1 1 2 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 3 4 5 REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT 6 PLANS COMMITTEE 7 8 9 Public Meeting 10 Carnegie Institution for Science 11 1530 P Street, N.W. 12 Washington, D.C. 13 June 17, 2009 14 9:00 a.m. 15 16 17 18 19 REPORTED BY JANA MULHOLLAN 20 Registered Professional Reporter 21 22 VALADOR, INC. 2 1 MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 2 (Appearances) 3 4 5 Chairman 6 NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE 7 8 Executive Director 9 Designated Federal Official (DFO) 10 PHIL MCALISTER 11 12 13 Members Listed Alphabetically 14 15 WANDA M. AUSTIN, PH.D. 16 BOHDAN BEJMUK 17 LEROY CHIAO, PH.D. 18 CHRISTOPHER CHYBA, PH.D. 19 EDWARD F. CRAWLEY, PH.D. 20 JEFF GREASON 21 22 3 1 I N D E X 2 3 MORNING SESSION 4 Introduction and Opening Remarks 5 Phil McAlister/Norman Augustine....... 6 6 Office of Science and Technology Policy 09:10:11 7 John Holdren.......................... 11 09:10:11 8 Administrator of NASA (Videoconference) 09:18:55 9 Christopher Scolese................... 19 10 Summary of Past Studies 11 Michael Hawes......................... 26 12 NASA's Constellation Program 13 Douglas Cooke......................... 32 14 Jeff Hanley........................... 41 15 Video................................. 52 16 International Space Station Partner 17 Discussions 18 European Space Agency (Videoconference) 19 Governor Dordain................ 67 20 Roscosmos (Videoconference) 21 General Perminov................ 85 22 4 1 I N D E X 2 (Continued) 3 4 MORNING SESSION (Continued) 5 House Space and Aeronautics Committee 6 Congressman Pete Olson............... 104 7 House Science and Technology Committee 11:22:05 8 Congressman Ralph Hall............... 110 9 (Presented by Ken Monroe) 10 Comments Via Website 11 Phil McAlister....................... 117 12 Public Comment Period..................... 123 13 Senate Science and Space Subcommittee 11:22:24 14 Senator Bill Nelson.................. 135 11:22:23 15 Senate Commerce, Science and Technology 11:21:52 16 Committee 11:21:52 17 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison......... 147 11:21:49 18 (Presented by Norman Augustine) 19 Lunch Break............................... 152 20 21 22 5 1 I N D E X 2 (Continued) 3 4 AFTERNOON SESSION 5 Introduction 6 Mike Hawes........................... 154 7 EELV Considerations 8 Current Use of EELV - Lynn Cline..... 158 9 United Launch - Michael Gass......... 170 10 Aerospace - Gary Pulliam............. 196 11 Other Commercial Launch Capabilities 12 NASA COTS Program - Doug Cooke....... 221 13 SpaceX COTS - Elon Musk.............. 230 14 Orbital COTS - Frank Culbertson...... 246 15 ISS CRS - Mike Suffredini............ 263 16 Alternative Architectures 17 Direct - Steve Metschan.............. 288 18 Space Shuttle Side-Mount Options 19 John Shannon.................... 323 20 Video........................... 350 21 Public comment period..................... 362 22 Meeting adjourned......................... 381 6 1 MR. McALISTER: Good morning and 09:05:27 2 welcome, everybody, to the first meeting of the 09:05:31 3 Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans 09:05:33 4 Committee. I just wanted to welcome everybody. 09:05:38 5 It's been a very good turnout today. I'm glad 09:05:41 6 you guys could join us. And to everybody that's 09:05:45 7 watching on the computer and on NASA TV, we want 09:05:47 8 to welcome you as well. 09:05:50 9 My name is Phil McAlister. I'm the 09:05:51 10 executive director of the committee. Just a 09:05:54 11 couple of quick notes. 09:05:54 12 This meeting is governed by the 09:05:57 13 Federal Advisory Committee Act. So this is a 09:05:59 14 public meeting obviously. All of the comments 09:06:01 15 today are on the record. 09:06:04 16 I ask that you please silence your 09:06:06 17 cell phones -- it's just like the movie 09:06:09 18 theaters -- so that we can get through the 09:06:13 19 agenda, which is very challenging today. 09:06:13 20 All of the presentations today will be 09:06:15 21 posted on the committee's website as well as the 09:06:17 22 minutes today. The committees's website is 09:06:18 7 1 http://hsf.nasa.gov. So please visit there. We 09:06:23 2 do have copies of the agenda also that are 09:06:33 3 available for anybody who wants to see it. 09:06:35 4 Let's see. I will be notifying the 09:06:38 5 presenters about five minutes before their end 09:06:40 6 so that we can make sure that we get through 09:06:43 7 everything. 09:06:45 8 I also wanted to mention that all 09:06:46 9 members of the committee have been reviewed by 09:06:48 10 NASA's legal counsel, they've analyzed all 09:06:50 11 potential conflicts of interest and they've 09:06:50 12 resolved all and -- any and all significant 09:06:55 13 conflicts in consultation with the Office of 09:06:57 14 Government Ethics. So we're in good shape 09:06:58 15 there. 09:07:00 16 There's going to be two public 09:07:00 17 comments periods today, one right before lunch 09:07:03 18 and then one right at the end of today. We're 09:07:05 19 very much looking forward to that, and we're 09:07:08 20 going to ask people to come to one of the two 09:07:10 21 standing microphones during those periods and 09:07:11 22 make your comments. If you could limit your 09:07:15 8 1 comments to about three -- no more than three 09:07:17 2 minutes, that would be preferable. We'd like to 09:07:19 3 get as much public comment in as possible. 09:07:23 4 We'd also request that you -- we would 09:07:25 5 strongly prefer that you ask questions via the 09:07:27 6 website. So if you have questions today, it 09:07:31 7 would be much better to submit those on the 09:07:33 8 website so that we can answer them and they can 09:07:33 9 be posted on the public's -- the website for all 09:07:35 10 of the public to see. 09:07:38 11 So for today, we're predominantly 09:07:41 12 looking for comments from the public for those 09:07:44 13 two periods. 09:07:47 14 For members of the media, we'd also 09:07:49 15 like those public comment periods to be before 09:07:49 16 the public. We've set aside a half hour at the 09:07:50 17 end of the day today at 5:00 for the media where 09:07:52 18 the chair, Norm Augustine, will be made 09:07:56 19 available to answer all of those questions. 09:08:00 20 With that, I'd like to turn it over to 09:08:02 21 our chair, Norm Augustine. 09:08:05 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Thank you, 09:08:08 9 1 Phil. 09:08:08 2 Good morning, everyone. Your presence 09:08:09 3 today and the interest we've found in our 09:08:12 4 assignment, I think, speaks to the care and the 09:08:12 5 importance that is assigned to the topic. 09:08:15 6 I would encourage you, as Phil did, to 09:08:21 7 use our website. It's set up to handle a very 09:08:24 8 large capacity. We've already received a lot of 09:08:28 9 comments, and we look forward to more. 09:08:31 10 I'm not going to take time to 09:08:34 11 introduce all of my colleagues. Their names are 09:08:37 12 in front of them, and you probably know many of 09:08:39 13 them. Their biographies are on the website. 09:08:40 14 Three of our members had commitments 09:08:42 15 prior to their knowing they were going to be 09:08:46 16 doing this this summer. So we are depending a 09:08:48 17 lot on wiring people in by videoconference and 09:08:51 18 telephone conference, and that seems to work 09:08:54 19 very well. 09:08:57 20 We've been able to take some 09:08:58 21 preparatory steps for this meeting. There are 09:09:00 22 some administrative things we've set up. Let me 09:09:02 10 1 quickly cover them so you'll kind of know where 09:09:06 2 we are. 09:09:09 3 In terms of administrative actions, 09:09:10 4 we've set up four task groups or subgroups that 09:09:14 5 will be working on specific aspects of the 09:09:17 6 overall charter that we've been given. 09:09:21 7 We have taken steps to have the 09:09:23 8 Aerospace Corporation assist our panel directly. 09:09:26 9 They will be responding to tasks that we may 09:09:30 10 assign them, where we'd like to get more detail 09:09:33 11 and more background than we may have ourselves 09:09:37 12 as the members. 09:09:42 13 Today we're just going to be able to 09:09:42 14 do a snapshot overview. We'll be going into 09:09:45 15 much greater depth as time goes on and through 09:09:49 16 our subgroups. 09:09:52 17 And as Phil said, I've asked him to 09:09:53 18 kind of keep us on time as the day goes on. 09:09:55 19 And so with that, the first thing I'd 09:09:58 20 like to do, it's my privilege to introduce 09:10:00 21 Dr. John Holdren, whom you know is the science 09:10:05 22 advisor to the President and also the head of 09:10:08 11 1 the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and 09:10:10 2 it was really, I think, in large part, his 09:10:15 3 efforts that brought about this review. 09:10:19 4 John, we'd surely welcome any comments 09:10:22 5 you'd like to share with us. 09:10:26 6 DR. HOLDREN: Well, thank you, Norm. 09:10:28 7 And I want to start by thanking you and the 09:10:30 8 panel for stepping up to the challenge of 09:10:33 9 conducting this assessment of the future of U.S. 09:10:36 10 participation in human space flight. 09:10:42 11 The President is grateful to you for 09:10:43 12 this service. I'm grateful. NASA Acting 09:10:47 13 Administrator Chris Scolese is grateful. And 09:10:51 14 I'm sure the nominee for director of NASA, 09:10:55 15 General Bolden, would be grateful too if he were 09:11:03 16 allowed to comment publicly on anything before 09:11:01 17 his confirmation. 09:11:02 18 I want to start by emphasizing, to put 09:11:06 19 this in context, the importance that 09:11:12 20 President Obama places on science and 09:11:14 21 technology, in general, as keys to the country's 09:11:18 22 ability to address the great challenges we face 09:11:20 12 1 across a very wide array of issues, as you know, 09:11:22 2 including the economy, health, energy, climate 09:11:23 3 change, other resource and environmental issues, 09:11:26 4 national and homeland security. We face a truly 09:11:30 5 haunting array of challenges across these 09:11:34 6 domains, and only with a major contribution from 09:11:38 7 innovation driven by science, engineering and, 09:11:41 8 indeed, the social sciences as well are we going 09:11:46 9 to be able to meet those challenges effectively. 09:11:50 10 Our capabilities in space are a very important 09:11:53 11 part of that. 09:11:57 12 I like to think of our capacity to 09:11:58 13 meet that whole array of challenges as defined 09:12:00 14 by a set of cross-cutting foundational 09:12:03 15 capabilities which include the health of our 09:12:07 16 great fundamental research institutions, our 09:12:10 17 research universities, national and private 09:12:12 18 laboratories; the capabilities of our 09:12:15 19 infrastructure, information technology, 09:12:16 20 transportation, communications, energy; the 09:12:19 21 capacity of our teaching institutions in 09:12:24 22 science, technology, engineering and math 09:12:28 13 1 education from preschool to grad school and 09:12:30 2 beyond. 09:12:33 3 And I think of space as one of those 09:12:35 4 foundational cross-cutting sets of capabilities 09:12:39 5 that are essential to our ability to meet the 09:12:41 6 full array of applied challenges that we face. 09:12:42 7 Space, of course, is also a marvelous 09:12:47 8 venue for expanding fundamental knowledge, for 09:12:50 9 improving our understanding of the universe and 09:12:56 10 our place in it. It's a wonderful vantage point 09:12:59 11 for looking down as well as looking up for 09:13:04 12 understanding what's happening on the surface of 09:13:07 13 the Earth, whether it be changes in land use, 09:13:11 14 emissions of various pollutants, activities that 09:13:12 15 we need to understand to monitor our arms 09:13:16 16 control agreements -- a huge array of important 09:13:16 17 functions of looking down. 09:13:20 18 Space is also historically and in the 09:13:20 19 present a way of inspiring the next generation 09:13:23 20 to take an interest in science, technology, 09:13:26 21 engineering and math. It fulfilled that 09:13:29 22 function admirably during the space race, when a 09:13:32 14 1 whole generation of scientists and engineers -- 09:13:36 2 including, I should say, myself -- were inspired 09:13:36 3 to go into science and technology, in part, 09:13:38 4 because of the attractions and allure of space. 09:13:41 5 It continues along with other challenges to be 09:13:45 6 able to play that role. 09:13:47 7 And, of course, human space flight is 09:13:47 8 a particularly important component of that. The 09:13:52 9 extraordinary capabilities, the extraordinary 09:13:57 10 achievements, one only had to look at the 09:14:00 11 shuttle mission to the Hubble most recently -- 09:14:05 12 five space walks, extraordinary accomplishments 09:14:09 13 in fixing things that were never designed to be 09:14:14 14 fixed in space by astronauts using their 09:14:19 15 ingenuity and responding on the spur of the 09:14:22 16 moment to the conditions they faced -- 09:14:24 17 underlined why it is, always has been and always 09:14:24 18 will be important to be able to put human beings 09:14:29 19 in space. 09:14:29 20 Robotic space exploration is important 09:14:31 21 too. The other missions of NASA are important 09:14:35 22 in fundamental science, in Earth observation, in 09:14:38 15 1 aeronautics, but we have to maintain the 09:14:42 2 viability of our Human Space Flight program. 09:14:45 3 The President is determined to do 09:14:48 4 that. He's committed to human space flight. 09:14:50 5 He's excited by human space flight. He has 09:14:54 6 spoken with the astronauts while they were in 09:14:57 7 orbit in each mission that has taken place since 09:15:00 8 he was inaugurated. He'll continue to do that. 09:15:01 9 He met with the Discovery astronauts 09:15:04 10 after they returned. I'm sure we'll met with 09:15:08 11 the Atlantis astronauts as well. 09:15:08 12 This is a president who gets it. He 09:15:12 13 understands the importance of space. He 09:15:14 14 understands the importance of human space 09:15:17 15 flight. He was clear in his campaign and since 09:15:19 16 about his commitment to continue U.S. leadership 09:15:22 17 in space, to go back to the Moon, other 09:15:26 18 destinations beyond low Earth orbit. 09:15:30 19 And so the work of this panel is truly 09:15:31 20 important to the President, important to me, 09:15:34 21 important to the leadership of NASA as a way of 09:15:37 22 making sure that we have assessed all of the 09:15:40 16 1 reasonable options for our Human Space Flight 09:15:45 2 program going forward, to make sure we have the 09:15:49 3 best answers possible to the question of how to 09:15:54 4 minimum the gap in our capacity to put U.S. 09:15:56 5 astronauts into space on U.S. launchers, the gap 09:16:00 6 that will ensue after the scheduled end of the 09:16:03 7 shuttle program at the end of 2010 and the 09:16:06 8 beginning of the capacities to put U.S. 09:16:08 9 astronauts in space in the Constellation 09:16:11 10 program. 09:16:14 11 The panel will be looking at the 09:16:14 12 challenges of how to utilize the International 09:16:16 13 Space Station after 2016. It will be looking at 09:16:21 14 the various kinds of balancing that have to be 09:16:25 15 done in NASA in an environment of constrained 09:16:29 16 budgets among the different missions and the 09:16:32 17 different components of NASA's activities. It 09:16:35 18 is a daunting challenge for the panel, but 09:16:37 19 one -- when I review the qualifications of this 09:16:43 20 extraordinary group, one which I really could 09:16:45 21 not imagine finding a more qualified set of 09:16:48 22 people to address this set of issues. 09:16:51 17 1 Of course, one possibility is that the 09:16:53 2 panel will conclude that the -- is that the 09:16:54 3 course we're already on is the best one 09:16:56 4 available, and we will stay on it. It may also 09:16:58 5 conclude that are there are variations that 09:17:02 6 should be pursued. And I know that this panel, 09:17:04 7 with its extraordinary set of abilities and the 09:17:07 8 independence and integrity of all of its 09:17:10 9 members, will tell us whatever it is they think 09:17:13 10 we need to hear about those options going 09:17:17 11 forward. 09:17:21 12 We are looking, as Norm and the panel 09:17:21 13 already know, to get the panel's findings by 09:17:26 14 sometime in August in order to be able to 09:17:30 15 influence a whole series of decisions that the 09:17:33 16 NASA leadership and the Administration will be 09:17:36 17 making going forward. That timing, too, is a 09:17:39 18 great challenge. 09:17:43 19 And, again, all I can do is express my 09:17:43 20 gratitude and the President's and that of Chris 09:17:46 21 Scolese, who for understandable reasons happens 09:17:50 22 to be in Florida at the moment, to the panel for 09:17:54 18 1 taking this on. I know that what you find will 09:17:57 2 be of immense use to us as we figure out how to 09:18:01 3 move forward in the most expeditious way with 09:18:06 4 this immensely important program. 09:18:10 5 So thank you again very much. 09:18:12 6 And thank you all in the audience for 09:18:13 7 coming to this first public meeting of the Human 09:18:15 8 Space Flight Review. 09:18:19 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: John, thank you very, 09:18:21 10 very much for being here and for the support you 09:18:23 11 and your office have given to us. 09:18:25 12 When I think about all of the 09:18:27 13 challenges our nation faces, space being just 09:18:29 14 one of them, so many of them are rich in 09:18:32 15 technology and science, and we couldn't have a 09:18:36 16 better person in the position of advising the 09:18:39 17 President on those issues than Dr. John Holdren. 09:18:41 18 So, again, John, thanks for being 09:18:45 19 here, and thanks for what you're doing. 09:18:46 20 We now would like to hear from 09:18:50 21 Mr. Chris Scolese, who is the acting 09:18:53 22 administrator of NASA, as you know, who has 09:18:57 19 1 filled that job for some months now. And we've 09:18:59 2 had the chance to visit with him briefly before, 09:19:02 3 and we'll be spending a good deal of time with 09:19:05 4 him. And we've also had a chance to just very 09:19:07 5 briefly have conversations with his successor, 09:19:11 6 who we'll be able to speak with more when he's 09:19:18 7 officially in position. 09:19:15 8 But Mr. Scolese has agreed to make a 09:19:19 9 few remarks this morning, and if everything 09:19:24 10 works the way we hope it will and it looks like 09:19:26 11 it is, Chris, welcome, and we'd love to hear not 09:19:28 12 only your comments on this panel but what's 09:19:32 13 happening where you are. 09:19:32 14 (Whereupon, Mr. Scolese presented his 09:19:32 15 comments via videoconference as follows: 09:19:34 16 MR. SCOLESE: Okay. Good morning. 09:19:34 17 Well, I guess I'll start with what's happening 09:19:38 18 down here. We, of course, had to scrub the 09:19:41 19 launch last night. 09:19:46 20 We have detected a leak in the GUP 09:19:47 21 with the area where we vent the liquid 09:19:52 22 hydrogen -- the gaseous hydrogen. The size of 09:19:56 20 1 the leak is about the size of a pinhole. So 09:20:03 2 it's a -- it's very small, but still it's 09:20:05 3 something that we need to be concerned about. 09:20:06 4 We don't yet have the cause for it. 09:20:08 5 This happened recently. The last -- 09:20:11 6 the mission before the Hubble servicing mission, 09:20:15 7 we were able to go in there and fill in the -- 09:20:18 8 do a replacement and a repair, and everything 09:20:22 9 went fine. We did the same thing this time, but 09:20:25 10 this time we didn't succeed. 09:20:29 11 So we're going to have to take a step 09:20:31 12 back, go off and look at what occurred, 09:20:33 13 understand the data and then go back, and we'll 09:20:35 14 have an attempt again no earlier than the 09:20:39 15 beginning of July when we'll try and fly this 09:20:43 16 mission then. But, of course, we're going to 09:20:47 17 fly safe, and we're going to understand what 09:20:49 18 occurred on this latest activity and then we'll 09:20:51 19 proceed. 09:20:55 20 But this morning I'd like to thank the 09:20:56 21 panel for agreeing to do this. We know how busy 09:20:59 22 you all are, and we really appreciate you taking 09:21:03 21 1 the time to go off and work on this very 09:21:07 2 important task. It's hard to add much more to 09:21:10 3 what John discussed earlier. 09:21:14 4 This is something that's critical for 09:21:17 5 the nation. It's critical for NASA. We 09:21:19 6 recognize clearly the importance of space and 09:21:23 7 aeronautics to the nation and to the world and 09:21:26 8 the human space flight, in particular, that 09:21:31 9 we're going to be reviewing here. 09:21:34 10 There's a number of challenges going 09:21:36 11 on in the budget environment that we live in. 09:21:37 12 There's a number of options that clearly can be 09:21:40 13 considered, and we hope to hear those from you 09:21:43 14 and work with you on that. 09:21:49 15 To that end, I want to assure you that 09:21:51 16 NASA is going to be very open and thorough in 09:21:54 17 our support of the team. To that end, we put 09:21:58 18 two of our best and brightest -- Phil McAlister, 09:22:02 19 who introduced the conference, and Mike Hawes -- 09:22:07 20 to support the team. 09:22:11 21 Mike is the head of our program 09:22:12 22 analysis and evaluation. He's uniquely suited 09:22:14 22 1 to be able to support the team because he looks 09:22:18 2 at the entire agency, he looks at all of the 09:22:19 3 things that we do. So human space flight is one 09:22:23 4 component of that. He has a long history in 09:22:26 5 that activity and understands it very well. I 09:22:28 6 assure you -- and I've told him -- that he has 09:22:32 7 access to everybody within the agency, and I'm 09:22:34 8 sure Charlie Bolden, when he's on board, will 09:22:37 9 make sure that that continues. 09:22:41 10 As we proceed, probably a couple of 09:22:43 11 items worth mentioning. I know the team is 09:22:46 12 going to work very hard -- the review committee 09:22:50 13 is going to work very hard looking at what we 09:22:53 14 do. And one of the things I -- or some of the 09:22:56 15 things that I think are important, as you look 09:22:58 16 at us, are to consider the mission that we have, 09:23:01 17 to get humans out of low Earth orbit now. 09:23:06 18 That's going to require us to do something we 09:23:09 19 haven't done in over 40 years. 09:23:13 20 The challenge is going to be greater 09:23:15 21 because this time we're not just going to go 09:23:18 22 back to the Moon for a few visits for a few days 09:23:21 23 1 but ultimately to travel beyond the Moon, 09:23:25 2 ultimately to Mars and other destinations that 09:23:29 3 will require long duration space flight. 09:23:31 4 Critical to that, of course, is our 09:23:31 5 understanding of long-duration space flight and 09:23:35 6 our International Space Station that is up there 09:23:36 7 today crewed by six people now and beginning to 09:23:40 8 conduct the research that we need to do to 09:23:43 9 understand long-duration space flight. So 09:23:46 10 there's some components that we need to consider 09:23:50 11 there. 09:23:53 12 I'd ask you to consider the comments 09:23:54 13 of the CAIB that looked at the aftermath of the 09:23:57 14 Columbia accident and made some recommendations 09:24:00 15 to NASA about separating crew and cargo, 09:24:04 16 providing crew escape and those types of 09:24:09 17 activities. 09:24:13 18 Also looking at our international 09:24:14 19 partnerships, both our commitments that we have 09:24:15 20 today but also what we need to do in the future. 09:24:18 21 Space is an international venture. Everything 09:24:21 22 that we have done almost since the beginning of 09:24:24 24 1 the Space Age has involved international 09:24:29 2 partnerships, whether they be in our robotic 09:24:30 3 missions or in our human space flight missions, 09:24:32 4 and we expect that will be something that will 09:24:37 5 be continued in the future. 09:24:37 6 And, of course, we have to look at our 09:24:38 7 program and understand it in terms of the budget 09:24:41 8 environment, the technological capabilities of 09:24:45 9 the nation, our industrial capabilities, how we 09:24:49 10 maintain those, our academic institutions and 09:24:53 11 how we preserve the pipeline of scientists and 09:24:57 12 engineers and technicians that we'll need to 09:24:58 13 operate not only these systems but other systems 09:25:01 14 and how we motivate them. 09:25:04 15 So that's really about all that I can 09:25:06 16 add to it. Again, I'd like to thank you for 09:25:08 17 agreeing to serve on this commission. I want to 09:25:11 18 let you know that we'll listen carefully, we'll 09:25:13 19 work with you closely and we'll work with the 09:25:16 20 Administration as we develop responses and 09:25:19 21 respond to the options that are presented. 09:25:22 22 So thank you again. 09:25:25 25 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris, thank you very 09:25:27 2 much and particularly under the circumstances 09:25:29 3 where you're very busy there for taking the time 09:25:32 4 to talk to us. 09:25:35 5 The support we've received from Mike 09:25:37 6 and Phil has been fantastic as we've tried to 09:25:39 7 organize and get ourselves prepared to move 09:25:42 8 ahead. 09:25:45 9 So thank you. We look forward to 09:25:46 10 working with you as well. 09:25:48 11 (Whereupon, the videoconference 09:25:48 12 portion of the meeting was concluded.) 09:25:48 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think that brings us 09:25:49 14 to our first briefing, which, appropriately 09:25:50 15 enough, is to take a look at past studies that 09:25:53 16 have been conducted. We're not the first to 09:25:55 17 look at the Human Space Flight program by a long 09:25:57 18 shot, and one of the things we'd like to do is 09:26:00 19 to learn from those who have gone before us. 09:26:04 20 Mike Hawes, who you heard Chris 09:26:08 21 describe his position at NASA, has been assigned 09:26:13 22 to give us technical support, and as I said, 09:26:13 26 1 he's done a terrific job of it. 09:26:17 2 And, Mike, if you would care to give 09:26:18 3 us a little bit of a summary of past studies 09:26:22 4 that relate to our charter. 09:26:25 5 MR. HAWES: Thank you, Norm. That's 09:26:27 6 exactly what I'd like to do, and I only have 09:26:29 7 one -- well, it's actually a double-sided chart, 09:26:31 8 and exactly as you captured, this exploration 09:26:35 9 mission question has been studied a number of 09:26:38 10 times by NASA and externals. 09:26:41 11 Some of the studies we have provided 09:26:46 12 you in your homework packages that, you know, we 09:26:48 13 have been sending you weekly since you got 09:26:52 14 named. Some of them we'll be able to hear and 09:26:53 15 discuss in our preparatory sessions, and some of 09:26:56 16 them you'll actually hear beginning today in 09:26:59 17 this public session. So that's really what I 09:27:01 18 wanted to just set that kind of context. 09:27:05 19 We kind of reached back and went 09:27:08 20 back -- we didn't go all of the way back to 09:27:10 21 Wernher von Braun, but we went back into the 09:27:14 22 late '80s anyway and have pulled out -- and I 09:27:17 27 1 would say that the words here are mine. If 09:27:19 2 anybody disagrees with the characterization of 09:27:22 3 perhaps what the themes were in here, you can 09:27:24 4 feel free to snarl at me, you know, outside 09:27:28 5 during lunch or something. 09:27:30 6 So we start with the exploration 09:27:30 7 office case studies back in the late '80s, the 09:27:32 8 90-day study, which was Dr. Cohen. 09:27:36 9 The synthesis report, we heard a 09:27:40 10 little bit from General Thom about the synthesis 09:27:42 11 report. We have provided that for you with 09:27:45 12 copies so you have multiple versions about that. 09:27:49 13 Followed on with the Office of 09:27:53 14 Exploration, a lunar outpost study in '93. 09:27:57 15 And then continuing in the theme, Dan 09:27:59 16 Goldin, as administrator, initiated a number of 09:28:04 17 activities that were all exploration focused. 09:28:07 18 One was focusing on the Human Lunar Return issue 09:28:08 19 and then an update of a Mars Design Reference 09:28:12 20 Mission -- is what we mean by DRMS. We have 09:28:20 21 actually also completed some more recent work on 09:28:21 22 updating that Mars Design Reference Mission, 09:28:22 28 1 given the change in our technologies and 09:28:26 2 environment. 09:28:28 3 The Decadal Planning Team was another 09:28:31 4 activity that was NASA lead that was in the 09:28:36 5 early 2000s as we have gone through. We have 09:28:38 6 the output of those materials that we can 09:28:43 7 certainly make available. 09:28:44 8 Chris mentioned the CAIB Report. And 09:28:46 9 in addition to the things that Chris highlighted 09:28:49 10 in terms of separating crew and cargo and the 09:28:52 11 crew safety aspects, the CAIB also took time to 09:28:55 12 make comment on the value proposition of human 09:28:59 13 space flight, and that value proposition being 09:29:03 14 driven by moving beyond the low Earth orbit that 09:29:06 15 we have been in for the last few decades. So 09:29:10 16 just in that aspect, I cite the CAIB for you. 09:29:13 17 Just after the vision was released, we 09:29:19 18 went through a variety of what we call Concept 09:29:23 19 Exploration and Requirement studies. We've 09:29:28 20 actually provided you, I believe, most of those 09:29:28 21 studies in terms of the study packages already. 09:29:32 22 And those studies were across a very broad set 09:29:35 29 1 of topics and several teams and companies 09:29:40 2 involved in those. So there's actually a wealth 09:29:44 3 of interesting stuff here. 09:29:48 4 When Mike Griffin came in as 09:29:50 5 administrator, he kicked off what has become 09:29:53 6 known as ESAS, the Exploration Systems 09:29:56 7 Architecture Study, and ESAS has set the 09:30:00 8 foundation of where we are today. And so much 09:30:03 9 of what you'll hear from the baseline program 09:30:07 10 has its roots in ESAS, but it has been grown and 09:30:11 11 modified in ways as we have gotten really into 09:30:14 12 the detailed design given the maturity of the 09:30:16 13 program today. 09:30:20 14 There are a few alternative options 09:30:21 15 that are out there. The Direct option is one 09:30:23 16 that's well known and well publicized external 09:30:27 17 to the agency. We'll actually hear from the 09:30:30 18 Direct team this afternoon. So you'll have an 09:30:32 19 opportunity to actually hear that. 09:30:35 20 We did a study within the agency that 09:30:38 21 we called Exploration Acceleration. This was 09:30:40 22 done by Ralph Roe. As you know, Ralph is on my 09:30:43 30 1 team. It was done with the full cooperation of 09:30:47 2 Doug and Jeff and the whole Constellation 09:30:51 3 program team and looked at potential ways to 09:30:55 4 increase our cost confidence for the program, 09:30:58 5 and I think many of the steps that Jeff and Doug 09:31:00 6 are taking now are well tied to that study 09:31:04 7 activity. 09:31:06 8 And then we heard a little bit as 09:31:06 9 well -- and it has been in your homework -- a 09:31:08 10 recent Congressional Budget Office report that 09:31:10 11 kind of lays out some of the constraints of 09:31:13 12 various scenarios of exploration given NASA's 09:31:16 13 budget profile. 09:31:20 14 So that's the context I wanted to set. 09:31:22 15 There are probably many more. You will hear 09:31:24 16 some other variations of activities today. That 09:31:27 17 was the goal for today -- was to get all of this 09:31:29 18 kind of laid out on the table for the panel and 09:31:32 19 then have you work with the NASA team to 09:31:35 20 determine what are the actions that we need to 09:31:40 21 take and go study in more depth. 09:31:44 22 Any of these that you're interested in 09:31:47 31 1 that we haven't provided, certainly let us know, 09:31:50 2 and we'll find a way. Some of these predate 09:31:53 3 our -- easily -- Electronic Age. So we'll find 09:31:56 4 a way to turn them into electrons so as to kill 09:31:59 5 less trees, but we can certainly make all of 09:32:05 6 these available for you. 09:32:07 7 And that's really all that I wanted to 09:32:07 8 try to accomplish this morning. 09:32:09 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Mike, thank you very 09:32:10 10 much. 09:32:12 11 We have been frankly inundated with 09:32:12 12 the documentation, and we'll be putting a bunch 09:32:14 13 of that on the website. That which is not 09:32:16 14 propriety or have other sensitive aspects, we 09:32:19 15 will try to share with you as much as we've had 09:32:24 16 available to us. 09:32:27 17 The next topic on the agenda is, 09:32:27 18 logically enough, I think, to talk about the 09:32:33 19 existing program that's being pursued, the 09:32:34 20 Constellation program. Doug Cooke with NASA is 09:32:38 21 going to give us a very quick snapshot of that 09:32:38 22 to sort of fill out the reading material that's 09:32:38 32 1 been available. 09:32:56 2 MR. COOKE: Thank you very much, 09:32:56 3 Chairman Augustine. I appreciate the 09:32:58 4 opportunity to talk with you and your panel. 09:33:00 5 I represent the Exploration Systems 09:33:02 6 Mission Directorate, and our primary program -- 09:33:05 7 most visible is the Constellation program. We 09:33:08 8 also have a human research program, a technology 09:33:08 9 program, robotic program, and we also have the 09:33:13 10 COTS and FERTS within our program. These are 09:33:18 11 all important to us and most of which feeds 09:33:21 12 directly into the Constellation program and 09:33:26 13 helps support it. 09:33:29 14 Our focus at the moment is a program 09:33:30 15 driving toward initial operating capability in 09:33:35 16 March of 2015 with a mission to the Space 09:33:42 17 Station with Ares I and Orion. We do have a 09:33:43 18 focus also long term on moving beyond the low 09:33:49 19 Earth orbit with exploration, and that's very 09:33:53 20 important to us. And we have quite a bit of our 09:33:56 21 effort in understanding the end-to-end 09:33:58 22 architecture that we work toward. 09:34:00 33 1 We have a number of milestones coming 09:34:04 2 up very shortly. Actually in the next three 09:34:06 3 days we hope to launch the Lunar Reconnaissance 09:34:10 4 Orbiter and the Lunar Crater Observation and 09:34:11 5 Sensing Satellite, which is -- both of which are 09:34:14 6 going to the Moon on robotic spacecraft and will 09:34:17 7 be getting us rich data that will feed into our 09:34:22 8 understanding of the Moon. So we're really 09:34:24 9 looking forward to that, and they're ready to 09:34:26 10 go. 09:34:30 11 We also have this summer the first 09:34:30 12 test of a five-segment solid rocket booster, 09:34:32 13 which is the first stage of Ares I. That will 09:34:37 14 be in August. We have a preliminary design 09:34:39 15 review on Orion in August as well. We have the 09:34:40 16 Ares I-X first test flight in -- no earlier than 09:34:46 17 the end -- end of August but within that general 09:34:48 18 time frame and a Pad Abort 1 test this fall. 09:34:51 19 And so we have a lot going on and are 09:34:57 20 making a lot of progress. We hope to show that 09:35:00 21 to you in this presentation. Next chart. 09:35:02 22 There's a lot of discussion on vehicle 09:35:06 34 1 concepts, but to us we need to -- we consider 09:35:09 2 the entire mission, what is it we hope to 09:35:12 3 accomplish. And we have gone through an 09:35:16 4 international set of activities and with 09:35:19 5 13 other space agencies in developing objectives 09:35:21 6 and themes for what we want to accomplish as we 09:35:24 7 move forward on the Moon, in particular. 09:35:27 8 As we have developed concepts, we look 09:35:30 9 to this for the lunar operations, which we've 09:35:33 10 studied a lot. Actually we've have had teams 09:35:38 11 going on that since 2006, to define what 09:35:41 12 exploration means on the Moon, what is it you 09:35:44 13 actually do and achieve. So that has informed 09:35:45 14 the overall transportation architecture which is 09:35:48 15 shown here. 09:35:51 16 And so as you develop those lunar 09:35:52 17 scenarios, we came up with the idea of an 09:35:55 18 outpost at a polar location. That tends to 09:35:59 19 drive your lander, which then backs up 09:36:01 20 into end-to-end importance understanding on your 09:36:03 21 entire end-to-end transportation architecture 09:36:07 22 with the appropriate allocation of mass and 09:36:09 35 1 performance margins to all of the vehicles so 09:36:13 2 that end to end it all closes and it works. 09:36:16 3 So this is an integrated architecture 09:36:19 4 that we've been working on, and it has informed 09:36:24 5 our current vehicles. The performance obviously 09:36:26 6 affects the designs and performance of Ares I 09:36:28 7 and actually the Orion. 09:36:32 8 Things like translunar injection 09:36:36 9 loads -- when we fire up the Earth departure 09:36:40 10 stage to send Orion and the lander to the Moon, 09:36:44 11 you have loads, and those loads have been 09:36:49 12 studied and has affected the structural design 09:36:49 13 of Orion, for instance. 09:36:51 14 So all of this is being worked in an 09:36:53 15 integrated fashion as we develop and mature the 09:36:55 16 design for Orion and Ares I. We can go to the 09:37:00 17 next chart. 09:37:03 18 We also have a number of top level 09:37:04 19 objectives. We have a cascading set of 09:37:07 20 requirements that derive from this. And they 09:37:12 21 derive originally from policy that is national 09:37:14 22 policy, including authorization acts of 2005 and 09:37:16 36 1 2008, that have focused our attention and 09:37:21 2 designs to meet this. 09:37:26 3 That includes a retirement of the 09:37:28 4 Shuttle in 2010, reducing operations costs in 09:37:33 5 order to be able to operate effectively and have 09:37:36 6 a sustained program in the future, to develop 09:37:39 7 the systems that we have in terms of building 09:37:42 8 blocks for future exploration to Mars and 09:37:46 9 beyond. 09:37:50 10 We have as a primary focus as a design 09:37:50 11 factor safety. This program was born out of the 09:37:55 12 Columbia accident, and we have had a focus on 09:37:59 13 loss of crew probabilities as we develop our 09:38:04 14 systems. And they have driven actually many of 09:38:08 15 our component designs. 09:38:10 16 We are to -- in our planning are to 09:38:12 17 support the Space Station by 2015 and get to the 09:38:16 18 Moon by 2020 with lunar missions. 09:38:22 19 A driving factor, Chris mentioned it 09:38:27 20 earlier, separate crew from cargo. 09:38:31 21 And we also have to pay attention to 09:38:33 22 our existing infrastructure and assets, 09:38:35 37 1 people/workforce, in terms of both NASA and the 09:38:38 2 supplier base. It's an important factor in all 09:38:43 3 of this. 09:38:46 4 Other factors that we have driven into 09:38:46 5 the design are global lunar access, anytime 09:38:49 6 return with the vehicles, use of the Space 09:38:56 7 Station for exploration goals, which we do 09:39:00 8 through our human research and technology 09:39:04 9 programs as well as we will with the Orion, and 09:39:06 10 to promote international and commercial 09:39:11 11 participation. 09:39:12 12 We think all of this has to be looked 09:39:13 13 at in terms of an integrated architecture. If 09:39:15 14 we can go to the next chart. 09:39:15 15 We've gone through a decision process 09:39:20 16 to get to the vehicles that we have that are 09:39:24 17 driven by this guidance, and I won't go through 09:39:24 18 them step by step because I want to get to some 09:39:28 19 of the other aspects of the program. 09:39:31 20 But basically we've gone through 09:39:33 21 decision steps that have lead us to where we 09:39:33 22 are. The fact that we go beyond low Earth orbit 09:39:34 38 1 has driven us to heavy lift to a -- to the 09:39:37 2 physics drive you to a capsule-type design 09:39:39 3 versus wings in terms of entry speeds and that 09:39:44 4 sort of thing. And also in terms of 09:39:47 5 understanding the transition of workforce and 09:39:49 6 infrastructure facilities that were developed 09:39:52 7 for Apollo and the space shuttle, it has 09:39:55 8 affected the approach that we've taken, which is 09:40:01 9 a shuttle drive design, the Ares I and Orion and 09:40:03 10 Ares V. 09:40:11 11 And through that decision process we 09:40:11 12 have looked for the opportunity to have synergy 09:40:14 13 between these vehicles. We do between solid 09:40:17 14 rocket boosters, the J-2X upper stage engine, 09:40:20 15 which is important to both, and other systems. 09:40:24 16 We can go to the next chart. 09:40:28 17 And so as we assess this capability in 09:40:29 18 our initial approaches to supporting the Space 09:40:31 19 Station and the Moon, we also have assessed it 09:40:36 20 with respect to Mars missions in terms of lift 09:40:39 21 capability with a heavy lift and crew size with 09:40:43 22 Orion, and it is capable as the basic 09:40:47 39 1 transportation infrastructure to support various 09:40:50 2 destinations. Next chart. 09:40:51 3 So an important factor -- I'll mention 09:40:56 4 briefly -- is the transition of shuttle 09:41:01 5 capabilities. We are making use of a 09:41:03 6 significant set of capabilities -- both 09:41:06 7 facilities, people and hardware -- at a number 09:41:07 8 of locations. 09:41:10 9 We have manufacturing capability that 09:41:14 10 was developed for Apollo and is used by the 09:41:16 11 external tank of the shuttle at Michoud. That 09:41:19 12 is one that we're going to use as we develop the 09:41:21 13 upper stage and build structure for Orion. 09:41:25 14 We have other capabilities -- we have 09:41:28 15 the big capabilities you see at KSC with the VAB 09:41:31 16 and the launch pads. 09:41:39 17 And we have a significant supplier 09:41:39 18 capability in the ATK with building solid 09:41:43 19 rockets. 09:41:44 20 We have Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne 09:41:44 21 building liquid rockets for our human space 09:41:48 22 flight vehicles. 09:41:51 40 1 So there is a significant synergy, and 09:41:53 2 actually it has been very important in trying to 09:41:56 3 efficiently and effectively move from shuttle to 09:41:59 4 station in terms of figuring out how to 09:42:03 5 transition all of this infrastructure. 09:42:06 6 And so it's important as we move 09:42:09 7 across these boundaries in the retirement of the 09:42:11 8 shuttle and in the flight of Ares I and Orion 09:42:16 9 that we understand how we work through all of 09:42:20 10 these capabilities that we have in the agency. 09:42:22 11 So that is a part of our decision process and 09:42:26 12 why we're on the path we're on. 09:42:30 13 And I would like to, now, turn it over 09:42:33 14 to minutes, so Jeff will be getting ready. We 09:42:36 15 can go to next chart. 09:42:39 16 I have two charts that show where the 09:42:40 17 work is being done. Currently we do have all of 09:42:43 18 Ares I and Orion under contract. We have civil 09:42:47 19 servants with various responsibilities all over 09:42:49 20 the agency. We've spread out a number of the 09:42:53 21 primary responsibilities. All of the NASA 09:42:56 22 centers are involved in this work. Next chart. 09:42:59 41 1 We also have, as I said, contractors 09:43:02 2 in place that are working on all aspects of 09:43:04 3 this, including now EVA -- the EVA suits, but 09:43:09 4 located in places across the country supporting 09:43:14 5 this program. 09:43:17 6 And if Jeff would come up, I would 09:43:18 7 like to hand it over to him to go through some 09:43:22 8 of where we are in status and in our approach to 09:43:24 9 this as well as address some of the issues and 09:43:28 10 progress that we're making. 09:43:30 11 MR. HANLEY: Thank you, Doug. 09:43:36 12 Good morning. So I have a short movie 09:43:40 13 to show you in just a minute to kind of really 09:43:43 14 most efficiently express to you the progress 09:43:45 15 over the last three years and where we're at. 09:43:48 16 Before I get to that, though, I do 09:43:51 17 want to touch on a couple of the issues that I 09:43:53 18 know get discussed now and then in the 09:43:58 19 community, and I thought I'd update you on our 09:44:00 20 progress on those. So Next chart. 09:44:03 21 First, this is the key driving aspects 09:44:04 22 of our lunar mission that we're designing to, 09:44:06 42 1 and while many of these -- or all of these 09:44:10 2 affect the solution for going to the Moon, a 09:44:13 3 couple of them are most significant. Global 09:44:16 4 lunar access -- global surface access is really 09:44:20 5 probably the main driver in what size is this 09:44:23 6 architecture. 09:44:26 7 But all of those parameters have been 09:44:28 8 studied. They've been parameterized. We've 09:44:29 9 done a significant amount of work to understand 09:44:33 10 what this integrated architecture must do, as 09:44:36 11 Doug was pointing out in his remark. Next 09:44:39 12 chart. 09:44:39 13 And we've looked beyond the Moon. 09:44:42 14 We've gone and refreshed the Mars studies of the 09:44:44 15 '90s for human missions to Mars and to refresh 09:44:47 16 that looking at it from the standpoint of 09:44:50 17 applying Constellation elements and making sure 09:44:52 18 that the decisions that we're making today have 09:44:55 19 a feed forward not just to the Moon but actually 09:44:58 20 are building a capability that will eventually 09:45:02 21 result in an ability to realize a human Mars 09:45:05 22 mission. Next chart. 09:45:08 43 1 And we've looked at other applications 09:45:09 2 of this hardware. There's many possible things 09:45:12 3 that one can do with this robust, heavy lift 09:45:15 4 architecture that we're trying to foster with 09:45:19 5 Constellation. 09:45:24 6 We've got a capability to put cargo on 09:45:24 7 board the Orion to be able to do missions other 09:45:28 8 than just the crew support mission to the Space 09:45:29 9 Station or to meet up with a lunar lander in low 09:45:33 10 Earth orbit. 09:45:37 11 We've looked at other applications of 09:45:37 12 the -- us and others have looked at other 09:45:39 13 applications of the Ares V lift capability. Not 09:45:42 14 only is it unprecedented in terms of the amount 09:45:44 15 of mass it can lift to low Earth orbit but also 09:45:46 16 the volume. We've sized it so that 09:45:50 17 volumetrically it will be unprecedented. 09:45:52 18 In this cartoon here in the lower 09:45:52 19 right here, that's not a sophisticated 09:45:57 20 satellite. That's several school buses that are 09:46:00 21 stacked inside the Ares V shroud -- very 09:46:04 22 significant capability. Next chart. 09:46:07 44 1 And so here's a couple of the main 09:46:08 2 issues that folks bring up every now and then or 09:46:10 3 they hear about that I thought I'd give you the 09:46:15 4 latest information on. 09:46:18 5 First of all, as we've just pointed 09:46:20 6 out, it's integrated architecture. And so mass 09:46:21 7 is one of the driving parameters, both the lift 09:46:25 8 capability of the rockets and how much the 09:46:28 9 elements that the rockets carry weigh, as you go 09:46:29 10 through the entire life cycle of a mission from 09:46:33 11 liftoff on the launch pad until the crew is 09:46:38 12 recovered after landing. 09:46:42 13 And so here's where we're at today for 09:46:43 14 the ISS mission for the amount of margin that 09:46:48 15 we're currently carrying. 09:46:50 16 For Ares I, it has 22 percent lift 09:46:51 17 capability margin, which is very good for where 09:46:55 18 we're at today, which is just after PDR for the 09:46:59 19 rocket. 09:47:02 20 The spacecraft is sitting at 09:47:03 21 23 percent mass margin for the ISS mission, and 09:47:06 22 I am holding at my program level an additional 09:47:11 45 1 5 percent margin on top of that. We're doing 09:47:13 2 very well for Block 1 of Orion and for Ares I. 09:47:16 3 The lunar mission, still healthy 09:47:21 4 margins, but probably the most driving one that 09:47:24 5 you see there on the chart is the 10 percent for 09:47:26 6 Orion. We'll watch that very closely. I've got 09:47:30 7 that additional 4 percent in my pocket in the 09:47:34 8 event that we need that. But the rocket, again, 09:47:37 9 Ares I, is doing very well to be able to lift 09:47:40 10 the Orion to do both the lunar mission and the 09:47:44 11 ISS mission. 09:47:47 12 The limiting factor in this 09:47:47 13 architecture today in terms of the Orion's mass 09:47:48 14 is its ability to land under the parachutes. 09:47:50 15 The mass limit for the three big main parachutes 09:47:54 16 is really the driving -- the parameter that 09:47:59 17 sizes how heavy the Orion can be. It is not the 09:48:02 18 lift capacity of the rocket. 09:48:08 19 Another issue that gets talked about 09:48:09 20 is what we call tower clearance or launch drift, 09:48:12 21 and this received some notable mention a few 09:48:15 22 months back. 09:48:20 46 1 If one goes and looks at a video of 09:48:20 2 the Saturn V lifting off launch pad during 09:48:25 3 Apollo, watch it closely from the right vantage 09:48:28 4 point and you'll watch that launch vehicle walk 09:48:31 5 off of the pad away from the launch -- actually 09:48:32 6 steer away from the launch tower. And the 09:48:34 7 Apollo crew members speak quite eloquently about 09:48:37 8 what that sensation was like. 09:48:41 9 Well, this is no different in this 09:48:44 10 case. Every launch vehicle needs to assure its 09:48:46 11 way as it takes off the launch pad. 09:48:50 12 We have one specific wind direction 09:48:50 13 with a very stiff wind, near hurricane-force 09:48:51 14 winds, where we would need to steer away -- 09:48:55 15 actually steer away from the launch tower, which 09:48:57 16 we can easily do. We have a design in place 09:49:00 17 that could realize that. 09:49:08 18 We can also look at the -- at limiting 09:49:08 19 the wind conditions for that one case, which 09:49:12 20 would not be a significant impact at all to 09:49:15 21 our -- what we call our launch availability, our 09:49:19 22 probability of launching on any given day of the 09:49:23 47 1 year at the Kennedy Space Center. 09:49:26 2 So that issue is, for all intents and 09:49:30 3 purposes, really now just focused on how do we 09:49:32 4 minimum plume damage to the launch tower as the 09:49:34 5 vehicle flies away. 09:49:38 6 For any rocket and spacecraft system 09:49:39 7 one of the driving issues that designers deal 09:49:42 8 with is induced environments. That's the loads 09:49:46 9 and the weather that you've got to fly through 09:49:50 10 and the speeds at which the rocket is traveling 09:49:53 11 and what that induces on both the rocket and its 09:49:57 12 payload. 09:50:00 13 And one of the conditions that gets 09:50:01 14 talked about quite a bit is the phenomenon of 09:50:03 15 thrust oscillation, and this is the phenomenon 09:50:08 16 where for about a ten-second period in the 09:50:10 17 130-second burn of the first stage -- for about 09:50:10 18 a ten-second period the solid, which is really 09:50:12 19 just a big tube, has a resonant frequency. It's 09:50:15 20 like an organ pipe. 09:50:20 21 And so there can be conditions where 09:50:21 22 for that five- to ten-second period it can 09:50:24 48 1 resonate in a way that will vibrate not just 09:50:27 2 solid motor but the entire vehicle if the 09:50:31 3 vehicle is tuned up to it. 09:50:34 4 So we have taken active steps to 09:50:36 5 mitigate that through putting in isolation 09:50:36 6 planes between the solid and the second stage 09:50:39 7 and between the second stage and the spacecraft 09:50:41 8 in order to mitigate that, and we're moving 09:50:45 9 forward with those designs. 09:50:48 10 And that design will give us not just 09:50:50 11 a -- not just a -- for a single set of 09:50:52 12 conditions but for a range of conditions that 09:50:54 13 could -- worse case conditions that could occur 09:50:57 14 with that phenomenon. 09:50:59 15 In addition to that, we are working -- 09:51:01 16 continue to work -- as every team of rocket 09:51:04 17 designers does, we work on vibroacoustic loads, 09:51:07 18 in other words, the sound levels both at liftoff 09:51:13 19 and during flight. The sound levels have been 09:51:16 20 to accounted for in the design of the spacecraft 09:51:18 21 and of the rocket and selection of the 09:51:21 22 components. And that's all normal work for us. 09:51:23 49 1 Next chart. 09:51:23 2 Loss of Mission/Loss of Crew. This is 09:51:26 3 where we want to make a historical jump in the 09:51:30 4 safety of the systems both for launch and in 09:51:34 5 flight, an order of magnitude improvement over 09:51:41 6 what we enjoy with the space shuttle today. We 09:51:44 7 believe that we are on a path to achieve that. 09:51:50 8 The rocket and the spacecraft, from an 09:51:51 9 abort capability perspective today, we're doing 09:51:54 10 much better -- better than ten times what the 09:51:58 11 statistical analyses of the shuttle suggests 09:52:00 12 with respect to the ascent risk. 09:52:05 13 And over 60 vehicle design changes 09:52:08 14 have been made. And we've driven into 09:52:10 15 Constellation a risk-based design culture that 09:52:11 16 looks at the probabilities of particular 09:52:13 17 components failing, what their implications are 09:52:16 18 to the mission and to the crew's safety, and we 09:52:19 19 have made our selections in terms of 09:52:22 20 architectures in spacecraft systems and 09:52:25 21 selection of components in order to make the 09:52:29 22 most -- the safest and most reliable spacecraft 09:52:31 50 1 and rocket system that we can. 09:52:36 2 Post Landing Crew Survival. We've got 09:52:38 3 a system that can survive for 24 hours landing 09:52:40 4 anywhere in the water in the world, and we've 09:52:44 5 also made sure that under the contingency 09:52:48 6 condition that the spacecraft should land on 09:52:52 7 land that that is, in fact, a survivable event 09:52:54 8 for the flight crew. 09:52:58 9 Budgets continue to be a challenge. 09:53:01 10 There have been many numbers floated out there 09:53:04 11 as to what the total cost to initial operating 09:53:07 12 capability is today. We stand at $35 billion -- 09:53:10 13 that's with reserves -- to achieve the March of 09:53:11 14 2015 goal, and that's with a confidence level in 09:53:15 15 cost of 65 percent, in other words, two thirds 09:53:19 16 chance that it will not cost any more than 09:53:22 17 $35 billion. That's really what all of that 09:53:25 18 really means. 09:53:28 19 We did have an original plan to spend, 09:53:29 20 within the time frame of now through 2015, an 09:53:31 21 additional roughly $9 billion to get started on 09:53:35 22 Phase A of the lunar program. That's Ares V and 09:53:39 51 1 Altair. That whole activity, of course, is 09:53:43 2 under review by this panel. 09:53:45 3 And Schedule. Schedule for ISS 09:53:47 4 Initial Operating Capability. Our external 09:53:49 5 commitment of March of 2015 is stable today. We 09:53:52 6 have a plan to get to that date. 09:53:55 7 We are -- by the shape of our funding 09:53:57 8 profile, we are challenged to make sure that we 09:54:01 9 get the right components in the pipeline to get 09:54:04 10 the spacecraft built so we can get it qualified, 09:54:07 11 tested and verified to meet that March 2015 09:54:11 12 date. 09:54:15 13 So we are undergoing right now, as 09:54:15 14 Doug alluded to, a program-wide content review 09:54:18 15 looking at the entire breadth of content in the 09:54:22 16 Constellation program to see if there's any 09:54:25 17 economies that we can find, whether we can 09:54:26 18 eliminate certain configurations. 09:54:29 19 And one of those -- one of those 09:54:31 20 notable ones was the six versus four crew. We 09:54:32 21 eliminated that strictly to simplify the path to 09:54:36 22 get to initial operating capability of March 09:54:40 52 1 2015, and that was worked in very close 09:54:44 2 coordination with the Space Station program. 09:54:48 3 Next chart. 09:54:48 4 So here we'd like to show a little 09:54:51 5 video if we could. My hope is, of course, that 09:54:54 6 the technology cooperates with us here. 09:55:09 7 (Whereupon, an informational video was 09:55:09 8 presented as follows: 09:55:09 9 NARRATOR: It has been three short 09:55:37 10 years NASA began a journey to create the next 09:55:38 11 space program, one that would take us beyond 09:55:40 12 Earth orbit, returning us to the Moon and 09:55:43 13 extending our reach to Mars and beyond. 09:55:47 14 No longer just a program on paper, 09:55:47 15 Constellation has projects, hardware and 09:55:52 16 software in every stage of development. In just 09:55:54 17 three years, Constellation is ready for its 09:55:56 18 first test flights, launching a new era of human 09:56:00 19 space exploration. 09:56:05 20 Through the Constellation program, 09:56:18 21 NASA has taken a vision, the idea of exploring 09:56:21 22 beyond low Earth orbit, and strategically 09:56:23 53 1 created a detailed space architecture, a plan to 09:56:28 2 make the vision a reality. Constellation begins 09:56:31 3 by conducting missions to the International 09:56:31 4 Space Station, using the space laboratory as a 09:56:37 5 destination and proving ground for a new 09:56:39 6 generation of spacecraft. 09:56:42 7 Next Constellation sets its sights on 09:56:43 8 the Moon, exploring the lunar surface in ways 09:56:47 9 never before possible. 09:56:51 10 Unlike Apollo which was limited to the 09:56:52 11 exploration of the lunar equator, 09:56:56 12 Constellation's architecture will allow 09:56:56 13 astronauts to explore anywhere on the Moon, 09:56:58 14 staying twice as long as the Apollo missions 09:57:02 15 with twice as many crew members. This extended 09:57:06 16 exploration capability has been a driving force 09:57:09 17 for all of the Constellation spacecraft designs, 09:57:09 18 which will be able to lift more mass and travel 09:57:24 19 farther than any previous spacecraft. 09:57:24 20 The Orion spacecraft is the crew 09:57:24 21 exploration vehicle for Constellation. Orion 09:57:26 22 borrows its shape and aerodynamic performance 09:57:30 54 1 from Apollo, saving time and design work as well 09:57:34 2 as reducing risk. However, the spacecraft is 09:57:37 3 greater in size than Apollo, featuring updated 09:57:39 4 computers, life support, electronics, heat 09:57:42 5 protection and other systems. 09:57:45 6 The development of the Orion 09:57:47 7 spacecraft is well underway. Several test 09:57:51 8 articles have already been constructed and are 09:57:55 9 being evaluated at NASA centers and engineering 09:57:56 10 centers across the nation. 09:58:00 11 Parachute drops have been conducted to 09:58:02 12 test how Orion will return crews safely to 09:58:06 13 Earth. 09:58:11 14 The launch abort system, capable of 09:58:11 15 pulling the spacecraft and its crew to safety in 09:58:13 16 the event of an emergency, is set for a full-out 09:58:16 17 test in 2009, while the rocket motors used in 09:58:21 18 that system have already been evaluated in 09:58:24 19 preparation for that flight test. 09:58:24 20 The launch vehicle for Orion is called 09:58:37 21 Ares I. It features two key components 09:58:39 22 utilizing legacy hardware. A solid rocket 09:58:44 55 1 booster, similar to that used by the space 09:58:45 2 shuttle, comprises the lower stage of Ares I. 09:58:49 3 The upper stage features a J-2X liquid fuel 09:58:53 4 rocket engine derived from an Apollo-era rocket 09:58:53 5 engine. Using these proven systems, the Ares I 09:59:00 6 will get the crew into Earth orbit. 09:59:01 7 The Ares I project completed its 09:59:04 8 preliminary design review, the first such 09:59:08 9 milestone in more than 35 years for a U.S. 09:59:11 10 rocket. A test flight article of the Ares I 09:59:13 11 called the Ares I-X is slated for launch in 09:59:18 12 2009. The test flight will be a major turning 09:59:23 13 point in the program, providing essentially data 09:59:24 14 on avionics, thrust vector control and other 09:59:26 15 systems, validating computer models by actually 09:59:31 16 flying a full-scale vehicle. In preparation for 09:59:32 17 the test flight, segments of the Ares I-X have 09:59:35 18 already arrived at the Kennedy Space Center for 09:59:39 19 assembly and processing. 09:59:43 20 In addition, tests continue in all 09:59:45 21 facets of the Ares program, from computer 09:59:48 22 simulations to wind tunnel tests, to engine test 09:59:52 56 1 firings, providing engineers with the best 09:59:55 2 information possible on how the crew launch 09:59:59 3 vehicle will perform. 10:00:02 4 Ares V is the heavy lift cargo launch 10:00:04 5 vehicle. It will carry the lunar lander and 10:00:06 6 other large components into space. Again using 10:00:07 7 legacy hardware, the Ares V will utilize solid 10:00:11 8 rocket boosters during liftoff to help get the 10:00:15 9 vehicle into orbit. 10:00:17 10 The crew on board the Orion will 10:00:22 11 rendezvous with an Earth departure stage of 10:00:22 12 Ares V. The entire stack -- Orion, the lunar 10:00:29 13 lander and the Earth departure stage -- is then 10:00:34 14 sent toward the Moon, once again, using the J-2X 10:00:37 15 rocket motor. 10:00:42 16 Because several key components of 10:00:42 17 Ares V are the same as Ares I, much of the 10:00:44 18 engineering work being done applies to both 10:00:47 19 vehicles, from solid rocket booster tests to 10:00:49 20 firings of the J-2X rocket engine, which is the 10:00:53 21 first component to pass beyond the critical 10:00:57 22 design review phase. 10:01:00 57 1 In all, the Ares V will be able to 10:01:02 2 lift more mass than any previous spacecraft. 10:01:05 3 Studies have already been conducted to see how 10:01:09 4 this versatile craft could be used to launch 10:01:10 5 scientific payloads, satellites and even space 10:01:14 6 telescopes. 10:01:22 7 The Altair lunar lander will carry 10:01:23 8 four astronauts to the Moon. Larger and more 10:01:27 9 robust than its Apollo predecessor, Altair will 10:01:30 10 be able to land anywhere on the lunar surface, 10:01:35 11 even the lunar poles, previously an unreachable 10:01:35 12 target by manned spacecraft. 10:01:38 13 The Constellation program recently 10:01:41 14 competed a lunar capability content review, 10:01:47 15 demonstrating how the Altair lunar lander will 10:01:47 16 reach the Moon and later help build lunar 10:01:52 17 outposts. 10:01:55 18 Spatial studies by engineers have 10:01:56 19 helped determine the interior layout of the 10:01:57 20 lander, driving out better ergonomic designs for 10:01:59 21 the crews who must live on board for extended 10:02:05 22 stays on the Moon. 10:02:05 58 1 Additionally work has already started 10:02:06 2 on testing and improving all of the gear needed 10:02:07 3 for exploration in the Constellation era. From 10:02:11 4 lunar rover tests to planetary space suits, to 10:02:15 5 tools, NASA is taking hardware out of the 10:02:17 6 laboratory and into the field to achieve the 10:02:20 7 best possible designs. 10:02:23 8 In addition to the hardware 10:02:25 9 development, NASA facilities are updating their 10:02:27 10 capabilities for Constellation. New launch 10:02:30 11 pads, lightning safety systems, firing rooms, 10:02:35 12 factories and testing facilities are being 10:02:38 13 completed to accommodate the new wave of 10:02:41 14 exploration requirements. 10:02:43 15 Most importantly, the Constellation 10:02:45 16 program is about people. From around the 10:02:54 17 nation, all NASA centers are engaged in this new 10:02:56 18 exploration effort, problem solving, building, 10:03:00 19 testing and taking on the challenges of human 10:03:03 20 space exploration. It is an effort that brings 10:03:08 21 together generations, those who experienced the 10:03:11 22 Apollo Moon landings and those who came after. 10:03:14 59 1 Together they are working on a brighter future, 10:03:18 2 looking to return to the Moon and go beyond. 10:03:21 3 As the Constellation program leaps off 10:03:24 4 of the drawing table onto the launch pad, a new 10:03:26 5 chapter in exploration history is being written 10:03:30 6 one milestone at a time. 10:03:33 7 (Whereupon, the video presentation 10:03:33 8 concluded.) 09:32:56 9 MR. COOKE: Okay. If we could just 09:32:56 10 return to the charts briefly here -- 09:32:56 11 MR. McALISTER: Doug, we've got a hard 10:04:02 12 cutoff with the -- 10:04:05 13 MR. COOKE: Got you. 09:32:56 14 MR. McALISTER: -- videoconference 10:04:05 15 coming right up. 10:04:06 16 MR. COOKE: So with that, there's 09:32:56 17 photographs in the back of additional hardware. 10:04:08 18 And thank you for your time. 10:04:10 19 MR. McALISTER: Thank you. 10:04:02 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Doug, thank you very 10:04:11 21 much, and I think we've all got a lot of 10:04:13 22 questions. We won't have time to take them 10:04:16 60 1 right now, but we'll have plenty of chance to 10:04:18 2 work with you in the future. 10:04:20 3 What we want to do now is turn to 10:04:22 4 another important aspect of the space program 10:04:24 5 which concerns our efforts with our partner 10:04:27 6 nations, and we have the opportunity this 10:04:30 7 morning to visit with two of our partners, 10:04:33 8 Mr. Dordain from ESA and General Perminov from 10:04:40 9 RSA. I believe they're together actually, and 10:04:45 10 we will set up a link here so that we can visit 10:04:48 11 with them. 10:04:52 12 MR. McALISTER: All right. Well, 10:05:20 13 we've hit our first glitch of the day. 10:05:20 14 Apparently the videoconference link has had a 10:05:23 15 technical difficulty in Paris, which is where 10:05:26 16 our international partners were going to link up 10:05:26 17 with us, but we do think we could get it 10:05:29 18 addressed in about ten minutes. 10:05:29 19 So we're going to take a ten-minute 10:05:31 20 break and -- 10:05:35 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, wait a minute. 10:05:35 22 Why don't we -- instead of taking a break this 10:05:36 61 1 early, why don't we ask some questions -- 10:05:39 2 MR. McALISTER: Oh, that's a great 10:05:44 3 idea. 10:05:46 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- of Doug here -- 10:05:56 5 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. 10:05:56 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- if you don't 10:05:56 7 mind -- both of you. 10:05:56 8 I'll start out with one while my 10:05:56 9 colleagues are thinking, if that's all right. 10:05:59 10 I was struck on the LOC calculations 10:06:02 11 that on the shuttle that we know a lot about. 10:06:05 12 You show a range of uncertainty by the factor of 10:06:09 13 260 to 270, and yet for the Constellation it's 10:06:14 14 one thousand two hundred -- or 2,850. 10:06:20 15 And I'm not trying to nitpick, but 10:06:22 16 just the question is: If we're so uncertain 10:06:25 17 about today's system, how can we determine with 10:06:27 18 certainty or anything approaching certainty -- 10:06:31 19 MR. COOKE: Well, that's a great 10:06:35 20 question. And it's probably in the way that we 10:06:37 21 chose to express it in the charts. 10:06:40 22 The number that we cite for 10:06:42 62 1 Orion/Ares I is the mean, and there is a 10= :06:44 2 distribution around that that would have a low 10:06:47 3 and a high value. It could be as low as a 10:06:49 4 certain number and as high as a certain number. 10:06:53 5 I don't have those numbers with me today. 10:06:56 6 The way we use these numbers is really 10:06:58 7 in comparison with alternatives in the design 10:07:01 8 that we might choose for various systems. The 10:07:04 9 probability numbers are really informing the 10:07:07 10 design. And so as we do comparative analyses, 10:07:09 11 really the absolute number is less important 10:07:16 12 than -- as long as the analysis is done in 10:07:19 13 comparing the alternatives in an 10:07:22 14 apples-to-apples way, that's where we would get 10:07:23 15 the most value out of those numbers. 10:07:26 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. My 10:07:29 17 colleagues -- one has got a question here. 10:07:29 18 MR. COOKE: We'll provide backup for 10:07:29 19 that. 10:07:29 20 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. And, In 10:07:38 21 particular, it would be interesting to look at 10:07:39 22 what are usually called the P-5 and P-95, you 10:07:40 63 1 know, the statistically significant lower and 10:07:43 2 upper bounds of those numbers to get some 10:07:48 3 insight as well. 10:07:48 4 MR. COOKE: Sure. 10:07:50 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Wanda... 10:07:50 6 DR. AUSTIN: Yes. You indicated you 10:07:51 7 had a 65 percent confidence in the cost numbers. 10:07:53 8 What's your confidence in the schedule 10:07:56 9 of March 2015? 10:08:00 10 MR. COOKE: Right now the model that 10:08:01 11 we have the most history with is the cost. 10:08:02 12 We're actually developing a schedule model to 10:08:05 13 get that type of calculation, and we're working 10:08:09 14 through that with PA&E at headquarters to get to 10:08:11 15 a point where we have a good schedule 10:08:17 16 calculation in terms of probability. 10:08:20 17 Our schedule, we are -- actually at 10:08:22 18 this point we have moved from internal dates 10:08:27 19 that we were planning for to our commitment date 10:08:33 20 of March 2015. So we're realigning our internal 10:08:36 21 schedules right at this moment. We know we have 10:08:42 22 areas we need to work. And so it's a tight 10:08:45 64 1 schedule. That's certain. 10:08:48 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris... 10:08:52 3 MR. CHYBA: Thank you. 10:08:54 4 Your chart that you showed us on 10:08:54 5 Influence of Key Drivers on Architecture 10:08:57 6 Selection compared loss of crew probabilities 10:09:01 7 for EELVs to Ares I and argued that it was 10:09:02 8 really that distinction, if I understood the 10:09:08 9 chart properly, that preferred Ares I to EELVs. 10:09:11 10 You've just said in your remark that there's a 10:09:17 11 range, of course, with respect to that estimate 10:09:19 12 for loss of crew for Ares I. 10:09:21 13 Does that -- you know, does the one 10:09:23 14 sigma in that extend over into the EELV range? 10:09:25 15 Can you give us some sense of whether there's 10:09:29 16 really a statistically significant difference 10:09:33 17 between the two? 10:09:34 18 MR. COOKE: I think, in terms of the 10:09:35 19 numbers that we showed you, the relative 10:09:37 20 differences are important. There are certainly 10:09:41 21 probabilities associated with each one, and once 10:09:43 22 again, I don't think we have those numbers here. 10:09:45 65 1 But I think in the -- they were calculated in an 10:09:47 2 apples-to-apples sense. 10:09:51 3 MR. CHYBA: But we will get those 10:09:54 4 numbers? 10:09:54 5 MR. COOKE: Yeah. 10:09:54 6 MR. CHYBA: Okay. Thank you. 10:09:56 7 MR. COOKE: We'll get you the 10:09:57 8 background on that. 10:09:58 9 MR. HANLEY: It's important to note, 10:09:59 10 though, that the methodology used to assess all 10:10:02 11 of the vehicle launch options was a common 10:10:04 12 methodology. That's what ESAS really was about. 10:10:07 13 It was to take the synthesis of prior analysis 10:10:10 14 and bring it apples to apples against a basic 10:10:13 15 set of mission requirements and compare on a 10:10:18 16 level playing field as best we could. 10:10:23 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Leroy... 10:10:26 18 MR. CHIAO: Yeah. I have a question 10:10:29 19 about the Orion. I know the nominal plan right 10:10:31 20 now is to land in the water, but I noted in your 10:10:33 21 charts that in a contingency you can land on 10:10:36 22 terra firma. 10:10:36 66 1 And if that's the case, I'm wondering 10:10:37 2 why we don't o go back to that now. 10:10:39 3 MR. COOKE: The reason is in a 10:10:42 4 contingency sense we don't carry as much 10:10:44 5 redundancy in the systems. If we use at a 10:10:48 6 primary mode of landing, we would have a lot 10:10:50 7 more redundancy in it, and it would weigh a lot 10:10:53 8 more. And that's really the primary reason that 10:10:56 9 we went to the water landing. We wanted to make 10:10:59 10 sure that we had the capability to land the crew 10:11:01 11 without injury, but there's not the level of 10:11:04 12 redundancy in systems to get to making that a 10:11:06 13 nominal case. 10:11:15 14 MR. CHIAO: So even in the reduction 10:11:18 15 of crew size from six to four, that's still the 10:11:18 16 case? I mean, you're still too heavy to land on 10:11:19 17 land? 10:11:20 18 MR. COOKE: Well, the thing is that we 10:11:20 19 don't want to lose the capability associated 10:11:22 20 with six crew. So if we fill up that with 10:11:25 21 weight, then you don't get to that point again. 10:11:31 22 And also it's important in the time 10:11:33 67 1 frame that we'll be traveling to the Space 10:11:35 2 Station that we are able to carry up mass and 10:11:39 3 down mass. So we don't want to give up the 10:11:42 4 mass -- any mass savings that you'd have there. 10:11:46 5 We don't want to give all of that up to do -- to 10:11:49 6 that capability or to get away from the original 10:11:52 7 requirements. 10:11:54 8 MR. McALISTER: Mr. Chair, our link is 10:11:59 9 back up with France. Unfortunately we're only 10:12:00 10 going to have audio, and we need to cut over 10:12:03 11 right now. 10:12:07 12 Sorry, Doug. 10:12:08 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Jeff and Doug, thank 10:12:08 14 very much. We appreciate it. 10:12:10 15 Is the audio link live now? 10:12:11 16 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. Just go ahead 10:12:17 17 and make the introduction, Mr. Chair. 10:12:17 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Fine. This is 10:12:19 19 Norm Augustine, and I'm here with my colleagues 10:12:22 20 on our committee looking at the future of the 10:12:24 21 U.S. Human Space Flight program. We understand 10:12:25 22 our video link is down but the audio link is 10:12:28 68 1 working. 10:12:33 2 We're very appreciative of your taking 10:12:34 3 the time to speak with us. I have already 10:12:37 4 introduced you to the audience here in the room 10:12:40 5 and on the television here in U.S. 10:12:44 6 But to both Mr. Dordain and General 10:12:47 7 Perminov, as I say, we're very anxious to hear 10:12:49 8 your thoughts on whatever it is you'd like to 10:12:51 9 share with us, but a few things that I think 10:12:53 10 we'd be particularly interested in would be what 10:12:56 11 you see as... 10:12:59 12 (Discussion off the record.) 10:12:59 13 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: Okay. Do you hear 10:13:42 14 me? Jean-Jacques speaking. So can I start my 10:13:43 15 remarks? 10:13:53 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you. And 10:13:53 17 let me just say a couple of things that we would 10:13:55 18 be particularly interested in hearing and we'd 10:13:58 19 welcome whatever you care to say to us. 10:14:01 20 We'd be very interested, I think, in 10:14:04 21 your view of the utility of the ISS beyond 2016. 10:14:06 22 We'd be, I think, also very interested 10:14:13 69 1 in your thoughts of what international programs 10:14:16 2 might go beyond the ISS into the future. 10:14:18 3 We'd certainly welcome any comments 10:14:24 4 you have on future international relationships 10:14:27 5 and on some of the lessons we've learned from 10:14:30 6 our partnerships to date. 10:14:35 7 So with that, let me turn to you and, 10:14:37 8 again, thank you for sharing your thoughts with 10:14:39 9 us. 10:14:39 10 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: Okay. Now, thank 10:14:41 11 you from my side. Thank you very much for 10:14:45 12 giving me an opportunity to make a contribution 10:14:48 13 to your committee. 10:14:53 14 (Whereupon, Governor Dordain presented 15 his comments via videoconference, and a 16 typewritten version provided by Governor Dordain 17 is included as follows: 18 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: This hearing is 19 very timely, since for the first time in the 20 history of the ISS, we have on board a crew of 21 six made of five different nationalities -- the 22 five partners are together in orbit, not only 70 1 with hardware but also with astronauts living 2 and working together in orbit, as we are working 3 together on the ground since 20 years. 4 This is just a fact which should 5 inspire our reflections - there is not anymore, 6 for any of the five partners, a separate Human 7 Space Flight program. We have all together 8 one Human Space Flight program shared among five 9 partners. Obviously ESA cannot have a separate 10 Human Space Flight program since we are 11 dependent on the USA and on Russia for 12 transporting our astronauts, but even though 13 NASA and Roskosmos could have a separate 14 program, they have not. 15 And this is the reason why I am 16 attaching a great importance to the hearing of 17 today because your conclusions may have an 18 impact on our own plans, but also, I hope, our 19 inputs might have an impact on your conclusions. 20 I thank Mike O'Brien to have sent me 21 four questions of interest for you and I shall 22 start by answering your questions, it being 71 1 understood that I am ready to answer any 2 further question you may raise, either today or 3 at a later stage. 4 I have not prepared a presentation of 5 the European Space Agency, its programs and 6 activities. 7 However, I would like to underline 8 three characteristics of ESA which could explain 9 the common aspects of my answers and remarks of 10 today: 11 The European Space Agency has today 18 12 Member States which, according to the 13 ESA Convention, pool their resources for 14 developing space systems for both science 15 and applications to the citizens. This means 16 that the overall ESA activities range from 17 Science of the Solar System and of the Universe, 18 Science of the Earth and its environment, Life 19 Sciences, Physical Sciences to operational 20 meteorology, operational services for 21 Environment and Security, operational navigation 22 systems with Galileo, without forgetting the 72 1 activities related to the guaranty of access to 2 space and the development of competitive 3 technologies, in particular for 4 telecommunications. As a result, human space 5 flight activities in ESA represent a maximum of 6 15% of the total ESA activities. And Member 7 States have never decided to increase their 8 contribution to human space flight activities to 9 the detriment of science and services to the 10 citizens. 11 This balance between different type of 12 activities -- science, applications, innovation, 13 launchers, human space flights is organized and 14 even protected by the fact that there is 15 not one ESA program and one ESA budget, but as 16 many programs as type of activities. And each 17 development program is subject to one legal 18 decision through which the Member States 19 participating to that program are committed up 20 to completion of that program (within the limit 21 of 120% of the planned budget). This 22 process makes the decision difficult, but 73 1 provides a robust basis to all individual 2 programs of ESA once the decision is taken. 3 This is the reason why ESA is the most reliable 4 partner in the world. 5 If there is one topic on which ESA can 6 teach the worlds, it is about international 7 cooperation. International cooperation is our 8 daily life: 18 countries of Europe 9 cooperating within ESA and cooperating with all 10 space powers in the world, starting 11 with NASA which has been a partner since the 12 start of the mother organization of 13 ESA (ESRO born in 1964), with Canada which is 14 not only an international partner but 15 also associated to ESA, i.e., contributing to 16 some ESA programs, with Russia, with 17 Japan, with India, China... We know how much 18 cooperation is difficult, but we know 19 how much cooperation is successful. It is 20 always easier not to cooperate, but always 21 more difficult to succeed alone. 22 With this background, let's move on to 74 1 your questions. 2 1. What has ESA learned from the ISS 3 partnership? 4 The partnership is the most important 5 asset of the ISS, which will live much longer 6 than the hardware in orbit. 7 The ISS partnership is an operational 8 "G5" working everyday to reach common 9 objectives. 10 This is a very solid partnership 11 because it has been built-up through a long list 12 of problems (technical and financial) that we 13 had to overcome together and even drama 14 (the worst being the loss of Columbia) that we 15 had to face together to reach a common 16 objective -- completing the assembly of the ISS 17 and maintaining a permanent human presence in 18 orbit. 19 ISS today is already a success, a 20 technical, operational and management success, a 21 fantastic success based on partnership. 22 The first lesson of this partnership 75 1 is the interest of keeping a partnership open to 2 new partners -- the partnership has moved from 3 the original four of Space Station Freedom 4 to five in 1993, when the four partners: USA, 5 Canada, Japan and ESA sent a collective 6 invitation to Russia for joining the 7 partnership. Fifteen years later, we know that, 8 without Russia after the Columbia tragedy, the 9 ISS would have collapsed. 10 Now, and just because the partnership 11 is so solid, we can and we have to draw 12 together the lessons learned coming from our 13 common experience onboard ISS, in particular, on 14 what we could do better in future endeavors. I 15 was the one among the ISS Heads of Agencies to 16 propose to share the lessons learned and the 17 exercise is on-going. 18 I would have preferred, therefore, to 19 present today an already collective set of 20 lessons learned, but I can tell you which points 21 must, in my view, be investigated for 22 improvements: 76 1 a) Need for redundancy in key 2 functions, in particular transportation 3 functions. The U.S. Space Shuttle has been a 4 single point failure, in particular for 5 transporting modules of ISS during the assembly 6 phase and for downloading significant 7 masses from the ISS to the ground. When the 8 Shuttle was grounded, all elements of ISS were 9 grounded. Interdependency should not mean, 10 therefore, lack of redundancy. 11 b) Need for full standardization -- 12 interdependency requires standardization of 13 interfaces, which could not be fully achieved 14 for ISS operation. 15 c) Need for balancing utilization, 16 assembly and maintenance activities from the 17 start of the program. The choice which has been 18 made (which was maybe the only possible scenario 19 after the Columbia tragedy), to concentrate all 20 operations towards assembly, postponing 21 therefore utilization after completion of 22 assembly, has pushed the benefits very late in 77 1 the program and created a gap with the user 2 communities. 3 d) The evolution of partnership from 4 Freedom to ISS, as well as the sequence: 5 assembly first, then utilization, has extended 6 the program into a very long period, with no 7 intermediate, concrete and visible, milestones 8 which could have focused the teams on shorter 9 term objectives and could have attracted the 10 attention and interest of governments and 11 public. The only significant milestone is 12 assembly complete which has moved continuously 13 for a long time. 14 e) The last improvement that we could 15 bring for future endeavors is to associate the 16 public from all partners to such programs. 17 2. What is the European Space Agency's 18 interest in continuing the ISS program and why? 19 First of all, as I said above, the ISS 20 program has been sequenced in two successive 21 periods: The assembly and then the utilization. 22 The assembly is going to be completed next year, 78 1 but the utilization is just starting. The ISS 2 is, therefore, already a technical success but 3 is still far to be an overall success since the 4 success of utilization is still to be 5 demonstrated. If the utilization is not a 6 success, the overall ISS program will be 7 assessed as a failure. 8 There are, therefore, two basic 9 reasons to continue the ISS program: 10 1. To reap the benefits of the 11 investments made, by utilizing the resources on 12 board. The ISS is a unique laboratory offering 13 resources which cannot be found on Earth. As 14 for any laboratory, significant results will 15 come from a repetition of experiments which 16 require years rather than months. 17 The costs of utilizing such laboratory 18 are well defined and known by all partners. The 19 only answer to the question: "How long should 20 we use the ISS as a laboratory?" Is: "As long 21 as the benefits are worth the costs." 22 As far as the utilization of ISS is 79 1 concerned, my proposal is therefore the 2 following: To organize every three years a 3 joint (all partners) assessment of the 4 benefits drawn from the utilization of ISS and 5 to jointly decide on that basis to 6 continue for another period of 4 to 5 years, up 7 to the end of the technical duration 8 of life of ISS. This means that, if the 9 benefits are worthwhile, new laboratories in 10 LEO should be developed in order to keep the 11 continuity of utilization beyond ISS. 12 2. To be part of the human exploration 13 program. The ISS is the place for testing 14 hardware and operations before they are used for 15 lunar exploration and even more for Mars 16 exploration which is the end objective of human 17 exploration. There should not be any gap 18 between ISS operations and lunar operations, 19 since any discontinuity would lead to a loss of 20 expertise, because expertise is with the 21 people who operate. 22 As far as the role of ISS within the 80 1 human exploration program is concerned, my 2 proposal is therefore to continue the ISS 3 operations up to the start of a human lunar base 4 operation. 5 In conclusion, there are two 6 rationales for continuing the ISS program 7 exploitation, one related to utilization, one 8 related to human exploration, which may lead to 9 two different dates for the end of exploitation. 10 The best is, therefore, to define a rationale 11 and not a date. 12 3. How would you characterize the ESA 13 obligation and that of the U.S. to the ISS in 14 terms of its operational life? 15 As I said above, it is more a question 16 of rationale than a question of obligation: If 17 there is a common rationale to continue, it 18 constitutes, in my view, an obligation to 19 continue together. On the other hand, no 20 obligation can replace a lack of rationale. 21 For what concerns each partner's 22 obligations, they are defined in the 81 1 multilateral IGA at Government level and in the 2 bilateral MOU's at Agency level. 3 First, the obligation of each partner 4 is to maintain its own flight elements in order 5 and to pay its share of common operations costs, 6 i.e., for ESA to maintain the Columbus 7 laboratory in order and to compensate for 8.3% 8 of the common operation costs. Against such 9 obligation, each partner gets a right of 10 utilization of a percentage of available 11 resources proportional to its obligations. 12 Second, there is no termination date in the 13 different agreements, meaning that operational 14 life continues if no decision is taken. Third, 15 each partner has the right to withdraw 16 unilaterally at any time. But there is a 17 difference among partners: If ESA withdrew, the 18 other partners could continue on their own; if 19 NASA withdrew, the ISS operations would stop, 20 which makes a significant difference. 21 However, I do not think that a 22 unilateral decision could happen, first thanks 82 1 to the solidity demonstrated in the partnership, 2 second because the rationale is the same for 3 all partners. As I said above, the duration of 4 operational life of ISS should rely on 5 solid rationale and should be a joint decision 6 by all partners. 7 At the end, the only obligation of 8 each Partner, is to match their budget with the 9 objectives. But this is true for any program, 10 including non space programs. 11 4. How does ISS and its extension past 12 2015 connect to the European Space 13 Agency's future plans for human and robotic 14 exploration beyond low Earth 15 orbit? 16 The future plans of ESA for human and 17 robotic exploration will be defined in several 18 steps, the next step being planned in 2011. 19 A first step has been defined in 20 November 2008, with the decisions by Member 21 States: 22 To embark into an ambitious program of 83 1 robotic exploration of Mars: A first 2 mission, Exomars, is under detailed definition, 3 planning a launch in early 2016 with an 4 objective for ESA to demonstrate landing, moving 5 at the surface and drilling capabilities. 6 Follow-on missions are being prepared. These 7 missions are subject to a lot of discussions 8 with NASA for a long term cooperation, starting 9 by a significant contribution of NASA to 10 Exomars, based on the model of our common 11 success Cassini Huygens. Discussions with 12 Russia are also on-going, including an ESA 13 contribution to the Russian Phobos Grunt 14 mission. 15 To start the preparation of a 16 potential contribution of ESA to a human lunar 17 exploration programs. It is clear that for 18 human exploration: 19 Europe is dependent upon other 20 partners, in particular, USA, and cannot take 21 decisions on its own. 22 Europe needs a high level political 84 1 decision, because any significant contribution 2 of Europe to human exploration requires 3 significant additional budget, since human 4 exploration should not be developed to the 5 detriment of science and applications for the 6 citizens. A first high level political 7 conference on the subject is planned in October 8 this year. 9 At the end, the most important 10 connection between ISS duration of life and 11 future human exploration is the budget 12 competition: Can we afford to finance ISS 13 continuation and the development of future human 14 exploration? 15 This is the reason why, one important 16 rationale to continue ISS is to make it an 17 integral part of the exploration program. 18 This the reason why also, additional 19 resources are necessary because you can always 20 transfer budgets between operations and 21 development activities, but you cannot transfer 22 the expertise because operations require very 85 1 different industrial capabilities than 2 development. 3 Before closing my statement, Mister 4 Chairman, I would like to come back to a 5 very important characteristic for a partnership 6 to be sustainable -- it must be open to new 7 partners. And we, the five partner of the ISS, 8 we must address an important question -- shall 9 we invite other partners, China, India, South 10 Korea (which are today contributing to the 11 elaboration of a Global Exploration Strategy) to 12 join our current partnership, under "terms and 13 conditions" that we could jointly agree (as we 14 have done in 1993 when inviting Russia to join 15 the four Freedom partners)? 16 I do not want to anticipate the 17 answer, but not raising the question among the 18 five partners would be, in my view, the worst 19 option. 20 You will receive soon a typed version 21 of my remarks and I thank you for your 22 attention. 10:50:36 86 1 (Whereupon, the typewritten version of 10:50:36 2 Governor Dordain's comments concluded.) 10:50:36 3 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: And, again, I am 10:50:36 4 more than ready to answer any other question 10:50:36 5 today or at any time you would like listen to 10:50:36 6 me. But thank you for your attention. 10:50:40 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you so 10:50:48 8 much for your candor and for sharing your 10:50:49 9 thoughts with us and for sharing the benefits of 10:50:52 10 your experience. We're very appreciative. 10:50:55 11 And let me check at this point to 10:50:59 12 see -- is General Perminov is on the line 10:51:04 13 anywhere? 10:51:07 14 General, are you there? 10:51:07 15 (Discussion off the record.) 10:52:26 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: General Perminov, have 10:52:26 17 you joined us? 10:52:31 18 GENERAL PERMINOV: Yes. 10:52:32 19 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. Mr. Perminov 10:52:32 20 is with you. 10:52:36 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Good. Well, thank you 10:52:36 22 very much for being with us. We have a large 10:52:38 87 1 group here in Washington and a group on 10:52:42 2 television -- public television -- or available 10:52:45 3 to the public, and we would be very interested 10:52:48 4 in your thoughts on the subject of international 10:52:52 5 programs, the long-term future of ISS, programs 10:52:56 6 beyond that and anything you would care to share 10:53:01 7 with us. We have allotted about 20 more minutes 10:53:04 8 for this session, and so if you could make any 10:53:07 9 comments, we'd be very appreciative. 10:53:12 10 I'm afraid our communications have 10:53:50 11 broken down. We may have to reschedule this for 10:53:52 12 another time. 10:53:56 13 General, are you able to hear me? 10:53:57 14 (Discussion off the record.) 15 GENERAL PERMINOV: Now, the view of 16 Roscosmos NASA Current Plan For Human Space 17 Flight. 18 (Whereupon, General Perminov presented 19 his comments via videoconference with the 20 assistance of an interpreter, and a typewritten 21 version provided by General Perminov is included 22 as follows: 88 1 GENERAL PERMINOV: Critical to the ISS 2 program implementation are the issues of 3 technical and transportation support (crew 4 rotation, crew rescue, cargo delivery, etc.). 5 Roscosmos welcomes NASA endeavor to 6 speed up the development of the new piloted 7 transportation system "Orion" and the new launch 8 vehicle "Ares I". 9 Successful implementation of 10 Commercial Orbital Transportation Services for 11 the ISS would allow to streamline technical and 12 transportation support of the station and to 13 make it more systematic and stable. 14 NASA Human Space Flight program looks 15 quite balanced and promising to us. 16 2. Cooperation with NASA in ISS 17 Program: 18 Roscosmos-NASA cooperation over recent 19 years has provided the following results: 20 After Columbia accident in 2003 the 21 permanent crew presence on the ISS was ensured 22 and maintained; 89 1 The ISS international crews rotation 2 has been conducted including rescue capability 3 in case of contingency situations; the ISS cargo 4 delivery and utilization has been ensured taking 5 into account the planned Space Shuttle 6 retirement in 2010; 7 ISS U.S. Segment deployment has been 8 completed; 9 The launch of Soyuz TMA in May 2009 10 increased the ISS crew up to six persons. 11 Cooperation experience accumulated by 12 Roscosmos and NASA allows us to proceed to the 13 next stage of ISS utilization: A full-scale 14 implementation of the national programs of 15 scientific experiments in space and ISS 16 utilization as an international space 17 laboratory. 18 2. Cooperation with NASA in ISS 19 Program: 20 Roscosmos-NASA cooperation over recent 21 years has provided the following results: 22 After Columbia accident in 2003 the 90 1 permanent crew presence on the ISS was ensured 2 and maintained; 3 The ISS international crews rotation 4 has been conducted including rescue capability 5 in case of contingency situations; the ISS cargo 6 delivery and utilization has been ensured taking 7 into account the planned Space Shuttle 8 retirement in 2010; 9 ISS U.S. Segment deployment has been 10 completed; 11 The launch of Soyuz TMA in May 2009 12 increased the ISS crew up to six persons. 13 Cooperation experience accumulated by 14 Roscosmos and NASA allows us to proceed to the 15 next stage of ISS utilization: A full-scale 16 implementation of the national programs of 17 scientific experiments in space and ISS 18 utilization as an international space 19 laboratory. 20 3. Desirability of ISS Operation 21 Beyond 2016: 22 Completion of the ISS U.S. segment 91 1 deployment as well as Roscosmos plans to 2 additionally equip the ISS Russian segment in 3 the nearest future will significantly increase 4 the ISS scientific potential. 5 By 2015 the ISS will have the unique 6 capabilities for scientific research in space, 7 engineering development and implementation of 8 humanitarian, educational and commercial 9 projects. 10 Taking into account these 11 circumstances, as well as recommendations 12 approved at June 2008 meeting of Heads of 13 Agencies Roscosmos considers it expedient to 14 prolong the ISS utilization term up to 2020 at 15 the minimum. 16 4. Russia Future Plans For Human Space 17 Flight Program: 18 The prospective plans for the Russian 19 human space flight are determined by the Federal 20 Space Program of Russia for the period from 2006 21 to 2015, the Concept of Russian Human Space 22 Flight Development till 2020 and a number of 92 1 other documents. 2 The main objectives of the future 3 human space flights are: 4 Exploration and efficient utilization 5 of the near Earth space; 6 Study and exploration of the Moon, 7 Mars and deep space in order to resolve global 8 problems on the Earth and in space and to 9 generate new knowledge for the benefit of the 10 humankind. 11 In order to achieve the above 12 mentioned goals we expect to make the following 13 steps in the timeframe until 2020: 14 Complete the assembly of the ISS 15 Russian Segment and to continue its utilization 16 in full configuration; 17 Provide the creation of the 18 prospective crew transportation system based on 19 a new generation piloted spacecraft; 20 Build and prepare for operation the 21 first elements of the orbital assembly 22 experimental piloted space complex by the end 93 1 the ISS life cycle; 2 Develop elements, technologies and key 3 systems of prospective interplanetary complexes 4 for missions to the Moon and Mars, and develop 5 new means and methods of biomedical support to 6 ensure long-term human space flights, including 7 the interplanetary flights, and so on. 8 5. Future Interaction With NASA In 9 Space Exploration: 10 The experience gained by Russia, U.S. 11 and Europe in the area of piloted space 12 complexes and their long-term utilization, 13 including the ISS activities, allows us to 14 proceed to the implementation of the 15 larger-scale projects, in particular, the 16 development of piloted spacecraft for missions 17 to the Moon and Mars. 18 Roscosmos supports the necessity of 19 involving technical and scientific potential of 20 other countries for such large-scale projects 21 implementation. 22 Russia finds acceptable those projects 94 1 which ensure equal rights of partners who will 2 share the obtained results and also Russia's 3 participation in the development of critical 4 elements (launch vehicles, power propulsion 5 systems, technologies and experience of 6 long-term crew life support in space). 7 In this connection Roscosmos considers 8 it expedient to establish the international 9 joint expert group to conduct comprehensive 10 analysis of integration feasibility in the 11 sphere of space exploration. 12 6. What has Roscosmos learned from the 13 ISS partnership? 14 Apparently, the ISS lessons show that 15 any critical element in the project should have 16 a backup (should be redundant). As a rule, such 17 elements include launch vehicles, crew and cargo 18 transportation spacecraft and Mission Control 19 Centers. 20 During the utilization phase the 21 redundancy should be provided by various modules 22 and project elements for the specific functions 95 1 such as habitation, power supply and, partly, 2 the payload complexes and systems. 3 The ISS could serve as a unique test 4 stand for developing advanced technologies. 5 This process has already started and will expand 6 as we accumulate more experience and 7 capabilities for autonomous stay on the ISS. 8 The ISS lessons show that educational 9 and public outreach activities are very 10 important for attracting the young people's 11 interest to space. 12 The ISS international management 13 structure has already demonstrated its success. 14 It would make sense to apply this experience to 15 other big international projects. 16 7. How would you characterize the 17 Russian obligations and that of the U.S. to the 18 ISS in terms of its operational life? 19 The main tasks of Russia and the U.S. 20 at this point are as follows: 21 Maintenance of operation of the ISS 22 Russian and U.S. Segments for implementation of 96 1 the national programs of space experiments and 2 research; 3 Fulfillment of mutual obligations 4 under existing international arrangements; 5 Maintenance of ground infrastructure 6 for the ISS nominal operation; 7 Transportation and technical provision 8 of the ISS according to the agreements achieved 9 with NASA in view of the Shuttle retirement in 10 2010; 11 Participation in managing the ISS 12 program (the ISS coordination boards and 13 groups); 14 Provision of the ISS efficient 15 utilization. 16 We believe that the Unites States, as 17 the main coordinator of the project, will 18 promote stable and planned implementation of the 19 ISS program, including the transportation and 20 technical provision of the station, the required 21 conditions for the crew presence onboard, 22 improvement of the station control structure, 97 1 etc. 2 8. How does ISS and its extension past 3 2015 connect to Russia's future plans for human 4 and robotic exploration beyond low-Earth orbit? 5 By the end of the ISS life cycle 6 Roscosmos plans to develop and prepare for 7 operation the first elements of the orbital 8 assembly experimental piloted space complex 9 which will become a basis for engineering 10 development for future human missions to Mars 11 beyond 2030. 12 It is impossible to create such a 13 complex without a preliminary testing of its 14 elements in space and verification of 15 engineering solutions and technologies. 16 The ISS operation experience 17 demonstrates that the station utilization allows 18 to solve the unique tasks of extending the life 19 of both the station elements and the automatic 20 space instruments (space telescopes, etc) in 21 autonomous flight. This adds another good 22 argument in favor of the ISS program extension 98 1 till 2020 and beyond. 10:50:36 2 (Whereupon, the typewritten version of 10:50:36 3 General Perminov's comments concluded.) 10:50:36 4 GENERAL PERMINOV: Thank you very much 10:50:36 5 for your attention. 11:12:54 6 MR. McALISTER: Thank you, 11:12:54 7 Mr. Perminov. Our chairman had to step out for 11:12:56 8 a moment. So we have a couple of minutes until 11:12:59 9 our next presentation. We're making a few 11:13:02 10 adjustments on the fly. 11:13:05 11 But for now, if any of the committee 11:13:07 12 members have any questions for Mr. Perminov or 11:13:09 13 Mr. Dordain, if he is still there, now is the 11:13:13 14 time. 11:13:17 15 And we also have our head of 11:13:17 16 international relations at NASA Mike O'Brien -- 11:13:18 17 I think I saw him in the audience. So if we 11:13:19 18 have any questions for Mike, he can address 11:13:22 19 those now as well. 11:13:25 20 We are just waiting on 11:13:26 21 Representative Hall who is at Mass and Third, 11:13:29 22 I'm told, on his way. 11:13:32 99 1 So for the committee members, any 11:13:34 2 questions for -- okay. 11:13:36 3 Oh, go ahead, Chris. 11:13:40 4 MR. CHYBA: Mr. Perminov, could you 11:13:45 5 tell us a bit more about how experience using 11:13:47 6 the station in orbital construction is or is not 11:13:51 7 crucial to your plans for the orbital assembly 11:13:57 8 of the space complex? 11:13:59 9 GENERAL PERMINOV: I would like to 11:15:16 10 note that the program over developing the newer 11:15:17 11 crew transportation vehicle is linked to the 11:15:20 12 International Space Station program, and their 11:15:25 13 link is mostly financial, because we will design 11:15:28 14 the new space transportation vehicle taking into 11:15:32 15 account all our obligations out of the ISS 11:15:36 16 program. 11:15:39 17 (Discussion off the record.) 11:15:51 18 MR. McALISTER: The question is -- is 11:15:51 19 Jean-Jacques Dordain still with us, because we 11:15:55 20 have a question for him? 11:16:00 21 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: Yes. Go ahead. I 11:16:02 22 am here. 11:16:10 100 1 DR. CRAWLEY: Mr. Dordain, this is Ed 11:16:18 2 Crawley, a member of the panel. I was very 11:16:21 3 interested in your comments about the need to 11:16:24 4 consider utilization of space assets and their 11:16:26 5 development in parallel. Of course, you made 11:16:30 6 this comment with respect to the development of 11:16:33 7 the ISS. 11:16:37 8 But I wonder if you could comment a 11:16:39 9 little bit more in general about how you might 11:16:41 10 see developments going forward in such a way 11:16:46 11 that they did not rely on a long period of 11:16:50 12 development before a period of utilization. 11:16:55 13 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: What I said is -- 11:17:01 14 again, the lessons learned coming from the ISS, 11:17:05 15 yes, as I said, pushing back the utilization at 11:17:08 16 the end of something complete is a problem, and 11:17:15 17 that's been a problem to keep the attractiveness 11:17:16 18 of the Space Station to the user communities. 11:17:23 19 In my view, if we could have done -- but, again, 11:17:27 20 as I said, the scenario which has been chosen 11:17:29 21 is -- has been chosen after the Columbia 11:17:36 22 tragedy, and taking into account the resected 11:17:39 101 1 number of federal flags that are left, maybe it 11:17:43 2 was not possible to do differently. 11:17:47 3 But in an ideal case where we could 11:17:49 4 have selected an optimal sequence, in my view, 11:17:54 5 we should have chosen to -- a scenario where we 11:18:02 6 could have started utilization of the Space 11:18:06 7 Station much earlier, taking benefit of the 11:18:13 8 first laboratories which have been launched, and 11:18:15 9 that would have required separate launches 11:18:19 10 dedicated to utilization before launches 11:18:26 11 dedicated to assembly. And that was not 11:18:29 12 possible. So this is the lessons learned from 11:18:32 13 the Space Station. 11:18:34 14 Now, for any future endeavor, 11:18:35 15 including now exploration, our interest is to 11:18:38 16 make sure that we shall not spend 10 to 15 years 11:18:44 17 just to build the infrastructure and to tell the 11:18:49 18 users -- in part, you know, the scientists -- 11:18:53 19 that they have to wait for 15 years before 11:18:57 20 having a chance to use that infrastructure. 11:19:01 21 So we have to have a plan which, as I 11:19:04 22 said, should include much softer milestone and 11:19:06 102 1 include also a utilization program at the 11:19:15 2 very -- at the earliest stage of the development 11:19:18 3 of a lunar base. 11:19:22 4 So, now, it may be simple to be said 11:19:23 5 and maybe more difficult to be accommodated. I 11:19:29 6 think that the five partners should work 11:19:36 7 together to make sure that we are able to 11:19:37 8 associate the user communities as early as 11:19:41 9 possible in the development of a new lunar base 11:19:45 10 or whatever endeavor that we are making 11:19:49 11 together. 11:19:52 12 DR. CRAWLEY: Thank you. 11:19:56 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think we should not 11:19:58 14 impose anymore on your time, but on behalf of 11:20:00 15 those of us here in America, let us thank both 11:20:03 16 of you for your willingness to share your 11:20:10 17 thoughts with us. 11:20:12 18 We look forward to having an 11:20:12 19 opportunity to visit with you again as we get 11:20:14 20 further into our work. And should you have 11:20:17 21 anything additional that either of you would 11:20:20 22 like us to be aware of, we would certainly 11:20:22 103 1 welcome any contact. 11:20:25 2 So, again, thank you very much, and we 11:20:26 3 hope you have a very nice day, both of you. 11:20:28 4 GENERAL PERMINOV: Thank you. 11:20:32 5 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: Thank you very 11:20:33 6 much. And, again, we are at your disposal for 11:20:34 7 anything that you would like to get from us. At 11:20:38 8 least I am speaking as ESA, but I am sure that 11:20:42 9 Mr. Perminov will say the same. 11:20:44 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Very good. Well, 11:20:48 11 thank you. 11:20:50 12 MR. McALISTER: Mr. Chair, a couple of 11:20:54 13 quick comments. 11:20:55 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sure. 11:20:56 15 MR. McALISTER: As I said, we're 11:20:58 16 moving things around a little bit on the fly. 11:20:59 17 We all know the cliche that rocket science is 11:20:59 18 hard. Well, running a meeting on rocket science 11:21:03 19 is also hard. We've hit our first glitch -- 11:21:05 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: I could note that we 11:21:08 21 get images from Mars quite well. 11:21:10 22 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. Good point. 11:21:10 104 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: But I won't. 11:21:12 2 MR. McALISTER: With respect to the 11:21:14 3 congressional hour, the leadership of the NASA 11:21:16 4 authorization committees were invited to address 11:21:19 5 the panel and/or submit information related to 11:21:22 6 the human space flight provisions of the NASA 11:21:25 7 Authorization Acts of 2004 and 2008. 11:21:29 8 Unfortunately due to the press of congressional 11:21:32 9 business, a number of the members were unable to 11:21:36 10 appear in person. 11:21:39 11 The panel would like to acknowledge 11:21:40 12 that the following members will be submitting 11:21:41 13 statements to the Committee for their 11:21:41 14 consideration: Congressman Bart Gordon, 11:21:43 15 chairman of the House Science and Technology 11:21:46 16 Committee; Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, ranking 11:21:48 17 member of the Senate Commerce, Science and 11:21:52 18 Technology Committee; and Senator David Vitter, 11:21:53 19 ranking member of the Senate Science and Space 11:21:56 20 Subcommittee. 11:22:00 21 In addition, Congressman Hall, the 11:22:02 22 ranking member of the House Science and 11:22:05 105 1 Technology Committee, has submitted a statement 11:22:07 2 that's going to be read by the Congressman Pete 11:22:09 3 Olson, the ranking member of the House Space and 11:22:11 4 Aeronautics Committee. So we welcome 11:22:13 5 Representative Hall, and we're ready for his 11:22:16 6 presentation. 11:22:18 7 And then following Representative 11:22:20 8 Hall's statement, we are expecting Senator Bill 11:22:21 9 Nelson, chairman of the Senate Science and Space 11:22:23 10 Subcommittee, to also address the panel at 11:22:24 11 approximately 11:45. 11:22:27 12 So amazingly we're kind of back on 11:22:29 13 schedule. 11:22:32 14 So Representative Olson... 11:22:33 15 CONGRESSMAN OLSON: Well, thank you 11:22:40 16 very much. It's a tremendous honor and an 11:22:42 17 opportunity to speak before you. And just to 11:22:46 18 show you, we're going to throw you another 11:22:46 19 little curve ball. Ken Monroe from 11:22:49 20 Congressman Ralph Hall's staff is going to read 11:22:50 21 his statement, and I'm going to give a very 11:22:52 22 brief statement myself. 11:22:55 106 1 But thank y'all for coming today. 11:22:57 2 Mr. Augustine and Members of the Review Panel, 11:23:00 3 thank you for the opportunity to speak today. 11:23:00 4 I was pleased when the Administration 11:23:02 5 announced the members of this panel. It's an 11:23:04 6 incredibly, incredibly successful and 11:23:07 7 well-respected panel, and we look forward to 11:23:10 8 your work. You all bring different expertise to 11:23:13 9 the task, and I look forward to working with you 11:23:17 10 during your review as well as afterwards in 11:23:20 11 response to your recommendations. 11:23:20 12 As I'm sure you're aware, your work is 11:23:21 13 being closely watched within the space 11:23:24 14 community, in the media and, particularly where 11:23:28 15 I work, on Capitol Hill. 11:23:31 16 NASA and Human Space Flight have 11:23:33 17 bipartisan support on the Hill, but 11:23:36 18 unfortunately too many of my colleagues are 11:23:37 19 unfamiliar with the challenges facing our Human 11:23:37 20 Space Flight program. Members and staff are 11:23:42 21 going to give tremendous weight to your findings 11:23:44 22 with respect to the future that NASA should be 11:23:47 107 1 taking. I know you take this responsibility 11:23:50 2 seriously, and I know you understand the 11:23:53 3 influence your review will wield. 11:23:55 4 I understand you'll be headed to 11:23:58 5 Houston, the Johnson Space Center, in late July, 11:24:01 6 and I look forward to welcoming you. The 11:24:03 7 Johnson Space Center is the lead space center, 11:24:06 8 as you know, for Constellation. The 11:24:09 9 Constellation systems and the Ares V heavy-lift 11:24:09 10 launch vehicle holds the promise of returning 11:24:14 11 America to exploring the Moon. 11:24:16 12 The Congress has endorsed that plan 11:24:18 13 since 2005, and NASA has had a remarkably stable 11:24:20 14 direction for the last several years. Our 11:24:26 15 problem has not been a lack of vision. It's 11:24:28 16 been a lack of commitment. 11:24:31 17 I'm proud to represent Texas, but my 11:24:33 18 concerns are not limited to my home state. The 11:24:36 19 United States is the global leader in aerospace. 11:24:38 20 Aerospace is one of our most successful export 11:24:41 21 markets and the driver of much of our new 11:24:46 22 technology. 11:24:49 108 1 For the past six months that I've been 11:24:50 2 in Congress, we have decried the loss of 11:24:53 3 prestigious industries that were once dominated 11:24:55 4 by American companies. I believe it's good 11:24:58 5 policy to foster the creation of good paying 11:25:01 6 jobs, and we have worked to establish 11:25:04 7 educational initiatives to promote a technical 11:25:07 8 and highly skilled workforce. Human space 11:25:09 9 flight provides all of those things. 11:25:13 10 Y'all know this. And I hope that 11:25:15 11 these points will be reiterated in your 11:25:18 12 findings. 11:25:22 13 Most of us who follow the space 11:25:23 14 program know the impending problems. But there 11:25:26 15 are other members of mine on Capitol Hill who 11:25:29 16 will soon be asking why we don't have our own 11:25:31 17 independent access to the Space Station that's 11:25:34 18 been primarily funded by the American taxpayer. 11:25:36 19 The American public will ask why are we paying 11:25:41 20 the Russians as much as $50 million to take our 11:25:41 21 astronauts to the Space Station. Others will 11:25:45 22 ask why we didn't accelerate the development of 11:25:48 109 1 Constellation to narrow the gap following the 11:25:50 2 retirement of the space shuttle. 11:25:50 3 And as we all know, the gap will be 11:25:54 4 very damaging to our aerospace workforce. The 11:25:57 5 job losses are real, and they are jobs we're not 11:26:00 6 going to easily get back. As our economy 11:26:04 7 struggles to rebound, this kind of job loss will 11:26:07 8 not be ignored. It should not happen under any 11:26:11 9 circumstance, but I'm just reiterating the 11:26:14 10 context of the work you're undertaking. 11:26:15 11 NASA and our Human Space Flight 11:26:18 12 program, as we all know, we're at one of the 11:26:22 13 crossroads. 11:26:23 14 In 1962 before I was born, John F. 11:26:25 15 Kennedy stood on the football stadium at my 11:26:29 16 alma mater, Rice University, and we were at one 11:26:32 17 of those crossroads there and he gave us 11:26:34 18 direction, that we'd go back to the Moon -- or 11:26:36 19 we'd go to the Moon by the end of the decade. 11:26:39 20 We faced another time in the late 11:26:42 21 '60s, early '70s when we were trying to figure 11:26:44 22 out what we were going to do after the Apollo 11:26:46 110 1 missions, and President Nixon put us on a course 11:26:51 2 to develop the space shuttle, which led to the 11:26:53 3 Space Station. 11:26:54 4 And now we're at another such time. 11:26:55 5 No entity in this whole debate is going to have 11:26:58 6 a bigger say than this commission. 11:27:03 7 I wish this panel the best, and I look 11:27:05 8 forward to working with you. If there's 11:27:08 9 anything I can do to help, please let me know, 11:27:10 10 because we must maintain our preeminence as the 11:27:12 11 leader in human space flight. 11:27:15 12 And I thank you, again, for the 11:27:18 13 opportunity to speak with you and, again, wish 11:27:19 14 you well and look forward to seeing you down in 11:27:22 15 Houston. Thank you. 11:27:24 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you very 11:27:26 17 much and thanks for your leadership on this 11:27:27 18 whole topic and I've appreciated the chances 11:27:29 19 we've had to speak in the past about this. So 11:27:32 20 we will be doing our best. 11:27:35 21 CONGRESSMAN OLSON: Yes, sir. Balls 11:27:39 22 and strikes. We'll take care of the politics. 11:27:41 111 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Thank you. 11:27:43 2 Very good. 11:27:45 3 MR. MONROE: Mr. Hall regrets that he 11:27:50 4 was not able to be here today, but I do have a 11:27:52 5 statement that I'll read. And we would like the 11:27:53 6 opportunity to submit more information for the 11:27:54 7 record. 8 (Whereupon, Mr. Monroe presented 9 Congressman Hall's comments as follows: 10 CONGRESSMAN HALL: I want to thank the 11 members of this committee for the important work 12 you are doing on behalf of the nation. I also 13 want to thank you for the opportunity to share 14 my views on the human space flight-related 15 policies of the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 16 and 2008. The views expressed here are 17 primarily mine, but I know they are shared by a 18 number of my colleagues. 19 I think it is important to note that 20 the first authorization act of 2005, Public Law 21 109-155, was the product of a Republican-led 22 Congress and the second authorization act of 112 1 2008, Public Law 110-422, was the product of a 2 Democratically-led Congress. Yet, in both cases 3 the intent was the same, to enable NASA to 4 succeed on its current path toward completion of 5 the International Space Station, utilize the 6 station to carry out world-class research, 7 retire the space shuttle after completing its 8 remaining flights without the constraint of a 9 predetermined date and develop a new launch 10 system capable of taking humans beyond low Earth 11 orbit -- a feat the shuttle cannot do -- for the 12 first time since the 1970s. 13 In both of our authorizations we 14 allocated more money than the Administration 15 requested because, in our opinion, NASA was 16 being asked to do too much with too little. I 17 am concerned that we cannot continue to be a 18 preeminent space-faring nation without adequate 19 Administration support and appropriate funding. 20 One of the most important issues 21 facing NASA -- and, indeed, our nation -- is the 22 impending retirement of the space shuttle and 113 1 the subsequent five-year gap in independent U.S. 2 access to the $100 billion International Space 3 Station. 4 With the NASA Authorization Act of 5 2005, Congress endorsed the development of the 6 new spacecraft and launch vehicles -- and I 7 stress "launch vehicles" plural -- with the goal 8 of launching the new system, quote, as close to 9 2010 as possible, unquote. 10 In the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, 11 Congress established the new system as a 12 priority by stating, quote, developing the 13 United States human space flight capabilities to 14 allow independent American access to the 15 International Space Station and to explore 16 beyond low Earth orbit is a strategically 17 important national imperative, emphasis added, 18 and all prudent steps should, thus, be taken to 19 bring the Orion crew exploration vehicle and 20 Ares I crew launch vehicle to full operational 21 capability as soon as possible and to ensure the 22 effective development of a U.S. heavy-lift 114 1 launch capabilities for missions beyond low 2 Earth orbit, unquote. As a result, the act 3 sought to accelerate the development of the new 4 system by authorizing an additional $1 billion 5 in FY 2009. 6 Looking longer term, we are very 7 concerned that the current budget request has 8 eliminated funding for the Ares V heavy-lift 9 launcher, and the Altair lunar lander, without 10 which America is unable to explore beyond low 11 Earth orbit. 12 The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 13 also recognized the space shuttle's critical 14 role in completing and utilizing the 15 International Space Station and added one 16 additional mission, if it could be done safely, 17 to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer. 18 As authorizers, we are concerned that 19 NASA may be unable to complete the remaining 20 shuttle missions, including the AMS flight, 21 before the end of 2010. Unless the 22 Administration and the Congress provide funds 115 1 commensurate with extension, the Agency could be 2 forced to take resources away from the 3 development of the Orion and Ares, adding delays 4 that could further jeopardize the 2015 5 availability and contribute to further losses of 6 our highly skilled aerospace workforce. 7 I, along with many of my colleagues, 8 am not in favor of excessive government 9 spending. But in this time of economic turmoil 10 and growing international technological 11 competitiveness, many of us are in agreement 12 that America's space program is well-established 13 on a path that, if sustained, will ensure our 14 role as the world leader in space exploration 15 and exploitation for decades to come. By 16 pursuing human space flight, we challenge our 17 industry and inspire America to dream big and 18 succeed. That is what leadership is all about. 19 Other countries recognize the 20 strategic importance of the soft power we gained 21 in the world through our audacious leadership in 22 human space flight. The political and 116 1 technological stature of America has been earned 2 through our space program has now sought -- is 3 now sought by other nations eager to demonstrate 4 their hard-won capabilities to the world. 5 The International Space Station in 6 orbit today is a remarkable achievement, 7 bringing together the scientific and engineering 8 talents and resources of many nations. That 9 achievement would not have been possible without 10 American leadership. But such leadership is 11 built on trust that we will keep our commitments 12 to our international partners. If we continue 13 to underfund our space program, we risk losing 14 the international trust and credibility that is 15 vital for long-term success. 16 Today nearly 70 percent of the world's 17 population was not alive to see Neil Armstrong 18 walk on the Moon. Their opinions will be shaped 19 by what happens in the future, not what has 20 happened in the past. 21 We should not be in a race with China 22 or any other country. We are the preeminent 117 1 leader in space. But leadership is temporary. 2 We should ensure that we take the necessary 3 actions to remain the leader in human space 4 flight. 5 I want to thank the committee, once 6 again, for this opportunity to share our 7 minority views. 10:50:36 8 (Whereupon, the presentation of 10:50:36 9 Congressman Hall's comments concluded.) 10:50:36 10 MR. MUNROE: Thank you. 11:33:44 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much 11:33:44 12 for reading that, and please express our 11:33:45 13 appreciation for the letter itself. 11:33:49 14 MR. MONROE: Will do. Thank you. 11:33:52 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Good. Is Senator 11:33:53 16 Nelson here yet, do we know? 11:33:58 17 MR. McALISTER: I don't think so. He 11:34:02 18 is on his way. 11:34:04 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. We were 11:34:06 20 getting a letter from Senator Kay Bailey 11:34:07 21 Hutchison. Has that shown up? 11:34:12 22 MR. McALISTER: No. They're going to 11:34:16 118 1 be submitting those sometime this week. 11:34:18 2 (Discussion off the record.) 11:34:27 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, somehow we're 11:34:27 4 ahead of schedule here. I think what we can... 11:34:29 5 (Discussion off the record.) 11:34:33 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: We can start the 11:34:33 7 public comment session early, and then we'll -- 11:34:38 8 when Senator Nelson gets here, we'll break and 11:34:42 9 hear his remarks. 11:34:47 10 MR. McALISTER: Mr. Chairman, I've got 11:34:49 11 some public comment information that we can go 11:34:49 12 to and show on the screen before we pull 11:34:53 13 everybody up. 11:35:00 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Why don't you just 11:35:00 15 handle the public comment session here yourself. 11:34:57 16 MR. McALISTER: Okay. 11:34:49 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's ask everyone to 11:35:00 18 hold their comments to three minutes out of 11:35:03 19 fairness to others who would like to comment. 11:35:07 20 We have microphones, I think, in both aisles. 11:35:07 21 (Discussion off the record.) 11:35:13 22 MR. McALISTER: I just wanted 11:35:13 119 1 acknowledge some of the comments that we 11:35:15 2 received via the website. We went live on the 11:35:16 3 website on June 1st, and as of June 15th, we had 11:35:21 4 almost 300 comments telling us what to do and 11:35:25 5 how to do our work. So it was very much 11:35:27 6 appreciated, and that was a very -- it was an 11:35:29 7 excellence response, and all of those comments 11:35:30 8 and suggestions are getting read. 11:35:32 9 Again, the website location is 11:35:34 10 http://hsf.nasa.gov. You don't need the www. 11:35:38 11 Anyway, you can see the pie chart 11:35:44 12 there. That's the breakdown of the comments 11:35:46 13 grouped by subject matter. 11:35:50 14 Constellation received about 11:35:52 15 10 percent of the comments. The comments were 11:35:54 16 mixed as to keeping the projects and some 11:35:56 17 suggesting canceling them. Most that were for 11:35:59 18 keeping them asked that it be used to fill the 11:36:03 19 gap between the shuttle and the next vehicle. 11:36:04 20 And those that were recommending canceling these 11:36:06 21 projects mostly discussed the cost and potential 11:36:09 22 unreliability. 11:36:11 120 1 Shuttle. The shuttle comments were 11:36:13 2 overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the 11:36:17 3 shuttle. The reasons fell into three groups 11:36:19 4 primarily -- keeping ahead of the world in space 11:36:23 5 travel, concern that we would lose the drive or 11:36:26 6 ability to return to space and lack of 11:36:29 7 competence in follow-on programs. 11:36:31 8 Budget Concerns, another frequent 11:36:34 9 topic. Most of the comments showed an interest 11:36:36 10 in increasing the budget for human space flight 11:36:36 11 or a concern in the recent cut in the NASA 11:36:39 12 budget that was announced on the House side 11:36:43 13 recently. We got a lot of -- we got a spike in 11:36:46 14 comments right after that was done. 11:36:48 15 The Moon comments stressed the need to 11:36:49 16 reach the Moon again. Most of the comments on 11:36:53 17 the Moon were in favor of that. Also mentioning 11:36:54 18 the need for a base of some sort to allow for 11:36:55 19 either mining or solar power collection. 11:36:59 20 Mars. Most of the comments related to 11:37:01 21 Mars stressed the need to skip the Moon, go 11:37:03 22 straight to Mars or to have at least Mars as the 11:37:07 121 1 ultimate goal for human exploration. 11:37:10 2 Other Destinations. There was a 11:37:13 3 grab-bag of other destinations. Most of those 11:37:16 4 were sort of beyond Mars type destinations. 11:37:18 5 And then a number of science-related 11:37:22 6 comments ranging from not wanting to explore 11:37:24 7 space at all and focusing on Earth and Earth 11:37:27 8 research to -- using space exploration to 11:37:36 9 increase our technology here. Also concern that 11:37:36 10 space exploration would just be used as 11:37:39 11 political gain and not for actual science. So 11:37:39 12 there was a number of questions along those 11:37:43 13 lines. 11:37:44 14 And I pulled out some examples. These 11:37:45 15 were just mine that I thought were 11:37:47 16 representative of some of the comments. 11:37:49 17 Sending a man to the Moon again and on 11:37:50 18 to Mars has the value of growth of ideas and 11:37:50 19 enhances the spirit of the people. We have 11:37:53 20 failed as a people if we let the space program 11:37:56 21 go on without the human being stepping his foot 11:37:58 22 on another planet. With a U.S.-based commercial 11:38:00 122 1 manned launch industry now maturing, 11:38:04 2 Constellation would be the last man launcher 11:38:06 3 built by NASA. I hope the committee will 11:38:09 4 examine a new role for NASA as an enabling 11:38:13 5 industry for American space flight 11:38:15 6 entrepreneurs, launching men and materials to 11:38:17 7 LEO aboard commercial spacecraft, so it can 11:38:19 8 concentrate its resources on taking mankind back 11:38:22 9 to the Moon and beyond. 11:38:23 10 A comment from a NASA employee: I'm 11:38:26 11 an engineer working for NASA at KSC on 11:38:27 12 Constellation. I wanted to express my desire to 11:38:31 13 see specific recommendations and plans -- 11:38:32 14 specific recommendations and plans for this 11:38:34 15 study. I fear we may see the same old general 11:38:36 16 open-ended inspirational message, which has left 11:38:41 17 our agency adrift for far too long. We need to 11:38:41 18 have a firm idea about what our goals are and 11:38:45 19 how to achieve them. We need specifics. 11:38:47 20 And then the last one. I had to throw 11:38:49 21 this one out. 11:38:51 22 I just wanted to send a thank you note 11:38:51 123 1 to all of those on the panel. I trust you will 11:38:56 2 make the right decisions with regards to a fair 11:38:58 3 balance between human and robotic space flight 11:39:00 4 without making human space flight -- taking 11:39:00 5 human space flight from us completely. 11:39:04 6 So I definitely wanted to end on a 11:39:06 7 thank you to us. 11:39:09 8 And then just one other thought on the 11:39:10 9 website. We are encouraging a lot of 11:39:14 10 participation. We want you to visit the 11:39:17 11 website. We're also twittering on the website, 11:39:19 12 and as of June 15th, we had 721 followers, 11:39:22 13 which, I'm told, is a very good number. So keep 11:39:26 14 following us. 11:39:30 15 I think we have -- we are also 11:39:31 16 twittering some messages realtime from the 11:39:33 17 committee meeting. So when you get back to your 11:39:37 18 computer, check those. 11:39:41 19 Okay. Status on Senator Nelson? 11:39:42 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Why don't we begin the 11:39:46 21 public comments. 11:39:48 22 Do you have a list of people who would 11:39:49 124 1 like to speak, or should we just ask folks to 11:39:51 2 come up? 11:39:53 3 MR. McALISTER: Right. Again, per my 11:39:55 4 comments this morning, please come up to one of 11:39:58 5 the two standing mics. We have one on both 11:39:59 6 sides. Please limit your comments to no more 11:40:01 7 than three minutes, and the preference is for 11:40:04 8 comments and not for questions. 11:40:07 9 Norman, go ahead and call them out as 11:40:07 10 you see them. 11:40:12 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. Sir, we'll 11:40:12 12 begin on this side. Could you identify 11:40:16 13 yourself, please. 11:40:17 14 MR. CITIZEN: My is Greg Citizen. 11:40:18 15 And, first of all, thank you for doing this 11:40:21 16 important work. 11:40:23 17 My concern with going back to the Moon 11:40:23 18 is that we -- there is a lot of interest in the 11:40:26 19 vehicles and in technology but there's still not 11:40:29 20 a very clear idea, I think, in public about what 11:40:32 21 we're really going to do when we get there. 11:40:35 22 And especially given the idea of the 11:40:39 125 1 Moon as a stepping stone to future places, I 11:40:40 2 don't have a good sense that we have a real plan 11:40:43 3 in place, at least not publicly discussed, that 11:40:46 4 really addresses things like what are we going 11:40:48 5 to do, how are we going to develop things that 11:40:51 6 are going to make the Moon a good stepping 11:40:53 7 stone, what kinds of -- for example, 11:40:55 8 manufacturing on the Moon seems to be an 11:40:57 9 important part of using that as a stepping 11:41:00 10 stone, being able to produce things on the Moon. 11= :41:03 11 That doesn't seem to be coming up a lot. 11:41:06 12 So I would ask the committee to, 11:41:09 13 please, bear in mind also not just the 11:41:10 14 technologies that get us to the Moon but also 11:41:12 15 what are we going to do once we get there. 11:41:15 16 Because that's going to be a very important 11:41:18 17 role, I think, of anything in terms of trying to 11:41:21 18 sell this program and then trying to keep 11:41:22 19 forward momentum going. 11:41:24 20 Apollo petered our very quickly, in 11:41:27 21 part, because people got very used -- once we 11:41:28 22 got past the anticipation of getting to the 11:41:30 126 1 Moon, we got very used to seeing astronauts 11:41:33 2 against a gray background doing the 11:41:36 3 moment-to-moment work, and I think we need a 11:41:39 4 very good vision of what we're going to do on 11:41:42 5 the Moon if we're going to sustain that. 11:41:44 6 Thank you. 11:41:47 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 11:41:47 8 Sir... 11:41:47 9 MR. FITCH: Good morning. My name is 11:41:56 10 Osa Fitch, and I'm a private citizen of the 11:41:57 11 United States. 11:42:00 12 I would like to thank the committee 11:42:01 13 for this opportunity to provide input into your 11:42:03 14 view of the plans for U.S. Human Space Flight. 11:42:05 15 As an American taxpayer with a technical 11:42:07 16 background in aerospace, I care about the United 11:42:07 17 States' Human Space Flight programs on many, 11:42:13 18 many fronts. 11:42:13 19 I'd like to make two major points to 11:42:16 20 the committee. 11:42:18 21 First is that the vision for space 11:42:19 22 exploration, I believe, is fundamentally sound, 11:42:22 127 1 and as an underlying mission and rationale for 11:42:25 2 NASA's involvement in human space flight, I'd 11:42:30 3 like to see that continue. 11:42:32 4 Second, NASA's Constellation, program 11:42:33 5 as currently structured, is really on the path 11:42:35 6 to failure, I believe, and it will not achieve 11:42:35 7 the vision for space exploration and it's likely 11:42:39 8 to continue to fail until it is fundamentally 11:42:42 9 restructured. 11:42:44 10 Regarding the VSE, any United States 11:42:45 11 government Human Space Flight program needs to 11:42:48 12 be shaped such that it inspires all Americans 11:42:49 13 and it does not compete with commercial 11:42:52 14 enterprises. The VSE, with its focus on moving 11:42:57 15 beyond low Earth orbit operations, meets this 11:42:58 16 need in both of these areas. I support this 11:43:00 17 vision, and I believe that all Americans support 11:43:03 18 this vision if it can be executed in a cost 11:43:05 19 effective manner. 11:43:09 20 Human space flight also inspires 11:43:10 21 people all over the world. 11:43:13 22 Regarding NASA's Constellation 11:43:15 128 1 program, that are two basic problems that I 11:43:17 2 believe need to be addressed. 11:43:20 3 One, the system requirements have been 11:43:21 4 set in a manner that does not account for any of 11:43:22 5 the real-world constraints based by a 11:43:24 6 government-run Human Space Flight program. 11:43:27 7 The largest issue facing the country 11:43:28 8 at this point in history is the current economic 11:43:31 9 crisis. Any government-run Human Space Flight 11:43:32 10 program must operate in an environment of fixed 11:43:35 11 or declining real budgets. Picking arbitrary 11:43:36 12 mission requirements and then assuming that the 11:43:41 13 budget will be made available to develop 11:43:42 14 arbitrary systems to meet those requirements 11:43:45 15 is -- in a monolithic architecture is 11:43:47 16 unrealistic in the economic and financial 11:43:51 17 environment we face today. 11:43:53 18 Two, the Ares launcher development 11:43:55 19 program has basically run off the rails. It is 11:43:56 20 developing two all new and unaffordable launch 11:43:58 21 systems. The Ares I program, even if 11:44:02 22 successful, fundamentally duplicates existing 11:44:02 129 1 launcher capability without adding anything new 11:44:07 2 of value, but it does so at great cost to the 11:44:10 3 taxpayer and that cost is growing daily. 11:44:11 4 The technical limitations of the 11:44:14 5 Ares I launcher have had significant negative 11:44:16 6 impact on the other areas of the Constellation 11:44:20 7 program, particularly on the Orion spacecraft, 11:44:20 8 forcing multiple redesigns and the elimination 11:44:25 9 of many important spacecraft systems, including 11:44:27 10 safety features and reusability features. 11:44:29 11 The Ares V has grown into a rocket 11:44:32 12 with little commonality with Ares I and almost 11:44:35 13 no commonality at all with the existing space 11:44:36 14 shuttle system, including infrastructure. 11:44:38 15 Because Ares I and Ares V are two 11:44:41 16 different launchers, the flight rate for each 11:44:41 17 will be lower than if a single launcher were 11:44:43 18 used for both missions, driving up costs. 11:44:46 19 Because of the enormous size of the Ares V 11:44:49 20 launcher, its flight rate will be very low, 11:44:49 21 driving up costs for it yet even further. 11:44:53 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Could I ask you to 11:44:56 130 1 wrap up, please. 11:44:57 2 MR. FISH: I'm wrapping up right now, 11:44:57 3 sir. 11:44:57 4 Okay. I'd like to make two points as 11:44:59 5 possible solutions. 11:45:02 6 One, switch to a capabilities-based 11:45:03 7 approach and leverage systems that already 11:45:05 8 exist, do it with minimum development to get to 11:45:07 9 an architecture that can be scaled and grown 11:45:11 10 over time. 11:45:12 11 You're going to hear several 11:45:14 12 presentations today, I believe, including EELV, 11:45:14 13 Direct, space shuttle side-mounted options. Any 11:45:15 14 of these may take that approach. I urge you to 11:45:19 15 give strong considerations to those. 11:45:22 16 Second, focus on cost as an 11:45:24 17 independent variable. We've got to understand 11:45:27 18 that we've got a fixed budget, take what we 11:45:28 19 have, put it together in a different way to 11:45:31 20 achieve a vision that can be grown over time. 11:45:33 21 I will go ahead and wrap it up here, 11:45:37 22 sir. Thank you very much. 11:45:39 131 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 11:45:40 2 Sir... 11:45:41 3 MR. FINGERHUT: Hi, my name is Henry 11:45:41 4 Fingerhut. I'm a student at Georgetown 11:45:43 5 University and an intern with the NASA Academy 11:45:43 6 program. 11:45:46 7 I guess I had more of, I guess, an 11:45:47 8 open-ended -- or, I guess, more nebulous per se 11:45:49 9 question, but given -- or a comment. But given 11:45:52 10 the trend of, I guess, tenuously bound projects 11:45:55 11 that NASA has taken up since the Apollo program 11:46:00 12 and the remarks of Director Dordain of ESA about 11:46:00 13 the importance of continuity when rationale for 11:46:06 14 a current project is still valid, I just think 11:46:09 15 it's important to, I guess, more critically 11:46:13 16 question whether Constellation fosters -- or to 11:46:14 17 what extent Constellation fosters a compelling 11:46:18 18 public image of our continuity or overall 11:46:22 19 direction for the agency. 11:46:23 20 I know Representative Olson mentioned 11:46:25 21 that the problem is not a lack of vision but a 11:46:27 22 lack of commitment. But it's important, I 11:46:30 132 1 think, to look into how that commitment is made 11:46:32 2 such that the vision isn't compromised. 11:46:36 3 And finally I just wanted to mention 11:46:41 4 that I think we should look at -- we should be 11:46:43 5 looking into the extent to which we can look 11:46:43 6 beyond Constellation to ensure that it doesn't 11:46:47 7 become just another in a series of, I guess, 11:46:49 8 more incremental discontinuous missions, 11:46:51 9 especially, for example, through the end of our 11:46:54 10 careers as the next generation of engineers and 11:46:56 11 scientists. 11:46:56 12 So I guess that's really more broad 11:47:03 13 based than a lot of the other questions, but I 11:47:03 14 think it's still important to keep in the back 11:47:05 15 of one's mind as they make these decisions. 11:47:07 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: We appreciate your 11:47:09 17 comments. 11:47:11 18 MR. FINGERHUT: Thank you. 11:47:11 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Sir... 11:47:12 20 MR. LANFORD: Hi, my name is Ephraim 11:47:12 21 Lanford. I just wanted to voice a slight 11:47:13 22 concern about the committee's, I guess, 11:47:15 133 1 authority and perhaps charter to explore the 11:47:19 2 implications and possibilities of international 11:47:25 3 leadership. So if there are -- if the committee 11:47:27 4 thinks that there are ways to use the space 11:47:33 5 program to draw attention to or reveal or 11:47:37 6 distribute benefits of international cooperation 11:47:40 7 in broad areas like global markets, weapons 11:47:44 8 non-proliferation, perhaps human rights in maybe 11:47:50 9 a particular country that some are considering 11:47:53 10 inviting to the ISS or to global aspects of more 11:47:56 11 specific questions that are kind of more 11:48:01 12 traditional, such as education and inspiration 11:48:03 13 or industrial base, then I hope that the 11:48:06 14 committee will -- I mean, you know, this is my 11:48:10 15 opinion -- but not be abash to seek the, I 11:48:14 16 guess, input or guidelines that it needs at a 11:48:21 17 high level to consider questions of high level 11:48:24 18 policy and diplomacy to explore all of these 11:48:30 19 issues to the fullest. Thank you. 11:48:35 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. 11:48:37 21 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Good morning. I 11:48:39 22 also want to thank you, gentlemen and ladies, 11:48:41 134 1 for the -- serving on the panel. 11:48:43 2 I started my act in my career in the 11:48:45 3 early '60s for the infamous Sputnik and have 11:48:48 4 been involved in the industry now for 45 years, 11:48:54 5 thereabouts, and I think one thing that I've 11:48:59 6 heard several times here regarding the extension 11:49:01 7 of the Constellation to Mars -- it's certainly 11:49:05 8 my opinion -- and I believe it's the Earth to 11:49:08 9 Mars that is really going to have the 11:49:12 10 technological breakthrough. Of course, most of 11:49:17 11 us have been to Mars -- or not personally but -- 11:49:19 12 the Mars episode -- I'm sorry -- to the Moon, 11:49:23 13 and I think it's the Mars that's going to get us 11:49:24 14 the real, real big next step in technology. 11:49:27 15 Thank you. 11:49:31 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 11:49:31 17 DR. CRAWLEY: Mr. Chairman, I wonder 11:49:36 18 if I might make a request. 11:49:37 19 The committee is sincerely interested 11:49:39 20 in very broad base of input from the national 11:49:42 21 community and particularly from the youth. As 11:49:46 22 we've already heard several references today, 11:49:48 135 1 one of the principal political incentives in 11:49:51 2 creating a broad-based human exploration program 11:49:56 3 is inspiration of youth. It's continually 11:50:00 4 referenced, in fact, even interestingly in the 11:50:03 5 comments today by our Russia colleague. 11:50:04 6 So I would especially invite the youth 11:50:08 7 of America to comment via all of the appropriate 11:50:11 8 mechanisms that only they know how to do, like 11:50:14 9 twittering back and blogging. There are several 11:50:15 10 blogs going on. And we'd really like to hear 11:50:19 11 from the youth of America what would inspire 11:50:22 12 them and how they would like to get engaged. 11:50:26 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: I think that's a great 11:50:29 14 requests, and we hope that those who are 11= :50:32 15 watching on television will heed that request. 11:50:34 16 While we have a moment here -- 11:50:39 17 MR. McALISTER: Norm, a quick update. 11:50:41 18 Representative Nelson is here. I'm sorry. 11:50:46 19 Senator Nelson. 11:50:49 20 (Discussion off the record.) 11:51:31 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Here means here in 11:51:31 22 Washington or here on Earth? 11:51:34 136 1 (Discussion off the record.) 11:51:34 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: You know, we're going 11:52:41 3 through comments from the folks from 11:52:42 4 Capitol Hill that have an interest in this 11:52:44 5 program -- a particular interest in it. 11:52:47 6 Senator Nelson, of course, has a long 11:52:49 7 and personal involvement in the program and has 11:52:52 8 been truly one of the great supporters of NASA 11:52:57 9 and the space program. 11:53:01 10 We're awful glad you're here, and we 11:53:03 11 welcome your thoughts. 11:53:06 12 SENATOR NELSON: Thank you, 11:53:07 13 Mr. Chairman. And I'm going to move over here 11:53:08 14 where I can actually see you all instead of 11:53:10 15 looking at the side of your head. 11:53:13 16 I want you to understand the 11:53:16 17 extraordinarily significant position that this 11:53:20 18 panel brings itself to the table. Because, in 11:53:23 19 essence, what you decide is going to be the 11:53:30 20 significant influence for the White House and, 11:53:38 21 therefore, also for the Congress in where the 11:53:45 22 space program is going. 11:53:51 137 1 And so I know you all know that, but I 11:53:52 2 want you to hear from somebody that lives it 11:53:55 3 every day that, if you decide that X is going to 11:53:59 4 be the case, the White House is a lot more 11:54:06 5 likely to embrace X, and whether or not I or 11:54:18 6 others disagree with X, it makes it much more 11:54:21 7 difficult for us to be able to round up the 11:54:24 8 votes in this kind of financial environment 11:54:27 9 other than what you say is X. 11:54:33 10 So you come to the table with 11:54:38 11 extraordinary influence. And I know you all 11:54:41 12 take the seriousness of this very much, but I 11:54:47 13 wanted you to understand when we're dealing with 11:54:51 14 a budget that is out of whack as bad as it is -- 11:54:53 15 and I've just come from the finance committee 11:54:58 16 trying to figure out what we're going to pass in 11:55:01 17 the way of health reform, and, of course, costs 11:55:04 18 are a major consideration. 11:55:08 19 And so a lot of what -- I wish it 11:55:12 20 weren't this way, but a lot of where we're going 11:55:18 21 with regard to our space program -- which 10, 11:55:21 22 15, 20, 25 years down the line we may not have 11:55:24 138 1 wished we had made in the prism of financial 11:55:30 2 restraints, but that's the reality that we're 11:55:35 3 dealing with now. 11:55:39 4 So for your consideration, I think 11:55:42 5 that you ought to seriously understand that from 11:55:47 6 this Senator's perspective and what the Office 11:55:50 7 of Management and Budget have laid out for the 11:55:56 8 President's plan in the out-years of '011, '12, 11:55:58 9 '13 and '14 are entirely deficient for where 11:56:06 10 we're going. 11:56:13 11 Now, part of your charter is that you 11:56:14 12 are to lay out options, and you're also to be 11:56:16 13 mindful of the fiscal restraints. NASA simply 11:56:21 14 can't do the job that it's been given with the 11:56:28 15 President's goal of being on the Moon by 2020 if 11:56:33 16 you take the OMB numbers. 11:56:37 17 I have clashed swords with Dr. Orzag, 11:56:42 18 who I have a great deal of respect. I have sat 11:56:47 19 in prayer sessions with Dr. Holgren. And I just 11:56:52 20 want you to know that if you come out with those 11:57:01 21 numbers, there's no way that NASA can be on the 11:57:05 22 Moon by 2020. 11:57:09 139 1 There's no way that with those numbers 11:57:13 2 that are coming -- and there's nothing magic 11:57:16 3 about those numbers. Those numbers were from a 11:57:20 4 group of folks who -- trying to come out with a 11:57:23 5 President's political document -- in addition to 11:57:28 6 it being an economic document -- about showing 11:57:31 7 how over the next five years that you get the 11:57:34 8 budget deficient down to 3 percent of the Gross 11:57:39 9 National Product. 11:57:43 10 But the President starts out crippled 11:57:44 11 because he's inheriting what he thought was a 11:57:48 12 $1.7 trillion deficient in the current year but, 11:57:52 13 in fact, it's going to be closer to 11:57:56 14 1.9 trillion. So understand the context in 11:58:02 15 which that is. 11:58:05 16 If you adopted those out-year numbers 11:58:07 17 of the President's budget -- which I'm trying to 11:58:09 18 tell you is really not the President's budget. 11:58:12 19 Therefore, that's all of the more reason your 11:58:17 20 panel is important. Because the President is 11:58:20 21 looking to you to really come up with where we 11:58:23 22 should go in our space program. 11:58:28 140 1 But if you adopted those numbers, we 11:58:31 2 would have a four- or five-year gap with no 11:58:35 3 American human-rated launch system, and that 11:58:40 4 would expand to six, seven, possibly eight 11:58:46 5 years. And I don't think anybody wants us to 11:58:50 6 continue in the circumstance where we are -- the 11:58:53 7 only way to get to the International Space 11:58:57 8 Station, which we built and paid for to the tune 11:59:00 9 of $100 billion -- that we want to continue to 11:59:03 10 stay in a multiyear period dependent upon the 11:59:07 11 Russians. 11:59:16 12 It's my hope that our foreign 11:59:17 13 relations with the Russians are going to get 11:59:19 14 better, but who knows what the geopolitics is 11:59:21 15 going to be later on in this coming decade. So 11:59:28 16 I ask you to consider that. 11:59:31 17 I also ask you to consider that the 11:59:32 18 last several years of budgets haven't been 11:59:35 19 realistic. NASA was asked to do too much with 11:59:39 20 too little, and that has led us to the point 11:59:42 21 that we are now -- with a space shuttle that's 11:59:48 22 going to shut down but without the new rocket 11:59:52 141 1 having been developed in time to pick up where 11:59:55 2 the space shuttle leaves off and a series of 11:59:58 3 budget documents over the last several years 12:00:04 4 that, in fact, were unrealistic because they 12:00:07 5 only went out to 2015 and played like the 12:00:10 6 International Space Station was going to go away 12:00:14 7 in 2015. 12:00:17 8 Well, if it's taken this long to build 12:00:18 9 it and it is really a wonderful tool in foreign 12:00:21 10 relations in the fact that it truly is 12:00:29 11 international and if we've spent $100 billion, I 12:00:31 12 don't think we want to shut it down in 2015. 12:00:36 13 And, therefore, I think you ought to consider in 12:00:39 14 your deliberations the continuation of that. 12:00:43 15 Now, you all had specifically asked me 12:00:46 16 to make a comment -- and then I will sit down 12:00:49 17 within my prescribed time -- about where we are 12:00:52 18 with regard to the NASA authorization bill. 12:01:02 19 We authorized NASA's funding for the 12:01:04 20 next several years in a 2008 NASA authorization 12:01:07 21 bill, and the policy of that authorization bill 12:01:14 22 is exactly what I've just said. The funding was 12:01:19 142 1 not what I've just said, but the authorization 12:01:25 2 for funding is what I have just said, that the 12:01:29 3 policy was to reduce the gap in human space 12:01:34 4 flight capability and also, because of that, to 12:01:39 5 mitigate the impact of having to lay off a 12:01:45 6 dedicated workforce of highly skilled workers. 12:01:49 7 And so you will see that the 12:01:54 8 authorization for the current year, 2009, when 12:01:57 9 you add the $400 million that we got in in the 12:02:01 10 stimulus for exploration, it actually brought it 12:02:06 11 up to the funding -- the appropriations, it 12:02:11 12 actually brought it up close to what the 12:02:14 13 authorization was, which was $3.9 billion for 12:02:18 14 exploration in the current year, whereas what we 12:02:22 15 authorized for space operations, which was well 12:02:30 16 above the President's request -- I'll round 12:02:34 17 it -- 6 billion -- what was appropriated was 12:02:38 18 about $250 million less than that, and yet you 12:02:44 19 still have to -- have to launch the space 12:02:48 20 shuttle. So appropriations just simply didn't 12:02:51 21 match what was authorized. 12:02:58 22 We got some help through the omnibus 12:03:01 143 1 appropriations and the stimulus bill of getting 12:03:07 2 additional money in, but other than that, the 12:03:12 3 projections for the future in the President's 12:03:16 4 budget are unrealistic. 12:03:20 5 Just a couple of other comments on the 12:03:23 6 authorization bill. We said science and 12:03:27 7 exploration should not be in competition with 12:03:33 8 each other, they're compatible. 12:03:36 9 We clearly nailed down the policy that 12:03:40 10 we ought to be prepared to operate the Space 12:03:42 11 Station until 2020 and that we had to put it in 12:03:48 12 because back then NASA was operating like they 12:03:57 13 had two additional missions. They had some 12:04:00 14 term -- oh, they called them contingent. 12:04:08 15 And as we would bring the 12:04:12 16 administrator in front of us -- well, why do you 12:04:17 17 call it a contingent. Well, I can tell you 12:04:20 18 Dr. Griffin didn't want to call it contingent. 12:04:23 19 He was being -- calling it contingent simply 12:04:25 20 because the Office of Management and Budget was 12:04:28 21 telling him that he had to. And so we said, 12:04:31 22 well, why is it contingent. And basically it 12:04:34 144 1 came out in the hearings that that was just a 12:04:37 2 name. 12:04:39 3 So you're looking at a full complement 12:04:40 4 of space shuttle missions to fully assemble and 12:04:45 5 to equip the International Space Station. 12:04:51 6 And then we did one more thing in the 12:04:55 7 authorization bill. We authorized an additional 12:04:58 8 flight. And that was there were a bunch of 12:05:02 9 scientific instruments that were going to be 12:05:05 10 left on the ground that were configured to fly 12:05:08 11 in the cargo bay of the space shuttle but NASA 12:05:11 12 wasn't planning for it. It wasn't NASA. It was 12:05:15 13 OMB wasn't planning for it. 12:05:20 14 And to the credit of the new 12:05:22 15 President, this is one of the commitments that 12:05:25 16 he made in the course of the campaign, and he 12:05:27 17 has fulfilled that commitment by adding the 12:05:31 18 additional flight. So that from now on, there 12:05:35 19 are eight flights remaining of the space 12:05:40 20 shuttle. 12:05:42 21 The one other thing that the 12:05:42 22 President has committed to is that -- although 12:05:44 145 1 budgetary-wise NASA, because OMB tells them to 12:05:48 2 do this, is planning that the space shuttle is 12:05:54 3 going to shut down by the end of 2010, the 12:05:57 4 President has committed publicly that if we do 12:06:00 5 not get the rest of the eight flights up by the 12:06:05 6 end of 2010 that we will continue to fly the 12:06:08 7 space shuttle until those eight flights -- which 12:06:13 8 includes the last one, the scientific missions 12:06:17 9 including the AMS -- until they are all flown to 12:06:20 10 complete the construction of the station and the 12:06:24 11 equipping of it. 12:06:29 12 So that could have some financial 12:06:32 13 consequences. If we go into 2011, then 12:06:34 14 additional moneys are going to have to be 12:06:38 15 generated -- and I made sure they got on the 12:06:44 16 record publicly on this -- and not take that out 12:06:47 17 of the rest of NASA's budget. 12:06:51 18 So that's a summary, Mr. Chairman, of 12:06:56 19 what I wanted to tell you. 12:07:03 20 Now, I would just add one other 12:07:08 21 thing -- that NASA is now going to have a great 12:07:10 22 leader and this is someone that I worked very 12:07:15 146 1 hard to get drawn to the attention of the 12:07:20 2 White House and President, and it has been a 12:07:29 3 very happy day for me and, I think, many others 12:07:31 4 in NASA in the space community that the 12:07:35 5 President has nominated -- and I expect soon to 12:07:38 6 be confirmed by the Senate -- Charlie Bolden. 12:07:43 7 I think he brings the quality of being 12:07:48 8 able to be not only a strong leader with an 12:07:50 9 enormous understanding of both human and 12:07:56 10 unmanned space but I think he brings the 12:07:58 11 qualities of a consensus builder, which is so 12:08:03 12 necessary at a time like this. 12:08:07 13 So with that kind of leadership, with 12:08:11 14 the imprimatur of what you decide, which I think 12:08:15 15 is going to be key, as to where our space 12:08:22 16 program is going in the future -- with the two 12:08:25 17 of those, we ought to be off on a good road 12:08:30 18 ahead for the nation's space program. 12:08:34 19 I am happy to entertain any questions 12:08:37 20 or comments from you all. 12:08:39 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, Senator, thank 12:08:42 22 you very much. You certainly encapsulate, I 12:08:44 147 1 think, the challenges that the space program 12:08:47 2 faces. Your comments are very sobering to us. 12:08:50 3 I think we well realize the responsibility we 12:08:55 4 have, and you certainly sharpened that in our 12:08:58 5 views. 12:09:02 6 Do any of my colleagues have questions 12:09:02 7 that you would like to ask? 12:09:04 8 I've had a chance to visit with the 12:09:05 9 Senator some in his office on this subject in 12:09:08 10 the last couple of weeks, so I won't ask 12:09:12 11 anything. But if anybody else does, this is the 12:09:14 12 time. 12:09:17 13 And I think that nobody has anything 12:09:19 14 for you. So we'll just thank you so much -- 12:09:21 15 SENATOR NELSON: Thank you, 12:09:26 16 Mr. Chairman. 12:09:26 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- for being here. 12:09:22 18 SENATOR NELSON: Thank you. 12:09:26 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: All the best. 12:09:24 20 SENATOR NELSON: Thank you. 12:09:26 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: One other thing before 12:09:27 22 we take a break for lunch. Senator Hutchison 12:09:29 148 1 asked that I read a letter. She had hoped to be 12:09:32 2 here today, and as you heard, the transactions 12:09:36 3 on the Hill have interfered with the best laid 12:09:40 4 plans. And so I will read her letter into the 12:09:44 5 record here. 12:09:49 6 This is, as I said, from Senator Kay 12:09:50 7 Bailey Hutchison. 12:09:54 8 (Whereupon, Mr. Augustine presented 9 Senator Hutchison's letter as follows: 10 SENATOR HUTCHISON: Mr. Chairman and 11 Members of the Human Space Flight Review Panel, 12 I want to thank you for the opportunity to 13 provide a statement in this hearing to 14 underscore some of the recent congressional 15 authorization activity that is relevant to your 16 review of U.S. Human Space Flight programs. 17 You have a huge challenge and a 18 critical responsibility, and I appreciate your 19 willingness to devote the time necessary to 20 conduct this review. 21 The first point that should be clear 22 from both the 2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization 149 1 Acts is that they reflect a broad, bi-partisan, 2 bicameral level of support for the U.S. Human 3 Space Flight programs. More specifically, both 4 bills express support for the goal of returning 5 to the Moon to conduct the kind of sustained 6 human exploration that was not possible in the 7 Apollo program. 8 They express support for completing 9 the International Space Station and making the 10 maximum possible use of its laboratory 11 facilities for microgravity research across a 12 broad range of science disciplines. The 2005 13 Act designated the Space Station as a national 14 laboratory and began its evolution to a facility 15 that not only can meet NASA's research needs but 16 those of other government agencies, educational 17 consortia and private research and development 18 concerns. 19 Both bills conveyed the concern of the 20 Congress regarding the pending gap in the 21 U.S. human space flight capability, a gap that 22 would begin voluntarily with the end of space 150 1 shuttle operations, mandated not by technical, 2 engineering, structural or systemic issues but 3 by a zero-sum budget plan that would require 4 transferring the funds being spent on the 5 shuttle to the efforts to develop its 6 replacement vehicles, the Ares launch vehicles 7 and the Orion crew exploration vehicle. 8 Both bills also demonstrated a serious 9 degree of concern for the difficult transition 10 from one launch system to the next and the 11 potential impacts to the highly and, in many 12 cases, uniquely qualified and dedicated people 13 across the country who support our nation's 14 human space flight programs, whether they be 15 civil servants, contractors, vendors or 16 suppliers. 17 The potential loss of many of these 18 skilled resources represents a severe 19 disturbance within the "Gathering Storm" that 20 the Chairman has clearly outlined in his most 21 recent contribution to U.S. policy in these 22 areas of science, technology, engineering and 151 1 mathematics excellence and competitiveness. It 2 has long-term implications, not only in places 3 like Houston and the Johnson Space Center in my 4 part of the country but across a broad spectrum 5 of the country's industrial capabilities and to 6 the vitality of its most skilled workforce. 7 We must also not forget that America's 8 leadership in space plays an important role in 9 our nation's national security. We have already 10 seen the preeminent role that space-based 11 technology plays in modern warfare and 12 intelligence gathering. Maintaining our efforts 13 in human space flight is an essential part of 14 sustaining the nation's overall space 15 leadership. 16 There is not adequate time today to 17 give you more than this brief overview of the 18 primary intentions behind the actions and 19 legislation of our subcommittee and the Congress 20 that I believe you need to be aware of and 21 factor into your deliberations. 22 My committee staff has prepared a 152 1 collection of the relevant language, supporting 2 and related information from NASA, the General 3 Accountability Office and the Congressional 4 Budget Office and a broader description of the 5 issues and concerns we have addressed and 6 continue to address as we draft a 2009 7 authorization bill, which we will provide to 8 you. My staff will be available to provide any 9 further detailed information you feel is needed. 10 Finally I want to stress my belief 11 that you must be able to consider any and all 12 possible options and alternatives to ensure the 13 continuation and future success of the U.S. 14 human space flight programs. I believe it is 15 essential for your review to be unconstrained by 16 any binding consideration, whether budgetary or 17 programmatic. 18 We in the Congress and, I believe, the 19 Administration, must be given a clear picture of 20 what is attainable and what resources would be 21 required. We will then be in a position to make 22 the judgments necessary to achieve the best 153 1 possible and most affordable result for the 2 American taxpayer. 3 Again, I want to thank you for your 4 commitment to this enormous task, and I look 5 forward to seeing the result of your efforts. I 6 commend you for joining with this Administration 7 and my colleagues at the Congress to derive the 8 best possible path forward to sustain an 9 essential national effort and preserve our 10 country's leadership in space. 10:50:36 11 (Whereupon, the presentation of 10:50:36 12 Senator Hutchison's letter concluded.) 10:50:36 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: We now are actually, 12:14:20 14 through the very good chairmanship, 15 minutes 12:14:22 15 ahead, and we could take a break for lunch. 12:14:28 16 And what I would suggest we do is 12:14:31 17 start the afternoon session 15 minutes early, 12:14:34 18 because I'm a great believer of having 12:14:39 19 contingencies in budgets and schedules. 12:14:39 20 I've received a number of notes handed 12:14:43 21 to me from my colleagues as I had to walk out of 12:14:45 22 the room for a moment citing that you're 12:14:49 154 1 freezing to death, and so I wonder if there's -- 12:14:52 2 we're not trying to simulate the Mars atmosphere 12:14:54 3 here, but if it's possible, could we get a 12:14:58 4 little more heat in here before we come back. 12:15:00 5 And we will plan to meet at 12:45 to continue. 12:15:01 6 Thank you all. 12:15:07 7 (Lunch recess.) 12:15:07 8 MR. HAWES: Good afternoon. I'm Mike 13:05:12 9 Hawes from NASA, and I would like to take just a 13:05:15 10 few minutes to kick off our afternoon session 13:05:18 11 and explain some of the content that we have 13:05:21 12 this afternoon. 13:05:23 13 As I described early this morning, 13:05:24 14 there are a number of studies, a number of 13:05:26 15 concepts and alternatives that have been 13:05:29 16 proposed by a variety of folks, and we have 13:05:33 17 tried to get many of those fundamentally on the 13:05:36 18 table today through all of these presentations. 13:05:40 19 So I would like to just kind of walk 13:05:45 20 through kind of a quick look at this afternoon's 13:05:47 21 set of presentations, Norm. And since you know 13:05:49 22 I need to duck out early, I appreciate the 13:05:50 155 1 forbearance so I can do this and duck out. 13:05:50 2 The first set of topics that will 13:05:55 3 start right as soon as I'm done is -- we called 13:05:58 4 EELV considerations, and in that we would ask 13:06:03 5 NASA Lynn Cline to talk about our current use of 13:06:06 6 the EELVs. 13:06:10 7 We would then ask ULA -- and I believe 13:06:12 8 it's going to be Mike Gass -- to present ULA's 13:06:14 9 activities as well. 13:06:20 10 And then everybody knows, imagine 13:06:21 11 that, that there has been an Aerospace study 13:06:26 12 going on about use of EELVs. Is that a surprise 13:06:30 13 to anybody in the room? Okay. 13:06:34 14 We have managed to get to where we can 13:06:35 15 have a public briefing of some of the summary 13:06:39 16 comments from that report. Gary Pulliam from 13:06:42 17 Aerospace will talk about that. We don't have a 13:06:47 18 final report yet. We've had to do a public 13:06:50 19 version of that report, and we're still in the 13:06:54 20 final throes of clearance. But Gary is here, 13:06:58 21 and he's going to give us the top level findings 13:06:58 22 of that. 13:07:00 156 1 After that, then we're also going to 13:07:02 2 talk about some of our other launch providers 13:07:02 3 and particularly talk about our Commercial 13:07:05 4 Orbital -- COTS program. 13:07:14 5 And, again, in a similar fashion, ask 13:07:16 6 NASA -- in the first case, Doug Cooke -- to talk 13:07:19 7 about the COTS program in terms of its 13:07:23 8 demonstration program; ask both SpaceX and 13:07:27 9 Orbital to talk about their activities; and then 13:07:30 10 also ask NASA/Mike Suffredini to talk about, 13:07:32 11 now, in the follow-on, the cargo resupply 13:07:36 12 contract that has just been awarded -- the same 13:07:39 13 two companies involved but have Mike highlight 13:07:41 14 the process and importance to the ISS program of 13:07:45 15 that particular activity. 13:07:48 16 Then to close out, there are a couple 13:07:50 17 of others that I would call alternative 13:07:52 18 architectures that have been out in the public 13:07:55 19 eye -- the blogsphere, whatever we call 13:08:01 20 ourself -- for a long time, and we did want to 13:08:04 21 have some discussion of those for the panel to 13:08:07 22 at least introduce those ideas. 13:08:09 157 1 One is usually called Direct, and we 13:08:11 2 have asked Steve Metschan to pitch for the 13:08:14 3 Direct team. So we'll hear that. 13:08:19 4 The other one is that there is a 13:08:22 5 variety of options that can be called Shuttle C, 13:08:24 6 Shuttle Side Mount. The challenge of that is 13:08:27 7 that the shuttle-derived options some years ago 13:08:29 8 had an industry team that had been put together 13:08:34 9 and was doing a lot of that definition but that 13:08:37 10 had tapered off as we had proceeded down the 13:08:40 11 baseline. And so to try to get that on the 13:08:45 12 table, I was in kind of an awkward situation of 13:08:47 13 finding a spokesperson that could bring the most 13:08:50 14 recent discussions and ideas of that. 13:08:53 15 So I will admit that it looks strange, 13:08:55 16 but the person that I could twist his arm into 13:08:58 17 doing this is John Shannon. So I know it looks 13:09:02 18 a little bit odd of having NASA propose an 13:09:07 19 alternative architecture, but as it is the most 13:09:11 20 shuttle-tied architecture, I have asked John to 13:09:14 21 tie those pieces together, even though it 13:09:18 22 represents lots -- a lot of different NASA and 13:09:21 158 1 industry components. 13:09:23 2 So don't read overly much into the 13:09:25 3 fact that I browbeat John into doing that. 13:09:26 4 That's just the best way we could get that 13:09:29 5 option on the table. 13:09:31 6 So with that, I will turn it back over 13:09:32 7 to the Chair and ask for any opening comments, 13:09:34 8 Norm, and then we could start with Lynn. 13:09:38 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Why don't we go right 13:09:40 10 ahead. 13:09:42 11 MS. CLINE: Thank you. Good 13:09:45 12 afternoon. Can you bring up my charts, please. 13:09:49 13 I was asked to represent NASA's 13:09:54 14 current use of the Evolved Expendable Launch 13:09:57 15 Vehicle. Next chart, please. 13:10:03 16 I am going to first just put that into 13:10:05 17 a little bit of context. 13:10:07 18 We have a NASA Launch Services program 13:10:09 19 that was consolidated in 1998 at our Kennedy 13:10:12 20 Space Center, and this is our acquisition arm 13:10:17 21 and also provides our mission assurance and 13:10:18 22 management for commercial launch services that 13:10:21 159 1 NASA acquires for its missions. We don't own 13:10:24 2 the vehicles. We buy commercial services in 13:10:28 3 this case. 13:10:32 4 We use a mixed fleet of vehicles, 13:10:33 5 range of performance classes, and we support, to 13:10:36 6 the largest degree, our Science Mission 13:10:41 7 Directorate with their programs but also some 13:10:45 8 other NASA directorates. For example, the LRO 13:10:47 9 mission that's on the pad today is for 13:10:52 10 Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. And we 13:10:55 11 also do some launch services for other 13:10:57 12 government agencies. 13= :11:00 13 We use a variety of ranges, including 13:11:01 14 out at Kwajalein, at Wallops/Kodiak as well as 13:11:04 15 the well-known Cape Canaveral and out at 13:11:09 16 Vandenberg. 13:11:15 17 We have a contract mechanism known as 13:11:17 18 the NASA Launch Services contract. This is set 13:11:19 19 up as a competition-based contract -- proposers 13:11:22 20 for launch services on ramp to this contract. 13:11:31 21 We have fixed price arrangement, and as we have 13:11:36 22 a particular mission we're ready to purchase a 13:11:38 160 1 service for, then we do a competition based on 13:11:41 2 the mass orbit, the class of payload and the 13:11:44 3 best value to the government. 13:11:50 4 We are in the process of extending 13:11:51 5 that contract so we have a longer ordering 13:11:54 6 period because the current one expires next 13:11:57 7 year. 13:12:00 8 Most recently we did a buy of launch 13:12:00 9 services for four missions -- tracking and data 13:12:03 10 relay satellite, the radiation belt storm probes 13:12:08 11 and the magnetospheric multiscale mission. All 13:12:12 12 of those were selected to go on an Atlas V. 13:12:15 13 Some of the issues we're facing in 13:12:20 14 launch services is loss of medium class launch 13:12:23 15 service providers, which has been 50 percent of 13:12:27 16 NASA's missions historically, particularly for 13:12:30 17 science. We're in transition. I'll talk about 13:12:34 18 that in just a little bit. 13:12:36 19 We have a compressed manifest, and 13:12:37 20 we're also looking to the future as how the 13:12:40 21 infrastructure costs are shared across the 13:12:44 22 government. Next chart, please. 13:12:47 161 1 This is our current planning manifest 13:12:49 2 that we have, and I'll just make a couple of 13:12:53 3 general comments. If you look at the small 13:12:56 4 class at the top, you'll see that we have an 13:12:58 5 oversupply of vehicles and an underutilization. 13:13:02 6 If you look in the medium class, this 13:13:06 7 demonstrates the transition period that we're in 13:13:10 8 with the Delta II discontinuation. 13:13:12 9 And since there's a bit of a lead time 13:13:15 10 when we put out a proposal for our science 13:13:18 11 missions, you've seen a shift over into that 13:13:20 12 intermediate class. And if you look in those 13:13:23 13 awards that we have given in that intermediate 13:13:26 14 to heavy class, NASA is a strong user of the 13:13:29 15 Atlas V. Next, please. 13:13:34 16 This is just a snapshot of our history 13:13:36 17 of launches. With regard to the expendable 13:13:42 18 launch vehicle, NASA's first use of Atlas V was 13:13:46 19 back in 2002 -- I'm sorry -- the first Atlas V 13:13:50 20 was launched in 2002, and NASA's first use was 13:13:55 21 in 2005 for the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter. 13:13:58 22 And the first use of Delta IV, NASA 13:14:03 162 1 has not had its own mission on it, but GOES was 13:14:06 2 on Delta IV in 2006. And another GOES mission 13:14:10 3 is on the pad right now for a Delta IV for a 13:14:15 4 launch scheduled for the 26th. 13:14:19 5 And we've had a very, very good track 13:14:20 6 record across our program, which was recently 13:14:23 7 marred with the failure of a Taurus with the 13:14:26 8 Orbiting Carbon Observatory on board. Next, 13:14:31 9 please. 13:14:31 10 This is really just provided to the 13:14:34 11 committee for reference. These are the small 13:14:36 12 launch vehicles that are available to us to use. 13:14:38 13 Next. 13:14:42 14 And then this is the medium to 13:14:43 15 intermediate and heavy class vehicles, and it 13:14:46 16 gives you a sense of the range of capabilities 13:14:49 17 that they offer. Next, please. 13:14:54 18 I want to talk a little bit about some 13:14:56 19 considerations. 13:15:00 20 Obviously for the EELV, given that 13:15:02 21 range of vehicles, this being the highest 13:15:05 22 performance class, it is at the high end of the 13:15:09 163 1 cost spectrum as well. 13:15:12 2 And another factor to keep in mind is 13:15:13 3 that the Department of Defense currently covers 13:15:17 4 the infrastructure for maintaining this EELV 13:15:22 5 capability. The National Space Transportation 13:15:26 6 policy calls for a review no later than 2010 to 13:15:30 7 evaluate the long-term requirements, funding and 13:15:35 8 management responsibilities and infrastructure. 13:15:38 9 So that is something that we, as a government, 13:15:41 10 will have to address across the agencies as to 13:15:43 11 whether the current financial base will be the 13:15:45 12 one we continue to use or not. 13:15:48 13 For our science missions, going to 13:15:51 14 EELV is required for certain missions, but it 13:15:56 15 also in many cases is more performance than we 13:16:00 16 actually need. And if we use that level, not 13:16:04 17 only do we have the higher cost of that vehicle 13:16:07 18 but it also can increase the cost of the 13:16:10 19 payload, particularly if they start growing to 13:16:12 20 fill that performance capability, and the more 13:16:16 21 we pay for launch services means the less we 13:16:18 22 have available for science missions. So those 13:16:21 164 1 are very closely linked in what we can 13:16:24 2 accomplish in our program. 13:16:27 3 With regard to infrastructure, we have 13:16:29 4 a pad on each coast for each of the EELV 13:16:35 5 vehicles available. We are finding recently 13:16:39 6 that the payload processing facilities near the 13:16:42 7 pads are limited and becoming a bit of a 13:16:45 8 bottleneck, and we've been collectively working 13:16:49 9 on how to deal with that. 13:16:51 10 With regard to the industrial base, 13:16:55 11 I'll just say again, we have an oversupply in 13:16:58 12 the small class. We have some uncertainty in 13:17:00 13 the medium class. 13:17:05 14 You will hear about the Commercial 13:17:07 15 Orbital Transportation Services program and our 13:17:11 16 Commercial Resupply Services. And so wearing my 13:17:12 17 hat of overseeing the Space Station program, we 13:17:16 18 very much want Commercial Resupply Services to 13:17:22 19 succeed to help us to sustain the station, and 13:17:23 20 wearing my launch services hat, I want them to 13:17:26 21 succeed because those are very likely new medium 13:17:29 22 class vehicles that we can use for our science 13:17:33 165 1 missions. So the station is becoming kind of a 13:17:35 2 market -- initial market entry for them for us. 13:17:39 3 There are questions in the industrial 13:17:44 4 base about -- related to mergers and supply 13:17:46 5 chains. There's always a tension between having 13:17:50 6 parallel capabilities and merging things for 13:17:54 7 efficiency. And the question is to what degree 13:17:58 8 do you integrate or use the same components and 13:18:00 9 gain those efficiencies, but then if you have a 13:18:06 10 failure, do you have a fleet-wide impact where 13:18:10 11 we're all grounded for a period of time. 13:18:15 12 There's a line about multiple users 13:18:17 13 risk approaches. That is to say that NASA, the 13:18:20 14 Air Force, NRO, commercial customers, we each 13:18:25 15 have our own way of looking at and assessing 13:18:29 16 risk for our missions and what our fallback 13:18:33 17 options are. 13:18:36 18 For NASA, we have been in the mode, 13:18:38 19 particularly with our science missions, of 13:18:41 20 flying unique payloads, one-of-a-kind, don't 13:18:43 21 have a backup. Others may be doing 13:18:46 22 constellations or a series of satellites so they 13:18:50 166 1 have a different posture. And that affects how 13:18:57 2 we look at mission assurance, how much risk 13:19:00 3 we're willing to accept, what kind of reviews we 13:19:02 4 need to do. 13:19:06 5 The schedule right now is a crowded 13:19:07 6 manifest, especially for Atlas V. And, again, 13:19:10 7 we've been working collectively across the 13:19:14 8 community to see what we can do to increase the 13:19:17 9 throughput there. 13:19:20 10 Just a couple of things to think about 13:19:22 11 if one were to go down the path of doing human 13:19:25 12 rating on EELV: Given our use of these for all 13:19:28 13 of these other missions and different approaches 13:19:33 14 to risk, would there be two lines of vehicles or 13:19:37 15 one; would there be a separate infrastructure or 13:19:43 16 would we have to figure out how to share pads 13:19:47 17 and processing facilities and so on; and to what 13:19:51 18 degree would we have common systems that affect 13:19:54 19 the fleet or different risk assessments for 13:19:57 20 human versus robotic missions. 13:20:00 21 And so those are all just -- I'm not 13:20:03 22 giving you answers. I'm just giving you things 13:20:06 167 1 to think about as you look at this. 13:20:08 2 And I provided some backup slides that 13:20:10 3 just shows you the history of the vehicles, but 13:20:17 4 that was all I had to present. 13:20:20 5 MR. BEJMUK: Can I ask you a question, 13:20:22 6 Lynn? 13:20:24 7 MS. CLINE: Go ahead, Bo. 13:20:22 8 MR. BEJMUK: When you talk about risk, 13:20:22 9 do you mean like loss of mission numbers? 13:20:26 10 MS. CLINE: Yes. Yes. 13:20:31 11 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. 13:20:22 12 MS. CLINE: Yeah. Questions about are 13:20:32 13 we ready to launch or not, are you willing to 13:20:33 14 go -- do you want to go on a vehicle that has a 13:20:36 15 long history of successful missions or are you 13:20:42 16 willing to accept a higher risk and be a 13:20:46 17 demonstration payload or an early payload on a 13:20:49 18 new mission -- those kinds of things. 13:20:53 19 MR. BEJMUK: Let me just follow up. 13:20:56 20 You had done on this table on page 5, I guess, 13:20:58 21 low, medium -- low for the risk. 13:21:02 22 Do you actually use numbers like LOM 13:21:05 168 1 like -- our Constellation friends do -- or do 13:21:10 2 you? 13:21:10 3 MS. CLINE: We actually have a series 13:21:18 4 of -- we go by a set of categories where once a 13:21:21 5 vehicle has been certified to a certain category 13:21:24 6 then we have our payloads certified to a 13:21:28 7 particular category. 13:21:32 8 So if you are, let's say, a Mars Rover 13:21:33 9 mission that we consider very critical, 13:21:37 10 one-of-a-kind, put a huge investment into it, 13:21:39 11 then we're going to want to go on a vehicle that 13:21:42 12 has a more reliable history or has been 13:21:44 13 certified to a certain level. If you are a 13:21:47 14 payload that's in a different category that's 13:21:50 15 willing to accept risk, then we'll match it to a 13:21:52 16 different type of vehicle. 13:21:56 17 So it's not so much loss of mission 13:21:57 18 numbers as it is trying to pair from the 13:22:00 19 beginning which payload goes on what kind of 13:22:04 20 vehicle. 13:22:07 21 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 13:22:08 22 MR. GREASON: I think it's really 13:22:09 169 1 great that you have, as an organization, worked 13:22:11 2 out how to manage all of this risk and put, you 13:22:13 3 know, nationally critical high value payloads on 13:22:16 4 these launchers. 13:22:19 5 How much does that mission assurance 13:22:20 6 activity that you do contribute to the total 13:22:22 7 cost of the mission? 13:22:25 8 MS. CLINE: That's a hard one to 13:22:27 9 measure, I think. 13:22:29 10 There was a study done a number of 13:22:31 11 years ago that looked across NASA, Air Force and 13:22:33 12 NRO management approaches and looked at our 13:22:37 13 respective track records and came to the 13:22:41 14 conclusion that we were adding value through 13:22:44 15 that mission assurance approach, but I think 13:22:47 16 it's always subject to some level of judgment as 13:22:50 17 how far you go. 13:22:55 18 In our contract we have put in place 13:22:56 19 certain things where we want to just have 13:23:01 20 insight and others where we want some stronger 13:23:04 21 oversight, given that they're not our vehicles 13:23:09 22 but they are our payloads. And so I think over 13:23:12 170 1 time we've worked through that with our 13:23:15 2 contractors as to what our respective roles are. 13:23:17 3 Any other questions? 13:23:25 4 All right. I'll hand off to my ULA 13:23:28 5 colleague. 13:23:31 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 13:23:32 7 Mike... 13:23:33 8 MR. GASS: Thank you, Lynn, and thanks 13:23:38 9 for those questions. Hopefully I'll have some 13:23:41 10 of the answers. 13:23:44 11 Norm and Committee, first I'd like to 13:23:46 12 thank you for inviting United Launch Alliance to 13:23:49 13 speak at this public hearing. My name is 13:23:54 14 Michael Gass. I'm the president and chief 13:23:54 15 executive officer of United Launch Alliance. 13:23:52 16 Like many who will be here before you, 13:24:00 17 I share deep appreciation for the importance of 13:24:02 18 human space flight for the American people and, 13:24:02 19 indeed, the entire world. I also share an 13:24:05 20 awareness that we're endanger of seeing U.S. 13:24:09 21 leadership in space exploration erode for the 13:24:11 22 lack of clear consensus on an affordable, 13:24:13 171 1 sustainable and executable plan for the 13:24:17 2 United States Human Space Flight. 13:24:19 3 So on behalf of the 4,000 women and 13:24:21 4 men of United Launch Alliance entrusted with the 13:24:25 5 task of delivering spacecraft safely and 13:24:26 6 reliably to space, I want to thank the members 13:24:26 7 of the committee for taking on this task. It 13:24:29 8 will not be easy. 13:24:31 9 My intention today is to share ideas 13:24:33 10 of potential credible alternatives and to 13:24:35 11 encourage the committee to create the forms for 13:24:38 12 appropriate technical evaluation of the options 13:24:41 13 and assess against affordable/sustainability to 13:24:43 14 support our nation's priorities and acquisition 13:24:46 15 approaches to human space flight. 13:24:49 16 Let me just, once again, add my 13:24:51 17 commitment -- my personal and corporate 13:24:53 18 commitment that, whatever the committee's 13:24:56 19 recommendations and the President's decisions 13:25:01 20 are, you have ULA's full support for its 13:25:02 21 execution. The constancy and purpose of the 13:25:06 22 nation of a consensus is more important than any 13:25:08 172 1 company's or individual's ideas. Next slide, 13:25:11 2 please. 13:25:15 3 Joint utilization of flight proven 13:25:16 4 systems by NASA, DOD and commercial providers 13:25:19 5 does provide a safe affordable and sustainable 13:25:23 6 approach to exploration. Leveraging the 13:25:27 7 existing investments will reduce annual stand 13:25:29 8 alone lien costs. 13:25:32 9 ULA is proud to operate two 13:25:35 10 state-of-the-art Evolved Expendable Launch 13:25:38 11 Vehicle systems which have launched 13:25:43 12 24 successful missions. These systems are 13:25:43 13 utilized to support our most critical National 13:25:45 14 Security Space assets and the most audacious 13:25:48 15 civil science programs, including the Lunar 13:25:48 16 Reconnaissance Orbiter that we plan to launch 13:25:53 17 tomorrow afternoon. 13:25:55 18 We have learned over the course of 13:25:56 19 history of developing and operating complex 13:25:58 20 space systems it is a financially stable 13:26:01 21 program, whether commercially stable or through 13:26:04 22 government funding stability, that enables a 13:26:08 173 1 strong systems engineering capability that 13:26:11 2 leverages product evolution, that encourages 13:26:12 3 test and flight trial repetition, that leads to 13:26:15 4 reliability, innovation and cost efficiency. 13:26:19 5 Human space flight utilization of EELV 13:26:21 6 will only improve the cost structure and 13:26:23 7 reliability for all of our national users and 13:26:26 8 make the entire EELV industrial base 13:26:28 9 infrastructure more internationally competitive. 13:26:31 10 We have also learned that the fixed 13:26:34 11 cost of maintaining and operating launch 13:26:36 12 infrastructure creates a long-term lien and 13:26:38 13 spaces -- and shapes the budget challenges of 13:26:42 14 entire agencies or companies for decades to 13:26:45 15 come. 13:26:48 16 ULA stands ready to support the 13:26:48 17 committee on evaluation of options that would 13:26:51 18 leverage the existing national and private 13:26:53 19 investments made in the EELV system for future 13:26:55 20 human space flight. 13:26:59 21 Delta IV Heavy provides a safe, low 13:27:00 22 cost capability to launch Orion, we believe, by 13:27:02 174 1 2014 with greater than 20 percent performance 13:27:05 2 margin. If tasked, ULA working with NASA 13:27:08 3 engineers, the Air Force and their aerospace 13:27:13 4 support team, we believe the Delta system can 13:27:16 5 support Orion with credible cost forecasts and 13:27:19 6 schedules based on the recent development 13:27:23 7 experience and meet the reliability needs for 13:27:24 8 human space flight sooner than any other 13:27:27 9 alternative. 13:27:29 10 Many of the system improvements 13:27:30 11 contemplated for human space flight are already 13:27:32 12 part of a planned evolution to benefit our 13:27:34 13 national security missions that we are currently 13:27:37 14 planning and supporting. 13:27:40 15 Further, we believe that Atlas V 13:27:41 16 provides commercial crew capability to ISS and 13:27:44 17 potentially even earlier. We have supported 13:27:48 18 several commercial entrepreneurs that found 13:27:50 19 Atlas IV well suited for these potential 13:27:54 20 ventures. The challenge was not the technical 13:27:55 21 solution but closing the business case in the 13:27:59 22 inherent market and venture risk. 13:28:01 175 1 Further evolution of EELV systems and 13:28:04 2 components provide options and flexibility to 13:28:08 3 explore the Moon and beyond. One of the issues 13:28:10 4 I observed from past exploration architecture is 13:28:13 5 the tendency to allow a point design for launch 13:28:18 6 systems to lock you into an inflexible 13:28:20 7 architecture. 13:28:22 8 The Atlas and Delta launch systems 13:28:23 9 have an inherent flexibility in their design 13:28:24 10 potential. We have developed evolutionary 13:28:26 11 incremental variance of these systems all of the 13:28:29 12 way up to 100,000 metric tons plus for 13:28:31 13 consideration. Not only is there vehicle 13:28:36 14 flexibility but there's options available for 13:28:40 15 manufacturing integration and launch operations 13:28:42 16 to address workforce transition and unique 13:28:46 17 requirements. 13:28:50 18 ULA is prepared to support the 13:28:55 19 committee with a thorough evaluation of all of 13:28:55 20 these options. So let me elaborate on some of 13:28:56 21 these thoughts. Next slide, please. 13:29:00 22 The pictures represent our diverse 13:29:02 176 1 capabilities of the expendable launch vehicle 13:29:06 2 fleet. ULA is proud of our role in our 13:29:10 3 partnership supporting national programs and 13:29:13 4 cherish the intellectual capital that we are 13:29:16 5 entrusted with that was gained in over 50 years 13:29:17 6 and 1300 flight experiences that were 13:29:19 7 accomplished by our heritage companies. Boeing 13:29:22 8 and Lockheed Martin and the predecessor firms 13:29:25 9 that were consolidated over the past decades 13:29:28 10 represent this experience. This intellectual 13:29:32 11 capital for launch is embodied in our current 13:29:34 12 experienced workforce and in the proven systems 13:29:38 13 for engineering and management that we operate 13:29:41 14 today. 13:29:43 15 The recent successful development 13:29:44 16 experience of Delta IV and Atlas V were 13:29:46 17 developed in the last decade. EELV systems 13:29:50 18 represent over $4 billion of government and 13:29:54 19 private investment that were fielded 13:29:57 20 approximately four years from the authority to 13:29:59 21 proceed to their first flight. The key theme I 13:30:01 22 want to emphasize throughout this presentation 13:30:04 177 1 is the benefit of reliability through the flight 13:30:07 2 trials of that fleet and a robust infrastructure 13:30:10 3 that comes with a sustained business 13:30:14 4 architecture. Next slide. 13:30:20 5 This slide represents the building 13:30:20 6 blocks for exploration, and it represents three 13:30:23 7 important parts. 13:30:26 8 First, we believe the nation needs to 13:30:28 9 go forth with an Orion launch capability to have 13:30:32 10 human space capability with a 13:30:34 11 government-provided launch capability. 13:30:35 12 We also think in parallel there must 13:30:37 13 be a commercial crew capability. As I 13:30:41 14 mentioned, the Atlas and Delta are potential, 13:30:43 15 and there's many entrepreneurs thinking about 13:30:45 16 entering that market as well. And it should be 13:30:48 17 done in parallel, and the government should 13:30:50 18 create an environment to support that. And the 13:30:52 19 market that should have is that support to the 13:30:54 20 International Space Station from 2014 through 13:30:58 21 that 2020 time frame to give that market an 13:31:00 22 opportunity to mature. 13:31:04 178 1 And on top of that, we show the third 13:31:05 2 leg of that -- of those building blocks is the 13:31:08 3 heavy lift variance. 13:31:10 4 In the recommendations that we put 13:31:11 5 forth is that it provides time for trade studies 13:31:13 6 on that future architecture. As we're focused 13:31:15 7 on the Orion and the commercial crew getting 13:31:19 8 capability, we have some time to hone the 13:31:19 9 architecture and pick a flight variant that 13:31:21 10 could be fielded to support the mission beyond 13:31:25 11 the low Earth orbit International Space Station. 13:31:27 12 As stated, we think that NASA could 13:31:34 13 leverage the Delta IV EELV system to support the 13:31:36 14 current Orion with a safe architecture, and the 13:31:38 15 time that we've outlined on this schedule is 13:31:41 16 equivalent to the time that we put forth for the 13:31:43 17 entire development of three different versions 13:31:46 18 of the Delta IV system to its first flight. 13:31:48 19 Next slide, please. 13:31:53 20 We do not pretend at ULA to be the 13:31:58 21 nation's expert in human space flight, but we 13:32:02 22 have been involved with NASA in Commercial Human 13:32:05 179 1 Rating 1 studies for the past eight years. 13:32:08 2 We've worked with commercial ventures, and we 13:32:10 3 are an active participant with NASA on the 13:32:15 4 Ares I-X program. 13:32:17 5 We believe flight experience is key to 13:32:19 6 human rating. Detailed understanding of the 13:32:20 7 system behavior and environments is -- getting 13:32:22 8 the benefit of understanding your system margins 13:32:25 9 and inherent risks. With the flight experience, 13:32:27 10 we'll be able to develop precise abort criteria 13:32:31 11 with a robust emergency detection system that 13:32:36 12 would fly on every mission, both human and 13:32:39 13 non-human space flights. 13:32:41 14 Non-crewed missions retire the risk 13:32:44 15 prior to that first crewed mission. 13:32:47 16 And I put what looks like a ruler on 13:32:49 17 the bottom, but that's actually our flight 13:32:52 18 experience that goes on in parallel with an 13:32:55 19 ongoing development program. And a lesson, when 13:32:58 20 we developed EELV, to blend that experience of 13:33:01 21 current flight and development expertise is +key 13:33:05 22 to that message. 13:33:09 180 1 Starting with a highly reliable 13:33:10 2 system, addition of the emergency detection 13:33:13 3 system and leveraging some of the -- some 13:33:16 4 redundant critical flight measurements, the 13:33:17 5 abort criteria can be developed, and matched 13:33:21 6 with a good crew safety system, we will be able 13:33:24 7 to deliver that safe human rating. Next slide, 13:33:27 8 please. 13:33:27 9 Delta IV Heavy was launched two times 13:33:33 10 operationally with 100 percent mission success. 13:33:36 11 The Delta IV human rating requirements 13:33:40 12 is well understood. I've talked about the EDS. 13:33:45 13 We believe, as Lynn mentioned, a separate launch 13:33:48 14 pad with a separate crew ingress and egress is 13:33:50 15 required. We also will have a good handle on 13:33:54 16 some additional reliability improvements that we 13:33:56 17 would incorporate into the vehicle, and it would 13:34:00 18 be synergistically required with our national 13:34:01 19 security missions. 13:34:04 20 We believe there's greater than 13:34:05 21 20 percent performance margin for both the ISS 13:34:06 22 and lunar trajectories that allows us to provide 13:34:10 181 1 the shaping to eliminate any concerns of black 13:34:12 2 zones for abort criteria. 13:34:14 3 The DOD RS-68 engine upgrade we're 13:34:16 4 currently working on is the enabler that 13:34:20 5 provides this performance margin. 13:34:24 6 Liquid systems of EELV have the 13:34:28 7 ability to create more benign launch and abort 13:34:32 8 environments. The changes to establish the 13:34:35 9 capability are minimum, and the improvements are 13:34:38 10 synergistic. We think we can be available 13:34:42 11 within four and a half years with credible cost 13:34:45 12 estimates. Next slide. 13:34:49 13 I mentioned in the beginning about 13:34:49 14 concept of operations, and I offered two 13:34:51 15 examples. 13:34:54 16 The two examples -- one is basically 13:34:55 17 the maximum synergy where we do the human space 13:34:56 18 flight utilizing the existing ULA infrastructure 13:34:59 19 combined with the DOD program, NASA science and 13:35:02 20 our commercial endeavors. That's what we used 13:35:05 21 in those cost estimates that I shared before on 13:35:08 22 the previous slide -- is based on Example 1. 13:35:11 182 1 Example 2 is the one that we'd look 13:35:13 2 forward to support and to go into more detail 13:35:18 3 about, which is about more of a separation where 13:35:21 4 NASA has an integration and operation role of 13:35:24 5 some unique infrastructure, and let me elaborate 13:35:27 6 that. 13:35:31 7 But before we do, these are only two 13:35:31 8 examples of many different ways that we could 13:35:33 9 approach the problem, and I want to just 13:35:36 10 highlight the Example 2 for a moment on the next 13:35:39 11 slide. 13:35:44 12 Example 2 is highlighted here with a 13:35:45 13 map of the United States that has three things 13:35:47 14 identified. The smallest dots represent 13:35:49 15 locations of our industrial base -- the key 13:35:52 16 suppliers for the EELV systems, critical 13:35:55 17 resources to the success of the program. The 13:35:58 18 larger red dots represent the locations of our 13:36:00 19 ULA facilities. And the yellow stars represent 13:36:04 20 some additional facilities we would recommend in 13:36:08 21 relationship to this approach. 13:36:12 22 The approach that we would recommend 13:36:13 183 1 that we maintain detailed part fabrication and 13:36:15 2 tank manufacturing in our Decatur, Alabama 13:36:21 3 facility with use of a common supply chain from 13:36:24 4 that industrial base that's represented here. 13:36:27 5 We would recommend that NASA establish 13:36:29 6 an engineering leadership team at the Marshall 13:36:30 7 Space Flight Center which is only about 15, 13:36:34 8 20 miles from our Decatur facility to make sure 13:36:36 9 they're the focus for the human rating elements 13:36:36 10 and the integration of the Orion vehicle. 13:36:39 11 We believe, when looking at the 13:36:41 12 overall constraints and needs of the program, an 13:36:42 13 additional area would be required for a final 13:36:45 14 assembly of this vehicle. We'd hope it would 13:36:48 15 have the same underlying technical baseline but 13:36:52 16 providing two assembly areas for production 13:36:58 17 rate, and utilizing existing facilities like 13:36:59 18 NASA's Michoud facility is recommended on this 13:37:00 19 slide. 13:37:04 20 The third element is, again, that 13:37:04 21 launch complex. Whether it's Launch Complex 37A 13:37:07 22 adjacent to our existing launch complex or 13:37:11 184 1 utilizing 39 should be evaluated carefully for 13:37:16 2 best operational activity. 13:37:19 3 One of the things we talk about many 13:37:21 4 times when we talk about synergism and this 13:37:22 5 approach is the efficiency of use of resources, 13:37:26 6 and resources typically is about dollars. I 13:37:29 7 want to emphasize the importance of the human 13:37:31 8 capital resource of our nation, and we need to 13:37:36 9 find a way to be able to harness the expertise 13:37:37 10 and find jobs on this program to ensure the 13:37:41 11 appropriate transition of that experience 13:37:42 12 resource as well as creating the opportunity for 13:37:45 13 the next generation. And this would enable some 13:37:48 14 of those great opportunities. Next slide. 13:37:51 15 We talked a little bit about EELV for 13:37:55 16 commercial human space. Again, we believe the 13:37:59 17 requirements are well understood. We've been 13:38:01 18 working with several of the companies, and they 13:38:03 19 were nice enough to let us use their pictures of 13:38:06 20 their potential spacecraft. And we gave credit 13:38:09 21 for them at the bottom of the slide. 13:38:14 22 I would want to also acknowledge that 13:38:18 185 1 United Launch Alliance, as part of our consent 13:38:20 2 order and master agreement, we're in the launch 13:38:24 3 vehicle business. We cannot be a provider of 13:38:25 4 that upper stage in service. We can launch 13:38:28 5 services to companies that want to be the prime 13:38:30 6 for that service and build those spacecrafts. 13:38:33 7 So being a merchant supplier of 13:38:37 8 launch, we're capable of working with many 13:38:40 9 teams. We believe we can offer them a low 13:38:42 10 non-recurring opportunity. Again, if human 13:38:45 11 space flight is coming on to the extended launch 13:38:47 12 vehicle, we'd recommend a second launch pad and, 13:38:48 13 with increased rate, have a competitive or 13:38:51 14 affordable cost. 13:38:55 15 Again, as Lynn mentioned, the 13:38:57 16 characterization from numerous flights both for 13:39:02 17 NASA, the DOD, the intelligence community and 13:39:06 18 some commercial spacecraft provides the data to 13:39:09 19 characterize for future flight safety. 13:39:12 20 EELV and the launch vehicle itself is 13:39:16 21 not on the critical path to this activity. We 13:39:23 22 believe we could have the vehicle ready long 13:39:24 186 1 before the development and qualification of 13:39:26 2 those spacecraft that you see depicted. 13:39:28 3 Again, the challenge for ULA and the 13:39:31 4 potential commercial operators is the 13:39:33 5 non-recurring implementation costs for both 13:39:35 6 spacecraft development and launch vehicle 13:39:39 7 integration and our EELV recurring costs. We 13:39:41 8 are working with our DOD, NRO and NASA customers 13:39:47 9 to buy launches more efficiently for government 13:39:49 10 use and which would enable better value for the 13:39:52 11 potential domestic commercial ventures. Next 13:39:56 12 slide, please. 13:40:00 13 I talked about the evolution of a 13:40:00 14 flexible -- that enables a flexible mission 13:40:03 15 architecture. This was a chart that was started 13:40:06 16 doing some studies with NASA back in the 13:40:09 17 2003-2004 time frame that we've further honed 13:40:14 18 after we became United Launch Alliance. The 13:40:16 19 initial studies were done as two independent 13:40:18 20 program teams. 13:40:20 21 We joked when we were forming ULA that 13:40:21 22 we'd up with the Franken rocket, and lo and 13:40:23 187 1 behold, it's becoming -- it's coming truth that 13:40:26 2 there's a best of both qualities that are being 13:40:28 3 integrated in our future evolution. 13:40:32 4 The important messages of this chart 13:40:35 5 is the modularity of the approach, that there's 13:40:38 6 different break points and opportunities for 13:40:41 7 different architectures, that all of the steps 13:40:44 8 have value to all of the customers and that 13:40:46 9 there be flight used on many of our current 13:40:50 10 NRO/DOD missions. 13:40:56 11 The first step that we always 13:40:57 12 highlight is the upper stage. It's the area 13:40:58 13 that can give us more performance, more 13:41:00 14 reliability, and the development of a common 13:41:01 15 upper stage with either improved RL-10 or a new 13:41:03 16 upper stage engine is something first and 13:41:08 17 foremost in our road map. 13:41:13 18 The areas in blue are things that we 13:41:16 19 could do using the existing launch 13:41:18 20 infrastructure and current engine systems. 13= :41:19 21 The orange, which we call Phrase 3, 13:41:21 22 represents things that would require new launch 13:41:23 188 1 infrastructure and, you know, the brick and 13:41:25 2 mortar of launch pads, flame buckets, and all of 13:41:27 3 the GSC is the expensive non-recurring element 13:41:32 4 and would need new propulsion systems. 13:41:34 5 The key message for all of this is 13:41:39 6 that there are choices and that there is synergy 13:41:41 7 in its use. Next slide. 13:41:45 8 We believe human space flight on EELV 13:41:47 9 could potentially enhance safety, lower costs by 13:41:54 10 enhancing and leveraging the flight tempo of the 13:41:57 11 existing programs. 13:42:01 12 Accelerating we also believe we could 13:42:04 13 accelerate initial capabilities to support the 13:42:07 14 utilization of the International Space Station. 13:42:10 15 We can enable -- if we do develop 13:42:14 16 those savings, enable those resources to be 13:42:16 17 applied to supporting missions to the Moon and 13:42:19 18 other destinations beyond low Earth orbit. 13:42:22 19 We believe the right policy and the 13:42:24 20 right acquisition strategies will stimulate 13:42:26 21 commercial space flight capabilities. 13:42:29 22 And we think we have provided options 13:42:32 189 1 to address workforce transition and unique 13:42:35 2 operational requirements of human space flight. 13:42:38 3 Again, we are prepared to support the 13:42:40 4 committee and NASA with the detail data for the 13:42:42 5 evaluations. I encourage an open and thorough 13:42:45 6 evaluation of options which will lead to the 13:42:48 7 best solution for the nation, and I thank you 13:42:50 8 for your leadership in doing that. 13:42:52 9 I'd be available to answer questions. 13:42:55 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yeah. Thank you very 13:42:57 11 much. I think we have time for one or two 13:42:58 12 questions, if folks have them. 13:43:01 13 Okay. Leroy and then Wanda. 13:43:06 14 MR. CHIAO: Yeah. Thanks very much 13:43:06 15 for your presentation. 13:43:08 16 I was interested in some of the points 13:43:09 17 you made, and, in fact, in the summary page you 13:43:11 18 said you were going to enhance safety and lower 13:43:14 19 costs. And I don't know if you saw the 13:43:17 20 morning's presentation from the NASA folks, but 13:43:20 21 it seems to run counter to what they're saying 13:43:22 22 about their Ares family. 13:43:24 190 1 I wonder if you could comment on that. 13:43:25 2 MR. GASS: I did not get to see the 13:43:28 3 presentation, and that's -- that's fundamentally 13:43:30 4 the comment about open and thorough 13:43:32 5 evaluation -- clearly need to have their 13:43:35 6 expertise of what's in the reliability, their 13:43:38 7 numbers and assessments. The aerospace team 13:43:41 8 done theirs. 13:43:45 9 To date all of these studies have been 13:43:46 10 done compartmentalized, and I think just getting 13:43:48 11 all of the experts in a room and with the 13:43:50 12 committee's oversight would get at the heart of 13:43:53 13 some of those questions. 13:43:55 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Wanda. 13:43:57 15 DR. AUSTIN: Hi, Mike. You showed a 13:44:01 16 chart that indicated you've got suppliers across 13:44:03 17 the country, and one of the concerns that has 13:44:05 18 been raised to us is about the industrial base. 13:44:07 19 Can you make a few comments about -- 13:44:10 20 in your summary chart you did not address that. 13:44:12 21 Could you say a few words about what the impact 13:44:15 22 would be. 13:44:18 191 1 MR. GASS: Absolutely, Dr. Austin. 13:44:19 2 Thank you for that question, and I apologize for 13:44:22 3 omitting it. 13:44:22 4 The number one thing that I talk 13:44:23 5 about -- and as a matter of fact, at this 13:44:23 6 morning's meeting with the intelligence 13:44:26 7 community and the Department of Defense, we were 13:44:27 8 talking about the focus on the industrial base. 13:44:28 9 It really is fragile. It's fragile for many 13:44:31 10 reasons, one of which is the work of this 13:44:37 11 committee. Without the knowledge and commitment 13:44:39 12 of a human space flight, nobody is investing, 13:44:42 13 nobody is basically planning it into their -- to 13:44:46 14 the future. 13:44:49 15 We already know about the budget 13:44:49 16 constraints of the nation, spending in the 13:44:51 17 Department of Defense. But fundamentally things 13:44:54 18 are getting really lean in some of those major 13:44:56 19 factories. 13:44:59 20 We encourage the use of expendable 13:45:01 21 launch vehicles as a strategic program. It does 13:45:07 22 have some key needs over the next ten years, and 13:45:07 192 1 the nation right now is not even using its -- 13:45:07 2 that capability strategically. We're buying 13:45:10 3 launches one at a time. So we're not able to 13:45:13 4 use EELV to give some anchor tenancy in some of 13:45:16 5 those supplier base and the knowledge for them 13:45:20 6 to either make investments. 13:45:21 7 The other thing that's going on in the 13:45:24 8 supplier base is an overcapacity. We sill have 13:45:26 9 an overcapacity in many of our facilities. We 13:45:28 10 have a challenge. As a nation, we love our 13:45:31 11 competition and have lots of competitors 13:45:35 12 domestically. But in this industry we're 13:45:36 13 dealing is international competition. 13:45:38 14 We need to make a decision -- is our 13:45:40 15 competition the global competitors or are we 13:45:43 16 looking to compete internally in this nation. 13:45:46 17 If we do that, we're going to dilute our 13:45:50 18 industrial base by spreading it around to lots 13:45:52 19 of suppliers that don't have enough business to 13:45:52 20 keep the robust processes that you need for 13:45:56 21 space flight. 13:45:58 22 DR. AUSTIN: All right. Thank you, 13:45:58 193 1 Mike. 13:45:58 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's do one more 13:45:58 3 question. Bo... 13:46:03 4 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you for your 13:46:03 5 terrific presentation, but I have one question 13:46:04 6 that has to do with the mainstay of structural 13:46:07 7 design in human systems that I've been exposed 13:46:11 8 to for many years has been use 1.4 safety 13:46:14 9 factor -- structural safety factor. 13:46:18 10 Is Delta IV and Atlas V designed to a 13:46:21 11 1.4 safety factor, and if not, how would you 13:46:25 12 overcome that, you know, challenge? 13:46:29 13 MR. GASS: The answer, Bo, you're on 13:46:32 14 the right -- and I think we're consistent with 13:46:32 15 all of those activities, and to some -- as Lynn 13:46:34 16 was showing in our criteria, those are some of 13:46:36 17 the kinds of criteria you have in those mature 13:46:39 18 systems. 13:46:42 19 We have a 2.0 factor of safety in 13:46:42 20 design margin if it's untested. We use 1.4 and 13:46:43 21 1.25, depending on its testing environment in 13:46:45 22 some of the different -- the modes it's in. But 13:46:49 194 1 clearly using the industry standards of 2.0 for 13:46:52 2 untested structure and 1.4 for tested is kind of 13:46:52 3 our mantra. And if we take exception to it, 13:46:57 4 it's noted with risk, and we have the 13:46:59 5 appropriate mitigations on that. 13:47:01 6 So we think our system is well 13:47:03 7 characterized, well understood on those margins 13:47:06 8 on not only structure but on every component 13:47:09 9 throughout the system. 13:47:11 10 MR. GREASON: Can I throw one more in 13:47:16 11 there? 13:47:16 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. One last one. 13:47:13 13 MR. GREASON: I'll be quick. 13:47:16 14 Among the industrial base concerns is, 13:47:18 15 you know, what we do for ongoing development 13:47:22 16 capability for large liquid rocket engines. I 13:47:24 17 notice that, you know, in your future growth 13:47:27 18 plan you've got the potential for putting dual 13:47:29 19 RD-180's on the Atlas V. 13:47:32 20 Have you looked at all at what it 13:47:36 21 would take to do, you know, a modern 13:47:38 22 F-1/RD-180/RD-170 class replacement to -- as an 13:47:39 195 1 alternative to just putting more of those on? 13:47:42 2 MR. GASS: Yes, Jeff, and thanks for 13:47:45 3 that question. 13:47:47 4 The number one issue for space flight 13:47:49 5 is -- if you will, it's not United Launch 13:47:51 6 Alliance with the system private. It's our 13:47:55 7 propulsion industry and our propulsion 13:48:00 8 capability. 13:48:00 9 The fact that our nation does not have 13:48:01 10 a LOX hydrocarbon engine capability is a 13:48:01 11 problem, and if there was that extra investment 13:48:07 12 dollar, that is a key resource across NASA's 13:48:10 13 civil and DOD that we need to invest in it. 13:48:14 14 From a commercial standpoint, if you will, the 13:48:17 15 business case doesn't close. The crossover 13:48:20 16 point is great. 13:48:22 17 We have looked at not only domestic -- 13:48:25 18 doing it alone, we've looked at joint 13:48:26 19 partnerships with joint developments. You had, 13:48:29 20 I think, Mr. Perminov on from the Russian 13:48:32 21 Roscosmos earlier. We worked with his team on a 13:48:35 22 potential of kind of an RD-181 joint development 13:48:38 196 1 activity as well as other international 13:48:40 2 partnerships. 13:48:42 3 But LOX hydrogen for a first stage 13:48:42 4 booster has been studied over and over again, 13:48:46 5 and it comes out the right answer. And the fact 13:48:48 6 that we don't have a good robust domestic 13:48:51 7 capability is a problem. 13:48:54 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 13:48:55 9 We appreciate your comments. 13:48:56 10 Let's see. I think the Aerospace 13:48:58 11 presentation is next, if I'm not mistaken. 13:49:04 12 Gary... 13:49:10 13 MR. PULLIAM: Good afternoon, 13:49:10 14 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My 13:49:12 15 name is Gary Pulliam, and I'm pleased to present 13:49:13 16 to you today the initial look in to Aerospace 13:49:16 17 Corporation's work on this important subject. 13:49:22 18 A word about Aerospace, we are a 13:49:23 19 California-based, not-for-profit company formed 13:49:23 20 in June 1960, 49 years ago this month, to 13:49:26 21 provide technical and scientific support to 13:49:30 22 Air Force and other government and space 13:49:33 197 1 programs. And that's the job we've been doing 13:49:35 2 for those 49 years. We've been a strong partner 13:49:37 3 with the Air Force and a strong partner with 13:49:41 4 NASA for many, many years, and we're proud of 13:49:43 5 that fact. 13:49:46 6 With regard to this particular piece 13:49:46 7 of work that NASA has asked us to do, we've been 13:49:48 8 looking at the subject matter of the EELV system 13:49:50 9 as a replacement for part of the Constellation 13:49:54 10 profile for some time, even before it became a 13:49:58 11 profile. We began an initial look back in 2005 13:50:01 12 after the President had announced his vision but 13:50:05 13 before the architecture was well understood. 13:50:09 14 And at that point we were simply asked to 13:50:11 15 determine whether or not the EELV could be human 13:50:13 16 ratable, and at that time we decided and 13:50:14 17 determined, yes, it could be. 13:50:15 18 Then NASA came out with its 13:50:17 19 architecture and proceeded along those 13:50:20 20 developmental paths. Then about three years 13:50:22 21 later, late last year, we were asked to look at 13:50:25 22 it again. 13:50:27 198 1 Now that NASA had begun its 13:50:28 2 development of its programs and now that the 13:50:30 3 EELV, particularly the Delta IV, had flown and 13:50:33 4 now that NASA had implemented some of its own 13:50:37 5 policies with regard to human rating factors and 13:50:39 6 other matters, we were asked to come back and 13:50:40 7 take another look at the state of information 13:50:45 8 regarding human rating of the EELV. And we 13:50:46 9 presented that information to the NASA 13:50:48 10 headquarters to Dr. Griffin and staff in 13:50:50 11 December. 13:50:50 12 And then following that, we were given 13:50:54 13 this final task, which is the last bullet there. 13:50:55 14 Next chart, please. 13:50:57 15 And the scope of that study was now to 13:50:58 16 get a bit more precise and to look at the 13:51:02 17 programmatic and technical feasibility of using 13:51:04 18 a Delta IV Heavy in lieu of the Ares I mission 13:51:07 19 and specifically to look at that in the context 13:51:11 20 of the overall effects on the Constellation 13:51:13 21 architecture. And that's a really important 13:51:15 22 point for our work. 13:51:17 199 1 We looked at the capability of using 13:51:18 2 the Delta IV Heavy in lieu of the Ares I to take 13:51:21 3 humans to low Earth orbit and what that means to 13:51:25 4 the rest of the Constellation and the intended 13:51:29 5 mission of taking humans beyond low Earth orbit. 13:51:31 6 So we did not look at alternatives to 13:51:33 7 the job that NASA has been given. We did not 13:51:36 8 look at alternatives to the architecture. Our 13:51:38 9 study assumed that you want to leave low Earth 13:51:43 10 orbit, and to do that, you need a big rocket and 13:51:45 11 the big rocket of record is the Ares V. 13:51:47 12 We also did not assess the confidence 13:51:50 13 levels or the executability of the current 13:51:53 14 Ares I cost and schedule. We took the program 13:51:56 15 of record and the progress that was initially 13:51:59 16 established for that program and used those for 13:51:59 17 comparability purposes. 13:52:04 18 As we began to look at those, we came 13:52:04 19 up with several options. First, we started with 13:52:06 20 the Delta IV baseline program, which is not 13:52:08 21 presently human rated, and then we began to look 13:52:13 22 at excursions around that to bound our study. 13:52:15 200 1 In option No. 2 we looked at taking 13:52:19 2 the Ares I upper stage and its J-2X engine and 13:52:21 3 using those on a Delta IV. We realized that the 13:52:25 4 J-2X engine, as being currently designed, has a 13:52:28 5 good deal more thrust than this application 13:52:31 6 would need. 13:52:34 7 So that led us to an Option No. 3 13:52:35 8 where we would still use the Ares I upper stage 13:52:38 9 with its engine but at a reduced, resized level 13:52:41 10 of thrust to be more appropriate for the mission 13:52:44 11 at hand. 13:52:47 12 Then we began to look at other kinds 13:52:48 13 of upper stages in Option 4. We looked at a 13:52:49 14 redesigned upper stage with a cluster of four 13:52:51 15 RL-10 engines, and then we looked at could you 13:52:54 16 do this mission with no upper stage at all, just 13:52:57 17 using the Orion service module for final 13:53:01 18 maneuvering, and then finally what about the 13:53:05 19 HR -- human-rated Delta IV with just a single 13:53:08 20 RL-10 engine. 13:53:11 21 We did not look at the Atlas V simply 13:53:11 22 because the Delta IV Heavy was farther along. 13:53:13 201 1 It had flown. We had more comparative data. So 13:53:16 2 we concentrated our work at NASA's direction on 13:53:19 3 the comparison of Delta IV Heavy to the Ares I 13:53:23 4 program. 13:53:25 5 As we completed this study, here are 13:53:27 6 some of the top level key findings that we had. 13:53:29 7 First of all, as we understood how NASA was 13:53:32 8 implementing the human rating requirements into 13:53:35 9 the Ares I program, we were better able to make 13:53:38 10 a determination about how these might flow into 13:53:40 11 a human-rated Delta IV program, and we tried to 13:53:43 12 get as precise as we could and as comparable as 13:53:47 13 we could as we made determinations about the 13:53:50 14 Delta IV human rating program. 13:53:53 15 The configurations that have either 13:53:56 16 the J-2X engine as the upper stage or RL-10 13:53:58 17 derivatives are feasible, and they have 13:54:03 18 significant margin in terms of cost -- in terms 13:54:05 19 of performance to both the International Space 13:54:06 20 Station point and to the LEO point for the lunar 13:54:10 21 mission, which is a bit more demanding. 13:54:13 22 We also looked at the Delta IV human 13:54:16 202 1 rated with one single RL-10 derivative engine. 13:54:19 2 We found that it meets the Ares I performance 13:54:23 3 margins, but it is closer, as you would 13:54:26 4 expect -- one engine instead of a cluster of 13:54:29 5 four engines, but we did find that it had 13:54:32 6 sufficient gross margin performance for that 13:54:35 7 mission. 13:54:38 8 But we suggest that if the committee 13:54:39 9 is interested in that particular option that we 13:54:40 10 need to be more precise and more work is 13:54:43 11 required on the exact profiling of the launch 13:54:46 12 and the ascent profiles and the performance 13:54:50 13 margins to those very important targets. 13:54:53 14 We looked at briefly at the no upper 13:54:56 15 stage configuration using the Orion Service 13:54:58 16 Module, and our estimation and our findings are 13:54:59 17 that while it could make performance to the ISS 13:55:03 18 target we didn't think it could make performance 13:55:05 19 to the lunar target, which has a bit more 13:55:09 20 up-mass requirements. So that was our findings 13:55:10 21 on that. Next chart. 13:55:12 22 As we looked at the Constellation 13:55:14 203 1 impacts piece on this possible trade, we believe 13:55:18 2 that industry can accommodate whatever increase 13:55:20 3 in production might come from moving the Ares I 13:55:23 4 into the Delta IV EELV human-rated family. 13:55:36 5 However, we're quick to point out that the 13:55:36 6 industrial base includes the large solid rocket 13:55:36 7 motor industrial base, and that becomes a 13:55:39 8 concern as we thought about the overall 13:55:39 9 architecture at large. 13:55:41 10 We recognized the Delta IV Heavy can 13:55:44 11 use some of the existing Ares I hardware 13:55:47 12 infrastructure -- ground processing and 13:55:47 13 infrastructure, and we tried to take of 13:55:52 14 advantage of that in our assessments wherever we 13:55:54 15 could. 13:55:58 16 You just heard from ULA that they 13:55:58 17 preferred SLC 37A. That would work. We 13:56:00 18 actually preferred SLC 39 a bit more, but both 13:56:04 19 of those options are attainable, depending on 13:56:06 20 which way you wanted to go and how you worked 13:56:08 21 the ground processing piece. 13:56:11 22 The Aerospace recommended option is 13:56:15 204 1 for the human-rated Delta IV Heavy with a 13:56:15 2 cluster of four resigned RL-10 engines. That 13:56:16 3 gives an engine-out ability, which we think is 13:56:20 4 important, and it allows a different kind of 13:56:23 5 thrusting and orbit insertion and a different 13:56:26 6 kind of thrust level than you would need with 13:56:29 7 only one engine. And that became our 13:56:31 8 recommended option among the six we looked at. 13:56:33 9 It is important to recognize as 13:56:36 10 well -- and this plays into the remainder of our 13:56:38 11 findings -- once you make that decision to go 13:56:40 12 with any combination of RL-10 engines assuming, 13:56:42 13 as we did, that the Constellation program is 13:56:47 14 still the program of record, which means that 13:56:51 15 you need a big rocket and that big rocket is the 13:56:54 16 Ares V. 13:56:56 17 Now you have to deal with what are you 13:56:57 18 going to do about the solid rocket motor 13:56:58 19 industrial base and who's going to take care of 13:57:00 20 the J-2X engine development. As you would 13:57:03 21 appropriately determine, because both the Ares I 13:57:07 22 and the Ares V use the J-2X engine, then those 13:57:11 205 1 developmental costs are borne by the Ares I 13:57:13 2 program. 13:57:14 3 So if that went away, now that burden 13:57:15 4 of developing that engine shifts over to the 13:57:18 5 Ares V program, and we'll see that when our cost 13:57:21 6 findings show up here in just a minute. Next 13:57:23 7 chart. 13:57:23 8 So the story now moves from the 13:57:26 9 technical ability to use a Delta IV Heavy human 13:57:28 10 rated in a number of configurations to 13:57:31 11 accomplish the mission then and then to what 13:57:37 12 does it mean to the Constellation at large. 13:57:39 13 So we start out with the idea of we're 13:57:42 14 talking about 14 flights to LEO, to the ISS and 13:57:45 15 lunar orbit targets, and we're presuming that 13:57:47 16 NASA's job is to still take humans beyond low 13:57:53 17 Earth orbit to accomplish the Moon mission and 13:57:53 18 eventually the Mars mission. So, again, we did 13:57:57 19 not attempt to change that architecture at all. 13:57:58 20 If you went with one upper stage -- 13:58:02 21 one RL-10 engine upper stage and delivery to 13:58:04 22 those two orbits, we believe that you could save 13:58:08 206 1 about $6 billion relative to the Ares I program 13:58:12 2 of record. Remember that we believe the 13:58:17 3 performance margins there are a bit closer than 13:58:19 4 they would be with our recommendation of four 13:58:22 5 RL-10's. 13:58:24 6 If you move into our recommendation of 13:58:25 7 the four RL-10's, we find the savings to be 13:58:28 8 about $3 billion from the Ares I program of 13:58:31 9 record. 13:58:36 10 And if you decide you're really going 13:58:36 11 to use the Ares I upper stage with the J-2X 13:58:37 12 engine on top of the human-rated Delta IV, we 13:58:37 13 think the cost comes out about the same in that 13:58:42 14 trade. 13:58:44 15 But immediately one must recognize for 13:58:45 16 all of those options there are some increases in 13:58:49 17 the present cost profile for the Ares V program. 13:58:51 18 Particularly if you choose an option that does 13:58:55 19 not have the J-2X engine, then those costs are 13:58:55 20 going to shift to the Ares V program and have to 13:58:59 21 be borne by it in order to have the J-2X engine 13:59:01 22 ready for that rocket. 13:59:06 207 1 So we find that those cost uppers for 13:59:07 2 the Ares V program would be somewhere between 13:59:10 3 1.1 and that $3.6 billion, depending on which of 13:59:13 4 these other options you choose and period of 13:59:16 5 implementation and some of those details. 13:59:18 6 If one cancels the Ares I program, 13:59:21 7 NASA asserts to Aerospace -- and it was a given 13:59:25 8 in our study -- that it has to add back a 13:59:29 9 substantial amount of funding in order to 13:59:32 10 accomplish the Constellation architecture 13:59:34 11 mission as originally given to them. 13:59:40 12 You can see in the final bullets 13:59:42 13 there, there are elements of that number that 13:59:44 14 NASA has given to us of between 14 and 13:59:48 15 $16 billion. There are industrial-based issues 13:59:52 16 there. There are sustainment of the workforce 13:59:54 17 issues. There are the increased costs of 13:59:59 18 development of the J-2X if you're now not doing 14:00:01 19 that under the Ares I program. 14:00:04 20 We've called one of those elements in 14:00:06 21 the middle bullet there about increased DDT&E 14:00:09 22 cost to the Ares V program. Those costs might 14:00:09 208 1 be partially or perhaps even fully accounted for 14:00:14 2 in NASA's number, but the point is NASA has 14:00:16 3 confirmed that if we went to the Delta IV Heavy 14:00:20 4 they believe at this moment that they would have 14:00:24 5 a requirement for this much additional money 14:00:27 6 back into the program to accomplish the mission 14:00:30 7 they've been given. Next chart, please. 14:00:33 8 With regard to schedule, we believe 14:00:34 9 that human rating of the Delta IV is on the 14:00:37 10 order of 5.5 to 7 years. That is Aerospace's 14:00:41 11 conservative estimate. No doubt there's some 14:00:41 12 time in there to get started. The go-ahead for 14:00:49 13 that would certainly not be today. And we've 14:00:49 14 done conservative things, as you would expect us 14:00:54 15 to do, as we contemplated historical times for 14:00:56 16 human development activity, and we believe it's 14:00:59 17 in the range of 5-1/2 to 7 years. 14:01:01 18 We did not compare that and a date on 14:01:04 19 a calendar to what Ares I is doing. We accept 14:01:06 20 the IOC as presently given for the Ares I 14:01:10 21 program, and this is simply a statement of how 14:01:13 22 long we think this program would take. 14:01:17 209 1 We think the ground facilities and the 14:01:17 2 launch vehicle and components actually are 14:01:17 3 pretty close to their critical path. Both of 14:01:20 4 them are going to take some amount of time. We 14:01:22 5 think Orion need not be on the critical path 14:01:25 6 because it's farther along, and if you want to 14:01:28 7 redesign a new upper stage, you can shift the 14:01:29 8 preponderance of that technical burden over to 14:01:33 9 the new upper stage and try to disrupt Orion as 14:01:35 10 little as possible. So we think there's a way 14:01:40 11 to work that. 14:01:43 12 With regard to the Ares V schedule, 14:01:44 13 it, again, depends on programmatic and program 14:01:44 14 management activities. With more time for the 14:01:47 15 Ares V program, the schedule actually could be 14:01:51 16 positively impacted. But if on the other hand 14:01:54 17 NASA were to cancel the Ares I program and wait 14:01:57 18 a long time before it turned its attention to 14:02:02 19 the Ares V program, there could actually be 14:02:06 20 damage. So the opportunities there exist to 14:02:07 21 actually help the Ares V schedule. 14:02:10 22 We see nothing inherent about using a 14:02:12 210 1 Delta IV Heavy that detracts from the Ares V 14:02:12 2 schedule other than one now needs to really pay 14:02:16 3 close attention to this industrial base issue to 14:02:19 4 make sure those capabilities are there for you 14:02:22 5 when you need them. 14:02:23 6 The same thing with the Orion 14:02:25 7 schedule. NASA has indicated to us that if you 14:02:26 8 move the Orion over to a new or redesigned upper 14:02:29 9 stage it might take as much as a year to 14:02:32 10 revalidate, recertify, requalify the interfaces. 14:02:39 11 Even if you're not redesigning that capsule, you 14:02:39 12 need to now make sure it's going to fit on the 14:02:43 13 new upper stage that you've decided to do if you 14:02:45 14 put it on a Delta IV instead of the Ares 14:02:48 15 vehicle. 14:02:51 16 And we would say that in all cases, if 14:02:52 17 such a decision were made, those decisions need 14:02:54 18 to happen immediately so that planning can begin 14:02:57 19 and long lead items can occur and all of the 14:03:00 20 things that would be required not to have that 14:03:03 21 schedule slip. 14:03:06 22 We were also asked to contemplate what 14:03:07 211 1 the effects might be on National Security Space. 14:03:10 2 And, again, it could be positive, and it could 14:03:13 3 be detrimental, depending on your point of view. 14:03:14 4 Certainly more production of EELVs for 14:03:18 5 more than one customer would serve to bolster 14:03:22 6 supplier chain robustness. It would have the 14:03:27 7 opportunity to bring down costs for all 14:03:30 8 customers potentially. It perhaps would get 14:03:32 9 suppliers and factories running back closer to 14:03:36 10 the kinds of capabilities and capacities they 14:03:36 11 had in mind when they designed those. 14:03:38 12 On the other hand, as was mentioned by 14:03:40 13 both previous briefers, you could wind up with 14:03:43 14 two configurations of the Delta IV Heavy in the 14:03:47 15 same plant. One would have to understand what 14:03:48 16 differences those make -- if the human-rated 14:03:51 17 Delta IV is a slightly different vehicle than 14:03:52 18 the non-human rated -- and those issues would 14:03:55 19 have to be managed. We think they could be and 14:03:58 20 that would be easily accommodated. 14:04:01 21 You could wind up with a single 14:04:03 22 vehicle that accommodates both users, and one 14:04:05 212 1 would have to really understand what the payload 14:04:07 2 capacity is for that vehicle in light of all of 14:04:10 3 the missions that it now has to do on behalf of 14:04:13 4 the National Security Space programs. 14:04:16 5 We think that the idea of National 14:04:21 6 Security Space and NASA working alongside could 14:04:23 7 be managed to the good of the nation, but it 14:04:26 8 would be something that everyone would need to 14:04:30 9 pay attention to. 14:04:32 10 And we think the pad and range issues, 14:04:33 11 regardless of which pad you go to, are 14:04:36 12 manageable and doable as both presenters prior 14:04:40 13 to me have indicated. 14:04:43 14 So finally, just to reiterate, the 14:04:45 15 Constellation architecture as designed by NASA 14:04:49 16 in 2005 is an architecture, and it behaves like 14:04:52 17 an architecture. The Ares I program feeds into 14:04:53 18 the Ares V program. Developmental costs for 14:04:54 19 engines are borne in the early part of the 14:04:56 20 program and then used in both segments of the 14:04:56 21 program. 14:04:56 22 So when one starts contemplating 14:05:00 213 1 replacing pieces of that architecture, all kinds 14:05:03 2 of things begin to happen, as you see here. You 14:05:08 3 see industrial sustainment costs, workforce 14:05:10 4 issues, perhaps pad issues that you hadn't 14:05:14 5 contemplated. 14:05:17 6 So when viewing the particular small 14:05:18 7 slice of can the Delta IV Heavy take humans to 14:05:21 8 low Earth orbit for less than the Ares I, the 14:05:25 9 Aerospace Center answer is, depending on which 14:05:28 10 option you pick, yes, quickly followed by are 14:05:31 11 you still going to build an Ares V and do you 14:05:33 12 still want to maintain that infrastructure, at 14:05:33 13 which time frankly the total cost of the total 14:05:37 14 mission for NASA depends heavily on what NASA 14:05:39 15 needs to do to sustain that program should such 14:05:42 16 a decision be made. 14:05:46 17 Mr. Chairman, it's my pleasure to 14:05:48 18 present this initial look into our work, and I'd 14:05:50 19 be happy to entertain your questions. 14:05:53 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 14:05:56 21 We've got, I think, just a couple of minutes if 14:05:58 22 anybody has questions. 14:05:58 214 1 MR. BEJMUK: I have a question, Norm. 14= :05:58 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Fine. We've 14:05:58 3 got two here. I saw both. 14:05:58 4 MR. BEJMUK: You go first this time. 14:06:00 5 MR. GREASON: All right. I've got 14:06:00 6 two, but they're quick. I just want to make 14:06:06 7 sure I'm not misreading what's in here. 14:06:09 8 The no upper stage option for the 14:06:11 9 existing Orion capsule, that's the same service 14:06:13 10 module that was already previously planned -- is 14:06:18 11 that correct -- and it just burns to do -- 14:06:19 12 MR. PULLIAM: Yes. 14:06:00 13 MR. GREASON: -- the rest of the 14:06:00 14 Delta V? 14:06:21 15 If it were true that we had the 14:06:26 16 ability to do RNO propellant supply, then you 14:06:27 17 could also do the next piece of the mission by 14:06:29 18 putting the gas back in, right? 14:06:32 19 MR. PULLIAM: I'm looking at my expert 14:06:34 20 across the room. 14:06:36 21 MR. JOHNSON: We'd have to look at 14:06:37 22 that. 14:06:25 215 1 MR. GREASON: Okay. 14:06:25 2 MR. PULLIAM: We didn't study it for 14:06:25 3 this. 14:06:38 4 MR. GREASON: Okay. No problem. And 14:06:38 5 the second very quick one is -- you said that 14:06:38 6 this 5.5- to 7-year human rating development 14:06:40 7 time is based on the past historical experience, 14:06:43 8 but the only past historical experience I can 14:06:47 9 think of is when we put people on the original 14:06:49 10 Atlas and the original Titan. 14:06:50 11 What did it take to human rate those 14:06:52 12 vehicles? 14:06:55 13 MR. PULLIAM: Can you help me, Ray? 14:06:56 14 MR. JOHNSON: Well, we went through 14:06:58 15 much the same process. They had to look at 14:07:00 16 things like redundant actuators on the ends, you 14:07:00 17 know, they had to look at structural margins and 14:07:01 18 things like that. 14:07:04 19 MR. GREASON: But it took 5.5 to 14:07:05 20 7 years? 14:07:08 21 MR. JOHNSON: We'd have to go back and 14:07:11 22 look at that. I think that those were done much 14:07:14 216 1 more quickly under the circumstances, but we 14:07:15 2 based it on what they have looked at for the 14:07:18 3 human rating of other systems. But also it's 14:07:19 4 just simply the development of recent space how 14:07:22 5 long it's taken is part of what we looked at. 14:07:25 6 MR. PULLIAM: This is Mr. Ray Johnson, 14:07:25 7 who manages our entire group for launch vehicles 14:07:25 8 at the Aerospace Corporation. 14:07:25 9 So it is a conservative estimate. 14:07:30 10 We'd be delighted if it were less than that, but 14:07:32 11 as we looked at the things that we think go into 14:07:36 12 it and how long we would take, we came up with 14:07:37 13 that bound of 5.5 to 7. 14:07:39 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Yes, sir. 14:07:43 15 MR. BEJMUK: The question: If you 14:07:43 16 replace Ares I with Delta IV Heavy, production 14:07:45 17 of solid rocket segments goes from -- to support 14:07:50 18 the shuttle is around 50 a year. For Ares I 14:07:57 19 that drops down to some smaller number and then 14:08:01 20 later picks up when you bring on Ares V. 14:08:05 21 In this scenario -- and I don't know 14:08:08 22 if you guys had a chance to look at that -- if 14:08:09 217 1 you, let's say, propose and get Delta IV to fly 14:08:12 2 to ISS, you essentially want to cease production 14:08:17 3 of the solid segments until you ultimately start 14:08:20 4 needing it for Ares V. 14:08:26 5 And the question is: Is it possible 14:08:27 6 that we are killing a country's capability to do 14:08:29 7 those solid motors? 14:08:34 8 MR. PULLIAM: Well, you put your 14:08:35 9 finger right on what we believe is one of the 14:08:37 10 critical issues surrounding any alternative one 14:08:37 11 might choose, and you've said it -- 14:08:40 12 MR. BEJMUK: Did you have it in your 14:08:40 13 briefing? I missed it, I guess, if you did. 14:08:42 14 MR. PULLIAM: We did do some work on 14:08:43 15 that which will hopefully be releasable when the 14:08:46 16 more detailed work comes out. 14:08:47 17 We do acknowledge exactly, as you've 14:08:49 18 said, that now there are two primary 14:08:51 19 manufacturers of solid rocket motors and only 14:08:54 20 one those is the manufacturer of large segmented 14:08:57 21 solids. The Ares I is intended to have a 14:08:57 22 five-segment solid. The Ares V is intended to 14:09:03 218 1 have a 5-1/2-segment solid. So that is all 14:09:07 2 understood from an industrial capacity. 14:09:12 3 If you cease building the Ares I, then 14:09:13 4 the big question becomes do you still need to 14:09:16 5 have the ability to produce segmented solids in 14:09:18 6 a few years, and if you're going to build an 14:09:19 7 Ares V, the answer to that is yes. 14:09:20 8 So then the next question becomes how 14:09:22 9 do you do that. And NASA can give you the 14:09:25 10 particulars, but that is a key factor in that 14:09:28 11 number that they believe is required of them to 14:09:31 12 sustain that kind of capability over the years. 14:09:34 13 So, you know, one can take excursions 14:09:36 14 on other ways of doing the large rocket, but, 14:09:39 15 again, for purposes of our scope for this 14:09:42 16 program, we did look at that. We understand 14:09:45 17 that if you -- from a capacity perspective, if 14:09:48 18 you stopped building segmented solids for a 14:09:50 19 while until you needed them, that the resultant 14:09:54 20 capacity in that industry should be viable, but 14:09:57 21 I'm not the person trying to run that industry. 14:10:01 22 I mean, the other supplier of that 14:10:03 219 1 industry operates at about the level that the 14:10:06 2 first supplier would wind up at. But what 14:10:09 3 happens to the people and the tools and the 14:10:09 4 artisans and the techniques and the recipes 14:10:09 5 and -- and the strike and missile defense area 14:10:15 6 certainly would not sustain both of those 14:10:17 7 suppliers. 14:10:20 8 So we believe that if one is serious 14:10:21 9 about moving away from the Ares I that there's 14:10:23 10 still a bit of work to do there so that we 14:10:26 11 really understand the effect of large segmented 14:10:29 12 solids on the industrial base and what that 14:10:32 13 means to the nation. 14:10:33 14 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 14:10:35 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Last question. 14:10:35 16 MR. CHIAO: Yeah. I was just 14:10:37 17 wondering if you had done any PRA for loss of 14:10:38 18 crew/loss of mission using this configuration? 14:10:41 19 MR. PULLIAM: We did not consider that 14:10:41 20 for this one. It was more of a technical cost 14:10:42 21 and schedule feasibility study. 14:10:45 22 MR. CHIAO: Okay. Thank you. 14:10:37 220 1 MR. CHYBA: Mr. Chairman, just an 14:10:49 2 information request. Clearly this 5.5- to 14:10:49 3 7-year human rating time scale is a very 14:10:52 4 important time scale. I'd like to ask if we 14:10:53 5 could be given by Aerospace more detail -- 14:10:56 6 MR. PULLIAM: Absolutely. 14:10:56 7 MR. CHYBA: -- on the origin of that 14:10:59 8 number, perhaps something in -- 14:11:01 9 MR. PULLIAM: Absolutely. 10 MR. CHYBA: -- writing explaining the 11 origin in detail. 12 MR. PULLIAM: There's, as you might 13 expect -- 14 MR. CHYBA: Thanks. 14:11:03 15 MR. PULLIAM: -- enormous technical 14:11:03 16 underpinning to all of these, and while we're 14:11:05 17 pleased to bring to you what is releasable 14:11:06 18 today, we recognize that the committee might 14:11:10 19 desire to get some of the details behind these. 14:11:10 20 We'll be happy to do that. 14:11:12 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Gary, I had a similar 14:11:13 22 request. It relates to the industrial base 14:11:15 221 1 backup data and the human resource backup data. 14:11:17 2 MR. PULLIAM: We'll be happy to. 14:11:21 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 14:11:22 4 MR. PULLIAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 14:11:24 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: We appreciate it. 14:11:25 6 Okay. We will now talk about some 14:11:28 7 more commercial launch capability options. And 14:11:29 8 the first one we'll talk about is the NASA COTS 14:11:32 9 program. I think Doug Cooke is going to make 14:11:36 10 that presentation. 14:11:38 11 And we've got four presentations in 14:11:41 12 one hour and a half. And so if I've done my 14:11:47 13 arithmetic right, it says we've got like 14:11:50 14 20 minutes including questions per each. So 14:11:54 15 we'd appreciate that. 14:11:57 16 MR. COOKE: Right. I will try to keep 14:12:02 17 this short because I should give the companies a 14:12:04 18 chance to talk about what they're doing. 14:12:05 19 We, in the Exploration Systems Mission 14:12:08 20 Directorate, have the management of the 14:12:11 21 commercial crew and cargo effort at NASA, known 14:12:13 22 as COTS. And I guess we're looking for charts. 14:12:17 222 1 But that is something that we've had 14:12:24 2 in place and it's an effort that we're proud of. 14:12:26 3 We can go ahead to the next chart. 14:12:30 4 You can point back -- and let's go 14:12:31 5 ahead and go beyond that. I'm going to talk 14:12:33 6 about these subjects. Let's go to the next one. 14:12:36 7 You can point back in terms of 14:12:39 8 national policy in space all of the way back to 14:12:41 9 the original space act in its promotion of 14:12:44 10 commercial use of space. 14:12:48 11 More recently in 2004 with the vision 14:12:49 12 for space exploration, also known the National 14:12:52 13 Space Exploration Policy, there was specific 14:12:55 14 interest in promoting commercial participation 14:13:00 15 in exploration. There was also talk about 14:13:03 16 providing for pursuing the provision of 14:13:08 17 transportation to low Earth orbit by commercial 14:13:13 18 capabilities. 14:13:18 19 The authorization acts of 2005 and 14:13:19 20 2008 supported this, and so we've been on that 14:13:24 21 path. If we can go to the next chart. 14:13:27 22 We established the Commercial Crew and 14:13:30 223 1 Cargo Program down at Johnson Space Center in 14:13:39 2 2005 to lead this effort. It's a small office 14:13:42 3 down there. And their objectives are to 14:13:45 4 implement the space policy and to facilitate 14:13:48 5 U.S. private industry demonstration of cargo and 14:13:52 6 crew capabilities. 14:13:59 7 A particular tenet of all of this is 14:14:01 8 that this effort is the development and 14:14:04 9 demonstration of this kind of capability, and 14:14:09 10 what NASA does in this approach is to invest in 14:14:11 11 these developments. It's not a funded contract 14:14:15 12 per se. These are Space Act Agreements that we 14:14:20 13 have, and we are investing in their 14:14:22 14 capabilities, as they move through them. And 14:14:25 15 I'll talk a little bit more about how that's 14:14:27 16 done. 14:14:30 17 And so we have a goal of achieving 14:14:30 18 safe, reliable and cost effective access to low 14:14:32 19 Earth orbit and create a market environment for 14:14:35 20 this type of capability. We can go to the next 14:14:36 21 chart. 14:14:39 22 As a part of this, in the budget, we 14:14:39 224 1 have had a $500 million bucket that we have 14:14:47 2 applied to this capability, these investments. 14:14:51 3 We have been through two competitions 14:14:56 4 on this. We're actually -- in terms of 14:14:58 5 commercial crew and cargo, we're in -- and in 14:15:01 6 this case, it's cargo -- we have two phases. 14:15:07 7 The first phase is a development and 14:15:10 8 demonstration phase where we are making those 14:15:14 9 investments. The second phase is actually a 14:15:16 10 procurement of these services once the 14:15:20 11 capabilities are developed. And I believe Mike 14:15:22 12 Suffredini is going to talk about that second 14:15:25 13 phase. 14:15:28 14 In Phase 1, in going back in history, 14:15:28 15 in August of 2006 we selected two companies for 14:15:31 16 funded Space Act Agreements. 14:15:35 17 One was SpaceX, and that was for an 14:15:38 18 amount of 278 million over a period of years. 14:15:41 19 We are still going through that. The money is 14:15:45 20 tied to milestones and development of different 14:15:48 21 types of milestones, both funding and technical. 14:15:53 22 We also at that time selected 14:15:57 225 1 Rocketplane Kistler as a recipient at -- I can't 14:16:00 2 remember -- I believe it's 208 million -- for 14:16:07 3 another funded Space Act Agreement. We actually 14:16:13 4 terminated that later because they could not 14:16:17 5 make the milestones. And then we had another 14:16:20 6 solicitation in which we awarded a Space Act 14:16:24 7 Agreement to Orbital Sciences in February of 14:16:28 8 last year. 14:16:32 9 So in Phase 1 we've had two different 14:16:34 10 solicitations, and we now have two funded Space 14:16:39 11 Act Agreements on board that are progressing. 14:16:42 12 And I'll leave the Phase 2 procurement 14:16:46 13 part of this to the final presentation because 14:16:47 14 they'll talk about that in more detail. If we 14:16:50 15 go to the next chart. 14:16:50 16 This is a diagram that talks about -- 14:16:53 17 it talks about the COTS effort and the types of 14:16:58 18 capabilities that we look to. And you hear 14:17:04 19 about capability -- COTS-D and that sort of 14:17:06 20 thing. 14:17:09 21 So what we have is we have COTS-A, 14:17:09 22 which is external cargo delivery and disposal. 14:17:11 226 1 We have COTS-B, which is internal cargo delivery 14:17:15 2 and disposal. We have COTS-C, which is internal 14:17:18 3 cargo delivery and return -- return of cargo in 14:17:23 4 that case. And then COTS-D is commercial crew 14:17:27 5 transport. So when you hear these terms, that's 14:17:32 6 what they represent. 14:17:35 7 And when we had the solicitations, the 14:17:36 8 companies bid against those different 14:17:40 9 capabilities, and they did not have to bid 14:17:43 10 against all of them. So we had different 14:17:45 11 approaches to how this would be done. If we can 14:17:48 12 go to the next one. 14:17:49 13 So we have, as I said, two funded 14:17:49 14 Space Act Agreements. The one we selected first 14:17:55 15 that's still on board is SpaceX. They bid at 14:17:58 16 278 million for the cargo part of this. And 14:18:04 17 also in that proposal they proposed crew 14:18:08 18 capability at 308 million. It is with a 14:18:13 19 Falcon 9 vehicle with a dragon crew and cargo 14:18:18 20 development. 14:18:25 21 We are funded actually for only the 14:18:25 22 cargo part. So that's the part we're currently 14:18:28 227 1 pursuing. If we go to the next one. 14:18:31 2 The next one is Orbital Sciences, and, 14:18:33 3 once again, we selected this last year. This 14:18:37 4 was $170 million award, once again, tied to 14:18:41 5 milestone payments. And it has a pressurized 14= :18:45 6 module that's based on the Space Station MPLM, 14:18:49 7 the logistics module, and it has unpressurized 14:18:57 8 capability. And they launch out of Wallops. 14:19:02 9 The SpaceX rocket is at Pad 40C at the Cape. 14:19:07 10 So both these have demonstrations that 14:19:14 11 they get to. And that is as far as COTS -- this 14:19:17 12 part of the effort, COTS Phase I, takes it. So 14:19:21 13 we're, once again, in development and 14:19:26 14 demonstration, and we reach culmination of that 14:19:29 15 as these capabilities are demonstrated. So if 14:19:33 16 we can go to the next one. 14:19:36 17 We do have two unfunded Space Act 14:19:38 18 Agreements at this point, one with SpaceDev and 14:19:40 19 one with PlanetSpace. And we do interact with 14:19:44 20 them, but these are unfunded. So we don't -- 14:19:50 21 but they are Space Act Agreements, and we work 14:19:52 22 with them. And the next chart. 14:19:55 228 1 So the next two charts you can't read 14:19:57 2 but -- I can't either in this case but -- and I 14:20:00 3 don't intend to. But this is for the committee. 14:20:05 4 And for reference, these are the -- what I've 14:20:08 5 got listed on the next two pages are the 14:20:12 6 milestones and the plan dates for those as of 14:20:16 7 the different revs of the Space Act Agreements, 14:20:19 8 and it actually shows the amounts that are 14:20:23 9 awarded with each milestone. These were 14:20:25 10 negotiated in the Space Act Agreement, and so 14:20:28 11 we're stepping through those at this point. 14:20:30 12 And for SpaceX we have awarded -- I 14:20:34 13 believe it's about 234 million out of 278- at 14:20:38 14 this point, and with Orbital Sciences we're at 14:20:44 15 100- out of 170-. So these represent milestones 14:20:48 16 and progress on these efforts. So this is the 14:20:53 17 way in which we invest in these capabilities. 14:20:57 18 So with that, I want to move on to 14:21:01 19 just another short topic on this subject. Go to 14:21:03 20 the next slide. 14:21:07 21 In the American Recovery and 14:21:07 22 Reinvestment Act, Exploration received 14:21:12 229 1 $400 million. That's where it's allocated to 14:21:14 2 Exploration. 14:21:18 3 150- of this is planned for the 14:21:19 4 commercial crew and cargo effort, and it's shown 14:21:21 5 delineated here. 14:21:25 6 80 million is actually for 14:21:26 7 solicitation in order to get proposals on 14:21:29 8 developing capabilities that will make progress 14:21:36 9 toward the crew capability. 14:21:41 10 There's $42 million to accelerate the 14:21:43 11 development of a docking system that would help 14:21:46 12 in terms of the crew capability and support of 14:21:48 13 the Space Station. 14:21:54 14 There's 20 million to advance some of 14:21:55 15 the work in getting to confidence in the 14:21:57 16 capability for -- as a part of the cargo 14:22:02 17 development. 14:22:06 18 And then there's an $8 million piece 14:22:06 19 of this that's allocated to working on 14:22:08 20 collecting and putting in one place the human 14:22:14 21 rating -- a set of human-rating requirements. 14:22:17 22 Right now we have a human-rating 14:22:21 230 1 requirements document, but it has fingers into a 14:22:22 2 lot of different requirements and standards 14:22:27 3 across the agency. This would be an effort to 14:22:28 4 try to make that a more collected set of 14:22:32 5 information that would help any needs in 14:22:35 6 developing this kind of capability. 14:22:41 7 And with that, I'll conclude, and 14:22:43 8 we're ready to move on. 14:22:45 9 (Inaudible.) 14:22:46 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. SpaceX is 14:22:46 11 next. Elon Musk. 14:22:58 12 MR. MUSK: All right. I think we're 14:23:16 13 just waiting for the slides to pop up. There we 14:23:18 14 go. 14:23:18 15 That's just a photo of Falcon 9 on the 14:23:21 16 launch pad at Cape Canaveral. That's a real 14:23:45 17 photo. It's not touched up or anything. 14:23:46 18 And that's the vehicle that will be 14:23:49 19 carrying cargo to the Space Station. We'll do 14:23:50 20 our first test flight later this year carrying 14:23:53 21 our Dragon spacecraft, and then next year we'll 14:23:58 22 be doing our first flight that actually goes to 14:23:58 231 1 the Space Station carrying cargo and bringing it 14:24:01 2 back. 14:24:03 3 I mean, before I -- one thing I think 14:24:04 4 it's very important for the public to realize is 14:24:07 5 that we're currently on a path to sole source 14:24:11 6 human space flight to the Russians. I don't 14:24:14 7 think this is really -- people have quite 14:24:19 8 realized this in the general public, but that's 14:24:20 9 what's going to happen right after the space 14:24:24 10 shuttle retires -- we're sole sourced to the 14:24:27 11 Russians and will be so until there is an 14:24:31 12 alternative. 14:24:33 13 We believe we can eliminate that gap 14:24:35 14 or substantially reduce it at least, and I think 14:24:36 15 it would be money very well spent to have an 14:24:40 16 American entrant into that race rather than the 14:24:42 17 current Space Station situation. Next slide. 14:24:45 18 SpaceX is about seven years old, but 14:24:47 19 the primary goal of SpaceX is actually 14:24:54 20 reliability and it's not reducing costs, 14:24:56 21 although we do reduce costs quite a bit as well. 14:24:59 22 We have about 800 employees who are growing at 14:25:05 232 1 about 50 percent a year. We're in California, 14:25:07 2 Texas and Florida primarily. 14:25:08 3 And really the whole purpose of SpaceX 14:25:11 4 from the very beginning has been human space 14:25:15 5 flight. That's the very reason I founded the 14:25:18 6 company and created it. So next slide. 14:25:20 7 We've been able to get a lot of 14:25:22 8 customers on board at SpaceX. So in addition to 14:25:24 9 NASA and the Defense Department, we've got a 14:25:26 10 Sweden, Malaysia, Canada, a number of commercial 14:25:28 11 providers, all whom have done technical and 14:25:33 12 financial due diligence on SpaceX and concluded 14:25:36 13 that SpaceX is a wise bet and put down deposits 14:25:37 14 for launches. Next slide. 14:25:44 15 We reached orbit last year with 14:25:44 16 Falcon 1. Falcon 1 is a complete ground-up 14:25:44 17 development. So we developed the main engine, 14:25:51 18 the upper stage engine, the structures, the 14:25:54 19 avionics, the launch infrastructure and launched 14:25:56 20 the rocket with cryogenic propellant from a 14:25:56 21 remote tropical island, which is not easy. 14:26:02 22 So it's also important to note that 14:26:05 233 1 there are huge lessons learned in Falcon 1 going 14:26:07 2 to Falcon 9. In fact, much of the same hardware 14:26:13 3 that's in Falcon 1 goes into Falcon 9. 14:26:16 4 And as far as the engine is 14:26:19 5 concerned -- and there were some questions 14:26:21 6 raised earlier about the engines -- there have 14:26:22 7 only been three engines developed in the 14:26:26 8 United States that have seen orbital flight in 14:26:29 9 the last -- since, I think, the space shuttle 14:26:29 10 main engine about -- almost 30 years ago is when 14:26:33 11 it was developed. One of them was the RS-68, 14:26:35 12 which is used in the Delta IV. The other two 14:26:38 13 are the Merlin and Kestrel engines developed by 14:26:41 14 SpaceX, which are hydrocarbon engines. Next 14:26:45 15 slide. 14:26:48 16 Here you can see some pictures of 14:26:49 17 Falcon 1 getting prepared for its next flight. 14:26:50 18 It will be carrying a satellite for Malaysia. 14:26:53 19 Next slide. 14:26:53 20 I'm going to go very quickly through 14:26:56 21 these slides since I only have 20 minutes. 14:26:57 22 We've made substantial reductions in 14:26:59 234 1 costs across the board in our engines structures 14:27:02 2 avionics and launch operation. 14:27:05 3 Again, I'm going to be reemphasizing 14:27:09 4 this many times. Falcon 9 was designed from the 14:27:13 5 beginning to be a human-carrying vessel. 14:27:17 6 It also has something which people 14:27:20 7 have taken for granted in airliners, which is 14:27:22 8 engine-out capability. So I think a lot of 14:27:26 9 people would be uncomfortable getting on an 14:27:27 10 airliner where -- with one engine, and yet 14:27:29 11 that's par for the course in rockets. In fact, 14:27:33 12 in a lot of rockets it's even worse than that. 14:27:37 13 Because you may have three engines and if any 14:27:40 14 one of those fails, the mission fails. 14:27:43 15 With Falcon 9 we've designed it in a 14:27:47 16 way similar to the Saturn I and Saturn V, which 14:27:48 17 had engine-out capability. If you lose an 14:27:52 18 engine, it doesn't matter. You can still 14:27:53 19 complete the mission. Next slide. 14:27:56 20 There's a lot of videos on our 14:27:58 21 website. If people are curious, just go to 14:28:04 22 spacex.com, and you can see engine test videos. 14:28:05 235 1 This year SpaceX will manufacture more 14:28:07 2 rocket engines than the rest of U.S. production 14:28:11 3 combined, in fact, more than any country except 14:28:14 4 Russia. Next year we expect to exceed Russia. 14:28:18 5 Next slide. 14:28:18 6 That's the base of Falcon 9. It bears 14:28:23 7 some resemblance to the base of the Saturn I, 14:28:26 8 which had eight engines rather than our nine. 14:28:28 9 Some pretty epic engine firing videos. Some 14:28:33 10 very funny videos on YouTube of the locals 14:28:37 11 observing the engine firings. Next slide. 14:28:44 12 Some pictures our factory in 14:28:47 13 Hawthorne. You can see our engine production 14:28:47 14 line. Next slide. 14:28:47 15 Here's Falcon 9 going through final 14:28:53 16 qualifications. We expect to be ready to launch 14:28:57 17 Falcon 9 later this year, and hopefully we'll 14:29:00 18 have the first and second flight stages on the 14:29:06 19 pad by the end of summer. So you can see 14:29:09 20 pictures of the factory and various stages of 14:29:12 21 the qualification. Next slide. 14:29:14 22 I'm going to go very quickly. This is 14:29:15 236 1 Falcon 9 on the launch pad at Cape Canaveral. 14:29:21 2 Next slide. 14:29:21 3 More Cape Canaveral stuff. Next 14:29:26 4 slide. 14:29:31 5 There's Dragon. That's the full -- 14:29:31 6 (inaudible) -- structural test unit of our 14:29:38 7 Dragon spacecraft. Our Dragon spacecraft is 14:29:38 8 designed explicitly to meet the NASA 14:29:40 9 human-rating standards, and we're 90 percent 14:29:46 10 complete on that qualification. It's worth 14:29:48 11 noting that Dragon has five windows -- four 14:29:52 12 windows, I should say, and you don't need 14:29:53 13 windows for cargo, you know, to state the 14:29:55 14 obvious. Next slide. 14:29:58 15 Dragon going through structural 14:29:59 16 qualification testing. The two driving load 14:30:04 17 cases for Dragon are the -- worse-case abort. 14:30:07 18 So if the system aborts, the worse case, and you 14:30:12 19 have these reentry loads, you can have it coming 14:30:14 20 in at 15 or 16 G's. So it's designed to meet 14:30:16 21 those loads. It's also designed to meet the 14:30:20 22 loads associated with a launch escape tower. 14:30:23 237 1 Next slide. 14:30:23 2 That's more SpaceX hardware. I 14:30:23 3 forgot -- I almost forgot to mention -- our 14:30:29 4 Draco engine, that's our in-space engine. So 14:30:33 5 it's basically -- it's actually another -- a 14:30:34 6 third engine which is used for in-space 14:30:34 7 maneuvering for -- primarily for docking and 14:30:37 8 orbital translation. Next slide. 14:30:42 9 More hardware. This is our heat 14= :30:44 10 shield on the bottom left. We developed the 14:30:45 11 PICA-X, which is an improved form of PICA, in 14:30:49 12 conjunction with NASA Ames. Next slide. 14:30:51 13 More hardware. This is the 14:30:55 14 communications unit for communicating between 14:30:57 15 Dragon and the Space Station, and that will be 14:31:00 16 delivered at the end of the month. It's quite a 14:31:04 17 tricky thing to do. Also the crew command 14:31:06 18 panel. Next slide. 14:31:10 19 DragonEye, this is a LIDAR system 14:31:12 20 that's used to image the Space Station. As 14:31:12 21 Dragon approaches the Space Station, it's got to 14:31:12 22 figure out relative orientation and the approach 14:31:19 238 1 vectors and then plot a course to berth with the 14:31:21 2 Space Station. That's going to get flown on the 14:31:25 3 STS-127, which is currently on the pad. So it 14:31:28 4 will be tested before we even go up for this 14:31:32 5 Dragon mission. Next slide. 14:31:36 6 We've completed the Space Station 14:31:37 7 Safety Review Panel Phase 1 and most of 2. We 14:31:41 8 expect to finish Phase 3 in early next year. 14:31:42 9 It's important to appreciate that Dragon is -- 14:31:45 10 even for cargo, Dragon has to be human rated for 14:31:48 11 the approach to Space Station, for being at 14:31:52 12 Space Station and for leaving Space Station, 14:31:55 13 because there are people in Space Station. Next 14:31:57 14 slide. 14:32:01 15 We've done 14 of the 22 milestones on 14:32:01 16 schedule, all financing rounds and all design 14:32:06 17 reviews through critical design review. There 14:32:08 18 have been several major hardware milestones also 14:32:12 19 in there. 14:32:12 20 There's going to be some slips in the 14:32:15 21 remaining milestones, but we're talking about 14:32:16 22 slips that are measured in months, not years, 14:32:19 239 1 which is relatively minor in the space industry. 14:32:21 2 And so we're expecting to complete all 14:32:26 3 of our demonstrations next year -- by summer 14:32:29 4 next year. And next slide. 14:32:32 5 As I mentioned, crew capability is the 14:32:36 6 very reason SpaceX was founded. So we will do 14:32:39 7 whatever we need to do to make this happen. 14:32:42 8 Next slide. 14:32:46 9 So one of the advantages of using the 14:32:46 10 Dragon for crew is that it will already have 14:33:00 11 been flown many times with cargo. So you have 14:33:02 12 essentially the same vehicle, the same 14:33:05 13 spacecraft and the same rocket that will have 14:33:07 14 flown many times before you even put people on 14:33:10 15 board. This is a huge -- a risk-retirement 14:33:14 16 approach. So, you know, it should be pretty 14:33:18 17 safe by the time you'd want to put people in it. 14:33:21 18 Next slide. 14:33:24 19 Regarding the effects of safety, 14:33:24 20 again, we're designed to the 1.4 factor of 14:33:31 21 safety throughout the vehicle unequivocally. 14:33:35 22 The EELVs would require some work at least in 14:33:39 240 1 some places to get to 1.4. The Falcon 9 does 14:33:42 2 not. It was designed for that from the 14:33:46 3 beginning. Next slide. 14:33:50 4 So in terms of what is necessary to go 14:33:50 5 from the cargo Dragon to the crew Dragon, 14:33:56 6 there's only one major development item, and 14:34:00 7 that is the launch escape system. And that's 14:34:03 8 the driving -- that drives the schedule for 14:34:07 9 completion of crew capability, and that is an 14:34:08 10 approximately 24-month development cycle. 14:34:11 11 So we've already done the preliminary 14:34:15 12 design on that. We need to complete the design, 14:34:17 13 qualify it and test it. That two years -- 14:34:20 14 basically from the moment NASA says go, it's 14:34:22 15 about two years minimum to get that capability 14:34:25 16 working. 14:34:28 17 If you add some margin in there -- if 14:34:29 18 you add another six to nine months of margin, 14:34:31 19 that says, I think, comfortably under three 14:34:34 20 years to get -- from today to get human 14:34:37 21 capability. So that really eliminates the gap, 14:34:39 22 from our standpoint. 14:34:44 241 1 I mean -- I do agree, by the way, with 14:34:45 2 having both Soyuz flights and COTS crew flights 14:34:48 3 at the same time, you know, as planned for the 14:34:54 4 same year, because you want to make sure that 14:34:56 5 you -- that there's no gap there. 14:34:58 6 So I do agree with the approach that 14:35:00 7 the space operations director of NASA has to 14:35:05 8 purchase or use flights. I would do the same in 14:35:08 9 their position. I just think it makes sense to 14:35:14 10 turn on commercial crew capability and have it 14:35:16 11 planned for that same period of time. 14:35:20 12 We can also do what's called a 14:35:22 13 life-boat Dragon which is just an emergency 14:35:26 14 escape vehicle. We can do that a lot faster 14:35:29 15 than we could do the ascent phase because no 14:35:31 16 launch escape system is needed. So we could do 14:35:34 17 the life-boat Dragon in one and a half years, 14:35:37 18 which would improve the capability of the Space 14:35:41 19 Station because our Dragon -- our crew capsule 14:35:45 20 is capable of carrying seven people rather than 14:35:47 21 three people for the Soyuz escape vehicle. Next 14:35:50 22 slide. 14:35:55 242 1 So there's a lot of value that's been 14:35:55 2 delivered for -- under the COTS program. I 14:35:58 3 mean, if you compare this to almost any other 14:36:02 4 space development program, you say what did the 14:36:03 5 government get for $278 million -- actually they 14:36:05 6 haven't even paid 278 million -- 230 million. 14:36:08 7 This is pretty -- this would be pretty 14:36:13 8 darn high on the list of highest value for the 14:36:15 9 money. So, yeah. All right. Next slide. 14:36:18 10 So, yeah. Next slide. I think I've 14:36:18 11 probably got like two minutes left. 14:36:18 12 I think we've seen this slide. Next 14:36:18 13 slide. 14:36:21 14 So COTS is really an enabling function 14:36:21 15 for NASA. By having COTS, again, commercial 14:36:39 16 crew servicing of low Earth orbit activity at an 14:36:43 17 affordable cost, that is really -- that really 14:36:46 18 enables NASA to go beyond low Earth orbit, to go 14:36:48 19 to the Moon, to go to Mars and maybe go to an 14:36:51 20 astroid. 14:36:55 21 On the other hand, if NASA's budget 14:36:55 22 is -- has to be dedicated to low Earth orbit 14:36:59 243 1 servicing, then that's all NASA can do. And the 14:37:01 2 reality is that NASA is not going to get a giant 14:37:05 3 budget increase. 14:37:10 4 So it seems like the only way 14:37:11 5 forward -- the only way we're going to do 14:37:12 6 exciting things in human space flight is if 14:37:13 7 commercial companies handle the low Earth orbit 14:37:18 8 stuff and NASA focuses on the stuff beyond low 14:37:19 9 Earth orbit. Next slide. 14:37:24 10 That's it. Any questions? 14:37:26 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Great. Elon, thank 14:37:28 12 you. 14:37:28 13 Are there questions? 14:37:29 14 Please, Chris... 14:37:34 15 MR. CHYBA: Thank you. On one of your 14:37:34 16 early slides on the Falcon 9, you included the 14:37:36 17 statement that it has a greater than five time 14:37:39 18 cost reduction compared to domestic competitors. 14:37:42 19 I simply don't understand what that's 14:37:46 20 trying to tell me. Can you elaborate on that? 14:37:46 21 MR. MUSK: Sure. That's just if you 14:37:50 22 take the cost of -- the average cost of an 14:37:52 244 1 ELV -- yeah -- and you compare that to our 14:37:55 2 vehicle it's somewhere around four or five X 14:38:01 3 difference. But Falcon 9 is about a $40 million 14:38:06 4 cost per flight -- per mission commercially. My 14:38:12 5 understanding is that if you had an equivalent 14:38:13 6 ELV you'd be paying closer to 200 million or 14:38:15 7 just below 200 million. 14:38:19 8 MR. CHYBA: Okay. Thank you. 14:37:34 9 MR. MUSK: But that's particularly 14:38:22 10 when you factor in the fact that there's 14:38:22 11 Air Force infrastructure payments that have to 14:38:25 12 be divided by those flights, which we do not 14:38:29 13 receive. 14:38:32 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Leroy... 14:38:33 15 MR. CHIAO: Thank you for your 14:38:35 16 presentation. Congratulations on your success 14:38:35 17 to date. I had a question on Falcon 9 and 14:38:35 18 Dragon. 14:38:38 19 Assuming COTS-D goes forward, do you 14:38:39 20 have a test program identified for Falcon 9 14:38:44 21 before you'd have confidence to put a crew on 14:38:46 22 board? 14:38:46 245 1 MR. MUSK: Yeah. Absolutely. 14:38:35 2 MR. CHIAO: And how many flights do 14:38:35 3 you envision having to -- for that test program? 14:38:52 4 MR. MUSK: Well, I think we'd want to 14:38:57 5 have at least a dozen flights of Falcon 9 before 14:38:58 6 we put crew on board. But that's not going to 14:39:01 7 be a problem because, I mean, we have right now 14:39:03 8 21 flights on manifest already. 14:39:06 9 MR. CHIAO: Okay. And I assume also 14:39:09 10 you'd have a test program for your crew escape 14:39:10 11 system? 14:39:15 12 MR. MUSK: Yes. 14:39:15 13 MR. CHIAO: And would that be part of 14:38:35 14 that test program? Would it actually -- would 14:39:15 15 you test that system off of Falcon 9? 14:39:15 16 MR. MUSK: Yeah. There are two major 14:39:15 17 tests. There's the pad abort test, which we 14:39:15 18 don't -- we would not need the rocket for. That 14:39:22 19 could be done at White Sands or something like 14:39:25 20 that. And then there's a high altitude abort, 14:39:26 21 which is really the same cost as a mission, if 14:39:31 22 not slight greater. So we'd want to do both of 14:39:32 246 1 those tests. 14:39:34 2 MR. CHIAO: And then once you get a 14:39:35 3 manned capsule, how many flights do you 14:39:37 4 envision -- manned flights into orbit before you 14:39:40 5 declare operational capability? 14:39:46 6 MR. MUSK: Well, for that we would 14:39:48 7 consult with NASA. I think that would be as 14:39:51 8 much NASA's call, if not more, than ours. But 14:39:52 9 I'd figure at least two or three. 14:39:57 10 Because there's very little difference 14:39:58 11 between our crew versus cargo version, it's kind 14:40:01 12 of a different situation than many developments 14:40:05 13 before which have been dedicated to crew or 14:40:07 14 dedicated to cargo. 14:40:10 15 MR. CHIAO: Okay. Thanks. 14:38:35 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 14:40:12 17 MR. MUSK: All right. Thank you. 14:40:12 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: We appreciate it a 14:40:14 19 lot. 14:40:14 20 We'll turn to Orbital next. 14:40:15 21 MR. CULBERTSON: Good afternoon 14:40:33 22 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. 14:40:34 247 1 Thank you very much for the opportunity to 14:40:36 2 present to you today and to the members of the 14:40:37 3 audience that are here. 14:40:39 4 Just a couple of words of introduction 14:40:41 5 about Orbital before I give you the status of 14:40:44 6 our COTS system and -- our COTS effort and our 14:40:46 7 Cargo Resupply Service program. 14:40:50 8 Orbital has been in existence for 14:40:52 9 approximately 27 years. We've deployed over 14:40:54 10 500 systems into space, satellites and various 14:40:57 11 other orbiting vehicles. We, in the last five 14:41:02 12 years, have over 60 successful launches, and the 14:41:07 13 company is continuing to move in many different 14:41:11 14 directions to support space flight, both 14:41:14 15 commercially and for the U.S. government. And 14:41:17 16 we think that this is a fantastic opportunity 14:41:20 17 for the commercial sector to demonstrate what 14:41:24 18 they can do to support this country in 14:41:27 19 maintaining human space flight. Next slide, 14:41:28 20 please. 14:41:30 21 The COTS architecture is basically 14:41:30 22 five elements. The Cygnus visiting vehicle 14:41:34 248 1 includes the service module, and, of course, on 14:41:39 2 the front of that is the cargo vehicle. 14:41:41 3 Currently we are contracted for eight missions 14:41:44 4 on the CRS contract. So we have changed our 14:41:47 5 plan on the COTS mission from an unpressurized 14:41:51 6 cargo module to a pressurized cargo module to 14:41:56 7 demonstrate that capability end to end, 14:41:58 8 including opening the hatch and transferring. 14:41:58 9 The Taurus II is our launch vehicle, 14:42:00 10 and I'll go into more detail on that in a few 14:42:03 11 minutes. 14:42:06 12 And then, of course, we have the cargo 14:42:06 13 operations which will allow us to work with NASA 14:42:10 14 on the necessary cargo to sustain the station, 14:42:13 15 mission operations to support the flight and 14:42:14 16 then the integrated launch site operations at 14:42:16 17 Wallops Flight Facility. Next slide. 14:42:20 18 A brief overview of the mission itself 14:42:21 19 from launch. I know this is a very busy slide 14:42:24 20 but for your read ahead tonight, I guess, on the 14:42:27 21 plane. 14:42:31 22 It shows you the sequence from launch 14:42:31 249 1 to rendezvous with the station, berthing by the 14:42:34 2 station arm and then unberthing and de-orbiting 14:42:39 3 to take the unwanted material from the station. 14:42:44 4 Next slide. 14:42:47 5 Taurus II. Taurus II was originally 14:42:47 6 planned by the company to fill the medium launch 14:42:51 7 vehicle need in the nation with the impending 14:42:54 8 end of the Delta II program and the gap that we 14:42:59 9 perceived between some of our larger vehicles 14:43:02 10 such as the Taurus and Minotaur IV and V and the 14:43:05 11 heavy-lift vehicles. The company decided to 14:43:11 12 embark on new development program that was named 14:43:14 13 Taurus II. 14:43:17 14 As NASA's solidified to the COTS and 14:43:17 15 then Cargo Resupply Service, Taurus II became 14:43:21 16 the vehicle that we decided to use for that 14:43:25 17 effort and is focused on that now. 14:43:28 18 The Cargo Resupply is -- its first 14:43:30 19 nine customers and, of course, we are marketing 14:43:35 20 to other areas to use Taurus II for supplying 14:43:36 21 the needs of the nation as well as commercial 14:43:39 22 customers. It will have a great deal of 14:43:42 250 1 capability and flexibility. It's currently -- 14:43:45 2 original missions are planned out of Wallops, 14:43:49 3 but we can launch out of other places, as you'll 14:43:52 4 see in just a minute. 14:43:56 5 Dual AJ26 engines, based on the NK-33 14:43:57 6 engines from Russia, with a second stage 14:44:02 7 provided by a Castor-30, which is a Heritage 120 14:44:05 8 engine. 14:44:08 9 We are also working towards an 14:44:09 10 enhanced second stage to fill the higher cargo 14:44:14 11 needs in the out-years and talking to providers 14= :44:17 12 of that second stage at this point. At the 14:44:20 13 moment we are looking towards a liquid fuel 14:44:22 14 second stage. 14:44:26 15 It incorporates flight-proven 14:44:29 16 components from leading global suppliers and 14:44:33 17 uses subsystems that we've already deployed on 14:44:37 18 other orbital launch vehicles. 14:44:39 19 As you'll see on the next slide, we 14:44:40 20 have a legacy all of the way back to Pegasus of 14:44:40 21 using those systems, enhancing them and 14:44:44 22 increasing their capabilities. And if you trace 14:44:46 251 1 through the various legacies, you can see that 14:44:48 2 it leads to Taurus II using the leverage of our 14:44:51 3 heritage and the many years of launch success. 14:44:55 4 Next slide. 14:44:58 5 The next couple of slides are a little 14:44:58 6 bit busy, but it's just to show the comparison 14:45:02 7 of the Taurus II projected performance to both 14:45:05 8 low Earth orbit and higher -- next slide -- as 14:45:08 9 well as a comparison to other known launch 14:45:11 10 vehicles in terms of environments and 14:45:14 11 performance. Next slide. 14:45:15 12 Payload Accommodations. It's a 14:45:16 13 3.9 meter fairing. So it will accommodate most 14:45:22 14 science payloads and, of course, will 14:45:25 15 accommodate the pressurized cargo module for the 14:45:27 16 COTS mission as well as the CRS program. 14:45:33 17 It's designed to maximize payload 14:45:36 18 integration to make it efficient and effective. 14:45:39 19 It will be integrated in a -- finally in the 14:45:42 20 flow in a horizontal fashion, which will give us 14:45:45 21 access to the payload until 24 hours before 14:45:49 22 launch, and, of course, we'll maintain all of 14:45:51 252 1 the required contamination control and power 14:45:53 2 requirements as we proceed to the launch pad. 14:45:59 3 Next slide. 14:46:03 4 Potential launch sites are listed on 14:46:03 5 this page. 14:46:03 6 Currently we were working with NASA 14:46:04 7 and the Mid-Atlantic Regional Space Board to 14:46:05 8 development the launch capabilities for a liquid 14:46:08 9 rocket out of Wallops. That has not been done 14:46:12 10 before, and so we are working through the 14:46:14 11 development aspects of that with a lot of 14:46:16 12 cooperation from our partners in that. Wallops 14:46:21 13 will allow us to reach the Space Station orbit 14:46:21 14 without any problem either from performance or 14:46:25 15 trajectory. 14:46:28 16 If we have payloads that we're going 14:46:29 17 to fly in the future that require polar- or 14:46:32 18 sun-synchronous, we have our options as well as 14:46:34 19 the potential to launch out of Cape Canaveral 14:46:37 20 should that need arise in the future. 14:46:40 21 Kodiak is very interested in talking 14:46:44 22 to us about launching from there as they develop 14:46:47 253 1 a new launch pad there. 14:46:49 2 And then, of course, Vandenberg is an 14:46:49 3 option for high inclination. Next slide. 14:46:52 4 The work in progress at Wallops Island 14:46:55 5 is depicted on this slide. You can see a number 14:46:57 6 of facilities that will be either modified or 14:47:00 7 updated or built to support this activity. 14:47:03 8 In the upper left, the cargo 14:47:07 9 processing building exists on the main base now, 14:47:09 10 and that will be used for the early missions for 14:47:12 11 processing the payloads. And then we're looking 14:47:12 12 at developing additional facilities on the 14:47:15 13 island to process as well as to fuel payloads. 14:47:18 14 The horizontal integration facility is 14:47:22 15 a new facility that will be built in the next 14:47:24 16 year to process two vehicles simultaneously, and 14:47:27 17 then the transporter/erector will carry the 14:47:30 18 vehicle from the horizontal integration facility 14:47:35 19 to the pad. 14:47:35 20 The pad is the previous 0-A pad that 14:47:36 21 was -- supported solid rockets and now is being 14:47:42 22 modified to support liquid fueled rockets, and 14:47:48 254 1 we're installing a liquid fueling facility, of 14:47:49 2 course, to support that capability. There are 14:47:50 3 some modifications required to the pad, of 14:47:51 4 course, to support the higher thrust as well as 14:47:53 5 the transporter/erector that will carry the 14:47:54 6 vehicle to the pad itself. 14:47:58 7 On the next slide, you see a depiction 14:48:00 8 of how that will look in the future. In the 14:48:03 9 center of the photograph up there is an artist 14:48:07 10 rendering of the Taurus II on the pad. And the 14:48:10 11 flame bucket extends out towards the seawall and 14:48:14 12 so the ramp comes up from inland towards the 14:48:16 13 line of sight and then the transporter/erector 14:48:18 14 will place the rocket on the pad 14:48:22 15 approximately -- less than 24 hours before 14:48:25 16 launch. 14:48:28 17 In addition to the work at Wallops, we 14:48:29 18 are working with Stennis Space Center on 14:48:31 19 constructing an engine test stand that will 14:48:34 20 support our program, the testing of our engines 14:48:36 21 prior to launch. Next slide, please. 14:48:38 22 That's a big hole in the ground, and 14:48:41 255 1 that's where they are right now in addition to 14:48:43 2 some support structure. But getting that hole 14:48:47 3 started and building the flame trench to support 14:48:50 4 the engine testing was a big step in cooperation 14:48:53 5 with NASA under a Space Act Agreement with 14:48:57 6 Orbital. That will be a part of our flow of the 14:49:01 7 engines coming from Aerojet in Sacramento. Next 14:49:04 8 slide. 14:49:08 9 These are the AJ26 engines. In the 14:49:09 10 lower right you can see there the number of 14:49:12 11 engines that are in storage. That's about half 14:49:14 12 of them. And then the engines themselves will 14:49:15 13 be processed, modified and then shipped to 14:49:19 14 Stennis for testing and then on to Wallops for 14:49:21 15 integration testing there and for launch. Next 14:49:25 16 slide. 14:49:28 17 The upper stage on the early missions 14:49:28 18 is a Castor-30. The static fire of that is 14:49:30 19 scheduled for this month, though I've heard it 14:49:34 20 may delay until July. ATK is developing this as 14:49:38 21 an offshoot from the Castro-120 and will provide 14:49:42 22 us with a lot of capability in the early 14:49:46 256 1 missions and possibly some growth directly out 14:49:48 2 of that engine. Next slide. 14:49:53 3 The payload fairing tool gives you an 14:49:55 4 idea of the size of the payload fairing and the 14:49:59 5 dimensions -- or, rather, the configuration of 14:50:01 6 it. Next slide. 14:50:03 7 The Cygnus visiting vehicle, it's a 14:50:05 8 service module, on the right-hand side with the 14:50:11 9 solar arrays, and then on the -- the gray on the 14:50:14 10 left side is the pressurized cargo module. 14:50:16 11 As I mentioned, we modified our plans 14:50:20 12 on the COTS mission to move to the pressurized 14:50:20 13 cargo module in order to demonstrate that 14:50:22 14 capability once we were awarded the CRS contract 14:50:25 15 and all of our missions were scheduled to be 14:50:29 16 pressurized cargo. Next slide. 14:50:33 17 The PCM itself will accommodate the 14:50:34 18 number of CTBs that you see up there. We 14:50:38 19 actually think that we can increase the 14:50:42 20 efficiency of the cargo stowage inside the 14:50:43 21 module -- and we're working on plans to do that 14:50:49 22 now -- to carry more CTBs as well as carry them 14:50:51 257 1 more efficiently and more securely. 14:50:55 2 We can also support powered payloads 14:50:59 3 and hard-mounted payloads as required as the 14:51:02 4 manifest shapes up. Next slide. 14:51:05 5 The service module itself in an 14:51:06 6 expanded view shows you the various components. 14:51:10 7 It's fairly standard spacecraft components. 14:51:14 8 They come from a variety of providers integrated 14:51:19 9 by Orbital at our facility in Dulles and tested 14:51:23 10 there, and then the entire spacecraft will be 14:51:28 11 finally assembled at Wallops itself after 14:51:31 12 integrated testing and environmental testing, 14:51:35 13 which we also do at Dulles. Next slide. 14:51:37 14 One feature of our vehicle is the PROX 14:51:40 15 system. Similar to Elines Coo-coo (phonetic), 14:51:44 16 it will allow us to do the rendezvous and 14:51:48 17 approach to the station. It's based on the same 14:51:51 18 system that the HTV is using. 14:51:51 19 So there's some legacy there as well 14:51:53 20 as the ability for NASA to monitor the 14:51:54 21 performance both systems on both spacecraft and 14:51:59 22 to learn from them so that we can, as we move 14:52:01 258 1 down the road, increase capabilities for 14:52:04 2 providing cargo as well as other vehicles more 14:52:06 3 efficiently and safely to the Space Station. 14:52:10 4 Next slide. 14:52:14 5 The Cygnus will approach in free 14:52:14 6 flight to a point about ten meters away from the 14:52:18 7 station, at which point it will be grappled by 14:52:22 8 the station's arm and installed on the node and 14:52:23 9 the hatch opened for -- next slide -- for 14:52:26 10 unloading of the cargo. 14:52:29 11 You can see it will be berthed at 14:52:31 12 Node 2. 14:52:35 13 We plan on being there for two to four 14:52:36 14 weeks, depending on the requirements of the crew 14:52:39 15 and how long it takes to unload as well as to 14:52:42 16 load it with the material that will be discarded 14:52:45 17 during de-orbit. Next slide. 14:52:48 18 Just some pictures of the standardized 14:52:50 19 bags that we'll be carrying for reference. Next 14:52:55 20 slide. 14:52:55 21 And then also, of course, we can carry 14:52:58 22 both powered stowage lockers, to a certain 14:53:01 259 1 extent, as well as ICEPAC lockers that can be 14:53:06 2 late loaded for scientific specimens. Next 14:53:06 3 slide. 14:53:11 4 Trash on the ISS -- on the right-hand 14:53:12 5 side that's Carl Walsh. That's not the trash. 14:53:14 6 The left-hand side is elements of the station 14:53:18 7 crew presence that need to be discarded 14:53:21 8 periodically from the station, kittoes and 14:53:26 9 yedevaze (phonetic), some of which are 14:53:27 10 carried -- most of which are carried back on 14:53:30 11 Progress now, but with six people up there, they 14:53:32 12 need to be discarded more frequently. And we 14:53:35 13 hope that everything in them burns up before it 14:53:36 14 gets back to Earth. 14:53:37 15 But that will be a part of our job -- 14:53:39 16 is to help offload the hardware and waste from 14:53:41 17 the station and dispose of it in the atmosphere. 14:53:45 18 Next slide. 14:53:45 19 And we did bid on and have the 14:53:52 20 capability to develop both unpressurized and 14:53:52 21 return cargo capability. We've not been tasked 14:53:56 22 to do that yet by NASA. If that were to happen 14:53:57 260 1 in the future, then we would get to work on that 14:54:00 2 and provide that capability on a reasonable 14:54:03 3 schedule along with what we plan to do today. 14:54:05 4 We do think that the work that we're 14:54:09 5 doing today is very important for the future of 14:54:12 6 human space flight from this country. 14:54:16 7 Maintaining an American presence on the 14:54:22 8 International Space Station -- a robust American 14:54:23 9 presence on the station and being able to supply 14:54:23 10 them is very critical, especially with the 14:54:27 11 transportation gap of the shuttle finishing its 14:54:30 12 missions. 14:54:33 13 Keeping that presence up there is 14:54:34 14 going to be watched by the rest of the world, 14:54:35 15 watched by our own industry and our own young 14= :54:38 16 people as they make decisions on where they want 14:54:43 17 to go with their futures and whether they want 14:54:46 18 to go into technology and whether they have a 14:54:48 19 place to go in space. So even though cargo 14:54:51 20 doesn't seem like a glamorous profession to be 14:54:53 21 in to start with, it's just one of the elements 14:54:53 22 that we have to maintain in order to keep people 14:54:57 261 1 flying in space and to keep this country 14:54:59 2 maintaining the Space Station that we have 14:55:02 3 invested so much in. Next slide. 14:55:04 4 To summarize the status of our COTS 14:55:06 5 program, we've completed 10 out of our 21 14:55:11 6 milestones, system level PDR is complete and 14:55:13 7 Phase I of the Safety Review Panel is complete, 14:55:17 8 with Phase II coming up in about two months. 14:55:20 9 We changed, as I said, from 14:55:23 10 unpressurized cargo to pressurized cargo and 14:55:26 11 then updated the Space Act to reflect that and 14:55:28 12 changed the mission schedule from late '10 to 14:55:31 13 early '11 to reflect the additional work 14:55:33 14 required to execute that. 14:55:36 15 For CRS we completed the first two 14:55:37 16 milestones for the cargo resupply service, and 14:55:42 17 the next major milestone will be the Vehicle 14:55:45 18 Baseline Review at L minus 13 months. 14:55:47 19 And we are currently working the cargo 14:55:50 20 manifesting process with NASA to ensure that we 14:55:52 21 understand not only what they're going to fly 14:55:56 22 but how they want it stowed and how they want it 14:55:59 262 1 unloaded and how they want it handled in space. 14:56:01 2 Next slide. 14:56:05 3 And this is an overview of our 14:56:05 4 schedule, as I've already described it, and you 14:56:08 5 can see the dates on there for reference 14:56:10 6 purposes. Next slide. 14:56:14 7 To summarize, I'd like to say, again, 14:56:14 8 that even though it's not glamorous carrying 14:56:18 9 cargo it is glamorous for our people to be 14:56:23 10 working on the Human Space Flight program, and 14:56:26 11 they've very excited about being a part of this, 14:56:28 12 being a part of the International Space Station 14:56:33 13 and helping to continue that mission. 14:56:33 14 Because we know that even as we are 14:56:36 15 working to achieve other goals in space, 14:56:39 16 maintaining our presence on the International 14:56:42 17 Space Station keeps the interest up, it keeps 14:56:45 18 the attention on space and it keeps Americans 14:56:48 19 flying. That cannot be overemphasized, I 14:56:51 20 believe. 14:56:54 21 Evolving that capability to 14:56:54 22 understanding what it will take to go further in 14:56:56 263 1 space, to live longer in space and to take those 14:56:59 2 capabilities further out from low Earth orbit 14:57:01 3 requires the delivery of this cargo and the 14:57:04 4 delivery of the experiments, and we intend to do 14:57:06 5 that successfully and to do it cost effectively 14:57:09 6 and efficiently and, most importantly, safely. 14:57:12 7 So with that, Mr. Chairman, any 14:57:15 8 questions? 14:57:18 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 14:57:19 10 Are there questions? 14:57:20 11 I guess you've answered the questions. 14:57:24 12 We thank you for the briefing. 14:57:26 13 MR. CULBERTSON: Thank you very much 14:57:28 14 for your attention. 14:57:31 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. Mike 14:57:31 16 Suffredini is next, the ISS program manager, who 14:57:31 17 will talk to us a little bit about commercial 14:57:31 18 resupply services from his perspective. 14:57:31 19 MR. SUFFREDINI: Good afternoon, 14:57:44 20 Mr. Chairman and Members of Committee. It's 14:57:46 21 good to see you guys here this afternoon. 14:57:48 22 And just last night or this morning 14:57:51 264 1 early I was sitting over in Florida hoping John 14:57:54 2 would launch the shuttle so we'd get on with the 14:57:57 3 rest of assembly, but, anyway, we're going to 14:58:01 4 try that again in July and we're looking forward 14:58:01 5 to it. 14:58:01 6 Before I go on, I made a huge error. 14:58:02 7 Elon reminded me in looking at his paragraphs of 14:58:05 8 actual hardware that I should have done the same 14:58:09 9 with Space Station, but Frank's Chart 25, if you 14:58:11 10 look at that, that's not an artist's rendition 14:58:13 11 of what ISS is going to look like. That is a 14:58:15 12 photograph of the Space Station, and it is 14:58:19 13 largely complete, as we know it today. 14:58:21 14 It is also manned as recently as late 14:58:24 15 May with a six-person crew. And so we're 14:58:27 16 continuing on in that program, and, of course, a 14:58:29 17 very important part of that -- an important part 14:58:32 18 of that is the ability to resupply and to get 14:58:33 19 utilization on board so we can utilize the 14:58:36 20 vehicle that we built. And so I thought I'd 14:58:40 21 spend a little time talking to you about that 14:58:42 22 today. Next chart, please. 14:58:45 265 1 Of course, we all know we are going to 14:58:46 2 retire the shuttle. The plan is to retire it at 14:58:49 3 the end of 2010, and what that left us with was 14:58:52 4 a significant gap in our capability to the 14:58:56 5 resources to orbit between the time it retires 14:59:00 6 and, at that time, the planned life of the 14:59:03 7 International Space Station, which is -- our 14:59:06 8 plan is to operate through the end of 2015 and 14:59:08 9 then de-orbit it in the first quarter of 2016. 14:59:11 10 And what we ended up with through our 14:59:14 11 analysis is we found out we needed about 14:59:15 12 60 metric tons of upmass. And when we look at 14:59:18 13 the vehicles that we have today that are 14:59:23 14 available to us or will be available to us soon, 14:59:25 15 we have, of course, we all know, the Russian 14:59:27 16 Progress vehicle for cargo and the Soyuz vehicle 14:59:30 17 for crew. 14:59:32 18 We recently had the first flight of 14:59:32 19 the automated transfer vehicle, which is the 14:59:36 20 European contribution to payback which we 14:59:39 21 call -- what we call common systems ops cost, 14:59:41 22 and that's going to be four vehicles -- four 14:59:44 266 1 more vehicles, the first one plus four. And 14:59:46 2 that will be each year starting in '10. So '10, 14:59:49 3 '11, '12, '13 will have an ATV vehicle. 14:59:52 4 In addition to that, we're about to 14:59:58 5 fly our first H-II transfer vehicle, which is 15:00:00 6 the JAXA contribution, also as a payback for 15:00:01 7 common systems ops costs. That will be one per 15:00:05 8 year through the life of the program, starting 15:00:05 9 with their first flight, which is going to occur 15:00:08 10 here in September. 15:00:10 11 Now, all of those vehicles together 15:00:12 12 flying through those times that I just told you 15:00:15 13 about, we still have a 60-metric-ton shortfall. 15:00:17 14 In addition to that -- and you've 15:00:21 15 heard folks talk about it today -- we also have 15:00:22 16 a need to get crew to orbit. To date, of 15:00:23 17 course, the shuttle had done that for us prior 15:00:26 18 to the accident. We kind of evolved to doing 15:00:29 19 most of the crew transport needs with the Soyuz 15:00:32 20 spacecraft, although we still -- up into the 15:00:35 21 next couple of flights, we have one crew member 15:00:38 22 that we do rotate on the shuttle. 15:00:39 267 1 And then the future, of course, for 15:00:42 2 now shows us having to procure those seats until 15:00:45 3 the crew exploration vehicle is available, and 15:00:50 4 the first flight where we can take six crew to 15:00:52 5 orbit and it stays on orbit as a rescue is 15:00:55 6 currently the fall of 2015. 15:00:55 7 We have procured Soyuz spacecraft 15:01:00 8 through the fall of 2012 with the return in 15:01:02 9 2013, and so we do have a gap there that we 15:01:05 10 haven't procured to date. Next chart, please. 15:01:07 11 So this chart -- you've seen it 15:01:11 12 before. This kind of just shows you the 15:01:14 13 different capabilities. A couple of points I 15:01:17 14 would make on this chart. 15:01:20 15 The first is you'll note that no 15:01:21 16 vehicle other than the space shuttle is able to 15:01:23 17 return unpressurized cargo. And that was a 15:01:26 18 significant change for us. That drove us to go 15:01:29 19 to a -- what we refer to as the build-and-burn 15:01:31 20 philosophy. 15:01:34 21 Prior to this time, we built a limited 15:01:35 22 number of orbit replacement units or basically 15:01:37 268 1 spare components, and when they failed, the 15:01:39 2 intention was to return them home and repair 15:01:41 3 them and fly them back up when we needed them. 15:01:43 4 The external ORUs are all very -- I 15:01:47 5 wouldn't say all -- they're mostly all very, 15:01:50 6 very larger components, very heavy, and there 15:01:53 7 was just -- there was no capability at the time 15:01:56 8 or planned capability we knew of to be able to 15:01:59 9 handle the external ORUs. And, in fact, that's 15:02:01 10 holding true today. Nobody is planning to do a 15:02:06 11 return capability external ORUs. 15:02:10 12 In addition to that, you'll see if we 15:02:13 13 hadn't gone with the commercial resupply 15:02:16 14 services contract that there wasn't even a 15:02:18 15 capability to bring a significant amount of 15:02:21 16 pressurized cargo home. 15:02:24 17 The Soyuz does bring home a little bit 15:02:26 18 per our contract. For each seat we get about 15:02:26 19 17 kilograms in a very confined space so we can 15:02:28 20 bring home some samples, water samples, 15:02:31 21 experiment samples, but it's fairly limited. 15:02:35 22 And so we needed that capability as well. 15:02:37 269 1 Now, the HTV does have -- it was at 15:02:40 2 the time -- before CRS, HTV was the only vehicle 15:02:43 3 that also had an upmass capability through her 15:02:48 4 external ORUs. So now we still have to get the 15:02:52 5 spares to orbit. HTV was going to be the only 15:02:52 6 capability to do that. And this is something we 15:02:56 7 also got more capability with the CRS contract. 15:02:59 8 So you can see -- just that chart 15:03:03 9 alone kind of makes you realize how big of an 15:03:05 10 impact that losing shuttle did to us. 15:03:09 11 Now, you have to remember much of the 15:03:12 12 shuttle capability -- the whole program was 15:03:14 13 built around assembly, and, of course, much that 15:03:14 14 of capability that we utilize on shuttle has 15:03:17 15 been for assembly as well. So it's hard to 15:03:19 16 compare apples to apples on this chart just from 15:03:22 17 a pure upmass standpoint. Next chart. 15:03:25 18 So all of this drove us to go into a 15:03:27 19 procurement of a capability to take care of the 15:03:31 20 remaining 60 metric tons that we had to procure 15:03:33 21 in order to operate the ISS through 2015. I 15:03:37 22 won't go through all of these charts. 15:03:41 270 1 But we did do a lengthy process to 15:03:42 2 involve commercial -- the industry early on to 15:03:46 3 understand what they could and couldn't do, what 15:03:49 4 was reasonable to expect. We were into a fixed 15:03:52 5 price contract. We wanted to understand the 15:03:55 6 application of that capability. 15:03:56 7 All of that drove us to an RFP on 15:03:57 8 April 14. And you can see down here at the 15:04:01 9 bottom it showed you basically what we put in as 15:04:04 10 the need that the RFP was trying to fulfill. 15:04:07 11 You'll notice it has upmass, both 15:04:10 12 internal and external. It has only pressurized 15:04:13 13 return, because that was the only capability we 15:04:17 14 thought we could get in a return capability, and 15:04:19 15 then this disposal downmass, which is just a 15:04:22 16 nice way of saying trash -- Frank mentioned 15:04:25 17 earlier. Next chart, please. 15:04:28 18 This chart -- we spent a lot of time 15:04:29 19 trying to decide what we could do and when we 15:04:32 20 should do it. This chart is showing -- it says 15:04:35 21 it here in the title, Using 2008 Historical 15:04:38 22 Schedule Dates. 15:04:41 271 1 So in late 2007 we were trying to 15:04:42 2 decide when to do the procurement. And this 15:04:46 3 chart just kind shows you at this time RPK was 15:04:48 4 out of the picture. The COTS Phase I second 15:04:51 5 re-award, if you will, hadn't taken place. So 15:04:54 6 we knew what the SpaceX plan was going to be. 15:04:59 7 We also knew from talking to our JAXA 15:05:03 8 colleagues that they needed about a 36-month 15:05:06 9 lead time to build an HTV. If we ask for one, 15:05:08 10 they need about 36 months. And, of course, we 15:05:10 11 need additional time just to do the negotiations 15:05:11 12 before the 36-month clock started. 15:05:14 13 In addition to that, we found in 15:05:18 14 talking to industry that it would probably take 15:05:20 15 about two years to get any vehicle that we 15:05:23 16 wanted. So if we ordered, we had to always 15:05:27 17 order about two years in advance. And that's 15:05:30 18 been true for the Progress vehicle as well. 15:05:32 19 It's a pretty standard time. The human-rated 15:05:34 20 spacecraft tend to take a little longer, and 15:05:37 21 that's also born out from our purchase of the 15:05:39 22 Soyuz spacecraft. 15:05:42 272 1 But in any event, 2011 -- early 2011 15:05:44 2 is when we decided was the deadline to have 15:05:45 3 capability to orbit. And I'll talk a little bit 15:05:49 4 about the challenges associated with any 15:05:52 5 movement to the right of schedule here in a 15:05:54 6 minute. But that drove us then to do the 15:05:56 7 acquisition when we did. Next chart, please. 15:05:59 8 This was going to be a new way of 15:06:04 9 doing business, at least for us anyway. We're 15:06:07 10 used to doing cost-plus contracts, controlling 15:06:10 11 every aspect of the process. 15:06:13 12 And we also are fairly hands-on even 15:06:14 13 in ELV land in terms of what we watch and what 15:06:18 14 data we get back, and we even give a go at 15:06:21 15 launch time. And we were trying to change to 15:06:26 16 a -- to a little more closer to the type of 15:06:28 17 fixed price contract you'd expect. It's an 15:06:30 18 end-to-end service type contract. 15:06:33 19 In all of these cases, we supply an 15:06:35 20 ORU or a bag of supplies to the provider and the 15:06:38 21 provider gives it back to us when we get on 15:06:43 22 Space Station. And so it's an end-to-end 15:06:45 273 1 service. 15:06:48 2 Now, to the extent we could let go of 15:06:48 3 the launch vehicle we have, we got relatively 15:06:50 4 hands-off in terms of the launch vehicle prep 15:06:54 5 and what they have to do to ensure mission 15:06:56 6 success. There's still work they have to do 15:07:01 7 working with the range and FAA to assure safety 15:07:03 8 for the people on the ground, but once you get 15:07:05 9 past that point, it's really up to these 15:07:07 10 contractors to ensure that they're going to be 15:07:09 11 successful and get to ISS. 15:07:12 12 And then we have this sphere around 15:07:14 13 ISS -- about a two-by-two-by-four kilometer 15:07:17 14 sphere around ISS, and anything that the 15:07:18 15 spacecraft does inside that sphere, including 15:07:21 16 the burn to get to that sphere, then is a little 15:07:24 17 more tightly controlled, more like you'd expect 15:07:26 18 NASA would do. But it really was only from a 15:07:31 19 safety aspect. 15:07:31 20 Anything to do with mission success, 15:07:31 21 we took off those kinds of requirements we 15:07:31 22 normally apply, and we applied just the 15:07:35 274 1 requirements having to do with safety in order 15:07:37 2 to ensure that we would be safe. But the whole 15:07:39 3 idea was to put the monkey on the back of the 15:07:42 4 provider to get to ISS and try to take some of 15:07:44 5 our work out of that process. 15:07:47 6 So it's a contract for fixed price, as 15:07:49 7 I said here, for the internal/external upmass 15:07:52 8 and the cargo return and cargo disposal. And in 15:07:56 9 the end, we ended up selecting two vendors 15:07:56 10 inside this contract. We had the option to 15:08:00 11 select one, two -- even could do more than two, 15:08:01 12 if we chose. Of course, more than two, you 15:08:05 13 probably -- you'd run into a problem of having 15:08:06 14 enough business to entice a contractor to play. 15:08:09 15 We felt like we needed at least two. 15:08:13 16 Because in the cases of what were proposed to 15:08:16 17 us, it was always -- it was all new vehicle, and 15:08:19 18 so we felt like we needed some redundancy there 15:08:21 19 to hope that if -- if two applied, we would, of 15:08:25 20 course, hope both will be successful, but if 15:08:28 21 they don't, we still have a chance that one 15:08:30 22 might be enough to keep us going until we get 15:08:33 275 1 other capability to orbit. Next chart, please. 15:08:37 2 So this is the result of the task 15:08:38 3 order after we awarded the contract in late 15:08:41 4 December. In about the March time frame we sat 15:08:41 5 down with both companies and did what we call 15:08:44 6 our task orders, and this is basically how the 15:08:46 7 flights worked out. We put the year and month 15:08:48 8 and kind of laid them out. 15:08:51 9 And then as we get closer in, within 15:08:53 10 about two years, we'll do ATP. And at about 15:08:56 11 18 months then we'll actually select the launch 15:09:00 12 date and a 90-day period that they have to lunch 15:09:02 13 within, and we'll agree to that at this Vehicle 15:09:05 14 Baseline Review that has occurred in one case 15:09:10 15 and is to occur here shortly, as Frank 15:09:14 16 mentioned. Next chart, please. 15:09:17 17 So this just kind of gives you a sense 15:09:17 18 of the two-year window and how the flights line 15:09:22 19 up. The red X's are the actual launch dates, 15:09:26 20 and then the bar there is the time from ATP to 15:09:30 21 launch. And it just kind of gives you a feel 15:09:33 22 for where everything lays out. 15:09:36 276 1 Remember I told you the beginning of 15:09:39 2 2011 is when we wanted to be able to have cargo 15:09:41 3 to orbit. And the current plan for the COTS 15:09:46 4 part of this process was not to carry cargo to 15:09:50 5 ISS. So the first cargo on either of the two 15:09:52 6 vehicles was going to be on the SpaceX vehicle 15:09:54 7 in late 2010. So when we made the award, we 15:09:56 8 were already kind of late relative to our needs. 15:10:00 9 Next chart, please. 15:10:03 10 So I won't get into too much detail on 15:10:03 11 these next two charts in order to save time, but 15:10:08 12 you can kind of see the milestones that are 15:10:11 13 listed here. 15:10:13 14 We're coupled very closely to the COTS 15:10:14 15 effort. The COTS program really manages the 15:10:16 16 relationship with Orbital and SpaceX. All of 15:10:21 17 the integration work, all of the requirement, 15:10:24 18 all of that is supplied by and verified by the 15:10:25 19 International Space Station program, and that 15:10:28 20 ensures that when the COTS flight occurs and if 15:10:29 21 it is successful then transitioning to the CRS 15:10:33 22 flight should be relatively seamless. Next 15:10:38 277 1 chart, please. 15:10:42 2 And this is just the specifics for the 15:10:42 3 Orbital flight as well. You'll notice there's a 15:10:44 4 little bit of difference to Orbital, and Frank 15:10:48 5 mentioned it. They have a solid second stage 15:10:49 6 early in their program, and after the first 15:10:52 7 couple of flights, they go to a liquid stage 15:10:55 8 which provides more performance. 15:11:00 9 And as the last two bullets say -- 15:11:01 10 really this is a challenging business, at best. 15:11:02 11 It is a very difficult business. We all in this 15:11:05 12 room -- most of us in this room have a lot of 15:11:08 13 experience with this, and no matter how well we 15:11:11 14 plan and how hard we work and how much money we 15:11:14 15 put into it, there are always challenges to 15:11:18 16 overcome. 15:11:20 17 And even once you become operational, 15:11:21 18 until you've flown a few times, you're still 15:11:23 19 going to have challenges making schedule. And 15:11:28 20 so we believe that even once we do the VBR we 15:11:31 21 need to be prepared for slips as much as three 15:11:36 22 to six months and maybe more. Next chart, 15:11:39 278 1 please. 15:11:42 2 So this chart is an attempt to show 15:11:42 3 you what the logistics are on board that we have 15:11:44 4 to provide for on the International Space 15:11:47 5 Station through the end of 2011. And I'll try 15:11:49 6 to talk to you a little bit in large detail. 15:11:53 7 The green line is the crew supply. So 15:11:56 8 that's water, food, clothing -- all of the 15:11:59 9 things that the crew needs to survive. 15:12:01 10 The orange line is consumables. So 15:12:05 11 those are filters, tanks -- those big tanks you 15:12:08 12 saw Frank show, those kinds of things are the 15:12:10 13 consumables required to operate the systems for 15:12:11 14 the crew. 15:12:14 15 The dashed purple line is the 15:12:15 16 utilization requirements, and you can see even 15:12:17 17 today with the capability we have because of 15:12:19 18 assembly we're challenged early in 2010 to meet 15:12:21 19 the needs of the utilization crowd. 15:12:26 20 And then, finally, the light gray is 15:12:29 21 corrective maintenance. And so even as we plan 15:12:30 22 today, we're relatively challenged to do the 15:12:33 279 1 corrective maintenance. Now, that's not a bad 15:12:36 2 thing. This is all based on meantime between 15:12:39 3 failure. 15:12:41 4 Our meantime between failures on the 15:12:41 5 majority of our components have been very 15:12:44 6 friendly to us. And as you can expect, early in 15:12:45 7 the life of the Space Station, these systems are 15:12:47 8 relatively young, and we would expect that we 15:12:49 9 will continue to have positive performance from 15:12:56 10 the hardware relative to failures. 15:12:57 11 However, as the vehicle gets older, 15:13:00 12 you wouldn't want to carry this kind of 15:13:02 13 challenge because you can expect more failures 15:13:04 14 as they get closer to their design life. 15:13:07 15 Now, what we have done in the program 15:13:10 16 to try to mitigate the risk of the potential for 15:13:12 17 these vehicles to move to the right are two 15:13:16 18 things. 15:13:19 19 One is -- you see the dots that 15:13:19 20 represent both of the demo flight -- the demo 15:13:21 21 flights that actually berth to the ISS, so 15:13:22 22 Demo 3 for SpaceX and the single Orbital demo, 15:13:25 280 1 and then you see the first couple of flights for 15:13:29 2 SpaceX there and that first CRS flight for 15:13:29 3 Orbital. None of that upmass is accommodated in 15:13:33 4 that chart. 15:13:37 5 So what that chart tells you is we 15:13:37 6 could probably keep the ISS flying and utilize 15:13:40 7 it the way we expect to utilize it through about 15:13:43 8 the end of 2011, and at that point if we don't 15:13:46 9 have some upmass from one of these systems, 15:13:50 10 we're going to be challenged to continue to 15:13:52 11 utilize ISS in the long term. 15:13:54 12 Now, I'll tell you a couple of things. 15:13:58 13 One is, of course, I told you that we don't -- 15:13:59 14 we haven't accommodated any upmass. So I 15:14:01 15 haven't assumed any upmass from any of those 15:14:01 16 vehicles. And second of all, even though the 15:14:07 17 demos today are not intended to carry flight 15:14:08 18 hardware to orbit, one of the things we're 15:14:12 19 looking at is we want to make sure the demo is 15:14:14 20 as realistic as possible. 15:14:17 21 In order to do that, we believe we 15:14:19 22 should manifest those vehicles as if they're 15:14:21 281 1 flying as real vehicles, and it's all about how 15:14:24 2 you pack it and how you're going to -- once you 15:14:26 3 get to orbit, how you're going to unpack it and 15:14:29 4 how you're going to fill it back up with trash. 15:14:32 5 And so we believe that we have a 15:14:34 6 rationale to go ahead and manifest flight 15:14:36 7 hardware on the -- from the demonstration 15:14:38 8 flights as well. So that's another mitigation. 15:14:39 9 If any one of these flights makes it between now 15:14:39 10 and the end of 2011, that's just more margin for 15:14:44 11 us to continue on. 15:14:46 12 So our job is to try to manage the ISS 15:14:48 13 such that we can give as much to both Orbital 15:14:52 14 and SpaceX to move to the right as they 15:14:56 15 naturally -- as you might expect them to have to 15:14:58 16 as they conquer problems. 15:15:02 17 Part of that, of course, is working 15:15:05 18 very closely with them not to let other slips 15:15:06 19 occur. So you want to manage really hard to 15:15:08 20 your milestones so you can deal with those 15:15:09 21 problems that you're not expecting to have. And 15:15:10 22 so that's part of what we've been working 15:15:14 282 1 closely with both SpaceX and Orbital to talk 15:15:17 2 about. 15:15:18 3 And I'll just tell you up front right 15:15:19 4 now, both companies have done just a great job 15:15:21 5 of working with us and designing their systems 15:15:24 6 and understanding our requirements, and we've 15:15:26 7 been very impressed so far. We just know that 15:15:30 8 the challenge is there no matter how good you 15:15:33 9 are. Next chart, please. 15:15:37 10 So this is really my summary chart. 15:15:38 11 We selected two contracts to get us some 15:15:44 12 mitigation to the possibility if one or the 15:15:44 13 other didn't quite make it. 15:15:47 14 We're working very closely with the -- 15:15:49 15 they call themselves C3PO, the office that 15:15:51 16 manages the COTS program on behalf of the ESMD 15:15:55 17 and, in fact, are doing all of the integration 15:15:57 18 work for the COTS program to ensure that the 15:16:00 19 COTS vehicles then can seamlessly become CRS 15:16:03 20 vehicle when that occurs. 15:16:07 21 We have great insight into their 15:16:09 22 milestones and are working closely with them 15:16:11 283 1 when we see challenges coming along. And while 15:16:13 2 the contractors do have quite a bit of work 15:16:15 3 ahead of them, we think they're doing a great, 15:16:17 4 great job, but we would expect schedule slips, 15:16:19 5 as you normally would. And we're working hard 15:16:22 6 to help mitigate those, as we mentioned earlier. 15:16:25 7 And that concludes my presentation, 15:16:28 8 Mr. Chairman, and I'm ready to take any 15:16:30 9 questions you might have. 15:16:32 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Terrific. 15:16:33 11 Thanks very much, Mike. 15:16:36 12 Questions from anybody? 15:16:37 13 Okay. Jeff... 15:16:39 14 MR. GREASON: Back on your Chart 11, I 15:16:39 15 assume these jagged lines are your demand as to 15:16:41 16 what you want to fly? 15:16:46 17 MR. SUFFREDINI: That's what we will 15:16:48 18 fly. 15:16:49 19 MR. GREASON: That's what you will 15:16:49 20 fly? 15:16:49 21 MR. SUFFREDINI: Yes, sir. 15= :16:50 22 MR. GREASON: Okay. I'm at a loss as 15:16:52 284 1 to how things like -- in 2010, for example, how 15:16:55 2 does the consumable -- how do some of these 15:16:57 3 items like ISS utilization get negative? 15:16:58 4 MR. SUFFREDINI: They get negative 15:17:01 5 when you know you're not supplying at the 15:17:02 6 level -- zero represents what we believe we need 15:17:04 7 to be above to meet the needs of different 15:17:07 8 suppliers. 15:17:10 9 MR. GREASON: This would basically be 15:17:10 10 the margin you have? 15:17:10 11 MR. SUFFREDINI: Right. 15:17:11 12 MR. GREASON: Okay. Got you. 15:17:10 13 MR. SUFFREDINI: So in this case we're 15:17:11 14 trying to meet the needs of utilization folks. 15:17:14 15 I'll tell you, that dip is for -- I'll say for 15:17:18 16 utilization resupply. So all of the racks and 15:17:20 17 capability that we need to put on orbit to use 15:17:23 18 in the future, that all does make it to orbit. 15:17:26 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Please go ahead, Bo. 15:17:30 20 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 15:17:32 21 Michael, when we listen today to 15:17:34 22 Mr. Perminov, the Russian space agency head, he 15:17:36 285 1 didn't seem to be concerned about the fact that 15:17:42 2 NASA budget for support to International Space 15:17:45 3 Station today is not planned beyond 2016. 15:17:48 4 I haven't heard any concern from 15:17:52 5 either of the COTS contractors either, your 15:17:54 6 suppliers, and I'm thinking: Is it that just 15:17:58 7 everybody assumes that America and NASA will 15:18:01 8 come to its senses and figure out how to fund it 15:18:06 9 past 2016, or are these guys in it for short 15:18:09 10 run? What am I missing? 15:18:15 11 (Discussion off the record.) 15:17:11 12 MR. SUFFREDINI: Good. I was about to 15:17:11 13 say we should ask him. So there's Frank up 15:18:20 14 there. He's going -- yes. Well, I'll tell you 15:18:23 15 what my conversations are, and then I would 15:18:24 16 encourage you to get -- 15:18:25 17 MR. BEJMUK: Well, you work with all 15:18:25 18 of these guys, you know. 15:17:11 19 MR. SUFFREDINI: -- Frank and Elon -- 15:17:11 20 let Frank and Elon come up here and talk, and I 15:18:29 21 think Anatolli (phonetic) is gone. 15:18:32 22 But all of the partners expressed to 15:18:33 286 1 us that they have made a major investment in 15:18:35 2 ISS. And, in fact, in the Russians' case, they 15:18:38 3 want to build yet another module, and they kind 15:18:40 4 of don't want to do that if it's only going to 15:18:40 5 be on orbit for two or three years. That's a 15:18:43 6 major investment for two or three years. 15:18:44 7 So our discussions with the partners 15:18:46 8 has been they would like to see us go beyond 15:18:48 9 2015. 15:18:52 10 Now, as far as SpaceX and Orbital go, 15:18:52 11 I've got to believe, based on the way the 15:18:56 12 contract is written, that they would like to see 15:18:58 13 the opportunity to defray more of the costs that 15:19:00 14 they made in their first investment to get to 15:19:02 15 where they are and see us fly more so they could 15:19:02 16 do more resupply. 15:19:06 17 But Frank and Elon would have to 15:19:07 18 comment. If you'd like. 15:19:10 19 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yeah. 15:17:11 20 MR. SUFFREDINI: Was I close? Did I 15:17:11 21 get it right? 15:17:11 22 (Discussion off the record.) 15:17:11 287 1 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: We think, as I said, 15:17:11 2 maintaining the human presence in space is 15:17:11 3 extremely important for this country, 15:19:25 4 particularly if we're going to go beyond low 15:19:25 5 Earth orbit, and we want to keep the programs 15:19:25 6 going, particularly this one going. We've got a 15:19:32 7 lot invested in ISS, and our partners have a lot 15:19:32 8 invested in it. Going beyond 2016, I think, is 15:19:35 9 a very important decision that needs to be made 15:19:39 10 very soon. 15:19:42 11 MR. BEJMUK: Thank you. 15:19:42 12 MR. SUFFREDINI: Now, we're going to 15:19:45 13 have lots of opportunities to talk about other 15:19:46 14 things, and if you ever ask me what I think 15:19:46 15 about that, it's likely to be even slightly 15:19:46 16 different than how I answer it for those guys. 15:19:52 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: I have a question I 15:19:52 18 wanted to ask. From October 2010 to -- for five 15:19:54 19 years or thereabouts, the current plan would be 15:19:58 20 depend on the Russians to put astronauts on the 15:20:02 21 station. 15:20:07 22 If I go backwards in time from October 15:20:07 288 1 of 2010, there's one more mission that carries a 15:20:10 2 crew with the shuttle -- is that right -- one 15:20:14 3 remaining? 15:17:11 4 MR. SUFFREDINI: Two more. 15:17:11 5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, there are two 15:20:17 6 remaining missions? 15:17:11 7 MR. SUFFREDINI: 2J, which is on the 15:17:11 8 pad, and 17A, we'll rotate one U.S./Soyuz -- 15:20:19 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: One beyond that. 15:17:11 10 MR. SUFFREDINI: -- crew member, and 15:17:11 11 then we bring home that crew member on ULF-3. 15:20:23 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: And if I take 15:20:28 13 literally today and go backwards in time, when 15:20:30 14 was the previous flight of the shuttle that 15:20:34 15 carried a crew? 15:20:36 16 MR. SUFFREDINI: The previous flight. 15:20:37 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: There was a previous 15:20:39 18 flight? 15:20:41 19 MR. SUFFREDINI: Uh-huh. 15:20:41 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Thank you very 15:20:41 21 much. 15:20:41 22 MR. SUFFREDINI: We did the lion's 15:20:42 289 1 share of crew rotation on the shuttle until the 15:20:45 2 accident, and then the Soyuz had to do all of it 15:20:48 3 until we started flying again. After we started 15:20:51 4 flying again, we started putting a single 15:20:54 5 crew -- doing two on the Soyuz and a single crew 15:20:55 6 on the shuttle, and we've done that 15:20:56 7 semi-consistently for a little while. 15:20:59 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: Got it. Very good. 15:21:01 9 Are there any questions? 15:21:03 10 Hearing no other questions, well, 15:21:05 11 thank you very much. 15:21:06 12 MR. SUFFREDINI: Thank you very much. 15:21:07 13 I appreciate it. 15:21:09 14 MR. AUGUSTINE: Let's see. The next 15:21:13 15 item concerns alternative architectures. The 15:21:14 16 first topic will be Direct. And, let's see, 15:21:18 17 Steve Metschan is going to do that. 15:21:24 18 Steve... 15:21:28 19 MR. METSCHAN: Good afternoon, 15:21:37 20 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. My 15:21:39 21 name is a Steve Metschan. It is my privilege to 15:21:41 22 present the Direct proposal to you on behalf of 15:21:45 290 1 a courageous group of engineers and other 15:21:47 2 concerned citizens. 15:21:51 3 This began for me four years ago when 15:21:52 4 NASA asked my company for an analysis of all 15:21:55 5 possible approaches that could meet the policy 15:22:00 6 objectives of the VSE -- or the vision within 15:22:03 7 the available budget. This analysis was refined 15:22:04 8 and transformed by a government and industry 15:22:07 9 experts into the Direct concepts I'm showing 15:22:10 10 today. Next slide. 15:22:14 11 The Direct plan is intended to help 15:22:16 12 put U.S. exploration plans back into alignment 15:22:20 13 with the approved policy and within the limits 15:22:22 14 of the available budget. 15:22:24 15 The reductions in long-term 15:22:28 16 discretionary spending make this even more 15:22:30 17 imperative today. 15:22:34 18 So what is the Jupiter? 15:22:36 19 Jupiter is based on the space shuttle. 15:22:38 20 The space shuttle is the horse we are currently 15:22:41 21 riding today into orbit and represents a good 15:22:43 22 foundation from which to create a new capability 15:22:46 291 1 for the future. Jupiter retains the proven and 15:22:48 2 already man-rated shuttle main engines and the 15:22:51 3 solid rocket boosters. 15:22:54 4 Now, ironically the first thing that 15:22:59 5 all shuttle-derived systems do is they remove 15:22:59 6 the shuttle, but they retain the heavy-lift 15:23:01 7 stack that has taken us to orbit now for almost 15:23:05 8 30 years. 15:23:09 9 The primary modifications to the stack 15:23:09 10 is to use the tooling at Michoud to actually 15:23:13 11 produce the oxygen tank to turn it into an 15:23:15 12 in-line vehicle, in which the core becomes the 15:23:19 13 carrier for the payload. 15:23:22 14 The primary new piece of structure we 15:23:23 15 need is the aft thrust structure. We then 15:23:24 16 replace the shuttle main engines that are 15:23:27 17 already flying, the existing four-segment 15:23:29 18 rockets, and we produce what we call the Jupiter 15:23:33 19 core once we add the payload adapter and the 15:23:36 20 avionics. 15:23:41 21 Above that we put the payload, which 15:23:42 22 is completely separate from the spacecraft, so 15:23:44 292 1 it does not affect the abort capabilities for 15:23:46 2 that. And with the payload fairing, that's our 15:23:47 3 entry level vehicle, what we call the 15:23:49 4 Jupiter-130 or some may want to call it some day 15:23:50 5 the Ares III. 15:23:52 6 Once you're at that point, we add a 15:23:55 7 planned addition fourth engine to the core, 15:23:57 8 which is already designed to handle the 15:24:01 9 additional loads associated with an upper stage, 15:24:04 10 which could be J-2 or RL-6 based. The avionics 15:24:06 11 ring is then replaced with the Altair lander, 15:24:09 12 the payload fairing already developed with 15:24:15 13 Orion, and that becomes the Ares IV, the 15:24:15 14 Jupiter-246 in this particular configuration. 15:24:23 15 Direct is not a new concept. Even 15:24:25 16 before the shuttle first flew, NASA engineers 15:24:29 17 suggested utilizing the hardware and 15:24:33 18 infrastructure of the shuttle to develop a 15:24:33 19 derivative heavy-lift launch system. 15:24:35 20 Following Challenger, NASA engineers, 15:24:38 21 once again, studied this idea in even greater 15:24:40 22 detail, ultimately recommending the National 15:24:45 293 1 Launch System or the NSL, which passed its 15:24:47 2 preliminary design review milestone in 1993. 15:24:49 3 Now, in a post-Columbia world, some 15:24:53 4 NASA engineers have, once again, asserted at 15:24:57 5 great risk to their livelihood that the best 15:24:59 6 path forward is still a true direct -- hence, 15:25:04 7 the name Direct -- shuttle directive. 15:25:08 8 Given the imminent destruction of 15:25:11 9 America's second heavy-lift system and 15:25:11 10 infrastructure, this commission will ultimately 15:25:14 11 help determine if a solution repeatedly 15:25:17 12 advocated by NASA engineers over the last 15:25:20 13 30 years as a practical solution to America's 15:25:23 14 heavy-lift requirements will ever become 15:25:25 15 reality. Next slide. 15:25:29 16 The engineering feasibility, use of 15:25:31 17 available tooling, flow within the existing 15:25:38 18 external tank manufacturing facility and 15:25:41 19 transport of an in-line core has been assessed 15:25:44 20 in great detail by NASA repeatedly. In fact, 15:25:47 21 the National Launch System study produced a 15:25:52 22 series of detailed studies, of which the core 15:25:52 294 1 alone had 1,000 pages of detail associated with 15:25:56 2 the design and how one would accomplish that. 15:25:59 3 Then, as now, the most time-consuming 15:26:03 4 and risky element of any rocket development 15:26:06 5 effort is still the rocket engine, not the tank 15:26:10 6 structure. Direct is the only man-ratable 15:26:13 7 proposal on the table with man-rated rocket 15:26:19 8 engines already flying; namely, the shuttle main 15:26:19 9 engines. 15:26:23 10 Now, some have said Direct is nothing 15:26:23 11 more than paper rocket. Nothing could be 15:26:29 12 further from the truth. 15:26:31 13 Currently the Ares I requires a new 15:26:32 14 five-segment solid rocket booster development. 15:26:35 15 The Jupiter's four-segment SRB is already flying 15:26:39 16 on the shuttle. 15:26:40 17 Ares requires a new upper stage engine 15:26:43 18 development, the J-2X. The Jupiter's engine, 15:26:46 19 the shuttle main engine, is already man rated 15:26:50 20 and flying on the shuttle. 15:26:53 21 Ares I is currently struggling to 15:26:55 22 mitigate the serious thrust oscillation issues 15:26:58 295 1 associated with an unproven configuration. The 15:27:01 2 Jupiter's configuration utilizes a proven 15:27:02 3 approach for dampening these vibrations. 15:27:05 4 The Ares I requires a new launch 15:27:09 5 infrastructure, whereas the Jupiter uses the 15:27:12 6 current infrastructure while also incorporating 15:27:17 7 cost efficient improvements to the current 15:27:17 8 side-mounted approach. 15:27:21 9 The Ares I requires a staging event, 15:27:23 10 whereas the Jupiter's main engines are ground 15:27:26 11 lit just like the shuttle before committing to 15:27:29 12 the launch. 15:27:32 13 The Ares I lift limitations has 15:27:33 14 required key safety mission systems and 15:27:38 15 redundancy to be eliminated from Orion while 15:27:38 16 forcing the same to endure an unprecedented 15:27:42 17 vibrational environment for a lunar spacecraft. 15:27:45 18 Jupiter has more than enough margin to put all 15:27:49 19 of these safety systems back in. 15:27:49 20 Taken together, all of the development 15:27:54 21 costs for the Ares I makes it's substantially 15:27:57 22 more expensive to develop while simultaneously 15:27:59 296 1 increasing both schedule risk over the Jupiter. 15:28:03 2 The bottom line, we believe strongly 15:28:08 3 that the Jupiter will close the gap within the 15:28:10 4 current budget. 15:28:14 5 More importantly, see let's what we're 15:28:15 6 getting for our money. With Ares -- though I 15:28:18 7 realize Ares develops a lot of technologies for 15:28:21 8 the Ares V -- we'll get to that in a second. 15:28:23 9 But with what we get out of the gate here, with 15:28:25 10 Ares we spend about $14 billion for a launch 15:28:28 11 system less capable than what we can buy today, 15:28:31 12 whereas with the Jupiter, while we spend 15:28:35 13 $8 billion, we get a launch system that will be 15:28:37 14 second to none in the world while increasing 15:28:42 15 substantially the crew safety. 15:28:46 16 So let's look at the basic overview 15:28:47 17 here. 15:28:50 18 Ultimately even our entry level 15:28:50 19 Jupiter, which has no upper stage, will offer a 15:28:53 20 capability that no one else in the world has, 15:28:56 21 especially in terms of volume capacity. But 15:28:58 22 when it comes to lift capacity, we have roughly 15:29:01 297 1 three times as much mass performance as the next 15:29:02 2 largest operational launch system, the Delta IV 15:29:04 3 Heavy. Next. 15:29:09 4 It is also important to point out that 15:29:11 5 the current plan requires the development of an 15:29:14 6 even larger launch system, the Ares V. That 15:29:16 7 promises to bust the budget and will also 15:29:18 8 require the de-orbiting of the International 15:29:21 9 Space Station in 2016 in order to free up the 15:29:24 10 cash necessary to pay for its development. 15:29:27 11 Under the Direct proposal, the only 15:29:30 12 new component we require is an upper stage in 15:29:34 13 order to deliver a sufficiently high 15:29:37 14 performance, lower cost and more flexible lunar 15:29:38 15 architecture enabled by operating one launch 15:29:41 16 system but launching it twice. 15:29:44 17 While certainly not as inexpensive as 15:29:46 18 abandoning the vision for space exploration and 15:29:49 19 remaining in low Earth orbit for another 15:29:52 20 30 years, it is significantly less expensive 15:29:54 21 than the current plan. 15:29:59 22 Because the Jupiter's main engines and 15:30:01 298 1 solid rocket boosters already finished, our 15:30:05 2 schedule and budget are not dictated by such 15:30:06 3 costly and high schedule risk items. 15:30:11 4 By stretching out the remaining 15:30:13 5 shuttle flights by one or two years, we can 15:30:16 6 deliver a significantly smoother and, therefore, 15:30:18 7 safer fly-out of the remaining shuttle missions 15:30:22 8 by providing a future for the operations 15:30:26 9 workforce. We are depending on them right now 15:30:28 10 to stay at their posts despite our lack of 15:30:30 11 commitment to them. 15:30:36 12 Direct can do this even in the tough 15:30:37 13 budget environment before us, because the 15:30:41 14 shuttle workforce in a Direct approach is an 15:30:42 15 asset. We need it in order to conduct the 15:30:45 16 Jupiter test flights themselves and not a 15:30:49 17 liability to be eliminated in order to fund the 15:30:52 18 development costs of Ares. 15:30:56 19 The primary tent pole for initial 15:30:57 20 operating capability for the Jupiter to the ISS 15:31:01 21 is not the launch system but is, in fact, the 15:31:02 22 Orion spacecraft. 15:31:06 299 1 Ultimately the transition will not be 15:31:09 2 pain free, by any means. America will have a 15:31:14 3 much more capable system sooner than any other 15:31:17 4 plan on the table at the end of that transition. 15:31:20 5 A lot has been said about the 15:31:23 6 importance of crew safety during the ascent 15:31:28 7 portion of the mission, yet ascent risk 15:31:30 8 represents a very small portion of the overall 15:31:35 9 mission risk for beyond Earth orbit 15:31:37 10 destinations. For these missions, it is, in 15:31:43 11 fact, redundancy and margins of the crew 15:31:45 12 spacecraft that determines the overall mission 15:31:49 13 safety level. 15:31:52 14 Due, in part, to the Ares I's limited 15:31:53 15 lift capability and unprecedented vibrational 15:31:55 16 environment, Orion has been forced to remove 15:31:57 17 important safety systems and reduce overall 15:32:00 18 redundancy. As a result, the overall crew 15:32:02 19 safety has been significantly reduced during the 15:32:06 20 whole mission, not just the first eight minutes 15:32:10 21 of it. 15:32:13 22 The fact that the Ares I is composed 15:32:13 300 1 of unproven systems, whereas the Jupiter is 15:32:16 2 largely composed of existing flight-proven 15:32:19 3 systems, only casts further doubts on the Ares I 15:32:22 4 safety claims. Regardless, the Jupiter enables 15:32:27 5 all of the safety systems that NASA originally 15:32:31 6 wanted on Orion, not the least of which is 15:32:34 7 returning to the land landing capability once 15:32:38 8 again for every mission. 15:32:41 9 Even our entry level launch system, 15:32:44 10 the Jupiter-130 -- that's the system without the 15:32:46 11 upper stage -- will provide a remarkable range 15:32:46 12 of new capabilities. 15:32:46 13 For example, currently there is no way 15:32:54 14 to repair or upgrade the James Webb Space 15:32:56 15 Telescope. With Direct, a servicing mission 15:33:00 16 could be conducted using the Jupiter-130 to 15:33:02 17 place both crew and equipment into a high Earth 15:33:07 18 orbit, rendezvous the telescope and repair it in 15:33:09 19 a similar fashion as what happened with Hubble, 15:33:15 20 only in a much higher orbit. 15:33:19 21 The same capability could be used to 15:33:19 22 assemble a network of extremely large 12-meter 15:33:19 301 1 diameter telescopes, enabling the ability to 15:33:22 2 resolve other habitable planets in our galaxy, 15:33:24 3 answering a question as old as mankind itself: 15:33:32 4 Are we alone? 15:33:30 5 The Jupiter's increased payload 15:33:35 6 diameter enables robust Mars sample return 15:33:38 7 missions that would pioneer new entry ascent 15:33:39 8 landing systems needed before we can ever land 15:33:44 9 astronauts on Mars. 15:33:44 10 On Earth everywhere we find an energy 15:33:47 11 source and liquid water, we find life. With our 15:33:51 12 entry level Jupiter, we enable the Earth 15:33:55 13 departure mass required for these kind of large 15:33:58 14 missions to the Jovian moons in order to find if 15:33:59 15 a second genesis has, indeed, occurred within 15:34:03 16 our own solar system. 15:34:07 17 By removing the barriers that limit 15:34:09 18 all future exploration, the Jupiter will ensure 15:34:11 19 that NASA and, therefore, mankind's best days of 15:34:15 20 discovery clearly lie ahead. As Carl Sagan once 15:34:19 21 said, somewhere something incredible are waiting 15:34:24 22 to be known. 15:34:28 302 1 The Jupiter-130 will also enable new 15:34:28 2 missions to the planet Earth, starting with an 15:34:29 3 inspirational mission that originally went to 15:34:32 4 explore the Moon, yet ended up rediscovering the 15:34:32 5 Earth. As a manmade spacecraft looked back at 15:34:38 6 Earth in 1968, all of mankind became aware that 15:34:40 7 we are all astronauts and drove home the 15:34:45 8 importance of protecting our delicate spacecraft 15:34:50 9 world for this and future generations. 15:34:53 10 We are quickly approaching a time 15:34:53 11 where the majority of people on Earth were not 15:34:56 12 yet born to experience -- myself among them -- 15:34:57 13 this profound mission themselves. It would find 15:35:00 14 it just as remarkable as the previous generation 15:35:04 15 did. 15:35:08 16 One potential Earth focus use of the 15:35:08 17 Jupiter-130 would be to launch space-based solar 15:35:11 18 power systems in one ground-integrated package 15:35:17 19 that can deliver environmentally friendly energy 15:35:18 20 from space 24 hours a day. 15:35:19 21 The same telescopes developed to 15:35:23 22 discover the signs of life on other planets in 15:35:26 303 1 our galaxy could also improve the resolution of 15:35:30 2 Earth's climate by many orders of magnitude. 15:35:33 3 With this increased data resolution, climate 15:35:35 4 models could be significantly improved in 15:35:39 5 accuracy, helping to guide trillion-dollar 15:35:43 6 decisions concerning the environment. 15:35:46 7 And, of course, there are national 15:35:47 8 security reasons to improve our ability to look 15:35:49 9 back at the Earth from space as well. 15:35:52 10 It has been asserted that any system 15:35:58 11 based on the shuttle will be just as 15:36:01 12 unaffordable as the space shuttle. Nothing 15:36:04 13 could be further from the truth. The cost 15:36:08 14 breakout of the shuttle shown here is based on 15:36:11 15 almost three decades of hard cost data generated 15:36:14 16 by a mature system. 15:36:18 17 Because the Jupiter is so closely 15:36:19 18 associated with the shuttle, we can, with a high 15:36:21 19 degree of confidence, predict what the cost 15:36:24 20 structure will likely be for the Jupiter. 15:36:27 21 Once the costs associated the orbiter 15:36:31 22 and crew training is removed, the cost of a 15:36:34 304 1 cargo only launch of the Jupiter-130 would be 15:36:36 2 about 72 percent of the current shuttle -- a 15:36:40 3 step in the right direction certainly but not a 15:36:41 4 large cost reduction. 15:36:44 5 The primary improvement in the cost 15:36:46 6 effectiveness in going from the shuttle to the 15:36:48 7 Jupiter is not from the reduced cost but from 15:36:51 8 the increased lift capacity. By removing the 15:36:53 9 dead weight of the orbiter, we can achieve 15:36:57 10 almost a fivefold increase in lift capacity. 15:37:01 11 Taken together, the Jupiter will deliver almost 15:37:06 12 a sevenfold improvement in dollars per kilogram 15:37:08 13 delivered to orbit compared to that of the 15:37:08 14 shuttle, dropping it almost below $5,000 per 15:37:11 15 kilogram to orbit, a very competitive price, 15:37:15 16 indeed. Next slide. 15:37:16 17 The cost benefits of the Jupiter go 15:37:21 18 well beyond launch costs. The Saturn V was the 15:37:24 19 first and last time America had access to a high 15:37:27 20 volume, heavy-lift launch capacity. With the 15:37:31 21 Saturn V we were able to launch 15:37:33 22 ground-integrated, more capable spacecraft into 15:37:39 305 1 space using only one launch. 15:37:40 2 After destroying our first heavy-lift 15:37:42 3 launch system, we were then forced to assemble 15:37:45 4 large spacecraft like the International Space 15:37:49 5 Station in 20-ton chunks. Mike Griffin had it 15:37:49 6 right when he said this was a step backwards in 15:37:53 7 terms of cost effectiveness. 15:37:55 8 Unmanned exploration experienced the 15:37:59 9 same dynamic, with the development cost overruns 15:38:00 10 of the James Webb Space Telescope and the Mars 15:38:03 11 Science Laboratory now running many times their 15:38:07 12 respective launch cost due, in part, to trying 15:38:09 13 to shoehorn more capability into existing launch 15:38:12 14 systems' capacities. It pays to use the right 15:38:17 15 tool for the job. 15:38:20 16 To grow beyond our past impressive 15:38:21 17 accomplishments in both manned and unmanned 15:38:25 18 exploration, America needs the Jupiter. NASA is 15:38:28 19 on record of claiming the Jupiter cannot achieve 15:38:35 20 a self-imposed performance objective that NASA 15:38:38 21 has seen fit to place ahead of the real of 15:38:45 22 requirements of budget and policy. 15:38:47 306 1 In fact, they took it one step further 15:38:48 2 and claimed that Jupiter actually violated the 15:38:50 3 laws of physics, yet the recently leaked ESAS 15:38:52 4 appendix shows that a lower performing 15:38:52 5 configuration of the Jupiter will actually 15:38:59 6 exceed NASA's self-imposed performance objective 15:39:00 7 even while burdened by an inefficient upper 15:39:06 8 stage design, a self-imposed performance 15:39:09 9 objective that the technically challenged Ares I 15:39:12 10 and the budget-busting Ares V can still cannot 15:39:13 11 achieve. 15:39:16 12 Not only does Direct meet NASA's 15:39:17 13 desired lunar performance objectives but Direct 15:39:22 14 will place NASA back within the confines of 15:39:23 15 policy for a price we can actually afford. 15:39:26 16 Based on this track record, we 15:39:29 17 strongly recommend that this commission get a 15:39:31 18 second opinion on the upper stage design by 15:39:34 19 talking to experts at the United Launch 15:39:37 20 Alliance. Engineers like Bernard Cutter have 15:39:39 21 decades of experience designing, building and 15:39:41 22 flying advanced upper stages, something NASA has 15:39:45 307 1 not done for nearly three decades. 15:39:46 2 In fact, we would recommend a second 15:39:49 3 independent expert opinion be sought on all 15:39:51 4 critical issues brought before the commission. 15:39:54 5 What about the performance needed for 15:39:57 6 Mars though? 15:39:59 7 This issue was addressed over 46 years 15:40:01 8 ago by none other than Werner Von Brown himself, 15:40:05 9 who had always dreamed of one day seeing man 15:40:08 10 land on Mars. He said that once you reach the 15:40:11 11 limit of whatever launch system you can forward 15:40:14 12 you're left with two options for increasing 15:40:18 13 performance. 15:40:21 14 The first option is what he called 15:40:22 15 connect mode, where you assemble various 15:40:22 16 spacecraft elements in Earth orbit. The second 15:40:26 17 option, though, is called tanker mode, where the 15:40:29 18 spacecraft is launched in one piece, dry, if 15:40:31 19 necessary -- without propellant -- but then is 15:40:34 20 filled in orbit with propellant prior to 15:40:37 21 departure. 15:40:38 22 Von Brown clearly preferred tanker 15:40:40 308 1 mode because he correctly understood that most 15:40:42 2 of the mass needed for Mars -- for a Mars 15:40:46 3 mission is, in fact, propellant, not spacecraft. 15:40:49 4 Therefore, propellant is the primary component 15:40:53 5 that we need to assemble in orbit. 15:40:56 6 Well, the best way to assemble a 15:41:00 7 propellant in orbit is with a propellant depot. 15:41:01 8 A propellant depot has a number of advantages, 15:41:06 9 not all of them technical, some geopolitical as 15:41:07 10 well. 15:41:11 11 A propellant depot increases mission 15:41:13 12 flexibility while opening up almost 70 percent 15:41:13 13 of the mass required to commercial and 15:41:14 14 international supply. In addition, one future 15:41:17 15 option for potentially lowering the cost of 15:41:22 16 space exploration is by producing propellant 15:41:25 17 from the Moon, Mars or other suitable bodies 15:41:27 18 throughout our solar system. 15:41:30 19 A critical first step, though, is the 15:41:32 20 ability to store and transfer propellant in 15:41:34 21 space. The propellant depot is also a critical 15:41:37 22 step for lowering exploration costs still 15:41:42 309 1 further, by reusing the very expensive 15:41:42 2 spacecraft, thereby, eliminating the need to 15:41:45 3 throw away these expensive systems after each 15:41:50 4 mission. 15:41:52 5 Utilities that propound people also 15:41:52 6 naturally attract international participation 15:41:54 7 and funding as it improves the capabilities of 15:41:56 8 all partner nations. 15:42:00 9 The bottom line, once your volume 15:42:02 10 capacity is sufficient to launch 15:42:05 11 ground-integrated spacecraft as one unit, 15:42:08 12 your launcher is large enough. 15:42:09 13 The Saturn class Jupiter is more than 15:42:12 14 sufficient for the exploration program while 15:42:15 15 also having a lower fixed and variable cost than 15:42:17 16 the Nova class Ares V. 15:42:19 17 On the other extreme are those that 15:42:23 18 would advocate an exclusive ELV/COTS program, 15:42:28 19 thereby resulting in the destruction of 15:42:31 20 America's second heavy-lift system and 15:42:34 21 workforce. The Direct plan meets that team more 15:42:36 22 than halfway by opening up 70 percent of the 15:42:39 310 1 mass needed in orbit to competitive bid. 15:42:42 2 In addition, a significant barrier to 15:42:46 3 entry for new companies and approaches is 15:42:49 4 removed because cheap propellant is less 15:42:52 5 expensive to insure than expensive spacecraft or 15:42:56 6 people. Unlike opening up a few flights to the 15:42:58 7 International Space Station per year, this 15:43:00 8 approach represents more than enough demand to 15:43:01 9 max out the launch capacity of most ELV/COTS 15:43:04 10 providers, enabling them to achieve the 15:43:09 11 economies of production associated with high 15:43:13 12 launch rates, lowering the costs for all their 15:43:13 13 customers. 15:43:16 14 Establishing an in-space market for 15:43:20 15 propellant will also help build the business 15:43:20 16 case to commercially develop propellant from the 15:43:22 17 Moon as well. 15:43:26 18 It has now been almost four years 15:43:28 19 since the basics of what I just presented here 15:43:30 20 was first shown at NASA headquarters but 15:43:32 21 unfortunately rejected in favor of the Ares I. 15:43:34 22 Even now because so much of the 15:43:37 311 1 hardware infrastructure and workforce are still 15:43:39 2 in place operating the shuttle, Direct can 15:43:42 3 enable -- Direct can be available much sooner 15:43:44 4 while also delivering a significant increase in 15:43:48 5 crew safety over the shuttle. 15:43:51 6 Direct not only builds upon its 15:43:53 7 existing multibillion-dollar heritage but 15:43:55 8 simultaneously accelerates the progress already 15:43:59 9 made by removing the bottleneck of the Ares I 15:44:00 10 for ISS access and retargeting its development 15:44:04 11 already underway for subsequent -- for the 15:44:08 12 subsequent lunar phase of the vision for space 15:44:10 13 exploration. 15:44:13 14 Ultimately I strongly believe that 15:44:14 15 Direct is the only way our nation can hope to 15:44:16 16 achieve the policy objectives within the limited 15:44:20 17 budget we have before us. 15:44:20 18 Direct not only solves the looming 15:44:22 19 issues facing manned space exploration, which is 15:44:26 20 the goal of this commission, but presents -- but 15:44:28 21 will present a new opportunity for unmanned 15:44:33 22 exploration as well by removing the limits 15:44:37 312 1 imposed by existing launch systems. 15:44:40 2 The ability to lead from the front and 15:44:43 3 capability will naturally attract other nations 15:44:46 4 to join the American led efforts and to a truly 15:44:50 5 global effort while at the same time providing a 15:44:53 6 serious opportunity to the commercial sector to 15:44:57 7 deliver most of the mass needed for the vision 15:45:00 8 over the long term. 15:45:02 9 Taken together, we strongly believe 15:45:02 10 that Direct is by far the best possible path. 15:45:02 11 It's an ultimate success for NASA, which is 15:45:06 12 what's motivated from the Direct from the very 15:45:09 13 beginning -- America, mankind and the furthering 15:45:12 14 space exploration and development. 15:45:17 15 I carry three requests from the Direct 15:45:20 16 team to the commission. 15:45:22 17 The first request is the commission 15:45:24 18 ask the President to order NASA to cease any 15:45:25 19 further destruction of the shuttle 15:45:26 20 infrastructure until this commission can make 15:45:28 21 its recommendation to the President. 15:45:31 22 Our second request is that the 15:45:33 313 1 commission endeavor to talk to the engineers at 15:45:36 2 the working level of the Ares I technical 15:45:38 3 problems and the Ares V cost problems as 15:45:41 4 anonymously as possible in order to determine 15:45:44 5 independently for themselves the ground truth of 15:45:47 6 the present program. 15:45:50 7 We have certain knowledge that this 15:45:51 8 ground truth is being altered as it ascends the 15:45:54 9 chain of command, and there's significant amount 15:45:58 10 of pressure being brought to bear to prevent any 15:46:01 11 information from being provided to this 15:46:04 12 commission that is counter to the current party 15:46:06 13 line. 15:46:09 14 Our third request is for the 15:46:09 15 commission to get a second expert opinion on all 15:46:11 16 critical issues or disagreements NASA may have 15:46:14 17 with our plan -- like the upper stage, for 15:46:17 18 example -- from sources independent of the 15:46:19 19 current NASA chain of command. 15:46:22 20 I thank you for your time, and I 15:46:23 21 welcome any questions you may have. 15:46:25 22 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 15:46:30 314 1 Those are very serious charges as well as a very 15:46:31 2 serious set of performance and cost data you've 15:46:36 3 offered us. 15:46:41 4 Let me ask if my colleagues have any 15:46:42 5 questions to begin with. Then I have one. 15:46:45 6 MR. CHYBA: Steve, you may not be the 15:46:57 7 right person to ask this, but in the ESAS study 15:46:57 8 in '05 the sort of -- something that looked 15:46:58 9 pretty close to this to launch a 70-ish-ton 15:46:59 10 vehicle was pretty closely looked at and, in 15:47:02 11 fact, carried as one of the options at least in 15:47:05 12 the first and second cycle of the ESAS study. 15:47:06 13 Do you understand what the rationale 15:47:10 14 was in the ESAS study that caused the decision 15:47:15 15 to be made into the so-called one-and-a-half 15:47:18 16 launch options as opposed to the sort of two 15:47:22 17 70-ton class launches, and what would your 15:47:28 18 response be to that rationale? 15:47:31 19 MR. METSCHAN: I probably can't 15:47:32 20 explain it to you because I don't understand it 15:47:35 21 myself. 15:47:36 22 I think it makes a lot of sense to 15:47:36 315 1 develop -- we really only have the money to 15:47:37 2 develop one launch system, and I think the 15:47:39 3 efforts of SpaceX and the efforts with the EELVs 15:47:41 4 and the COTS program are more than adequately 15:47:46 5 covering that class of launch systems the Ares I 15:47:50 6 represents. I think NASA's right position is to 15:47:52 7 work on a heavy launch system. 15:47:56 8 I would also suggest that the current 15:47:58 9 Ares V has gone a great distance away from the 15:48:00 10 Ares V that they recommended. The Jupiter is 15:48:04 11 closer to the original Ares V than the current 15:48:06 12 one. It used shuttle main engines. We use 15:48:09 13 four. They used five. 15:48:11 14 But so I'm -- again, our main 15:48:14 15 contention really is the Ares I, not the 15:48:17 16 heavy-lift capability, and our only 15:48:20 17 recommendation is the heavy-lift capability 15:48:23 18 needs to get back to a true shuttle-drive 15:48:25 19 system. 15:48:28 20 MR. CHYBA: Thank you. 15:48:28 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Jeff... 15:48:34 22 MR. GREASON: I've got a thousand of 15:48:34 316 1 them, not just one. So I'll ask a meta question 15:48:32 2 first. 15:48:32 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Just one. 15:48:32 4 MR. GREASON: Just let me get back to 15:48:36 5 you with more questions. 15:48:37 6 MR. METSCHAN: Yes. Definitely. 15:48:37 7 MR. GREASON: Okay. In that case, 15:48:39 8 I'll take only the highest one, which is, you 15:48:39 9 know, I'm well aware of the many advantages that 15:48:43 10 you get from propellant depot architecture, and 15:48:47 11 I understand the concerns about the workforce 15:48:51 12 but set that aside for a moment. 15:48:52 13 Now, if you are going to do a depot 15:48:57 14 capability, why not go farther? Because when 15:49:01 15 you look at any of the systems architecture I'm 15:49:04 16 familiar with, the spacecraft dry already fit on 15:49:07 17 EELV-like objects. 15:49:11 18 MR. METSCHAN: They do mass-wise. 15:49:14 19 They do not volume-wise. People keep forgetting 15:49:17 20 the importance of volume. When I saw some of 15:49:17 21 the Delta heavy configurations, they kept the 15:49:21 22 same five-meter -- yeah -- if it's big sack of 15:49:26 317 1 hammers we're putting up there, they're probably 15:49:26 2 right. But most -- the average density of 15:49:26 3 payload in space is about that of balsa wood. 15:49:33 4 So you've got to keep that in mind. 15:49:33 5 You've got to grow your volume at the same time 15:49:36 6 you're growing your lift capability, and the 15:49:38 7 Jupiter does that. 15:49:41 8 MR. GREASON: Thank you. 15:49:43 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Please, Leroy... 15:49:43 10 MR. CHIAO: I just have a question 15:49:47 11 about who are you guys. I mean, is there a list 15:49:49 12 of folks who are -- I mean, I understand what 15:49:52 13 you're saying about wanting to be anonymous. 15:49:54 14 But are any of you besides you willing to be 15:49:57 15 identified? 15:50:00 16 MR. METSCHAN: Well, when you find 15:50:01 17 them, let me know, because I don't know them all 15:50:02 18 either. In fact, none of us do. It's -- we're 15:50:03 19 taking advantage of the new communication 15:50:05 20 technologies that came available with computers 15:50:08 21 and the Internet. 15:50:11 22 Which, I think, is why going forward 15:50:13 318 1 after this point -- and we fully attend to abide 15:50:17 2 by the recommendations of the commission. This 15:50:21 3 is not -- there's no way to make money at this, 15:50:23 4 by the way, of disagreeing with your customer. 15:50:25 5 MR. CHIAO: It's just difficult to 15:50:30 6 assess the work without knowing who's doing it. 15:50:31 7 MR. METSCHAN: Well, we can get you 15:50:34 8 names of people to talk to, but the anonymous 15:50:35 9 part is critical. There's a certain amount of 15:50:37 10 blood in the water, if you will. 15:50:41 11 So I just think it's -- it would be -- 15:50:43 12 if you want to get to the bottom of what's going 15:50:45 13 on, I think that's the best policy. I think 15:50:48 14 that's the great thing about this commission 15:50:51 15 actually. 15:50:53 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Bo... 15:50:55 17 MR. BEJMUK: Steve, I'm impressed with 15:50:55 18 your enthusiasm and with your boldness, but I do 15:50:56 19 have one question. 15:51:00 20 And your charts are not numbered. So 15:51:03 21 this is a pie chart that talks about your 15:51:04 22 Jupiter and STS cost comparison. 15:51:08 319 1 MR. METSCHAN: Yes. 15:51:08 2 MR. BEJMUK: Can we get that chart 15:51:14 3 back for a second? 15:51:15 4 (Discussion off the record.) 15:51:15 5 MR. BEJMUK: Well, let me go ahead 15:51:22 6 with my question. 15:51:23 7 You're comparing current STS to your 15:51:24 8 Jupiter-130 and you're saying that the cost of 15:51:29 9 five flights, I believe, is $2.6 billion and you 15:51:34 10 contrast it with only 1.9 billion for Jupiter. 15:51:40 11 MR. METSCHAN: Correct. 15:51:45 12 MR. BEJMUK: But shouldn't you include 15:51:46 13 cost of five Orions if you wanted to have like 15:51:49 14 an apples-to-apples comparison? 15:51:51 15 MR. METSCHAN: Well, this is cargo 15:51:53 16 version. 15:51:53 17 MR. BEJMUK: Well, I know, but you're 15:51:54 18 comparing it to a vehicle that carries seven 15:51:54 19 astronauts also. 15:51:57 20 MR. METSCHAN: Actually that's one of 15:51:58 21 the big advantages of this approach. We can fly 15:51:59 22 with a crew or not, and so we have both the 15:52:01 320 1 cargo version and a crewed version. Obviously 15:52:04 2 if you fly with a crew, any launch system will 15:52:09 3 be more expensive than if you don't fly with a 15:52:13 4 crew. That's one of the utilities of this 15:52:13 5 approach. 15:52:17 6 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. So this is a cargo 15= :52:17 7 version and you're -- 15:52:18 8 MR. METSCHAN: Right. 15:52:21 9 MS. CLINE: -- comparing it to a 15:52:19 10 crew-fairing vehicle? 15:52:20 11 MR. METSCHAN: But that's the 15:52:21 12 interesting thing about the shuttle. It 15:52:23 13 combined cargo and crew together. 15:52:24 14 MR. BEJMUK: Right. 15:52:24 15 MR. METSCHAN: Which not only affected 15:52:27 16 the safety and the abort possibilities -- 15:52:28 17 because our cargo is carried below the crew if 15:52:29 18 the crew -- if the crew comes along with the 15:52:29 19 mission equipment, they're carried below it like 15:52:33 20 Apollo, so they're unaffected by their abort. 15:52:35 21 So we believe that was the fundamental 15:52:39 22 recommendation from the Columbia report. Let's 15:52:41 321 1 not have such a large launch system that we 15:52:43 2 can't quickly and safely extract the crew should 15:52:48 3 something go wrong. 15:52:51 4 Likewise, it works on a cost basis 15:52:51 5 which means now you can have a cargo version 15:52:53 6 that's less expensive and also fly crew when you 15:52:54 7 need to as well. 15:52:57 8 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Thank you. 15:52:57 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris... 15:53:01 10 MR. CHYBA: You stated that the 15:53:01 11 Jupiter system would represent an improvement in 15:53:04 12 crew safety compared to the shuttle. 15:53:04 13 Could you quantify that? 15:53:06 14 MR. METSCHAN: Well, right away if you 15:53:09 15 assume we had the same safety level as the 15:53:11 16 shuttle, the two accidents that we know of -- 15:53:13 17 the Challenger, being the SRB leaking, could 15:53:16 18 have been abortable had we been watching for 15:53:23 19 those kinds of things, the leaking SRB. And 15:53:24 20 then, of course, in the Columbia accident, the 15:53:28 21 heat shield is entirely protected during the 15:53:29 22 ascent. 15:53:32 322 1 So just having a quick escape system 15:53:34 2 on the shuttle, which we currently really do not 15:53:37 3 have, and assuming that's one out of ten -- you 15:53:39 4 know, it fails out of ten times, you get a 15:53:42 5 tenfold improvement. 15:53:44 6 Now, I'm glad you brought that up 15:53:45 7 because there's another big advantage. In our 15:53:45 8 architecture, even in a lunar program, half of 15:53:48 9 the time we're launching uncrewed. So as long 15:53:50 10 as the vehicle is being processed and treated as 15:53:55 11 if we have a crew on it, the probability of an 15:53:57 12 accident occurring on a crewed flight is 15:54:00 13 naturally cut in half. 15:54:02 14 That's one of the advantages that the 15:54:04 15 ELV and the other programs have is that they're 15:54:06 16 essentially continually testing the entire 15:54:09 17 system, which is not just hardware -- it's 15:54:10 18 people, the culture. Every time they launch, 15:54:10 19 they're testing everything. 15:54:14 20 Many times these hardware safety-based 15:54:16 21 assessments, I think, are incorrect. When we 15:54:19 22 looked at the accidents that have happened, 15:54:22 323 1 they've been an impact -- they're interacted 15:54:25 2 with the hardware, certainly, but there's a 15:54:26 3 certain aspect of culture that came into it. 15:54:29 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: I'll take the last 15:54:32 5 question, I think, if that's all right, with the 15:54:34 6 group. 15:54:36 7 Many years ago NASA looked at a 15:54:37 8 configuration quite similar to the Jupiter-130 15:54:39 9 that -- based on the external tank, solid rocket 15:54:43 10 motors and so on -- and didn't continue it. 15:54:47 11 With your folks' apparent background 15:54:50 12 and knowledge of NASA, do you have any idea why 15:54:52 13 that was dropped? 15:54:55 14 MR. METSCHAN: I think they didn't 15:54:56 15 want to operate both -- they didn't have the 15:54:58 16 money to operate both the shuttle and that 15:54:58 17 system at the same time. I think now that the 15:55:01 18 retirement of the shuttle is now official 15:55:04 19 national policy we can now afford to 15:55:05 20 entertain -- it keeps coming back to the same 15:55:06 21 principle. I think we only have the money to 15:55:08 22 operate one launch system. So let's make it as 15:55:10 324 1 capable and as expandable as we can. And I 15:55:13 2 think the in-line version of a shuttle-drive 15:55:15 3 system achieves that objective. 15:55:18 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you very 15:55:20 5 much for your presentation. We will take it 15:55:22 6 very seriously. 15:55:25 7 Let's turn then to the final scheduled 15:55:27 8 speaker for the day, and we're going to hear 15:55:33 9 about side-mount options from John Shannon. 15:55:36 10 MR. SHANNON: You guys didn't tell me 15:55:47 11 there was blood in the water before I 15:55:49 12 volunteered to do this. 13 And just as a senior NASA manager, let 14 me say, I don't agree with that, and I felt 15 perfectly comfortable coming up here and talking 16 about an alternate architecture, something that 17 we've looked at for many years. And, you know, 18 Jeff and Steve Cook and company have embraced, 19 and we've talked about it. We talk about 20 transition between programs all of the time. 21 Sir, if you're worried about going to 22 talk to anybody, come talk to me. Talk to Wayne 325 1 Hale. Talk to Mike Suffredini. Talk to -- just 2 come talk to us, and we'll -- you know, if you 3 don't want us to attribute things to you, we can 4 certainly do that, but we're always looking for 5 good ideas. 6 And I think just the fact that I'm 7 standing up here talking about something that 8 departs from the current baseline should maybe 9 prove that to you. 10 Stay on the title page for a minute. 11 I want to preface the presentation 15:56:45 12 with some other comments here that NASA has a 15:56:48 13 plan -- NASA has a baseline plan, and I think it 15:56:52 14 was a well-thought-out plan in the time of ESAS 15:56:57 15 and in that the Constellation program has put 15:57:00 16 together a viable architecture. And I'm not 15:57:05 17 going to talk about an architecture. I'm just 15:57:09 18 going to talk about a launch vehicle. 15:57:10 19 But it has not been funded. It has 15:57:12 20 not been funded to the level that we would need 15:57:15 21 to see it through. And I see that on the 15:57:17 22 shuttle side from the transition. 15:57:19 326 1 Jeff Hanley and myself worked with our 15:57:22 2 teams. We had a very close-knit transition 15:57:25 3 plan, not just for civil servants but also for 15:57:27 4 contractors. And because of the funding 15:57:29 5 problems, that has become un-knit, and we have 15:57:32 6 gaps in the industrial capability and in the 15:57:36 7 workforce, which is causing all of this. 15:57:38 8 I don't think it is some big 15:57:41 9 conspiracy. I don't think they've had cost 15:57:43 10 overruns. I think they've just not been funded 15:57:44 11 the way that they were -- the plan was 15:57:47 12 originally produced. 15:57:48 13 You know, we talked about this a 15:57:49 14 couple of weeks ago, and I think that the first 15:57:50 15 option should be to fund the plan that we have. 15:57:54 16 But if we can't do that, I don't think we're 15:57:57 17 ready to cede human space flight, like Elon 15:58:00 18 said. We're not ready to cede support of the 15:58:05 19 ISS. We're not ready to cede the opportunity to 15:58:06 20 go outside of low Earth orbit. 15:58:10 21 So I've had a small team inside the 15:58:10 22 shuttle program that has kept alive some of the 15:58:12 327 1 side-mount decisions, and when I say small, it 15:58:13 2 is three people that go and grab some 15:58:16 3 information from other people to think about new 15:58:19 4 things. And I'm going to talk a little bit 15:58:21 5 about that. 15:58:24 6 But you need to realize it has been a 15:58:25 7 small effort. It has not been across NASA. It 15:58:27 8 has not had the advantage of being looked at 15:58:31 9 across the Agency -- for good reason. It's 15:58:35 10 because we have another plan, and it's just now 15:58:37 11 that we're looking at and seeing the budget does 15:58:41 12 not quite align with it. 15:58:44 13 So what I'm going to tell you today -- 15:58:46 14 is promising that it has some benefit, some 15:58:48 15 things that could -- that are obvious advantages 15:58:49 16 but it needs to be looked at to a much greater 15:58:51 17 level than what my team has been able to do. 15:58:55 18 Now, I want to -- we're still on the 15:58:58 19 title page and I've burned like four minutes. 15:58:59 20 This does not look at Shuttle C. I 15:59:03 21 don't even call it Shuttle C. We call it a 15:59:05 22 heavy-lift vehicle. Shuttle C was an autonomous 15:59:07 328 1 vehicle that separated from the external tank 15:59:12 2 just like the orbiters had orbital maneuvering 15:59:12 3 capability added to capability -- thermal 15:59:16 4 capability -- a lot of different things that 15:59:17 5 this does not have. 15:59:19 6 This is simply a first and second 15:59:20 7 stage to inject the payload into a 8 30-nautical-mile by 120-nautical mile orbit. 9 That payload is assumed to be autonomous. It 10 takes care of itself. When it's injected, it 11 goes off and does its thing. 12 And all that you see in the title page 13 picture goes into the ocean. So it's just a -- 14 it's a foundational kind of a launch capability. 15 Let's go to the next chart. 16 We've looked at this a lot. It's been 17 called a lot of different things. You can see 18 what I was talking about on the upper left. It 19 was looked at by industry five years ago. It 20 was a two-year study. So there is a lot of data 21 out there. I know we've provided a lot of that 22 to you. 329 1 We do not have a deployable fairing. 2 When you get out of the atmosphere -- and this 16:00:03 3 team I have, added that, which will give you a 16:00:04 4 little bit more performance. It also -- the 16:00:06 5 beauty of, I think, the most recent concept the 16:00:10 6 team has come up with is that it does not try to 16:00:14 7 reuse engines. 16:00:19 8 We have learned from life-cycle costs 16:00:20 9 on SSMEs that you never -- reusability is a 16:00:22 10 myth, in my opinion. You don't buy your engines 16:00:27 11 and then you never have to talk to the engine 16:00:29 12 manufacturer again, you just keeping using them. 16:00:32 13 That's not true at all -- because parts wear 16:00:35 14 out, you have failures, you have design issues. 16:00:38 15 So you have to keep your production 16:00:41 16 line going or at least available to you, and 16:00:43 17 that's a significant cost. And then you buy 16:00:46 18 "one of" pieces whenever you need new parts, and 16:00:47 19 that gets to be extremely expensive. 16:00:51 20 So we would take, I think, the 16:00:53 21 approach of you get rid of the very -- I'll say 16:00:55 22 hazardous -- it's probably the most hazardous 16:01:00 330 1 part, I think, on the orbiter -- of that 16:01:05 2 interface between the main engines and the 16:01:06 3 external tank and you just have straight pipes. 16:01:08 4 You don't have all of your disconnects and your 16:01:10 5 pyro systems and all of those things. Let's go 16:01:10 6 to the next chart. 16:01:14 7 So that chart was just supposed to say 16:01:16 8 we've looked at this many times over many years, 16:01:18 9 and I think most of the people in this room are 16:01:20 10 familiar with a lot of that. 16:01:22 11 This is just a basic cargo 16:01:24 12 configuration. If you notice, it doesn't modify 16:01:27 13 the external tank at all. It's exactly -- the 16:01:30 14 external tank we produce right now. It's the 16:01:32 15 solid rocket boosters we produce right now. The 16:01:34 16 boat tail that holds the SSMEs that are 16:01:37 17 unchanged is simplified because it is bolted 16:01:40 18 directly onto the external tank. 16:01:40 19 It does not have the separation plane 16:01:40 20 which causes a complexity. An avionics module 16:01:44 21 in front of it -- I'll talk about avionics in a 16:01:48 22 minute -- and then a separable fairing that 16:01:53 331 1 provides a performance boost up to about 16:01:55 2 72-metric tons to that 30-by-120 orbit. Next 16:01:56 3 chart. 16:02:03 4 This is an important chart here. What 16:02:03 5 I would -- let me back up for a second here. 16:02:06 6 I think Elon Musk hit it exactly 16:02:11 7 right. The way the Russians do things is really 16:02:14 8 smart. I wish we would have done Shuttle C in 16:02:18 9 the '80s or the '90s. I think the space shuttle 16:02:22 10 orbiter would be a safer vehicle to fly if we 16:02:22 11 had done Shuttle C back then. 16:02:27 12 Because if you have a cargo vehicle 16:02:29 13 that is the same configuration as your crewed 16:02:32 14 vehicle, you have the opportunity to roll in new 16:02:35 15 design, new enhancements on the cargo vehicle 16:02:39 16 much easier than you do on your manned vehicle. 16:02:44 17 And that's what the Russians do. For 16:02:44 18 the most part, they'll fly new hardware on their 16:02:46 19 Progress several times before they roll it into 16:02:48 20 the Soyuz. 16:02:51 21 And we have a terrible track record in 16:02:53 22 the space shuttle program from upgrades. We did 16:02:53 332 1 main engine upgrades, controller upgrades, some 16:02:57 2 things like that. It costs us way too much 16:02:58 3 money. It took way too much time. I think that 16:03:01 4 is because you do not have a combined 16:03:03 5 environments test capability except to go fly 16:03:06 6 the vehicle with a crew on it. So that made it 16:03:09 7 very difficult. 16:03:13 8 I think if we had done Shuttle C we 16:03:15 9 would have been able to roll in those upgrades 16:03:17 10 on the cargo vehicle and verified through 11 combined environment flight testing they 12 actually are effective and then you can roll 13 them into the crewed vehicle. And I'm just 14 guessing, but I think that our upgrades program 15 would have been much more successful from that 16 standpoint. 17 So the thought here was that you build 18 this Block I, which is just a two-stage 19 capability to get to low Earth orbit. As I said 20 before, no change to the external tank. No 21 change to the SRBs. No change to the SSMEs. 22 You use existing avionics. 333 1 And I grew up in the guidance, 2 navigation and control world, and that is 3 absolutely possible. 4 The one thing that nobody has talked 5 about in all of the rocket designs that we've 6 seen that is an enormous bullet -- and those of 7 you that have been -- that have ever worked with 8 rockets or even -- or modern aircraft -- is 16:04:10 9 flight software. It is -- it will eat your 16:04:10 10 lunch. It is critical path from the day you put 16:04:12 11 the first rocket drawing down a paper. 16:04:15 12 And getting flight software to work 16:04:18 13 with your hardware from a timing standpoint is 16:04:21 14 extremely difficult. We've been flying the 16:04:24 15 space shuttle for 30 years, and we'll still find 16:04:27 16 things through simulation that we did not expect 16:04:27 17 in the way software interacts with hardware. 16:04:29 18 This Block I capability, you can use 16:04:31 19 your existing flight software. You can use the 16:04:33 20 computers that we have right now. You can use 16:04:36 21 the rate gyros, the IMUs, the accelerometer 16:04:37 22 assemblies -- all of those things required to 16:04:42 334 1 fly any spacecraft but you've already got 16:04:45 2 30 years of flight test behind it and use it. 16:04:48 3 Now, I would not use the full suite 16:04:48 4 that we use. On an orbiter you can use one of 16:04:51 5 each, and it would be perfectly safe. The 16:04:53 6 flight software can be modified just to no-op 16:04:56 7 the channels that you're not flying on that 16:04:59 8 particular spacecraft. 16:05:03 9 The other one that nobody has talked 16:05:05 10 about that we spent a lot of time and money on 16:05:07 11 is your systems integration tools. The acoustic 16:05:08 12 models, your aerodynamic models, structural 16:05:13 13 models, loads, your trajectory models -- 16:05:19 14 extremely important. 16:05:19 15 As you all know -- and Bo actually 16:05:23 16 wrote a paper on it not too long ago -- we 16:05:24 17 totally blew the acoustics for STS-1 and almost 16:05:29 18 lost the vehicle. We had a structural member 16:05:34 19 buckle in the OMS pod just because we did not 16:05:35 20 have the water flow and the acoustics right. 12:00:38 21 So if you use a more evolutionary 12:06:59 22 approach that has the same or similar mold line 12:07:07 335 1 of the space shuttle stack now -- you already 12:07:18 2 have that history -- and you can roll it into 12:07:27 3 your next vehicle and that's a big deal. 12:07:34 4 Those are two things, I think, one, 12:08:16 5 software and your environmental tools that 12:08:27 6 people really overlook when they're starting to 12:08:35 7 design a vehicle and don't understand very well. 12:08:54 8 Existing pad structure, that follows. 12:09:13 9 The launch and ground control 12:09:24 10 software, that's important because that -- 12:09:54 11 again, it's software and it will eat your lunch 12:10:01 12 if you don't get it right. 12:10:07 13 That high-risk aft interface, it's 12:10:15 14 just bolted on, so you got rid of that. 12:10:31 15 You don't have fuel cells, you'd have 12:10:42 16 batteries, you don't have the cryo systems 12:10:50 17 because you don't have fuel cells or people on 12:10:58 18 it. Nitrogen tanks, the cooling systems, your 12:11:04 19 orbital maneuvering system, your RC -- you don't 12:11:36 20 have any hypergols on it at all. So it's a very 12:11:49 21 slim-down and stream-lined kind of vehicle. 12:12:13 22 And that's all very different from the 12:12:48 336 1 Shuttle C. 12:12:53 2 Block II, of course, you can do things 12:12:56 3 to get more performance. And at some point we 12:13:37 4 will run out of spares in hardware that is 12:13:47 5 cannibalized from orbital vehicles, and you 12:14:03 6 would end up building. But the nice thing is 12:14:19 7 you're doing flight tests with your basic design 12:14:30 8 as you're beginning to procure your follow-on 12:14:37 9 avionics. Next chart. 12:14:52 10 I already talked about 12:15:50 11 infrastructure/facilities. Y'all know how we do 12:16:05 12 space shuttle. You can obviously see that 12:16:12 13 that -- you don't have to buy a new ET barge. 12:16:19 14 Nobody has talked about that. You know, you 12:17:02 15 don't have to buy a new Pegasus. You don't have 12:17:05 16 to do solid rocket booster or anything like that 12:17:15 17 that changes. 12:17:28 18 And my complete ineptness at 12:17:52 19 PowerPoint means that the cargo carrier is 12:18:04 20 really fat there. I just noticed that. But I 12:18:26 21 just stretched the picture out, and that's why 12:18:35 22 it looks like that. Next chart. Don't laugh. 12:18:42 337 1 The last one great graphics. That was good. 12:19:30 2 The team has looked at payload 12:19:39 3 envelopes and designs, and actually I think we 12:20:04 4 found from the industry study that we would have 12:20:12 5 a CG problem, and the center main engine would 12:20:16 6 hit its gimbal limits. So we actually shrunk 12:20:39 7 the payload envelope a little bit. 12:21:02 8 They've done some studies -- again, 12:21:12 9 this is something that needs a great deal of 12:21:17 10 work from the broader community -- from the NASA 12:21:23 11 team, from the Aerospace -- to show. It does 12:21:30 12 look like, you know, with the 72-metric tons 12:22:53 13 that you could do quite a bit with that payload 12:23:04 14 capacity. Next chart. 12:23:33 15 Everyone had one incomprehensible 12:23:40 16 chart. So this is mine. And it is just the -- 12:23:53 17 it is just the flow of avionics and hardware 12:25:11 18 required between Block I and then a follow-on 12:25:23 19 Block I that has some new stuff and then a 12:25:57 20 Block II, where you get all of the new stuff. 12:26:05 21 And basically if you look across the 12:26:37 22 top, there's no really new builds for avionics 12:26:41 338 1 in the Block I architecture. We could build it 12:26:51 2 with the hardware we have in hand right now. 12:27:07 3 Next chart. 12:28:34 4 This is, to me, sort of like everybody 12:28:38 5 comes, ah, Shuttle C is great but you've got to 12:30:02 6 throw your SSMEs away and that makes it 12:30:21 7 unsustainable and it's unaffordable and let's 12:30:51 8 move on to the next vehicle. 12:31:12 9 SSME, we have a million seconds of 12:33:05 10 runtime on. We understand SSME performance very 12:33:14 11 well. I have 14 assets right now limited by 12:33:54 12 nozzles that you could go fly in a test program. 12:34:25 13 We have all of the hardware. We're set up to do 12:34:35 14 the test. 12:34:41 15 There is -- Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne 12:34:45 16 can provide you books of data on the RS-25E, 12:35:53 17 which is expendable, which is your channel wall 12:36:11 18 nozzle, the non-refurbished turbo pumps. The 12:36:22 19 fact that you're not trying to refly these 12:36:34 20 engines means you don't have inspection ports 12:36:40 21 and you don't have a lot of different 12:36:46 22 requirements that you would -- that we have 12:36:52 339 1 built into the SSME that has caused the cost to 12:36:57 2 be significant. 12:37:08 3 And you can't really take an SSME cost 12:37:10 4 and say, well, that's what the expendable cost 12:37:23 5 would be. Because what you do for expendables 12:37:28 6 is you put them on a production line and you 12:37:36 7 would commoditize it basically. And that's 12:37:47 8 how -- you would build a certain number per 12:38:24 9 year, and then you'd have the economy of scale 12:38:33 10 to do that. 12:38:39 11 So there is a lot of -- a lot of data 12:38:42 12 on there in bullet PWR. Go get it if you guys 12:38:48 13 want. Next chart. 12:39:04 14 I really debated cost -- putting cost 12:39:23 15 estimates in here. The team needs to validate 12:39:51 16 these. I wasn't going to put them in because I 12:40:00 17 said, well, you guys haven't spent enough time 12:40:08 18 on this. Then I looked at the industry study 12:40:14 19 that was done in '04, '05. The costs were 12:40:20 20 almost exactly the same. 12:40:38 21 I put them in here for your interest. 12:40:41 22 Take your big grain of salt right now. And we 12:40:46 340 1 need to go validate these numbers externally. 12:40:54 2 Next chart. 12:41:08 3 Everything I just said about cost I'll 12:41:10 4 say about schedule. The industry team and the 12:41:35 5 NASA team, somewhat independently, came up with, 12:41:41 6 if you turn it on, it's a 4-1/2-year project to 12:41:51 7 fly your first test flight. We need to work on 12:42:12 8 this some more and debate it and get a better 12:42:22 9 schedule. So take your second big grain of salt 12:42:33 10 now. Next chart. 12:42:45 11 We did some design reference mission 12:42:50 12 just to show is this even something that would 12:43:37 13 be useful. It is obviously. It's 70-plus 12:43:43 14 metric tons, a heavy-lifter, that is -- there is 12:43:59 15 not another vehicle right now other than the 12:44:15 16 space shuttle that provides that kind of 12:44:23 17 injection capability. But would it be useful. 12:44:27 18 And this gets a little bit into 12:44:48 19 architecture, and I don't want to get into 12:44:59 20 architecture. I just want to talk to you about 12:45:24 21 the launch vehicle. 12:45:30 22 But these are some of the -- some of 12:45:34 341 1 the ideas the team has thrown out. And, again, 12:45:39 2 I would say that this needs a lot of work with 12:45:51 3 the broader community. Next chart. 12:45:57 4 The thought being this is -- you can 12:46:01 5 kind of see the approach, normal solid rocket 16:11:19 6 booster separation, fairing separation, you hit 16:11:23 7 MECO and off goes your upper stage with 16:11:25 8 autonomous rendezvous and docking capability -- 16:11:29 9 which actually if we would have launched this 16:11:32 10 morning, we were going to demonstrate the 16:11:34 11 autonomous rendezvous and docking capability. 16:11:36 12 We put some sensors on in the payload 16:11:39 13 bay of Endeavour and we'll demonstrate that 16:11:42 14 software and I hope -- although doing it within 16:11:46 15 eight flights is going to be difficult. I hope 16:11:48 16 to have the capability to demonstrate the 16:11:53 17 shuttle autonomous docking to the ISS. At least 16:11:55 18 we'll get the sensor data and then put it on the 16:11:56 19 ground through simulation and be able to show 16:11:59 20 that. 16:12:02 21 And then you toss your external tank 16:12:03 22 with the big heel structure that goes up to the 16:12:05 342 1 bipod fitting that holds the boat tail into the 16:12:09 2 Pacific Ocean. Next chart. 16:12:14 3 Design Reference Mission, just what it 16:12:14 4 looks like, and obviously you phase with 16:12:14 5 station. Next chart. 16:12:33 6 We have looked at crewed options. 16:12:33 7 This was the ISS crew piece. We have done some 8 early assessments on the launch abort system, 9 being close to the inner tank, and it looks 10 doable. Again, this is a prime area of heavy 11 study to look at the LAS. You'll see a chart 12 where it shows safety. It all depends on how 13 effective we can make a launch abort system 14 work. 15 The thought here would be that you 16 would end up injecting the carrier with an MPLM 17 or external payloads, and you would fly it 18 actually around and dock with it and then fly it 19 to the station. Next chart. 20 This is the crew and logistics launch 21 just like before. Next chart. 22 There was also a profile where you 16:13:06 343 1 could do a two launch, one from Pad A, one from 16:13:08 2 Pad B. You may have noticed before Hubble we 16:13:11 3 had a shuttle sitting out at each of the two 16:13:13 4 pads. So from a ground-up standpoint, that was 16:13:15 5 maybe a precursor look at how you could do that. 16:13:19 6 Lunar lander with an Earth departure 16:13:21 7 stage on it. 16:13:25 8 And then fly Orion. Same discussion 16:13:26 9 we had on LAS with its Earth departure stage. 16:13:30 10 Next chart. 16:13:30 11 And, again, we're into architecture. 16:13:33 12 What I would do is, as opposed to training two 16:13:33 13 EDSs with a lander and a CV, I would go and put 16:13:37 14 my -- put the lunar lander in lunar orbit, and 16:13:40 15 then if it has hypergols on it, you can go 16:13:45 16 whenever you want, you can launch your crewed 16:13:50 17 vehicle. 16:13:53 18 I'll say right -- this is not the 16:13:53 19 lunar lander that is currently in the baseline 16:13:57 20 architecture. This is a different lunar lander. 16:14:01 21 The guys just were running some calculations. 16:14:04 22 It was a 28-metric ton lander. 16:14:04 344 1 Doug, what's the -- Altair right now 16:14:08 2 is 45-ish. Apollo was 16-ish. So it's a 16:14:12 3 different architecture, and that's something you 16:14:17 4 have to understand right off. It's not as 16:14:19 5 capable as what the Ares V architecture looks 16:14:21 6 like. 16:14:25 7 You know, we can talk the same depot 16:14:25 8 discussion. I like depots, but there's -- 16:14:30 9 again, they're different architectures than what 16:14:30 10 we have right now, and this has not received 16:14:32 11 sufficient study time from the broader community 16:14:35 12 to say this is the answer in any -- in any way 16:14:39 13 at all. Next chart. 16:14:42 14 Well, okay. I've got two 16:14:42 15 incomprehensible charts. This is a baseball 16:14:42 16 card of just performance between the cargo 16:14:42 17 version for Block I and Block II and then the 16:14:42 18 crewed version. Next chart. 16:14:42 19 This is -- I'm not going to spend a 16:14:58 20 lot of time on this. We are flying at the max 16:15:00 21 rate on the shuttle program in fiscal year 10. 16:15:03 22 If we were going to move into something like 16:15:08 345 1 this, I would lobby strongly to spread out the 16:15:09 2 fiscal year 10 launches into 11 and in 12 and as 16:15:09 3 we restarted production for solid rocket 16:15:16 4 boosters and external tanks. 16:15:19 5 And the configuration is so similar, 16:15:21 6 you know, production is really what you have to 16:15:24 7 worry about, and you could essentially get rid 16:15:26 8 of most of the gap by doing that. Now, you will 16:15:30 9 have a gap because Orion -- the Orion 16:15:33 10 development time is what would pace the next 16:15:35 11 crewed vehicle. Next chart. 16:15:39 12 There are some growth options from the 16:15:40 13 81 tons. I didn't just magically go from 72 to 16:15:42 14 81. It's a suborbital staging. You load up the 16:15:45 15 vehicle more, you end up with MECO that is a 16:15:50 16 suborbital, but then you separate your third 16:15:51 17 stage with either J-2 or an SSME and off you go. 16:15:55 18 You get to 81 tons by doing that suborbital 16:15:55 19 staging. If you ran your SSMEs at 16:16:00 20 109 percent -- and I wouldn't let you do that 16:16:03 21 with crew on it, but with cargo on it, you might 16:16:05 22 want to do it. 16:16:08 346 1 Five-segment SRBs we've talked about 2 before. If you had an SSME on your Earth 3 departure stage -- there's a few things you 4 could do to maybe get above 90-metric tons. 5 There are some -- these things are lines on a 6 chart, but there would be great expense and a 7 significant amount of development testing 8 required before you would sign up to do any of 9 these. 16:16:09 10 So I wouldn't say, hey, this idea will 16:16:09 11 get you above 90-metric tons. It's -- those are 16:16:09 12 thoughts. Next chart. 16:16:32 13 I asked my guys to go off and say, 16:16:32 14 hey, let's just do a PRA. We know what all of 16:16:35 15 the different pieces are -- all of the different 16:16:40 16 components are, except I don't know the EDS or I 16:16:40 17 don't know what -- what's under the fairing, but 16:16:42 18 for the stuff that you see in the little picture 16:16:44 19 on the lower right, where would you get -- and 16:16:47 20 we did a 5 percent/95 percent study, and you can 16:16:48 21 see the numbers for the loss of vehicle that we 16:16:52 22 got. Again, this is your third big grain of 16:16:55 347 1 salt here. Next chart. 16:16:59 2 Boy, this just makes sense, right, is 16:17:00 3 that -- if your launch abort system is 16:17:05 4 100 percent successful, you're flying a pretty 16:17:07 5 safe rocket. It will not be. And it actually 16:17:12 6 may be low if we look at the shock interactions 16:17:15 7 between the LAS and the external tank. 16:17:19 8 This is an area that needs a 16:17:22 9 significant amount of study. And I think if we 16:17:24 10 were at all serious about doing something like 16:17:29 11 this we would go work on that as a -- as the 16:17:31 12 first thing we would go do. Next chart. 16:17:32 13 Sep design. I told them I didn't want 16:17:34 14 any RCS, I didn't want any extra propulsion. So 15 post MECO, of course, your fairing is gone, and 16 it's -- they designed -- some of the guys at 17 JSC -- a spring mechanism that just pops it out, 18 and you would add the ET tumble valve back on to 19 give you a good clean separation. We think this 20 is a very solvable problem. Next chart. 21 Yeah. We did a little thing there. 22 Next chart. 348 1 The first bullet is the most important 2 bullet. The HLV design, it is less capable than 3 the current baseline. And we need to stress 4 that fact. 5 And it has not been studied to the 6 amount where I feel very comfortable coming up 7 here and telling you a whole lot about it. I 8 think it is something that if we decided we were 9 not going to get the money to do the baseline 10 plan and we wanted a backup that would provide a 11 lunar capability or a human servicing of the 12 station capability that this is something that 13 we would want to go study again. 14 And, again, we've spent 30 years 15 studying it. So we have a lot of background to 16 do that. 17 Benefits are obvious. We basically 16:18:30 18 have the parts to build everything. What we 19 don't have is some structural parts for the keel 20 for the fairing and for the boat tail to mount 21 up the engines. If you're going to have a 22 development or a program, I think the structural 349 1 piece is probably the one you would pick. It 2 wouldn't be flight software or engines or 3 anything else like that. 4 Another thing that's kind of near and 5 dear to my heart is that the HLV retains 6 essential the contractor and civil servant skill 7 base that we have right now, especially in 16:19:21 8 concert with spreading out some of the shuttle 16:19:23 9 flights that we currently have on the manifest. 16:19:26 10 I'm very concerned about the 16:19:28 11 industrial base. I'll tell you that, you know, 16:19:30 12 the congressional budget numbers that have been 16:19:32 13 provided to NASA basically took away the lunar 16:19:35 14 program, and that's where all of my space 16:19:40 15 shuttle civil servants were going to go. 16:19:44 16 The folks at Marshall were going to go 16:19:46 17 to Ares V. The folks at Johnson Space Center 16:19:46 18 were going to go work on Altair. Of course, if 16:19:51 19 the lunar program is gone, I have got to make a 16:19:52 20 place for civil servants. And it's just worse 16:19:54 21 on the contractor side if the lunar program goes 16:19:56 22 away. 16:20:00 350 1 Potentially support ISS for crew and 16:20:00 2 cargo, we talked about that a little bit. And I 16:20:05 3 really don't want to get into architecture 16:20:08 4 discussions, especially with Dr. Crawley because 16:20:12 5 he knows a whole lot more about it than I do. 16:20:12 6 But he left, so okay. Let's talk 16:20:13 7 architecture for a minute. 16:20:16 8 You know, because this is -- that's 16:20:18 9 not what I'm hear to talk about. I'm talking 16:20:20 10 about a capability to provide heavy-lift 16:20:23 11 capability into low Earth orbit and then off you 16:20:29 12 go. 16:20:30 13 I did have a -- because this is a 16:20:31 14 little bit different than shuttle, see, I had a 16:20:34 15 short movie, a couple of minutes. 16:20:36 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Go ahead. 16:20:36 17 MR. SHANNON: I think it just helps 16:20:40 18 you. The music is really corny. I did not pick 16:20:42 19 up the music on it. So maybe if the sound is 20 turned off, I'll tip somebody really good. Or 21 not. 22 And it just shows the build-up of the 351 1 vehicle. And this is very simplistic, right, 2 but it shows you fairing and there's a whole 3 bunch of different things. My graphics guys got 4 really excited on me here. 5 What I really want you to see is the 6 launch and the fairing separations. Oh, here it 7 comes. Great. No tip for you. 8 (Whereupon, informational video 9 began.) 10 MR. SHANNON: And as people are 11 watching, we could ask questions that are really 12 loud and drowned out the sound, if you would 13 like. 14 And this was just a conceptual lunar 15 lander. He's on an EDS to be designed. 16 All right. That's probably all we can 17 stand of it. 18 (Whereupon, informational video 19 concluded.) 20 MR. SHANNON: Okay. So that gives you 16:22:18 21 a little better idea. And, again, I want to 16:22:20 22 really stress the fact that this has not been 16:22:22 352 1 vetted or discussed in the level of detail it 16:22:26 2 needs to be throughout the entire NASA and 16:22:30 3 contracting communities. It's an old idea, and 16:22:35 4 there's a few changes to an old idea. 16:22:38 5 And that's all I was going to present 16:22:40 6 today. 16:22:42 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Terrific. That was 16:22:42 8 very well done. 16:22:45 9 Please, go ahead, Leroy. 16:22:47 10 MR. CHIAO: Thanks, John. Let's see. 16:22:50 11 I just wanted to ask you about your first 16:22:50 12 conclusion, HLV design is less capable than the 16:22:53 13 current baseline. 16:22:59 14 You mean that it's less capable than 16:22:59 15 the current baseline because the current 16:22:59 16 baseline includes Ares V. Is that correct? 16:23:02 17 MR. SHANNON: Yes. 16:22:50 18 MR. CHIAO: Okay. And so -- 16:22:50 19 MR. SHANNON: And the current baseline 16:23:06 20 is an architecture that has a very large, very 16:23:07 21 capable lander, and there's no way -- 16:23:07 22 MR. CHIAO: Sure. 16:22:50 353 1 MR. SHANNON: -- to do that on this 16:23:11 2 vehicle, both from the volume side or the 16:23:12 3 propulsion side. 16:23:17 4 MR. CHIAO: Right. But if we're just 16:22:50 5 thinking of Ares I -- comparing this to Ares I, 16:23:21 6 let me make sure I'm understanding that your 16:23:21 7 numbers are extremely preliminary and haven't 16:23:21 8 been vetted by the community: 4-1/2 years, 16:23:24 9 6.6 billion, 72-metric tons of cargo and Orion 16:23:29 10 with crew to orbit? 16:23:35 11 MR. SHANNON: With your caveats, I 16:23:37 12 would say -- 16:23:43 13 MR. CHIAO: With the caveats, right? 16:23:43 14 MR. SHANNON: Yes. 16:23:37 15 MR. CHIAO: Okay. So in that context, 16:23:43 16 maybe you or maybe Doug can kind of give us a 16:23:44 17 high level answer -- but, I mean, I'm sure ESAS 16:23:44 18 looked at this kind of architecture as well as 16:23:47 19 the Direct-type architecture. 16:23:49 20 Can you kind of give us a high big 16:23:51 21 picture of why the current architecture was 16:23:54 22 selected over -- why these architectures were 16:23:55 354 1 rejected? 16:23:57 2 MR. SHANNON: It's a require -- well, 16:24:03 3 no. It's a requirements discussion. It's what 16:24:04 4 kind of lander do you want to put on the Moon, 16:24:05 5 what kind of capability do you want to put on 16:24:08 6 the Moon? 16:24:10 7 MR. CHIAO: So driven by the lander, 16:24:11 8 right? Okay. 16:24:11 9 MR. SHANNON: And they were given a 16:24:13 10 mission, and they built an architecture that 16:24:15 11 would support that mission. This vehicle will 16:24:18 12 not support that mission. It will support a 16:24:19 13 different mission, but we'd have to go and 16:24:24 14 change that architecture. 16:24:25 15 MR. CHIAO: Okay. 16:24:25 16 MR. SHANNON: Is that fair, Doug? 16:24:25 17 It's a requirements discussion. 16:23:43 18 MR. CHIAO: So it was pretty much 16:23:43 19 driven by the lunar mission and the lander 16:24:26 20 requirements? 16:24:29 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Why don't you come up 16:24:29 22 so everybody can hear you. 16:24:29 355 1 MR. COOKE: I don't think they 16:24:42 2 actually studied -- or they didn't look at 16:24:43 3 directly the crewed version of it, because they 16:24:47 4 considered it a safety issue. I think probably 16:24:50 5 because it was next to the tank. But they 16:24:53 6 looked at the cargo capability, and they were 16:24:55 7 looking at the mission overall, I think. 16:24:58 8 MR. CHIAO: Okay. Thanks. 16:25:01 9 MR. SHANNON: And if you automatically 16:25:04 10 said it was uncrewed, that gives you three 16:25:06 11 launches, right, because you're going to put the 16:25:08 12 crew on Ares and then you had your -- you had an 16:25:09 13 EDS with a lander and another EDS for the crewed 16:25:11 14 thing that went up. And three launches is, I 16:25:16 15 think -- 16:25:22 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: My question relates to 16:25:22 17 that same sort of line of thinking. 16:25:23 18 Many years ago I was involved in a 16:25:26 19 study where we had actually recommended building 16:25:27 20 a Shuttle C or something very similar to it, and 16:25:31 21 at that time it seemed to make sense because you 16:25:36 22 could pair it with the shuttle. And so you 16:25:39 356 1 didn't have to risk astronauts to provide 16:25:41 2 trucking and you could use astronauts the fix 16:25:46 3 Hubbles and the likes and it seemed to make more 16:25:50 4 sense to us. 16:25:53 5 And today if you were to say you 16:25:54 6 aren't going to have a shuttle for whatever 16:25:56 7 reason, if you weren't, then you've almost got 16:25:58 8 to go to the Orion version or something like 16:26:01 9 that. But your reliability figures -- loss of 16:26:05 10 crew figures, if my memory is correct, showed 16:26:08 11 the Orion version of what you might call a 16:26:11 12 Shuttle C derived or something was much less 16:26:16 13 reliable -- less safe than the Constellation 16:26:19 14 configuration, and that sort of surprises me. 16:26:26 15 Could you elaborate a bit? 16:26:29 16 MR. SHANNON: No. Because I don't 16:26:31 17 have any knowledge of the Constellation numbers. 16:26:34 18 I can tell you shuttle program numbers are not 16:26:37 19 as good as what Jeff presented earlier. 16:26:40 20 Our mean is 1 in 81 or 16:26:44 21 5 percent/95 percent or 1 in 57 and 1 in 117. 16:26:50 22 Those are numbers that are very near and dear to 16:26:51 357 1 my heart. 16:26:53 2 I think that the effective of the 16:26:54 3 launch abort system is going to completely drive 16:26:56 4 what the final number is going to be, and I have 16:27:00 5 no idea how effective that is going to be 16:27:03 6 because we haven't studied it. 16:27:06 7 MR. AUGUSTINE: That should be 16:27:06 8 relatively independent of which vehicle it was 16:27:08 9 on, though, if that's the driver? 16:27:11 10 (Discussion off the record.) 16:27:11 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: No. Well, we 16:27:11 12 shouldn't design vehicles that -- 16:27:11 13 MR. SHANNON: Oh, I'd like to. I 16:27:16 14 mean, I've had a ball today because, you know, 16:27:17 15 if you like space, this is kind of neat stuff. 16:27:20 16 MR. AUGUSTINE: The other thing that 16:27:22 17 occurred to me -- I've not been that close in 16:27:23 18 recent time, but the concern over SOFI peeling 16:27:26 19 off, that was a problem for the shuttle clearly 16:27:30 20 because the leading edge of the shuttle was 16:27:35 21 exposed. 16:27:35 22 With this configuration, would that be 16:27:41 358 1 viewed as problem or -- 16:27:41 2 MR. SHANNON: Okay. The shuttle 16:27:41 3 program manager piece of me says we fixed that 16:27:42 4 problem, we're very vigilant about it but we 16:27:43 5 understand it and have fixed that problem, but 16:27:46 6 it doesn't matter if we did or not because, of 16:27:49 7 course, you have a very robust fairing with no 16:27:54 8 TPS issue at all. 16:27:56 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, you have a 16:27:57 10 different geometry here too. 16:27:58 11 MR. SHANNON: Right. 16:27:58 12 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Other questions 16:27:58 13 from the committee? 16:28:04 14 MR. CHYBA: Just to follow this up so 16:28:04 15 I'm sure I understand it. 16:28:06 16 It seems like the conclusion is that 16:28:07 17 the biggest problem identified with this 16:28:08 18 external system was the loss of crew 16:28:11 19 probability, but you showed a graphic -- and I 16:28:15 20 understand all of the caveats you applied to 16:28:17 21 everything that you showed us. 16:28:17 22 This plot of probability of loss of 16:28:17 359 1 crew with the launch abort system, it looks 16:28:22 2 like, you know, at least at one end of that plot 16:28:25 3 that one gets into the range for loss of crew, 16:28:27 4 accidents that the current architecture is in. 16:28:32 5 Is that correct? 16:28:33 6 MR. SHANNON: Again, it is completely 16:28:34 7 dependent on the launch abort system capability. 16:28:38 8 MR. CHYBA: So it's just not 16:28:04 9 quantified well enough to -- 16:28:04 10 MR. SHANNON: You know, and I'd kind 16:28:42 11 of laugh, right, because after Challenger we 16:28:43 12 made a big run at trying to put an abort 16:28:46 13 capability -- or crew capsule capability at the 16:28:50 14 tip of the orbiter, but you just can't do it 16:28:50 15 from a weight standpoint -- a design complexity 16:28:54 16 standpoint. 16:28:54 17 This is basically that same thing. So 16:28:55 18 we have some studies that have some of the 16:28:57 19 dynamics associated with that, but we need to go 16:29:00 20 back and really go through that and really 16:29:03 21 understand that. Because the safety of this 16:29:05 22 vehicle depends exactly on that one thing. 16:29:07 360 1 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. We thank you 16:29:11 2 very much. 16:29:14 3 MR. BEJMUK: Real quickly, if I may. 16:29:14 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: Oh, I'm sorry. One 16:29:14 5 more. Bo... 16:29:14 6 MR. BEJMUK: Basically, Doug, LAS has 16:29:14 7 improved a launch vehicle loss of crew by a 16:29:20 8 factor of ten roughly. I mean, you know, John 16:29:20 9 had this curve but -- and I think you guys are 16:29:26 10 talking a factor of like 90 percent effective. 16:29:29 11 So that would increase it by a factor of ten, I 16:29:31 12 guess, right? Do you agree with that? 16:29:35 13 MR. SHANNON: Well, it's 90 percent on 16:29:36 14 top of a rocket, though, and this is a 16:29:37 15 different -- 16:29:39 16 MR. COOKE: It's not a rocket failure 16:29:41 17 and it's -- 16:29:41 18 MR. BEJMUK: Yes. 16:29:41 19 MR. SHANNON: -- different design. 16:29:41 20 MR. COOKE: The failure mode is a 16:29:41 21 rocket, and the trajectories -- the actual 16:29:43 22 ascent profile differ between different 16:29:46 361 1 designs -- where you are when there is a 16:29:52 2 failure; if there's a range destruct on a tank, 16:29:57 3 do you want to be sitting next to it. It's kind 16:30:01 4 of -- you know, that sort of discussion can get 16:30:04 5 into this. If you're sitting up on top and do a 16:30:07 6 range destruct, because you're off course, that 16:30:10 7 tends to look better. 16:30:14 8 I mean, back when I was in the shuttle 16:30:16 9 program office after Challenger and we were 16:30:19 10 getting ready to fly Galileo, which had an RTG 16:30:22 11 on it and we studied the Titan 34D launch 16:30:27 12 destruct, we looked at -- we looked at the -- 16:30:32 13 how the boosters destructed on Challenger 16:30:36 14 because they were -- they did a range destruct 16:30:43 15 after the accident because they kept flying. 16:30:44 16 They recovered hardware out of the 16:30:48 17 ocean and looked at how the boosters came part, 16:30:50 18 and they tended to fly sideways more than they 16:30:52 19 did up. 16:30:55 20 So it matters where you are in terms 16:30:56 21 of what failure and what mode of destruct you're 16:30:59 22 in. So, I mean, that's a long discussion -- 16:31:01 362 1 MR. BEJMUK: Okay. Thank you. 16:29:14 2 MR. COOKE: -- but those kind of 16:31:03 3 things do come into play. 16:31:05 4 MR. AUGUSTINE: But by the same 16:31:08 5 token -- and, again, I don't want to design 16:31:11 6 rockets here. Well, maybe I do, but we 16:31:13 7 shouldn't. 16:31:13 8 MR. SHANNON: I do. Yeah. 16:31:13 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: If you slide the 16:31:14 10 cargo -- the side mount forward, you could still 16:31:17 11 have the escape capsule -- you say not? 16:31:19 12 MR. SHANNON: We need to -- I'll 16:31:24 13 design it. But the CG becomes a really issue 16:31:26 14 then, and you end up sacrificing your gimbal 16:31:30 15 capabilities so you don't -- of course, we don't 16:31:30 16 have a range package on the ET. We have them on 16:31:31 17 the solid rocket boosters, and if we were going 16:31:34 18 off course, you've got plenty of warning before 16:31:38 19 the range takes actions. 16:31:41 20 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. We probably 21 should -- 22 MR. COOKE: It needs to be studied. 363 1 MR. SHANNON: It does. 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- move ahead. 3 MR. SHANNON: That is true about every 16:31:44 4 single page I just showed -- is it has to be 16:31:47 5 studied if we want to go look at it. 16:31:47 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 16:31:49 7 MR. SHANNON: You bet. 16:31:51 8 MR. AUGUSTINE: All right. Let's see. 16:31:52 9 We're 30 seconds behind here. Slipping up this 16:31:54 10 afternoon. 16:31:58 11 We then come to the time for public 16:32:00 12 comment. We've allowed up to 30 minutes for 16:32:03 13 comments. If there's anyone who didn't comment 16:32:05 14 this morning that would like to comment, two 16:32:08 15 microphones are here. 16:32:13 16 We'd certainly welcome comments. We'd 16:32:14 17 ask tat you hold them to three minutes or less 16:32:16 18 so that we can give as many folks a chance to 16:32:19 19 speak as possible. 16:32:22 20 And I guess we'll start here. And 16:32:23 21 will you identify yourself, please. 16:32:26 22 MR. SNYDER: Good afternoon. My name 16:32:26 364 1 is Mike Snyder. I'm from Houston, Texas, and I 16:32:33 2 appreciate the opportunity to share my personal 16:32:33 3 opinions and thoughts with you here today. 16:32:51 4 You've heard a lot of good ideas and a 16:32:51 5 lot of different concepts, and so I'd like to 16:32:51 6 tell you a little bit and maybe bring it a 16:32:51 7 little bit on to personal side things. 16:32:51 8 I'm in my early 30's, and I was born 16:32:51 9 after Apollo. My only connection to that 16:32:51 10 program is the historical pictures and the 16:32:52 11 videos that everyone sees, the fact that I drive 16:32:56 12 by the Saturn V's every day laying on the ground 16:32:57 13 and still get the chance now and again to talk 16:32:58 14 to the people that used to work on that program 16:33:02 15 and hear about all of the great efforts that 16:33:04 16 they did. 16:33:08 17 Of course, I inherited the shuttle, 16:33:09 18 and while it's an outstanding vehicle with a lot 16:33:12 19 of great capabilities and it's one that I think 16:33:13 20 that this nation should not be so quick to give 16:33:15 21 up, it is limited to only low Earth orbit. And 16:33:20 22 we spent the last 30 years there doing that, 16:33:23 365 1 basically calling it exploration. 16:33:26 2 I have a lot of opinions on this, and 16:33:26 3 one of my larger opinions is that our current 16:33:28 4 strategy does not do enough to engage the 16:33:32 5 private sector and promote the development of 16:33:35 6 the budding commercial space environment and the 16:33:38 7 capabilities that they may one day have, such as 16:33:39 8 the propellant depots that folks talked about. 16:33:43 9 We do not seem to be -- appear to be 16:33:47 10 building a true space-fairing architecture and 16:33:48 11 infrastructure, actively encouraging the private 16:33:48 12 sector or taking advantage of any of the design 16:33:52 13 reference missions that have been discussed so 16:33:55 14 many time and revised so many times throughout 16:33:57 15 the decades. 16:34:01 16 What we currently have has been 16:34:01 17 referred to as Apollo on steroids, but Apollo 16:34:03 18 was labeled unsustainable. And I ask why will 16:34:03 19 this time be any different with all of the extra 16:34:10 20 developments that we have to do. 16:34:12 21 With regards to what I mentioned 16:34:14 22 above, Ares I and Ares V is not what was 16:34:16 366 1 recommended in ESAS. While we have put a 16:34:19 2 significant amount of money in there, there 16:34:21 3 obviously have been issues, both technical, cost 16:34:23 4 and schedule. 16:34:25 5 Second, with the current designs, I 16:34:26 6 worry that we're going to have two separate 16:34:29 7 launch developments, two large development 16:34:30 8 programs, and then the operations costs that are 16:34:32 9 going to be required to sustain both. In 16:34:34 10 today's economic climate, I'm not sure that 16:34:37 11 that's the best strategic decision we can make. 16:34:40 12 What I believe we need to do is 16:34:43 13 leverage the launch vehicle from as much of the 16:34:44 14 is existing hardware as possible to do the job 16:34:47 15 required while private enterprise is off 16:34:50 16 developing its own capabilities. This allows 16:34:50 17 for the development costs to be minimized and 16:34:56 18 operations costs to be forecasted much more 16:34:56 19 accurately and with higher confidence. 16:35:02 20 We heard today both about the 16:35:03 21 Jupiter -- the National Launch System derived 16:35:03 22 vehicle -- and both the side-mounted vehicle 16:35:06 367 1 that John just talked about. This class of 16:35:08 2 vehicle has been -- 16:35:08 3 MR. AUGUSTINE: Could I ask you to 16:35:13 4 wrap up -- 16:35:14 5 MR. SNYDER: Certainly. 16:35:14 6 MR. AUGUSTINE: -- your comments, 16:35:14 7 please. 16:35:15 8 MR. SNYDER: This class of vehicle has 16:35:15 9 sometimes been called overkill for ISS, but it 16:35:17 10 is exactly that vehicle that we're flying today 16:35:20 11 to construct and build the Space Station, and I 16:35:23 12 would like to see that gain serious 16:35:28 13 consideration by this program -- by this 16:35:32 14 commission. 16:35:34 15 Finally, the only thing I have to say 16:35:34 16 then is that, you know, like I said, I was born 16:35:35 17 after Apollo. I sincerely want and hope to see 16:35:36 18 us go beyond low Earth orbit. I would like to 16:35:42 19 be able to do that and have that as part of my 16:35:44 20 career. I sincerely hope that my two little 16:35:46 21 girls, who are very small, don't grow up in a 16:35:48 22 world where they have to -- too -- look to the 16:35:50 368 1 history books to see what we used to be able 16:35:53 2 to -- what we were, at one time, capable of 16:35:54 3 doing. 16:35:54 4 I know y'all have a great job to do 16:35:57 5 and a very tough job to do, and I appreciate the 16:36:01 6 opportunity to talk to you. And whatever 16:36:03 7 decisions you make, hopefully they're good ones. 16:36:05 8 Thank you. 16:36:08 9 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 16:36:08 10 Sir... 16:36:11 11 MR. SIMPSON: Hi, I'm Randy Simpson 16:36:11 12 and I'm a taxpayer and an -- (inaudible). 16:36:15 13 I just want to recall -- I know you 16:36:17 14 know this and other people have said it -- just 16:36:18 15 the importance of this review and to think 16:36:22 16 back -- because this isn't the first one you've 16:36:24 17 done -- think back in 1990 when you did a 16:36:26 18 similar review like this and maybe -- and I'm 16:36:29 19 sure you've done this and gone through your 16:36:32 20 head. 16:36:34 21 But I think it would be good for you 16:36:34 22 and for the panel to think about it maybe out 16:36:35 369 1 loud -- to think about what was the environment 16:36:38 2 back in 1990 technology -- from a technology 16:36:39 3 perspective, from a political perspective and 16:36:43 4 think about the process that you went through, 16:36:45 5 the decisions that you made and how it impacted 16:36:48 6 the next 20 years and, in looking at that, take 16:36:50 7 those lessons learned and think to yourself what 16:36:54 8 the decisions you're going to make now are going 16:36:58 9 to do for the next 20 years. 16:37:02 10 So just think about it from a 16:37:05 11 visionary standpoint. And in the process of 16:37:06 12 doing that, remember there are a lot of little 16:37:08 13 eyes that are looking at you. You know, they 16:37:10 14 want to know what the next 20 years are going to 16:37:14 15 be like. 16:37:17 16 There was a discussion about our 16:37:18 17 youth. I've got a herd of youth at home in my 16:37:20 18 family. They're watching you. They're watching 16:37:22 19 NASA. They're watching me. They're wanting me 16:37:23 20 to be excited about NASA, which I am, and for 16:37:25 21 them to be able to move into the space business. 16:37:29 22 We need to do something that's going 16:37:32 370 1 to, in your recommendations, energize the 16:37:34 2 current workforce and the workforce that's 16:37:39 3 coming in later. This is an amazing place that 16:37:41 4 we're in. We're surrounded by Psalm 19 all of 16:37:45 5 the way around the wall. We're under Elihu 16:37:46 6 Root. I don't know if you know who that is, but 16:37:52 7 you ought to look it up. It's amazing. And 16:37:53 8 this -- you've got a big job, and I hope you do 16:37:55 9 it well. 16:37:58 10 MR. AUGUSTINE: We'll certainly do our 16:37:59 11 best. Thank you. 16:38:02 12 Sir... 16:38:04 13 MR. TURNER: Good afternoon, 16:38:04 14 Mr. Chairman and panel. My name is David 16:38:06 15 Turner. I'm from right here in Washington, D.C. 16:38:09 16 Like many people I was very excited five years 16:38:12 17 ago in 2004 when President Bush announced the 16:38:15 18 VSE. I was very excited about that. And here 16:38:20 19 we are in 2009, five years later, and where are 16:38:22 20 we. 16:38:23 21 Well, this morning we saw a 16:38:24 22 Constellation video, which was very impressive 16:38:28 371 1 and would indicate that everything is fine, 16:38:28 2 we're progressing along, yet I feel that if 16:38:31 3 things were fine we wouldn't be here today 16:38:35 4 having this meeting. 16:38:38 5 We've seen a lot of excellent 16:38:40 6 presentations this afternoon, and over the past 16:38:42 7 few years as I've been following this as a 16:38:44 8 concerned citizen, it seems that there are -- 16:38:47 9 we're only going to -- because of the economic 16:38:49 10 issues, we're more than likely only going to get 16:38:51 11 one rocket system that Congress and the 16:38:54 12 White House will support. 16:38:57 13 I've gotten more concerned that if 16:38:59 14 Ares I is selected that we're going to end up 16:39:01 15 only with that, that Ares V won't reach the 16:39:03 16 funding point when it's time for its 16:39:07 17 development. 16:39:10 18 I'm a child of Apollo, and I was a 16:39:11 19 young teen when the Moon was taken away from us 16:39:12 20 in the early '70s. And speaking for my 16:39:15 21 generation, I'm still young, I want the Moon 16:39:17 22 back, I'd like to have it back. And I'm afraid 16:39:19 372 1 that if we only have Ares I we won't get the 16:39:22 2 Moon again for decades. 16:39:25 3 So it seems to me that whatever rocket 16:39:28 4 we select needs to have the most 16:39:31 5 functionality -- the most flexibility to grow, 16:39:34 6 and Ares I isn't designed to do that. 16:39:36 7 So I hope that the rocket system that 16:39:40 8 you all choose has that in mind, that it's -- 16:39:41 9 whatever it can do today, it also has 16:39:46 10 flexibility for growth in the future to ensure 16:39:49 11 that we do get the Moon. 16:39:50 12 Thank you. 16:39:52 13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you very much. 16:39:52 14 Sir... 16:39:55 15 MR. BLAKE: My name is Earl Blake. I 16:39:55 16 am probably one of the only average citizens in 16:39:57 17 here. I don't have a dog in this fight, you 16:40:01 18 know. I don't care how we launch as long as 16:40:05 19 it's done safely. 16:40:06 20 You know, I took off work to come down 16:40:09 21 here to show you and to show everyone that there 16:40:11 22 are average citizens out there that look to NASA 16:40:15 373 1 as inspiration still and has been for the past 16:40:18 2 50 years. 16:40:24 3 So really actually when I look back at 16:40:25 4 it, I find that the Space Station when it was 16:40:28 5 first proposed -- and I was a young father, had 16:40:31 6 a small one-year old daughter -- now as it's 16:40:34 7 coming to fruition, I'm a grandfather. 16:40:39 8 What I'm really hoping for is that 16:40:43 9 Orion can come along before I become a great 16:40:47 10 grandfather. 16:40:51 11 MR. AUGUSTINE: Or worse. 16:40:53 12 MR. BLAKE: Or worse. 16:40:54 13 So what I'm hoping for is 16:40:58 14 Constellation really has to be capable, it has 16:41:03 15 to be safe and it has to be soon or else you're 16:41:07 16 going to lose another generation of children 16:41:11 17 and -- that just do not know the excitement of 16:41:15 18 space exploration. 16:41:20 19 I mean, Dr. Chiao has been to the 16:41:21 20 Space Station, I believe. It's exciting for the 16:41:27 21 person in that position. For the rest of us on 16:41:29 22 the -- except for people like me, eh, not so 16:41:33 374 1 much. But, you know, we need to inspire our 16:41:37 2 youth. 16:41:40 3 So basically I think what really 16:41:42 4 should come out of this commission is the fact 16:41:44 5 that whatever we decide to take, it has to be 16:41:46 6 supported by Congress for a long term and it has 16:41:52 7 to be properly funded. It just -- if the 16:41:54 8 figures come out and we need this amount of 16:41:59 9 money to get it done in this amount of time, it 16:42:01 10 has to be allocated. We can't go along 16:42:03 11 thinking, oh, we'll make it up later, because we 16:42:07 12 never do. 16:42:11 13 So that's what I'm hoping that you can 16:42:12 14 do for us. 16:42:14 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you very 16:42:14 16 much for those comments. Each of you who have 16:42:16 17 made public comments certainly inspire us with 16:42:24 18 the importance of what we've been tasked to do. 16:42:28 19 I assure you we're all committed to do our very 16:42:31 20 best. 16:42:35 21 As you can see, this is not an easy 16:42:35 22 task, and as I've visited on Capitol Hill quite 16:42:38 375 1 a bit, I've discovered there are a lot of 16:42:41 2 different views there too, all strongly held, 16:42:46 3 mostly contradictory. So we're aware of what 16:42:49 4 we're into and we're aware of the importance of 16:42:51 5 it and we will do our best. 16:42:54 6 Let me thank all of you in the 16:42:57 7 audience who've stuck with us to the bitter end 16:42:59 8 here today. We appreciate your interest. 16:43:02 9 I want to thank the people at NASA on 16:43:05 10 behalf my colleagues, the people at NASA who 16:43:07 11 made the briefings and people who provided the 16:43:10 12 logistics of pulling this all together today. 16:43:14 13 It was, I think, a very worthwhile day from our 16:43:18 14 standpoint. 16:43:23 15 Let me just ask if any of my 16:43:24 16 colleagues would like to have the last word 16:43:25 17 here. 16:43:28 18 Jeff, do you want to or Bo or -- 16:43:28 19 MR. GREASON: I can't resist the 16:43:32 20 temptation to say something. 16:43:32 21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Please. 16:43:32 22 MR. GREASON: But so as to be 16:43:32 376 1 noncontroversial -- always something I've said 16:43:34 2 on a public record before -- you know, and I'm 16:43:37 3 reminding you of it because of the comments I 16:43:40 4 got here at the public meeting. You know, I 16:43:42 5 stood up on an occasion much like this when I 16:43:45 6 was on that side of the microphone and I told 16:43:45 7 the story that, you know, I've had that moment 16:43:48 8 that we used to be -- used to say about laughing 16:43:51 9 late when my little boy came to me and said, 16:43:54 10 Daddy, did they really used to go to the Moon 16:43:59 11 when you were a boy. 16:44:02 12 And, you know, I am only one of us and 16:44:03 13 we have a really hard job to do and at the end 16:44:05 14 of day we make recommendation and other people 16:44:09 15 have their hard job to do, but if I can, I'm 16:44:12 16 going to make sure that no -- that when they 16:44:15 17 grow up their kids don't have to ask that. 16:44:18 18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Bo, do you want to add 16:44:18 19 anything? 16:44:23 20 MR. BEJMUK: I only have just one 16:44:23 21 thought. You know, this gentleman who took off 16:44:24 22 work to come to talk to us, what resonated with 16:44:26 377 1 me was when he said soon. 16:44:30 2 You know, this was like the most 16:44:31 3 powerful word I almost heard today. We had a 16:44:35 4 lot of briefings, a lot of fancy stuff, a lot of 16:44:37 5 clever stuff, smart stuff, and there is a good 16:44:38 6 citizen who takes off work and he says, guys, do 16:44:41 7 something soon, and I think this is one area 16:44:44 8 that we have fallen behind in this country. 16:44:46 9 I've been in this industry longer than 16:44:50 10 my memory serves me to remember. But we have 16:44:53 11 slowed down in the way we do things. We do well 16:44:55 12 things, we do it with little resources, we 16:44:59 13 somehow have forgotten or maybe never learned or 16:45:02 14 we didn't think it was important to do things 16:45:07 15 soon. 16:45:08 16 And I appreciate what you have said. 16:45:09 17 We will try to see if we can maybe advise 16:45:11 18 somebody to do things soon. Thank you. 16:45:13 19 MR. AUGUSTINE: Leroy... 16:45:20 20 MR. CHIAO: Thanks, Norm. I'd just 16:45:20 21 like to say what a great honor it is for me to 16:45:22 22 serve on this commission, and like my fellow 16:45:25 378 1 committee members, I take my responsibilities 16:45:28 2 very seriously and intend to do the best job I 16:45:30 3 can to help move the process forward. 16:45:34 4 It really touches me to see all of the 16:45:37 5 folks that came out, people who took time off of 16:45:37 6 their jobs, people who made a special trip out 16:45:40 7 to D.C. to participate in the meeting today and 16:45:42 8 stayed all day really -- I'm also impressed with 16:45:46 9 people who've come out and made bold 16:45:47 10 presentations and statements. 16:45:49 11 And, you know, it just shows that 16:45:50 12 people do care about space in this country, and 16:45:53 13 I think this commission will play an important 16:45:57 14 role in ensuring that this country continues to 16:45:59 15 be a leader in human space flight. 16:46:02 16 So thank you all for coming. 16:46:03 17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Ed... 16:46:09 18 DR. CRAWLEY: The task we have before 16:46:10 19 us is, I think, pretty important, and I think I 16:46:13 20 want to assure all of you listening today that 16:46:16 21 we really understand that deeply. 16:46:18 22 The previous NASA administrator said 16:46:22 379 1 on a number of occasions that the main task of 16:46:25 2 his administration was to get the first launch 16:46:28 3 vehicle rolling and get the first spacecraft 16:46:31 4 rolling and basically the rest of the program 16:46:35 5 was budget ahead of us and payload on top and 16:46:38 6 that it would, in fact, be the responsibility of 16:46:42 7 the next -- now current -- administration to 16:46:45 8 really decide where we were going to go beyond 16:46:47 9 low Earth orbit and how we were going to get 16:46:52 10 there other than with the launch systems and 16:46:54 11 first spacecraft. 16:46:56 12 And I think that we're at a time and 16:46:57 13 place in history where the recommendations of 16:46:59 14 this panel, as we heard from the elected 16:47:02 15 representative of the people this morning, will 16:47:05 16 really be listened to, and we take that 16:47:07 17 responsibility with great seriousness. 16:47:09 18 Someone referenced previous studies. 16:47:13 19 Norm has chaired these studies before. Sally 16:47:16 20 was on both of the accident investigation 16:47:20 21 boards, Columbia and Challenger. I happened to 16:47:25 22 be on the -- 16 years ago when the Space Station 16:47:28 380 1 study that was begun in the first year in the 16:47:31 2 Clinton Administration, called the BEST report, 16:47:33 3 and one of the outcomes of that report was a 16:47:37 4 decision to move the Space Station to 16:47:40 5 51.5 degrees orbital inclination and invite the 16:47:42 6 Russians to participate. 16:47:47 7 On the morning -- on the day when 16:47:48 8 Columbia was tragically lost, I had one warm 16:47:50 9 feeling in my heart that the astronauts who were 16:47:56 10 then on orbit would not be because of the 16:47:59 11 recommendation of that committee. 16:48:02 12 So these committees do, in fact, 16:48:05 13 sometimes change history, and I think we're in a 16:48:08 14 position to do that at this time. 16:48:11 15 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you, Ed. 16:48:11 16 Chris... 16:48:16 17 MR. CHYBA: Thank you. First, I'd 16:48:16 18 like to thank the chairman and my co-panelist 16:48:17 19 and the presenters today, but above all, the 16:48:21 20 members of the public who gave us their views. 16:48:23 21 Our responsibility as a committee, 16:48:28 22 Mr. Chairman, I believe is to look at a set of 16:48:30 381 1 options and present -- look at a very wide set 16:48:32 2 of options and present a somewhat winnowed down 16:48:35 3 set of options to the White House and NASA, also 16:48:39 4 to Congress and to the public. 16:48:43 5 I think it's important for us to look 16:48:45 6 across a very wide number of options and to be 16:48:48 7 very clear what the choices are, what the 16:48:52 8 choices are with respect to the goals -- those 16:48:55 9 options may have different goals that imply 16:48:57 10 different destinations -- what the choices mean 16:49:01 11 for national infrastructures and capabilities, 16:49:04 12 what the choices mean for the time scale, how 16:49:06 13 soon we will be doing different things and what 16:49:10 14 the realistic budget requirements for those 16:49:10 15 different options are. 16:49:19 16 And ultimately the choice is not going 16:49:19 17 to be made by this group, of course; it's going 16:49:19 18 to be made by an elaborate dance between the 16:49:21 19 Executive and Legislative Branches and 16:49:23 20 ultimately the American public. 16:49:26 21 Our job, I think, is to queue up the 16:49:28 22 options as clearly as we can so that the people, 16:49:31 382 1 through their representatives, can choose. 16:49:33 2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you. I 16:49:37 3 guess I would just observe that my small 16:49:39 4 grandchildren, the two things that I think 16:49:41 5 excite them the most are space and dinosaurs, 16:49:44 6 and we're very short on dinosaurs. 16:49:47 7 So thank you very much. 16:49:52 8 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned 16:49:52 9 at 4:50 p.m.) 16:49:52 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 383 1 16:49:52 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22