12 changed the mission schedule from late '10 to 14:55:31 13 early '11 to reflect the additional work 14:55:33 14 required to execute that. 14:55:36 15 For CRS we completed the first two 14:55:37 16 milestones for the cargo resupply service, and 14:55:42 17 the next major milestone will be the Vehicle 14:55:45 18 Baseline Review at L minus 13 months. 14:55:47 19 And we are currently working the cargo 14:55:50 20 manifesting process with NASA to ensure that we 14:55:52 21 understand not only what they're going to fly 14:55:56 22 but how they want it stowed and how they want it 14:55:59 262 1 unloaded and how they want it handled in space. 14:56:01 2 Next slide. 14:56:05 3 And this is an overview of our 14:56:05 4 schedule, as I've already described it, and you 14:56:08 5 can see the dates on there for reference 14:56:10 6 purposes. Next slide. 14:56:14 7 To summarize, I'd like to say, again, 14:56:14 8 that even though it's not glamorous carrying 14:56:18 9 cargo it is glamorous for our people to be 14:56:23 10 working on the Human Space Flight program, and 14:56:26 11 they've very excited about being a part of this, 14:56:28 12 being a part of the International Space Station 14:56:33 13 and helping to continue that mission. 14:56:33 14 Because we know that even as we are 14:56:36 15 working to achieve other goals in space, 14:56:39 16 maintaining our presence on the International 14:56:42 17 Space Station keeps the interest up, it keeps 14:56:45 18 the attention on space and it keeps Americans 14:56:48 19 flying. That cannot be overemphasized, I 14:56:51 20 believe. 14:56:54 21 Evolving that capability to 14:56:54 22 understanding what it will take to go further in 14:56:56 263 1 space, to live longer in space and to take those 14:56:59 2 capabilities further out from low Earth orbit 14:57:01 3 requires the delivery of this cargo and the 14:57:04 4 delivery of the experiments, and we intend to do 14:57:06 5 that successfully and to do it cost effectively 14:57:09 6 and efficiently and, most importantly, safely. 14:57:12 7 So with that, Mr. Chairman, any 14:57:15 8 questions? 14:57:18 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 14:57:19 10 Are there questions? 14:57:20 11 I guess you've answered the questions. 14:57:24 12 We thank you for the briefing. 14:57:26 13 MR. CULBERTSON: Thank you very much 14:57:28 14 for your attention. 14:57:31 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. Mike 14:57:31 16 Suffredini is next, the ISS program manager, who 14:57:31 17 will talk to us a little bit about commercial 14:57:31 18 resupply services from his perspective. 14:57:31 19 MR. SUFFREDINI: Good afternoon, 14:57:44 20 Mr. Chairman and Members of Committee. It's 14:57:46 21 good to see you guys here this afternoon. 14:57:48 22 And just last night or this morning 14:57:51 264 1 early I was sitting over in Florida hoping John 14:57:54 2 would launch the shuttle so we'd get on with the 14:57:57 3 rest of assembly, but, anyway, we're going to 14:58:01 4 try that again in July and we're looking forward 14:58:01 5 to it. 14:58:01 6 Before I go on, I made a huge error. 14:58:02 7 Elon reminded me in looking at his paragraphs of 14:58:05 8 actual hardware that I should have done the same 14:58:09 9 with Space Station, but Frank's Chart 25, if you 14:58:11 10 look at that, that's not an artist's rendition 14:58:13 11 of what ISS is going to look like. That is a 14:58:15 12 photograph of the Space Station, and it is 14:58:19 13 largely complete, as we know it today. 14:58:21 14 It is also manned as recently as late 14:58:24 15 May with a six-person crew. And so we're 14:58:27 16 continuing on in that program, and, of course, a 14:58:29 17 very important part of that -- an important part 14:58:32 18 of that is the ability to resupply and to get 14:58:33 19 utilization on board so we can utilize the 14:58:36 20 vehicle that we built. And so I thought I'd 14:58:40 21 spend a little time talking to you about that 14:58:42 22 today. Next chart, please. 14:58:45 265 1 Of course, we all know we are going to 14:58:46 2 retire the shuttle. The plan is to retire it at 14:58:49 3 the end of 2010, and what that left us with was 14:58:52 4 a significant gap in our capability to the 14:58:56 5 resources to orbit between the time it retires 14:59:00 6 and, at that time, the planned life of the 14:59:03 7 International Space Station, which is -- our 14:59:06 8 plan is to operate through the end of 2015 and 14:59:08 9 then de-orbit it in the first quarter of 2016. 14:59:11 10 And what we ended up with through our 14:59:14 11 analysis is we found out we needed about 14:59:15 12 60 metric tons of upmass. And when we look at 14:59:18 13 the vehicles that we have today that are 14:59:23 14 available to us or will be available to us soon, 14:59:25 15 we have, of course, we all know, the Russian 14:59:27 16 Progress vehicle for cargo and the Soyuz vehicle 14:59:30 17 for crew. 14:59:32 18 We recently had the first flight of 14:59:32 19 the automated transfer vehicle, which is the 14:59:36 20 European contribution to payback which we 14:59:39 21 call -- what we call common systems ops cost, 14:59:41 22 and that's going to be four vehicles -- four 14:59:44 266 1 more vehicles, the first one plus four. And 14:59:46 2 that will be each year starting in '10. So '10, 14:59:49 3 '11, '12, '13 will have an ATV vehicle. 14:59:52 4 In addition to that, we're about to 14:59:58 5 fly our first H-II transfer vehicle, which is 15:00:00 6 the JAXA contribution, also as a payback for 15:00:01 7 common systems ops costs. That will be one per 15:00:05 8 year through the life of the program, starting 15:00:05 9 with their first flight, which is going to occur 15:00:08 10 here in September. 15:00:10 11 Now, all of those vehicles together 15:00:12 12 flying through those times that I just told you 15:00:15 13 about, we still have a 60-metric-ton shortfall. 15:00:17 14 In addition to that -- and you've 15:00:21 15 heard folks talk about it today -- we also have 15:00:22 16 a need to get crew to orbit. To date, of 15:00:23 17 course, the shuttle had done that for us prior 15:00:26 18 to the accident. We kind of evolved to doing 15:00:29 19 most of the crew transport needs with the Soyuz 15:00:32 20 spacecraft, although we still -- up into the 15:00:35 21 next couple of flights, we have one crew member 15:00:38 22 that we do rotate on the shuttle. 15:00:39 267 1 And then the future, of course, for 15:00:42 2 now shows us having to procure those seats until 15:00:45 3 the crew exploration vehicle is available, and 15:00:50 4 the first flight where we can take six crew to 15:00:52 5 orbit and it stays on orbit as a rescue is 15:00:55 6 currently the fall of 2015. 15:00:55 7 We have procured Soyuz spacecraft 15:01:00 8 through the fall of 2012 with the return in 15:01:02 9 2013, and so we do have a gap there that we 15:01:05 10 haven't procured to date. Next chart, please. 15:01:07 11 So this chart -- you've seen it 15:01:11 12 before. This kind of just shows you the 15:01:14 13 different capabilities. A couple of points I 15:01:17 14 would make on this chart. 15:01:20 15 The first is you'll note that no 15:01:21 16 vehicle other than the space shuttle is able to 15:01:23 17 return unpressurized cargo. And that was a 15:01:26 18 significant change for us. That drove us to go 15:01:29 19 to a -- what we refer to as the build-and-burn 15:01:31 20 philosophy. 15:01:34 21 Prior to this time, we built a limited 15:01:35 22 number of orbit replacement units or basically 15:01:37 268 1 spare components, and when they failed, the 15:01:39 2 intention was to return them home and repair 15:01:41 3 them and fly them back up when we needed them. 15:01:43 4 The external ORUs are all very -- I 15:01:47 5 wouldn't say all -- they're mostly all very, 15:01:50 6 very larger components, very heavy, and there 15:01:53 7 was just -- there was no capability at the time 15:01:56 8 or planned capability we knew of to be able to 15:01:59 9 handle the external ORUs. And, in fact, that's 15:02:01 10 holding true today. Nobody is planning to do a 15:02:06 11 return capability external ORUs. 15:02:10 12 In addition to that, you'll see if we 15:02:13 13 hadn't gone with the commercial resupply 15:02:16 14 services contract that there wasn't even a 15:02:18 15 capability to bring a significant amount of 15:02:21 16 pressurized cargo home. 15:02:24 17 The Soyuz does bring home a little bit 15:02:26 18 per our contract. For each seat we get about 15:02:26 19 17 kilograms in a very confined space so we can 15:02:28 20 bring home some samples, water samples, 15:02:31 21 experiment samples, but it's fairly limited. 15:02:35 22 And so we needed that capability as well. 15:02:37 269 1 Now, the HTV does have -- it was at 15:02:40 2 the time -- before CRS, HTV was the only vehicle 15:02:43 3 that also had an upmass capability through her 15:02:48 4 external ORUs. So now we still have to get the 15:02:52 5 spares to orbit. HTV was going to be the only 15:02:52 6 capability to do that. And this is something we 15:02:56 7 also got more capability with the CRS contract. 15:02:59 8 So you can see -- just that chart 15:03:03 9 alone kind of makes you realize how big of an 15:03:05 10 impact that losing shuttle did to us. 15:03:09 11 Now, you have to remember much of the 15:03:12 12 shuttle capability -- the whole program was 15:03:14 13 built around assembly, and, of course, much that 15:03:14 14 of capability that we utilize on shuttle has 15:03:17 15 been for assembly as well. So it's hard to 15:03:19 16 compare apples to apples on this chart just from 15:03:22 17 a pure upmass standpoint. Next chart. 15:03:25 18 So all of this drove us to go into a 15:03:27 19 procurement of a capability to take care of the 15:03:31 20 remaining 60 metric tons that we had to procure 15:03:33 21 in order to operate the ISS through 2015. I 15:03:37 22 won't go through all of these charts. 15:03:41 270 1 But we did do a lengthy process to 15:03:42 2 involve commercial -- the industry early on to 15:03:46 3 understand what they could and couldn't do, what 15:03:49 4 was reasonable to expect. We were into a fixed 15:03:52 5 price contract. We wanted to understand the 15:03:55 6 application of that capability. 15:03:56 7 All of that drove us to an RFP on 15:03:57 8 April 14. And you can see down here at the 15:04:01 9 bottom it showed you basically what we put in as 15:04:04 10 the need that the RFP was trying to fulfill. 15:04:07 11 You'll notice it has upmass, both 15:04:10 12 internal and external. It has only pressurized 15:04:13 13 return, because that was the only capability we 15:04:17 14 thought we could get in a return capability, and 15:04:19 15 then this disposal downmass, which is just a 15:04:22 16 nice way of saying trash -- Frank mentioned 15:04:25 17 earlier. Next chart, please. 15:04:28 18 This chart -- we spent a lot of time 15:04:29 19 trying to decide what we could do and when we 15:04:32 20 should do it. This chart is showing -- it says 15:04:35 21 it here in the title, Using 2008 Historical 15:04:38 22 Schedule Dates. 15:04:41 271 1 So in late 2007 we were trying to 15:04:42 2 decide when to do the procurement. And this 15:04:46 3 chart just kind shows you at this time RPK was 15:04:48 4 out of the picture. The COTS Phase I second 15:04:51 5 re-award, if you will, hadn't taken place. So 15:04:54 6 we knew what the SpaceX plan was going to be. 15:04:59 7 We also knew from talking to our JAXA 15:05:03 8 colleagues that they needed about a 36-month 15:05:06 9 lead time to build an HTV. If we ask for one, 15:05:08 10 they need about 36 months. And, of course, we 15:05:10 11 need additional time just to do the negotiations 15:05:11 12 before the 36-month clock started. 15:05:14 13 In addition to that, we found in 15:05:18 14 talking to industry that it would probably take 15:05:20 15 about two years to get any vehicle that we 15:05:23 16 wanted. So if we ordered, we had to always 15:05:27 17 order about two years in advance. And that's 15:05:30 18 been true for the Progress vehicle as well. 15:05:32 19 It's a pretty standard time. The human-rated 15:05:34 20 spacecraft tend to take a little longer, and 15:05:37 21 that's also born out from our purchase of the 15:05:39 22 Soyuz spacecraft. 15:05:42 272 1 But in any event, 2011 -- early 2011 15:05:44 2 is when we decided was the deadline to have 15:05:45 3 capability to orbit. And I'll talk a little bit 15:05:49 4 about the challenges associated with any 15:05:52 5 movement to the right of schedule here in a 15:05:54 6 minute. But that drove us then to do the 15:05:56 7 acquisition when we did. Next chart, please. 15:05:59 8 This was going to be a new way of 15:06:04 9 doing business, at least for us anyway. We're 15:06:07 10 used to doing cost-plus contracts, controlling 15:06:10 11 every aspect of the process. 15:06:13 12 And we also are fairly hands-on even 15:06:14 13 in ELV land in terms of what we watch and what 15:06:18 14 data we get back, and we even give a go at 15:06:21 15 launch time. And we were trying to change to 15:06:26 16 a -- to a little more closer to the type of 15:06:28 17 fixed price contract you'd expect. It's an 15:06:30 18 end-to-end service type contract. 15:06:33 19 In all of these cases, we supply an 15:06:35 20 ORU or a bag of supplies to the provider and the 15:06:38 21 provider gives it back to us when we get on 15:06:43 22 Space Station. And so it's an end-to-end 15:06:45 273 1 service. 15:06:48 2 Now, to the extent we could let go of 15:06:48 3 the launch vehicle we have, we got relatively 15:06:50 4 hands-off in terms of the launch vehicle prep 15:06:54 5 and what they have to do to ensure mission 15:06:56 6 success. There's still work they have to do 15:07:01 7 working with the range and FAA to assure safety 15:07:03 8 for the people on the ground, but once you get 15:07:05 9 past that point, it's really up to these 15:07:07 10 contractors to ensure that they're going to be 15:07:09 11 successful and get to ISS. 15:07:12 12 And then we have this sphere around 15:07:14 13 ISS -- about a two-by-two-by-four kilometer 15:07:17 14 sphere around ISS, and anything that the 15:07:18 15 spacecraft does inside that sphere, including 15:07:21 16 the burn to get to that sphere, then is a little 15:07:24 17 more tightly controlled, more like you'd expect 15:07:26 18 NASA would do. But it really was only from a 15:07:31 19 safety aspect. 15:07:31 20 Anything to do with mission success, 15:07:31 21 we took off those kinds of requirements we 15:07:31 22 normally apply, and we applied just the 15:07:35 274 1 requirements having to do with safety in order 15:07:37 2 to ensure that we would be safe. But the whole 15:07:39 3 idea was to put the monkey on the back of the 15:07:42 4 provider to get to ISS and try to take some of 15:07:44 5 our work out of that process. 15:07:47 6 So it's a contract for fixed price, as 15:07:49 7 I said here, for the internal/external upmass 15:07:52 8 and the cargo return and cargo disposal. And in 15:07:56 9 the end, we ended up selecting two vendors 15:07:56 10 inside this contract. We had the option to 15:08:00 11 select one, two -- even could do more than two, 15:08:01 12 if we chose. Of course, more than two, you 15:08:05 13 probably -- you'd run into a problem of having 15:08:06 14 enough business to entice a contractor to play. 15:08:09 15 We felt like we needed at least two. 15:08:13 16 Because in the cases of what were proposed to 15:08:16 17 us, it was always -- it was all new vehicle, and 15:08:19 18 so we felt like we needed some redundancy there 15:08:21 19 to hope that if -- if two applied, we would, of 15:08:25 20 course, hope both will be successful, but if 15:08:28 21 they don't, we still have a chance that one 15:08:30 22 might be enough to keep us going until we get 15:08:33 275 1 other capability to orbit. Next chart, please. 15:08:37 2 So this is the result of the task 15:08:38 3 order after we awarded the contract in late 15:08:41 4 December. In about the March time frame we sat 15:08:41 5 down with both companies and did what we call 15:08:44 6 our task orders, and this is basically how the 15:08:46 7 flights worked out. We put the year and month 15:08:48 8 and kind of laid them out. 15:08:51 9 And then as we get closer in, within 15:08:53 10 about two years, we'll do ATP. And at about 15:08:56 11 18 months then we'll actually select the launch 15:09:00 12 date and a 90-day period that they have to lunch 15:09:02 13 within, and we'll agree to that at this Vehicle 15:09:05 14 Baseline Review that has occurred in one case 15:09:10 15 and is to occur here shortly, as Frank 15:09:14 16 mentioned. Next chart, please. 15:09:17 17 So this just kind of gives you a sense 15:09:17 18 of the two-year window and how the flights line 15:09:22 19 up. The red X's are the actual launch dates, 15:09:26 20 and then the bar there is the time from ATP to 15:09:30 21 launch. And it just kind of gives you a feel 15:09:33 22 for where everything lays out. 15:09:36 276 1 Remember I told you the beginning of 15:09:39 2 2011 is when we wanted to be able to have cargo 15:09:41 3 to orbit. And the current plan for the COTS 15:09:46 4 part of this process was not to carry cargo to 15:09:50 5 ISS. So the first cargo on either of the two 15:09:52 6 vehicles was going to be on the SpaceX vehicle 15:09:54 7 in late 2010. So when we made the award, we 15:09:56 8 were already kind of late relative to our needs. 15:10:00 9 Next chart, please. 15:10:03 10 So I won't get into too much detail on 15:10:03 11 these next two charts in order to save time, but 15:10:08 12 you can kind of see the milestones that are 15:10:11 13 listed here. 15:10:13 14 We're coupled very closely to the COTS 15:10:14 15 effort. The COTS program really manages the 15:10:16 16 relationship with Orbital and SpaceX. All of 15:10:21 17 the integration work, all of the requirement, 15:10:24 18 all of that is supplied by and verified by the 15:10:25 19 International Space Station program, and that 15:10:28 20 ensures that when the COTS flight occurs and if 15:10:29 21 it is successful then transitioning to the CRS 15:10:33 22 flight should be relatively seamless. Next 15:10:38 277 1 chart, please. 15:10:42 2 And this is just the specifics for the 15:10:42 3 Orbital flight as well. You'll notice there's a 15:10:44 4 little bit of difference to Orbital, and Frank 15:10:48 5 mentioned it. They have a solid second stage 15:10:49 6 early in their program, and after the first 15:10:52 7 couple of flights, they go to a liquid stage 15:10:55 8 which provides more performance. 15:11:00 9 And as the last two bullets say -- 15:11:01 10 really this is a challenging business, at best. 15:11:02 11 It is a very difficult business. We all in this 15:11:05 12 room -- most of us in this room have a lot of 15:11:08 13 experience with this, and no matter how well we 15:11:11 14 plan and how hard we work and how much money we 15:11:14 15 put into it, there are always challenges to 15:11:18 16 overcome. 15:11:20 17 And even once you become operational, 15:11:21 18 until you've flown a few times, you're still 15:11:23 19 going to have challenges making schedule. And 15:11:28 20 so we believe that even once we do the VBR we 15:11:31 21 need to be prepared for slips as much as three 15:11:36 22 to six months and maybe more. Next chart, 15:11:39 278 1 please. 15:11:42 2 So this chart is an attempt to show 15:11:42 3 you what the logistics are on board that we have 15:11:44 4 to provide for on the International Space 15:11:47 5 Station through the end of 2011. And I'll try 15:11:49 6 to talk to you a little bit in large detail. 15:11:53 7 The green line is the crew supply. So 15:11:56 8 that's water, food, clothing -- all of the 15:11:59 9 things that the crew needs to survive. 15:12:01 10 The orange line is consumables. So 15:12:05 11 those are filters, tanks -- those big tanks you 15:12:08 12 saw Frank show, those kinds of things are the 15:12:10 13 consumables required to operate the systems for 15:12:11 14 the crew. 15:12:14 15 The dashed purple line is the 15:12:15 16 utilization requirements, and you can see even 15:12:17 17 today with the capability we have because of 15:12:19 18 assembly we're challenged early in 2010 to meet 15:12:21 19 the needs of the utilization crowd. 15:12:26 20 And then, finally, the light gray is 15:12:29 21 corrective maintenance. And so even as we plan 15:12:30 22 today, we're relatively challenged to do the 15:12:33 279 1 corrective maintenance. Now, that's not a bad 15:12:36 2 thing. This is all based on meantime between 15:12:39 3 failure. 15:12:41 4 Our meantime between failures on the 15:12:41 5 majority of our components have been very 15:12:44 6 friendly to us. And as you can expect, early in 15:12:45 7 the life of the Space Station, these systems are 15:12:47 8 relatively young, and we would expect that we 15:12:49 9 will continue to have positive performance from 15:12:56 10 the hardware relative to failures. 15:12:57 11 However, as the vehicle gets older, 15:13:00 12 you wouldn't want to carry this kind of 15:13:02 13 challenge because you can expect more failures 15:13:04 14 as they get closer to their design life. 15:13:07 15 Now, what we have done in the program 15:13:10 16 to try to mitigate the risk of the potential for 15:13:12 17 these vehicles to move to the right are two 15:13:16 18 things. 15:13:19 19 One is -- you see the dots that 15:13:19 20 represent both of the demo flight -- the demo 15:13:21 21 flights that actually berth to the ISS, so 15:13:22 22 Demo 3 for SpaceX and the single Orbital demo, 15:13:25 280 1 and then you see the first couple of flights for 15:13:29 2 SpaceX there and that first CRS flight for 15:13:29 3 Orbital. None of that upmass is accommodated in 15:13:33 4 that chart. 15:13:37 5 So what that chart tells you is we 15:13:37 6 could probably keep the ISS flying and utilize 15:13:40 7 it the way we expect to utilize it through about 15:13:43 8 the end of 2011, and at that point if we don't 15:13:46 9 have some upmass from one of these systems, 15:13:50 10 we're going to be challenged to continue to 15:13:52 11 utilize ISS in the long term. 15:13:54 12 Now, I'll tell you a couple of things. 15:13:58 13 One is, of course, I told you that we don't -- 15:13:59 14 we haven't accommodated any upmass. So I 15:14:01 15 haven't assumed any upmass from any of those 15:14:01 16 vehicles. And second of all, even though the 15:14:07 17 demos today are not intended to carry flight 15:14:08 18 hardware to orbit, one of the things we're 15:14:12 19 looking at is we want to make sure the demo is 15:14:14 20 as realistic as possible. 15:14:17 21 In order to do that, we believe we 15:14:19 22 should manifest those vehicles as if they're 15:14:21 281 1 flying as real vehicles, and it's all about how 15:14:24 2 you pack it and how you're going to -- once you 15:14:26 3 get to orbit, how you're going to unpack it and 15:14:29 4 how you're going to fill it back up with trash. 15:14:32 5 And so we believe that we have a 15:14:34 6 rationale to go ahead and manifest flight 15:14:36 7 hardware on the -- from the demonstration 15:14:38 8 flights as well. So that's another mitigation. 15:14:39 9 If any one of these flights makes it between now 15:14:39 10 and the end of 2011, that's just more margin for 15:14:44 11 us to continue on. 15:14:46 12 So our job is to try to manage the ISS 15:14:48 13 such that we can give as much to both Orbital 15:14:52 14 and SpaceX to move to the right as they 15:14:56 15 naturally -- as you might expect them to have to 15:14:58 16 as they conquer problems. 15:15:02 17 Part of that, of course, is working 15:15:05 18 very closely with them not to let other slips 15:15:06 19 occur. So you want to manage really hard to 15:15:08 20 your milestones so you can deal with those 15:15:09 21 problems that you're not expecting to have. And 15:15:10 22 so that's part of what we've been working 15:15:14 282 1 closely with both SpaceX and Orbital to talk 15:15:17 2 about. 15:15:18 3 And I'll just tell you up front right 15:15:19 4 now, both companies have done just a great job 15:15:21 5 of working with us and designing their systems 15:15:24 6 and understanding our requirements, and we've 15:15:26 7 been very impressed so far. We just know that 15:15:30 8 the challenge is there no matter how good you 15:15:33 9 are. Next chart, please. 15:15:37 10 So this is really my summary chart. 15:15:38 11 We selected two contracts to get us some 15:15:44 12 mitigation to the possibility if one or the 15:15:44 13 other didn't quite make it. 15:15:47 14 We're working very closely with the -- 15:15:49 15 they call themselves C3PO, the office that 15:15:51 16 manages the COTS program on behalf of the ESMD 15:15:55 17 and, in fact, are doing all of the integration 15:15:57 18 work for the COTS program to ensure that the 15:16:00 19 COTS vehicles then can seamlessly become CRS 15:16:03 20 vehicle when that occurs. 15:16:07 21 We have great insight into their 15:16:09 22 milestones and are working closely with them 15:16:11 283 1 when we see challenges coming along. And while 15:16:13 2 the contractors do have quite a bit of work 15:16:15 3 ahead of them, we think they're doing a great, 15:16:17 4 great job, but we would expect schedule slips, 15:16:19 5 as you normally would. And we're working hard 15:16:22 6 to help mitigate those, as we mentioned earlier. 15:16:25 7 And that concludes my presentation, 15:16:28 8 Mr. Chairman, and I'm ready to take any 15:16:30 9 questions you might have. 15:16:32 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Terrific. 15:16:33 11 Thanks very much, Mike. 15:16:36 12 Questions from anybody? 15:16:37 13 Okay. Jeff... 15:16:39 14 MR. GREASON: Back on your Chart 11, I 15:16:39 15 assume these jagged lines are your demand as to 15:16:41 16 what you want to fly? 15:16:46 17 MR. SUFFREDINI: That's what we will 15:16:48 18 fly. 15:16:49 19 MR. GREASON: That's what you will 15:16:49 20 fly? 15:16:49 21 MR. SUFFREDINI: Yes, sir. 15= :16:50 22 MR. GREASON: Okay. I'm at a loss as 15:16:52 284 1 to how things like -- in 2010, for example, how 15:16:55 2 does the consumable -- how do some of these 15:16:57 3 items like ISS utilization get negative? 15:16:58 4 MR. SUFFREDINI: They get negative 15:17:01 5 when you know you're not supplying at the 15:17:02 6 level -- zero represents what we believe we need 15:17:04 7 to be above to meet the needs of different 15:17:07 8 suppliers. 15:17:10 9 MR. GREASON: This would basically be 15:17:10 10 the margin you have? 15:17:10 11 MR. SUFFREDINI: Right. 15:17:11 12 MR. GREASON: Okay. Got you. 15:17:10 13 MR. SUFFREDINI: So in this case we're 15:17:11 14 trying to meet the needs of utilization folks. 15:17:14 15 I'll tell you, that dip is for -- I'll say for 15:17:18 16 utilization resupply. So all of the racks and 15:17:20 17 capability that we need to put on orbit to use 15:17:23 18 in the future, that all does make it to orbit. 15:17:26 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Please go ahead, Bo. 15:17:30 20 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 15:17:32 21 Michael, when we listen today to 15:17:34 22 Mr. Perminov, the Russian space agency head, he 15:17:36 285 1 didn't seem to be concerned about the fact that 15:17:42 2 NASA budget for support to International Space 15:17:45 3 Station today is not planned beyond 2016. 15:17:48 4 I haven't heard any concern from 15:17:52 5 either of the COTS contractors either, your 15:17:54 6 suppliers, and I'm thinking: Is it that just 15:17:58 7 everybody assumes that America and NASA will 15:18:01 8 come to its senses and figure out how to fund it 15:18:06 9 past 2016, or are these guys in it for short 15:18:09 10 run? What am I missing? 15:18:15 11 (Discussion off the record.) 15:17:11 12 MR. SUFFREDINI: Good. I was about to 15:17:11 13 say we should ask him. So there's Frank up 15:18:20 14 there. He's going -- yes. Well, I'll tell you 15:18:23 15 what my conversations are, and then I would 15:18:24 16 encourage you to get -- 15:18:25 17 MR. BEJMUK: Well, you work with all 15:18:25 18 of these guys, you know. 15:17:11 19 MR. SUFFREDINI: -- Frank and Elon -- 15:17:11 20 let Frank and Elon come up here and talk, and I 15:18:29 21 think Anatolli (phonetic) is gone. 15:18:32 22 But all of the partners expressed to 15:18:33 286 1 us that they have made a major investment in 15:18:35 2 ISS. And, in fact, in the Russians' case, they 15:18:38 3 want to build yet another module, and they kind 15:18:40 4 of don't want to do that if it's only going to 15:18:40 5 be on orbit for two or three years. That's a 15:18:43 6 major investment for two or three years. 15:18:44 7 So our discussions with the partners 15:18:46 8 has been they would like to see us go beyond 15:18:48 9 2015. 15:18:52 10 Now, as far as SpaceX and Orbital go, 15:18:52 11 I've got to believe, based on the way the 15:18:56 12 contract is written, that they would like to see 15:18:58 13 the opportunity to defray more of the costs that 15:19:00 14 they made in their first investment to get to 15:19:02 15 where they are and see us fly more so they could 15:19:02 16 do more resupply. 15:19:06 17 But Frank and Elon would have to 15:19:07 18 comment. If you'd like. 15:19:10 19 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yeah. 15:17:11 20 MR. SUFFREDINI: Was I close? Did I 15:17:11 21 get it right? 15:17:11 22 (Discussion off the record.) 15:17:11 287 1 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: We think, as I said, 15:17:11 2 maintaining the human presence in space is 15:17:11 3 extremely important for this country, 15:19:25 4 particularly if we're going to go beyond low 15:19:25 5 Earth orbit, and we want to keep the programs 15:19:25 6 going, particularly this one going. We've got a 15:19:32 7 lot invested in ISS, and our partners have a lot 15:19:32 8 invested in it. Going beyond 2016, I think, is 15:19:35 9 a very important decision that needs to be made 15:19:39 10 very soon. 15:19:42 11 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 15:19:42 12 MR. SUFFREDINI: Now, we're going to 15:19:45 13 have lots of opportunities to talk about other 15:19:46 14 things, and if you ever ask me what I think 15:19:46 15 about that, it's likely to be even slightly 15:19:46 16 different than how I answer it for those guys. 15:19:52 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: I have a question I 15:19:52 18 wanted to ask. From October 2010 to -- for five 15:19:54 19 years or thereabouts, the current plan would be 15:19:58 20 depend on the Russians to put astronauts on the 15:20:02 21 station. 15:20:07 22 If I go backwards in time from October 15:20:07 288 1 of 2010, there's one more mission that carries a 15:20:10 2 crew with the shuttle -- is that right -- one 15:20:14 3 remaining? 15:17:11 4 MR. SUFFREDINI: Two more. 15:17:11 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, there are two 15:20:17 6 remaining missions? 15:17:11 7 MR. SUFFREDINI: 2J, which is on the 15:17:11 8 pad, and 17A, we'll rotate one U.S./Soyuz -- 15:20:19 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: One beyond that. 15:17:11 10 MR. SUFFREDINI: -- crew member, and 15:17:11 11 then we bring home that crew member on ULF-3. 15:20:23 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: And if I take 15:20:28 13 literally today and go backwards in time, when 15:20:30 14 was the previous flight of the shuttle that 15:20:34 15 carried a crew? 15:20:36 16 MR. SUFFREDINI: The previous flight. 15:20:37 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: There was a previous 15:20:39 18 flight? 15:20:41 19 MR. SUFFREDINI: Uh-huh. 15:20:41 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Thank you very 15:20:41 21 much. 15:20:41 22 MR. SUFFREDINI: We did the lion's 15:20:42 289 1 share of crew rotation on the shuttle until the 15:20:45 2 accident, and then the Soyuz had to do all of it 15:20:48 3 until we started flying again. After we started 15:20:51 4 flying again, we started putting a single 15:20:54 5 crew -- doing two on the Soyuz and a single crew 15:20:55 6 on the shuttle, and we've done that 15:20:56 7 semi-consistently for a little while. 15:20:59 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Got it. Very good. 15:21:01 9 Are there any questions? 15:21:03 10 Hearing no other questions, well, 15:21:05 11 thank you very much. 15:21:06 12 MR. SUFFREDINI: Thank you very much. 15:21:07 13 I appreciate it. 15:21:09 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. The next 15:21:13 15 item concerns alternative architectures. The 15:21:14 16 first topic will be Direct. And, let's see, 15:21:18 17 Steve Metschan is going to do that. 15:21:24 18 Steve... 15:21:28 19 MR. METSCHAN: Good afternoon, 15:21:37 20 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. My 15:21:39 21 name is a Steve Metschan. It is my privilege to 15:21:41 22 present the Direct proposal to you on behalf of 15:21:45 290 1 a courageous group of engineers and other 15:21:47 2 concerned citizens. 15:21:51 3 This began for me four years ago when 15:21:52 4 NASA asked my company for an analysis of all 15:21:55 5 possible approaches that could meet the policy 15:22:00 6 objectives of the VSE -- or the vision within 15:22:03 7 the available budget. This analysis was refined 15:22:04 8 and transformed by a government and industry 15:22:07 9 experts into the Direct concepts I'm showing 15:22:10 10 today. Next slide. 15:22:14 11 The Direct plan is intended to help 15:22:16 12 put U.S. exploration plans back into alignment 15:22:20 13 with the approved policy and within the limits 15:22:22 14 of the available budget. 15:22:24 15 The reductions in long-term 15:22:28 16 discretionary spending make this even more 15:22:30 17 imperative today. 15:22:34 18 So what is the Jupiter? 15:22:36 19 Jupiter is based on the space shuttle. 15:22:38 20 The space shuttle is the horse we are currently 15:22:41 21 riding today into orbit and represents a good 15:22:43 22 foundation from which to create a new capability 15:22:46 291 1 for the future. Jupiter retains the proven and 15:22:48 2 already man-rated shuttle main engines and the 15:22:51 3 solid rocket boosters. 15:22:54 4 Now, ironically the first thing that 15:22:59 5 all shuttle-derived systems do is they remove 15:22:59 6 the shuttle, but they retain the heavy-lift 15:23:01 7 stack that has taken us to orbit now for almost 15:23:05 8 30 years. 15:23:09 9 The primary modifications to the stack 15:23:09 10 is to use the tooling at Michoud to actually 15:23:13 11 produce the oxygen tank to turn it into an 15:23:15 12 in-line vehicle, in which the core becomes the 15:23:19 13 carrier for the payload. 15:23:22 14 The primary new piece of structure we 15:23:23 15 need is the aft thrust structure. We then 15:23:24 16 replace the shuttle main engines that are 15:23:27 17 already flying, the existing four-segment 15:23:29 18 rockets, and we produce what we call the Jupiter 15:23:33 19 core once we add the payload adapter and the 15:23:36 20 avionics. 15:23:41 21 Above that we put the payload, which 15:23:42 22 is completely separate from the spacecraft, so 15:23:44 292 1 it does not affect the abort capabilities for 15:23:46 2 that. And with the payload fairing, that's our 15:23:47 3 entry level vehicle, what we call the 15:23:49 4 Jupiter-130 or some may want to call it some day 15:23:50 5 the Ares III. 15:23:52 6 Once you're at that point, we add a 15:23:55 7 planned addition fourth engine to the core, 15:23:57 8 which is already designed to handle the 15:24:01 9 additional loads associated with an upper stage, 15:24:04 10 which could be J-2 or RL-6 based. The avionics 15:24:06 11 ring is then replaced with the Altair lander, 15:24:09 12 the payload fairing already developed with 15:24:15 13 Orion, and that becomes the Ares IV, the 15:24:15 14 Jupiter-246 in this particular configuration. 15:24:23 15 Direct is not a new concept. Even 15:24:25 16 before the shuttle first flew, NASA engineers 15:24:29 17 suggested utilizing the hardware and 15:24:33 18 infrastructure of the shuttle to develop a 15:24:33 19 derivative heavy-lift launch system. 15:24:35 20 Following Challenger, NASA engineers, 15:24:38 21 once again, studied this idea in even greater 15:24:40 22 detail, ultimately recommending the National 15:24:45 293 1 Launch System or the NSL, which passed its 15:24:47 2 preliminary design review milestone in 1993. 15:24:49 3 Now, in a post-Columbia world, some 15:24:53 4 NASA engineers have, once again, asserted at 15:24:57 5 great risk to their livelihood that the best 15:24:59 6 path forward is still a true direct -- hence, 15:25:04 7 the name Direct -- shuttle directive. 15:25:08 8 Given the imminent destruction of 15:25:11 9 America's second heavy-lift system and 15:25:11 10 infrastructure, this commission will ultimately 15:25:14 11 help determine if a solution repeatedly 15:25:17 12 advocated by NASA engineers over the last 15:25:20 13 30 years as a practical solution to America's 15:25:23 14 heavy-lift requirements will ever become 15:25:25 15 reality. Next slide. 15:25:29 16 The engineering feasibility, use of 15:25:31 17 available tooling, flow within the existing 15:25:38 18 external tank manufacturing facility and 15:25:41 19 transport of an in-line core has been assessed 15:25:44 20 in great detail by NASA repeatedly. In fact, 15:25:47 21 the National Launch System study produced a 15:25:52 22 series of detailed studies, of which the core 15:25:52 294 1 alone had 1,000 pages of detail associated with 15:25:56 2 the design and how one would accomplish that. 15:25:59 3 Then, as now, the most time-consuming 15:26:03 4 and risky element of any rocket development 15:26:06 5 effort is still the rocket engine, not the tank 15:26:10 6 structure. Direct is the only man-ratable 15:26:13 7 proposal on the table with man-rated rocket 15:26:19 8 engines already flying; namely, the shuttle main 15:26:19 9 engines. 15:26:23 10 Now, some have said Direct is nothing 15:26:23 11 more than paper rocket. Nothing could be 15:26:29 12 further from the truth. 15:26:31 13 Currently the Ares I requires a new 15:26:32 14 five-segment solid rocket booster development. 15:26:35 15 The Jupiter's four-segment SRB is already flying 15:26:39 16 on the shuttle. 15:26:40 17 Ares requires a new upper stage engine 15:26:43 18 development, the J-2X. The Jupiter's engine, 15:26:46 19 the shuttle main engine, is already man rated 15:26:50 20 and flying on the shuttle. 15:26:53 21 Ares I is currently struggling to 15:26:55 22 mitigate the serious thrust oscillation issues 15:26:58 295 1 associated with an unproven configuration. The 15:27:01 2 Jupiter's configuration utilizes a proven 15:27:02 3 approach for dampening these vibrations. 15:27:05 4 The Ares I requires a new launch 15:27:09 5 infrastructure, whereas the Jupiter uses the 15:27:12 6 current infrastructure while also incorporating 15:27:17 7 cost efficient improvements to the current 15:27:17 8 side-mounted approach. 15:27:21 9 The Ares I requires a staging event, 15:27:23 10 whereas the Jupiter's main engines are ground 15:27:26 11 lit just like the shuttle before committing to 15:27:29 12 the launch. 15:27:32 13 The Ares I lift limitations has 15:27:33 14 required key safety mission systems and 15:27:38 15 redundancy to be eliminated from Orion while 15:27:38 16 forcing the same to endure an unprecedented 15:27:42 17 vibrational environment for a lunar spacecraft. 15:27:45 18 Jupiter has more than enough margin to put all 15:27:49 19 of these safety systems back in. 15:27:49 20 Taken together, all of the development 15:27:54 21 costs for the Ares I makes it's substantially 15:27:57 22 more expensive to develop while simultaneously 15:27:59 296 1 increasing both schedule risk over the Jupiter. 15:28:03 2 The bottom line, we believe strongly 15:28:08 3 that the Jupiter will close the gap within the 15:28:10 4 current budget. 15:28:14 5 More importantly, see let's what we're 15:28:15 6 getting for our money. With Ares -- though I 15:28:18 7 realize Ares develops a lot of technologies for 15:28:21 8 the Ares V -- we'll get to that in a second. 15:28:23 9 But with what we get out of the gate here, with 15:28:25 10 Ares we spend about $14 billion for a launch 15:28:28 11 system less capable than what we can buy today, 15:28:31 12 whereas with the Jupiter, while we spend 15:28:35 13 $8 billion, we get a launch system that will be 15:28:37 14 second to none in the world while increasing 15:28:42 15 substantially the crew safety. 15:28:46 16 So let's look at the basic overview 15:28:47 17 here. 15:28:50 18 Ultimately even our entry level 15:28:50 19 Jupiter, which has no upper stage, will offer a 15:28:53 20 capability that no one else in the world has, 15:28:56 21 especially in terms of volume capacity. But 15:28:58 22 when it comes to lift capacity, we have roughly 15:29:01 297 1 three times as much mass performance as the next 15:29:02 2 largest operational launch system, the Delta IV 15:29:04 3 Heavy. Next. 15:29:09 4 It is also important to point out that 15:29:11 5 the current plan requires the development of an 15:29:14 6 even larger launch system, the Ares V. That 15:29:16 7 promises to bust the budget and will also 15:29:18 8 require the de-orbiting of the International 15:29:21 9 Space Station in 2016 in order to free up the 15:29:24 10 cash necessary to pay for its development. 15:29:27 11 Under the Direct proposal, the only 15:29:30 12 new component we require is an upper stage in 15:29:34 13 order to deliver a sufficiently high 15:29:37 14 performance, lower cost and more flexible lunar 15:29:38 15 architecture enabled by operating one launch 15:29:41 16 system but launching it twice. 15:29:44 17 While certainly not as inexpensive as 15:29:46 18 abandoning the vision for space exploration and 15:29:49 19 remaining in low Earth orbit for another 15:29:52 20 30 years, it is significantly less expensive 15:29:54 21 than the current plan. 15:29:59 22 Because the Jupiter's main engines and 15:30:01 298 1 solid rocket boosters already finished, our 15:30:05 2 schedule and budget are not dictated by such 15:30:06 3 costly and high schedule risk items. 15:30:11 4 By stretching out the remaining 15:30:13 5 shuttle flights by one or two years, we can 15:30:16 6 deliver a significantly smoother and, therefore, 15:30:18 7 safer fly-out of the remaining shuttle missions 15:30:22 8 by providing a future for the operations 15:30:26 9 workforce. We are depending on them right now 15:30:28 10 to stay at their posts despite our lack of 15:30:30 11 commitment to them. 15:30:36 12 Direct can do this even in the tough 15:30:37 13 budget environment before us, because the 15:30:41 14 shuttle workforce in a Direct approach is an 15:30:42 15 asset. We need it in order to conduct the 15:30:45 16 Jupiter test flights themselves and not a 15:30:49 17 liability to be eliminated in order to fund the 15:30:52 18 development costs of Ares. 15:30:56 19 The primary tent pole for initial 15:30:57 20 operating capability for the Jupiter to the ISS 15:31:01 21 is not the launch system but is, in fact, the 15:31:02 22 Orion spacecraft. 15:31:06 299 1 Ultimately the transition will not be 15:31:09 2 pain free, by any means. America will have a 15:31:14 3 much more capable system sooner than any other 15:31:17 4 plan on the table at the end of that transition. 15:31:20 5 A lot has been said about the 15:31:23 6 importance of crew safety during the ascent 15:31:28 7 portion of the mission, yet ascent risk 15:31:30 8 represents a very small portion of the overall 15:31:35 9 mission risk for beyond Earth orbit 15:31:37 10 destinations. For these missions, it is, in 15:31:43 11 fact, redundancy and margins of the crew 15:31:45 12 spacecraft that determines the overall mission 15:31:49 13 safety level. 15:31:52 14 Due, in part, to the Ares I's limited 15:31:53 15 lift capability and unprecedented vibrational 15:31:55 16 environment, Orion has been forced to remove 15:31:57 17 important safety systems and reduce overall 15:32:00 18 redundancy. As a result, the overall crew 15:32:02 19 safety has been significantly reduced during the 15:32:06 20 whole mission, not just the first eight minutes 15:32:10 21 of it. 15:32:13 22 The fact that the Ares I is composed 15:32:13 300 1 of unproven systems, whereas the Jupiter is 15:32:16 2 largely composed of existing flight-proven 15:32:19 3 systems, only casts further doubts on the Ares I 15:32:22 4 safety claims. Regardless, the Jupiter enables 15:32:27 5 all of the safety systems that NASA originally 15:32:31 6 wanted on Orion, not the least of which is 15:32:34 7 returning to the land landing capability once 15:32:38 8 again for every mission. 15:32:41 9 Even our entry level launch system, 15:32:44 10 the Jupiter-130 -- that's the system without the 15:32:46 11 upper stage -- will provide a remarkable range 15:32:46 12 of new capabilities. 15:32:46 13 For example, currently there is no way 15:32:54 14 to repair or upgrade the James Webb Space 15:32:56 15 Telescope. With Direct, a servicing mission 15:33:00 16 could be conducted using the Jupiter-130 to 15:33:02 17 place both crew and equipment into a high Earth 15:33:07 18 orbit, rendezvous the telescope and repair it in 15:33:09 19 a similar fashion as what happened with Hubble, 15:33:15 20 only in a much higher orbit. 15:33:19 21 The same capability could be used to 15:33:19 22 assemble a network of extremely large 12-meter 15:33:19 301 1 diameter telescopes, enabling the ability to 15:33:22 2 resolve other habitable planets in our galaxy, 15:33:24 3 answering a question as old as mankind itself: 15:33:32 4 Are we alone? 15:33:30 5 The Jupiter's increased payload 15:33:35 6 diameter enables robust Mars sample return 15:33:38 7 missions that would pioneer new entry ascent 15:33:39 8 landing systems needed before we can ever land 15:33:44 9 astronauts on Mars. 15:33:44 10 On Earth everywhere we find an energy 15:33:47 11 source and liquid water, we find life. With our 15:33:51 12 entry level Jupiter, we enable the Earth 15:33:55 13 departure mass required for these kind of large 15:33:58 14 missions to the Jovian moons in order to find if 15:33:59 15 a second genesis has, indeed, occurred within 15:34:03 16 our own solar system. 15:34:07 17 By removing the barriers that limit 15:34:09 18 all future exploration, the Jupiter will ensure 15:34:11 19 that NASA and, therefore, mankind's best days of 15:34:15 20 discovery clearly lie ahead. As Carl Sagan once 15:34:19 21 said, somewhere something incredible are waiting 15:34:24 22 to be known. 15:34:28 302 1 The Jupiter-130 will also enable new 15:34:28 2 missions to the planet Earth, starting with an 15:34:29 3 inspirational mission that originally went to 15:34:32 4 explore the Moon, yet ended up rediscovering the 15:34:32 5 Earth. As a manmade spacecraft looked back at 15:34:38 6 Earth in 1968, all of mankind became aware that 15:34:40 7 we are all astronauts and drove home the 15:34:45 8 importance of protecting our delicate spacecraft 15:34:50 9 world for this and future generations. 15:34:53 10 We are quickly approaching a time 15:34:53 11 where the majority of people on Earth were not 15:34:56 12 yet born to experience -- myself among them -- 15:34:57 13 this profound mission themselves. It would find 15:35:00 14 it just as remarkable as the previous generation 15:35:04 15 did. 15:35:08 16 One potential Earth focus use of the 15:35:08 17 Jupiter-130 would be to launch space-based solar 15:35:11 18 power systems in one ground-integrated package 15:35:17 19 that can deliver environmentally friendly energy 15:35:18 20 from space 24 hours a day. 15:35:19 21 The same telescopes developed to 15:35:23 22 discover the signs of life on other planets in 15:35:26 303 1 our galaxy could also improve the resolution of 15:35:30 2 Earth's climate by many orders of magnitude. 15:35:33 3 With this increased data resolution, climate 15:35:35 4 models could be significantly improved in 15:35:39 5 accuracy, helping to guide trillion-dollar 15:35:43 6 decisions concerning the environment. 15:35:46 7 And, of course, there are national 15:35:47 8 security reasons to improve our ability to look 15:35:49 9 back at the Earth from space as well. 15:35:52 10 It has been asserted that any system 15:35:58 11 based on the shuttle will be just as 15:36:01 12 unaffordable as the space shuttle. Nothing 15:36:04 13 could be further from the truth. The cost 15:36:08 14 breakout of the shuttle shown here is based on 15:36:11 15 almost three decades of hard cost data generated 15:36:14 16 by a mature system. 15:36:18 17 Because the Jupiter is so closely 15:36:19 18 associated with the shuttle, we can, with a high 15:36:21 19 degree of confidence, predict what the cost 15:36:24 20 structure will likely be for the Jupiter. 15:36:27 21 Once the costs associated the orbiter 15:36:31 22 and crew training is removed, the cost of a 15:36:34 304 1 cargo only launch of the Jupiter-130 would be 15:36:36 2 about 72 percent of the current shuttle -- a 15:36:40 3 step in the right direction certainly but not a 15:36:41 4 large cost reduction. 15:36:44 5 The primary improvement in the cost 15:36:46 6 effectiveness in going from the shuttle to the 15:36:48 7 Jupiter is not from the reduced cost but from 15:36:51 8 the increased lift capacity. By removing the 15:36:53 9 dead weight of the orbiter, we can achieve 15:36:57 10 almost a fivefold increase in lift capacity. 15:37:01 11 Taken together, the Jupiter will deliver almost 15:37:06 12 a sevenfold improvement in dollars per kilogram 15:37:08 13 delivered to orbit compared to that of the 15:37:08 14 shuttle, dropping it almost below $5,000 per 15:37:11 15 kilogram to orbit, a very competitive price, 15:37:15 16 indeed. Next slide. 15:37:16 17 The cost benefits of the Jupiter go 15:37:21 18 well beyond launch costs. The Saturn V was the 15:37:24 19 first and last time America had access to a high 15:37:27 20 volume, heavy-lift launch capacity. With the 15:37:31 21 Saturn V we were able to launch 15:37:33 22 ground-integrated, more capable spacecraft into 15:37:39 305 1 space using only one launch. 15:37:40 2 After destroying our first heavy-lift 15:37:42 3 launch system, we were then forced to assemble 15:37:45 4 large spacecraft like the International Space 15:37:49 5 Station in 20-ton chunks. Mike Griffin had it 15:37:49 6 right when he said this was a step backwards in 15:37:53 7 terms of cost effectiveness. 15:37:55 8 Unmanned exploration experienced the 15:37:59 9 same dynamic, with the development cost overruns 15:38:00 10 of the James Webb Space Telescope and the Mars 15:38:03 11 Science Laboratory now running many times their 15:38:07 12 respective launch cost due, in part, to trying 15:38:09 13 to shoehorn more capability into existing launch 15:38:12 14 systems' capacities. It pays to use the right 15:38:17 15 tool for the job. 15:38:20 16 To grow beyond our past impressive 15:38:21 17 accomplishments in both manned and unmanned 15:38:25 18 exploration, America needs the Jupiter. NASA is 15:38:28 19 on record of claiming the Jupiter cannot achieve 15:38:35 20 a self-imposed performance objective that NASA 15:38:38 21 has seen fit to place ahead of the real of 15:38:45 22 requirements of budget and policy. 15:38:47 306 1 In fact, they took it one step further 15:38:48 2 and claimed that Jupiter actually violated the 15:38:50 3 laws of physics, yet the recently leaked ESAS 15:38:52 4 appendix shows that a lower performing 15:38:52 5 configuration of the Jupiter will actually 15:38:59 6 exceed NASA's self-imposed performance objective 15:39:00 7 even while burdened by an inefficient upper 15:39:06 8 stage design, a self-imposed performance 15:39:09 9 objective that the technically challenged Ares I 15:39:12 10 and the budget-busting Ares V can still cannot 15:39:13 11 achieve. 15:39:16 12 Not only does Direct meet NASA's 15:39:17 13 desired lunar performance objectives but Direct 15:39:22 14 will place NASA back within the confines of 15:39:23 15 policy for a price we can actually afford. 15:39:26 16 Based on this track record, we 15:39:29 17 strongly recommend that this commission get a 15:39:31 18 second opinion on the upper stage design by 15:39:34 19 talking to experts at the United Launch 15:39:37 20 Alliance. Engineers like Bernard Cutter have 15:39:39 21 decades of experience designing, building and 15:39:41 22 flying advanced upper stages, something NASA has 15:39:45 307 1 not done for nearly three decades. 15:39:46 2 In fact, we would recommend a second 15:39:49 3 independent expert opinion be sought on all 15:39:51 4 critical issues brought before the commission. 15:39:54 5 What about the performance needed for 15:39:57 6 Mars though? 15:39:59 7 This issue was addressed over 46 years 15:40:01 8 ago by none other than Werner Von Brown himself, 15:40:05 9 who had always dreamed of one day seeing man 15:40:08 10 land on Mars. He said that once you reach the 15:40:11 11 limit of whatever launch system you can forward 15:40:14 12 you're left with two options for increasing 15:40:18 13 performance. 15:40:21 14 The first option is what he called 15:40:22 15 connect mode, where you assemble various 15:40:22 16 spacecraft elements in Earth orbit. The second 15:40:26 17 option, though, is called tanker mode, where the 15:40:29 18 spacecraft is launched in one piece, dry, if 15:40:31 19 necessary -- without propellant -- but then is 15:40:34 20 filled in orbit with propellant prior to 15:40:37 21 departure. 15:40:38 22 Von Brown clearly preferred tanker 15:40:40 308 1 mode because he correctly understood that most 15:40:42 2 of the mass needed for Mars -- for a Mars 15:40:46 3 mission is, in fact, propellant, not spacecraft. 15:40:49 4 Therefore, propellant is the primary component 15:40:53 5 that we need to assemble in orbit. 15:40:56 6 Well, the best way to assemble a 15:41:00 7 propellant in orbit is with a propellant depot. 15:41:01 8 A propellant depot has a number of advantages, 15:41:06 9 not all of them technical, some geopolitical as 15:41:07 10 well. 15:41:11 11 A propellant depot increases mission 15:41:13 12 flexibility while opening up almost 70 percent 15:41:13 13 of the mass required to commercial and 15:41:14 14 international supply. In addition, one future 15:41:17 15 option for potentially lowering the cost of 15:41:22 16 space exploration is by producing propellant 15:41:25 17 from the Moon, Mars or other suitable bodies 15:41:27 18 throughout our solar system. 15:41:30 19 A critical first step, though, is the 15:41:32 20 ability to store and transfer propellant in 15:41:34 21 space. The propellant depot is also a critical 15:41:37 22 step for lowering exploration costs still 15:41:42 309 1 further, by reusing the very expensive 15:41:42 2 spacecraft, thereby, eliminating the need to 15:41:45 3 throw away these expensive systems after each 15:41:50 4 mission. 15:41:52 5 Utilities that propound people also 15:41:52 6 naturally attract international participation 15:41:54 7 and funding as it improves the capabilities of 15:41:56 8 all partner nations. 15:42:00 9 The bottom line, once your volume 15:42:02 10 capacity is sufficient to launch 15:42:05 11 ground-integrated spacecraft as one unit, 15:42:08 12 your launcher is large enough. 15:42:09 13 The Saturn class Jupiter is more than 15:42:12 14 sufficient for the exploration program while 15:42:15 15 also having a lower fixed and variable cost than 15:42:17 16 the Nova class Ares V. 15:42:19 17 On the other extreme are those that 15:42:23 18 would advocate an exclusive ELV/COTS program, 15:42:28 19 thereby resulting in the destruction of 15:42:31 20 America's second heavy-lift system and 15:42:34 21 workforce. The Direct plan meets that team more 15:42:36 22 than halfway by opening up 70 percent of the 15:42:39 310 1 mass needed in orbit to competitive bid. 15:42:42 2 In addition, a significant barrier to 15:42:46 3 entry for new companies and approaches is 15:42:49 4 removed because cheap propellant is less 15:42:52 5 expensive to insure than expensive spacecraft or 15:42:56 6 people. Unlike opening up a few flights to the 15:42:58 7 International Space Station per year, this 15:43:00 8 approach represents more than enough demand to 15:43:01 9 max out the launch capacity of most ELV/COTS 15:43:04 10 providers, enabling them to achieve the 15:43:09 11 economies of production associated with high 15:43:13 12 launch rates, lowering the costs for all their 15:43:13 13 customers. 15:43:16 14 Establishing an in-space market for 15:43:20 15 propellant will also help build the business 15:43:20 16 case to commercially develop propellant from the 15:43:22 17 Moon as well. 15:43:26 18 It has now been almost four years 15:43:28 19 since the basics of what I just presented here 15:43:30 20 was first shown at NASA headquarters but 15:43:32 21 unfortunately rejected in favor of the Ares I. 15:43:34 22 Even now because so much of the 15:43:37 311 1 hardware infrastructure and workforce are still 15:43:39 2 in place operating the shuttle, Direct can 15:43:42 3 enable -- Direct can be available much sooner 15:43:44 4 while also delivering a significant increase in 15:43:48 5 crew safety over the shuttle. 15:43:51 6 Direct not only builds upon its 15:43:53 7 existing multibillion-dollar heritage but 15:43:55 8 simultaneously accelerates the progress already 15:43:59 9 made by removing the bottleneck of the Ares I 15:44:00 10 for ISS access and retargeting its development 15:44:04 11 already underway for subsequent -- for the 15:44:08 12 subsequent lunar phase of the vision for space 15:44:10 13 exploration. 15:44:13 14 Ultimately I strongly believe that 15:44:14 15 Direct is the only way our nation can hope to 15:44:16 16 achieve the policy objectives within the limited 15:44:20 17 budget we have before us. 15:44:20 18 Direct not only solves the looming 15:44:22 19 issues facing manned space exploration, which is 15:44:26 20 the goal of this commission, but presents -- but 15:44:28 21 will present a new opportunity for unmanned 15:44:33 22 exploration as well by removing the limits 15:44:37 312 1 imposed by existing launch systems. 15:44:40 2 The ability to lead from the front and 15:44:43 3 capability will naturally attract other nations 15:44:46 4 to join the American led efforts and to a truly 15:44:50 5 global effort while at the same time providing a 15:44:53 6 serious opportunity to the commercial sector to 15:44:57 7 deliver most of the mass needed for the vision 15:45:00 8 over the long term. 15:45:02 9 Taken together, we strongly believe 15:45:02 10 that Direct is by far the best possible path. 15:45:02 11 It's an ultimate success for NASA, which is 15:45:06 12 what's motivated from the Direct from the very 15:45:09 13 beginning -- America, mankind and the furthering 15:45:12 14 space exploration and development. 15:45:17 15 I carry three requests from the Direct 15:45:20 16 team to the commission. 15:45:22 17 The first request is the commission 15:45:24 18 ask the President to order NASA to cease any 15:45:25 19 further destruction of the shuttle 15:45:26 20 infrastructure until this commission can make 15:45:28 21 its recommendation to the President. 15:45:31 22 Our second request is that the 15:45:33 313 1 commission endeavor to talk to the engineers at 15:45:36 2 the working level of the Ares I technical 15:45:38 3 problems and the Ares V cost problems as 15:45:41 4 anonymously as possible in order to determine 15:45:44 5 independently for themselves the ground truth of 15:45:47 6 the present program. 15:45:50 7 We have certain knowledge that this 15:45:51 8 ground truth is being altered as it ascends the 15:45:54 9 chain of command, and there's significant amount 15:45:58 10 of pressure being brought to bear to prevent any 15:46:01 11 information from being provided to this 15:46:04 12 commission that is counter to the current party 15:46:06 13 line. 15:46:09 14 Our third request is for the 15:46:09 15 commission to get a second expert opinion on all 15:46:11 16 critical issues or disagreements NASA may have 15:46:14 17 with our plan -- like the upper stage, for 15:46:17 18 example -- from sources independent of the 15:46:19 19 current NASA chain of command. 15:46:22 20 I thank you for your time, and I 15:46:23 21 welcome any questions you may have. 15:46:25 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 15:46:30 314 1 Those are very serious charges as well as a very 15:46:31 2 serious set of performance and cost data you've 15:46:36 3 offered us. 15:46:41 4 Let me ask if my colleagues have any 15:46:42 5 questions to begin with. Then I have one. 15:46:45 6 MR. CHYBA: Steve, you may not be the 15:46:57 7 right person to ask this, but in the ESAS study 15:46:57 8 in '05 the sort of -- something that looked 15:46:58 9 pretty close to this to launch a 70-ish-ton 15:46:59 10 vehicle was pretty closely looked at and, in 15:47:02 11 fact, carried as one of the options at least in 15:47:05 12 the first and second cycle of the ESAS study. 15:47:06 13 Do you understand what the rationale 15:47:10 14 was in the ESAS study that caused the decision 15:47:15 15 to be made into the so-called one-and-a-half 15:47:18 16 launch options as opposed to the sort of two 15:47:22 17 70-ton class launches, and what would your 15:47:28 18 response be to that rationale? 15:47:31 19 MR. METSCHAN: I probably can't 15:47:32 20 explain it to you because I don't understand it 15:47:35 21 myself. 15:47:36 22 I think it makes a lot of sense to 15:47:36 315 1 develop -- we really only have the money to 15:47:37 2 develop one launch system, and I think the 15:47:39 3 efforts of SpaceX and the efforts with the EELVs 15:47:41 4 and the COTS program are more than adequately 15:47:46 5 covering that class of launch systems the Ares I 15:47:50 6 represents. I think NASA's right position is to 15:47:52 7 work on a heavy launch system. 15:47:56 8 I would also suggest that the current 15:47:58 9 Ares V has gone a great distance away from the 15:48:00 10 Ares V that they recommended. The Jupiter is 15:48:04 11 closer to the original Ares V than the current 15:48:06 12 one. It used shuttle main engines. We use 15:48:09 13 four. They used five. 15:48:11 14 But so I'm -- again, our main 15:48:14 15 contention really is the Ares I, not the 15:48:17 16 heavy-lift capability, and our only 15:48:20 17 recommendation is the heavy-lift capability 15:48:23 18 needs to get back to a true shuttle-drive 15:48:25 19 system. 15:48:28 20 MR. CHYBA: Thank you. 15:48:28 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Jeff... 15:48:34 22 MR. GREASON: I've got a thousand of 15:48:34 316 1 them, not just one. So I'll ask a meta question 15:48:32 2 first. 15:48:32 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Just one. 15:48:32 4 MR. GREASON: Just let me get back to 15:48:36 5 you with more questions. 15:48:37 6 MR. METSCHAN: Yes. Definitely. 15:48:37 7 MR. GREASON: Okay. In that case, 15:48:39 8 I'll take only the highest one, which is, you 15:48:39 9 know, I'm well aware of the many advantages that 15:48:43 10 you get from propellant depot architecture, and 15:48:47 11 I understand the concerns about the workforce 15:48:51 12 but set that aside for a moment. 15:48:52 13 Now, if you are going to do a depot 15:48:57 14 capability, why not go farther? Because when 15:49:01 15 you look at any of the systems architecture I'm 15:49:04 16 familiar with, the spacecraft dry already fit on 15:49:07 17 EELV-like objects. 15:49:11 18 MR. METSCHAN: They do mass-wise. 15:49:14 19 They do not volume-wise. People keep forgetting 15:49:17 20 the importance of volume. When I saw some of 15:49:17 21 the Delta heavy configurations, they kept the 15:49:21 22 same five-meter -- yeah -- if it's big sack of 15:49:26 317 1 hammers we're putting up there, they're probably 15:49:26 2 right. But most -- the average density of 15:49:26 3 payload in space is about that of balsa wood. 15:49:33 4 So you've got to keep that in mind. 15:49:33 5 You've got to grow your volume at the same time 15:49:36 6 you're growing your lift capability, and the 15:49:38 7 Jupiter does that. 15:49:41 8 MR. GREASON: Thank you. 15:49:43 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Please, Leroy... 15:49:43 10 MR. CHIAO: I just have a question 15:49:47 11 about who are you guys. I mean, is there a list 15:49:49 12 of folks who are -- I mean, I understand what 15:49:52 13 you're saying about wanting to be anonymous. 15:49:54 14 But are any of you besides you willing to be 15:49:57 15 identified? 15:50:00 16 MR. METSCHAN: Well, when you find 15:50:01 17 them, let me know, because I don't know them all 15:50:02 18 either. In fact, none of us do. It's -- we're 15:50:03 19 taking advantage of the new communication 15:50:05 20 technologies that came available with computers 15:50:08 21 and the Internet. 15:50:11 22 Which, I think, is why going forward 15:50:13 318 1 after this point -- and we fully attend to abide 15:50:17 2 by the recommendations of the commission. This 15:50:21 3 is not -- there's no way to make money at this, 15:50:23 4 by the way, of disagreeing with your customer. 15:50:25 5 MR. CHIAO: It's just difficult to 15:50:30 6 assess the work without knowing who's doing it. 15:50:31 7 MR. METSCHAN: Well, we can get you 15:50:34 8 names of people to talk to, but the anonymous 15:50:35 9 part is critical. There's a certain amount of 15:50:37 10 blood in the water, if you will. 15:50:41 11 So I just think it's -- it would be -- 15:50:43 12 if you want to get to the bottom of what's going 15:50:45 13 on, I think that's the best policy. I think 15:50:48 14 that's the great thing about this commission 15:50:51 15 actually. 15:50:53 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Bo... 15:50:55 17 MR. BEJMUK: Steve, I'm impressed with 15:50:55 18 your enthusiasm and with your boldness, but I do 15:50:56 19 have one question. 15:51:00 20 And your charts are not numbered. So 15:51:03 21 this is a pie chart that talks about your 15:51:04 22 Jupiter and STS cost comparison. 15:51:08 319 1 MR. METSCHAN: Yes. 15:51:08 2 MR. BEJMUK: Can we get that chart 15:51:14 3 back for a second? 15:51:15 4 (Discussion off the record.) 15:51:15 5 MR. BEJMUK: Well, let me go ahead 15:51:22 6 with my question. 15:51:23 7 You're comparing current STS to your 15:51:24 8 Jupiter-130 and you're saying that the cost of 15:51:29 9 five flights, I believe, is $2.6 billion and you 15:51:34 10 contrast it with only 1.9 billion for Jupiter. 15:51:40 11 MR. METSCHAN: Correct. 15:51:45 12 MR. BEJMUK: But shouldn't you include 15:51:46 13 cost of five Orions if you wanted to have like 15:51:49 14 an apples-to-apples comparison? 15:51:51 15 MR. METSCHAN: Well, this is cargo 15:51:53 16 version. 15:51:53 17 MR. BEJMUK: Well, I know, but you're 15:51:54 18 comparing it to a vehicle that carries seven 15:51:54 19 astronauts also. 15:51:57 20 MR. METSCHAN: Actually that's one of 15:51:58 21 the big advantages of this approach. We can fly 15:51:59 22 with a crew or not, and so we have both the 15:52:01 320 1 cargo version and a crewed version. Obviously 15:52:04 2 if you fly with a crew, any launch system will 15:52:09 3 be more expensive than if you don't fly with a 15:52:13 4 crew. That's one of the utilities of this 15:52:13 5 approach. 15:52:17 6 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. So this is a cargo 15= :52:17 7 version and you're -- 15:52:18 8 MR. METSCHAN: Right. 15:52:21 9 MS. CLINE: -- comparing it to a 15:52:19 10 crew-fairing vehicle? 15:52:20 11 MR. METSCHAN: But that's the 15:52:21 12 interesting thing about the shuttle. It 15:52:23 13 combined cargo and crew together. 15:52:24 14 MR. BEJMUK: Right. 15:52:24 15 MR. METSCHAN: Which not only affected 15:52:27 16 the safety and the abort possibilities -- 15:52:28 17 because our cargo is carried below the crew if 15:52:29 18 the crew -- if the crew comes along with the 15:52:29 19 mission equipment, they're carried below it like 15:52:33 20 Apollo, so they're unaffected by their abort. 15:52:35 21 So we believe that was the fundamental 15:52:39 22 recommendation from the Columbia report. Let's 15:52:41 321 1 not have such a large launch system that we 15:52:43 2 can't quickly and safely extract the crew should 15:52:48 3 something go wrong. 15:52:51 4 Likewise, it works on a cost basis 15:52:51 5 which means now you can have a cargo version 15:52:53 6 that's less expensive and also fly crew when you 15:52:54 7 need to as well. 15:52:57 8 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Thank you. 15:52:57 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris... 15:53:01 10 MR. CHYBA: You stated that the 15:53:01 11 Jupiter system would represent an improvement in 15:53:04 12 crew safety compared to the shuttle. 15:53:04 13 Could you quantify that? 15:53:06 14 MR. METSCHAN: Well, right away if you 15:53:09 15 assume we had the same safety level as the 15:53:11 16 shuttle, the two accidents that we know of -- 15:53:13 17 the Challenger, being the SRB leaking, could 15:53:16 18 have been abortable had we been watching for 15:53:23 19 those kinds of things, the leaking SRB. And 15:53:24 20 then, of course, in the Columbia accident, the 15:53:28 21 heat shield is entirely protected during the 15:53:29 22 ascent. 15:53:32 322 1 So just having a quick escape system 15:53:34 2 on the shuttle, which we currently really do not 15:53:37 3 have, and assuming that's one out of ten -- you 15:53:39 4 know, it fails out of ten times, you get a 15:53:42 5 tenfold improvement. 15:53:44 6 Now, I'm glad you brought that up 15:53:45 7 because there's another big advantage. In our 15:53:45 8 architecture, even in a lunar program, half of 15:53:48 9 the time we're launching uncrewed. So as long 15:53:50 10 as the vehicle is being processed and treated as 15:53:55 11 if we have a crew on it, the probability of an 15:53:57 12 accident occurring on a crewed flight is 15:54:00 13 naturally cut in half. 15:54:02 14 That's one of the advantages that the 15:54:04 15 ELV and the other programs have is that they're 15:54:06 16 essentially continually testing the entire 15:54:09 17 system, which is not just hardware -- it's 15:54:10 18 people, the culture. Every time they launch, 15:54:10 19 they're testing everything. 15:54:14 20 Many times these hardware safety-based 15:54:16 21 assessments, I think, are incorrect. When we 15:54:19 22 looked at the accidents that have happened, 15:54:22 323 1 they've been an impact -- they're interacted 15:54:25 2 with the hardware, certainly, but there's a 15:54:26 3 certain aspect of culture that came into it. 15:54:29 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: I'll take the last 15:54:32 5 question, I think, if that's all right, with the 15:54:34 6 group. 15:54:36 7 Many years ago NASA looked at a 15:54:37 8 configuration quite similar to the Jupiter-130 15:54:39 9 that -- based on the external tank, solid rocket 15:54:43 10 motors and so on -- and didn't continue it. 15:54:47 11 With your folks' apparent background 15:54:50 12 and knowledge of NASA, do you have any idea why 15:54:52 13 that was dropped? 15:54:55 14 MR. METSCHAN: I think they didn't 15:54:56 15 want to operate both -- they didn't have the 15:54:58 16 money to operate both the shuttle and that 15:54:58 17 system at the same time. I think now that the 15:55:01 18 retirement of the shuttle is now official 15:55:04 19 national policy we can now afford to 15:55:05 20 entertain -- it keeps coming back to the same 15:55:06 21 principle. I think we only have the money to 15:55:08 22 operate one launch system. So let's make it as 15:55:10 324 1 capable and as expandable as we can. And I 15:55:13 2 think the in-line version of a shuttle-drive 15:55:15 3 system achieves that objective. 15:55:18