21 The one other thing that the 12:05:42 22 President has committed to is that -- although 12:05:44 145 1 budgetary-wise NASA, because OMB tells them to 12:05:48 2 do this, is planning that the space shuttle is 12:05:54 3 going to shut down by the end of 2010, the 12:05:57 4 President has committed publicly that if we do 12:06:00 5 not get the rest of the eight flights up by the 12:06:05 6 end of 2010 that we will continue to fly the 12:06:08 7 space shuttle until those eight flights -- which 12:06:13 8 includes the last one, the scientific missions 12:06:17 9 including the AMS -- until they are all flown to 12:06:20 10 complete the construction of the station and the 12:06:24 11 equipping of it. 12:06:29 12 So that could have some financial 12:06:32 13 consequences. If we go into 2011, then 12:06:34 14 additional moneys are going to have to be 12:06:38 15 generated -- and I made sure they got on the 12:06:44 16 record publicly on this -- and not take that out 12:06:47 17 of the rest of NASA's budget. 12:06:51 18 So that's a summary, Mr. Chairman, of 12:06:56 19 what I wanted to tell you. 12:07:03 20 Now, I would just add one other 12:07:08 21 thing -- that NASA is now going to have a great 12:07:10 22 leader and this is someone that I worked very 12:07:15 146 1 hard to get drawn to the attention of the 12:07:20 2 White House and President, and it has been a 12:07:29 3 very happy day for me and, I think, many others 12:07:31 4 in NASA in the space community that the 12:07:35 5 President has nominated -- and I expect soon to 12:07:38 6 be confirmed by the Senate -- Charlie Bolden. 12:07:43 7 I think he brings the quality of being 12:07:48 8 able to be not only a strong leader with an 12:07:50 9 enormous understanding of both human and 12:07:56 10 unmanned space but I think he brings the 12:07:58 11 qualities of a consensus builder, which is so 12:08:03 12 necessary at a time like this. 12:08:07 13 So with that kind of leadership, with 12:08:11 14 the imprimatur of what you decide, which I think 12:08:15 15 is going to be key, as to where our space 12:08:22 16 program is going in the future -- with the two 12:08:25 17 of those, we ought to be off on a good road 12:08:30 18 ahead for the nation's space program. 12:08:34 19 I am happy to entertain any questions 12:08:37 20 or comments from you all. 12:08:39 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, Senator, thank 12:08:42 22 you very much. You certainly encapsulate, I 12:08:44 147 1 think, the challenges that the space program 12:08:47 2 faces. Your comments are very sobering to us. 12:08:50 3 I think we well realize the responsibility we 12:08:55 4 have, and you certainly sharpened that in our 12:08:58 5 views. 12:09:02 6 Do any of my colleagues have questions 12:09:02 7 that you would like to ask? 12:09:04 8 I've had a chance to visit with the 12:09:05 9 Senator some in his office on this subject in 12:09:08 10 the last couple of weeks, so I won't ask 12:09:12 11 anything. But if anybody else does, this is the 12:09:14 12 time. 12:09:17 13 And I think that nobody has anything 12:09:19 14 for you. So we'll just thank you so much -- 12:09:21 15 SENATOR NELSON: Thank you, 12:09:26 16 Mr. Chairman. 12:09:26 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- for being here. 12:09:22 18 SENATOR NELSON: Thank you. 12:09:26 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: All the best. 12:09:24 20 SENATOR NELSON: Thank you. 12:09:26 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: One other thing before 12:09:27 22 we take a break for lunch. Senator Hutchison 12:09:29 148 1 asked that I read a letter. She had hoped to be 12:09:32 2 here today, and as you heard, the transactions 12:09:36 3 on the Hill have interfered with the best laid 12:09:40 4 plans. And so I will read her letter into the 12:09:44 5 record here. 12:09:49 6 This is, as I said, from Senator Kay 12:09:50 7 Bailey Hutchison. 12:09:54 8 (Whereupon, Mr. Augustine presented 9 Senator Hutchison's letter as follows: 10 SENATOR HUTCHISON: Mr. Chairman and 11 Members of the Human Space Flight Review Panel, 12 I want to thank you for the opportunity to 13 provide a statement in this hearing to 14 underscore some of the recent congressional 15 authorization activity that is relevant to your 16 review of U.S. Human Space Flight programs. 17 You have a huge challenge and a 18 critical responsibility, and I appreciate your 19 willingness to devote the time necessary to 20 conduct this review. 21 The first point that should be clear 22 from both the 2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization 149 1 Acts is that they reflect a broad, bi-partisan, 2 bicameral level of support for the U.S. Human 3 Space Flight programs. More specifically, both 4 bills express support for the goal of returning 5 to the Moon to conduct the kind of sustained 6 human exploration that was not possible in the 7 Apollo program. 8 They express support for completing 9 the International Space Station and making the 10 maximum possible use of its laboratory 11 facilities for microgravity research across a 12 broad range of science disciplines. The 2005 13 Act designated the Space Station as a national 14 laboratory and began its evolution to a facility 15 that not only can meet NASA's research needs but 16 those of other government agencies, educational 17 consortia and private research and development 18 concerns. 19 Both bills conveyed the concern of the 20 Congress regarding the pending gap in the 21 U.S. human space flight capability, a gap that 22 would begin voluntarily with the end of space 150 1 shuttle operations, mandated not by technical, 2 engineering, structural or systemic issues but 3 by a zero-sum budget plan that would require 4 transferring the funds being spent on the 5 shuttle to the efforts to develop its 6 replacement vehicles, the Ares launch vehicles 7 and the Orion crew exploration vehicle. 8 Both bills also demonstrated a serious 9 degree of concern for the difficult transition 10 from one launch system to the next and the 11 potential impacts to the highly and, in many 12 cases, uniquely qualified and dedicated people 13 across the country who support our nation's 14 human space flight programs, whether they be 15 civil servants, contractors, vendors or 16 suppliers. 17 The potential loss of many of these 18 skilled resources represents a severe 19 disturbance within the "Gathering Storm" that 20 the Chairman has clearly outlined in his most 21 recent contribution to U.S. policy in these 22 areas of science, technology, engineering and 151 1 mathematics excellence and competitiveness. It 2 has long-term implications, not only in places 3 like Houston and the Johnson Space Center in my 4 part of the country but across a broad spectrum 5 of the country's industrial capabilities and to 6 the vitality of its most skilled workforce. 7 We must also not forget that America's 8 leadership in space plays an important role in 9 our nation's national security. We have already 10 seen the preeminent role that space-based 11 technology plays in modern warfare and 12 intelligence gathering. Maintaining our efforts 13 in human space flight is an essential part of 14 sustaining the nation's overall space 15 leadership. 16 There is not adequate time today to 17 give you more than this brief overview of the 18 primary intentions behind the actions and 19 legislation of our subcommittee and the Congress 20 that I believe you need to be aware of and 21 factor into your deliberations. 22 My committee staff has prepared a 152 1 collection of the relevant language, supporting 2 and related information from NASA, the General 3 Accountability Office and the Congressional 4 Budget Office and a broader description of the 5 issues and concerns we have addressed and 6 continue to address as we draft a 2009 7 authorization bill, which we will provide to 8 you. My staff will be available to provide any 9 further detailed information you feel is needed. 10 Finally I want to stress my belief 11 that you must be able to consider any and all 12 possible options and alternatives to ensure the 13 continuation and future success of the U.S. 14 human space flight programs. I believe it is 15 essential for your review to be unconstrained by 16 any binding consideration, whether budgetary or 17 programmatic. 18 We in the Congress and, I believe, the 19 Administration, must be given a clear picture of 20 what is attainable and what resources would be 21 required. We will then be in a position to make 22 the judgments necessary to achieve the best 153 1 possible and most affordable result for the 2 American taxpayer. 3 Again, I want to thank you for your 4 commitment to this enormous task, and I look 5 forward to seeing the result of your efforts. I 6 commend you for joining with this Administration 7 and my colleagues at the Congress to derive the 8 best possible path forward to sustain an 9 essential national effort and preserve our 10 country's leadership in space. 10:50:36 11 (Whereupon, the presentation of 10:50:36 12 Senator Hutchison's letter concluded.) 10:50:36 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: We now are actually, 12:14:20 14 through the very good chairmanship, 15 minutes 12:14:22 15 ahead, and we could take a break for lunch. 12:14:28 16 And what I would suggest we do is 12:14:31 17 start the afternoon session 15 minutes early, 12:14:34 18 because I'm a great believer of having 12:14:39 19 contingencies in budgets and schedules. 12:14:39 20 I've received a number of notes handed 12:14:43 21 to me from my colleagues as I had to walk out of 12:14:45 22 the room for a moment citing that you're 12:14:49 154 1 freezing to death, and so I wonder if there's -- 12:14:52 2 we're not trying to simulate the Mars atmosphere 12:14:54 3 here, but if it's possible, could we get a 12:14:58 4 little more heat in here before we come back. 12:15:00 5 And we will plan to meet at 12:45 to continue. 12:15:01 6 Thank you all. 12:15:07 7 (Lunch recess.) 12:15:07 8 MR. HAWES: Good afternoon. I'm Mike 13:05:12 9 Hawes from NASA, and I would like to take just a 13:05:15 10 few minutes to kick off our afternoon session 13:05:18 11 and explain some of the content that we have 13:05:21 12 this afternoon. 13:05:23 13 As I described early this morning, 13:05:24 14 there are a number of studies, a number of 13:05:26 15 concepts and alternatives that have been 13:05:29 16 proposed by a variety of folks, and we have 13:05:33 17 tried to get many of those fundamentally on the 13:05:36 18 table today through all of these presentations. 13:05:40 19 So I would like to just kind of walk 13:05:45 20 through kind of a quick look at this afternoon's 13:05:47 21 set of presentations, Norm. And since you know 13:05:49 22 I need to duck out early, I appreciate the 13:05:50 155 1 forbearance so I can do this and duck out. 13:05:50 2 The first set of topics that will 13:05:55 3 start right as soon as I'm done is -- we called 13:05:58 4 EELV considerations, and in that we would ask 13:06:03 5 NASA Lynn Cline to talk about our current use of 13:06:06 6 the EELVs. 13:06:10 7 We would then ask ULA -- and I believe 13:06:12 8 it's going to be Mike Gass -- to present ULA's 13:06:14 9 activities as well. 13:06:20 10 And then everybody knows, imagine 13:06:21 11 that, that there has been an Aerospace study 13:06:26 12 going on about use of EELVs. Is that a surprise 13:06:30 13 to anybody in the room? Okay. 13:06:34 14 We have managed to get to where we can 13:06:35 15 have a public briefing of some of the summary 13:06:39 16 comments from that report. Gary Pulliam from 13:06:42 17 Aerospace will talk about that. We don't have a 13:06:47 18 final report yet. We've had to do a public 13:06:50 19 version of that report, and we're still in the 13:06:54 20 final throes of clearance. But Gary is here, 13:06:58 21 and he's going to give us the top level findings 13:06:58 22 of that. 13:07:00 156 1 After that, then we're also going to 13:07:02 2 talk about some of our other launch providers 13:07:02 3 and particularly talk about our Commercial 13:07:05 4 Orbital -- COTS program. 13:07:14 5 And, again, in a similar fashion, ask 13:07:16 6 NASA -- in the first case, Doug Cooke -- to talk 13:07:19 7 about the COTS program in terms of its 13:07:23 8 demonstration program; ask both SpaceX and 13:07:27 9 Orbital to talk about their activities; and then 13:07:30 10 also ask NASA/Mike Suffredini to talk about, 13:07:32 11 now, in the follow-on, the cargo resupply 13:07:36 12 contract that has just been awarded -- the same 13:07:39 13 two companies involved but have Mike highlight 13:07:41 14 the process and importance to the ISS program of 13:07:45 15 that particular activity. 13:07:48 16 Then to close out, there are a couple 13:07:50 17 of others that I would call alternative 13:07:52 18 architectures that have been out in the public 13:07:55 19 eye -- the blogsphere, whatever we call 13:08:01 20 ourself -- for a long time, and we did want to 13:08:04 21 have some discussion of those for the panel to 13:08:07 22 at least introduce those ideas. 13:08:09 157 1 One is usually called Direct, and we 13:08:11 2 have asked Steve Metschan to pitch for the 13:08:14 3 Direct team. So we'll hear that. 13:08:19 4 The other one is that there is a 13:08:22 5 variety of options that can be called Shuttle C, 13:08:24 6 Shuttle Side Mount. The challenge of that is 13:08:27 7 that the shuttle-derived options some years ago 13:08:29 8 had an industry team that had been put together 13:08:34 9 and was doing a lot of that definition but that 13:08:37 10 had tapered off as we had proceeded down the 13:08:40 11 baseline. And so to try to get that on the 13:08:45 12 table, I was in kind of an awkward situation of 13:08:47 13 finding a spokesperson that could bring the most 13:08:50 14 recent discussions and ideas of that. 13:08:53 15 So I will admit that it looks strange, 13:08:55 16 but the person that I could twist his arm into 13:08:58 17 doing this is John Shannon. So I know it looks 13:09:02 18 a little bit odd of having NASA propose an 13:09:07 19 alternative architecture, but as it is the most 13:09:11 20 shuttle-tied architecture, I have asked John to 13:09:14 21 tie those pieces together, even though it 13:09:18 22 represents lots -- a lot of different NASA and 13:09:21 158 1 industry components. 13:09:23 2 So don't read overly much into the 13:09:25 3 fact that I browbeat John into doing that. 13:09:26 4 That's just the best way we could get that 13:09:29 5 option on the table. 13:09:31 6 So with that, I will turn it back over 13:09:32 7 to the Chair and ask for any opening comments, 13:09:34 8 Norm, and then we could start with Lynn. 13:09:38 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Why don't we go right 13:09:40 10 ahead. 13:09:42 11 MS. CLINE: Thank you. Good 13:09:45 12 afternoon. Can you bring up my charts, please. 13:09:49 13 I was asked to represent NASA's 13:09:54 14 current use of the Evolved Expendable Launch 13:09:57 15 Vehicle. Next chart, please. 13:10:03 16 I am going to first just put that into 13:10:05 17 a little bit of context. 13:10:07 18 We have a NASA Launch Services program 13:10:09 19 that was consolidated in 1998 at our Kennedy 13:10:12 20 Space Center, and this is our acquisition arm 13:10:17 21 and also provides our mission assurance and 13:10:18 22 management for commercial launch services that 13:10:21 159 1 NASA acquires for its missions. We don't own 13:10:24 2 the vehicles. We buy commercial services in 13:10:28 3 this case. 13:10:32 4 We use a mixed fleet of vehicles, 13:10:33 5 range of performance classes, and we support, to 13:10:36 6 the largest degree, our Science Mission 13:10:41 7 Directorate with their programs but also some 13:10:45 8 other NASA directorates. For example, the LRO 13:10:47 9 mission that's on the pad today is for 13:10:52 10 Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. And we 13:10:55 11 also do some launch services for other 13:10:57 12 government agencies. 13= :11:00 13 We use a variety of ranges, including 13:11:01 14 out at Kwajalein, at Wallops/Kodiak as well as 13:11:04 15 the well-known Cape Canaveral and out at 13:11:09 16 Vandenberg. 13:11:15 17 We have a contract mechanism known as 13:11:17 18 the NASA Launch Services contract. This is set 13:11:19 19 up as a competition-based contract -- proposers 13:11:22 20 for launch services on ramp to this contract. 13:11:31 21 We have fixed price arrangement, and as we have 13:11:36 22 a particular mission we're ready to purchase a 13:11:38 160 1 service for, then we do a competition based on 13:11:41 2 the mass orbit, the class of payload and the 13:11:44 3 best value to the government. 13:11:50 4 We are in the process of extending 13:11:51 5 that contract so we have a longer ordering 13:11:54 6 period because the current one expires next 13:11:57 7 year. 13:12:00 8 Most recently we did a buy of launch 13:12:00 9 services for four missions -- tracking and data 13:12:03 10 relay satellite, the radiation belt storm probes 13:12:08 11 and the magnetospheric multiscale mission. All 13:12:12 12 of those were selected to go on an Atlas V. 13:12:15 13 Some of the issues we're facing in 13:12:20 14 launch services is loss of medium class launch 13:12:23 15 service providers, which has been 50 percent of 13:12:27 16 NASA's missions historically, particularly for 13:12:30 17 science. We're in transition. I'll talk about 13:12:34 18 that in just a little bit. 13:12:36 19 We have a compressed manifest, and 13:12:37 20 we're also looking to the future as how the 13:12:40 21 infrastructure costs are shared across the 13:12:44 22 government. Next chart, please. 13:12:47 161 1 This is our current planning manifest 13:12:49 2 that we have, and I'll just make a couple of 13:12:53 3 general comments. If you look at the small 13:12:56 4 class at the top, you'll see that we have an 13:12:58 5 oversupply of vehicles and an underutilization. 13:13:02 6 If you look in the medium class, this 13:13:06 7 demonstrates the transition period that we're in 13:13:10 8 with the Delta II discontinuation. 13:13:12 9 And since there's a bit of a lead time 13:13:15 10 when we put out a proposal for our science 13:13:18 11 missions, you've seen a shift over into that 13:13:20 12 intermediate class. And if you look in those 13:13:23 13 awards that we have given in that intermediate 13:13:26 14 to heavy class, NASA is a strong user of the 13:13:29 15 Atlas V. Next, please. 13:13:34 16 This is just a snapshot of our history 13:13:36 17 of launches. With regard to the expendable 13:13:42 18 launch vehicle, NASA's first use of Atlas V was 13:13:46 19 back in 2002 -- I'm sorry -- the first Atlas V 13:13:50 20 was launched in 2002, and NASA's first use was 13:13:55 21 in 2005 for the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter. 13:13:58 22 And the first use of Delta IV, NASA 13:14:03 162 1 has not had its own mission on it, but GOES was 13:14:06 2 on Delta IV in 2006. And another GOES mission 13:14:10 3 is on the pad right now for a Delta IV for a 13:14:15 4 launch scheduled for the 26th. 13:14:19 5 And we've had a very, very good track 13:14:20 6 record across our program, which was recently 13:14:23 7 marred with the failure of a Taurus with the 13:14:26 8 Orbiting Carbon Observatory on board. Next, 13:14:31 9 please. 13:14:31 10 This is really just provided to the 13:14:34 11 committee for reference. These are the small 13:14:36 12 launch vehicles that are available to us to use. 13:14:38 13 Next. 13:14:42 14 And then this is the medium to 13:14:43 15 intermediate and heavy class vehicles, and it 13:14:46 16 gives you a sense of the range of capabilities 13:14:49 17 that they offer. Next, please. 13:14:54 18 I want to talk a little bit about some 13:14:56 19 considerations. 13:15:00 20 Obviously for the EELV, given that 13:15:02 21 range of vehicles, this being the highest 13:15:05 22 performance class, it is at the high end of the 13:15:09 163 1 cost spectrum as well. 13:15:12 2 And another factor to keep in mind is 13:15:13 3 that the Department of Defense currently covers 13:15:17 4 the infrastructure for maintaining this EELV 13:15:22 5 capability. The National Space Transportation 13:15:26 6 policy calls for a review no later than 2010 to 13:15:30 7 evaluate the long-term requirements, funding and 13:15:35 8 management responsibilities and infrastructure. 13:15:38 9 So that is something that we, as a government, 13:15:41 10 will have to address across the agencies as to 13:15:43 11 whether the current financial base will be the 13:15:45 12 one we continue to use or not. 13:15:48 13 For our science missions, going to 13:15:51 14 EELV is required for certain missions, but it 13:15:56 15 also in many cases is more performance than we 13:16:00 16 actually need. And if we use that level, not 13:16:04 17 only do we have the higher cost of that vehicle 13:16:07 18 but it also can increase the cost of the 13:16:10 19 payload, particularly if they start growing to 13:16:12 20 fill that performance capability, and the more 13:16:16 21 we pay for launch services means the less we 13:16:18 22 have available for science missions. So those 13:16:21 164 1 are very closely linked in what we can 13:16:24 2 accomplish in our program. 13:16:27 3 With regard to infrastructure, we have 13:16:29 4 a pad on each coast for each of the EELV 13:16:35 5 vehicles available. We are finding recently 13:16:39 6 that the payload processing facilities near the 13:16:42 7 pads are limited and becoming a bit of a 13:16:45 8 bottleneck, and we've been collectively working 13:16:49 9 on how to deal with that. 13:16:51 10 With regard to the industrial base, 13:16:55 11 I'll just say again, we have an oversupply in 13:16:58 12 the small class. We have some uncertainty in 13:17:00 13 the medium class. 13:17:05 14 You will hear about the Commercial 13:17:07 15 Orbital Transportation Services program and our 13:17:11 16 Commercial Resupply Services. And so wearing my 13:17:12 17 hat of overseeing the Space Station program, we 13:17:16 18 very much want Commercial Resupply Services to 13:17:22 19 succeed to help us to sustain the station, and 13:17:23 20 wearing my launch services hat, I want them to 13:17:26 21 succeed because those are very likely new medium 13:17:29 22 class vehicles that we can use for our science 13:17:33 165 1 missions. So the station is becoming kind of a 13:17:35 2 market -- initial market entry for them for us. 13:17:39 3 There are questions in the industrial 13:17:44 4 base about -- related to mergers and supply 13:17:46 5 chains. There's always a tension between having 13:17:50 6 parallel capabilities and merging things for 13:17:54 7 efficiency. And the question is to what degree 13:17:58 8 do you integrate or use the same components and 13:18:00 9 gain those efficiencies, but then if you have a 13:18:06 10 failure, do you have a fleet-wide impact where 13:18:10 11 we're all grounded for a period of time. 13:18:15 12 There's a line about multiple users 13:18:17 13 risk approaches. That is to say that NASA, the 13:18:20 14 Air Force, NRO, commercial customers, we each 13:18:25 15 have our own way of looking at and assessing 13:18:29 16 risk for our missions and what our fallback 13:18:33 17 options are. 13:18:36 18 For NASA, we have been in the mode, 13:18:38 19 particularly with our science missions, of 13:18:41 20 flying unique payloads, one-of-a-kind, don't 13:18:43 21 have a backup. Others may be doing 13:18:46 22 constellations or a series of satellites so they 13:18:50 166 1 have a different posture. And that affects how 13:18:57 2 we look at mission assurance, how much risk 13:19:00 3 we're willing to accept, what kind of reviews we 13:19:02 4 need to do. 13:19:06 5 The schedule right now is a crowded 13:19:07 6 manifest, especially for Atlas V. And, again, 13:19:10 7 we've been working collectively across the 13:19:14 8 community to see what we can do to increase the 13:19:17 9 throughput there. 13:19:20 10 Just a couple of things to think about 13:19:22 11 if one were to go down the path of doing human 13:19:25 12 rating on EELV: Given our use of these for all 13:19:28 13 of these other missions and different approaches 13:19:33 14 to risk, would there be two lines of vehicles or 13:19:37 15 one; would there be a separate infrastructure or 13:19:43 16 would we have to figure out how to share pads 13:19:47 17 and processing facilities and so on; and to what 13:19:51 18 degree would we have common systems that affect 13:19:54 19 the fleet or different risk assessments for 13:19:57 20 human versus robotic missions. 13:20:00 21 And so those are all just -- I'm not 13:20:03 22 giving you answers. I'm just giving you things 13:20:06 167 1 to think about as you look at this. 13:20:08 2 And I provided some backup slides that 13:20:10 3 just shows you the history of the vehicles, but 13:20:17 4 that was all I had to present. 13:20:20 5 MR. BEJMUK: Can I ask you a question, 13:20:22 6 Lynn? 13:20:24 7 MS. CLINE: Go ahead, Bo. 13:20:22 8 MR. BEJMUK: When you talk about risk, 13:20:22 9 do you mean like loss of mission numbers? 13:20:26 10 MS. CLINE: Yes. Yes. 13:20:31 11 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. 13:20:22 12 MS. CLINE: Yeah. Questions about are 13:20:32 13 we ready to launch or not, are you willing to 13:20:33 14 go -- do you want to go on a vehicle that has a 13:20:36 15 long history of successful missions or are you 13:20:42 16 willing to accept a higher risk and be a 13:20:46 17 demonstration payload or an early payload on a 13:20:49 18 new mission -- those kinds of things. 13:20:53 19 MR. BEJMUK: Let me just follow up. 13:20:56 20 You had done on this table on page 5, I guess, 13:20:58 21 low, medium -- low for the risk. 13:21:02 22 Do you actually use numbers like LOM 13:21:05 168 1 like -- our Constellation friends do -- or do 13:21:10 2 you? 13:21:10 3 MS. CLINE: We actually have a series 13:21:18 4 of -- we go by a set of categories where once a 13:21:21 5 vehicle has been certified to a certain category 13:21:24 6 then we have our payloads certified to a 13:21:28 7 particular category. 13:21:32 8 So if you are, let's say, a Mars Rover 13:21:33 9 mission that we consider very critical, 13:21:37 10 one-of-a-kind, put a huge investment into it, 13:21:39 11 then we're going to want to go on a vehicle that 13:21:42 12 has a more reliable history or has been 13:21:44 13 certified to a certain level. If you are a 13:21:47 14 payload that's in a different category that's 13:21:50 15 willing to accept risk, then we'll match it to a 13:21:52 16 different type of vehicle. 13:21:56 17 So it's not so much loss of mission 13:21:57 18 numbers as it is trying to pair from the 13:22:00 19 beginning which payload goes on what kind of 13:22:04 20 vehicle. 13:22:07 21 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 13:22:08 22 MR. GREASON: I think it's really 13:22:09 169 1 great that you have, as an organization, worked 13:22:11 2 out how to manage all of this risk and put, you 13:22:13 3 know, nationally critical high value payloads on 13:22:16 4 these launchers. 13:22:19 5 How much does that mission assurance 13:22:20 6 activity that you do contribute to the total 13:22:22 7 cost of the mission? 13:22:25 8 MS. CLINE: That's a hard one to 13:22:27 9 measure, I think. 13:22:29 10 There was a study done a number of 13:22:31 11 years ago that looked across NASA, Air Force and 13:22:33 12 NRO management approaches and looked at our 13:22:37 13 respective track records and came to the 13:22:41 14 conclusion that we were adding value through 13:22:44 15 that mission assurance approach, but I think 13:22:47 16 it's always subject to some level of judgment as 13:22:50 17 how far you go. 13:22:55 18 In our contract we have put in place 13:22:56 19 certain things where we want to just have 13:23:01 20 insight and others where we want some stronger 13:23:04 21 oversight, given that they're not our vehicles 13:23:09 22 but they are our payloads. And so I think over 13:23:12 170 1 time we've worked through that with our 13:23:15 2 contractors as to what our respective roles are. 13:23:17 3 Any other questions? 13:23:25 4 All right. I'll hand off to my ULA 13:23:28 5 colleague. 13:23:31 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 13:23:32 7 Mike... 13:23:33 8 MR. GASS: Thank you, Lynn, and thanks 13:23:38 9 for those questions. Hopefully I'll have some 13:23:41 10 of the answers. 13:23:44 11 Norm and Committee, first I'd like to 13:23:46 12 thank you for inviting United Launch Alliance to 13:23:49 13 speak at this public hearing. My name is 13:23:54 14 Michael Gass. I'm the president and chief 13:23:54 15 executive officer of United Launch Alliance. 13:23:52 16 Like many who will be here before you, 13:24:00 17 I share deep appreciation for the importance of 13:24:02 18 human space flight for the American people and, 13:24:02 19 indeed, the entire world. I also share an 13:24:05 20 awareness that we're endanger of seeing U.S. 13:24:09 21 leadership in space exploration erode for the 13:24:11 22 lack of clear consensus on an affordable, 13:24:13 171 1 sustainable and executable plan for the 13:24:17 2 United States Human Space Flight. 13:24:19 3 So on behalf of the 4,000 women and 13:24:21 4 men of United Launch Alliance entrusted with the 13:24:25 5 task of delivering spacecraft safely and 13:24:26 6 reliably to space, I want to thank the members 13:24:26 7 of the committee for taking on this task. It 13:24:29 8 will not be easy. 13:24:31 9 My intention today is to share ideas 13:24:33 10 of potential credible alternatives and to 13:24:35 11 encourage the committee to create the forms for 13:24:38 12 appropriate technical evaluation of the options 13:24:41 13 and assess against affordable/sustainability to 13:24:43 14 support our nation's priorities and acquisition 13:24:46 15 approaches to human space flight. 13:24:49 16 Let me just, once again, add my 13:24:51 17 commitment -- my personal and corporate 13:24:53 18 commitment that, whatever the committee's 13:24:56 19 recommendations and the President's decisions 13:25:01 20 are, you have ULA's full support for its 13:25:02 21 execution. The constancy and purpose of the 13:25:06 22 nation of a consensus is more important than any 13:25:08 172 1 company's or individual's ideas. Next slide, 13:25:11 2 please. 13:25:15 3 Joint utilization of flight proven 13:25:16 4 systems by NASA, DOD and commercial providers 13:25:19 5 does provide a safe affordable and sustainable 13:25:23 6 approach to exploration. Leveraging the 13:25:27 7 existing investments will reduce annual stand 13:25:29 8 alone lien costs. 13:25:32 9 ULA is proud to operate two 13:25:35 10 state-of-the-art Evolved Expendable Launch 13:25:38 11 Vehicle systems which have launched 13:25:43 12 24 successful missions. These systems are 13:25:43 13 utilized to support our most critical National 13:25:45 14 Security Space assets and the most audacious 13:25:48 15 civil science programs, including the Lunar 13:25:48 16 Reconnaissance Orbiter that we plan to launch 13:25:53 17 tomorrow afternoon. 13:25:55 18 We have learned over the course of 13:25:56 19 history of developing and operating complex 13:25:58 20 space systems it is a financially stable 13:26:01 21 program, whether commercially stable or through 13:26:04 22 government funding stability, that enables a 13:26:08 173 1 strong systems engineering capability that 13:26:11 2 leverages product evolution, that encourages 13:26:12 3 test and flight trial repetition, that leads to 13:26:15 4 reliability, innovation and cost efficiency. 13:26:19 5 Human space flight utilization of EELV 13:26:21 6 will only improve the cost structure and 13:26:23 7 reliability for all of our national users and 13:26:26 8 make the entire EELV industrial base 13:26:28 9 infrastructure more internationally competitive. 13:26:31 10 We have also learned that the fixed 13:26:34 11 cost of maintaining and operating launch 13:26:36 12 infrastructure creates a long-term lien and 13:26:38 13 spaces -- and shapes the budget challenges of 13:26:42 14 entire agencies or companies for decades to 13:26:45 15 come. 13:26:48 16 ULA stands ready to support the 13:26:48 17 committee on evaluation of options that would 13:26:51 18 leverage the existing national and private 13:26:53 19 investments made in the EELV system for future 13:26:55 20 human space flight. 13:26:59 21 Delta IV Heavy provides a safe, low 13:27:00 22 cost capability to launch Orion, we believe, by 13:27:02 174 1 2014 with greater than 20 percent performance 13:27:05 2 margin. If tasked, ULA working with NASA 13:27:08 3 engineers, the Air Force and their aerospace 13:27:13 4 support team, we believe the Delta system can 13:27:16 5 support Orion with credible cost forecasts and 13:27:19 6 schedules based on the recent development 13:27:23 7 experience and meet the reliability needs for 13:27:24 8 human space flight sooner than any other 13:27:27 9 alternative. 13:27:29 10 Many of the system improvements 13:27:30 11 contemplated for human space flight are already 13:27:32 12 part of a planned evolution to benefit our 13:27:34 13 national security missions that we are currently 13:27:37 14 planning and supporting. 13:27:40 15 Further, we believe that Atlas V 13:27:41 16 provides commercial crew capability to ISS and 13:27:44 17 potentially even earlier. We have supported 13:27:48 18 several commercial entrepreneurs that found 13:27:50 19 Atlas IV well suited for these potential 13:27:54 20 ventures. The challenge was not the technical 13:27:55 21 solution but closing the business case in the 13:27:59 22 inherent market and venture risk. 13:28:01 175 1 Further evolution of EELV systems and 13:28:04 2 components provide options and flexibility to 13:28:08 3 explore the Moon and beyond. One of the issues 13:28:10 4 I observed from past exploration architecture is 13:28:13 5 the tendency to allow a point design for launch 13:28:18 6 systems to lock you into an inflexible 13:28:20 7 architecture. 13:28:22 8 The Atlas and Delta launch systems 13:28:23 9 have an inherent flexibility in their design 13:28:24 10 potential. We have developed evolutionary 13:28:26 11 incremental variance of these systems all of the 13:28:29 12 way up to 100,000 metric tons plus for 13:28:31 13 consideration. Not only is there vehicle 13:28:36 14 flexibility but there's options available for 13:28:40 15 manufacturing integration and launch operations 13:28:42 16 to address workforce transition and unique 13:28:46 17 requirements. 13:28:50 18 ULA is prepared to support the 13:28:55 19 committee with a thorough evaluation of all of 13:28:55 20 these options. So let me elaborate on some of 13:28:56 21 these thoughts. Next slide, please. 13:29:00 22 The pictures represent our diverse 13:29:02 176 1 capabilities of the expendable launch vehicle 13:29:06 2 fleet. ULA is proud of our role in our 13:29:10 3 partnership supporting national programs and 13:29:13 4 cherish the intellectual capital that we are 13:29:16 5 entrusted with that was gained in over 50 years 13:29:17 6 and 1300 flight experiences that were 13:29:19 7 accomplished by our heritage companies. Boeing 13:29:22 8 and Lockheed Martin and the predecessor firms 13:29:25 9 that were consolidated over the past decades 13:29:28 10 represent this experience. This intellectual 13:29:32 11 capital for launch is embodied in our current 13:29:34 12 experienced workforce and in the proven systems 13:29:38 13 for engineering and management that we operate 13:29:41 14 today. 13:29:43 15 The recent successful development 13:29:44 16 experience of Delta IV and Atlas V were 13:29:46 17 developed in the last decade. EELV systems 13:29:50 18 represent over $4 billion of government and 13:29:54 19 private investment that were fielded 13:29:57 20 approximately four years from the authority to 13:29:59 21 proceed to their first flight. The key theme I 13:30:01 22 want to emphasize throughout this presentation 13:30:04 177 1 is the benefit of reliability through the flight 13:30:07 2 trials of that fleet and a robust infrastructure 13:30:10 3 that comes with a sustained business 13:30:14 4 architecture. Next slide. 13:30:20 5 This slide represents the building 13:30:20 6 blocks for exploration, and it represents three 13:30:23 7 important parts. 13:30:26 8 First, we believe the nation needs to 13:30:28 9 go forth with an Orion launch capability to have 13:30:32 10 human space capability with a 13:30:34 11 government-provided launch capability. 13:30:35 12 We also think in parallel there must 13:30:37 13 be a commercial crew capability. As I 13:30:41 14 mentioned, the Atlas and Delta are potential, 13:30:43 15 and there's many entrepreneurs thinking about 13:30:45 16 entering that market as well. And it should be 13:30:48 17 done in parallel, and the government should 13:30:50 18 create an environment to support that. And the 13:30:52 19 market that should have is that support to the 13:30:54 20 International Space Station from 2014 through 13:30:58 21 that 2020 time frame to give that market an 13:31:00 22 opportunity to mature. 13:31:04 178 1 And on top of that, we show the third 13:31:05 2 leg of that -- of those building blocks is the 13:31:08 3 heavy lift variance. 13:31:10 4 In the recommendations that we put 13:31:11 5 forth is that it provides time for trade studies 13:31:13 6 on that future architecture. As we're focused 13:31:15 7 on the Orion and the commercial crew getting 13:31:19 8 capability, we have some time to hone the 13:31:19 9 architecture and pick a flight variant that 13:31:21 10 could be fielded to support the mission beyond 13:31:25 11 the low Earth orbit International Space Station. 13:31:27 12 As stated, we think that NASA could 13:31:34 13 leverage the Delta IV EELV system to support the 13:31:36 14 current Orion with a safe architecture, and the 13:31:38 15 time that we've outlined on this schedule is 13:31:41 16 equivalent to the time that we put forth for the 13:31:43 17 entire development of three different versions 13:31:46 18 of the Delta IV system to its first flight. 13:31:48 19 Next slide, please. 13:31:53 20 We do not pretend at ULA to be the 13:31:58 21 nation's expert in human space flight, but we 13:32:02 22 have been involved with NASA in Commercial Human 13:32:05 179 1 Rating 1 studies for the past eight years. 13:32:08 2 We've worked with commercial ventures, and we 13:32:10 3 are an active participant with NASA on the 13:32:15 4 Ares I-X program. 13:32:17 5 We believe flight experience is key to 13:32:19 6 human rating. Detailed understanding of the 13:32:20 7 system behavior and environments is -- getting 13:32:22 8 the benefit of understanding your system margins 13:32:25 9 and inherent risks. With the flight experience, 13:32:27 10 we'll be able to develop precise abort criteria 13:32:31 11 with a robust emergency detection system that 13:32:36 12 would fly on every mission, both human and 13:32:39 13 non-human space flights. 13:32:41 14 Non-crewed missions retire the risk 13:32:44 15 prior to that first crewed mission. 13:32:47 16 And I put what looks like a ruler on 13:32:49 17 the bottom, but that's actually our flight 13:32:52 18 experience that goes on in parallel with an 13:32:55 19 ongoing development program. And a lesson, when 13:32:58 20 we developed EELV, to blend that experience of 13:33:01 21 current flight and development expertise is +key 13:33:05 22 to that message. 13:33:09 180 1 Starting with a highly reliable 13:33:10 2 system, addition of the emergency detection 13:33:13 3 system and leveraging some of the -- some 13:33:16 4 redundant critical flight measurements, the 13:33:17 5 abort criteria can be developed, and matched 13:33:21 6 with a good crew safety system, we will be able 13:33:24 7 to deliver that safe human rating. Next slide, 13:33:27 8 please. 13:33:27 9 Delta IV Heavy was launched two times 13:33:33 10 operationally with 100 percent mission success. 13:33:36 11 The Delta IV human rating requirements 13:33:40 12 is well understood. I've talked about the EDS. 13:33:45 13 We believe, as Lynn mentioned, a separate launch 13:33:48 14 pad with a separate crew ingress and egress is 13:33:50 15 required. We also will have a good handle on 13:33:54 16 some additional reliability improvements that we 13:33:56 17 would incorporate into the vehicle, and it would 13:34:00 18 be synergistically required with our national 13:34:01 19 security missions. 13:34:04 20 We believe there's greater than 13:34:05 21 20 percent performance margin for both the ISS 13:34:06 22 and lunar trajectories that allows us to provide 13:34:10 181 1 the shaping to eliminate any concerns of black 13:34:12 2 zones for abort criteria. 13:34:14 3 The DOD RS-68 engine upgrade we're 13:34:16 4 currently working on is the enabler that 13:34:20 5 provides this performance margin. 13:34:24 6 Liquid systems of EELV have the 13:34:28 7 ability to create more benign launch and abort 13:34:32 8 environments. The changes to establish the 13:34:35 9 capability are minimum, and the improvements are 13:34:38 10 synergistic. We think we can be available 13:34:42 11 within four and a half years with credible cost 13:34:45 12 estimates. Next slide. 13:34:49 13 I mentioned in the beginning about 13:34:49 14 concept of operations, and I offered two 13:34:51 15 examples. 13:34:54 16 The two examples -- one is basically 13:34:55 17 the maximum synergy where we do the human space 13:34:56 18 flight utilizing the existing ULA infrastructure 13:34:59 19 combined with the DOD program, NASA science and 13:35:02 20 our commercial endeavors. That's what we used 13:35:05 21 in those cost estimates that I shared before on 13:35:08 22 the previous slide -- is based on Example 1. 13:35:11 182 1 Example 2 is the one that we'd look 13:35:13 2 forward to support and to go into more detail 13:35:18 3 about, which is about more of a separation where 13:35:21 4 NASA has an integration and operation role of 13:35:24 5 some unique infrastructure, and let me elaborate 13:35:27 6 that. 13:35:31 7 But before we do, these are only two 13:35:31 8 examples of many different ways that we could 13:35:33 9 approach the problem, and I want to just 13:35:36 10 highlight the Example 2 for a moment on the next 13:35:39 11 slide. 13:35:44 12 Example 2 is highlighted here with a 13:35:45 13 map of the United States that has three things 13:35:47 14 identified. The smallest dots represent 13:35:49 15 locations of our industrial base -- the key 13:35:52 16 suppliers for the EELV systems, critical 13:35:55 17 resources to the success of the program. The 13:35:58 18 larger red dots represent the locations of our 13:36:00 19 ULA facilities. And the yellow stars represent 13:36:04 20 some additional facilities we would recommend in 13:36:08 21 relationship to this approach. 13:36:12 22 The approach that we would recommend 13:36:13 183 1 that we maintain detailed part fabrication and 13:36:15 2 tank manufacturing in our Decatur, Alabama 13:36:21 3 facility with use of a common supply chain from 13:36:24 4 that industrial base that's represented here. 13:36:27 5 We would recommend that NASA establish 13:36:29 6 an engineering leadership team at the Marshall 13:36:30 7 Space Flight Center which is only about 15, 13:36:34 8 20 miles from our Decatur facility to make sure 13:36:36 9 they're the focus for the human rating elements 13:36:36 10 and the integration of the Orion vehicle. 13:36:39 11 We believe, when looking at the 13:36:41 12 overall constraints and needs of the program, an 13:36:42 13 additional area would be required for a final 13:36:45 14 assembly of this vehicle. We'd hope it would 13:36:48 15 have the same underlying technical baseline but 13:36:52 16 providing two assembly areas for production 13:36:58 17 rate, and utilizing existing facilities like 13:36:59 18 NASA's Michoud facility is recommended on this 13:37:00 19 slide. 13:37:04 20 The third element is, again, that 13:37:04 21 launch complex. Whether it's Launch Complex 37A 13:37:07 22 adjacent to our existing launch complex or 13:37:11 184 1 utilizing 39 should be evaluated carefully for 13:37:16 2 best operational activity. 13:37:19 3 One of the things we talk about many 13:37:21 4 times when we talk about synergism and this 13:37:22 5 approach is the efficiency of use of resources, 13:37:26 6 and resources typically is about dollars. I 13:37:29 7 want to emphasize the importance of the human 13:37:31 8 capital resource of our nation, and we need to 13:37:36 9 find a way to be able to harness the expertise 13:37:37 10 and find jobs on this program to ensure the 13:37:41 11 appropriate transition of that experience 13:37:42 12 resource as well as creating the opportunity for 13:37:45 13 the next generation. And this would enable some 13:37:48 14 of those great opportunities. Next slide. 13:37:51 15 We talked a little bit about EELV for 13:37:55 16 commercial human space. Again, we believe the 13:37:59 17 requirements are well understood. We've been 13:38:01 18 working with several of the companies, and they 13:38:03 19 were nice enough to let us use their pictures of 13:38:06 20 their potential spacecraft. And we gave credit 13:38:09 21 for them at the bottom of the slide. 13:38:14 22 I would want to also acknowledge that 13:38:18 185 1 United Launch Alliance, as part of our consent 13:38:20 2 order and master agreement, we're in the launch 13:38:24 3 vehicle business. We cannot be a provider of 13:38:25 4 that upper stage in service. We can launch 13:38:28 5 services to companies that want to be the prime 13:38:30 6 for that service and build those spacecrafts. 13:38:33 7 So being a merchant supplier of 13:38:37 8 launch, we're capable of working with many 13:38:40 9 teams. We believe we can offer them a low 13:38:42 10 non-recurring opportunity. Again, if human 13:38:45 11 space flight is coming on to the extended launch 13:38:47 12 vehicle, we'd recommend a second launch pad and, 13:38:48 13 with increased rate, have a competitive or 13:38:51 14 affordable cost. 13:38:55 15 Again, as Lynn mentioned, the 13:38:57 16 characterization from numerous flights both for 13:39:02 17 NASA, the DOD, the intelligence community and 13:39:06 18 some commercial spacecraft provides the data to 13:39:09 19 characterize for future flight safety. 13:39:12 20 EELV and the launch vehicle itself is 13:39:16 21 not on the critical path to this activity. We 13:39:23 22 believe we could have the vehicle ready long 13:39:24 186 1 before the development and qualification of 13:39:26 2 those spacecraft that you see depicted. 13:39:28 3 Again, the challenge for ULA and the 13:39:31 4 potential commercial operators is the 13:39:33 5 non-recurring implementation costs for both 13:39:35 6 spacecraft development and launch vehicle 13:39:39 7 integration and our EELV recurring costs. We 13:39:41 8 are working with our DOD, NRO and NASA customers 13:39:47 9 to buy launches more efficiently for government 13:39:49 10 use and which would enable better value for the 13:39:52 11 potential domestic commercial ventures. Next 13:39:56 12 slide, please. 13:40:00 13 I talked about the evolution of a 13:40:00 14 flexible -- that enables a flexible mission 13:40:03 15 architecture. This was a chart that was started 13:40:06 16 doing some studies with NASA back in the 13:40:09 17 2003-2004 time frame that we've further honed 13:40:14 18 after we became United Launch Alliance. The 13:40:16 19 initial studies were done as two independent 13:40:18 20 program teams. 13:40:20 21 We joked when we were forming ULA that 13:40:21 22 we'd up with the Franken rocket, and lo and 13:40:23 187 1 behold, it's becoming -- it's coming truth that 13:40:26 2 there's a best of both qualities that are being 13:40:28 3 integrated in our future evolution. 13:40:32 4 The important messages of this chart 13:40:35 5 is the modularity of the approach, that there's 13:40:38 6 different break points and opportunities for 13:40:41 7 different architectures, that all of the steps 13:40:44 8 have value to all of the customers and that 13:40:46 9 there be flight used on many of our current 13:40:50 10 NRO/DOD missions. 13:40:56 11 The first step that we always 13:40:57 12 highlight is the upper stage. It's the area 13:40:58 13 that can give us more performance, more 13:41:00 14 reliability, and the development of a common 13:41:01 15 upper stage with either improved RL-10 or a new 13:41:03 16 upper stage engine is something first and 13:41:08 17 foremost in our road map. 13:41:13 18 The areas in blue are things that we 13:41:16 19 could do using the existing launch 13:41:18 20 infrastructure and current engine systems. 13= :41:19 21 The orange, which we call Phrase 3, 13:41:21 22 represents things that would require new launch 13:41:23 188 1 infrastructure and, you know, the brick and 13:41:25 2 mortar of launch pads, flame buckets, and all of 13:41:27 3 the GSC is the expensive non-recurring element 13:41:32 4 and would need new propulsion systems. 13:41:34 5 The key message for all of this is 13:41:39 6 that there are choices and that there is synergy 13:41:41 7 in its use. Next slide. 13:41:45 8 We believe human space flight on EELV 13:41:47 9 could potentially enhance safety, lower costs by 13:41:54 10 enhancing and leveraging the flight tempo of the 13:41:57 11 existing programs. 13:42:01 12 Accelerating we also believe we could 13:42:04 13 accelerate initial capabilities to support the 13:42:07 14 utilization of the International Space Station. 13:42:10 15 We can enable -- if we do develop 13:42:14 16 those savings, enable those resources to be 13:42:16 17 applied to supporting missions to the Moon and 13:42:19 18 other destinations beyond low Earth orbit. 13:42:22 19 We believe the right policy and the 13:42:24 20 right acquisition strategies will stimulate 13:42:26 21 commercial space flight capabilities. 13:42:29 22 And we think we have provided options 13:42:32 189 1 to address workforce transition and unique 13:42:35 2 operational requirements of human space flight. 13:42:38 3 Again, we are prepared to support the 13:42:40 4 committee and NASA with the detail data for the 13:42:42 5 evaluations. I encourage an open and thorough 13:42:45 6 evaluation of options which will lead to the 13:42:48 7 best solution for the nation, and I thank you 13:42:50 8 for your leadership in doing that. 13:42:52 9 I'd be available to answer questions. 13:42:55 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Thank you very 13:42:57 11 much. I think we have time for one or two 13:42:58 12 questions, if folks have them. 13:43:01 13 Okay. Leroy and then Wanda. 13:43:06 14 MR. CHIAO: Yeah. Thanks very much 13:43:06 15 for your presentation. 13:43:08 16 I was interested in some of the points 13:43:09 17 you made, and, in fact, in the summary page you 13:43:11 18 said you were going to enhance safety and lower 13:43:14 19 costs. And I don't know if you saw the 13:43:17 20 morning's presentation from the NASA folks, but 13:43:20 21 it seems to run counter to what they're saying 13:43:22 22 about their Ares family. 13:43:24 190 1 I wonder if you could comment on that. 13:43:25 2 MR. GASS: I did not get to see the 13:43:28 3 presentation, and that's -- that's fundamentally 13:43:30 4 the comment about open and thorough 13:43:32 5 evaluation -- clearly need to have their 13:43:35 6 expertise of what's in the reliability, their 13:43:38 7 numbers and assessments. The aerospace team 13:43:41 8 done theirs. 13:43:45 9 To date all of these studies have been 13:43:46 10 done compartmentalized, and I think just getting 13:43:48 11 all of the experts in a room and with the 13:43:50 12 committee's oversight would get at the heart of 13:43:53 13 some of those questions. 13:43:55 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Wanda. 13:43:57 15 DR. AUSTIN: Hi, Mike. You showed a 13:44:01 16 chart that indicated you've got suppliers across 13:44:03 17 the country, and one of the concerns that has 13:44:05 18 been raised to us is about the industrial base. 13:44:07 19 Can you make a few comments about -- 13:44:10 20 in your summary chart you did not address that. 13:44:12 21 Could you say a few words about what the impact 13:44:15 22 would be. 13:44:18 191 1 MR. GASS: Absolutely, Dr. Austin. 13:44:19 2 Thank you for that question, and I apologize for 13:44:22 3 omitting it. 13:44:22 4 The number one thing that I talk 13:44:23 5 about -- and as a matter of fact, at this 13:44:23 6 morning's meeting with the intelligence 13:44:26 7 community and the Department of Defense, we were 13:44:27 8 talking about the focus on the industrial base. 13:44:28 9 It really is fragile. It's fragile for many 13:44:31 10 reasons, one of which is the work of this 13:44:37 11 committee. Without the knowledge and commitment 13:44:39 12 of a human space flight, nobody is investing, 13:44:42 13 nobody is basically planning it into their -- to 13:44:46 14 the future. 13:44:49 15 We already know about the budget 13:44:49 16 constraints of the nation, spending in the 13:44:51 17 Department of Defense. But fundamentally things 13:44:54 18 are getting really lean in some of those major 13:44:56 19 factories. 13:44:59 20 We encourage the use of expendable 13:45:01 21 launch vehicles as a strategic program. It does 13:45:07 22 have some key needs over the next ten years, and 13:45:07 192 1 the nation right now is not even using its -- 13:45:07 2 that capability strategically. We're buying 13:45:10 3 launches one at a time. So we're not able to 13:45:13 4 use EELV to give some anchor tenancy in some of 13:45:16 5 those supplier base and the knowledge for them 13:45:20 6 to either make investments. 13:45:21 7 The other thing that's going on in the 13:45:24 8 supplier base is an overcapacity. We sill have 13:45:26 9 an overcapacity in many of our facilities. We 13:45:28 10 have a challenge. As a nation, we love our 13:45:31 11 competition and have lots of competitors 13:45:35 12 domestically. But in this industry we're 13:45:36 13 dealing is international competition. 13:45:38 14 We need to make a decision -- is our 13:45:40 15 competition the global competitors or are we 13:45:43 16 looking to compete internally in this nation. 13:45:46 17 If we do that, we're going to dilute our 13:45:50 18 industrial base by spreading it around to lots 13:45:52 19 of suppliers that don't have enough business to 13:45:52 20 keep the robust processes that you need for 13:45:56 21 space flight. 13:45:58 22 DR. AUSTIN: All right. Thank you, 13:45:58 193 1 Mike. 13:45:58 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's do one more 13:45:58 3 question. Bo... 13:46:03 4 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you for your 13:46:03 5 terrific presentation, but I have one question 13:46:04 6 that has to do with the mainstay of structural 13:46:07 7 design in human systems that I've been exposed 13:46:11 8 to for many years has been use 1.4 safety 13:46:14 9 factor -- structural safety factor. 13:46:18 10 Is Delta IV and Atlas V designed to a 13:46:21 11 1.4 safety factor, and if not, how would you 13:46:25 12 overcome that, you know, challenge? 13:46:29 13 MR. GASS: The answer, Bo, you're on 13:46:32 14 the right -- and I think we're consistent with 13:46:32 15 all of those activities, and to some -- as Lynn 13:46:34 16 was showing in our criteria, those are some of 13:46:36 17 the kinds of criteria you have in those mature 13:46:39 18 systems. 13:46:42 19 We have a 2.0 factor of safety in 13:46:42 20 design margin if it's untested. We use 1.4 and 13:46:43 21 1.25, depending on its testing environment in 13:46:45 22 some of the different -- the modes it's in. But 13:46:49 194 1 clearly using the industry standards of 2.0 for 13:46:52 2 untested structure and 1.4 for tested is kind of 13:46:52 3 our mantra. And if we take exception to it, 13:46:57 4 it's noted with risk, and we have the 13:46:59 5 appropriate mitigations on that. 13:47:01 6 So we think our system is well 13:47:03 7 characterized, well understood on those margins 13:47:06 8 on not only structure but on every component 13:47:09 9 throughout the system. 13:47:11 10 MR. GREASON: Can I throw one more in 13:47:16 11 there? 13:47:16 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. One last one. 13:47:13 13 MR. GREASON: I'll be quick. 13:47:16 14 Among the industrial base concerns is, 13:47:18 15 you know, what we do for ongoing development 13:47:22 16 capability for large liquid rocket engines. I 13:47:24 17 notice that, you know, in your future growth 13:47:27 18 plan you've got the potential for putting dual 13:47:29 19 RD-180's on the Atlas V. 13:47:32 20 Have you looked at all at what it 13:47:36 21 would take to do, you know, a modern 13:47:38 22 F-1/RD-180/RD-170 class replacement to -- as an 13:47:39 195 1 alternative to just putting more of those on? 13:47:42 2 MR. GASS: Yes, Jeff, and thanks for 13:47:45 3 that question. 13:47:47 4 The number one issue for space flight 13:47:49 5 is -- if you will, it's not United Launch 13:47:51 6 Alliance with the system private. It's our 13:47:55 7 propulsion industry and our propulsion 13:48:00 8 capability. 13:48:00 9 The fact that our nation does not have 13:48:01 10 a LOX hydrocarbon engine capability is a 13:48:01 11 problem, and if there was that extra investment 13:48:07 12 dollar, that is a key resource across NASA's 13:48:10 13 civil and DOD that we need to invest in it. 13:48:14 14 From a commercial standpoint, if you will, the 13:48:17 15 business case doesn't close. The crossover 13:48:20 16 point is great. 13:48:22 17 We have looked at not only domestic -- 13:48:25 18 doing it alone, we've looked at joint 13:48:26 19 partnerships with joint developments. You had, 13:48:29 20 I think, Mr. Perminov on from the Russian 13:48:32 21 Roscosmos earlier. We worked with his team on a 13:48:35 22 potential of kind of an RD-181 joint development 13:48:38 196 1 activity as well as other international 13:48:40 2 partnerships. 13:48:42 3 But LOX hydrogen for a first stage 13:48:42 4 booster has been studied over and over again, 13:48:46 5 and it comes out the right answer. And the fact 13:48:48 6 that we don't have a good robust domestic 13:48:51 7 capability is a problem. 13:48:54 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 13:48:55 9 We appreciate your comments. 13:48:56 10 Let's see. I think the Aerospace 13:48:58 11 presentation is next, if I'm not mistaken. 13:49:04 12 Gary... 13:49:10 13 MR. PULLIAM: Good afternoon, 13:49:10 14 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My 13:49:12 15 name is Gary Pulliam, and I'm pleased to present 13:49:13 16 to you today the initial look in to Aerospace 13:49:16 17 Corporation's work on this important subject. 13:49:22 18 A word about Aerospace, we are a 13:49:23 19 California-based, not-for-profit company formed 13:49:23 20 in June 1960, 49 years ago this month, to 13:49:26 21 provide technical and scientific support to 13:49:30 22 Air Force and other government and space 13:49:33 197 1 programs. And that's the job we've been doing 13:49:35 2 for those 49 years. We've been a strong partner 13:49:37 3 with the Air Force and a strong partner with 13:49:41 4 NASA for many, many years, and we're proud of 13:49:43 5 that fact. 13:49:46 6 With regard to this particular piece 13:49:46 7 of work that NASA has asked us to do, we've been 13:49:48 8 looking at the subject matter of the EELV system 13:49:50 9 as a replacement for part of the Constellation 13:49:54 10 profile for some time, even before it became a 13:49:58 11 profile. We began an initial look back in 2005 13:50:01 12 after the President had announced his vision but 13:50:05 13 before the architecture was well understood. 13:50:09 14 And at that point we were simply asked to 13:50:11 15 determine whether or not the EELV could be human 13:50:13 16 ratable, and at that time we decided and 13:50:14 17 determined, yes, it could be. 13:50:15 18 Then NASA came out with its 13:50:17 19 architecture and proceeded along those 13:50:20 20 developmental paths. Then about three years 13:50:22 21 later, late last year, we were asked to look at 13:50:25 22 it again. 13:50:27 198 1 Now that NASA had begun its 13:50:28 2 development of its programs and now that the 13:50:30 3 EELV, particularly the Delta IV, had flown and 13:50:33 4 now that NASA had implemented some of its own 13:50:37 5 policies with regard to human rating factors and 13:50:39 6 other matters, we were asked to come back and 13:50:40 7 take another look at the state of information 13:50:45 8 regarding human rating of the EELV. And we 13:50:46 9 presented that information to the NASA 13:50:48 10 headquarters to Dr. Griffin and staff in 13:50:50 11 December. 13:50:50 12 And then following that, we were given 13:50:54 13 this final task, which is the last bullet there. 13:50:55 14 Next chart, please. 13:50:57 15 And the scope of that study was now to 13:50:58 16 get a bit more precise and to look at the 13:51:02 17 programmatic and technical feasibility of using 13:51:04 18 a Delta IV Heavy in lieu of the Ares I mission 13:51:07 19 and specifically to look at that in the context 13:51:11 20 of the overall effects on the Constellation 13:51:13 21 architecture. And that's a really important 13:51:15 22 point for our work. 13:51:17 199 1 We looked at the capability of using 13:51:18 2 the Delta IV Heavy in lieu of the Ares I to take 13:51:21 3 humans to low Earth orbit and what that means to 13:51:25 4 the rest of the Constellation and the intended 13:51:29 5 mission of taking humans beyond low Earth orbit. 13:51:31 6 So we did not look at alternatives to 13:51:33 7 the job that NASA has been given. We did not 13:51:36 8 look at alternatives to the architecture. Our 13:51:38 9 study assumed that you want to leave low Earth 13:51:43 10 orbit, and to do that, you need a big rocket and 13:51:45 11 the big rocket of record is the Ares V. 13:51:47 12 We also did not assess the confidence 13:51:50 13 levels or the executability of the current 13:51:53 14 Ares I cost and schedule. We took the program 13:51:56 15 of record and the progress that was initially 13:51:59 16 established for that program and used those for 13:51:59 17 comparability purposes. 13:52:04 18 As we began to look at those, we came 13:52:04 19 up with several options. First, we started with 13:52:06 20 the Delta IV baseline program, which is not 13:52:08 21 presently human rated, and then we began to look 13:52:13 22 at excursions around that to bound our study. 13:52:15 200 1 In option No. 2 we looked at taking 13:52:19 2 the Ares I upper stage and its J-2X engine and 13:52:21 3 using those on a Delta IV. We realized that the 13:52:25 4 J-2X engine, as being currently designed, has a 13:52:28 5 good deal more thrust than this application 13:52:31 6 would need. 13:52:34 7 So that led us to an Option No. 3 13:52:35 8 where we would still use the Ares I upper stage 13:52:38 9 with its engine but at a reduced, resized level 13:52:41 10 of thrust to be more appropriate for the mission 13:52:44 11 at hand. 13:52:47 12 Then we began to look at other kinds 13:52:48 13 of upper stages in Option 4. We looked at a 13:52:49 14 redesigned upper stage with a cluster of four 13:52:51 15 RL-10 engines, and then we looked at could you 13:52:54 16 do this mission with no upper stage at all, just 13:52:57 17 using the Orion service module for final 13:53:01 18 maneuvering, and then finally what about the 13:53:05 19 HR -- human-rated Delta IV with just a single 13:53:08 20 RL-10 engine. 13:53:11 21 We did not look at the Atlas V simply 13:53:11 22 because the Delta IV Heavy was farther along. 13:53:13 201 1 It had flown. We had more comparative data. So 13:53:16 2 we concentrated our work at NASA's direction on 13:53:19 3 the comparison of Delta IV Heavy to the Ares I 13:53:23 4 program. 13:53:25 5 As we completed this study, here are 13:53:27 6 some of the top level key findings that we had. 13:53:29 7 First of all, as we understood how NASA was 13:53:32 8 implementing the human rating requirements into 13:53:35 9 the Ares I program, we were better able to make 13:53:38 10 a determination about how these might flow into 13:53:40 11 a human-rated Delta IV program, and we tried to 13:53:43 12 get as precise as we could and as comparable as 13:53:47 13 we could as we made determinations about the 13:53:50 14 Delta IV human rating program. 13:53:53 15 The configurations that have either 13:53:56 16 the J-2X engine as the upper stage or RL-10 13:53:58 17 derivatives are feasible, and they have 13:54:03 18 significant margin in terms of cost -- in terms 13:54:05 19 of performance to both the International Space 13:54:06 20 Station point and to the LEO point for the lunar 13:54:10 21 mission, which is a bit more demanding. 13:54:13 22 We also looked at the Delta IV human 13:54:16 202 1 rated with one single RL-10 derivative engine. 13:54:19 2 We found that it meets the Ares I performance 13:54:23 3 margins, but it is closer, as you would 13:54:26 4 expect -- one engine instead of a cluster of 13:54:29 5 four engines, but we did find that it had 13:54:32 6 sufficient gross margin performance for that 13:54:35 7 mission. 13:54:38 8 But we suggest that if the committee 13:54:39 9 is interested in that particular option that we 13:54:40 10 need to be more precise and more work is 13:54:43 11 required on the exact profiling of the launch 13:54:46 12 and the ascent profiles and the performance 13:54:50 13 margins to those very important targets. 13:54:53 14 We looked at briefly at the no upper 13:54:56 15 stage configuration using the Orion Service 13:54:58 16 Module, and our estimation and our findings are 13:54:59 17 that while it could make performance to the ISS 13:55:03 18 target we didn't think it could make performance 13:55:05 19 to the lunar target, which has a bit more 13:55:09 20 up-mass requirements. So that was our findings 13:55:10 21 on that. Next chart. 13:55:12