of 16:26:05 10 crew figures, if my memory is correct, showed 16:26:08 11 the Orion version of what you might call a 16:26:11 12 Shuttle C derived or something was much less 16:26:16 13 reliable -- less safe than the Constellation 16:26:19 14 configuration, and that sort of surprises me. 16:26:26 15 Could you elaborate a bit? 16:26:29 16 MR. SHANNON: No. Because I don't 16:26:31 17 have any knowledge of the Constellation numbers. 16:26:34 18 I can tell you shuttle program numbers are not 16:26:37 19 as good as what Jeff presented earlier. 16:26:40 20 Our mean is 1 in 81 or 16:26:44 21 5 percent/95 percent or 1 in 57 and 1 in 117. 16:26:50 22 Those are numbers that are very near and dear to 16:26:51 357 1 my heart. 16:26:53 2 I think that the effective of the 16:26:54 3 launch abort system is going to completely drive 16:26:56 4 what the final number is going to be, and I have 16:27:00 5 no idea how effective that is going to be 16:27:03 6 because we haven't studied it. 16:27:06 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: That should be 16:27:06 8 relatively independent of which vehicle it was 16:27:08 9 on, though, if that's the driver? 16:27:11 10 (Discussion off the record.) 16:27:11 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: No. Well, we 16:27:11 12 shouldn't design vehicles that -- 16:27:11 13 MR. SHANNON: Oh, I'd like to. I 16:27:16 14 mean, I've had a ball today because, you know, 16:27:17 15 if you like space, this is kind of neat stuff. 16:27:20 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: The other thing that 16:27:22 17 occurred to me -- I've not been that close in 16:27:23 18 recent time, but the concern over SOFI peeling 16:27:26 19 off, that was a problem for the shuttle clearly 16:27:30 20 because the leading edge of the shuttle was 16:27:35 21 exposed. 16:27:35 22 With this configuration, would that be 16:27:41 358 1 viewed as problem or -- 16:27:41 2 MR. SHANNON: Okay. The shuttle 16:27:41 3 program manager piece of me says we fixed that 16:27:42 4 problem, we're very vigilant about it but we 16:27:43 5 understand it and have fixed that problem, but 16:27:46 6 it doesn't matter if we did or not because, of 16:27:49 7 course, you have a very robust fairing with no 16:27:54 8 TPS issue at all. 16:27:56 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, you have a 16:27:57 10 different geometry here too. 16:27:58 11 MR. SHANNON: Right. 16:27:58 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Other questions 16:27:58 13 from the committee? 16:28:04 14 MR. CHYBA: Just to follow this up so 16:28:04 15 I'm sure I understand it. 16:28:06 16 It seems like the conclusion is that 16:28:07 17 the biggest problem identified with this 16:28:08 18 external system was the loss of crew 16:28:11 19 probability, but you showed a graphic -- and I 16:28:15 20 understand all of the caveats you applied to 16:28:17 21 everything that you showed us. 16:28:17 22 This plot of probability of loss of 16:28:17 359 1 crew with the launch abort system, it looks 16:28:22 2 like, you know, at least at one end of that plot 16:28:25 3 that one gets into the range for loss of crew, 16:28:27 4 accidents that the current architecture is in. 16:28:32 5 Is that correct? 16:28:33 6 MR. SHANNON: Again, it is completely 16:28:34 7 dependent on the launch abort system capability. 16:28:38 8 MR. CHYBA: So it's just not 16:28:04 9 quantified well enough to -- 16:28:04 10 MR. SHANNON: You know, and I'd kind 16:28:42 11 of laugh, right, because after Challenger we 16:28:43 12 made a big run at trying to put an abort 16:28:46 13 capability -- or crew capsule capability at the 16:28:50 14 tip of the orbiter, but you just can't do it 16:28:50 15 from a weight standpoint -- a design complexity 16:28:54 16 standpoint. 16:28:54 17 This is basically that same thing. So 16:28:55 18 we have some studies that have some of the 16:28:57 19 dynamics associated with that, but we need to go 16:29:00 20 back and really go through that and really 16:29:03 21 understand that. Because the safety of this 16:29:05 22 vehicle depends exactly on that one thing. 16:29:07 360 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. We thank you 16:29:11 2 very much. 16:29:14 3 MR. BEJMUK: Real quickly, if I may. 16:29:14 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, I'm sorry. One 16:29:14 5 more. Bo... 16:29:14 6 MR. BEJMUK: Basically, Doug, LAS has 16:29:14 7 improved a launch vehicle loss of crew by a 16:29:20 8 factor of ten roughly. I mean, you know, John 16:29:20 9 had this curve but -- and I think you guys are 16:29:26 10 talking a factor of like 90 percent effective. 16:29:29 11 So that would increase it by a factor of ten, I 16:29:31 12 guess, right? Do you agree with that? 16:29:35 13 MR. SHANNON: Well, it's 90 percent on 16:29:36 14 top of a rocket, though, and this is a 16:29:37 15 different -- 16:29:39 16 MR. COOKE: It's not a rocket failure 16:29:41 17 and it's -- 16:29:41 18 MR. BEJMUK: Yes. 16:29:41 19 MR. SHANNON: -- different design. 16:29:41 20 MR. COOKE: The failure mode is a 16:29:41 21 rocket, and the trajectories -- the actual 16:29:43 22 ascent profile differ between different 16:29:46 361 1 designs -- where you are when there is a 16:29:52 2 failure; if there's a range destruct on a tank, 16:29:57 3 do you want to be sitting next to it. It's kind 16:30:01 4 of -- you know, that sort of discussion can get 16:30:04 5 into this. If you're sitting up on top and do a 16:30:07 6 range destruct, because you're off course, that 16:30:10 7 tends to look better. 16:30:14 8 I mean, back when I was in the shuttle 16:30:16 9 program office after Challenger and we were 16:30:19 10 getting ready to fly Galileo, which had an RTG 16:30:22 11 on it and we studied the Titan 34D launch 16:30:27 12 destruct, we looked at -- we looked at the -- 16:30:32 13 how the boosters destructed on Challenger 16:30:36 14 because they were -- they did a range destruct 16:30:43 15 after the accident because they kept flying. 16:30:44 16 They recovered hardware out of the 16:30:48 17 ocean and looked at how the boosters came part, 16:30:50 18 and they tended to fly sideways more than they 16:30:52 19 did up. 16:30:55 20 So it matters where you are in terms 16:30:56 21 of what failure and what mode of destruct you're 16:30:59 22 in. So, I mean, that's a long discussion -- 16:31:01 362 1 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Thank you. 16:29:14 2 MR. COOKE: -- but those kind of 16:31:03 3 things do come into play. 16:31:05 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: But by the same 16:31:08 5 token -- and, again, I don't want to design 16:31:11 6 rockets here. Well, maybe I do, but we 16:31:13 7 shouldn't. 16:31:13 8 MR. SHANNON: I do. Yeah. 16:31:13 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: If you slide the 16:31:14 10 cargo -- the side mount forward, you could still 16:31:17 11 have the escape capsule -- you say not? 16:31:19 12 MR. SHANNON: We need to -- I'll 16:31:24 13 design it. But the CG becomes a really issue 16:31:26 14 then, and you end up sacrificing your gimbal 16:31:30 15 capabilities so you don't -- of course, we don't 16:31:30 16 have a range package on the ET. We have them on 16:31:31 17 the solid rocket boosters, and if we were going 16:31:34 18 off course, you've got plenty of warning before 16:31:38 19 the range takes actions. 16:31:41 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. We probably 21 should -- 22 MR. COOKE: It needs to be studied. 363 1 MR. SHANNON: It does. 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- move ahead. 3 MR. SHANNON: That is true about every 16:31:44 4 single page I just showed -- is it has to be 16:31:47 5 studied if we want to go look at it. 16:31:47 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 16:31:49 7 MR. SHANNON: You bet. 16:31:51 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: All right. Let's see. 16:31:52 9 We're 30 seconds behind here. Slipping up this 16:31:54 10 afternoon. 16:31:58 11 We then come to the time for public 16:32:00 12 comment. We've allowed up to 30 minutes for 16:32:03 13 comments. If there's anyone who didn't comment 16:32:05 14 this morning that would like to comment, two 16:32:08 15 microphones are here. 16:32:13 16 We'd certainly welcome comments. We'd 16:32:14 17 ask tat you hold them to three minutes or less 16:32:16 18 so that we can give as many folks a chance to 16:32:19 19 speak as possible. 16:32:22 20 And I guess we'll start here. And 16:32:23 21 will you identify yourself, please. 16:32:26 22 MR. SNYDER: Good afternoon. My name 16:32:26 364 1 is Mike Snyder. I'm from Houston, Texas, and I 16:32:33 2 appreciate the opportunity to share my personal 16:32:33 3 opinions and thoughts with you here today. 16:32:51 4 You've heard a lot of good ideas and a 16:32:51 5 lot of different concepts, and so I'd like to 16:32:51 6 tell you a little bit and maybe bring it a 16:32:51 7 little bit on to personal side things. 16:32:51 8 I'm in my early 30's, and I was born 16:32:51 9 after Apollo. My only connection to that 16:32:51 10 program is the historical pictures and the 16:32:52 11 videos that everyone sees, the fact that I drive 16:32:56 12 by the Saturn V's every day laying on the ground 16:32:57 13 and still get the chance now and again to talk 16:32:58 14 to the people that used to work on that program 16:33:02 15 and hear about all of the great efforts that 16:33:04 16 they did. 16:33:08 17 Of course, I inherited the shuttle, 16:33:09 18 and while it's an outstanding vehicle with a lot 16:33:12 19 of great capabilities and it's one that I think 16:33:13 20 that this nation should not be so quick to give 16:33:15 21 up, it is limited to only low Earth orbit. And 16:33:20 22 we spent the last 30 years there doing that, 16:33:23 365 1 basically calling it exploration. 16:33:26 2 I have a lot of opinions on this, and 16:33:26 3 one of my larger opinions is that our current 16:33:28 4 strategy does not do enough to engage the 16:33:32 5 private sector and promote the development of 16:33:35 6 the budding commercial space environment and the 16:33:38 7 capabilities that they may one day have, such as 16:33:39 8 the propellant depots that folks talked about. 16:33:43 9 We do not seem to be -- appear to be 16:33:47 10 building a true space-fairing architecture and 16:33:48 11 infrastructure, actively encouraging the private 16:33:48 12 sector or taking advantage of any of the design 16:33:52 13 reference missions that have been discussed so 16:33:55 14 many time and revised so many times throughout 16:33:57 15 the decades. 16:34:01 16 What we currently have has been 16:34:01 17 referred to as Apollo on steroids, but Apollo 16:34:03 18 was labeled unsustainable. And I ask why will 16:34:03 19 this time be any different with all of the extra 16:34:10 20 developments that we have to do. 16:34:12 21 With regards to what I mentioned 16:34:14 22 above, Ares I and Ares V is not what was 16:34:16 366 1 recommended in ESAS. While we have put a 16:34:19 2 significant amount of money in there, there 16:34:21 3 obviously have been issues, both technical, cost 16:34:23 4 and schedule. 16:34:25 5 Second, with the current designs, I 16:34:26 6 worry that we're going to have two separate 16:34:29 7 launch developments, two large development 16:34:30 8 programs, and then the operations costs that are 16:34:32 9 going to be required to sustain both. In 16:34:34 10 today's economic climate, I'm not sure that 16:34:37 11 that's the best strategic decision we can make. 16:34:40 12 What I believe we need to do is 16:34:43 13 leverage the launch vehicle from as much of the 16:34:44 14 is existing hardware as possible to do the job 16:34:47 15 required while private enterprise is off 16:34:50 16 developing its own capabilities. This allows 16:34:50 17 for the development costs to be minimized and 16:34:56 18 operations costs to be forecasted much more 16:34:56 19 accurately and with higher confidence. 16:35:02 20 We heard today both about the 16:35:03 21 Jupiter -- the National Launch System derived 16:35:03 22 vehicle -- and both the side-mounted vehicle 16:35:06 367 1 that John just talked about. This class of 16:35:08 2 vehicle has been -- 16:35:08 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Could I ask you to 16:35:13 4 wrap up -- 16:35:14 5 MR. SNYDER: Certainly. 16:35:14 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- your comments, 16:35:14 7 please. 16:35:15 8 MR. SNYDER: This class of vehicle has 16:35:15 9 sometimes been called overkill for ISS, but it 16:35:17 10 is exactly that vehicle that we're flying today 16:35:20 11 to construct and build the Space Station, and I 16:35:23 12 would like to see that gain serious 16:35:28 13 consideration by this program -- by this 16:35:32 14 commission. 16:35:34 15 Finally, the only thing I have to say 16:35:34 16 then is that, you know, like I said, I was born 16:35:35 17 after Apollo. I sincerely want and hope to see 16:35:36 18 us go beyond low Earth orbit. I would like to 16:35:42 19 be able to do that and have that as part of my 16:35:44 20 career. I sincerely hope that my two little 16:35:46 21 girls, who are very small, don't grow up in a 16:35:48 22 world where they have to -- too -- look to the 16:35:50 368 1 history books to see what we used to be able 16:35:53 2 to -- what we were, at one time, capable of 16:35:54 3 doing. 16:35:54 4 I know y'all have a great job to do 16:35:57 5 and a very tough job to do, and I appreciate the 16:36:01 6 opportunity to talk to you. And whatever 16:36:03 7 decisions you make, hopefully they're good ones. 16:36:05 8 Thank you. 16:36:08 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 16:36:08 10 Sir... 16:36:11 11 MR. SIMPSON: Hi, I'm Randy Simpson 16:36:11 12 and I'm a taxpayer and an -- (inaudible). 16:36:15 13 I just want to recall -- I know you 16:36:17 14 know this and other people have said it -- just 16:36:18 15 the importance of this review and to think 16:36:22 16 back -- because this isn't the first one you've 16:36:24 17 done -- think back in 1990 when you did a 16:36:26 18 similar review like this and maybe -- and I'm 16:36:29 19 sure you've done this and gone through your 16:36:32 20 head. 16:36:34 21 But I think it would be good for you 16:36:34 22 and for the panel to think about it maybe out 16:36:35 369 1 loud -- to think about what was the environment 16:36:38 2 back in 1990 technology -- from a technology 16:36:39 3 perspective, from a political perspective and 16:36:43 4 think about the process that you went through, 16:36:45 5 the decisions that you made and how it impacted 16:36:48 6 the next 20 years and, in looking at that, take 16:36:50 7 those lessons learned and think to yourself what 16:36:54 8 the decisions you're going to make now are going 16:36:58 9 to do for the next 20 years. 16:37:02 10 So just think about it from a 16:37:05 11 visionary standpoint. And in the process of 16:37:06 12 doing that, remember there are a lot of little 16:37:08 13 eyes that are looking at you. You know, they 16:37:10 14 want to know what the next 20 years are going to 16:37:14 15 be like. 16:37:17 16 There was a discussion about our 16:37:18 17 youth. I've got a herd of youth at home in my 16:37:20 18 family. They're watching you. They're watching 16:37:22 19 NASA. They're watching me. They're wanting me 16:37:23 20 to be excited about NASA, which I am, and for 16:37:25 21 them to be able to move into the space business. 16:37:29 22 We need to do something that's going 16:37:32 370 1 to, in your recommendations, energize the 16:37:34 2 current workforce and the workforce that's 16:37:39 3 coming in later. This is an amazing place that 16:37:41 4 we're in. We're surrounded by Psalm 19 all of 16:37:45 5 the way around the wall. We're under Elihu 16:37:46 6 Root. I don't know if you know who that is, but 16:37:52 7 you ought to look it up. It's amazing. And 16:37:53 8 this -- you've got a big job, and I hope you do 16:37:55 9 it well. 16:37:58 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: We'll certainly do our 16:37:59 11 best. Thank you. 16:38:02 12 Sir... 16:38:04 13 MR. TURNER: Good afternoon, 16:38:04 14 Mr. Chairman and panel. My name is David 16:38:06 15 Turner. I'm from right here in Washington, D.C. 16:38:09 16 Like many people I was very excited five years 16:38:12 17 ago in 2004 when President Bush announced the 16:38:15 18 VSE. I was very excited about that. And here 16:38:20 19 we are in 2009, five years later, and where are 16:38:22 20 we. 16:38:23 21 Well, this morning we saw a 16:38:24 22 Constellation video, which was very impressive 16:38:28 371 1 and would indicate that everything is fine, 16:38:28 2 we're progressing along, yet I feel that if 16:38:31 3 things were fine we wouldn't be here today 16:38:35 4 having this meeting. 16:38:38 5 We've seen a lot of excellent 16:38:40 6 presentations this afternoon, and over the past 16:38:42 7 few years as I've been following this as a 16:38:44 8 concerned citizen, it seems that there are -- 16:38:47 9 we're only going to -- because of the economic 16:38:49 10 issues, we're more than likely only going to get 16:38:51 11 one rocket system that Congress and the 16:38:54 12 White House will support. 16:38:57 13 I've gotten more concerned that if 16:38:59 14 Ares I is selected that we're going to end up 16:39:01 15 only with that, that Ares V won't reach the 16:39:03 16 funding point when it's time for its 16:39:07 17 development. 16:39:10 18 I'm a child of Apollo, and I was a 16:39:11 19 young teen when the Moon was taken away from us 16:39:12 20 in the early '70s. And speaking for my 16:39:15 21 generation, I'm still young, I want the Moon 16:39:17 22 back, I'd like to have it back. And I'm afraid 16:39:19 372 1 that if we only have Ares I we won't get the 16:39:22 2 Moon again for decades. 16:39:25 3 So it seems to me that whatever rocket 16:39:28 4 we select needs to have the most 16:39:31 5 functionality -- the most flexibility to grow, 16:39:34 6 and Ares I isn't designed to do that. 16:39:36 7 So I hope that the rocket system that 16:39:40 8 you all choose has that in mind, that it's -- 16:39:41 9 whatever it can do today, it also has 16:39:46 10 flexibility for growth in the future to ensure 16:39:49 11 that we do get the Moon. 16:39:50 12 Thank you. 16:39:52 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 16:39:52 14 Sir... 16:39:55 15 MR. BLAKE: My name is Earl Blake. I 16:39:55 16 am probably one of the only average citizens in 16:39:57 17 here. I don't have a dog in this fight, you 16:40:01 18 know. I don't care how we launch as long as 16:40:05 19 it's done safely. 16:40:06 20 You know, I took off work to come down 16:40:09 21 here to show you and to show everyone that there 16:40:11 22 are average citizens out there that look to NASA 16:40:15 373 1 as inspiration still and has been for the past 16:40:18 2 50 years. 16:40:24 3 So really actually when I look back at 16:40:25 4 it, I find that the Space Station when it was 16:40:28 5 first proposed -- and I was a young father, had 16:40:31 6 a small one-year old daughter -- now as it's 16:40:34 7 coming to fruition, I'm a grandfather. 16:40:39 8 What I'm really hoping for is that 16:40:43 9 Orion can come along before I become a great 16:40:47 10 grandfather. 16:40:51 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Or worse. 16:40:53 12 MR. BLAKE: Or worse. 16:40:54 13 So what I'm hoping for is 16:40:58 14 Constellation really has to be capable, it has 16:41:03 15 to be safe and it has to be soon or else you're 16:41:07 16 going to lose another generation of children 16:41:11 17 and -- that just do not know the excitement of 16:41:15 18 space exploration. 16:41:20 19 I mean, Dr. Chiao has been to the 16:41:21 20 Space Station, I believe. It's exciting for the 16:41:27 21 person in that position. For the rest of us on 16:41:29 22 the -- except for people like me, eh, not so 16:41:33 374 1 much. But, you know, we need to inspire our 16:41:37 2 youth. 16:41:40 3 So basically I think what really 16:41:42 4 should come out of this commission is the fact 16:41:44 5 that whatever we decide to take, it has to be 16:41:46 6 supported by Congress for a long term and it has 16:41:52 7 to be properly funded. It just -- if the 16:41:54 8 figures come out and we need this amount of 16:41:59 9 money to get it done in this amount of time, it 16:42:01 10 has to be allocated. We can't go along 16:42:03 11 thinking, oh, we'll make it up later, because we 16:42:07 12 never do. 16:42:11 13 So that's what I'm hoping that you can 16:42:12 14 do for us. 16:42:14 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you very 16:42:14 16 much for those comments. Each of you who have 16:42:16 17 made public comments certainly inspire us with 16:42:24 18 the importance of what we've been tasked to do. 16:42:28 19 I assure you we're all committed to do our very 16:42:31 20 best. 16:42:35 21 As you can see, this is not an easy 16:42:35 22 task, and as I've visited on Capitol Hill quite 16:42:38 375 1 a bit, I've discovered there are a lot of 16:42:41 2 different views there too, all strongly held, 16:42:46 3 mostly contradictory. So we're aware of what 16:42:49 4 we're into and we're aware of the importance of 16:42:51 5 it and we will do our best. 16:42:54 6 Let me thank all of you in the 16:42:57 7 audience who've stuck with us to the bitter end 16:42:59 8 here today. We appreciate your interest. 16:43:02 9 I want to thank the people at NASA on 16:43:05 10 behalf my colleagues, the people at NASA who 16:43:07 11 made the briefings and people who provided the 16:43:10 12 logistics of pulling this all together today. 16:43:14 13 It was, I think, a very worthwhile day from our 16:43:18 14 standpoint. 16:43:23 15 Let me just ask if any of my 16:43:24 16 colleagues would like to have the last word 16:43:25 17 here. 16:43:28 18 Jeff, do you want to or Bo or -- 16:43:28 19 MR. GREASON: I can't resist the 16:43:32 20 temptation to say something. 16:43:32 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Please. 16:43:32 22 MR. GREASON: But so as to be 16:43:32 376 1 noncontroversial -- always something I've said 16:43:34 2 on a public record before -- you know, and I'm 16:43:37 3 reminding you of it because of the comments I 16:43:40 4 got here at the public meeting. You know, I 16:43:42 5 stood up on an occasion much like this when I 16:43:45 6 was on that side of the microphone and I told 16:43:45 7 the story that, you know, I've had that moment 16:43:48 8 that we used to be -- used to say about laughing 16:43:51 9 late when my little boy came to me and said, 16:43:54 10 Daddy, did they really used to go to the Moon 16:43:59 11 when you were a boy. 16:44:02 12 And, you know, I am only one of us and 16:44:03 13 we have a really hard job to do and at the end 16:44:05 14 of day we make recommendation and other people 16:44:09 15 have their hard job to do, but if I can, I'm 16:44:12 16 going to make sure that no -- that when they 16:44:15 17 grow up their kids don't have to ask that. 16:44:18 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Bo, do you want to add 16:44:18 19 anything? 16:44:23 20 MR. BEJMUK: I only have just one 16:44:23 21 thought. You know, this gentleman who took off 16:44:24 22 work to come to talk to us, what resonated with 16:44:26 377 1 me was when he said soon. 16:44:30 2 You know, this was like the most 16:44:31 3 powerful word I almost heard today. We had a 16:44:35 4 lot of briefings, a lot of fancy stuff, a lot of 16:44:37 5 clever stuff, smart stuff, and there is a good 16:44:38 6 citizen who takes off work and he says, guys, do 16:44:41 7 something soon, and I think this is one area 16:44:44 8 that we have fallen behind in this country. 16:44:46 9 I've been in this industry longer than 16:44:50 10 my memory serves me to remember. But we have 16:44:53 11 slowed down in the way we do things. We do well 16:44:55 12 things, we do it with little resources, we 16:44:59 13 somehow have forgotten or maybe never learned or 16:45:02 14 we didn't think it was important to do things 16:45:07 15 soon. 16:45:08 16 And I appreciate what you have said. 16:45:09 17 We will try to see if we can maybe advise 16:45:11 18 somebody to do things soon. Thank you. 16:45:13 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Leroy... 16:45:20 20 MR. CHIAO: Thanks, Norm. I'd just 16:45:20 21 like to say what a great honor it is for me to 16:45:22 22 serve on this commission, and like my fellow 16:45:25 378 1 committee members, I take my responsibilities 16:45:28 2 very seriously and intend to do the best job I 16:45:30 3 can to help move the process forward. 16:45:34 4 It really touches me to see all of the 16:45:37 5 folks that came out, people who took time off of 16:45:37 6 their jobs, people who made a special trip out 16:45:40 7 to D.C. to participate in the meeting today and 16:45:42 8 stayed all day really -- I'm also impressed with 16:45:46 9 people who've come out and made bold 16:45:47 10 presentations and statements. 16:45:49 11 And, you know, it just shows that 16:45:50 12 people do care about space in this country, and 16:45:53 13 I think this commission will play an important 16:45:57 14 role in ensuring that this country continues to 16:45:59 15 be a leader in human space flight. 16:46:02 16 So thank you all for coming. 16:46:03 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Ed... 16:46:09 18 DR. CRAWLEY: The task we have before 16:46:10 19 us is, I think, pretty important, and I think I 16:46:13 20 want to assure all of you listening today that 16:46:16 21 we really understand that deeply. 16:46:18 22 The previous NASA administrator said 16:46:22 379 1 on a number of occasions that the main task of 16:46:25 2 his administration was to get the first launch 16:46:28 3 vehicle rolling and get the first spacecraft 16:46:31 4 rolling and basically the rest of the program 16:46:35 5 was budget ahead of us and payload on top and 16:46:38 6 that it would, in fact, be the responsibility of 16:46:42 7 the next -- now current -- administration to 16:46:45 8 really decide where we were going to go beyond 16:46:47 9 low Earth orbit and how we were going to get 16:46:52 10 there other than with the launch systems and 16:46:54 11 first spacecraft. 16:46:56 12 And I think that we're at a time and 16:46:57 13 place in history where the recommendations of 16:46:59 14 this panel, as we heard from the elected 16:47:02 15 representative of the people this morning, will 16:47:05 16 really be listened to, and we take that 16:47:07 17 responsibility with great seriousness. 16:47:09 18 Someone referenced previous studies. 16:47:13 19 Norm has chaired these studies before. Sally 16:47:16 20 was on both of the accident investigation 16:47:20 21 boards, Columbia and Challenger. I happened to 16:47:25 22 be on the -- 16 years ago when the Space Station 16:47:28 380 1 study that was begun in the first year in the 16:47:31 2 Clinton Administration, called the BEST report, 16:47:33 3 and one of the outcomes of that report was a 16:47:37 4 decision to move the Space Station to 16:47:40 5 51.5 degrees orbital inclination and invite the 16:47:42 6 Russians to participate. 16:47:47 7 On the morning -- on the day when 16:47:48 8 Columbia was tragically lost, I had one warm 16:47:50 9 feeling in my heart that the astronauts who were 16:47:56 10 then on orbit would not be because of the 16:47:59 11 recommendation of that committee. 16:48:02 12 So these committees do, in fact, 16:48:05 13 sometimes change history, and I think we're in a 16:48:08 14 position to do that at this time. 16:48:11 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you, Ed. 16:48:11 16 Chris... 16:48:16 17 MR. CHYBA: Thank you. First, I'd 16:48:16 18 like to thank the chairman and my co-panelist 16:48:17 19 and the presenters today, but above all, the 16:48:21 20 members of the public who gave us their views. 16:48:23 21 Our responsibility as a committee, 16:48:28 22 Mr. Chairman, I believe is to look at a set of 16:48:30 381 1 options and present -- look at a very wide set 16:48:32 2 of options and present a somewhat winnowed down 16:48:35 3 set of options to the White House and NASA, also 16:48:39 4 to Congress and to the public. 16:48:43 5 I think it's important for us to look 16:48:45 6 across a very wide number of options and to be 16:48:48 7 very clear what the choices are, what the 16:48:52 8 choices are with respect to the goals -- those 16:48:55 9 options may have different goals that imply 16:48:57 10 different destinations -- what the choices mean 16:49:01 11 for national infrastructures and capabilities, 16:49:04 12 what the choices mean for the time scale, how 16:49:06 13 soon we will be doing different things and what 16:49:10 14 the realistic budget requirements for those 16:49:10 15 different options are. 16:49:19 16 And ultimately the choice is not going 16:49:19 17 to be made by this group, of course; it's going 16:49:19 18 to be made by an elaborate dance between the 16:49:21 19 Executive and Legislative Branches and 16:49:23 20 ultimately the American public. 16:49:26 21 Our job, I think, is to queue up the 16:49:28 22 options as clearly as we can so that the people, 16:49:31 382 1 through their representatives, can choose. 16:49:33 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you. I 16:49:37 3 guess I would just observe that my small 16:49:39 4 grandchildren, the two things that I think 16:49:41 5 excite them the most are space and dinosaurs, 16:49:44 6 and we're very short on dinosaurs. 16:49:47 7 So thank you very much. 16:49:52 8 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned 16:49:52 9 at 4:50 p.m.) 16:49:52 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 383